INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING

THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(CROATIA v. SERBIA)

REPLY

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

VOLUME 4

ANNEXES 44 – 115

20 DECEMBER 2010

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LIST OF EXHUMED BODIES FOR ADDITIONAL SITES

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	FATHER'S NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF EXHUMATION	DATE OF EXHUMATION		INDIVIDUAL /MASS GRAVES
EASTERN SLAVONIA								
1.	IVŠAN	Ljubica	Vinko	1.3.1925	ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY LOCATION 2	25.04.1997		MASS GRAVE
2.	KUKEC	Lina	Đuro	5.11.1926	ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY LOCATION 2	25.04.1997		MASS GRAVE
3.	MORŽAN	Stevo	Stjepan	22.6.1955	ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY LOCATION 2	25.04.1997		MASS GRAVE
4.	UNKNOWN				ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY LOCATION 2	25.04.1997		MASS GRAVE
5.	UNKNOWN				ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY LOCATION 2	25.04.1997		MASS GRAVE
6.	GROFEC	Ruža	Ivan	14.01.1930.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 1	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
7.	JUMIĆ	Ivan	Mirko	31.08.1947.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 1	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
8.	LILEK	Ivan	Ivan	18.02.1938.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 1	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
9.	NAĐ	Stevan	Ištvan	05.05.1939.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 1	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
10.	VLAHOVIĆ	Anđa	Jozo	01.01.1944.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 1	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
11.	BRDARIĆ	Adam	Stipo	01.01.1929.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 2	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
12.	BRDARIĆ	Marta	Pavo	01.01.1934.	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 2	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
13.	ŠARAC	Pavao	Marko	3.12.1931	BELI MANASTIR, CATHOLIC CEMETERY LOCATION 2	15.04.1998		MASS GRAVE
14.	BANOVIĆ	Manda	Pero	11.05.1938.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998		MASS GRAVE
15.	FUČEK	Franjo	Josip	29.08.1927.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998		MASS

							GRAVE
16.	GOTOVAC	Andrija	Nedeljko	18.05.1959.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
17.	GOTOVAC	Nedeljko	Andrija	18.03.1928.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
18.	GOTOVAC	Elbehindbeta	Mato	05.05.1926.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
19.	KNEŽEVIĆ	Marko	Marijan	12.06.1932.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
20.	KNEŽEVIĆ	Mara	Pero	23.04.1934.	BETIN DVOR	26.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
21.	GETO	Stjepan	Stevan	31.5.1947	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
22.	MAJSAN	Ivan	Mijo	25.5.1956	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
23.	MAJSAN	Josip	Mijo	24.1.1958	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
24.	ORĐAN	Šandor		25.3.1925	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
25.	ŠAJTOŠ	Ivan	Šandor	26.3.1928	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
26.	URBANOVIĆ	Kristina	Janez	9.7.1924	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
27.	URBANOVIĆ	Ljudevit		27.4.1927	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
28.	BATKI	Andraš		22.10.1940	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
29.	BATKI	Katalin		6.7.1936	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
30.	NEMET	Marija		11.11.1909	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
31.	BAGARIĆ	Metod	Ivan	3.7.1933	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
32.	DORIĆ	Edvard	Franjo	1.10.1932	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE

33.	FEHER	Borbala		6.12.1943	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
34.	FEHER	Josip		9.8.1945	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
35.	MALOBABIĆ	Marija	Ivan	18.6.1943	BILJE, CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	21.08.1997	MASS GRAVE
36.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
37.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
38.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
39.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
40.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
41.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
42.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, WELL	22.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
43.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, ŽARKOVAC 167	02.02.1999	MASS GRAVE
44.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, ŽARKOVAC 167	02.02.1999	MASS GRAVE
45.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, ŽARKOVAC 167	02.02.1999	MASS GRAVE
46.	KOCKAR	Pavo	Ilija	3.9.1932	ERNESTINOVO, PARK	24.04.1997	MASS GRAVE
47.	KOCKAR	Josip	Pavo	13.5.1964	ERNESTINOVO, PARK	24.04.1997	MASS GRAVE
48.	KOCKAR	Snježana	Filip	14.7.1969	ERNESTINOVO, PARK	24.04.1997	MASS GRAVE
49.	KRSTIĆ	Željko	Tomislav	17.7.1972	ERNESTINOVO, PARK	24.04.1997	MASS GRAVE
50.	ROMIĆ	Drago	Mirko	30.10.1943	ERNESTINOVO, PARK	24.04.1997	MASS

							GRAVE
51.	BAŠURIĆ	Zdenko	Marijan	16.4.1962	MARINOVCI, FARM	26.03.1997	MASS GRAVE
52.	ČALUŠIĆ	Franjo	Filip	9.9.1955	MARINOVCI, FARM	26.03.1997	MASS GRAVE
53.	HERTARIĆ	Željko	Josip	3.5.1960	MARINOVCI, FARM	26.03.1997	MASS GRAVE
54.	STEPIĆ	Zdenko	Zvonimir	27.8.1968	MARINOVCI, FARM	26.03.1997	MASS GRAVE
55.	DUJMOVIĆ	Emil			ORLOVNJAK, FARM	18.02.1997	MASS GRAVE
56.	KIŠUREK	Darko	Andrija	25.9.1972	ORLOVNJAK, FARM	18.02.1997	MASS GRAVE
57.	ŠKLEBEK	Mato	Franjo	12.2.1943	ORLOVNJAK, FARM	18.02.1997	MASS GRAVE
58.	SVALINA	Olga			ALJMAŠ, CEMETERY	14.10.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
59.	UNKNOWN				ALJMAŠ, CATHOLIC CEMETERY	23.10.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
60.	KOMPANJEC	Milenko	Todor	8.3.1960	ALJMAŠ, CATHOLIC CEMETERY	26.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
61.	BOROTA	Ilija	Teodor	1.1.1925	ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY Lok 1	25.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
62.	UNKNOWN				ANTUNOVAC, CEMETERY Lok 1	25.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
63.	MIKULIĆ	Božidar	Petar	21.07.1958.	ANTUNOVAC	9.3.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
64.	UNKNOWN				ANTUNOVAC, LOCAL CEMETERY	3.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
65.	ŠARAC	Pavo	Stjepan	21.02.1935.	BARANJSKO PETROVO SELO	20.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
66.	GRLADINOVIĆ	Janja			BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 10	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
67.	GRLADINOVIĆ	Mato	Luka	30.11.1930.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 9	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

68.	LALIĆ	Đuro	Andrija	11.04.1931.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 7	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
69.	MATIJA	Stjepan			BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 11	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
70.	MESARIĆ	Vlado			BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 5	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
71.	UNKNOWN				BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 3	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
72.	UNKNOWN				BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 3	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
73.	UNKNOWN				BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 4	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
74.	SPAHIĆ	Jasmin	Husnija	16.04.1972.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 8	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
75.	TOMAŠEK	Josip			BELI MANASTIR, LOCATION 6	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
76.	ANDRIĆ	Marko	Kuzman	14.07.1921.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 5	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
77.	ANDRIĆ	Marta	Tado	26.11.1925.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 5	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
78.	BARIĆ	Adam	Vinko	19.07.1914.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION4	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
79.	SKELEDŽIJA	Stipo	Adam	22.07.1942.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION2	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
80.	STRAHIJA	Marija	Franjo	01.01.1938.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 3	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
81.	VADLJA	Dorotea	Blaž	01.01.1913.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 1	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
82.	ŠAGI	Anton	Antun	17.05.1948.	BELI MANASTIR, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 12	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
83.	MIKOLAŠ	Mato	Đuro	25.12.1931.	BETIN DVOR, LOCATION 5	26.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
84.	RAKUŠA	Željko	Antun	01.01.1944.	BETIN DVOR, LOCATION 7	26.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
85.	ŠMIT	Terezija		24.6.1926	BIJELO HILL	24.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
86.	KRALJEVIĆ	Hrvoje	Krunoslav	6.5.1972	BILJE, CEMETERY	21.8.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
87.	STRMEČKI	Ivan		15.5.1928	BILJE, CEMETERY	21.8.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
88.	UNKNOWN				ČEMINAC, LOCAL CEMETERY	27.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
89.	BANIĆ	Josip	Ćiril	18.11.1942.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 5	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
90.	BOŠNJAK	Pavle	Pero	06.05.1948.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 4	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
91.	ČANKOVIĆ	Bogdanka	Bogdan	11.11.1961.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 2	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
92.	ČANKOVIĆ	Gordana	Petar	18.11.1986.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 2	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
93.	ČAVLEK	Mato	Mato	08.10.1949.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 6	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
94.	GERENČIR	Željko	Martin	29.05.1959.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 10	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
95.	GREGORAN	Kazimir	Gabrijel	23.02.1934.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
96.	STRMEČKI	Branko	Slavko	14.09.1949	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
97.	RAŠIĆ	Anđa	Mato	08.02.1952.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 8	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
98.	RAŠIĆ	Gordana	Pero	12.10.1971.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 7	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
99.	ŠTOKOM	Zvonimir	Ivan	10.11.1935.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 9	4.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
100.	KENJVAŠO	Šimon laslo		14.01.1945.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	5.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
101.	PRIBILIĆ	Stjepan	Martin	29.04.1930.	DARDA, LOCAL CEMETERY, LOCATION 1	5.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
102.	UNKNOWN				ĐAKOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY, L2-5-18-7	5.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

103.	UNKNOWN				ERDUT, LOCAL CEMETERY	28.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
104.	ŠIMUNOVIĆ	Marijan	Antun	13.4.1948	ERDUT, CATHOLIC CEMETERY, LOK 1	14.12.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
105.	BAČIĆ	Tomislav	Josip	19.10.1973	ERNESTINOVO, LOCATION 5 POLJSKI PUT	24.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
106.	PRGOMET	Marko	Mijo	2.7.1968	ERNESTINOVO, LOCATION 4	24.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
107.	STARČEVIĆ	Drago	Mirko	8.3.1969	ERNESTINOVO, LOCATION 4	24.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
108.	ROGULJIĆ	Vlado	Marijan	4.7.1960	ERNESTINOVO, NEAR SCALE	25.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
109.	MARINKOVIĆ	Branko			ERNESTINOVO	19.8.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
110.	UZELAC	Sofija			ERNESTINOVO, ŠKOLSKA 10	19.8.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
111.	UNKNOWN				ERNESTINOVO, FIELD SRAKA	14.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
112.	UNKNOWN				ERNESTINOVO, FIELD SRAKA	14.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
113.	UNKNOWN				ERNESTINOVO, FIELD SRAKA	14.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
114.	ŠKVORC	Mihael	Josip	30.09.1944.	KNEŽEVI VINOGRADI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION6	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
115.	ŠKVORC	Katica	Marko	13.09.1943.	KNEŽEVI VINOGRADI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION6	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
116.	LONČAREK	Josip	Ignacije	13.12.1959	KOZARAC, LOCAL CEMETERY	4.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
117.	DEVETAK	Dragan	Aleksandar	14.11.1970	LASLOVO	25.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
118.	EĐEDI	Janoš	Janoš	27.11.1963.	LASLOVO, P. ŠANDORA 45	23.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
119.	HORVAT	Lajoš	Lajoš	21.08.1943.	LUG	16.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
120.	BARTOLOVIĆ	Stjepan	Adam	1.10.1939	ORLOVNJAK, FARM	18.2.1997	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
121.	GAJČIĆ	Milan	Dušan	24.11.1963	ORLOVNJAK, FARM	18.2.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
122.	VUKAJLOVIĆ	Svetislav	Milivoj	24.05.1929.	OSIJEK, CENTRAL CEMETERY	27.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
123.	UNKNOWN				OSIJEK, RIVER DRAVA NEAR PODRAVLJE	24.7.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
124.	LAPČEVIĆ	Milka	Petar	1.1.1910	OSIJEK, CENTRAL CEMETERY	17.6.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
125.	UNKNOWN				OSIJEK, CENTRAL CEMETERY, C/11/9	4.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
126.	UNKNOWN				OSIJEK, CENTRAL CEMETERY, C/12/5	4.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
127.	UNKNOWN				OSIJEK, CENTRAL CEMETERY, C/12/2	4.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
128.	BOJANIĆ	Melanija	Miloja	24.06.1927.	SARVAŠ, ORTODOX CEMETERY, LOCATION 7	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
129.	JERENIĆ	Lazar	Milenko	15.10.1954.	SARVAŠ, ORTODOX CEMETERY, LOCATION 8	3.11.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
130.	KOLENIK	Branko	Dragutin	10.02.1957	SARVAŠ, LJUBAVNI PUT, LOCATION 2	30.3.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
131.	DORIĆ	Danijel	Ivan		SELEŠ	3.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
132.	PERIĆ	Stjepan	Stjepan	21.7.1962	SELEŠ	3.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
133.	KOVAČIĆ	Slavko	Ivan	18.04.1945.	SELEŠ, NEAR ROAD	14.10.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
134.	HORVAT	Pavo	Stjepan		TORJANCI	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
135.	ANTINAC	Martin	Roka	27.07.1935.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
136.	FLINČEC	Zvonimir	Zvonko	26.10.1943.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
137.	KOTARLIĆ	Josip	Đuro	01.10.1934.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE

138.	KOVAČEVIĆ	Zvonko	Adam	16.2.1935	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
139.	MIHALJEVIĆ	Antun	Pavo	30.05.1942.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
140.	MIKLOŠEVIĆ	Antun	Josip	07.08.1951.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
141.	FARAGO	Iva	Marko	16.2.1930	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
142.	PASTOR	Josip	Ivan	20.07.1945.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
143.	ŠARČEVIĆ	Stjepan	Stjepan	15.06.1936.	ANTIN, CAREV RIBNJAK	22.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
144.	KUĆA	Anđelko	Đuro	04.08.1955.	BRŠADIN	14.05.1998	MASS GRAVE
145.	MILIČEVIĆ	Šimun	Ivan	23.04.1953.	BRŠADIN	14.05.1998	MASS GRAVE
146.	ŠEGO	Ivica	Marijan	13.05.1957.	BRŠADIN	14.05.1998	MASS GRAVE
147.	MATIJAŠEVIĆ	Dominko	Josip	20.5.1942	BRŠADIN, BETWEEN RIVER VUKA AND THE ROAD	21.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
148.	ŠIMIĆ	Kata	Nikola	1.1.1939	BRŠADIN, BETWEEN RIVER VUKA AND THE ROAD	21.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
149.	UNKNOWN				BRŠADIN, BETWEEN RIVER VUKA AND THE ROAD	21.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
150.	MECANOVIĆ	Antun		1.1.1922	CERIĆ, LOCATION 7	11.3.1997	MASS GRAVE
151.	NUIĆ	Ivan	Jure	7.9.1958	CERIĆ, LOCATION 7	11.3.1997	MASS GRAVE
152.	POSAVI	Ivan	Stjepan	5.1.1970	CERIĆ, LOCATION 7	11.3.1997	MASS GRAVE
153.	FARAGO	Stjepan	Stjepan	02.11.1956.	ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS GRAVE
154.	HAJDUK	Slavko	Mihajlo	11.12.1969.	ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS GRAVE
155.	VULIĆ	Nedijeljko	Krsto	21.1.1950	ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS

							GRAVE
156.	SITAŠ	Antun	Imra	02.07.1941.	ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS GRAVE
157.	ŠOLJIĆ	Mijo	Anto	04.05.1945.	ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS GRAVE
158.	UNKNOWN				ČAKOVCI, ŽELJEZNIČK WELL	10.5.1999	MASS GRAVE
159.	ANĐAL	Zoran	Ištvan	31.12.1967.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
160.	BAČIĆ	Stevo	Svetislav	11.12.1949.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
161.	BOGOVIĆ	Franciska	Nikola	17.03.1922.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
162.	FILIPČIĆ	Željko	Vlatko	22.02.1966.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
163.	KUŠIĆ	Darko	Vinko-Zvonimir	26.04.1968.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
164.	PREDOJEVIĆ	Čedomir	Stevo	30.08.1954.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
165.	ŠTNAMEC	Dražen	Zvonko	28.01.1970.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
166.	ZELEMBER	Ivan	Mihalj	20.09.1934.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
167.	ZEMLJAK	Pavo	Roko	14.10.1934.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
168.	ZEMLJAK	Vladimir	Pavo	22.11.1967.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
169.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
170.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
171.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE
172.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, LOCATION 1	23.2.1998	MASS GRAVE

173.	BARBARIĆ	Jakob	Ilija	18.07.1931.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
174.	BENCE	Josip	Andrija	27.01.1925.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
175.	BEREŠ	Pavo	Ljudevit	05.10.1927.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
176.	CURIĆ	Tomo	Ivan	06.04.1937.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
177.	DEBIĆ	Josip	Blaž	09.03.1946.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
178.	KALOZI	Antun	Nikola	15.01.1929.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
179.	KALOZI	Nikola	Nikola	11.12.1952.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
180.	KUĆAN	Ivan	Josip	16.02.1947.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
181.	MIHALJEV	Ivan	Antun	01.01.1955.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
182.	PAP	Mihajlo	Franjo	01.10.1966.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
183.	SENAŠI	Josip	Stjepan	10.03.1967.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
184.	SENAŠI	Stjepan	Stjepan	13.12.1935.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
185.	TOLIĆ	Marko	Mirko	14.1.1932	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
186.	VANIČEK	Josip	Josip	29.08.1951.	ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
187.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
188.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE, BEHIND CATHOLIC CEMENTERY, LOCATION 1	14.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
189.	KIŠ	Petar		29.6.1935	MARINCI, LOCATION 9	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
190.	BUDAČ	Brigita	Ivan	2.10.1952	MARINCI, LOCATION 9	13.02.1998	MASS

							GRAVE
191.	BUDAČ	Ivica	Andrija	18.5.1919	MARINCI, LOCATION 9	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
192.	BUDAČ	Marija	Mijo	25.5.1923	MARINCI, LOCATION 9	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
193.	KRUPICA	Rozalija	Đuro	12.5.1922	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
194.	KVAKA	Andrija			MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
195.	KVAKA	Pavo		28.6.1930	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
196.	NOVAK	Karlo	Martin	10.5.1919	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
197.	OROZ	Ivan	Josip	25.10.1920	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
198.	OROZ	Rozalija	Stjepan	24.4.1927	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	13.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
199.	ČERNOK	Igor	Ivan	16.8.1977	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
200.	SEKIĆ	Drago	Ivo	25.7.1965	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
201.	ZRNIĆ	Ivica	Andrija	23.12.1963	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
202.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, LOCATION 1	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
203.	VESTIĆ	Josip	Franjo	19.8.1926	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
204.	KUNTIĆ	Josip		30.7.1932	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
205.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, LOCATION 2	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
206.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, LOCATION 2	16.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
207.	HOLIK	Julian	Kiril	29.03.1928.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.04.1999	MASS GRAVE

208.	HOLIK	Mihajlo	Julijan	01.01.1949.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
209.	HOLIK	Veronika	Snameon	30.06.1925.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.04.1999	MASS GRAVE
210.	MATIJEVIĆ	Ana	Niko	2.2.1932	MOHOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY	30.01.1998	MASS GRAVE
211.	MATIJEVIĆ	Franjo	Jozo	10.5.1975	MOHOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY	30.01.1998	MASS GRAVE
212.	MATIJEVIĆ	Jozo	Tado	1.3.1931	MOHOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY	30.01.1998	MASS GRAVE
213.	UNKNOWN				MOHOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY	30.01.1998	MASS GRAVE
214.	DRVODERIĆ	Irena	Karol	19.12.1916.	NEGOSLAVCI, CEMETERY	09.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
215.	MAĐAREVIĆ	Marin	Bariša	5.1.1928	NEGOSLAVCI, CEMETERY	09.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
216.	PALAHINJAK	Zlatko	Josip	20.04.1973.	NEGOSLAVCI, CEMETERY	09.10.1998	MASS GRAVE
217.	MIJATOVIĆ	Mato	Ilija	21.03.1955.	NEGOSLAVCI, POND	12.05.1999	MASS GRAVE
218.	TOMIĆ	Luca	Mato	21.05.1946.	NEGOSLAVCI, POND	12.05.1999	MASS GRAVE
219.	TOMIĆ	Mato	Anto	09.02.1945.	NEGOSLAVCI, POND	12.05.1999	MASS GRAVE
220.	BLAZINIĆ	Franjo	Stjepan	26.3.1937	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
221.	IŽAKOVIĆ-LEMUNOVIĆ	Ljubica-željka	Vinko	18.4.1947	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
222.	JELENIĆ	Milan	Petar	6.1.1916	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
223.	KOVAČEVIĆ	Damir	Milan	2.6.1964	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
224.	MARINČIĆ	Marijan	Josip	15.7.1930	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
225.	MITROVIĆ	Marin	Đuka	28.2.1953	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS

							GRAVE
226.	PENAVIĆ	Bartol	Ivan	16.6.1937	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
227.	PENAVIĆ	Dragutin	Petar	12.8.1945	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
228.	TEREK	Rudolf	Mihajlo	19.2.1943	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
229.	VRANČIĆ	Eva	Stjepan	1.8.1915	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
230.	VRANČIĆ	Marko	Mato	16.10.1934	NEGOSLAVCI, SWAMP	24.09.2003	MASS GRAVE
231.	DIKONIĆ	Kata		68 years old	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 2A,	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
232.	LUČIĆ	Franjo		28.09.1914.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 2A,	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
233.	LUČIĆ	Ana		23.04.1915.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 2A,	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
234.	BUDEŠ	Cvitko	Anto	3.4.1957	PETROVCI, CEMETERY	08.12.1997	MASS GRAVE
235.	HUDAK	Željko	Eugen	8.1.1957	PETROVCI, CEMETERY	08.12.1997	MASS GRAVE
236.	MARIČAK	Zdravko	Ivan	27.2.1955	PETROVCI, CEMETERY	08.12.1997	MASS GRAVE
237.	MARJANOVIĆ	Stipo	Ignac	30.8.1949	PETROVCI, CEMETERY	08.12.1997	MASS GRAVE
238.	JAGARIĆ	Slavko		72 years old	SLAKOVCI, LOCATION 3	16.10.1997	MASS GRAVE
239.	MARIĆ	Mato		48 years old	SLAKOVCI, LOCATION 3	16.10.1997	MASS GRAVE
240.	VUKOVIĆ	Petar		61 years old	SLAKOVCI, LOCATION 3	16.10.1997	MASS GRAVE
241.	GONAN	Slavica			STARI JANKOVCI, B. RADIĆA 45	03.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
242.	JURAŠIĆ	Pejo			STARI JANKOVCI, B. RADIĆA 45	03.09.1997	MASS GRAVE

243.	KRIŽANOVIĆ	Nada			STARI JANKOVCI, B. RADIĆA 45	03.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
244.	PANENIĆ	Alojzije	Mijo	17.7.1946	STARI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 1	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
245.	PANENIĆ	Katica	Antun	22.2.1949	STARI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 1	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
246.	PANENIĆ	Vjekoslav	Alojzije	5.6.1970	STARI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 1	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
247.	SUNDAREVIĆ	Marija	Ilija	1.1.1924	STARI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 1	19.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
248.	IVIĆ	Marin	Marko	31.01.1937.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 7	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
249.	IVIĆ	Stjepan	Marko	01.06.1927.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 7	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
250.	JAGRIĆ	Zdenka	Ilija	28.09.1965.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 7	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
251.	KOVAČ	Kata	Marijan	20.12.1923.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 5	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
252.	KOVAČ	Antun		01.05.1921.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 5	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
253.	TOLIĆ	Juro	Ivo	21.05.1926.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 5	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
254.	JAGRIĆ	Damir	Ivan	21.09.1963.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 1	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
255.	MARINKOVIĆ	Marin	Stanko	08.03.1923.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 1	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
256.	PASTOVIĆ	Mato	Josip	03.09.1956.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 1	20.02.1998	MASS GRAVE
257.	KOVAČEVIĆ	Pavo	Ignjac	14.09.1950.	ANTIN	22.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
258.	LUKADINOVIĆ	Andrija	Mladen	12.11.1917	ANTIN, LOCAL CEMETERY	22.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
259.	ČOLIĆ	Mato	Ivan	1.1.1950	APŠEVCI, CEMETERY	5.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
260.	KNEŽEVIĆ	Marko			APŠEVCI, BOSUT	5.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
261.	MIKINAC	Marijan		9.9.1909	APŠEVCI, KRALJA TOMISLAVA 1	5.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
262.	VUIĆ	Jakob	Luka	17.3.1936	APŠEVCI, CEMETERY	5.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
263.	BUŠIĆ	Antun	Ivan	5.6.1961	APŠEVCI, BOSUT- DUBOVICA	2.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
264.	MOGOŠ	Ivan	Marko	9.1.1948	APŠEVCI	2.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
265.	PLAVŠIĆ	Jakob	Mato	17.11.1935.	APŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	15.5.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
266.	JAKIRČEVIĆ	Dragan	Ivan	20.04.1957	BOBOTA, MRCINIŠTE	2.3.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
267.	KOVAČIĆ	Vinko	Vinko	28.05.1918.	BOKŠIĆ, LOCAL CEMETERY	10.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
268.	KOVAČIĆ	Ana	Mijo	26.09.1926.	BOKŠIĆ, LOCAL CEMETERY	10.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
269.	ŠIJAKOVIĆ	Elbehindbeta	Josip	02.11.1943.	BRŠADIN	11.10.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
270.	ŠIJAKOVIĆ	Franjo	Ivan	12.07.1934.	BRŠADIN	11.10.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
271.	UNKNOWN			19.9.1943	BRŠADIN, LOCAL CEMETERY	9.11.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
272.	UNKNOWN				BRŠADIN, 200 M BEFORE TRUN TO PAČETIN	10.12.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
273.	KLJUNIĆ	Marko	Martin	3.3.1919	CERIĆ	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
274.	MARINKOVIĆ	Martin	Luka	3.5.1951	CERIĆ	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
275.	MILEŠIĆ	Stjepan	Đuro	29.12.1925	CERIĆ, LOK 3	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
276.	MRAVLINČIĆ	Slavko	Mijo	5.9.1929	CERIĆ	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
277.	PEIĆ	Marija		1.1.1905	CERIĆ, LOK 3	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

278.	PERIĆ	Anto		1.1.1927	CERIĆ, LOK 12	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
279.	RADIĆ	Mato	Ivan	8.1.1959	CERIĆ, LOK 12	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
280.	SALAK	Pero	Janko	13.7.1924	CERIĆ, LOK 5	11.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
281.	ĐUROVIĆ	Marko			CERIĆ, LOK 12	12.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
282.	SENTE	Franjo	Ladislav	10.6.1940	CERIĆ, LOK 8	12.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
283.	ŠEREMET	Ljupko	Tomo	19.4.1940	CERIĆ	12.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
284.	VRKIĆ	Željko	Alojzije	9.2.1970	CERIĆ, GRAVEL	14.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
285.	MAROŠ	Petar	Ivan	30.06.1936.	CERIĆ, S. RADIĆA 63	23.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
286.	REŠETAR	Branko	Ivan	29.11.1959.	CERIĆ, NEAR ROAD	23.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
287.	PUŠKARIĆ	Josip	Mile	04.05.1925.	CERIĆ, B.J. JELAČIĆA 18	2.3.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
288.	MAJHEN	Stjepan	Mato	04.12.1924.	CERIĆ, A. STEPINCA 1	7.11.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
289.	VRKIĆ	Alojzije	Jure	16.1.1941	CERIĆ, NEAR TELEPHONE EXCHANGE	13.11.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
290.	UNKNOWN				CERIĆ, NEAR TELEPHONE EXCHANGE	13.11.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
291.	UNKNOWN				CERIĆ, BRIZINA FIELD	14.9.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
292.	KARAGIĆ	Ivan	Josip	16.09.1913.	ČAKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 5	6.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
293.	KOVAČ	Franjo	Franjo	08.01.1921.	ČAKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 1	6.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
294.	LUČIĆ	Lucija	Ilija	15.04.1924.	ČAKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION 2	6.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
295.	LUČIĆ	Vinko	Marko	05.04.1924.	ČAKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.5.1999	INDIVIDUAL

					LOCATION 2		GRAVE
296.	IBRIĆ	Mehmed	Osman	25.6.1935	ĆELIJE, LOK 2	23.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
297.	PLETEŠ	Marijan	Franjo	20.08.1963.	ĆELIJE, LOK 2	23.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
298.	ŠARIĆ	Jure	Ivan	11.05.1927.	ĆELIJE, ZAGORSKA bb	23.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
299.	UNKNOWN				ĆELIJE	24.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
300.	TOPALOVIĆ	Tomas	Pero	05.01.1977.	ĆELIJE, LOCATION 6	25.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
301.	BOŽANIĆ	Nikša	Miho	09.10.1962.	DONJE NOVO SELO, CANAL NEAR SALA	14.6.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
302.	KATONA	Janko	Stjepan	13.10.1910	ĐELETOVCI	20.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
303.	PETEJ	Andrija	Antun	30.11.1928	ĐELETOVCI	20.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
304.	TREML	Dragutin		93 god.	ĐELETOVCI	20.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
305.	KOVAČ	Stjepan	Josip	11.11.1931.	ĐELETOVCI, B. RADIĆA 8	23.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
306.	UNKNOWN				ĐELETOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	29.5.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
307.	UNKNOWN				ĐELETOVCI, J.B. JELAČIĆA 46	2.6.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
308.	UNKNOWN				ĐELETOVCI, NEAR RAILROAD	9.12.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
309.	ĐEREK	Ivan	Martin	16.11.1959.	HENRIKOVCI-CERIĆ, FARM	24.3.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
310.	PERKOVIĆ	Miroslav	Mirko	07.01.1942.	HENRIKOVCI-CERIĆ, FARM	24.3.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
311.	RAJKOVIĆ	Josip	Tomo	14.08.1954.	HENRIKOVCI-CERIĆ, FARM	24.3.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
312.	BALIČEVIĆ	Ilija	Ivan	24.6.1948	ILAČA, LOCATION4	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

313.	BALIĆ	Đuro	Martin	17.7.1945	ILAČA, LOCATION3	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
314.	BOŽIĆ	Josip	Antun	16.5.1971	ILAČA, LOCATION1	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
315.	GLAVAŠ	Rafael	Jozo	16.1.1921	ILAČA, LOCATION2	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
316.	KOLAREVIĆ	Vinka	Andrija	8.3.1937	ILAČA, LOCATION5	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
317.	KORNET	Marijan	Ivan	25.3.1962	ILAČA, LOCATION1A	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
318.	MOČILJANIN	Robert	Vinko	19.7.1970	ILAČA, LOCATION1B	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
319.	PETRIČEVIĆ	Manda	Mato	14.4.1918	ILAČA, LOCATION5	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
320.	VIDAČEK	Dragutin	Stjepan	4.4.1932	ILAČA, LOCATION4	19.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
321.	KRALJ	Ivan		4.7.1919	ILAČA, LOCATION2	20.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
322.	PERKUNIĆ	Berta			ILAČA, LOCATION1	20.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
323.	PETRIČEVIĆ	Bartol	Marko	09.01.1944.	ILAČA, STARA ILAČA	29.5.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
324.	MAJNOVIĆ	Mato	Mata	15.3.1915	ILAČA, LOCAL CEMETERY	12.11.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
325.	UNKNOWN				JARMINA, FIELD KAMENICA	29.6.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
326.	UNKNOWN				JARMINA, FIELD KAMENICA	29.6.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
327.	UNKNOWN				JARMINA, FIELD KAMENICA	25.11.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
328.	KOS	Branko	Petar	05.05.1964.	KARAĐIČEVO	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
329.	MIŠKIĆ	Miro	Anto	31.03.1965.	KARAĐIČEVO	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
330.	MUDROVČIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	23.11.1955.	KARAĐIČEVO	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
331.	PONGRAC	Željko	Ivan	24.10.1964.	KARAĐIČEVO	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
332.	SUŠAK	Tomislav	Ivan	03.03.1958.	KARAĐIČEVO	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
333.	ĐEKE	Josip	Ral	18.01.1937.	KOROG, P. ŠANDORA 8	21.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
334.	SANKI-SEKEREŠ	Janoš	Janoš	23.09.1920.	KOROG, LOCAL CEMETERY	21.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
335.	UNKNOWN				LIPOVAC, LJUDEVITA GAJA 26,	2.6.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
336.	KUNAC	Ivan	Lovro	21.05.1937.	LIPOVAČA	26.6.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
337.	HRGOVIĆ	Danica-marija		03.11.1913.	LIPOVAČA, LOCAL CEMETERY	4.10.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
338.	MARUŠIĆ	Petar	Franjo	12.11.1935.	LIPOVAČA, LOCAL CEMETERY	16.5.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
339.	LONČAR	Branislav	Ivan	07.01.1960	LIPOVAČA, NEAR BOBOTSKI CANAL	10.4.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
340.	OŽEGOVIĆ	Damir	Damjan	23.05.1968.	MARINCI	30.3.1992	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
341.	BOŠKOVIĆ	Ivica	Boško	18.1.1961	MARINCI, LOCATION 8	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
342.	KUNTIĆ	Antun		14.7.1944	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
343.	MARKOVIĆ	Nikola		2.4.1926	MARINCI, LOCATION 6	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
344.	PERIĆ	Milica	Šimun	3.5.1928	MARINCI, LOCATION 7	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
345.	PEROLIĆ	Roka	Nikola	6.9.1931	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
346.	PETEJ	Manda		73	MARINCI, LOCATION 10	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
347.	PETEJ	Stjepan		70	MARINCI, LOCATION 10	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

348.	VEGELI	Adam	Pavao	21.5.1915	MARINCI, LOCATION 4	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
349.	VESTIĆ	Josip	Imra	18.5.1937	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	12.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
350.	GUBICA	Ignjac	Petar	7.4.1939	MARINCI, LOCATION 4	13.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
351.	KUDRA	Adam	Ivan	24.12.1961	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	13.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
352.	ANTUNOVIĆ	Zoran	Ivo	22.7.1973	MARINCI, LOCATION 4A	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
353.	DVOJKOVIĆ	Slavica	Marko	4.3.1945	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
354.	KUDRA	Ivan	Ivan	6.5.1933	MARINCI, LOCATION 1	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
355.	MENGES	Goran	Zlatko	10.1.1970	MARINCI, LOCATION 4B	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
356.	PAJIĆ	Tihomir	Bogoljub	10.5.1970	MARINCI, LOCATION 4B	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
357.	PAP	Miroslav	Vladimir	9.6.1948	MARINCI, LOCATION 4C	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
358.	ŠARIĆ	Ante	Pavo	23.9.1974	MARINCI, LOCATION 4A	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
359.	TIŠLJAR	Miroslav	Božo	1.6.1961	MARINCI, LOCATION 2	17.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
360.	GUBICA	Albert	Josip	26.04.1934.	MARINCI, FIELD "KERVEŠ"	25.8.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
361.	POVAŽANJ	Josip	Franjo	14.09.1924.	MARINCI, M. TITA 46	25.8.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
362.	VESTIĆ	Zoltan	Mijo	11.11.1941.	MARINCI, FIELD "KERVEŠ"	25.8.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
363.	BENJAK	Pavao	Andrija	28.06.1931.	MARINCI, VOJNI KANAL LOK 8	7.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
364.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, VOJNI KANAL LOCATION 1	10.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
365.	PAP	Pavo	Andrija	03.09.1934.	MARINCI, VOJNI KANAL LOCATION 1	10.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
366.	MAŽAR	Srečko	Josip	13.01.1972.	MARINCI, A. STEPINCA 96	14.5.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
367.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, FIELD "VODICE"	24.10.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
368.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, FIELD "VODICE"	24.10.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
369.	UNKNOWN				MARINCI, FIELD "VODICE"	24.10.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
370.	STRACENSKI	Marta	Mihal	20.07.1925.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
371.	STRACENSKI	Petar	Petar	24.06.1919.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
372.	ŠIMKO	Nikola	Miron	10.12.1963.	MIKLUŠEVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.4.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
373.	ALIĆ	Andrija	Mirko	29.09.1950.	MIRKOVCI, VIDAŠEVAC	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
374.	ALIĆ	Slavko	Mirko	05.07.1951.	MIRKOVCI, VIDAŠEVAC	26.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
375.	UNKNOWN				MIRKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	16.5.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
376.	UNKNOWN				MIRKOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	29.6.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
377.	UNKNOWN				MIRKOVCI, STREET V.S.KARADŽIĆA 77	9.12.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
378.	UNKNOWN				NEGOSLAVCI, FIELD PARCELA 44 S	10.4.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
379.	UNKNOWN				NEGOSLAVCI, ORTODOX CEMETERY	27.5.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
380.	UNKNOWN				NEGOSLAVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY	22.11.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
381.	BOZANOVIĆ	Ljubica			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
382.	ČIRIĆ	Tadija			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

383.	ĐULABIĆ	Grga			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
384.	ĐULABIĆ	Jelena			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
385.	ĐURAŠEVIĆ	Mato	Antun		NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
386.	LANDEKA	Ruža			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
387.	LOVRETIĆ	Ilija	Ilija	30.3.1919	NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
388.	MEHANDŽIĆ	Stjepan	Antun	1.1.1913	NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
389.	MRKONJIĆ	Marica			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
390.	NIKOLIĆ	Manda			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
391.	OSTOVIĆ	Mara			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
392.	OSTOVIĆ	Matija			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
393.	PERICA	Katica			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
394.	TERZIĆ	Cecilija			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
395.	TERZIĆ	Mirko			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
396.	ZVONAREVIĆ	Stjepan			NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	19.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
397.	ĐURAŠEVIĆ	Manda	Petar	1.1.1915	NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	20.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
398.	KORMOŠ	Slavko	Đuro	6.10.1949	NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	20.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
399.	RAJKOVIĆ	Ana			NIJEMCI, MATIJE GUPCA 62 STREET	20.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
400.	SVITLANOVIĆ	Antun	Luka	11.12.1958	NIJEMCI, CEMETERY	12.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
401.	UNKNOWN				NIJEMCI, K. KREŠIMIRA 15 STREET	2.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
402.	SUBOTIĆ	Stjepan	Andrija	15.9.1928	NIJEMCI, KBR 65	9.12.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
403.	SAMARDŽIJA	Mijo			NIJEMCI, BANA J. JELAČIĆA KBR 5	10.6.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
404.	MEHANDŽIĆ	Martin	Emerik	29.09.1912.	NIJEMCI, A. STARČEVIĆA bb	20.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
405.	UNKNOWN				NIJEMCI, BANA J. JELAČIĆA bb	28.4.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
406.	UNKNOWN				NIJEMCI, BANA J. JELAČIĆA 1b	28.4.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
407.	BOŽIĆ	Marko	Božo	08.03.1969.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 2	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
408.	DIKONIĆ	Stana		80	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 5	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
409.	GALIJAŠEVIĆ	Ferid	Osman	16.03.1963.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 6	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
410.	GRAOVAC	Luka	Marko	16.04.1931.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 4	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
411.	JELKIĆ	Nikola	Niko	18.04.1963.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 7	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
412.	JOSIPOVIĆ	Slavko	Marijan	26.09.1936.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 3	19.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
413.	TANJGA	Ivka	Tomo	18.09.1925.	NOVI JANKOVCI, LOCATION 2	4.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
414.	UNKNOWN				NOVO SELO, MARŠALA TITA 182	20.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
415.	SERDAR	Dragan	Stevan	11.4.1941	OPATOVAC, CATHOLIC CEMETERY	9.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
416.	MAČVANIN	Marica	Mato	25.6.1926	OROLIK, LOK 1	27.1.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
417.	UNKNOWN				PAČETIN, FIELD KEVEŽDIN	18.10.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

418.	KOROV	Petar	Karlo	14.3.1966	PAČETIN, DISTRICT "GRADINA UZ VUKU	25.10.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
419.	UNKNOWN				PETROVCI, NEAR POND	2.10.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
420.	ČOLAKOVIĆ	Ilija			PODGRAĐE, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
421.	FLANJAK	Stjepan			PODGRAĐE, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
422.	GRGIĆ	Ana			PODGRAĐE, MATIJE GUPCA 1	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
423.	MATIĆ	Josip			PODGRAĐE, M. TITA 87	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
424.	MESIĆ	Marija			PODGRAĐE, M. TITA 67	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
425.	ŽIDO	Ana			PODGRAĐE, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
426.	FRANK	Ivan	Josip	1.1.1927	PODGRAĐE	2.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
427.	ĆUTUK	Miljenko	Mate		PRIVLAKA	16.3.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
428.	ALADIĆ	Antun	Petar	28.10.1957	SLAKOVCI	16.10.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
429.	ĆOSIĆ	Ivan	Josip		SLAKOVCI	16.10.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
430.	FILAKOVIĆ	Marija		81god.	SLAKOVCI	16.10.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
431.	ŠOKČEVIĆ	Joza		73 god.	SLAKOVCI	16.10.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
432.	GAVRIĆ	Đorđe			SOPOT, AGRICULTURAL REGION SOPOT	12.3.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
433.	GAVRIĆ	Nenad			SOPOT, AGRICULTURAL REGION SOPOT	12.3.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
434.	UNKNOWN				SOPOT, AGRICULTURAL REGION SOPOT	12.3.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
435.	UNKNOWN				SOPOT, AGRICULTURAL REGION	12.3.2007	INDIVIDUAL

					SOPOT		GRAVE
436.	BOŽIĆ	Manda	Tadija	1913	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 3	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
437.	IVANOVAC	Marin		1937	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 2	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
438.	IVANOVAC	Stanka		1939	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 2	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
439.	RAMLJAK	Franjo	Tomo	07.09.1923.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 8	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
440.	ZULIĆ	Ivan		08.07.1940.	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 4	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
441.	ZULIĆ	Marija		52 years old	SVINJAREVCI, LOCATION 4	20.2.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
442.	CAP	Đuro	Snameon	06.06.1920.	VINKOVCI, CATHOLIC CEMETERY	16.10.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
443.	UNKNOWN				VINKOVCI, CATHOLIC CEMETERY	16.10.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
444.	KOZIĆ	Ivan	Smiljan	08.04.1960	VINKOVCI, RIMOCATHOLIC CEMETERY	5.3.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
445.	JOSIĆ	Slavko	Ivo	12.03.1970	VINKOVCI, RIMOCATHOLIC CEMETERY	5.3.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
446.	UNKNOWN				VINKOVCI, RIMOCATHOLIC CEMETERY	5.3.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
WESTERN SLAVONIA							
447.	HLEVNJAK	Ivanka	Franjo	1.1.1933	GAVRINICA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	MASS GRAVE
448.	HLEVNJAK	Stjepan	Ivan	2.10.1921	GAVRINICA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	MASS GRAVE
449.	JURGEC	Ivan	Franjo	30.6.1920	GAVRINICA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	MASS GRAVE
450.	JURGEC	Marija	Franjo	17.9.1928	GAVRINICA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	MASS GRAVE

451.	GOLUB	Ivo	Ilija	18.06.1935.	KORENIČANI, RAJČEVICA FOREST	10.04.2002.	MASS GRAVE
452.	GYORDJI	Ivan	Petar	21.06.1939.	KORENIČANI, RAJČEVICA FOREST	10.04.2002.	MASS GRAVE
453.	PALJEVIĆ	Vlado	Stevo	28.10.1953.	KORENIČANI, RAJČEVICA FOREST	10.04.2002.	MASS GRAVE
454.	TRŠEK	Pavle	Gusta	08.06.1947.	KORENIČANI, RAJČEVICA FOREST	10.04.2002.	MASS GRAVE
455.	BOKAN	Nikola	Stevan	21.9.1934	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
456.	DANOJEVIĆ	Ilija	Djuro	1910.	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
457.	MARIĆ	Jula	Nikola	30.4.1923	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
458.	MARKOVIĆ	Kata	Mato	25.11.1919	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
459.	PERŠE	Ana	Ivan	22.7.1931	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
460.	VUJAKLIJA	Milija	Vaso	7.2.1915	OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
461.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
462.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
463.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
464.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
465.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
466.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
467.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
468.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS

							GRAVE
469.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETER	30.08.2005.	MASS GRAVE
470.	ŠAJNOVIĆ	Marija	Ivan	20.1.1941	BODEGRAJ HOUSE NO. 90	02.08.1996	MASS GRAVE
471.	ŠAJNOVIĆ	Renato	Stanko	8.9.1984	BODEGRAJ HOUSE NO. 90	02.08.1996	MASS GRAVE
472.	ŠAJNOVIĆ	Stanko	Nikola	11.11.1933	BODEGRAJ HOUSE NO. 90	02.08.1996	MASS GRAVE
473.	UNKNOWN				DAVOR, LOCATION2, NEAR GAS STATION	18.9.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
474.	HABENŠUS	Darko	Đuro	14.07.1970.	DERVENTA	19.06.2000.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
475.	SVETEC	Ivan	Josip	14.01.1948.	DERVENTA	19.06.2000.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
476.	TOMIĆ	Ivica	Ljubo	24.06.1967.	DERVENTA	25.05.2000.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
477.	SOUŠEK	Emil	Franjo	19.8.1931	GORNJI BOGIĆEVCI	14.3.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
478.	ĐANIJA	Ana	Andrej	1.1.1945	LAĐEVAC 5	16.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
479.	KUČAN	Marko			MEDARI	16.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
480.	LOVRENČIĆ	Nikola	Stanislav	6.7.1971	OKUČANI, WELL	24.10.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
481.	SANJICKI	Darko	Josip	11.11.1967	OKUČANI, WELL	24.10.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
482.	HRDŽIĆ	Đuro	Ilija	02.04.1948.	OKUČANI, CEMETERY	11.6.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
483.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, CEMETERY	11.6.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
484.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	22.11.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
485.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	22.11.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

486.	UNKNOWN				OKUČANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	22.11.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
487.	POPIĆ	Pavle		29.1.1941.	SEOCE	4.12.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
488.	ANTUNOVIĆ	Petar	Đuro	1.1.1930	SLAVONSKI BROD, CEMETERY	16.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
489.	ŠANDOROVIĆ	Ilija	Luka	21.7.1927	SLAVONSKI BROD, CEMETERY	16.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
490.	TOMLJENOVIĆ	Mirko	Vladimir	7.5.1946	SLAVONSKI BROD, CEMETERY	16.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
491.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI BROD, CEMETERY	12.10.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
492.	BUDIMIR	Marko	Anto	19.11.1961	SLAVONSKI KOBAŠ, RIVER SAVA	3.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
493.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI ŠAMAC	19.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
494.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI ŠAMAC	19.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
495.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI ŠAMAC	19.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
496.	UNKNOWN				ŠIRINCI, 1000 M WEST OF ŠIRINCI	14.11.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
497.	KABLAR	Nikola	Petar	15.06.1922.	BATINJANI 89	7.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
498.	BOSANAC	Gajo	Marko	26.8.1903	BATINJANI 43	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
499.	BOSANAC	Savka	Lazo	2.4.1918	BATINJANI 43	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
500.	MALENIĆ	Anka	Marko	1.1.1911	BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
501.	NN				BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
502.	ZABRDAC	Blagoje	Marko	21.4.1943	BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
503.	NN				BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
504.	NN				BATINJANI IZMEĐU 5 I 7	11.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
505.	NN				BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
506.	NOVAKOVIĆ	Marijan	Ernest	22.7.1952	BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
507.	ZEC	Petar	Petar	12.8.1941	BATINJANI, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.12.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
508.	NN				ČEČAVAČKI VUČJAK 35	14.7.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
509.	NN				DEREZA 7	7.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
510.	NN				DEREZA 7	7.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
511.	BIRAĆ	Dragutin		1.1.1933	GAVRINICA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
512.	PRODANOVIĆ	Stana	Jovo	15.06.1915.	GAVRINICA, LOCAL CEMETERY	7.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
513.	VUKOVIĆ	Jelena	Jeremije	1.1.1907	GAVRINICA, LOCAL CEMETERY	7.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
514.	BABEC	Željko	Ivan	28.12.1962.	KUKUNJEVAC, STARI PUT	7.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
515.	NN				KUKUNJEVAC, ORTODOX CEMETERY	9.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
516.	SABO	Stana			LIPIK, JADRANSKA 36	30.8.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
517.	NN				LIPIK, LOCAL CEMETERY	9.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
518.	NN				OŽEGOVCI 36	7.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
519.	KESERICA	Ivan	Josip		POŽEGA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
520.	ROČEK	Branko	Franjo	31.12.1964	POŽEGA, CEMETERY	21.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

521.	NN				POŽEGA, GENERAL HOSPITAL POŽEGA	7.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
522.	KUTIĆ	Veljko	Savo	1.3.1967.	ŠEOVICA, FOREST BJEGOVAČA	8.2.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
523.	PROTIĆ	Ljubomir	Mladen	10.6.1938	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
524.	ŽIVKOVIĆ	Nikola	Janko	25.10.1950	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
525.	PROTIĆ	Milan	Jovo	19.9.1982	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
526.	PROTIĆ	Draga	Dušan	1930	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
527.	STANKOVIĆ	Anđa	Nikola	1921.	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
528.	RADMILOVIĆ	Ilija	Stanko	2.8.1951	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
529.	RANOSAVLJEVIĆ	Željko	Dragan	23.2.2965	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
530.	RADMILOVIĆ	Ana	Stojan	9.7.1927	ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
531.	NN				ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
532.	NN				ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
533.	NN				ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
534.	NN				ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
535.	NN				ŠNJEGAVIĆ, ROAD TO CEMETERY	11.12.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
536.	BRNČIĆ	Danica	Đuro	10.1.1940	ŠUMETLICA, CEMETERY	22.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
537.	BRNČIĆ	Stjepan	Antun	31.8.1935	ŠUMETLICA, CEMETERY	22.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
538.	PLAVŠIĆ	Đuro			DONJE KUSONJE (DUBROVAČKA	3.7.2007	INDIVIDUAL

					STREET)		GRAVE
539.	PEJČIĆ	Jeka	Marko	4.6.1943	DONJE KUSONJE (GLAVNA STREET NO. 4)	3.7.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
540.	CVETIĆ	Rade	Savo	22.02.1949	DONJE KUSONJE (DUBROVAČKA STREET)	3.7.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
541.	ILIĆ	Branko	Milan	07.08.1956.	SEKULINCI (STUDENAČKI PUT)	06.08.1998.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
BANOVINA							
542.	BJELIĆ	Željko	Marko	10.09.1963.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
543.	BOJANOVSKI	Franjo	Leon	17.10.1949.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
544.	MILOŠ	Božan	Ilija	07.09.1966.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
545.	ŽIVKO	Đuro	Ivan	06.05.1956.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
546.	BOJANOVSKI	Antun	Leon	16.11.1933.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
547.	MAJTA	Zdravko	Ivan	26.06.1968.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
548.	PEREGLIN	Dražen	Rudolf	27.2.1970	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
549.	ŠKACAN	Ivica	Martin	18.06.1937.	DONJI HRASTOVAC	08.06.1999	MASS GRAVE
550.	KAURIĆ	Ivan	Josip	1.1.1930	GORNJA BUČICA, LOCATION 1A	13.05.1997	MASS GRAVE
551.	KAURIĆ	Janja	Antun	1.1.1925	GORNJA BUČICA, LOCATION 1A	13.05.1997	MASS GRAVE
552.	DOBRENIĆ	Josip	Milan	1.1.1926	GORNJA BUČICA, LOCATION 1A	13.05.1997	MASS GRAVE
553.	DOBRENIĆ	Josip			GORNJA BUČICA, IN FRONT OF THE SCHOOL, LOCATION 1	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
554.	POPOVČIĆ	Stjepan	Josip	12.12.1923	GORNJA BUČICA, IN FRONT OF THE	18.09.1997	MASS

					SCHOOL, LOCATION 1		GRAVE
555.	ZAGORAC	Nikola	Stjepan	8.11.1923	GORNJA BUČICA, IN FRONT OF THE SCHOOL, LOCATION 1	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
556.	ZAGORAC	Zora	Pavao	16.7.1931	GORNJA BUČICA, IN FRONT OF THE SCHOOL, LOCATION 1	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
557.	DOBRENIĆ	Jana	Stjepan	1.1.1922	GORNJA BUČICA, MEADOW, LOCATION 2	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
558.	ROŽANKOVIĆ	Branko	Stjepan	12.3.1971	GORNJA BUČICA, MEADOW, LOCATION 2	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
559.	ROŽANKOVIĆ	Mara	Franjo	25.7.1929	GORNJA BUČICA, MEADOW, LOCATION 2	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
560.	ROŽANKOVIĆ	Stjepan	Pavao	20.11.1941	GORNJA BUČICA, MEADOW, LOCATION 2	18.09.1997	MASS GRAVE
561.	JAŽETA	Ivica	Milan	25.5.1972	GORNJE TABORIŠTE	25.07.1996.	MASS GRAVE
562.	MIHALJEVIĆ	Danijel	Dragutin	1.1.1952	GORNJE TABORIŠTE	25.07.1996.	MASS GRAVE
563.	SRBIĆ	Darko	Slavko	17.9.1963	GORNJE TABORIŠTE	25.07.1996.	MASS GRAVE
564.	KLARIĆ	Pavo		1.1.1934	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 1	05.09.1996.	MASS GRAVE
565.	PIŠKOR	Zvonimir	Nikola	13.11.1933	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 1	05.09.1996.	MASS GRAVE
566.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 1	05.09.1996.	MASS GRAVE
567.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 1	05.09.1996.	MASS GRAVE
568.	FILETIĆ	Bara	Luka	1.1.1914	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 5	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
569.	KLARIĆ	Ana	Ivan	1.1.1925	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 5	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
570.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 5	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
571.	KRZNAREVIĆ	Pavo	Mato	10.2.1920	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 6	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE

572.	LESKOVAC	Mirko	Zvonko	5.6.1948	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 6	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
573.	VRBANAC	Joso	Marko	17.3.1952	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 6	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
574.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 6	06.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
575.	CEKOVIĆ	Pavo	Miko	10.1.1921	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	19.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
576.	MILATOVIĆ	Jela	Jandre	1.1.1900	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	19.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
577.	MILATOVIĆ	Mara	Janko	2.2.1919	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	19.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
578.	MUŽA	Ana		30.10.1937	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, CEMETERY, LOCATION 3	19.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
579.	KLASNIĆ	Grga	Ivan	1.1.1903	GREĐANI HOUSE NO. 225	16.05.1996	MASS GRAVE
580.	KLASNIĆ	Katarina	Pavao	12.2.1934	GREĐANI HOUSE NO. 225	16.05.1996	MASS GRAVE
581.	KLASNIĆ	Ana-jana	Pavao	1.1.1931	GREĐANI HOUSE NO. 225	16.05.1996	MASS GRAVE
582.	GOVORČINOVIĆ	Zvonko	Nikola	1.7.1939	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
583.	KARDAŠ	Antun	Petar	3.6.1931	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
584.	NOGIĆ	Petar	Blaž	25.05.1933	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
585.	LIKOVIĆ	Pero	Milan	24.02.1940	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
586.	NOGIĆ	Nikola	Blaž	1.3.1931	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
587.	PAVIĆ	Petar	Ivan	14.6.1930	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
588.	PAVLOVIĆ	Davor	Milan	18.5.1960	KOMOGOVINA, SLOPAČKA KOSA	28.06.2002	MASS GRAVE
589.	DRVODELIĆ	Josip	Zvonko	20.11.1966	MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS

							GRAVE
590.	MIKULČIĆ	Ivica	Nikola	29.1.1970	MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS GRAVE
591.	KITONIĆ	Srećko	Nikola	4.1.1964	MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS GRAVE
592.	MIKULČIĆ	Željko	Nikola	17.1.1969	MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS GRAVE
593.	PREPORUČENI	Đuro	Ivan	31.3.1964	MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS GRAVE
594.	UNKNOWN				MARVENO CEMETERY	03.11.1997	MASS GRAVE
595.	ANDRIJEVIĆ	Vlado	Pejo	12.2.1945	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
596.	BRIŠEVAC	Davorin	Anto	17.7.1967	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
597.	GALIĆ	Petar	Marko	9.6.1945	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
598.	JERGOVIĆ	Tomislav	Milan	29.4.1963	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
599.	LENARTIĆ	Drago	Dragutin	28.5.1966	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
600.	LEVAK	Perica	Ljuban	21.4.1958	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
601.	VUKADIN	Stipica	Petar	18.6.1960	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
602.	RADIĆ	Damir	Ivan	22.4.1970	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
603.	VUJANOVIĆ	Željko	Željko	16.8.1966	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
604.	VUJČIĆ	Dražen	Ivan	30.7.1969	PLAVIČEVAC	07. 05.1997	MASS GRAVE
605.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE
606.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE

607.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE
608.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE
609.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE
610.	UNKNOWN				ROŽDANIK	16.11.2005	MASS GRAVE
611.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
612.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
613.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
614.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
615.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
616.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
617.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
618.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
619.	UNKNOWN				SLAVONSKI TROKUT	13.06.2006.	MASS GRAVE
620.	DRAŽETIĆ	Blaž	Pavo	1.1.1929	SIBIĆ	29.03.1996	MASS GRAVE
621.	VRBANAC	Jagica	Ivan	1.1.1924	SIBIĆ	29.03.1996	MASS GRAVE
622.	VRBANAC	Tomo	Ivan	1.1.1918	SIBIĆ	29.03.1996	MASS GRAVE
623.	BEHLIĆ	Izet			VASIĆ BARE	29.09.1998	MASS GRAVE
624.	KALTAK	Esad			VASIĆ BARE	29.09.1998	MASS

							GRAVE
625.	BEHLIĆ	Fikret			VASIĆ BARE	29.09.1998	MASS GRAVE
626.	BEHLIĆ	Redđep			VASIĆ BARE	29.09.1998	MASS GRAVE
627.	KAURIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	1.1.1919	VELIKA SOLINA	11.07.1996	MASS GRAVE
628.	KAURIĆ	Kata	Josip	1.1.1924	VELIKA SOLINA	11.07.1996	MASS GRAVE
629.	SEVER	Stjepan	Andrija	2.10.1926	VELIKA SOLINA	11.07.1996	MASS GRAVE
630.	BARUNOVIĆ	Nikola	Blaž	6.8.1933	VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
631.	PEZO	Ivo	Filip	1.1.1910	VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
632.	UNKNOWN				VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
633.	UNKNOWN				VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
634.	UNKNOWN				VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
635.	UNKNOWN				VIŠNJIČKI BOK	16.10.1996	MASS GRAVE
636.	FAZLIĆ	Mujo	Suljo	9.9.1923	BABINA RIJEKA, NEAR WATER MILL	8.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
637.	VINSKI	Josip	Josip	23.3.1964	BABINA RIJEKA, NEAR WATER MILL	8.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
638.	VRGA	Đuro	Ljuban	3.2.1956	BATINOVA KOSA, NEAR HOUSE M. RATKOVIĆA	10.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
639.	MIKLEČIĆ	Boždar	Ivan	24.6.1970	BIŠĆANOVO, INTERSECTION BIŠĆANOVO-SELKOVAC	26.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
640.	UNKNOWN				BIŠĆANOVO, INTERSECTION BIŠĆANOVO-SELKOVAC	26.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
641.	KONČAR	Slavko	Milan	16.3.1952	BRESTIK, HAMLET LALIĆI 86, ŠLJIVIK	21.5.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

642.	UNKNOWN				BROČICE, NOVSKA, NEAR CANAL STRUG	28.3.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
643.	UNKNOWN				BRUBANJ BB	8.6.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
644.	BOLTUŽIĆ	Mara	Marko	7.10.1929	BUDIČINA 21	30.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
645.	JAJČINOVIĆ	Katarina	Stjepan	26.2.1936	BUDIČINA 21	30.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
646.	JAJČINOVIĆ	Mara		1.1.1912	BUDIČINA 42	19.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
647.	DUMBOVIĆ	Ivan	Ivan	1.1.1943	CEPELIŠ	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
648.	MACEK	Mario	Stjepan	02.12.1961.	CEPELIŠ-TINJANI, FOREST	25.10.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
649.	ZDJELAR	Milan	Mile	12.5.1921	CRNI POTOK 8	12.9.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
650.	ŽAGAR	Vladimir	Antun	20.1.1941	DESNI DEGOJ	26.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
651.	SEDLARIĆ	Anka	Stjepan	6.11.1920	DESNI DEGOJ, HAMLET ŽAGARI, LOCATION6	19.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
652.	PETROVIĆ	Milan	Nikola	1.1.1933	DOLJNJACI bb	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
653.	KVAKIĆ	Milka	Vid	1.1.1918	DOLJNJACI bb	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
654.	KAURIĆ	Nada	Ivan	24.2.1915	DONJA BUČICA	31.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
655.	DOBRENIĆ	Stjepan	Mijo	23.1.1923	DONJA BUČICA 62, LOCATION 4	18.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
656.	LUCIĆ	Jaga		1.1.1905	DONJA BUČICA 41, LOCATION5	18.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
657.	DMITROVIĆ	Stana	Simo	5.1.1925	DONJA ČEMERNICA, ACROSS HOUSE NO 84	10.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
658.	MACUT	Dragica	Janko	23.2.1926	DONJA ČEMERNICA, ACROSS HOUSE NO 84	10.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
659.	SUČEC	Franjo	Ivan	25.11.1928	DONJI SELKOVAC	31.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
660.	ŠANTEK	Mara	Pavo	1.1.1905	DONJI VIDUŠEVAC	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
661.	ŠANTEK	Kata	Janko	1.1.1904	DONJI VIDUŠEVAC 55	30.10.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
662.	ROM	Jaga	Marko	2.4.1934	DONJI VIDUŠEVAC 40	17.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
663.	ŠANTEK	Mara	Ivan	1.1.1914	DONJI VIDUŠEVAC 78, LOCATION1	23.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
664.	METIKOŠ	Dušan	Đuro	18.10.1911	DRAGOTINA, CEMETERY	14.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
665.	PAVUŠEK	Stjepan	Marko	17.1.1912	DVORIŠTE 8	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
666.	ŠANTEK	Stjepan	Lovro	8.8.1929	DVORIŠTE 4	17.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
667.	ANTOLOVIĆ	Mara	Janko	11.12.1920	DVORIŠTE 37	17.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
668.	MILEKOVIĆ	Bara	Ivan	1.1.1910	DVORIŠTE, KOD DUDA	17.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
669.	PAVUŠEK	Mara	Mato	1.1.1912	DVORIŠTE 30	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
670.	ŠEPARAC	Bara	Stjepan	1.11.1919	DVORIŠTE 54	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
671.	RADIĆ	Dragan	Ivan	2.5.1936	GOLUBOVAC	27.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
672.	UNKNOWN				GORA 97	28.6.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
673.	BOŽURIĆ	Mara	Nikola	4.5.1909	GORNJA BUČICA	31.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
674.	FABIJANAC	Kata	Stjepan	7.7.1906	GORNJA BUČICA, LOCATION 4	13.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
675.	GRAHOVAC	Cvijeta		1.1.1910	GORNJA BUČICA, NEAR ROAD, LOCATION 5	19.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
676.	ZGURIĆ	Pavo	Tomo	1.1.1928	GORNJE TABORIŠTE	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

677.	DRVODELIĆ	Dragica	Stipo	1.1.1957	GORNJE TABORIŠTE	26.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
678.	DRVODELIĆ	Stjepan	Ivan	21.2.1956	GORNJE TABORIŠTE, LOK 3 DESNI ODVOJAK	19.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
679.	RUDIĆ	Evica	Sava	15.7.1918	GORNJI KLASNIĆ, ACROSS HOUSE NO 5	5.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
680.	GAŠPAREVIĆ	Ana	Ivan		GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 3	6.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
681.	PAVUŠEK	Luka	Tomo	1.1.1912	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 3	6.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
682.	ŠKOLNEKOVIĆ	Luka	Blaž	1.1.1916	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 7	6.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
683.	ŠKOLNEKOVIĆ	Mara	Marko	1.1.1921	GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 7	6.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
684.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, FOREST	27.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
685.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, LOCATION 5	16.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
686.	UNKNOWN				GORNJI VIDUŠEVAC, ACROSS HOUSE NO 26	17.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
687.	PALADINIĆ	Pavao		1.1.1911	GRAČANICA, ŠIŠINEČKA 25	19.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
688.	HODALJ	Tomo	Mato	11.03.1911.	GRAČANICA ŠIŠINEČKA, LIVADA, LOCATION 4	18.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
689.	ŽUTIĆ	Milka	Mićo	27.7.1911	GREĐANI 200	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
690.	ŽUTIĆ	Mira	Ivan	11.11.1936	GREĐANI 200	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
691.	KUZMIĆ	Marko	Josip	5.3.1911	GREĐANI	23.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
692.	ŽUŽIĆ	Ivan	Nikola	8.12.1931	GRAĐANI 87, LOCATION1	25.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
693.	VEJNOVIĆ	Nedeljko	Lazo	19.4.1953	GREĐANI, LOCATION 4	13.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
694.	OMERAGIĆ	Zuhdija	Ređep	1.12.1956	GREĐANI, WELL, KBR 193	18.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
695.	DMITROVIĆ	Milorad		13.8.1963	GVOZD	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
696.	ŠOŠTARIĆ	Janko	Šimo	20.9.1910	HAĐER	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
697.	ROM	Nikola	Marko	6.9.1920	HAĐER 12	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
698.	ŠOŠTARIĆ	Andrija	Tomo	26.11.1913	HAĐER 18	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
699.	ŠOŠTARIĆ	Kata	Šimo	30.1.1913	HAĐER 13	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
700.	VRBANAC	Nikola	Blaž	6.1.1909	HAĐER 16	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
701.	VRBANAC	Blaž	Stjepan	25.12.1932	HAĐER 15	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
702.	VRBANAC	Roža	Đuro	1.1.1913	HAĐER 13	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
703.	HANJEC	Jelica	Ivan	1.1.1908	HRASTOVICA 62	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
704.	VRAČAN	Marija	Ivan	19.9.1927	HRASTOVICA 62	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
705.	VRAČAN	Stjepan	Lovro	12.8.1923	HRASTOVICA 64	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
706.	KUDLEK	Ivica	Mirko	6.12.1940	HRASTOVICA bb	6.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
707.	STANEŠIĆ	Stjepan	Josip	5.10.1949	HRASTOVICA	6.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
708.	UNKNOWN				HRASTOVICA, FOREST 2 KM FROM HRASTOVICE,LOCATION 7	11.3.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
709.	UNKNOWN				HRASTOVICA	25.5.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
710.	GRAHOVAC	Jana	Pero	1.1.1903	ILOVAČAK 64	1.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
711.	KAPAC	Milan	Stjepan	4.9.1933	ILOVAČAK 24	1.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

712.	KIRETA	Jana	Mato		ILOVAČAK 56	15.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
713.	BIELIĆ	Đuro	Stjepan	11.11.1939.	JASENOVAC, CEMETERY	29.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
714.	ORLOVIĆ	Marija			JAZAVICA	9.7.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
715.	UNKNOWN				JAZAVICA, BROOK DRAGOLIJA	28.6.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
716.	CERJAK	Luka	Mato	1.1.1908	JUKINAC	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
717.	ČURČIJA	Mirko		1947	KIRIŠNICA	29.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
718.	KNEŽEVIĆ	Slavka		1920	KIRIŠNICA	29.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
719.	UNKNOWN				KOMAREVO	7.8.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
720.	BOGDANOVIĆ	Simo	Stojan	7.4.1933	KOMORA, LEFT SIDE D-6, DVOR-GLINA	24.10.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
721.	GOVORČINOVIĆ	Bara	Ilija	2.1.1940	KOSTAJNIČKO SELIŠTE 1	23.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
722.	GOVORČINOVIĆ	Josip	Nikola	14.2.1902	KOSTAJNIČKO SELIŠTE 12	23.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
723.	IVEZIĆ	Mato	Stevo	1.1.1918	KOSTAJNIČKO SELIŠTE 37	23.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
724.	KOSTRIĆ	Pava	Ilija	11.1.1926	KOSTAJNIČKO SELIŠTE bb	23.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
725.	LOTINA	Dragan	Nikola	15.10.1930	KOSTAJNIČKO SELIŠTE bb	23.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
726.	BOGATIĆ	Eva	Josip	23.08.1914.	KOŠUTARICA 128	2.9.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
727.	UNKNOWN				KOŠUTARICA, DALJAN 1	6.4.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
728.	UNKNOWN				KRIČKE, HOUSE NO.72	15.6.2010	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
729.	UNKNOWN				KRIČKE, HOUSE NO.72	15.6.2010	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
730.	BOLUN	Franjo	Pavao	9.2.1911	KRIŽ 2, BEHIND STABLE	19.5.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
731.	PINOTIĆ	Marica	Mato	1.1.1920	LETOVANCI, CEMETERY	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
732.	PINOTIĆ	Mato	Đuro	1.1.1917	LETOVANCI, CEMETERY	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
733.	MARKOVIĆ	Mara	Mato	05.02.1920	LETOVANCI, HOUSE NO. 6	3.7.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
734.	KOZIĆ	Mara	Petar	12.2.1929	MAĐARI, CEMETERY	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
735.	MLAĐENOVIĆ	Mato	Ivan	24.6.1925	MAJA 34	12.10.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
736.	PAROPATIĆ	Jadranka	Milan	1.1.1991	MAJA	2.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
737.	KRKAČ	Ilija			MAJA, CEMETERY	14.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
738.	LIKOVIĆ	Milan	Nikola	20.8.1920	MAJA 59	16.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
739.	BAŠIĆ	Katarina	Janko	13.12.1912.	MAJUR, LOCAL CEMETERY	6.4.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
740.	SERDAR	Josip	Nikola	01.03.1907	MAJUR, LOCAL CEMETERY	26.6.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
741.	PIŠKOR	Kata	Ivan	12.11.1929	MALA SOLINA	19.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
742.	ŠTEFANČIĆ	Jaga	Đuro	18.2.1904	MALA SOLINA, LOCATION7	23.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
743.	CESTARIĆ	Josip	Marko	1.1.1939	MALA SOLINA 20, LOCATION6	23.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
744.	CESTARIĆ	Jela	Marko	25.6.1933	MALA SOLNA 14	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
745.	CESTARIĆ	Nikola	Andrija	4.12.1935	MALA SOLNA 14	21.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
746.	PANEŽIĆ	Jaga	Luka	24.06.1899	MALA SOLNA	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

747.	ROHAK	Kata	Đuro	1.1.1906	MALA SOLNA	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
748.	ŠOŠTARIĆ	Slavica	Ivan	1.1.1939	MALA SOLNA	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
749.	ROVIŠAN	Stjepan	Ivan	1.1.1928	MALA SOLNA	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
750.	DUJMIĆ	Mara	Blaž	1.1.1911	MALA SOLNA 5, RUIN	15.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
751.	PIŠKOR	Josip	Nikola	20.7.1928	MALA SOLINA, OT	15.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
752.	GAŠPAREVIĆ	Jaga	Marko	17.9.1913	MALA SOLNA 5, RUIN	15.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
753.	GAŠPAREVIĆ	Mara	Marko	24.10.1935	MALA SOLNA 5, RUIN	15.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
754.	ROHAK	Mara	Josip	1.1.1903	MALA SOLNA	15.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
755.	FABAC	Jana	Ivan	22.6.1934	MARINBROD 15	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
756.	GRUDENIĆ	Kata	Mato	1.1.1921	MARINBROD 51	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
757.	JANKOVIĆ	Nikola		76 god.	MARINBROD 58	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
758.	ŽINIĆ	Stjepan	Mate	16.8.1907	MARINBROD 31	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
759.	BAČURIN	Kata	Mato	1.1.1920	MARINBROD	9.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
760.	ŠOŠTARIĆ	Slavica	Luka	26.11.1937	MARINBROD 37	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
761.	ABRAMOVIĆ	Ilija	Marko	25.7.1937	MARINBROD	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
762.	TOMINOVIĆ	Stjepan	Mato	01.01.1919	MARINBROD, FIELD "POLOJ"	26.10.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
763.	UNKNOWN				MEMINSKA	29.4.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
764.	UNKNOWN				MIOČINOVIĆI, LOCATION2, UZ	1.7.2008	INDIVIDUAL

					CEMETERY		GRAVE
765.	UNKNOWN				MUŽINO HILL, HOUSE NO.26 A	1.4.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
766.	TEJIĆ	Đuro	Ljuban	22.4.1963	NOVO SELIŠTE 18	29.3.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
767.	PETANJEK	Željko		30.11.1957	NOVSKA, CEMETERY	3.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
768.	GALIĆ	Dragica	Milan	27.7.1950	NOVSKA, CEMETERY	11.9.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
769.	UNKNOWN				OSTOJIĆI, LOCAL ROAD OSTOJIĆI-SUZIĆI	23.1.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
770.	UNKNOWN				PAUKOVAC, RUIN HOUSE	26.1.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
771.	BRANKO	Bučan	Vladimir	8.6.1964	PEDALJ, LOCAL CEMETERY	5.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
772.	UNKNOWN				PJEŠČANICA, LOCAL CEMETERY	3.4.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
773.	BUBALO	Alen	Ante		POPOVAC	1.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
774.	UNKNOWN				POPOVAC	1.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
775.	NOVOSEL	Miljenko		12.2.1949	POPOVAC	1.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
776.	BUNJAN	Jela	Janko	1.1.1907	PREKOPA bb	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
777.	MILČIĆ	Kata	Stjepan	10.4.1912	PREKOPA 35	10.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
778.	NOGIĆ	Petar	Stevo	20.9.1921	RAVNO RAŠĆE 21	29.10.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
779.	LIČANIN	Đuro	Nikola	1.1.1925	ROSULJE 64	20.5.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
780.	KLJAJIĆ	Miladin	Petar	2.8.1930	RUJEVAC 2	20.5.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
781.	STAMBOLIJA	Mirko	Adam	1950.	RUJEVAC, PAŠNJAK	9.6.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

782.	STUBLJAR	Mirko	Ivan	23.9.1920	SELIŠTE 13	20.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
783.	ŠUBIĆ	Ljubica	Imbro	8.7.1916	SELIŠTE 1	20.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
784.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	12.10.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
785.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 3	12.10.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
786.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 3	12.10.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
787.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 1	11.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
788.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 1	11.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
789.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 2	11.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
790.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 3	11.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
791.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 4	11.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
792.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	12.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
793.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 2	12.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
794.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	12.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
795.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	13.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
796.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	13.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
797.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CEMETERY VIKTOROVAC, LOK 5	13.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
798.	UNKNOWN				SISAK, CITY CEMETERY	17.6.2010	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
799.	ŠUŠTIĆ	Velimir	Drago	27.03.1959.	SLABINJA, ŠUPLJI KAMEN	7.9.1995	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
800.	KLASNIĆ	Nikola	Stjepan	1.1.1933	SLATINA POKUPSKA	16.5.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
801.	UNKNOWN				SLAVSKO FIELD, HOUSE NO. 6	18.6.2010	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
802.	ALEKSIĆ	Milka	Dmitar	12.4.1906	SLOVINCI 83	20.5.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
803.	BENKOVIĆ	Slavica	Tomo	1.1.1937	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
804.	DEJANOVIĆ	Janko	Vilim	31.3.1936	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
805.	FRKOVIĆ	Ivan	Josip	11.2.1949	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
806.	MEDVED	Ivan	Stjepan	28.3.1935	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
807.	PROTULIPAC	Milka	Petar	1.10.1922	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
808.	SILAJ	Jana	Josip	1.1.1928	STANKOVAC	24.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
809.	CVETKOVIĆ	Mara			STANKOVAC	13.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
810.	CVETKOVIĆ	Josip	Stjepan		STANKOVAC	13.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
811.	VUČETIĆ	Ivan	Ivan	22.12.1957	STANKOVAC, KUPA	26.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
812.	KRAMARIĆ	Sofija	Ignjac	15.5.1922	STANKOVAC, LOCATION3	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
813.	BENKOVIĆ	Kata	Ivan	17.1.1910	STANKOVAC, LOCATION3	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
814.	KRKOVIĆ	Jalža	Mato	16.8.1924	STANKOVAC 2, LOCATION2	24.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
815.	KRAMARIĆ	Mijo	Nikola	29.9.1903	STARO SELO 2	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
816.	VIŠNJIĆ	Slavko	Mirko	07.09.1936.	SVINICA 131	6.4.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

817.	UNKNOWN				ŠAMARICA	25.5.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
818.	UNKNOWN				ŠAŠ, LOCAL CEMETERY	19.5.2010	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
819.	UNKNOWN				ŠAŠ, LOCAL CEMETERY	16.6.2010	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
820.	SREMIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	5.5.1965	ŠATORNJA	23.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
821.	BRAJDIĆ	Nikola	Mate	12.05.1961.	ŠMREKOVAC, BIH		INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
822.	CERJAK	Ivan	Stjepan	14.8.1939	TABORIŠTE 20	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
823.	KNEŽIĆ	Marica	Ćiril	1.1.1924	TABORIŠTE 61	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
824.	PALAJIĆ	Jela	Ivan	1.1.1911	TABORIŠTE 54	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
825.	TIŠINIĆ	Barica	Ivan	4.10.1939	TABORIŠTE 33	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
826.	VUJASIĆ	Jaga	Mijo	27.1.1906	TABORIŠTE 40	19.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
827.	JELKOVIĆ	Kata	Josip	23.4.1924	TOPUSKO, CEMETERY	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
828.	JELKOVIĆ	Mijo	Marko	27.9.1929	TOPUSKO, CEMETERY	16.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
829.	ŽUGAJ	Alojzija	Ludvig	6.8.1911	TOPUSKO, CEMETERY, LOCATION2	25.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
830.	VOJNOVIĆ	Stojan	Savo	17.03.1938.	TOPUSKO, ŠKOLSKA 45	5.4.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
831.	MILJANOVIĆ	Simo	Stojan	23.9.1948	TOPUSKO, KLINSKA bb NEAR "MALI RAJ"	10.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
832.	VUČIČEVIĆ	Stoja		70 g	UŠTICA	1.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
833.	UNKNOWN				VANIĆI, RUBJEŠIĆA HILL	7.1.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
834.	ZDIONICA	Fedhet	Hamdija	12.08.1962.	VELIKA GRADUSA	30.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
835.	BORIĆ	Stjepan	Đuro	24.3.1933	VELIKA SOLINA 17	30.10.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
836.	PEREKOVIĆ	Jana	Franjo	1.10.1908	VELIKA SOLINA, J.MARJANOVIĆA 30	16.9.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
837.	BABIĆ	Jana	Tomo	20.8.1922	VELIKA SOLNA 37	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
838.	BELČIĆ	Mara	Janko	1.1.1925	VELIKA SOLNA 102	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
839.	GAŠLJEVIĆ	Kata	Ivan	1.1.1914	VELIKA SOLNA 127	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
840.	KAURIĆ	Ivan	Tomo	17.12.1913	VELIKA SOLNA 102	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
841.	OSONIČKI	Milka	Nikola	10.3.1939	VELIKA SOLNA 87	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
842.	BARTOLIĆ	Slavka		1.1.1910	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
843.	BORIĆ- ROVIŠAN	Milka		1.1.1928	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
844.	ABRAMOVIĆ	Ive	Stanko	10.5.1934	VELIKA VRANOVINA 11	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
845.	FERDERBAR	Jana	Mate	1.1.1904	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
846.	FERDERBAR	Vid	Mate	1.1.1908	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
847.	ŠPRUK	Ivanka	Juraj	1.9.1932	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
848.	ŠPRUK	Vječeslav	Vilko	22.2.1930	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
849.	MAREKOVIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	12.1.1943	ZALOJ	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
850.	TRDENIĆ	Ivan			ZALOJ	13.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
851.	PEZEROVIĆ	Šefik	Abdulah	15.03.1968.	ZRIN, FIELD NEAR KULA	17.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

852.	BELČIĆ	Mara	Janko	1.1.1925	VELIKA SOLNA 102	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
853.	GAŠLJEVIĆ	Kata	Ivan	1.1.1914	VELIKA SOLNA 127	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
854.	KAURIĆ	Ivan	Tomo	17.12.1913	VELIKA SOLNA 102	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
855.	OSONIČKI	Milka	Nikola	10.3.1939	VELIKA SOLNA 87	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
856.	BARTOLIĆ	Slavka		1.1.1910	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
857.	BORIĆ- ROVIŠAN	Milka		1.1.1928	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
858.	ABRAMOVIĆ	Ive	Stanko	10.5.1934	VELIKA VRANOVINA 11	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
859.	FERDERBAR	Jana	Mate	1.1.1904	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
860.	FERDERBAR	Vid	Mate	1.1.1908	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
861.	ŠPRUK	Ivanka	Juraj	1.9.1932	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
862.	ŠPRUK	Vječeslav	Vilko	22.2.1930	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
863.	MAREKOVIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	12.1.1943	ZALOJ	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
864.	TRDENIĆ	Ivan			ZALOJ	13.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
865.	PEZEROVIĆ	Šefik	Abdulah	15.03.1968.	ZRIN, FIELD NEAR KULA	17.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
866.	OSONIČKI	Milka	Nikola	10.3.1939	VELIKA SOLNA 87	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
867.	BARTOLIĆ	Slavka		1.1.1910	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
868.	BORIĆ- ROVIŠAN	Milka		1.1.1928	VELIKA SOLNA 17	11.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
869.	ABRAMOVIĆ	Ive	Stanko	10.5.1934	VELIKA VRANOVINA 11	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
870.	FERDERBAR	Jana	Mate	1.1.1904	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
871.	FERDERBAR	Vid	Mate	1.1.1908	VELIKA VRANOVINA 5	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
872.	ŠPRUK	Ivanka	Juraj	1.9.1932	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
873.	ŠPRUK	Vječeslav	Vilko	22.2.1930	VOLINJA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
874.	MAREKOVIĆ	Ivan	Stjepan	12.1.1943	ZALOJ	25.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
875.	TRDENIĆ	Ivan			ZALOJ	13.11.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
876.	PEZEROVIĆ	Šefik	Abdulah	15.03.1968.	ZRIN, FIELD NEAR KULA	17.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
877.	ČEHIĆ	Huse	Ibrahim		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
878.	HOROZOVIĆ	Elfad	Hasan		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
879.	PEČENKOVIĆ	Derviš	Nedžad		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
880.	SALKIĆ	Fikret	Nurija		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
881.	SALKIĆ	Izet	Nurija		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
882.	ŠIŠIĆ	Hasib	Damir		CETINGRAD	18.3.2003	MASS GRAVE
883.	HODAK	Juraj	Ivan	24.2.1922	RAKOVICA, DREŽNIK GRAD HOUSE NO. 5	14.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
884.	HODAK	Magdalena	Josip	18.4.1914	RAKOVICA, DREŽNIK GRAD HOUSE NO. 5	14.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
885.	VRANIĆ	Barbara	Pavle	16.1.1916	RAKOVICA, DREŽNIK GRAD HOUSE NO. 5	14.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
886.	BIČANIĆ	Jelena	Ivan	17.10.1922	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE

887.	HODAK	Vinko	Dane	14.4.1937	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
888.	KRIZMANIĆ	Barbara	Josip	4.12.1918	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
889.	KRIZMANIĆ	Ivan	Leopold	24.12.1916	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
890.	ŠTEFANAC	Jelena	Marko	4.6.1899	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
891.	VELIĆ	Nada	Mile	2.11.1943	RAKOVICA, IRINOVAC	13.06.1996	MASS GRAVE
892.	JUKIĆ	Nikola	Jure	08.08.1974.	CETINGRAD, STRMAČKA	23.09.1998.	MASS GRAVE
893.	KATIĆ	Milan	Franjo	02.02.1955.	CETINGRAD, STRMAČKA	23.09.1998.	MASS GRAVE
894.	KATIĆ	Pero	Mile	10.12.1967.	CETINGRAD, STRMAČKA	23.09.1998.	MASS GRAVE
895.	KATIĆ	Zvonko	Franjo	15.01.1963.	CETINGRAD, STRMAČKA	23.09.1998.	MASS GRAVE
896.	BLAŽ	Zlatica			BANSKA SELNICA 3	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
897.	JURIŠIĆ	Petar			BANSKA SELNICA 19	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
898.	KEČA	Antun			BANSKA SELNICA 15	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
899.	PUCAREVIĆ	Ivan			BANSKA SELNICA 9	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
900.	VLAŠIĆ	Vladimir	Anto	1.1.1938	BATNOGA 189	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
901.	BARIĆ	Mile	Joso	23.3.1973	BATNOGA, HOUSE NO. 143	10.12.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
902.	ŽALAC	Ljuba	Vinko	08.12.1926.	BILO	17.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
903.	BRAJDIĆ	Marko	Josip	23.4.1912	BRAJDIĆ SELO 197	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
904.	UNKNOWN				HILL MAŠVINA	17.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
905.	MILINOVIĆ	Josip	Anton	22.10.1948	BREZOVA GLAVA	23.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
906.	KALIĆ	Pero		1.1.1954	CETINGRAD bb	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
907.	LONČARIĆ	Klara			CETINGRAD bb	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
908.	UNKNOWN				CETINGRAD, PODCETIN, STARI GRAD	20.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
909.	UNKNOWN				CETINGRAD, PODCETIN, STARI GRAD	30.1.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
910.	VUKOVIĆ	Anton	Joso	1.1.1915	ČATRNJA, RUIN	27.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
911.	MILJENOVIĆ	Slobodan		1961	ČATRNJA, FOREST ČATRNJA	19.9.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
912.	STEPIĆ	Milan	Ivan	15.3.1971	DELIĆ POLJANA	5.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
913.	ŠPIŠIĆ	Slavko	Mijo	3.5.1947	DESNI ŠTEFANKI	15.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
914.	KARAS	Branko		1970	DESNI ŠTEFANKI 2	18.9.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
915.	MASLAK	Josip	Mato	25.8.1956	DESNO SREDIČKO	14.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
916.	ĆUNOVIĆ	Zora	Nikola	2.1.1931	DESNO SREDIČKO, LOCATION1, K.Ć. "HOLE"	27.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
917.	SKENDER	Stanislav	Marko	17.3.1932	DESNO SREDIČKO, LOCATION1, K.Ć. "HOLE"	27.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
918.	MALKOČ	Jakob	Dane	12.3.1941	DREŽNIK GRAD 40	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
919.	BUJADINOVIĆ	Ana			DREŽNIK GRAD	12.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
920.	MATOVINA	Josip			DREŽNIK GRAD	12.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
921.	UNKNOWN				DREŽNIK GRAD 46	20.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

922.	JURČIĆ	Jelena	Mijo	20.9.1925	GLINICE	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
923.	IŠEK	Zlata	Stjepan	18.7.1938	GOLINJA	23.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
924.	UNKNOWN				GORNJA BUSOVAČA, HOUSE NO.22	10.12.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
925.	BEGOVIĆ	Manda	Janko	3.6.1924	GORNJA GLINA 119	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
926.	JURČEVIĆ	Mile	Jure	29.9.1919	GORNJA GLINA 162	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
927.	PUŠKARIĆ	Katarina	Marko	29.5.1929	GORNJA GLINA bb	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
928.	BARIČEVIĆ	Ivan	Luka	24.10.1942.	GORNJA ŠVARČA	17.6.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
929.	POZNANOVIĆ	Ivica	Luka	13.10.1942	IRONOVAC 138	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
930.	BIČANIĆ	Magdalena	Petar	28.7.1922	IRINOVAC	17.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
931.	PAVLIĆ	Marija	Anton	15.12.1943	JELOV KLANAC 249	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
932.	GRGIĆ	Ivan	Ivan	27.7.1933	KABLARI 23	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
933.	GRGIĆ	Ivan	Ivan	22.8.1908	KABLARI 23	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
934.	POJE	Mara	Josip	1.1.1914	KABLARI 62	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
935.	ŠLAT	Mile	Nikola	27.2.1968	KORANA CANYON	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
936.	LONČARIĆ	Zvonko	Marko	9.7.1943	KAPLJUH 181	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
937.	LONČARIĆ	Marko	Zvonko	29.10.1964.	KAPLJUH	17.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
938.	MAGDIĆ	Jelena	Stjepan	10.2.1921	KORITA RAKOVAČKA 61	14.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
939.	MAGDIĆ	Juraj	Antun	13.3.1910	KORITA RAKOVAČKA 61	14.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
940.	VALENTIĆ	Janja	Mile	1.1.1943	KRUŠKOVAČA 2	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
941.	NN				LAĐEVAČKO SELIŠTE 35	2.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
942.	RADOČAJ	Ivan	Ante	3.10.1930	LAĐEVAČKO SELIŠTE 35A	19.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
943.	RADOČAJ	Roze	Franjo	29.6.1932	LAĐEVAČKO SELIŠTE 35A	19.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
944.	UNKNOWN				LAĐEVAČKO SELIŠTE 50	20.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
945.	UNKNOWN				LAĐEVAČKO SELIŠTE 50	20.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
946.	DUJMIĆ	Josip	Milan		LIČKA JESENICA	18.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
947.	KESER	Ivan	Petar	6.5.1924	LIPOVAC 103	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
948.	KESER	Dragica	Jure	12.9.1930	LIPOVAC 103	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
949.	DUMENČIĆ	Ivan	Mile	18.8.1952	LIPOVAC bb	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
950.	KONČALOVIĆ	Smilja		1943	MALI KOZINAC, ORTODOX CEMETERY	19.9.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
951.	MANOJLOVIĆ	Stana		21.4.1915	MALI KOZINAC, ORTODOX CEMETERY	19.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
952.	NN				MALI KOZINAC, ORTODOX CEMETERY	19.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
953.	UNKNOWN		Petar	8.2.1954	MALI KOZINAC, LOCAL CEMETERY	20.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
954.	UNKNOWN				MALI KOZINAC, LOCAL CEMETERY	20.5.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
955.	PALIJAN	Anka	Dane	16.1.1916	OŠTARSKI STANOVI 140	13.6.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
956.	UNKNOWN				PERJASICA	2.7.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

957.	FLANJAK	Slavko	Jure	5.4.1939	PODCETIN 77	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
958.	PAULIĆ	Nikola	Josip	13..07.1930	POLOJSKI VAROŠ	16.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
959.	PAULIĆ	Kata	Josip	1.1.1927	POLOJSKI VAROŠ	16.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
960.	NN				PONOR 8	17.7.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
961.	KESER	Marija			RAKOVICA	27.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
962.	ŠPEHAR	Ivan	Petar	29.11.1924	RAKOVICA, CEMETERY	27.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
963.	GAŠPAROVIĆ	Juraj	Ivan		RAKOVICA, GRDIČEVO CEMETERY	17.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
964.	KRIZMANIĆ	Marija	Joso	20.7.1921	RAKOVICA, PUŠKARIĆEVO CEMETERY	17.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
965.	PAVLIĆ	Kata	Pero	1.1.1908	RAKOVICA	17.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
966.	SABLJAK	Ilija	Ivan	4.3.1932	RAKOVICA, GRDIČEVO CEMETERY	17.6.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
967.	UNKNOWN				RAKOVICA	28.8.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
968.	VUDRAGOVIĆ	Milan		1.1.1927	RUŠEVICA, ORTODOX CEMETERY	18.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
969.	VUKOVIĆ	Nikola	Mate	8.11.1940	RUŠEVICA, ORTODOX CEMETERY	18.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
970.	BUNČIĆ	Dušan	Đurađ	1.2.1925	SAGRADŽIJIN POTOK BB	19.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
971.	CINDRIĆ	Marko	Tomo	12.10.1926	SASTAVAK 133	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
972.	CINDRIĆ	Tomo	Jure	3.10.1943	SASTAVAK 133	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
973.	PANIĆ	Pave	Mate	15.8.1911	SASTAVAK 9	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
974.	ŠEGAVAC	Marko		1.1.1912	SASTAVAK 9	4.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
975.	ROŽIĆ	Mato	Franjo	11.09.1936.	SKAKAVAC, CEMETERY	22.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
976.	ROŽIĆ	Mato	Mato	11.12.1953.	SKAKAVAC, CEMETERY	22.9.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
977.	FRKLIĆ	Mara			SLUNJSKA SELNICA 52	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
978.	KLOBUČAR	Marica	Martin	23.3.1914	SLUNJSKA SELNICA 50	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
979.	MATIJAŠIĆ	Slavko	Ivan	30.11.1934	SLUNJSKA SELNICA 49	18.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
980.	JURČIĆ	Vinko			TATAR VAROŠ 124	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
981.	PAVLIĆ	Milka			TATAR VAROŠ 96	17.4.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
982.	VUKOVIĆ	Jelena	Ivan	1.1.1919	TROVRH	5.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
983.	STAVLJENIĆ	Stjepan	Andrija	15.9.1925	TURANJSKI GOLJACI	23.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
984.	BOŽIĆ	Nikola	Miloš	11.10.1967	TUŠILOVIĆ, ORTODOX CEMETERY	29.10.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
985.	MATIJEVIĆ	Desanka	Đuro	23.1.1925	TUŠILOVIĆ, ORTODOX CEMETERY	29.10.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
986.	MATIJEVIĆ	Cvijan	Miloš	30.11.1924	TUŠILOVIĆ, ORTODOX CEMETERY	29.10.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
987.	MRKONJA	Pero	Nikola	09.11.1908.	VIDEKIĆ SELO	17.6.1999	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
988.	GOJAK	Andrija	Andrija	7.10.1938	VOJIŠNICA	11.11.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
989.	PAPA	Nikola	Mijo	1.1.1910	VOJIŠNICA	11.11.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
990.	NN				VOJIŠNICA	18.9.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
991.	MEDVED	Janja	Mato	25.5.1924	VUKMANIČKI CEROVAC	23.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

992.	LATKOVIĆ	Juraj	Andrija	1.1.1909	VUKMANIĆ	11.11.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
KORDUN I LIKA							
993.	RAKIĆ	Mane	Bude	1933.	GOLUBNJAČA 1	16.10.2001.	MASS GRAVE
994.	RAKIĆ	Dragan	Mane	1968.	GOLUBNJAČA 1	16.10.2001.	MASS GRAVE
995.	RAKIĆ	Milovan	Mane	1961.	GOLUBNJAČA 1	16.10.2001.	MASS GRAVE
996.	RAKIĆ	Radmila	Mane	1963.	GOLUBNJAČA 1	16.10.2001.	MASS GRAVE
997.	JUKIĆ	Josip	Ivo	13.5.1942	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
998.	JUKIĆ	Lucija	Franjo	15.10.1936	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
999.	KLOBUČAR	Nikola	Milan	22.2.1967	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1000.	NIKŠIĆ	Ante	Ivan	6.6.1937	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1001.	NIKŠIĆ	Ivica	Petar	2.11.1974	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1002.	NIKŠIĆ	Joso	Mile	5.10.1956	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1003.	NIKŠIĆ	Petar	Marko	31.8.1942	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1004.	PAVLETIĆ	Martin	Josip	20.1.1942	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1005.	PERKOVIĆ	Ivan	Ilija	29.4.1933	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1006.	VOJVODIĆ	Ana	Ivan	27.2.1933	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1007.	VOJVODIĆ	Mile	Mile	11.9.1938	GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE

1008.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 2	24.09.2004	MASS GRAVE
1009.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1010.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1011.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1012.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1013.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1014.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1015.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1016.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1017.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1018.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1019.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1020.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1021.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1022.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1023.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1024.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1025.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS

							GRAVE
1026.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1027.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1028.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1029.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1030.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1031.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1032.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1033.	UNKNOWN				GOLUBNJAČA 3	20.10.2001	MASS GRAVE
1034.	ČORAK	Kata	Šname	13.8.1940	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1035.	ČORAK	Martin	Mate	3.11.1939	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1036.	ČORAK	Mate	Petar	1.5.1940	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1037.	ČORAK	Slavko	Antun	7.11.1930	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1038.	ČORAK	Stjepan	Petar	25.12.1934	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1039.	ČORAK	Vladimir	Antun	10.5.1939	OŠTRI VRŠAK, ĆURINKA	19.06.2002.	MASS GRAVE
1040.	UNKNOWN				ČORKOVA UVALA	21.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1041.	GRBAC	Blaž	Blaž	25.03.1930.	ĆANAK	23.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1042.	NN				DONJI LAPAC, A.G.MATOŠA bb	15.5.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

1043.	UNKNOWN				DONJI LAPAC, SQUARE N. TESLE 14	4.11.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1044.	BORIĆ	Vesna	Dane	6.9.1973	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1045.	ĆURUVIJA	Dmitar	Vujo	1.1.1928	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1046.	KRTINIĆ	Jovo	Mane	10.1.1946	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1047.	POŠMUGA	Branko	Nikola	9.8.1955	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1048.	VUKMIROVIĆ	Milan	Đuro	2.11.1970	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1049.	ZAGORAC	Božidar	Mihajlo	1.1.1935	DONJI LAPAC, CEMETERY RUDINE	23.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1050.	UNKNOWN				FRKAŠIĆ, HOLE LAZINKA	18.10.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1051.	RADAKOVIĆ	Mile	Jandre		JOŠAN	5.10.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1052.	BRKLJAČIĆ	Ika			LIČKO CERJE	27.8.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1053.	BRKLJAČIĆ	Kata			LIČKO CERJE	27.8.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1054.	ZUPČIĆ	Ana			LIČKO CERJE	27.8.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1055.	BOBIĆ	Rade	Nikola	15.10.1936	LIČKO PETROVO SELO	12.12.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1056.	CARIĆ	Zdravko	Branko	12.10.1955	LIČKO PETROVO SELO	12.12.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1057.	VESELICA	Marija		1.1.1908	LIČKO PETROVO SELO	12.12.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1058.	NN				LIČKO PETROVO SELO, HILL ČALOPEK	30.10.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1059.	KNEŽEVIĆ	Milan	Spase	2.4.1938	LJUBOVO, ĆULUMOVKA	5.11.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1060.	DANILOVIĆ	Ilija			MALI ALAN, DISTRICT MATEKOVAC-	7.9.2006	INDIVIDUAL

					VELEBIT		GRAVE
1061.	PEČINA	Ante	Jandre	27.04.1942.	MEDAK-MOGORIĆ, NEAR ROAD	17.10.2001	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1062.	ČORAK	Tomo	Petar	6.2.1930	PODLAPAČA	23.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1063.	ČORAK	Slavko	Josip	25.11.1948	PRIJEBOJ	14.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1064.	UNKNOWN				RADUČ, HAMLET GAJIĆI	11.11.2008	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1065.	RUPČIĆ	Manda	Joso	29.03.1920.	RIČICE	8.9.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1066.	KOVAČEVIĆ	Manda	Marko	1.1.1898	RIČICE	22.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1067.	SKORUP	Marija	Pajo	24.2.1906	RIČICE	22.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1068.	MIŠČEVIĆ	Nikola	Petar	27.9.1941	SMILJANSKO FIELD, CEMETERY VRANEŠ	22.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1069.	UNKNOWN				SMILJANSKO FIELD, CEMETERY VRANEŠ	22.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1070.	UNKNOWN				SMILJANSKO FIELD, CEMETERY VRANEŠ	22.9.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1071.	PAVIČIĆ	Josip	Ivan	01.01.1928.	SMOKRIĆ	21.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1072.	PAVIČIĆ	Mile	Ivan	01.01.1930.	SMOKRIĆ	21.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1073.	ŽUPAN	Dane	Ante	25.10.1926.	SVETI ROK	10.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1074.	ŠULENTIĆ	Antun	Pavle	15.06.1911.	SVETI ROK	26.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1075.	ŠULENTIĆ	Milka	Pavle	11.11.1889.	SVETI ROK	26.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1076.	KOVAČEVIĆ	Mate	Dane	22.11.1894	SVETI ROK	22.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1077.	MAHMUTOVIĆ	Jasmin	Izet	27.9.1974	TROVRH KIK, PLJEŠEVICA	3.11.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

1078.	VELIĆ	Amir	Hasan	7.8.1975	TROVRH KIK, PLJEŠEVICA	3.11.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1079.	UNKNOWN				TURANJSKI, HOUSE BASEMENT	10.4.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1080.	UNKNOWN				VUJINE DRAGE, HOLE 1	19.10.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1081.	UNKNOWN				VUKAVA, KAMENJAR	4.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1082.	NIKŠIĆ	Ana	Mile	9.1.1919	VUKAVA, HOLE "SNJEŽNICA"	23.10.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
DALMATIA							
1083.	COPIĆ	Manda	Ivan	15.2.1906	BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1084.	ČAJHINOVIĆ	Ferid			BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1085.	DUVANČIĆ	Ante	Ante	3.9.1971	BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1086.	GLUIĆ	Petar	Mate	16.8.1904	BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1087.	MATIĆ	Ana	Ivan	5.7.1907	BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1088.	VUCIĆ	Damir	Mile	12.6.1969	BADANJ	10.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1089.	BURA	Marta	Jere	1.1.1930	KRKOVIĆ, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1090.	BURA	Rade	Mate	1.1.1923	KRKOVIĆ, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1091.	BURA	Šimica	Šname	3.12.1914	KRKOVIĆ, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1092.	BRAČIĆ	Ana	Josip	1.1.1921	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1093.	BRAČIĆ	Ivan	Luka	16.2.1914	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE

1094.	BRAČIĆ	Krste božo	Ivan	23.2.1940	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1095.	PARAĆ	Pavle	Paško	1.3.1923	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1096.	PARAĆ	Anica	Marko	24.12.1928	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1097.	PARAĆ	Kata	Mile	14.5.1921	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1098.	PERICA	Ante	Mate	24.10.1924	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.09.1996	MASS GRAVE
1099.	BARIŠIĆ	Nikola	Niko	18.02.1927.	BADANJ	3.7.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1100.	BITUNJAC	Kata	Mate	11.7.1924	BADANJ	10.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1101.	ERCEGOVAC	Vice	Ante	18.2.1906	BADANJ, CEMETERY	11.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1102.	IVIĆ	Kata	Marko	10.10.1920	BADANJ, CEMETERY	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1103.	MUJAN	Cvita	Mate	1.10.1915	BADANJ, CEMETERY	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1104.	MUJAN	Ivan	Božo	1.1.1911	BADANJ, CEMETERY	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1105.	PONOŠ	Petar	Ivan	1.1.1915	BADANJ, CEMETERY	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1106.	CICVARA	Milka	Nikola	3.8.1938	BRIBIRSKE MOSTINE	10.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1107.	KOROF	Mihajlo			BRIBIRSKE MOSTINE	10.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1108.	LALIĆ	Marta	Ive	31.10.1936	BRIBIRSKE MOSTINE	10.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1109.	BAČIĆ	Marija	Nikola	1.1.1927	DRINOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1110.	BAČIĆ	Mate	Stipe	1.1.1921	DRINOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1111.	KOZIĆ	Paško	Mate	2.8.1921	DRINOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
1112.	UNKNOWN				DRINOVCI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION3	13.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1113.	BAJIĆ	Jovan	Lazo	8.1.1932	GORNJI RADLJEVAC, FIELD	14.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1114.	LEŽAJIĆ	Gojko	Luka	25.8.1930	GOŠIĆ, FAMILY CRYPT	17.12.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1115.	CIGIĆ	Nikola	Mijo	3.2.1910	GRADAC, CEMETERY	13.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1116.	MEŠTROVIĆ	Stipan	Božo	25.12.1909	GRADAC, CEMETERY	13.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1117.	PILIPOVIĆ	Pilip	Josip	24.5.1931	GRADAC, CEMETERY	13.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1118.	RELJANOVIĆ	Luka	Božo	24.3.1921	GRADAC, CEMETERY	13.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1119.	MAŽIBRADA	Manda		14.10.1914	KISTANJE, LOCAL CEMETERY	18.6.2004	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1120.	LELA	Ivan			KLJACI, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION	13.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1121.	PIPUNIĆ	Milan	Ante	1.1.1938	KRKOVIĆ, CEMETERY	11.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1122.	PODRUG	Ivanica	Ante	21.6.1907	KRKOVIĆ, sv. BARTOL	11.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1123.	MARIĆ	Todor			MARKOVAC, SV. ILIJA CEMETERY	12.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1124.	MAZALIN	Marija	Mate	1.1.1925	MILJEVAČKI BOGATIĆI	15.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1125.	BRAČIĆ	Marija	Petar	12.3.1926	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1126.	DŽAJA	Petar	Ante	10.2.1928	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1127.	VUCIĆ	Tomica	Tomo	1.1.1912	MRATOVO, CEMETERY	12.9.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1128.	DŽEPINA	Marija	Marko	5.10.1929	MRATOVO	15.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

1129.	PARAĆ	Josip	Ilija	9.3.1919	MRATOVO, CEMETERY SV. MARTINA	19.10.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1130.	UNKNOWN				MRATOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION2	14.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1131.	UNKNOWN				MRATOVO, LOCAL CEMETERY LOCATION2	14.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1132.	ZORICA	Nikola	Ilija	1.1.1912	NUNIĆ	14.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1133.	UNKNOWN				OTON FIELD, HAMLET VUJINOVIĆI	12.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1134.	DUBAJIĆ	Lazo	Simo	25.3.1920	PLAVNO, HAMLET DUBAJIĆI	27.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1135.	UNKNOWN				PLAVNO, LOCAL CEMETERY	11.12.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1136.	UNKNOWN				PLAVNO, RUSIĆI, DISTRICT GRADINA	12.5.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1137.	BJEDOV	Đorđe	Nikola	25.03.1956	RADUČIĆ, DISTRICT LENKOVAČA	26.10. 2005.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1138.	BAČKONJA	Milan	Vojin	1.1.1940	STRMICA, HAMLET KOMALIĆ	27.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1139.	UNKNOWN				STRMICA, HAMLET MIZDRAK	27.10.2005	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1140.	GALIĆ	Šname	Ante	22.2.1927	ŠIRITOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1141.	GALIĆ	Vinko	Ante	25.7.1948	ŠIRITOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1142.	LOVRIĆ	Šname	Ivan	1.11.1931	ŠIRITOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1143.	VLAIĆ	Ivan	Marko	2.8.1924	ŠIRITOVCI	16.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1144.	VUJEVIĆ	Marko	Ilija	1.10.1920	ŠTIKOVO	13.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1145.	MILOVAC	Milka	Josip	1.1.1933	TROBUNJ	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1146.	ČULINA	Ivan	Mate	27.9.1919	VELUŠIĆ	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
1147.	ĐIDARA	Ilija	Josip	1.7.1929	VELUŠIĆ	12.12.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1148.	ŠKARIĆ	Stana	Ilija	18.1.1922	VRBNIK, FAMILY CRYPT	15.12.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1149.	UNKNOWN				VRBNIK, KUVIN DRAČE	19.11.2009	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1150.	MILETIĆ	Kuzman	Marko	17.1.1920	BIOGRAD N/M	24.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1151.	MILETIĆ	Đurđija	Vaso	5.5.1921	BIOGRAD N/M	24.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1152.	MALENICA	Vedran	Ivan	04.05.1971.	BROTNJA	20.5.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1153.	NEKIĆ	Ika	Stjepan	10.01.1938.	BULIĆ	23.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1154.	NEKIĆ	Stipe	Jakov	10.11.1962.	BULIĆ	23.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1155.	GRGIĆ	Miro	Ante	09.09.1963.	DRVAR	27.09.1995.	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1156.	UNKNOWN				ISLAM GRČKI, ZASEPK REČANI	7.4.2000	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1157.	SOVILJ	Mara	Nikola	20.6.1923	KIJANI, FAMILY HOUSE	12.8.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1158.	UNKNOWN				KRUPA, DISTRICT GASTUŠA	10.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1159.	UNKNOWN				KRUPA, DISTRICT GASTUŠA	10.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1160.	TRAVICA	Stevan	Miloš	9.8.1922	KRUPA, DISTRICT GASTUŠA	10.3.2003	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1161.	MIJIĆ	Andrijana	Jakov	1.1.1906	LEPURI	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1162.	MILETIĆ	Marko	Nikola	14.11.1922	LEPURI	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1163.	BONAČIĆ	Goran	Zdravko	13.09.1970.	MALO TIĆEVO		INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

1164.	POPOVAC	Sergije	Ivan	19.04.1960.	MALO TIĆEVO		INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1165.	RAMIĆ	Nikola	Kuzman	06.01.1922.	NOVIGRAD	22.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1166.	UNKNOWN				NOVIGRAD	17.9.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1167.	BUTERIN	Jure	Ante	06.03.1911.	PALJUV	9.9.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1168.	BARABA	Josip	Petar	11.3.1906	PALJUV, SMILČIĆ	29.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1169.	IVANIĆ	Veronika	Marko	26.8.1926	PODLUG	24.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1170.	KAMBER	Jadre	Rade	18.3.1933	PODLUG	24.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1171.	BOBANOVIĆ	Josip	Mijat	15.03.1927.	POLAČA	23.11.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1172.	ŽEPINA	Ljubica	Ilija	03.12.1934.	POLAČA	1.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1173.	ŽEPINA	Mare	Kuzman	16.08.1923.	POLAČA	1.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1174.	ŽEPINA	Stipan	Jako	24.11.1935.	POLAČA	1.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1175.	ŽEPINA	Stipan	Kuzman	27.09.1929.	POLAČA	1.12.1995	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1176.	PRTENJAČA	Jerko	Marijan	18.9.1931	POLAČA	25.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1177.	UNKNOWN				POLAČA	27.8.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1178.	BATUR	Marija	Šname	1.1.1903	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1179.	ČULINA.	Niko	Marko	1.1.1936	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1180.	JERGAN	Ika		1.1.1922	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1181.	JERGAN	Ive	Ante	1.1.1914	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL

							GRAVE
1182.	OŠTRIĆ	Stanko	Pero	2.1.1936	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1183.	ZUBČIĆ	Ante	Vice	1.1.1912	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1184.	ZUBČIĆ	Martin	Ive	28.10.1924	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1185.	ZUBČIĆ	Ante	Šname	4.12.1910	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1186.	ZUBČIĆ	Ive	Luka	11.11.1907	PRIDRAGA	28.5.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1187.	ATELJ	Nikola	Grgo	6.12.1913	RAŠTEVIĆ	25.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1188.	TEPŠA	Mile	Vasilj	14.8.1922	RAŠTEVIĆ	25.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1189.	TOMIČIĆ	Ivan	Jure	14.11.1920	TOMINGAJ	22.8.1996	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1190.	DRAGIČEVIĆ	Dušan	Jovan	1.10.1966	VELEBIT	22.8.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1191.	STOJSAVLJEVIĆ	Marija	Jovo	18.11.1909	VELIKA POPINA	1.6.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1192.	LEDENKO	Ana	Petar	1.1.1924	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1193.	LEDENKO	Cvitko	Joso	1.1.1913	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1194.	LEDENKO	Cvitko	Marko	13.6.1908	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1195.	LEDENKO	Ivan	Šname	1.1.1908	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1196.	MARIĆ	Mate	Blaž	10.9.1910	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1197.	MARIĆ	Stana	Stipe	23.3.1914	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1198.	NIMAC	Stoja	Mate	1.1.1930	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

1199.	ŠIMUNAC	Milica	Jure	13.3.1938	VUKŠIĆ	23.1.1997	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1200.	LEDENKO	Cvita	Nikola	07.06.1920.	VUKŠIĆ, WELL	15.4.1998	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1201.	UNKNOWN				ZAGRAD, GOLI BRIG	13.4.2006	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1202.	UNKNOWN				ZAGRAD	26.2.2007	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1203.	GROZDANIĆ	Ljubica			ŽEGAR, HAMLET GROZDANIĆ	7.11.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE
1204.	UNKNOWN				ŽEGAR, HAMLET GROZDANIĆ	7.11.2002	INDIVIDUAL GRAVE

ANNEX 45:
SAMPLE EXHUMATION DATA

Rev. Ivan Borik
Age 63

(Tovarnik, 23 Januray 1998)

MINUTES OF DISSECTION 18/98

(Examination of the bodies exhumed in Tovarnik)

First and last name: **Rev. Ivan Borik**
Occupation: **Catholic priest**
Age: **63 years old**
Date of death: **9 October 1991**
Date of section: **23 January 1998**

Autopsy performed by: **Dr Anto Blažanović**
Autopsy assisted by: **Ivan Grgić**
Recording clerk: **Ružica Petković**

Remark: The body was exhumed after seven years.
There are signs of saponification and partial putrefaction.

Exhumation of human mortal remains was conducted on 23 January 1998 in Tovarnik (location IC, file no. 037/ 2T).

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY

Examination of clothes and items

Next to the body there was a black waistcoat, a black cardigan with long sleeves, black–gray linen trousers with a black, narrow leather belt, black sports underpants, and green short socks.

AUTOPSY

Head: Masculine skull with no signs of trauma.

State of teeth:

X	Zn	Mzz	Mzz	Zn								x	

X	X	X	X	X	X	I	I	I		I	X	X	X

Legend: X – atrophic alveolar crest; i – tooth came out
Zn – golden cap; Mzz – bridge with a golden tooth

Torso: Vertebrae present, tied to saponified and putrefied soft tissues, no signs of trauma on most of the vertebrae, fractures visible in two thoracic vertebrae in the lower part of the thoracic spine. No signs of trauma in the collar bone, shoulder blade or manubrium sternum. Corpus sternum is missing. Ribs are present and fully preserved. The sternal end of ribs pertain to phase 7 which, according to Yasar-Iscan /method/, indicate age 54-64.

The bones of upper extremities do not show signs of trauma.

Pelvis: masculine, no signs of trauma. According to Suchey – Brooks /method/, the osteoarticular symphuseal face pertains to phase 6, which corresponds with the age between 34 and 86, or 61.2 in average.

There are no signs of trauma on the bones of lower extremities.

The right femur is 47.5 cm long. According to Dupertius and Hadden /method/, the body is 175.39 cm long, and 176.65 cm according to Ousley.

CONCLUSION:

Upon examination of the skeleton, it can be concluded that it is the body of a male, approximately 61.2 years old, approximately 175-177 cm tall.

Based on examination of the skeleton and clothes, it was concluded that they correspond with the identity of **Rev. IVAN BURIK**.

The fractures on two thoracic vertebrae indicate **unnatural and violent nature of death,** most probably as a result of a projectile fired from a sidearm.

Physician-prosector
Dr Anto Blažanović
Pathologist
/signed/


2



Slavica Pavošević
Age c.70

(Lovas, 8 July 1998)

/stamp:/
University School of Medicine
Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology
Zagreb

Physician – witness expert:
Prof. Dr Josip [kavi}
Zagreb

S.p. 61.885-827/1997 (40)

MINUTES

Drawn in the dissecting room of the Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Zagreb

Examination and autopsy of the dead body of N.N. /unidentified person/ no. 256/40 – LOVAS has been conducted.

Examination and identification has been conducted by physician – witness expert Prof. Dr Josip [kavi}, recording clerk Vlasta Hmelina, and assistant Sini{a Cujan.

FINDING

The remains of the dead body of a woman older than 70, gray-haired, with a black scarf on the head.
Along with the dead body the bag contains three handkerchieves, a black rosary, a medicine called Lydrocortison, a platelet of Cafetin, recipes without visible writing on it. A 20 /Austrian/ Schilling bill, 100 DEM /Deutsch Mark/, 1,000 Dinars and 500 Dinars.
The dead body is dressed in a sleeveless brown fleece-lined jacket, a brown machine-knitted cardigan, a black linen house dress with a flower pattern, a black linen pleated skirt underneath, a linen underskirt of light colour, flannel underpants up to the knees underpants, white with blue dots, cotton panties.
Woollen knee-stockings and socks on the feet. All clothing articles of the right lower quadrant of the abdomen were shot through, as well as the region of the abdomen with the exit wound in the middle part of the back and the exit wound on the left on the pelvis and on the right on the back.
On the feet, ankle-high flannel slippers with rubber soles and a zip fastener.
On the dead body there are a large numbers of wounds on the parietal-occipital region with the defect of the skin and the bone in the size of a palm and the gunshot fractures of the left humerus.

Teeth: total upper denture and partial lower denture.

Left femur: 430 mm /added in handwriting/ = 161 cm

Elements for the identification:

three handkerchiefs, black rosary, medicine;
banknotes of 20 shillings, DM 100, 1,000 Dinars and 500 Dinars (Yugoslav);
ankle-high flannel slippers with rubber soles and a zip fastener;
full upper denture and partial lower denture;
brown fleece-lined coat, machine-knitted;
knitted buttoned sweater;
linen house dress, black with a floral pattern

Height: 430 x 376 = 161.680 mm

which gives the approximate height of a woman of around 162 cm.

Head of the Institute
Professor Dušan Zečević, MD
/illegible signature/

Physician – Forensic Medicine Expert
Professor Josip Škavić, MD
/illegible signature/

/round stamp/:
Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology
Zagreb
/illegible/

/*stamp:*
University School of Medicine
Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology
Zagreb/

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
COMMISSION FOR DETAINED AND MISSING PERSONS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE DEAD PERSONS,
NOVA BOLNICA /New Hospital/

ZAGREB

Identification of the dead bodies from Lovas was conducted on 8 July 1997 at the Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology.

S.p. 61.885-826/1997 no. 255/39 PAVOŠEVIĆ MARIJANA
S.p. 61.886-827/1997 no. 256/40 PAVOŠEVIĆ SLAVICA
S.p. 61.881-822/1997 no. 251/35 PAVOŠEVIĆ JOZEFINA
S.p. 61.905-846/1997 no. 275/59 GRGIĆ MIRKO
S.p. 61.847-788/1997 no. 217/1. TURKALJ JOSIP
S.p. 61.911-852/1997 no. 281/65 POLIĆ ALOJZ
S.p. 61.897-838/1997 no. 267/51. SABLJAK TOMO
S.p. 61.877-818/1997 no. 247/31 PANDŽO FRANJO
S.p. 61.887-828/1997 no. 257/41 DOLAČKI STIPO
S.p. 61.898-839/1997 no. 268/52 KRALJEVIĆ JOSIP
S.p. 61.891-832/1997 no. 261/45 BOŽIĆ ZLATKO
S.p. 61.866-807/1997 no. 236/20 RENDULIĆ PERO
S.p. 61.883-824/1997 no. 253/37 SABLJAK IVAN
S.p. 61.871-812/1997 no. 241/25 SABLJAK MARKO
S.p. 61.888-829/1997 no. 258/42 KRIZMANIĆ ALOJZ
S.p. 61.914-855/1997 no. 284/68 POLJAK JOSIP
S.p. 61.901-842/1997 no. 271/55 PEJIĆ STJEPAN
S.p. 61.878-819/1997 DAMJANOVIĆ MARKO no. 248/32
S.p. 61.910-851/1997 JOVANOVIĆ ANKA, no. 280/64
S.p. 61.913-854/1997 JOVANOVIĆ ANTUN no. 283/67
S.p. 61.873-814/1997 ĐUMIĆ FRANJO no. 243/27
S.p. 61.903-844/1997 OSTRUN IVAN no. 273/57
S.p. 61.906-847/1997 KESER MATO no. 276/60
S.p. 61.880-821/1997 JOVANOVIĆ JOSIP no. 250/34





Rudolph Rapp
Age 49

(Tovarik, 27 January 1998)

LOCATION: TOVARNIK
Site: cornfield near the cemetery
Date: 27 January 1998

Location: no. 1 E **Tovarnik, local cemetery**

N.N. /unidentified person/ **048 / IT**

The body is lying on its back, arms are stretched along the body, legs are extended. The head is slightly bowed down, a brown cardigan is recognizable among the remains of the clothes on the body, and a white shirt underneath. There is wide leather belt around the waist, and high shoes with laces and buckles, and thick rubber soles. The body is tied with a 3 mm thick wire around the shins and chest.
According to witnesses, this is probably the body of the late Rudolf Rapp.

The body was identified on 27 January 1998.

N.N. 0148/IT - RUDOLF RAPP, aged 49


A complete set of funeral clothes was used.

WORKS COMPLETED AT: 3:30 p.m.

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F- 179.



Marija Brkić
Age c.85

(Škabrnja, 5 June 1996)

Kir-500/96.

CORPS NO. 2

A corps of an elderly female, lying broadside in a curled position, with knees close to the chin and clasped hands. The body is wrapped in a transparent thin curtain. The body is dressed in a dark blue cardigan, the head is covered with a dark blue kerchief that slipped to the back of the head. Visible on the body is also a yellow and greenish apron in the state of disintegration. Long wollen stockings above knee-height, black. No footwear. Number 2 designates the body, and the arrow designates a detail of the lower jaw to be described below. In its curled position the body is 120 cm long and 160 cm when stretched. Also found were remains of gray hair tied in a plait.

Examined was a female body of an elderly woman about 160 cm tall, with the remains of clothes: a dark blue kerchief that slipped to the back of the head, a thick wollen cardigan of black or dark blue colour, a dress around the waist of yellow and greenish colour, black wollen stockings above knee-height. Beneath the clothes a skeleton was found without any preserved tissues, and the following was found on the skeleton: fracture of the right section of the lower jaw, and an extensive and impressive fracture of the templar bone.

A denture was found in the mouth cavity that fits both the upper and the lower jaw.

The right clavicle was crushed in three fragments; in the height of the chest there is a 1.5 cm wide perforation on the clothes and another two in the height of the right shoulder. The rest of the skeleton corresponds with the age of the dead woman.

According to the findings, the death was caused by an extensive contusion of the brain as a consequence of blows inflicted by a blunt object to the right temple of the head, and by the haemorrhagic shock caused by an entry-and-exit wound in the chest which, judging by anatomical relations, affected the right lung and led to the hameorrhage of the thorax.
Kir-500/96.

On the Corps no. 2 visible are two defects on the cardigan in the area below the chin on the right shoulder, the nature of which corresponds to the defects caused by firearms.

In attendance of the exhumation wa also Mile Brkić, son of the late Marija Brkić, who recognized the aforementioned remains as his mother's, MARIJA BRKIĆ, born 1906. A separate official note on the details relevant for identification will be composed by the officer of the Zadar-Knin PU /Police Administration/ Ahmet Avdić, under the authority of the investigating judge.


5. 06. 1996
LOKACIJA 1
SKADRHA
H.N. 002
'96 6 5

Zoran Šmit
Age 10

(Pakrac, 14 November 1995)

/stamp:/
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
INSTITUTE FOR FORENSIC MEDICINE AND CRIMINOLOGY
ZAGREB

Physician – expert witness
Dr Davor Strinović, Ph.D.

Sp. 59.507-1430/95
(bag no. 3)

MINUTES
of 14 November 1995

composed at the Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology regarding the mortal remains from the bag no. 3, location no. 3 Pakrac – Pakrački Vinogradi /Pakrac Vineyards/, Sv. Roka Street bb /no number/, ruins of the house belonging to the Šmit family.
Examination performed by Dr Davor Strinović, assisted by Marino Paurović, notes taken by Lorenta Gaćina.

FINDING

A corps of a child aged about ten. The body is in the state of decomposition with only parts of certain tissues of the chest preserved, whereas other parts are skeletonized. An extensive defect, 7-8 cm in diameter, was found at the right temple extending all the way to the right jaw. The right side of the lower jaw is broken at the arch. The teeth are of a regular shape, eye-teeth not yet grown, the seventh tooth is visible, the hair is partly preserved, it is brown and about 6 cm long.

Description of clothes:
The child's body was wrapped in a bed sheet; it was dressed in a pyjama and a track suit of light colour with patterns of flowers and small clouds, red sports underants with white stripes on the sides, and underneath another red children's red underpants. The upper part of the tracksuit has a blue-bordered high collar. Underneath is a dark coloured T-shirt with lightly coloured sleeves.
The feet are shod in rubber slippers – thongs.

Opinion

The examination of the dead body in the body bag no. 3 has established that it is a male child who, based on the testimony of the witness, location and his uncle Ivan Šmit, was recognised as ŠMIT ZORAN, 10 years of age.

Head of the Institute
Professor Dušan Zečević, MD
/illegible signature/

Physician – Forensic Medicine Expert
Davor Strinović, DSc, Senior Lecturer
/illegible signature/

/illegible round stamp/


3.
3.

Manda Banović
Age 58

(Tenja, 26 February 1998)

REPORT OF DISSECTION No. 186/98

(Exhumation in Tenja – Betin dvor)

First and Last Name:	**MANDA BANOVIĆ**	Mentor:	**Dr Mladen Marcikić, DSc**
Occupation:	-		
Date of birth:	**11 May 1938**	Autopsist:	**Dr Boris Dumenčić**
Date of death:	**November 1991**	Assistant Autopsist:	**Ivica Grgić**
Date of dissection:	**26 February 1998**	Recording Clerk:	**Luka Tomasić**

NOTE: The exhumation of the body was performed on 26 February 1998 in Tenja (Betin dvor)

The exhumation of the human bodily remains was performed in the place of Tenja (Betin dvor), at the location **LOK 4,** under the number **173,** on 26 February 1998.

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY:

Examination of the clothing and objects:

The following clothing articles were found:

- **Black knitted sweater with oval neck, with long sleeves, with the interwoven pattern in the shape of small triangles;**
- **Green dressing gown with black ornaments made of thin material, with short sleeves and front buttoning;**
- **Rose-coloured T-shirt, with short sleeves and with the shirt-type collar;**
- **White camisole;**
- **Multicoloured reddish skirt with lining;**
- **Thick, grey, female tights;**
- **White female panties**

Autopsy:

The body is saponified**.**

Head: The general anatomic appearance of the head is consistent with the female person and the general examination established a deformity of the right side of the cranial vault and the base of the skull as well as the facial bones. Upon separating the saponified tissue, the multiple fractures of the bones of the cranial vault, base and facial bones were observed. On the maxilla there is a fracture on the median line.

Status of the teeth:

X	X	X		X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X
X		X	X				X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X

R /right/ **L** /left/

Key:

I =	fallen tooth;	x =	atrophic alveolar ridge	k =	caries
nz =	tooth cap-golden	u =	artificial tooth	p =	filling
m =	dental bridge	sn =	silver cap	zn =	golden cap
n =	tooth cap				

Trunk: On the general examination, no signs of trauma were observed on the trunk, both scapulas and both clavicles are adequate.

Thorax: On the examination of the rib wall, ribs and sternum, not signs of trauma were found.

Abdominal wall: The wall is saponified but, with the kept continuity and without trauma.

Vertebral column: The vertebrae are mutually connected with the saponified tissue and there are no signs of trauma on the vertebral column.

Pelvis: The general anatomic shape of the pelvis corresponds with the female person and there are no signs of fracture on the pelvis. On the examination of the inner surface of the symphisis the morphological changes were found which correspond to the phase VI as per the Suchey-Brooks /method/, which is the characteristic of the age of around 60 years (the span between 42 and 87 years)

Upper extremities: Both humerus and both antebrachiums are without trauma.

Lower extremities: Both femurs and both femur bones are without trauma and on the right tibia in the central part, through the saponified tissue, the fracture of the right tibia and fibula is prominent. The length of the right femur is 45 cm which, calculated by the method of Dupertuis and Hadden, corresponds to the length of the body of 165.67 years and according to the Ousley /method/ 167.23 years /sic/.

CONCLUSION

The external examination and the autopsy of the bodily characteristic of the saponified body and the skeleton as well as the clothing articles, established the identity of **MANDA BANOVIĆ**, aged 58 years at the time of death and of the average height of 165 cm.

The external examination and the autopsy established the multiple fractures of the bones of the cranial vault and the base of the skull as well as the facial bones on the right side, and also the fracture of the right tibia and fibula was established.


The finding of those wounds points to the violent natural death.

Autopsist:
Dr Boris Dumenčić
/signed/

Forensic expert:
Dr Mladen Marcikić, DSc
Specialist in Forensic Medicine and Pathology
/illegible signature/
/illegible round stamp/

/stamp/ **Dr MLADEN MARCIKIĆ, DSc**
Specialist in Pathological Anatomy and
Forensic Medicine
053392

THE TASKS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXHUMATION PROCESS



Remark: The organisation and co-ordination of the exhumation (conducted by the Directorate for Detained and Missing People) is initiated upon an oral or written notice on the preparation/issuing of the order for it to be performed made by the competent investigative court

ANNEX 47:
SERBIAN LIST OF PERSONS DETAINED ON THE TERRITORY OF SERBIA

1		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
3		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
4		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
5		SC Begejci		
6		VIZ Beograd	Brought from	doveden iz SM 14.06.1992.g.
7		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
8		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
9		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
10		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
11		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
12		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
13		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
14		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin
15		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
16		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
17		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
18		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
19		SC Begejci		
20		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
21		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
22		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
23		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
24		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
25		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
26		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
27		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
28		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
29		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
30		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
31		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
32		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
33		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
34		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
35		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
36		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
37		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
38		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
39		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
40		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Apatin
41		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
42		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
43		SC Begejci	Released	02.12.1991. god otpušten
44		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
45		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
46		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
47		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
48		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
49		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
50		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
51		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
52		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
53		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
54		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
55		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
56		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
57		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
58		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
59		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM

60	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
61	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	03.12.1991. god otpušten
62	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	03.12.1991. god otpušten
63	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	03.12.1991.god otpuštena
64	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
65	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
66	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
67	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
68	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
69	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
70	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
71	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
72	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
73	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
74	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
75	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
76	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
77	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
78	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
79	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
80	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
81	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
82	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
83	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
84	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
85	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
86	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
87	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
88	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
89	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
90	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
91	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
92	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
93	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
94	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
95	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
96	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
97	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
98	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
99	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
100	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
101	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
102	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
103	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
104	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
105	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
106	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
107	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
108	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
109	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
110	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released... leaves to	Otpušten 02.12.-odlazi u Beograd
111	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released... leaves to	Otpušten 02.12.-odlazi u Beograd
112	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
113	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
114	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
115	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
116	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
117	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
118	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin

119		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
120		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
121		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
122		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
123		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
124		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
125		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
126		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
127		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
128		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
129		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
130		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
131		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
132		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
133		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
134		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
135		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
136		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
137		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
138		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
139		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
140		SC Begejci		
141		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
142		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
143		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
144		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpušten
145		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
146		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
147		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
148		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
149		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
150		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
151		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
152		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
153		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
154		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
155		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
156		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
157		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
158		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpušten
159		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
160		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
161		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
162		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
163		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
164		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
165		SC S.Mitrovica		
166		SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu
167		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
168		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
169		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
170		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
171		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
172		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
173		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
174		SC Begejci		VIZ Beograd
175		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
176		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
177		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena

178		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
179		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
180		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
181		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
182		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
183		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
184		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
185		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
186		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
187		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
188		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
189		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
190		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
191		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
192		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
193		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
194		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
195		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
196		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
197		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
198		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
199		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
200		SC Begejci	Handed over... because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
201		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
202		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
203		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
204		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
205		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
206		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
207		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
208		SC S.Mitrovica		
209		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
210		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
211		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
212		SC Begejci		
213		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
214		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
215		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
216		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
217		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
218		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
219		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
220		SC Stajićevo	Released... leaves to village...	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u selo Naštin
221		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
222		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
223		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
224		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
225		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
226		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
227		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
228		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
229		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
230		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
231		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
232		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
233		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
234		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
235		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
236		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03

237	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
238	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
239	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
240	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
241	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
242	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
243	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
244	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
245	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
246	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
247	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
248	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
249	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
250	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
251	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
252	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
253	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
254	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
255	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
256	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
257	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
258	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
259	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
260	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
261	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
262	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
263	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
264	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
265	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
266	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
267	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
268	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
269	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
270	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Died	03.12.1991. god preminuo
271	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Died	preminuo 03.11.
272	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
273	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
274	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
275	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
276	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
277	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpušten
278	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
279	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
280	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
281	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
282	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
283	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
284	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
285	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
286	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
287	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
288	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
289	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
290	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
291	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
292	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
293	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
294	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
295	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

296		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
297		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
298		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
299		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
300		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
301		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
302		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
303		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
304		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
305		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
306		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
307		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
308		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
309		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
310		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
311		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
312		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
313		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
314		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
315		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
316		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
317		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
318		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
319		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
320		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
321		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
322		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
323		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
324		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
325		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
326		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
327		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
328		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
329		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
330		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
331		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
332		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
333		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
334		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
335		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
336		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
337		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
338		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
339		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
340		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
341		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
342		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
343		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
344		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
345		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
346		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
347		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
348		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
349		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
350		SC Begejci		
351		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
352		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
353		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
354		SC Begejci		

355		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
356		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
357		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
358		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
359		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
360		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
361		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
362		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
363		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
364		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
365		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
366		SC Begejci		
367		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
368		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
369		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
370		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
371		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
372		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
373		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
374		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
375		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
376		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
377		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
378		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
379		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
380		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
381		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over to Komisiju za razmenu	predat komisiji za razmenu 09.08.1992
382		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
383		SC Niš		
384		SC Stajićevo	Released - lazova ta	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Mladenovac
385		SC Begejci	Released	06.12.1991. god otpušten
386		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
387		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
388		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
389		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
390		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
391		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
392		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
393		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
394		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
395		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
396		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
397		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
398		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
399		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
400		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
401		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
402		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
403		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
404		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
405		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
406		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
407		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
408		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
409		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
410		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
411		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
412		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
413		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03

414		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
415		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
416		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
417		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
418		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
419		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
420		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
421		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
422		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
423		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
424		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
425		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
426		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
427		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
428		SC S.Mitrovica		
429		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
430		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
431		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
432		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
433		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
434		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
435		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
436		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
437		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
438		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
439		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
440		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
441		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
442		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
443		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
444		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
445		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
446		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
447		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
448		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
449		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
450		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
451		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
452		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
453		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
454		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
455		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
456		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
457		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
458		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
459		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
460		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
461		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
462		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
463		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
464		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
465		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
466		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
467		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
468		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
469		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
470		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
471		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
472		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03

473		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
474		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
475		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
476		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
477		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
478		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
479		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
480		SC Begejci	Released went to his sister in Novi Sad	05.12.1991. otpušten otišao kod sestre u Novi Sad
481		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
482		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
483		SC Begejci		
484		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
485		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
486		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
487		SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange - seriously ill	odbio razmenu-teški bolenik
488		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
489		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
490		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
491		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
492		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
493		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
494		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
495		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
496		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
497		SC Begejci		
498		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
499		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
500		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
501		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
502		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
503		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
504		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
505		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
506		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
507		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
508		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
509		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
510		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
511		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
512		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
513		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
514		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
515		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
516		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
517		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
518		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
519		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
520		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
521		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
522		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
523		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
524		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
525		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	predat VP 9922 Bgd 06.08.1992.g
526		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
527		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
528		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
529		SC Begejci		
530		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
531		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

532	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
533	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
534	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
535	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
536	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
537	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991.god razmena
538	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu 17.12. na Plesu
539	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
540	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
541	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
542	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
543	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
544	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
545	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
546	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
547	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
548	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
549	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over... because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
550	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
551	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
552	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
553	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
554	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
555	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
556	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
557	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
558	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
559	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
560	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
561	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
562	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
563	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
564	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
565	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
566	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
567	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
568	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
569	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
570	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
571	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
572	[redacted]	SC Begejci	05.12.1991. otpušten otišao u Backu Palanku u Released went to... to his house	svoju kuću
573	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
574	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
575	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
576	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
577	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
578	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
579	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
580	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
581	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
582	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
583	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
584	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
585	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
586	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
587	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
588	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
589	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
590	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.

591	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12
592	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
593	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
594	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
595	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu
596	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
597	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
598	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
599	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
600	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
601	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
602	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
603	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
604	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
605	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
606	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
607	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
608	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
609	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
610	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
611	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
612	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
613	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpušten
614	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
615	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
616	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
617	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
618	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
619	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
620	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
621	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
622	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
623	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
624	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
625	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
626	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
627	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
628	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
629	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
630	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
631	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
632	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
633	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
634	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
635	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
636	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
637	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
638	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
639	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
640	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
641	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
642	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
643	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
644	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
645	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
646	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
647	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
648	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
649	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

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650		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
651		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
652		SC Begejci		
653		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
654		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
655		SC S.Mitrovica		
656		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
657		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
658		SC Begejci	Exchanged	razmena
659		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
660		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
661		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
662		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
663		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
664		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
665		SC Stajićevo	Released	otpušten
666		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
667		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
668		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
669		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
670		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
671		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
672		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
673		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
674		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
675		SC S.Mitrovica		
676		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
677		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
678		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
679		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
680		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
681		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
682		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
683		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
684		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
685		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
686		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
687		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
688		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
689		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
690		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
691		SC S.Mitrovica		
692		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
693		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
694		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
695		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
696		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
697		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
698		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
699		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
700		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
701		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
702		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
703		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
704		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
705		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
706		SC Begejci		
707		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
708		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03

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709	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
710	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
711	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
712	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
713	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
714	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
715	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
716	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
717	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
718	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
719	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
720	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
721	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
722	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
723	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
724	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
725	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
726	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
727	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
728	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
729	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991.god razmena
730	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991.god razmena
731	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
732	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
733	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
734	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
735	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
736	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
737	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
738	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
739	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
740	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
741	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
742	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
743	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
744	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
745	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
746	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
747	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
748	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
749	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
750	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
751	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
752	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
753	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
754	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
755	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
756	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
757	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
758	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
759	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
760	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
761	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
762	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
763	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
764	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
765	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
766	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
767	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena

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768		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
769		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
770		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
771		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
772		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
773		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
774		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
775		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
776		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
777		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
778		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
779		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
780		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
781		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac
782		SC S.Mitrovica	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac	Exchanged
783		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
784		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
785		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
786		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
787		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
788		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
789		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
790		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
791		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
792		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
793		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
794		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
795		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
796		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
797		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
798		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
799		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
800		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
801		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
802		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
803		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
804		SC Begejci		
805		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
806		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
807		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
808		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
809		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
810		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
811		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
812		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
813		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
814		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena
815		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
816		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
817		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
818		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
819		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
820		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
821		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
822		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
823		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
824		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
825		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
826		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac

827	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
828	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
829	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
830	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
831	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
832	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
833	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
834	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
835	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
836	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
837	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
838	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
839	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
840	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
841	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
842	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
843	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac	Exchanged
844	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
845	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
846	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
847	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
848	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
849	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
850	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
851	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
852	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over ... because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
853	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
854	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
855	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
856	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
857	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
858	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
859	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
860	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
861	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
862	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
863	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
864	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Sarajevo
865	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
866	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
867	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
868	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
869	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
870	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
871	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
872	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
873	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
874	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
875	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
876	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
877	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
878	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
879	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
880	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
881	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
882	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
883	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
884	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
885	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.

886	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
887	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
888	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
889	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
890	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
891	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
892	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
893	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
894	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
895	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
896	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
897	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
898	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
899	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
900	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
901	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
902	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
903	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
904	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
905	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
906	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
907	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust -05.12.
908	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
909	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
910	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
911	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
912	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
913	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
914	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
915	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac
916	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
917	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
918	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ... through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
919	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
920	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
921	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
922	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
923	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
924	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
925	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
926	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
927	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
928	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
929	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
930	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
931	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
932	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
933	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
934	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
935	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
936	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
937	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
938	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
939	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
940	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
941	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
942	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
943	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
944	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

945	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
946	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
947	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
948	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
949	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
950	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
951	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
952	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.02
953	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
954	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
955	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
956	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
957	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
958	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
959	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
960	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
961	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
962	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released...went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Loznicu
963	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
964	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
965	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.04
966	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
967	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
968	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
969	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
970	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
971	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
972	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
973	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
974	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
975	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ..through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
976	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
977	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	predat MKCK 24.03.992.g
978	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
979	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
980	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
981	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
982	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
983	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
984	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
985	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
986	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
987	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
988	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
989	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
990	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
991	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
992	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
993	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
994	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
995	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
996	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
997	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
998	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
999	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1000	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1001	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1002	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1003	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		

1004		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1005		SC S.Mitrovica		
1006		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1007		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1008		SC Begejci	Withdraw for exchange	24.10.1991. povučen radi razmene
1009		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1010		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1011		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1012		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1013		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1014		SC Begejci		
1015		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena
1016		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
1017		SC S.Mitrovica		
1018		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1019		SC S.Mitrovica		
1020		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1021		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1022		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1023		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1024		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1025		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1026		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena
1027		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1028		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1029		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1030		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1031		SC S.Mitrovica		
1032		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1033		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1034		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1035		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1036		SC Begejci		
1037		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
1038		SC Begejci		
1039		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1040		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1041		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1042		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1043		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1044		SC Begejci		
1045		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1046		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1047		SC Stajićevo	Died	preminuo 23.11.
1048		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1049		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1050		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1051		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1052		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1053		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1054		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1055		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1056		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1057		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1058		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1059		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1060		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1061		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1062		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac

1063		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1064		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1065		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12
1066		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1067		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1068		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1069		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1070		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1071		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1072		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1073		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1074		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1075		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1076		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1077		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1078		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1079		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1080		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1081		SC S.Mitrovica	Died in	preminuo u VB Novi Sad 09.01.
1082		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena
1083		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1084		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1085		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1086		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1087		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpušten
1088		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1089		SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1090		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1091		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1092		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1093		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1094		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1095		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1096		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1097		SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1098		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1099		SC Begejci		
1100		SC S.Mitrovica	Died	preminuo 22.11.
1101		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1102		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1103		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1104		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1105		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1106		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1107		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1108		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1109		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1110		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1111		SC S.Mitrovica		
1112		SC S.Mitrovica		
1113		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1114		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1115		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1116		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1117		SC S.Mitrovica		
1118		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1119		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1120		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1121		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

1122	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1123	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1124	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1125	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1126	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1127	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1128	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1129	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1130	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1131	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1132	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1133	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1134	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1135	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1136	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1137	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1138	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1139	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1140	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Died	preminuo 15.12.
1141	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1142	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1143	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1144	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1145	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1146	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1147	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1148	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1149	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1150	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1151	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1152	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1153	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1154	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1155	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1156	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1157	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1158	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1159	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1160	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1161	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1162	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1163	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1164	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1165	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1166	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1167	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over ...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1168	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1169	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1170	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1171	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1172	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1173	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1174	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1175	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1176	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1177	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1178	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1179	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1180	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		

1181	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1182	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1183	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1184	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1185	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1186	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1187	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1188	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1189	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1190	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1191	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1192	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.02
1193	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1194	[redacted]	SC Niš		Pleso 17.12.
1195	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1196	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1197	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1198	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1199	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1200	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1201	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1202	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1203	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1204	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1205	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1206	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1207	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1208	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1209	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1210	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1211	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1212	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1213	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1214	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1215	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1216	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1217	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1218	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1219	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1220	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1221	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1222	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1223	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1224	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1225	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1226	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1227	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1228	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
1229	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1230	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1231	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1232	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1233	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1234	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1235	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1236	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1237	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1238	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1239	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.

1240	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.02
1241	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1242	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1243	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1244	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1245	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1246	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1247	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1248	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1249	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd		Pleso 17.12.
1250	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1251	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1252	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1253	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1254	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1255	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over... through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1256	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1257	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1258	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1259	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1260	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1261	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1262	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1263	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1264	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1265	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1266	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1267	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1268	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1269	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1270	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1271	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1272	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1273	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1274	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1275	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1276	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1277	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1278	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1279	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1280	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1281	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1282	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1283	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1284	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1285	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1286	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1287	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1288	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1289	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released sent to...	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Bačku Palanku
1290	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1291	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1292	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1293	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1294	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1295	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1296	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1297	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
1298	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03

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1299		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1300		SC Stajićevo	Died	preminuo 24.11.
1301		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1302		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1303		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1304		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1305		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1306		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1307		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1308		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1309		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1310		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1311		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1312		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1313		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1314		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1315		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1316		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1317		SC Begejci		
1318		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1319		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1320		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1321		SC Begejci		
1322		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1323		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1324		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1325		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1326		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1327		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1328		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1329		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1330		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1331		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1332		SC S.Mitrovica		
1333		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1334		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1335		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1336		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1337		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1338		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1339		SC Begejci		
1340		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1341		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1342		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1343		SC Begejci	Exchanged	11.12.1991. god razmena
1344		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1345		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1346		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1347		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1348		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1349		SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1350		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1351		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1352		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1353		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1354		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1355		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1356		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1357		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

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1358		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1359		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1360		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1361		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1362		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 02.12.
1363		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1364		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1365		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1366		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1367		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1368		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1369		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1370		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1371		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1372		VIZ Beograd		
1373		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1374		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1375		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1376		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1377		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1378		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1379		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1380		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1381		SC Begejci		
1382		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1383		SC S.Mitrovica		
1384		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1385		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1386		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1387		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1388		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1389		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1390		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1391		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1392		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1393		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1394		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1395		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1396		SC Begejci		
1397		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1398		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1399		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1400		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1401		SC Begejci		
1402		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1403		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1404		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1405		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1406		SC S.Mitrovica		
1407		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1408		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1409		SC S.Mitrovica	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac	Exchanged
1410		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1411		SC Niš	Stayed with his father	ostao uz oca KPD
1412		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1413		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1414		SC S.Mitrovica		
1415		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1416		SC S.Mitrovica		

1417	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1418	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1419	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1420	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1421	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1422	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1423	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1424	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1425	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1426	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1427	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1428	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1429	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1430	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1431	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1432	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1433	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1434	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1435	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1436	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1437	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1438	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1439	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd		
1440	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1441	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1442	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1443	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1444	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1445	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1446	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1447	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1448	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1449	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1450	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1451	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1452	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1453	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1454	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1455	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1456	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1457	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1458	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1459	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1460	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1461	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over...through	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1462	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1463	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1464	[redacted]	SC Begejci		KPD Lipovica
1465	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1466	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1467	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1468	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1469	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1470	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1471	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1472	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1473	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1474	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1475	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.

1476	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
1477	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1478	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1479	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1480	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1481	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1482	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1483	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1484	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1485	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1486	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1487	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1488	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1489	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1490	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released... leaves th	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Beograd
1491	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1492	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1493	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1494	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1495	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1496	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1497	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1498	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1499	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1500	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1501	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1502	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1503	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1504	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1505	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1506	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1507	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1508	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.-B.Šamac
1509	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1510	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1511	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1512	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1513	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1514	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1515	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1516	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Handed over...because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1517	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1518	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1519	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1520	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1521	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1522	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1523	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1524	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1525	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac	Exchanged
1526	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1527	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1528	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1529	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1530	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1531	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1532	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1533	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1534	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.

1535	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1536	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
1537	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1538	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1539	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1540	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1541	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1542	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1543	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1544	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1545	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1546	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1547	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1548	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1549	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1550	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1551	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1552	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1553	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1554	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1555	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1556	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1557	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1558	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1559	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1560	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1561	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1562	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1563	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1564	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1565	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1566	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1567	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1568	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1569	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1570	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1571	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1572	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1573	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1574	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1575	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1576	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1577	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1578	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1579	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1580	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1581	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1582	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1583	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1584	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1585	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1586	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1587	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1588	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1589	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1590	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1591	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1592	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1593	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

1594	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1595	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1596	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1597	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1598	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1599	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1600	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1601	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1602	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1603	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1604	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1605	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1606	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1607	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1608	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1609	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1610	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1611	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1612	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1613	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1614	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1615	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
1616	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1617	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1618	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1619	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1620	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1621	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1622	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1623	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1624	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1625	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1626	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1627	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1628	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1629	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1630	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1631	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1632	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1633	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1634	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1635	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1636	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1637	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1638	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1639	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1640	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1641	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1642	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1643	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1644	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1645	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1646	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1647	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1648	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1649	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1650	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1651	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1652	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.

1653	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1654	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1655	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
1656	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1657	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1658	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1659	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1660	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1661	[redacted]	SC Niš	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12..-B.Šamac
1662	[redacted]	SC Niš	Died	preminuo 25.11.
1663	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1664	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1665	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1666	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	Otpušten SSNO
1667	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1668	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1669	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1670	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1671	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1672	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1673	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1674	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1675	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1676	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1677	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1678	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1679	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1680	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1681	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1682	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1683	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1684	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1685	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1686	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1687	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1688	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1689	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1690	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1691	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1692	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1693	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1694	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1695	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1696	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1697	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	02.12.1991. god otpušten
1698	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		
1699	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
1700	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1701	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1702	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1703	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1704	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1705	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1706	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1707	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1708	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1709	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over through	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
1710	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1711	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena

1712	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu
1713	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1714	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1715	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1716	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1717	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1718	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1719	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1720	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1721	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1722	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1723	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1724	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1725	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1726	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1727	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1728	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1729	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1730	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1731	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1732	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1733	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1734	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1735	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1736	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1737	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1738	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1739	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1740	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1741	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1742	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1743	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1744	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1745	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1746	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1747	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1748	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1749	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1750	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1751	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1752	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1753	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1754	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1755	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1756	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1757	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1758	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1759	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1760	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1761	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1762	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1763	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1764	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1765	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1766	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1767	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1768	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1769	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1770	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

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1771		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1772		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1773		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1774		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
1775		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1776		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1777		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1778		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
1779		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1780		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1781		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1782		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1783		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1784		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1785		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1786		SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu
1787		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1788		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1789		SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1790		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1791		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1792		SC Begejci	Released to	03.12.1991. god otpušten u Suboticu
1793		SC Begejci	Released by	05.12.1991. god otpušten kod zvonika u Subotici
1794		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1795		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1796		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1797		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1798		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1799		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1800		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1801		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1802		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1803		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1804		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1805		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1806		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1807		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1808		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1809		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1810		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1811		SC S.Mitrovica		
1812		SC Stajićevo		Mitrovica
1813		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1814		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1815		SC S.Mitrovica		
1816		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1817		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1818		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
1819		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1820		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1821		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1822		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1823		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1824		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1825		SC Stajićevo	Released went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Krnjaču-Beograd
1826		SC S.Mitrovica		
1827		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1828		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1829		SC S.Mitrovica		

1830	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1831	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1832	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1833	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1834	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1835	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1836	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1837	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1838	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1839	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1840	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1841	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1842	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1843	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1844	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1845	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1846	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1847	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
1848	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1849	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1850	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1851	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1852	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1853	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1854	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1855	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1856	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1857	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1858	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1859	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1860	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1861	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1862	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1863	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1864	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1865	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1866	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1867	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1868	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1869	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1870	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1871	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1872	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1873	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1874	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1875	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
1876	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin
1877	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1878	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1879	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1880	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
1881	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1882	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1883	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1884	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1885	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1886	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1887	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1888	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over...because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen

1889		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12
1890		SC S.Mitrovica		
1891		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1892		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1893		SC Begejci		
1894		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1895		SC Begejci		
1896		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1897		SC Begejci		
1898		SC Begejci		
1899		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1900		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1901		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...throug	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
1902		SC Begejci	Released...went to Borcu by his cousine	Otpušten 03.12.1991. god, otišao u Borcu kod rođaka
1903		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1904		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...throug	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1905		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1906		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1907		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1908		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1909		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1910		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1911		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1912		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1913		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1914		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1915		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1916		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1917		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1918		SC Begejci		
1919		SC Begejci		
1920		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1921		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
1922		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1923		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1924		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1925		SC Begejci	withdraw for exchange	24.10.1991. god povučen radi razmene
1926		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1927		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1928		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1929		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1930		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1931		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1932		SC S.Mitrovica		
1933		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1934		SC S.Mitrovica		
1935		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1936		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1937		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1938		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1939		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1940		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1941		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1942		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1943		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1944		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1945		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1946		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1947		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM

1948	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1949	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1950	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1951	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1952	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1953	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1954	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1955	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1956	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1957	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1958	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
1959	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1960	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1961	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1962	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1963	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1964	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1965	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
1966	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
1967	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.
1968	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1969	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1970	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1971	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1972	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1973	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed to commission for exchange	predat komisiji za razmenu 09.08.1992
1974	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Prisoner went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Bačku Palanku
1975	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	13.12.1991. god otpušten u N. Beograd
1976	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1977	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1978	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
1979	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
1980	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1981	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1982	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1983	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
1984	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1985	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1986	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	18.11.1991. god otpušten
1987	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
1988	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
1989	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
1990	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
1991	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
1992	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1993	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1994	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1995	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1996	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1997	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
1998	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
1999	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2000	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2001	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2002	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2003	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2004	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2005	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2006	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.

2007	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2008	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2009	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2010	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2011	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2012	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2013	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2014	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2015	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2016	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2017	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2018	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2019	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2020	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2021	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2022	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2023	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2024	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2025	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2026	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2027	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2028	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2029	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2030	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2031	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2032	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2033	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2034	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2035	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2036	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2037	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2038	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over - through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2039	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2040	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2041	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2042	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2043	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2044	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2045	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2046	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2047	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2048	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2049	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2050	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2051	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2052	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2053	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	15.12.1991. god otpušten
2054	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	03.12.1991. otpušten
2055	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2056	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu 17.12. na Plesu
2057	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2058	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2059	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2060	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2061	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2062	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2063	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		
2064	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2065	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

2066	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2067	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2068	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2069	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2070	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2071	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2072	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2073	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2074	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2075	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2076	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2077	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2078	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2079	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2080	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2081	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
2082	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2083	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2084	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2085	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2086	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2087	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2088	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2089	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2090	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2091	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2092	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2093	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2094	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2095	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2096	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2097	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2098	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2099	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2100	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2101	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2102	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2103	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2104	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over..through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2105	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2106	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2107	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2108	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
2109	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2110	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2111	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released	05.12.1991. otpušten kod sestre od tetke u Beogradu
2112	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2113	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2114	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over..through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2115	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2116	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2117	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2118	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2119	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2120	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2121	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2122	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2123	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2124	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.

2125	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2126	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2127	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2128	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2129	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2130	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2131	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2132	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2133	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2134	SC Begejci		
2135	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2136	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2137	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2138	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2139	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2140	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2141	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2142	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...Because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2143	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2144	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2145	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2146	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2147	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2148	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2149	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2150	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2151	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2152	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2153	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2154	SC Begejci		
2155	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2156	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2157	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2158	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2159	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2160	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2161	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2162	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2163	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2164	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	predat VMC Karaburma 25.08.1992
2165	SC Stajićevo	Released...went	Otpušten 02.12.-odlazi u Pančevo
2166	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2167	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2168	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2169	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2170	SC Begejci		
2171	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2172	SC Begejci		
2173	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2174	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2175	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
2176	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2177	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2178	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2179	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2180	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2181	SC S.Mitrovica		
2182	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2183	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK

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2184	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released...went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Kljajićevo
2185	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2186	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2187	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2188	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2189	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2190	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2191	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2192	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2193	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2194	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2195	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2196	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2197	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2198	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2199	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2200	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2201	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2202	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2203	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2204	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2205	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2206	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2207	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2208	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2209	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Razmena 21.01.-B.Šamac	Exchanged
2210	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2211	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2212	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2213	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2214	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2215	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2216	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2217	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2218	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2219	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2220	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2221	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2222	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2223	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2224	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2225	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2226	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2227	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2228	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2229	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2230	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2231	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2232	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2233	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged...went to	Razmena 17.12.-odlazi u Mladenovac
2234	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2235	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2236	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2237	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2238	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2239	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2240	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2241	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2242	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12

2244	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2245	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2246	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2247	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2248	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2249	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2250	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2251	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2252	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2253	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2254	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2255	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2256	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
2257	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2258	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2259	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2260	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2261	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2262	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2263	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2264	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2265	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2266	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2267	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2268	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2269	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2270	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2271	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2272	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2273	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2274	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2275	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2276	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2277	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2278	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2279	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2280	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2281	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2282	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2283	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2284	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2285	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2286	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
2287	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2288	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2289	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2290	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Refused exchange	odbio razmenu
2291	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2292	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2293	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2294	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2295	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2296	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2297	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2298	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2299	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2300	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2301	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
		SC Begejci		

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2302	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2303	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2304	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2305	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2306	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2307	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2308	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2309	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2310	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2311	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2312	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2313	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2314	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2315	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2316	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2317	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2318	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2319	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2320	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2321	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2322	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2323	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2324	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2325	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	predat MKCK 24.03.992.g
2326	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2327	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2328	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2329	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2330	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2331	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2332	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2333	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2334	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2335	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2336	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2337	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2338	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2339	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2340	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2341	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2342	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2343	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2344	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2345	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2346	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2347	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2348	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2349	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2350	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2351	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2352	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2353	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2354	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2355	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2356	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2357	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Brought from	doveden iz SM 14.06.1992.g
2358	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2359	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2360	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

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2361		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2362		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2363		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2364		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2365		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2366		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2367		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2368		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2369		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2370		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2371		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2372		SC Begejci		
2373		SC Begejci		
2374		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2375		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2376		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2377		SC Stajićevo	Released...went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Zenicu
2378		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2379		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2380		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2381		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2382		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2383		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2384		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2385		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2386		SC Begejci		
2387		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2388		SC Begejci		
2389		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2390		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2391		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2392		SC S.Mitrovica		
2393		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2394		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2395		SC S.Mitrovica		
2396		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2397		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2398		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2399		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2400		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2401		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2402		SC Begejci		
2403		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2404		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2405		SC Begejci		
2406		SC Begejci		
2407		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2408		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2409		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2410		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2411		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2412		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2413		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2414		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2415		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2416		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2417		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2418		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2419		SC S.Mitrovica		Pleso 17.12.

2420	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2421	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2422	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2423	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2424	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2425	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2426	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2427	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2428	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2429	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2430	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2431	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2432	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2433	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2434	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2435	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2436	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2437	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2438	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2439	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2440	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2441	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2442	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2443	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2444	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2445	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2446	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2447	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2448	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2449	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2450	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
2451	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2452	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2453	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2454	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2455	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2456	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2457	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2458	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2459	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2460	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2461	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2462	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2463	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2464	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2465	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2466	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2467	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2468	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2469	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2470	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2471	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2472	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Pale, Sarajevo
2473	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2474	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2475	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2476	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2477	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2478	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen

2479	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2480	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2481	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2482	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2483	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2484	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2485	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2486	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2487	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2488	[redacted]	SC Niš	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2489	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2490	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2491	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2492	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2493	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2494	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2495	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena
2496	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2497	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2498	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2499	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2500	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2501	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2502	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2503	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2504	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2505	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2506	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2507	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2508	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2509	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
2510	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2511	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2512	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2513	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2514	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2515	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2516	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2517	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2518	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2519	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2520	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2521	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2522	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2523	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2524	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2525	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2526	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2527	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2528	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2529	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2530	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2531	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2532	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2533	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2534	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2535	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2536	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2537	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. razmena

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2538	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2539	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2540	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12
2541	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2542	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2543	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12
2544	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2545	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2546	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2547	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2548	SC Begejci		
2549	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2550	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2551	SC S.Mitrovica		nemetin 14.08.
2552	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2553	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2554	SC Begejci		
2555	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2556	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2557	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2558	SC Begejci		
2559	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2560	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2561	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2562	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12
2563	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. razmena
2564	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2565	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2566	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2567	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2568	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2569	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2570	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2571	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2572	SC Begejci		
2573	SC Begejci		
2574	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2575	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2576	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2577	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2578	SC S.Mitrovica		
2579	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2580	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2581	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2582	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2583	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2584	SC Begejci	Released, went to	13.12.1991. god otpušten otišao u Beograd
2585	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2586	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2587	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2588	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2589	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2590	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2591	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2592	SC S.Mitrovica		
2593	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2594	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2595	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2596	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

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2597	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2598	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2599	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2600	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2601	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2602	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2603	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2604	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2605	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2606	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2607	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2608	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2609	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2610	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2611	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2612	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2613	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2614	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2615	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2616	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2617	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2618	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2619	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
2620	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2621	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2622	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2623	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2624	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2625	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2626	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2627	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2628	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2629	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2630	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2631	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2632	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	predat MZ B.Naselje 02.07.1992.g
2633	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2634	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2635	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2636	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2637	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Released 1.12.1991. god otpušten bilsao kod rodaka went to cousine	
2638	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2639	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released went to	Otpust 02.12.-odlazi u Zenicu
2640	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2641	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2642	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2643	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2644	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2645	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2646	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2647	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2648	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2649	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2650	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2651	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2652	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2653	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2654	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2655	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK

2656	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2657	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2658	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2659	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2660	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2661	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2662	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	otpušten
2663	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2664	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2665	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2666	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2667	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2668	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2669	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2670	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2671	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2672	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2673	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2674	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
2675	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2676	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2677	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2678	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2679	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2680	[redacted]	SC Begejci		
2681	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2682	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2683	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2684	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2685	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2686	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2687	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2688	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2689	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2690	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2691	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2692	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2693	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2694	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2695	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2696	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2697	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2698	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2699	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2700	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2701	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2702	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2703	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2704	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2705	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2706	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2707	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2708	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2709	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2710	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2711	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2712	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12.
2713	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2714	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM

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2715		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2716		SC Begejci		
2717		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over	23.04.-predat MKCK
2718		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2719		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2720		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2721		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2722		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2723		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2724		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2725		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2726		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2727		VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2728		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over through	07.02.-predat CK SRJ preko CKSM
2729		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2730		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2731		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2732		SC S.Mitrovica		
2733		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2734		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2735		SC Begejci	Exchanged	08.12.1991. god razmena
2736		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2737		SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2738		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2739		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2740		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2741		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2742		SC Stajićevo	Exchanged	Razmena 10.12.
2743		SC S.Mitrovica	Handed over...through	Predat CKSRJ preko CK SM
2744		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2745		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2746		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2747		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2748		SC Stajićevo		Pleso 17.12.
2749		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2750		SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2751		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2752		SC Begejci	Released...went to cousine	05.12.1991. god otpušten otišao kod tetke[illegible]
2753		SC Begejci		
2754		SC Begejci		
2755		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2756		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2757		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2758		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2759		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2760		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2761		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2762		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2763		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2764		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2765		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2766		SC Stajićevo	Handed over	Predat MKCK 17.12.
2767		SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2768		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2769		SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2770		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2771		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2772		SC S.Mitrovica	Released	otpust 05.12
2773		SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

For Evaluation Only

2774	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Handed over because he was wounded	predat CK jer je bio ranjen
2775	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2776	[redacted]	SC Begejci	Exchanged	10.12.1991. god razmena
2777	[redacted]	VIZ Beograd	Exchanged	Razmena 14.08.
2778	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		
2779	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03.
2780	[redacted]	SC Stajićevo	Released	Otpust 19.12.
2781	[redacted]	SC Niš	Released	Otpust 05.12.
2782	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2783	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2784	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Ernestinovo 27.03
2785	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.
2786	[redacted]	SC S.Mitrovica		Nemetin 14.08.

ANNEX 48:

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY, MANUAL FOR THE OPERATION OF COMMANDS, STAFFS AND UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, 1988

/five-pointed star/

MANUAL

**FOR THE OPERATION OF COMMANDS, STAFFS
AND UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/
IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS**

1988

FEDERAL SEKCRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRJ

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Record No. 14

/five-pointed star/

MANUAL

FOR THE OPERATION OF COMMANDS, STAFFS AND UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRJ IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

/Partly illegible note in handwriting reading/:
Colonel /illegible/:

The following is, in particular, of current interest:

1. Updating of the plans for emergency situations (pages 10 and 1?)
2. The defence plan, separately for every facility;
3. It should be prescribed – give instructions how to act while carrying out the tasks and defence of /illegible/ which is not within the scope of the guards' service (page 15).

1988

Pursuant to Article 79 , paragraph 2, of the Law on All People's Defence (Official Gazette of the SFRJ, no. 21/82), in conjunction with Article 8, paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure on the Competences of the Organisational Units of the SSNO /Federal Secretariat for National Defence/ in peacetime, I hereby prescribe the following:

MANUAL

FOR THE OPERATION OF COMMANDS, STAFFS AND UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRJ IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

This Manual contains the most essential positions from the Guidelines of the Presidency of the SFRJ for Prevention of Occurrence and Elimination of the Emergency Situations, the Directive on Special Measures of Permanent and Increased Combat Readiness of the OS /Armed Forces/ of the SFRJ and the Guidelines for Elaboration and Implementation of the Directive on Special Measures of Permanent and Increased Combat Readiness of the OS of the SFRJ which regulate the use of the Armed Forces of the SFRJ in emergency situations.

It is intended for the commanders of strategic and operative level, the TO /Territorial Defence/ of the SR /Socialist Republic/ and SAP /Socialist Autonomous Province/ as an orientation and assistance in assessing the situation, planning and taking measures, actions and procedures in emergency situations.

The Manual shall be applied from the date of its signing.

The Manual shall be kept and used together with the Plan for Emergency Situations.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRJ

Colonel General
Stevan Mirković, s.r. /with his own hand/

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1. ROLE AND THE TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

a) *Role of the Armed Forces*

The Armed Forces shall protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social system as stipulated by the Constitution of the SFRJ against the counterrevolutionary activities of the forces of external and internal enemy (Article 92 of the ZONO /Law on National Defence/).

b) *Tasks of the Armed Forces in Emergency Situations*

(1) In co-operation with the official organs of the internal affairs, increase the intelligence and reconnaissance activities towards the neighbouring countries in order to monitor the activities of their armed forces more thoroughly. Ensure the timely gathering of intelligence and other information in by engaging the reconnaissance units, units for EI /electronic reconnaissance/ and intelligence centres, a part of the reconnaissance aircraft and the VOJ /Air Surveillance and Warning/;

(2) By engaging the security organs in cooperation with the organs of internal affairs, timely detect the formation, locations and bases of the renegade and other counterrevolutionary groups within the area of responsibility;

(3) Ensure the readiness of the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ and TO /Territorial Defence/ units for combat against the renegade, sabotage, terrorist and other counterrevolutionary forces;

(4) Intensify the ideological and political work and keep the entire strength of the Armed Forces informed, in particular in those units which shall be engaged in emergency situations,

(5) Prevent the propaganda activities from the neighbouring countries;

(6) Provide intensified and in depth security of the state border in order to prevent the infiltration of terrorist and other armed groups to our territory over land and through the air space;

(7) Engaging a part of the forces increase the security of the military facilities, the in particular the weapons and ammunition depots, all other facilities of special importance for the defence on the territory and control the territory in the areas of responsibility;

(8) Engage a part of the peacetime formations of the peacetime army in order to demonstrate power;

(9) Independently and in co-operation with the organs of internal affairs rout the terrorist and sabotage groups infiltrated from the territories of the neighbouring countries and the renegade and other armed groups in the country;

(10) Ensure the combat readiness of the transport aircraft and helicopters for transportation of the relevant JNA units and other forces of the internal affairs to carry out the tasks in emergency situations;

(11) Establish the necessary cooperation with the organs of the DPZ /Socio-political Communities/, DPO /Socio-political Organisations/ and the organs of internal affairs, in particular with the committees for all people's defence and social self-protection, in order to monitor and assess the situation in the territory and in order to take adequate measures.

……..

4. USE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

The Presidency of the SFRJ, pursuant to its competences stipulated by the Constitution of the SFRJ and the Federal legislation, shall make a decision on the use of the Armed Forces in order to eliminate the emergency situations, taking into the account the fact that the scope and the method of the use of Armed Forces should be in keeping with the requirements of a specific situation.

For the implementation of the Decision of the Presidency of the SFRJ, the Federal Secretary for National Defence shall engage those units of the Armed Forces which can act most efficiently in a specific situation and which can achieve the aim quickly.

The security organs of the OS, relying on other subjects in charge of security and self-protection and in close co-operation with the organs of the SDB /State Security Service/ and public security, and by applying their methods and means, shall be engaged primarily on detecting and preventing the organisation and formation of renegade and other counterrevolutionary groups, detecting their plans and aims – linking up with the enemy forces in the country and abroad, their focus being on preventing their activities within the Armed Forces and against them. The close cooperation with the organs of the SDB and public security shall be achieved through the exchange of information and through joint actions in order to cut this aspect of enemy activities.

The command of the strategic and operative level shall take measures of increased and in-depth security of the state border in order to prevent infiltration of the terrorist and other armed groups. The forces and equipment and their engagement in order to carry out of this task are stipulated in the Plan of Intensified and In-depth Security, which is drawn up by these commands (Amendments, Directives on Special Measures of Permanent and Increased b/g /combat readiness/, page 1). The Rule of the Border Services specifies the method of providing the intensified and in-depth security of the state border.

Following the Decision on the Use of Armed Forces, the measures of intensified security of military facilities and the defence of the facilities of special interest for security and defence of the country in the area of responsibility are taken in a specific emergency situation. The measures that are being taken, the forces, the order and the method of their engagement are regulated in the defence plan for every facility separately.

The increased security of the military facilities shall ensure their protection against attacks, demolition and damages, that is, against revealing of the secret information. A larger number of manpower shall be engaged for the increased security of the military facilities, for providing the physical security of the facilities (guards), the duty or other units for the intervention on the endangered facility: electricity is turned on in the wired fence, minefields are being laid around the facilities and other measures are being taken in keeping with the specific situation and characteristics of the facility (PS /Rules of Service/ of the OS, item 319). The military facilities are secured according to the provisions for performing guard service. The units of the Armed Forces are engaged to provide security for the facilities of special interest for security and defence of the country in a manner prescribed for the security of military facilities, and the measures which are being taken shall be regulated in keeping with the specific situation and based on the Defence Plan of every individual facility.

Security organs under which authority is the facility of special interest, following the counterintelligence assessment and elaborated plans, intensify their work on detecting and preventing the proponents of intelligence-reconnaissance, sabotage-terrorist, sabotage and other subversive activities performed in the facility or against it, applying approved methods and means of operation and in a close cooperation with the organs of the SDB and public security and other subjects of social self-protection.

A demonstration of power is applied in order to give an impression on the external and internal enemies about the power, capability of the JNA and its determination to defend the constitutional order. The units of all combat arms and services can take part in carrying out of this task, but the use of armoured-mechanised units, motorised units, reconnaissance units and

communications units and also the self-propelled artillery, air force and helicopter units is most frequent and most efficient.

The demonstration of power is an organised movement of the military column in one or more directions (a unit can circulate and each time it can come from a different direction). The smallest unit for the demonstration of power is an armoured-mechanised or motorised battalion and, depending on a specific situation and the mass scale, it could be up to the brigade strength (armoured, mechanized, motorized). The best thing is to synchronize the movements with the use of low-flying aircraft and helicopters.

When an infiltrated sabotage-terrorist or renegade group is detected in the areas where facilities under the competence of the Armed Forces are located, immediately upon their detection the parts of the ready JNA forces are deployed for their routing and destruction, and later, depending on the requirements, also the forces of the internal affairs and the TO. The command in whose area of responsibility such group is detected shall be responsible to plan, organise and carry out the task.

If the group is detected on the facilities or in the areas outside the competence of the Armed Forces, the forces of the internal affairs are fist to be engaged for its routing and destruction, and thereafter, following the decision on the use of the OS, the forces of the territorial defence and only after that the parts of the JNA. The forces, equipment and the method of engagement are prescribed by the plans for emergency situations.

5. CONTROL AND COMMAND

Control and command of the Armed Forces for the purpose of eliminating the emergency situations shall be performed by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, as per to the authorities of the Presidency of the SFRJ. The General Staff of the Armed Forces (the Team for Control and Command in Emergency Situations), through the commands of strategic and operative level, RŠTO /Republican Territorial Defence staff/ and PŠTO /Provincial Territorial Defence staff/ is in charge of the direct control and command of the units of the Armed Forces (JNA and TO), but for a certain specific situations a forward command group /IKM/ could be formed out of the composition of the Team.

The commands of strategic and operative level, RŠTO and PŠTO are directly in command of their deployed units through the subordinated commands – staffs.

The General Staff of the OS, the commands of strategic and operative level have a special communications unit with the mobile equipment and worked-out communications documents. They shall ensure a permanent and reliable functioning of all kinds of communications with the units deployed to eliminate the emergency situations, and the communications for the coordinated actions and a cooperation with the respective commands and staffs of the Territorial Defence, the Republican and Provincial committees of ONO and DSZ and in particular with the organs of internal affairs.

Those commands – staffs have to ensure the following through control and command:

- Full level of drill and training of their commands and staffs and of the subordinated ones for the successful control and command in order to eliminate the emergency situations;
- The permanent readiness of the OS and duty teams, a timely arrival of the required information on political and security situation in the area of responsibility and assessing how it would influence the development of the situation on the territory and in the units;
- Safe and reliable communications and their complete cryptographic protections, especially between the SSNO – the commands of the strategic and operative level - engaged forces and communications for coordinated actions and cooperation (SUP /Secretariat of the Interior/, organs of the DPZ and DPO);
- Regular reporting of the General Staff of the OS and the SSNO on the political and security situation in the area of responsibility and in the units, commands and institutions and on their combat readiness;

- Effective strength, supply situation and level of training of the units anticipated to be used for elimination of the emergency situations (intelligence and operative organs, reconnaissance units, ready battalions, military police battalion and the unit for the anti-terrorist actions);
- At all levels of control and command the entire strength should be kept timely, continuously and fully informed, particularly those units which are to be used to eliminate the emergency situations, and
- Regular updating of the plans for emergency situations at all levels through inspections and taking appropriate measures.

.....

7. **COOPERATION WITH OTHER SUBJECTS OF THE ALL PEOPLE'S DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION**

All subjective forces of the society, in keeping with their role in the defence and protection system and legal rights and obligations (strategy of the ONO and DSZ, page 143) should most vigorously and decisively get engaged in order to prevent the occurrence and to eliminate the emergency situations in the area of responsibility.

The commands of the strategic and operative level, RŠTO and PŠTO shall cooperate with the organs of the DPZ and DPO in the following: (1) working out of the plans in order to prevent the occurrence and to eliminate the emergency situations and (2) in carrying out of the tasks as prescribed in those plans and in this Manual.

The plans for prevention of occurrence and elimination of the emergency situations shall be prepared in accordance with the contents of t. /item/ 2 of this Manual. A part which refers to the assessment of the political and security situation on the territory and engagement of certain organs and units of the OS and the respective organs of the DPZ and DPO in carrying out the tasks should be jointly coordinated and constantly updated. To that effect it is necessary for the commands and staffs to establish a permanent cooperation with the relevant organs of the DPZ and DPO.

ATTACHMENTS

1. **Concept and types of emergency situations**
2. **Role and tasks of the subjects of socio-political system in emergency situations**

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

CONCEPT AND TYPES OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

1. Concept of emergency situations

The emergency situations are social situations which occur in the smaller or larger part of the territory of the SFRJ or on the entire territory thereof, when the internal enemy independently or jointly with the forces of the external enemy, using the contradictories of our social development, objective difficulties, subjective weaknesses and international situation, intensifies subversive activities within the framework of a special war, takes limited actions or plans to take armed and other actions on a larger scale which will destabilise social system, aiming to completely paralyse it, thus directly threatening the independence of the country, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and social system as stipulated by the Constitution of the SFRJ.[1]

2. **Types of emergency situations and some of their important characteristics**

Considering the aims, means and methods of the enemy' activities, there are two basic types of emergency situations:

1) Emergency situations caused by subversive activity of the internal and external enemy against the SFRJ;
2) Emergency situations caused by the direct threat of an aggression on the SFRJ.

Both types of emergency situations, despite the significant differences in the mode of their appearance, the means and methods of the actions, are most frequently interconnected and mutually dependent and their final aim is the same.

The essence of the first type of emergency situations is the subversive activity in all spheres of social life, based on creation of crisis situations and destabilisation of the system – including also the counterrevolution. With reference to the means and methods of their operation, non-military means prevail, hidden and secret activity using various methods of manipulation, indoctrination, infiltration and other methods of psychological and propaganda and other subversive activities, with the limited use of military means such as sabotage and terrorist operations and military pressures.

In the second type of emergency situations, which is identified as the imminent threat of war, in addition to the mentioned subversive activities contained in the first type of emergency situation, military actions and activities of smaller intensity are used to a larger extent, and there is a threat of use of respective ready units of the Armed Forces of a potential aggressors. Actually, a situation which is on the border with the state of war is in question. Namely, our estimates start from the fact that a sudden armed aggression against the SFRJ could be undertaken when there are major political disturbances in the country and stronger counterrevolutionary attacks from the inside, which could objectively be the reason to undertake it under any pretext.[2]

3**. Emergency situations caused by the subversive operations of the internal and external enemy against the SFRJ**

The occurrence of emergency situations may be speeded up also by the weaknesses and difficulties in the functioning of the socio-political and economic system, notwithstanding the fact whether they have been caused by objective or subjective reasons. In addition, they can be caused or speeded up, under certain circumstances, due to the disrupted inter-ethic relations, fiercer expression

[1] Strategy of the ONO and DSZ, 1987 edition, page 132
[2] Strategy of the ONO and DSZ, 1987 edition, page 132

of nationalism and activities of irredentists, separatists, unitarianists and other nationalistic forces and tendencies, and various other forces of the internal enemy, either independently and in cooperation with the external enemy, directed at weakening of brotherhood and unity and full equality of the nations and nationalities in the SFRJ, endangering of the territorial integrity of the country and its socio-political system as stipulated by the Constitution and its foreign policy of non-alignment and independence..

The proponents of the destructive activities within the country are various kinds of groups of the internal enemy. They are, first and foremost, the remnants of the counterrevolutionary forces from the war; irredentists, separatists, unitarianists and other nationalistic forces; dogmatic, bureaucratic, liberalistic, clerical and other reactionary groups and individuals as well as certain forces of the civic right wing.

Main forms in which the counterrevolutionary and other hostile activities are expressed are the following: psychological, propaganda and political and subversive activities; infiltration of enemy groups; intelligence activity towards the OS of the SFRJ and activities of foreign citizens, military, diplomatic and trade representatives; activities against the units, institutions and facilities of the OS, sabotage activities, terrorist activities and occurrences of defection from the military units and institutions of the OS; demonstrations based on nationalistic and other anti-self-management and political platforms; attempts to direct the mass strikes; negation of the self-management and other forms of public pressures and subversive activities which attempt to force a solution out of the existing social system.

The following could be expected when this type of emergency situations is in question: more intensive intelligence and reconnaissance and psychological and propaganda activities from abroad and from the centres and points built within the country; the attempts of infiltration of the terrorist groups into the country and their joining with the organised forces of the internal enemy in order to carry out armed actions; inciting and exacerbating the nationalisms of all kinds; sabotage and diversions with the aim of disorganising and preventing the vital political, economic, military and other systems and subjects from functioning; violation of law and order on a more massive scale; attempts of assassination on the lives of prominent figures; spreading of the hostile propaganda, rumours, misinformation and the like within the country.[3]

4. Emergency situations caused by the direct threat of the armed aggression against the SFRJ.

Emergency situations may occur with a gradual escalation of the tensions in the international relations and the gradual development of the emergency situations characterised by subversive activity into the state of imminent threat of armed aggression, a sudden aggravation of the situation in the country due to the activities of the subversive forces, including also the counterrevolution. In conditions of the imminent threat of war, in addition to already known forms, there is a possibility of state and other kind of terrorism and the limited military actions, which is one of the modalities of the armed aggression of potential aggressors. As the start of the armed aggression is nearing, it must be taken into consideration that the sabotage and terrorist activities will proportionally increase, as well as a possibility of formation of renegade armed groups within the country and the armed attacks undertaken against the vital military, economic and other facilities and also the assassination attempts on the lives of prominent figures in the society. All that would be accompanied with fierce political, economic, psychological and propaganda and other pressures and intensive intelligence monitoring of the Armed Forces and preparations of the society to defend itself from the armed aggression and attempts of the foreign intelligence services and the internal enemy to get infiltrated into the Armed Forces and to create their supporting points in them, in addition to the activation of the cover-up organisation potentially formed earlier and preserved, in order to create a state of insecurity, dissatisfaction and various crises points within the SFRJ.[4]

[3] Strategy of ONO and DSZ of the SFRJ, 1987 edition, pages 133-139.
[4] Strategy of ONO and DSZ of the SFRJ,1987 edition, pages 139-142 and the Law on ONO, Article 8.

ANNEX 49:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, DECLARATION ON THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, AGAINST THE CIVIL WAR AND VIOLENCE, 2 APRIL 1991

Pursuant to Article 73, Item 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia,

the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, at its Forth Session of the First Regular Sitting held on 2 April 1991 issued the following:

DECLARATION ON THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS, AGAINST THE CIVIL WAR AND VIOLENCE

1. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia herewith expresses its resolute protests against the violence used by the authorities of the Republic of Croatia against the Serbian people in the Municipality of Titova Korenica when the blood was shed on the great Christian holiday of peace – Easter.

2. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia stands resolutely for the urgent peaceful and democratic resolving of the crisis of the Yugoslav state community and it is categorically against use of force which renders the actual resolution of that crisis impossible.

3. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia requests from the Presidency of the SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRJ not to allow that the interethnic armed conflicts and civil war happen in Yugoslavia and not to allow that any side resorts to violence in resolving the interethnic and inter-republic conflicts, since those are the fundamental grounds to end the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful and democratic way.

4. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia warns that the use of violence against the interests of the Serbian people in the Republic of Croatia renders the leadership of the Republic of Croatia solely responsible for the further development of events.

5. The Decision of the respective organs of the SAO /Serbian Autonomous District/ of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia and the reaction of the Serbian people in general is the result of the fact that the Republic of Croatia avoids to enable the expression of opinion of the people in a referendum, in a situation when the Republic of Croatia, violating the Constitution of Yugoslavia, proclaimed its decision to constitute itself in a separate, sovereign state in which the achievement of the national, civil and other human rights of the Serbian people have been considerably violated.

6. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and all the state organs of the Republic of Serbia will provide all necessary assistance and support to the Serbs in the Republic of Croatia.

7. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia asserts its position that the preservation of Yugoslavia is of the special importance for the Serbian people, since it enables them to live undivided and to achieve its legitimate national interests. It is the historic right and the need of the Serbian people to live in one democratic state, therefore this has to be respected when considering any alternative of resolving the Yugoslav Crisis.

Starting from the principles of the equality of the members of the Yugoslav community, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia considers that the right of every Yugoslav nation for self-determination, including the secession, is beyond dispute, but it can be exercised only in such way that every nation declares itself through a referendum. The use of this right must be regulated uniquely for all the Yugoslav nations.

8. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia requests from the responsible organs of the Republic of Croatia to immediately withdraw all the forces of the interior affairs that have been engaged in the area of Plitvice and to guarantee that they shall not use violence against the Serbian population.

9. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia asks from the Presidency of the SFRJ to ensure that the Yugoslav People's Army be engaged, in keeping with its constitutional function, in the SAO of Krajina, Slavonija, Baranja, Western Syrmia and in all other places in which the Serbian population lives, until such time when the political agreement is achieved regarding the resolution of the situation that has emerged.

10. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia requests that the initial talks on a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis continue and finalise in the Presidency of the SFRJ and between the presidents of the Yugoslav republics based on those prerequisites, respecting all the guaranteed human and civil rights.

11. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia would like to stress the need that all the issues of importance for the peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis be also discussed through the contacts of the interparliamentary groups.

RS Number 43
Belgrade, 2 April 1991

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
VICE PRESIDENT
L.S. Borivoje Petrović, signed

ANNEX 50:

COMMAND OF THE 1ST MILITARY DISTRICT, ORDER FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORCES OF THE 1ST MILITARY DISTRICT IN SLAVONIA, 8 JULY 1991

E 37-148
0122 8473

COMMAND OF THE 1st MILITARY DISTRICT MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential No. 1438-32 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
8 July 1991
At 00.30 hours

EXCERPT FOR THE 5th CORPS

O R D E R

for the engagement of forces of the 1st Military District in Slavonia

Sections 1:300,000: Koprivnica, Budapest, Subotica, B. Luka, Osijek, Belgrade, Vršac, Mostar, Sarajevo, Kragujevac, Niš.

1. – The paramilitary forces of the Republic of Croatia (Croatian National Guard and

armed formations of the Croatian Democratic Union) are present in the territory of Slavonia. The deployment of those forces is given in the overview made by the security organ of the 1st Military District.

The target of the combat operations by those forces is probably to prevent the JNA forces from leaving the barracks and their deployment in the territory of Slavonia as well as to impede their movement and reaching the Virovitica – Pakrac – Kutina line. It is to be expected that the paramilitary forces, by relying on certain populated areas, in particular the big cities: Vinkovci, Osijek, Đakovo, Sl. Brod and Našice, assisted by the extremist part of the population of the Croatian Democratic Union, persistently and at any cost try to prevent the advancing march and the execution of tasks by JNA units. It is to be expected that armour-piercing devices, explosive devices and anti-aircraft defence will be used, while the most important facilities that the JNA units will use during their movements along the routes will most probably be destroyed.

During the advancing march the military engagement of the armed forces of the Republic of Hungary should not be expected, although at certain critical points in time their military engagement, from either the ground or the air, cannot be excluded.

2. – I HAVE DECIDED the following: the forces of the 1st Military District (1st Proletarian Guard Mechanised Brigade (pgmbr); 453rd Mechanized Brigade (mbr); 51st Mechanized Brigade (mbr); and 12th Mechanized Brigade (mbr) will carry out the advancing march through Slavonia in the following

way: the main forces (1st Proletarian Guard Mechanised Brigade (pgmbr), 51st Mechanized Brigade (mbr) and parts of the 12th Mechanized Brigade (mbr) in the following directions: Sr. Mitrovica – Šid – Đakovo – Našice – Virovitica and Bogojevo – Osijek – Đakovo, and the auxiliary forces in the direction: Šid – Vinkovci – Vrpolje – Sl. Brod – Nova Gradiška – Kutina with the aim of: by rapid and energetic movements of armoured-mechanized troops in the given directions demonstrate power and prevent the engagement of paramilitary formations in the further escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts in the territory of Croatia. If armed resistance is met during the advancing march, by energetic and speedy action of armoured-mechanized troops, supported by artillery and aviation, destroy paramilitary formations along the directions of movement and reach, as soon as possible, the march target on the line: Virovitica – Pakrac – Kutina, and be ready for further operations by special order. At the same time, by continuing to engage the forces of the 17th Corps and by engaging the forces of the 51st Mechanised Brigade (mbr), prevent the paramilitary formations from conducting operations, ensure supplies to deployed forces.)

Readiness for movement of all forces at 4.00 hours on 9 July of this year.

13. – the 5th Corps composed of: part of the Command with the logistics unit (PJ), the 329th Armoured Brigade (okbr) and the 16th Motorized Brigade (mtbr) moves in the direction: B. Luka – Prijedor – Bos. Novi – Glina, where it is resubordinated to the Command of the 5th Corps for conducting military operations in the area of Banija and Lika. Part of the Command of the 5th Corps, the 10th Partisan Division, 293rd Engineer Regiment, 5th Autotransport Battalion (atb) and 5th Medical Battalion (snb), 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment (map) and 5th Mixed Anti-Armour Artillery Regiment (mpoap) are to be deployed in the area of B. Luka, San. Most, Prijedor and be ready for conducting operations by special order.

14. – Logistics:

Logistics shall be organised by the units on the march themselves, relying on the following logistics bases:

- units marching north of the Sava river to the line: D. Miholjac – Našice – Sl. Brod shall rely on the 793rd logistics base (PoB);

- units marching north of the Sava river from the line D. Miholjac – Našice – Sl. Brod to the march target shall rely on the 993rd logistics base (PoB);

- units of the 37th Corps shall rely on the 744th logistics base (PoB) and part of the 744th logistics base (PoB);

- units of the 5th Corps shall rely on the 993rd logistics base (PoB).

Upon reaching the march target, replenish all depleted material reserves by relying on the corresponding logistics bases.

Organise the provision of supplies according to the combined principle.

Secure mobile logistics elements by march formation and supply units by stronger combat forces.

Logistical priority shall be given to providing care to the injured and ill and then to the pulling out of combat equipment.

Traffic regulation and control shall be organised by the units themselves as well as with assistance from the 12th Proletarian Mechanized Brigade (pmbr) in the case of units marching through Slavonia.

15. – Secure militarily the movement and deployment area of units by relying on one's own forces and resources. Devote special attention to securing units at rest stops or in case of equipment failures along the way, and in deployment areas. During movement and deployment, wherever possible stay away from populated areas and avoid possible obstacles. Where this proves impossible, use aviation, artillery, weapons and techniques of the armoured-mechanised unit (OMJ) to destroy and remove obstacles.

Upon reaching the march target, secure units for the provision of combat supplies with smaller armoured-mechanised groups.

16. – Command and communication:

Command Post (KM) of the 1st Military District in Belgrade working round the clock.

Forward Command Post (IKM) of the 1st Military District by special order.
Organise communications:
- radiotelephony communications in the radiotelephony circuit, according to the plan of radiotelephony communications for peacetime needs.
- radio relay communications by relying on the stationary communication system (RR hub Dilj).
- radio communications according to the "Kremen" (Flint-Stone) communications plan.
- courier communications as necessary.
Communications readiness:
- Radiotelephony immediately,
- radio-relay communications and radio communications at 3.00 hours on 9 July,
- courier communications immediately.

The 5th Corps shall command its forces (with the exception of forces assigned to Banija and Lika) from the Banja Luka command post.

C O M M A N D E R
General
Aleksandar Spirkovski m.p.

Authenticity of excerpt certified by:
Colonel
Borisav Luković

(stamp with the following inscription:
COMMAND OF THE 5th CORPS
Strictly confidential No. 37-148
08 – 07 – 199 illegible)
(round seal: COMMAND OF THE 1st MILITARY DISTRICT)

ANNEX 51:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER ON THE SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN REPORT ON WAR OPERATIONS AS OF 26 JUNE 1991, 22 AUGUST 1991

SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
SAO /Serbian Autonomous District/ KRAJINA
GLINA MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY
War Presidency
No.57/91
Glina, 22 August 1991

Pursuant to Article 1 read with Article 3 of the Article 3 of the Decision on War Presidency No. 803-02/91-01/01 dated 18.6.1991, the War Presidency of the Municipal Assembly of Glina has issued at its session held on 22 August 1991 the

ORDER

It is hereby ordered to the Staff Commander of the Territorial Defence Glina to submit a written report on war operations as of 26 June 1991 to date. A special emphasis is required for the events in Maja on the occasion of mopping up of Maja, Svračica, Dolnjak, Joševica and Prijeka.

President
Jović dr Dušan
/signed/
/stamped: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Municipal Assembly of Glina
Coat-of-arms/

ANNEX 52:
JNA, 5TH CORPS., ORDER TO SET UP CAMP MANJAČA, 13 SEPTEMBER 1991

E – 1-330

C O M M A N D of 5th CORPUS
Strictly confidential number 1-330
13 September 1991

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Copy no. 1
0122 8212

Accommodation and security
of war prisoners, order

TO THE COMMAND _____

Further to the indicated need for accommodation, security and operation of the organisation of the working activities with the prisoners from the unit forces of the (MUP) Ministry of Interior and the (ZNG Croatia) Croatian National Guard,

I O R D E R T H A T

1.– Camp Commander of the war prisoners will be lieutenant colonel Baltić Stanko from the Command of the 5th Corpus.

2.- The reallocation of the Camp premises shall be performed at the space above the barrack "Mika Bosnić" of the polygon "Manjača". During the reallocation, a special attention should be paid to separate senior officers into an additional tent, as well as to nominate senior officers from their group.

3. - Security of the Camp will be monitored by the 5th Military Police Company, including 5 senior officers 2 (AVL) Active Military Personnel and 3 (RVS) Reserved Military Senior Officers and 35 soldiers – policemen in accordance with the security plan that will be made by the camp commander.

The (VP) military police organs shall execute a detailed investigation of all the persons and shall take away all the items by the prisoners – policemen in accordance with the security plan, which shall be made by the camp commander.

4. - All the camp premises will be secured with (PPM) antipersonnel mines, which shall be planned and realized by (NI) Chief Engineer. The deadline for this task shall be 14 September 1991 until 14.00 hrs. After the executed

security an appropriate documentation shall be made (minutes of mine field) and shall be kept in accordance with the relevant regulations.

5. - The procedure for war prisoners will be harmonized in according with the III Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (as of 12 August 1949), Article 4, 12-17 and 42.

6. - Logistics:

6.1. Quartermaster security:

For the accommodation of the prisoners there should be provided 10 ŠSV (10 staff members of the Serbian Army) , 800 blankets and the Commander of the 993th (POB) logistics base shall be responsible. He will forward the items to the commander of the Camp on 13 September 1991.

For the blankets there should be straw supplied from the (VE) Military Facility "Karadjordjevo" from the polygon of "Manjača". Preparing of food shall be done in the barrack "Mika Bosnić" and the food will be served within the camp. The Commander "Mika Bosnić" shall be responsible for preparing the food and for the serving the food the commander of the Camp.

There should be 400 meal portions provided. The responsible person will be PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics).

For washing the dishes 1 kitchen with warm water will be available. The responsible person will be PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics)of the 5th Command.

For drink and personal hygiene of the prisoners there will be 1 ACV (water tanker) provided and the responsible person will be PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics)of the 5th Command.

Other measures of the logistics related to the quartermaster security will be regulated by the camp commander and the PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics)of the 5th Command will provide necessary assistance.

6.2. Medical supplies:

For the medical supplies there should be one pharmacist and one sanitary motor vehicle available, as well as a separate tent that should be properly marked. For the realization of this task a PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics) of the 5th Command is responsible.

6.3. Traffic security:

The Commander of the 5th Command shall determine 1 motor vehicle (transport) and will put at disposal to the commander of the camp.

Other measures of SbOb (Security Forces) security shall be regulated by the camp commander and the necessary help will be provided by PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics) of the 5th Command.

7. – The entire activities of the organisation and the successful operation of all the activities will be coordinated by the Commander of the camp for war prisoners.

MD/JM

COMMANDER
Colonel
/first name illegible/ Talić

/round stamp with the text:
Command of 5th Corpus/ /handwritten signature illegible/

/handwritten in ink/
E 20C-D033-002

- Colonel Kosanović Lusan
- Lieutenant Colonel Amidžiž Boško
- Lieutenant Colonel Baltić Stanko
- 993 PoB 5
- ŠC OMJ 6
- 5 ČVP 7
- 5 KS 8
- OC 9
- Illegible 1

ANNEX 53:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, COL. RADE ORLIĆ, 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF THE HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

TO THE 2nd OPERATIONAL ZONE
"LIKA"

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
1. Write the order on appointment to duty
2. Hand in to HQTD z. opz

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel („Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces („Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

IS S E N T

TO TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA, TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 2ND OPERATIONAL ZONE "LIKA"

To garrison Korenica

9) ORLIĆ Miće(father's name) RADE, COL of the armoured and mechanized units,

personal MOS 31439, born on 7 April 1941.

Now according to Material Formation: carries out a duty in the Republic Headquarters of the TD of the Republic of Serbia, Formation Rank COL, Salary Group 11 of 26 December 1988, garrison Beograd.

The appointed has the obligation to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remains in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately returned to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the SSNO immediately.

C H I E F
Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class
Damljan Nikolić

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 77/91
25.11.1991
K N I N

ANNEX 54:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, COL. DUŠAN KASUM ET AL., 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
PNS OMPD
1. Write the order on appointment to duty

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces ("Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

A R E S E N T

TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA

To garrison Knin

1) – KASUM Obrada DUŠAN, signal COL,
Personal MOS 31840, born on 19 January 1938.
Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the 1st Directorate of the GS AF SFRY, Formation Rank COL, Salary Group 8 of 3 January 1991, garrison Beograd.

2) MAKSIĆ Slavomira RADOSLAV, infantry COL, personal MOS 31140, born on 27 August 1939.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the Command of the Defence of the City of Beograd of the 1st Military District, Formation Rank COL, Salary Group 8 of 31 August 1988, garrison Beograd.

3) - PUPOVAC Bože MILOŠ, artillery COL, personal MOS 31240, born on 28 December 1935.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the Command of the Defence of the City of Beograd of the 1st Military District, Formation Rank COL, Salary Group 7 of 26 May 1988, garrison Beograd.

4) VULETIĆ Dragomira ALEKSANDAR, signal LTC, personal MOS 31839, born on 6 July 1944.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty at Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for electronics and signal, Formation Rank LTC, PG 11 of 30 June 1990, garrison Beograd.

5. – KOROLIJA Stevana DUŠAN, Captain 1st class of the Army's Technical Service, personal MOS 32157, born on 26 November 1956.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in Technical Directorate of the SSNO, Formation Rank Captain 1st class, Salary Group 15 of 27 August 1990, garrison Beograd.

6. PAMUČAR Petra MOSELKO, signal 2LT, personal MOS 31888, born on 2 April 1959.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the 398th signal brigade of the Deputy Chief of the GS AF SFRY for electronics and signal, Formation Rank (2LT), Salary Group 19 of 20 July 1991, garrison Beograd.

7. ČUTURIĆ Tome SIMEUN, Captain 1st class, personal MOS 31801, born on 19 May 1957.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the School Signal Centre of the Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for electronics and signal, Formation Rank Captain 1st class, Salary Group 17 of 3rd July 1986, garrison Beograd.

8. BJELJAC Petra ZORAN, Senior Signal SGT, personal MOS 21813, born on 10 June 1961.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the 398th signal brigade of the Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for electronics and signals, Formation Rank Senior Sgt, Salary Group 20 of 1st July 1988, garrison Beograd.

The appointed are obligated to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remain in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in the Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately redeployed to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the SSNO immediately.

C H I E F

Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class

Damljan Nikolić

AM

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 78/91
25/11/1991
K N I N

ANNEX 55:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, COL. MILOŠ MALOBABIĆ, 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE 2nd OPERATIONAL ZONE
"LIKA"

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
1. Write the order on appointment to duty
2. Hand in to HQTD z. opz

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces ("Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

IS S E N T

TO TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA, TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 2ND OPERATIONAL ZONE "LIKA"
To garrison Korenica

9) MALOBABIĆ (father's name) Branka MILOŠ, Signal Major, personal MOS 31801, born on 20 October 1954.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the Artillery School Centre of the Deputy Chief of the GS AF SFRY for Army, Formation Rank LTC, PG 14 of 19 May 1988, garrison Sarajevo.

The appointed has the obligation to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remains in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately returned to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO) immediately.

C H I E F
Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class
Damljan Nikolić

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 77/91
25.11.1991
K N I N

ANNEX 56:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, KAMENKO POPOVIĆ, 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE 2nd OPERATIONAL ZONE
"LIKA"

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
1. Write the order on appointment to duty
2. Hand in to HQTD z. opz

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces ("Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

IS S E N T

TO TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA, TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 2ND OPERATIONAL ZONE "LIKA"
To garrison Korenica

10) POPOVIĆ (father's name) Rada KAMENKO, infantry LTC, personal MOS 31139, born on 9 August 1949.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in Command of the Defence of the City of Belgrade of the 1st Military District , Formation Rank LTC, Salary Group 11 of 25 February 1991, garrison Beograd.

The appointed has the obligation to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remains in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately returned to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the SSNO immediately.

C H I E F
Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class
Damljan Nikolić

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 77/91
25.11.1991
K N I N

ANNEX 57:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, SAVO SAVANOVIĆ, 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

2nd OPERATIONAL ZONE
"LIKA"

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
1. Write the order on appointment to duty
2. Hand in to HQTD z. opz

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces ("Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

IS S E N T

TO TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA, TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 2ND OPERATIONAL ZONE "LIKA"
To garrison Korenica

10) SAVANOVIĆ (father's name) Branislava SAVO , Senior Signal SGT, personal
MOS 21803, born on 5 January 1966.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the 389th signal brigade of the Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for electronics and signals, Formation Rank senior SGT, Salary Group 18 of 6 August 1991, garrison Beograd.

The appointed has the obligation to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remains in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately returned to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the SSNO immediately.

C H I E F
Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class
Damljan Nikolić

AM

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 77/91
25.11.1991
K N I N

ANNEX 58:
SAO KRAJINA, ORDER NO. 24-175, COL. RADE VUJAKLIJA ET AL., 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Re: excerpt.-

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

To the 3rd OPERATIONAL ZONE
"BANIJA AND KORDUN"

O R D E R Number 24-175

OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1991

Handwritten
PNS OMPD
1. Write the order on appointment to duty

On basis of the item 18 of the Order on determining competencies and on authorizations of the commanding officers for solving relations in the service of military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", number 5/87), with reference to article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces ("Official Gazette SFRY", no. 7/85, 29/89, 40/89 and 26/90)

A R E S E N T

TO TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SAO) KRAJINA, TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 3rd OPERATIONAL ZONE „BANIJA AND KORDUN"
To garrison Glina

13) VUJAKLIJA Djure RADE, artillery COL, personal MOS 31240, born on 28 September 1933.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in the Inspection of the Armed Forces, Formation Rank COL, Salary Group 7 of 2 December 1987, garrison Beograd.
Handwritten: illegible (Begović Mila COL retired)

14.- SUŽNJEVIĆ Bože PETAR, infantry LTC, personal MOS 31139, born on 5 August 1947.

Now according to MF: on duty in Command of the 1st Military District, Formation Rank LTC, Salary Group 12 of 29 June 1990, garrison Beograd.

15. – LUKAČ Adama DUŠAN, signal LTC, personal MOS 31828, born on 10 April 1946.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in School Signal Centre of the Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for electronics and signal, Formation Rank LTC, Salary Group 13 of 31 October 1988, garrison Beograd.

16. – RUŠNOV Djure MILE, signal WO 1st class, personal MOS 21815, born on 4 February 1949.

Now according to Material Formation: on duty in Engineering School Centre of the Deputy Chief GS AF SFRY for Army, Formation Rank WO 1st class, Salary Group 18 of 1 September 1990, garrison Šabac.

The appointed are obligated to report immediately to the stated Command of the unit.

The appointed remain in the stated unit, according to requirements of the service, in conformity with the provision of the article 271 of the Act on Service in Armed Forces, and afterwards is immediately returned to the unit from which he was sent. The report on accomplished task and other changes about personal status of the appointed during execution of the task as per this order, the stated Command of the unit to which he was deployed, delivers it compulsorily to the Personnel Directorate of the SSNO immediately.

C H I E F
Major General
Gojko Krstić, signed .

Accuracy of the excerpt is authenticated by: WO 1st class
Damljan Nikolić

AM

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
No. 78/91
25.11.1991
K N I N

ANNEX 59:
SAO SBWS, TO ORDER NO. 3/91, 23 SEPTEMBER 1991

Autonomous District of Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Syrmia

Number: 3/91
Dalj, 23.09.1991

With regard to the overall situation in the territory of the AO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia, as a Prime Minister, on 3rd September 1991,
I issue a following:

ORDER

1. The serving of alcohol and its selling shall be forbidden, as well as the work of all catering facilities in the territory of the AO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem.
2. This Order shall become effective on 24th September 1991.
3. The TO /Territorial Defence/ staffs of the local communities and police stations are entrusted with the execution of this Order.

Submitted to:
1. Local TO staffs
2. Police Station
3. Ministry of Interior
4. Ministry of Defence
5. Archives

Prime Minister
Hadžić Goran

Commander of the TO Staff
Stojčić Radovan

ANNEX 60:
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING HAND-OVER OF PRISONERS FROM DALJ POLICE STATION, 23 SEPTEMBER

AO /Autonomous Region/ OF SLAVONIJA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SREM
DALJ POLICE STATION
Number: 2/91.-
Dalj, 23 September 1991.

Attn: MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR OF AO SLAVONIJA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SREM
Subject: Hand-over of prisoners From Dalj SM /Police Station/
On 21 September 1991, around 18:00, Goran Hadzic, President of AO Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem came to the offices of Dalj Police Station. He came together with Željko Ražnatović, aka Arkan, who was accompanied by 20 men.

Goran Hadžić and Željko Ražnjatović released from detention Slavko Palinkaš from Aljmaš and Luka Šutalo from Erdut. Arkan and his men also took away the following men: Ivan Zelenber, Zoran Andjel, Čedomir Predojević, Dražen Štimec, Željko Filipčoć/as written/, Darko Kušić, Ivan Forjan, Pavao Zemljak, Vladimir Zemljak, Pavle Bek and Haso Brajović.
Goran Hadžić and Željko Ražnjatović did not give any explanation to Rajko Milovanović, duty man in Dalj Police Station, concerning those who were released or taken away. Goran Hadžić did not give neither written nor oral order for the above-mentioned action.
We are sending this memo in order to inform you about the above.

SUBMITTED TO:
1. UP */Police Administration/* Chief
2. Dalj Defense Staff Commander
3. Archives, here

Dalj Police Station Commander
Željko Čizmić
/signed/
/stamped/

ANNEX 61:
ULTIMATUM ISSUED TO THE PEOPLE OF BAPSKA, 28 SEPTEMBER 1991

TO THE PEOPLE OF BAPSKA

For some time now, the JNA units defending the region have been under attack from members of the Croatian National Guard, Croatian Interior Ministry and armed civilians.

Since inhabitants of your village were peaceful and did not cause any problems for JNA units so far, we believe there will be no problems in the future either. We are demanding the following from you:

1. By 15:00 hours you must collect all weapons in the village and take them to Virjača, where a JNA officer will be waiting for you.

2. Unless you comply with item 1, you can be certain that your village will no longer exist on a geographic map.

3. If you retain Borislav Tomić in any way, or if he does not return by 15:00 hours, this will mean that you did not accept this ultimatum.

4. If you do not comply with this ultimatum by 15:00 hours, you must inform us about it through Borislav Tomić and your representative, to whom we guarantee a safe return, regardless of the conditions or consequences of this ultimatum.

For JNA
Major
illegible
28 September 1991
Šid

ANNEX 62:
COMMAND OF THE GUARDS MOTORISED BRIGADE, NO. 15-1, 1 OCTOBER 1991

Draft translation L0112833

Gmtbr /Motorised Guards Brigade/ COMMAND — MILITARY SECRET

1 October 1991 — STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Negoslavci village (KM /Command Post/) — No. /illegible/

Deliver immediately

1

To _____ COMMAND

ORDER FOR BLOCKADE AND ATTACK

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Map 1:50,000 Vinkovci, sheets 2 and 4, and Bačka Palanka sheets 1 and 3

1. DATA ON THE ENEMY:

The enemy defence on the Gmtbr axis of attack numbers between 500 and 800 (parts of the ZNG /National Guards Corps/). The enemy defence is well entrenched, using existing cellars, catacombs and an additional system of entrenching and placing obstacles which they are successfully defending with 60 mm and 120 mm mortar fire, according to some intelligence also B-1 76 mm cannon, 1 or 2 tanks and 1 or 2 TO /as printed/ /expansion unknown/.

In operations to date mortar and sniper fire have been significant.

They are deployed as follows:

The main defence line is on the line 1 Maja, Otokara Keršovanija, and Ognjena Price Streets, /?stratified/ to Pionirsko Naselje, and the second position is on the line 1 Maja St, Trg Rade Končara, and Slonja.

In the Leva and Desna Supoderica sectors there is a defence line from the Bogdanovci village direction. The enemy are mounting a defence by support on Vukovar. They are pretty well deployed in positions, and there p/k /forward defence line is blocked with mixed minefields, bunkers, fortified with firing positions, snipers' nests and barricades.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

In order to prevent a further breakthrough by our forces the planned destruction of buildings is expected; strong ZNG forces are mounting a defence on the line of Dr Mladena Stojanovića St in the Mitnica estate sector. During operations to date we have concluded that that Mitnica is the core of Vukovar's defence. The Mitnica estate lies on the catacombs of the Roman settlement which have been organised and prepared for these operations.

In the Bogdanovačka kosa sector by Bogdanovci village to the Desna Supoderica district strong ZNG forces, supplied by ZNG units in Vukovar, are mounting a defence and securing the newly built Lužac village – Bogdanovci village sector. The whole of Bogsanovička Kosa is blocked with mixed minefields and well-defended with all resources. This road is Vukovar's main supply route. The enemy have also used guided PO /anti-tank/ missiles in this sector but without success.

Detailed data on specific features in Vukovar are provided in attachment no. 1.

The enemy is well prepared and trained for street fighting.
Their communications system is functioning well, as is the reporting and information system.

Some of the women and children are included and have been trained, with sniper rifles already prepared.

An intervention by more powerful forces from the Sotin village, Orolik village and Ilok village sectors is expected.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

2. The Gmtbr will conduct a blockade and assault on Vukovar with the use of JOd /Assault Detachments/ within the OG, with the task: in cooperation with Vukovar TO /Territorial Defence/ units (Petrova Gora odTO /Territorial Defence detachment/, okb /Armoured Battalion// 544th mtbr /Motorised Brigade/, break up enemy forces in the operations zone, take the town and establish an inspection regime.

Bring up infantry sections at the achieved line during the night – before first light on 2 October 1991, with guides from Petrova Gora odTO, but bring up tanks and other combat equipment during the artillery preparation. Sector of operations: right: Dr Mladena Stojanovića St – Leva Bara – Watertower – River Danube, left: western boundary of Vukovar.

Readiness: _____

3. Neighbouring forces:

a/ Petrova Gora odTO, with part of the 2nd okb/453rd mbt /Mechanised Brigade/ in Vukovar, will hold the achieved lines with their main forces. Dispatch the required number of guides to wait in the 1st and 2nd JOd waiting sector by 1800 hours on 1 October 1991, and at dawn bring them up to the line of contact. At the beginning of artillery preparation, bring up tanks and other combat equipment with the other guides and deploy them along the axis of attack. After artillery preparations are finished, an attack with the 1st and 3rd čTO in the Sector right: left half of A/u/gusta Cesarca, Vase Pelagića and Nikole Tesle Streets, and break out to the River Vuka, left: left boundary of the urban area of Vukovar. Introduce the 1st JOd as well in the same Sector.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

An attack with the 2nd and 4th čTO in the Sector right: Dr Mladena Stojanovića St, Leva Bara, the water tower, River Danube, left: right half of A/u/gusta Cesarca, Vase Pelagića and Nikole Tesle Streets.

Right from the barracks sector and on the axis: barracks – River Danube to /?Leva Bara Street/, 1st okb/1st pgmbr /Infantry Mechanised Guards Brigade/ protect the right wing of the attack forces from the Mitnica estate with fire and movement.

4. I HAVE DECIDED: during the night, before first light on 2 October 1991, bring the Gmtbr units up to the line of contact, and then with aerial and artillery support (artillery support lasting 20 minutes) attack energetically in the assigned zone in cooperation with the JTO /Territorial Defence unit/ and JNA units with the aim of:

breaking up enemy forces, taking the town and establishing a regime in the Gmbtr operations zone.

Combat deployment: attack forces, artillery support forces, reserve, and logistical support forces.

Readiness for attack at _____.

Execute the attack on the lines:

Line no. 1._____,

Line no. 2 _____,

Line no. 3 _____,

Line no.4 _____,

DRAFT TRANSLATION

5. UNIT TASKS:

5.1 JOd comprising: 1st mtb with 3-1 /?3nd Platoon1st Company/okb, 2-2 lsard /Light Self-propelled Artillery and Rocket Battalion/ of the PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/, 1-3-/2nd bVP /Military Police Battalion/ and Pioneer Squad, detachment commander 1st mtb commander. Task: Bring up the infantry parts to the first Sector to the achieved line during the night before first light on 2 October 1991, with guides from Petrova Gora odTO.

Bring up tanks and other equipment during artillery preparations.

At the beginning of the attack, in cooperation with the 1st and 3rd čTO/odTO, attack in Sector: right: left half of A/u/gusta Cesarca, Vase Pelagića and Nikole Tesle Streets and break out to the River Vuka, western boundary of urban Vukovar.

5.2 JOd-2 comprising: 2nd mtb with 3-2/okb, 2/lsard PVO (-2), and Pioneer Squad, bring up infantry parts to II Sector to the achieved lines during the night, before first light on 2 October 1991 with guides from Petrova Gora od TO. Bring up tanks and other combat equipment during the artillery preparation period.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

At the beginning of the attack and in cooperation with the 2nd and 4th čTO/Petrova Gora odTO, attack in the Sector right: Dr Mladena Stojanovića Street, Leva Bara, water tower, River Danube and left: right half of A/u/gusta Cesarca, Vase Pelagića, and Nikole Tesle Streets.

5.3 okb (without two tank platoons) with the 4thčVP /Military Police Company//2nd bVP in the waiting area in Ovčara village will organise a circular defence with the task: be at readiness for an attack towards Jakubovac, Sotin, Grabovo and Negoslavci villages, pay special attention to Mala Dubrava wood. Engagement of the battalion towards Vukovar is possible, depending on the development of the situation.

5.4 1st bVP (without the čVPPTD /?Military Police Company for Anti-Terrorist Activities/) will secure the KM /Command Post/ and IKM /Forward Command Post/ with part of their forces until the start of the attack, and with the main forces exercise control over the territory of Negoslavci village.

At the commencement of the attack, be at readiness to establish control and authority in Vukovar to the extent that the town has been overrun. Secure the KM and IKM with part of the forces.

5.5 The 2nd bVP (without the 3rd and 4th čVP) from the Berak village deployment sector will be at readiness to establish control and authority in Vukovar to the extent that the town has been overrun, and control of the territory on the Orolik village – Vukovar axis.

5.6 lsard PVO (without 1st and 2nd) from the current firing position sector at readiness for PVO of the KM and IKM in position and in movement.

5.7 inžč /Engineering Company/ will form a group for clearing routes, and pioneer squads attached to JOd-1 and JOd-2 are to be at readiness to fortify the achieved lines.

6. SECURITY FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS:

9.1 Intelligence:

Up until the beginning of the attack, collect all data on enemy deployment at the approaches to the town and in the town from units in contact and by the use of your own reconnaissance organs. Compile a Plan of Attack for each unit, with details of the deployment of enemy forces.

At the commencement of the attack, be at readiness to establish control and authority in Vukovar to the extent that the town has been overrun. Secure the KM and IKM with part of the forces.

5.5 The 2nd bVP (without the 3rd and 4th čVP) from the Berak village deployment sector will be at readiness to establish control and authority in Vukovar to the extent that the town has been overrun, and control of the territory on the Orolik village – Vukovar axis.

5.6 lsard PVO (without 1st and 2nd) from the current firing position sector at readiness for PVO of the KM and IKM in position and in movement.

5.7 inžč /Engineering Company/ will form a group for clearing routes, and pioneer squads attached to JOd-1 and JOd-2 are to be at readiness to fortify the achieved lines.

6. SECURITY FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS:

9.1 Intelligence:

Up until the beginning of the attack, collect all data on enemy deployment at the approaches to the town and in the town from units in contact and by the use of your own reconnaissance organs. Compile a Plan of Attack for each unit, with details of the deployment of enemy forces.

Destroy MEP /mines and explosive obstacles/ discovered at the site, and remove fortified obstacles or destroy them with weapons fire or with /?explosives/.

In order to protect units at the achieved lines, axes under threat and gaps, establish obstacles with groups of mines.

Engage inžč as in item 5.7.

9.4 Logistical Support

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Serve personnel cooked meals until the beginning of operations, and Sd/o /combat rations/ on the commencement of combat operations.

I approve the following expenditure for the execution of the task:

- firearms ammunition…… 3 b/k /combat sets/
- Zolja /hand-held rocket launcher/ …… 2 b/k
- hand grenades…….. 5 b/k
- for 82 mm BsT /recoilless cannon/…… 7 b/k
- for 120 mm mortar…….. 7 b/k
- for PA /anti-aircraft/ weapons…… 4 b/k

Expenditure of fuel:

- for armoured b/s /combat equipment/ ……. 1.5 p/r tankfuls
- for engineering machinery…… 2 p/r
- for generators…… 4 tankfuls

The Tovarnik – Orolik – Negoslavci – Vukovar road is under the authority of the 453rd mbr commander.

Units shall provide medical care for the sick and injured independently, relying on the Gmtbr SnSt /Medical Post/ in Negoslavci village sector. Engage a H-V8 /V-8 helicopter/ of the mehvn /expansion unknown/ from the heliport in Negoslavci village for transport of the sick and wounded.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

10. COMMANDING AND COMMUNICATIONS

Gmtbr KM in Negoslavci village sector (centre of the village)
Gmtbr IKM in Negoslavci village sector (the next-to-last building on the road to Vukovar).
PKM (Rear Command Post) in Gibarac village sector.

Secure radio and courier communications from the command.

Submit reports

- on readiness for movement,
- on taking position at the line of blockade,

- on readiness for attack.

During operations, as needed.

Signals as in the signals table.

Submit regular reports by 1800 hours, with the situation at 1700 hours, and interim ones as needed.

Drafted by: Lieutenant Colonel B. LUKIĆ

Typed by: Warrant Officer 2nd Class D. RISTOVIĆ

COMMANDER

Colonel

Mile MRKŠIĆ

/signed and stamped/

DRAFT TRANSLATION

ANNEX 63:
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING CONDUCT OF ARKAN IN EASTERN SLAVONIA, OCTOBER 1991

BCS 0340-4870-0340-4871; Eng ET 0340-4870-0340-4871

OB Security Organ/ Republic Staff of the MILITARY SECRET

TO /Territorial Defence of Serbia STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 13.10.1991.

Printed in 3 copies

Submitted to:

- the 1 st Department of the UB /Security Administration/

of the SSNO /Federal Secretariat for National Defence/

- The 3rd Department of the UB SSNO

- OB of the RŠTO /Republic Territorial Defence Staff/

Socialist Republic of Serbia

Republic Territorial Defence Staff

Security Organ

Strictly Confidential No. 254-1191

13.10.1991.

BELGRADE

Register No.: 2015691000254

Activities of the "Serbian Guard Staff' from

Belgrade regarding organizing an army and

breaking the Armed Forces of the SFRJ

/Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ apart INFORMATION

On 13. 10. 1991. the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia has ceded to us information obtained through the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the request of the "Belgrade Serbian Guard Staff' submitted to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Gov ment of the Republic of Serbia, regarding the establishing of "Non-Ideological Serbian Army" med as 05, No. 80-5062, dated 08.10. 1991/illegible/. Attached is the copy of the request.

According to our confirmed operational information, a paramilitary formation called "Serbian Guard" is taking part in combat operations against Ustaša Soldiery carried out in many places in the territory of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem. A Command has been formed in the Vojvodina TO Centre - Erdut and it is headed by RAZNJATOVIC Zeljko aka Arkan and a group of his assistants. MUACIC Goran aka Kum has a special role there. They (Arkan and Kum) have special attention and privileged

treatment by numerous Ministers and other officials of the Serbian Government every day. They are becoming idols of the resistance movement of the Serbian people and in reality they represent the core of the proposed Nationalistic Soldiery, using the motto "For the King and the Fatherland".

In the greater area of Vukovar volunteer troops under the command of Arkan and Kum are committing uncontrolled genocide and various forms of terrorism, completely out of the control of the commands of the units carrying out combat activities in that area. They are spreading intensive propaganda activity through their contacts with local media, members of the Serbian Orthodox Church from ahroad, press and TV agencies.

According to unverified information, these two nationalistic leaders known in public as international criminals, are robbing and looting the property of the Croatian and Serbian citizens, "awarding" the members of their units and are planning to form "Special Units for the Defence of Serbia", all under the name of " organized combat".

We estimate that this is a very dangerous and well-organized paramilitary group of considerable power. Sooner or later governmental bodies and armed forces will have to fight them. I suggest that this problem be raised at the level of the federal organs and official organs of the Republic of Serbia, and that the appropriate solutions be found and measures taken to prevent any harmful effects.

Commander of the TO of the Republic of Serbia, Assistant Minister of the Defence for military issues of the Republic of Serbia has been /as written/ informed about this. Their position concerning the aforementioned issues is that they will not tolerate delays, so it is realistic to expect that it would be raised at the level of the board of these two organs.

I hereby submit this note for your information and suggest that you do not submit the original note to the organs outside the Armed forces.

Attachment:

Copy of the request of the "Staff of the Serbian Guard Belgrade"

regarding the formation of Serbian Army

MD/BS

/stamped/ Socialist Republic of Serbia

Republic Territorial Defence Staff

Security Organ

Belgrade

CHIEF OF SECURITY

Colonel Milinko DOKOVIC /signed/

MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential
/handwritten: "Č.3.3.06"/

1. Military District
.....
Security organ

03404876
/handwritten: "180"/

On the day of 25.10. 19 91.
Made in 3 copies
Submitted to:
- I station of Security Administration, Federal Secretariat of National Defence
- III
- OB 1. VO (Security Organ of the 1st Military District)

Reg. no. 20101915605/?6/2

/handwritten: "35-15403"/

I N F O R M A T I O N

1ST MILITARY DISTRICT COMMAND
SECURITY ORGAN

The behaviour of the Commander of
the special forces of
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem,
RAŽNJATOVIĆ ŽELJKO
– "ARKAN" in Erdut. -

On the day of 21.10.1991, a conversation was conducted with BALAĆ MILOVAN[1] who was banished by Arkan from the "course" in Erdut.

Balać wanted to join the volunteer units in order to give his contribution to the cleansing of the Serbian villages from the newly arisen vampires of the Ustasha movement.
He had a particular motif since his parents live in the village of Klis, SO Osijek (Serbian District of Osijek) and he himself had lived in Kutina for about twenty years where he had gone through a series of difficulties in the last year.

03404877

After he had run away from Kutina (23.09.91), he decided to come as a volunteer and to fight in Klis together with his father. He arrived to Borovo selo on 15.10.1991 wherefrom he was instructed to go to Erdut – to the Centre for Training of Volunteers which is led by Arkan. Upon arriving to Erdut, one of Arkan's volunteers, in the role of a security organ, conducted a conversation with him regarding the circumstances of his escapement from Kutina and the possible

[1] BALAĆ Špire MILOVAN, born 06.10.1955 in Bosansko Grahovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb, lawyer, used to work in the PTT (postal service) company in Kutina where he lived. With his family he fled from Kutina on 23.09.91. His parents are in Klis, SO Osijek.

informative activity for HOS (Croatian Defence Forces). After that, he enrolled in the "training" which he successfully finished and where he was one of the best marksmen. In the course of the training they were mostly trained in moving around the battlefield, studying mines, training in sidearms, shooting and providing first-aid. He completed his training under some DRAGAN person.

In the training process, they teach every volunteer, upon entering a Croatian house, to kill everything and everyone in the house, including children, elders, disabled persons, women etc. They are taught to perform the killing by opening fire from the right to the left.

The food for the volunteers is of first quality, there is meat in abundance as well as fruit and different candies. Especially unlimited amounts of chocolate so they could make up for the calories lost in the training which is very strenuous.
In the mornings, before the beginning of the training, the Serbian church flag is risen and the anthem "Bože pravde" ("God of Justice") is played. The volunteers cut out five-pointed star. They move around the circle with loaded arms.
The discipline in the Centre is impeccable. The one who violates the rules is beaten personally by Arkan. Most of the volunteers are criminals. All those who are from Belgrade and who successfully complete the training (in duration of 5 days) remain in the unit with Arkan; he does not trust the others so they are being sent to the local units of TO /Territorial Defence/.

Captain DRAGAN visited the Centre on several occasions. When he comes to the Centre, special precaution measures are undertaken. None of the volunteers is allowed to be in the circle, and Arkan's specials point their rifles to those who are on duty.

In the Centre, Arkan kills the prisoners that are brought before him by the local territorial units. He /?the source/ observed one man being beaten by a baseball bat and than being put on a nylon and left to bleed to death.
He had observed four men being killed in a way that barrels with silencers were put on the back of their heads and thus they were murdered. After the killing of those four men he personally cleaned the blood and the people were thrown to the Danube.

03404878

He forced out Balaća from the Centre because he was suspicious to him because he Balaća "ran away" from Kutina too late and because he insisted to fight exclusively in the village of Klis where he father had been fighting.

BK/LJK

Chief
General-Major
/illegible/ Babić

/illegible/ **Strictly Confidential**

(security organ)

Date: /illegible/ /?January/ /illegible/ /handwritten: illegible/

Done in three copies

To: – 1 x OB /Security Organ/ 1st VO /Military District/

– 1 x OB 12th K /Corps/

– 1 x /?NB – Security Chief/ SSNO /Federal Secretariat for National Defence/

Registration no. _____

R E P O R T

/handwritten: illegible/

DRAFT TRANSLATION

ŽELJKO RAŽNJAVIĆ /name as printed/ aka ARKAN

Commander of Serbian Volunteers' Guard

ŽELJKO RAŽNJATOVIĆ aka ARKAN, Commander of the Serbian Volunteers' Guard, the headquarters of which is at the Erdut TO /Territorial Defence/ Centre, has been on the territory of /underlining by hand:/ /?Eastern/ Slavonia since May. He was initially staying in the village of Tenja, and then in the first half of September he moved to the village of Erdut.

We do not have precise and complete personal details for RAŽNJATOVIĆ. We know that he is the son of an Air Force colonel, that he lives in Belgrade, is married and has four children. A great deal of information indicates that he is very wealthy. He has been a professional criminal. Many experts assert that he is still engaging in

crime and controls the underworld of Belgrade and probably even that of Yugoslavia. He is insolent, arrogant and brave. He claims to be a Serbian nationalist.

He is a bitter opponent of the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ and advocates the creation of a Serbian Army. Its core would be the Serbian National Guard that he commands, and it would be strengthened with junior officers who have distinguished themselves in this war.

He claims that the only officers he respects are Colonel Zoran JOVANOVIĆ, Commander of the 51st mbr /Mechanised Brigade/, Colonel Boro IVANOVIĆ, NŠ /Chief of Staff/ of the 12th Corps, and Colonel Enes TOSA, the recently appointed Chief of ONO /All-People's Defence/, 2nd VO.

Otherwise, he openly criticises officers and generals, claiming they are incompetent and drunkards. During his first meeting with General BIORČEVIĆ upon taking up his present post, he said that he had heard some good things about him, but his trouble was that he drank. During /illegible/ strict discipline reigns, founded on drilling, corporal punishment and /?fighting/. Alcohol is banned.

The presence of women is the cause of numerous conflicts. All members of /?the Centre/ must pray before every meal and attend church regularly.

/?Food/ is of very good quality and well varied. People can help themselves whenever they want. There are reportedly unlimited supplies of chocolate and juices.

Concerning weapons, in addition to APs /automatic rifles/, the detachment has two tanks, two triple-barrelled 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, Zoljas /portable rocket launchers/, and sniper rifles with night sights and silencers. Every soldier has a *Škorpion* /sub-machine gun/ with silencer, while the officers have *Hecklers.*

DRAFT TRANSLATION

The vehicle pool is comprised of:

– two ambulances

– two Campanolas, one with yellow, the other with blue /?rotating/ lights

– two *Yugos*

– one *Zastava 101*

– two Puchs, one with a metal cabin and no glass windows

– one van, owned by *Šumarija* of Erdut

– two *TAM-110* vehicles

– two *TAM-4500* vehicles

– one *Pajera* vehicle

DRAFT TRANSLATION

The vehicles do not have ordinary registration plates, and instead have numbers and visible "Serbian Volunteers' Guard" markings.

The weapons and vehicles were acquired from the TO, MUP and RS /?reserve force/ of the JNA.

The centre is financed and supplied in various ways which have not yet been fully analysed. It is known that it is financed by the SPS /Socialist Party of Serbia/ from within the country and from abroad, as well as by numerous enterprises. Accordingly, a characteristic example is the Dalj farm, which /illegible/ /?written order/ of Goran HADŽIĆ has paid out 7,088,674.50 dinars for the needs of /illegible/ Guard, while /illegible/ for free. Large quantities of food are delivered /illegible/ /?Red Cross/.

Fuel is supplied by the Novi Sad refinery. /illegible/ we know that Guard vehicles take fuel from the 51st mbr with the authorisation of the 12th Corps Commander. /illegible/ Centre was established at the expense of the Republic of Serbia MNO /Ministry of National Defence/.

/?It is known/ that RAŽNJATOVIĆ is openly supported by the MUP, TO and MNO of the Republic of Serbia, but it is claimed that this is on the direct orders of the most senior /illegible/ of the Republic of Serbia.

Our assessment is that /?certain/ JNA leaders accept him, on the /illegible/ and influence of these circles. It is a telling fact that although RAŽNJATOVIĆ has small forces at his disposal, he attends meetings at the 1st VO Command with corps commanders. RAŽNJATOVIĆ is officially subordinated to the 12th Corps, but only in formal terms, as can be seen from the following: he enters and leaves combat when he wants; he is quartered in a luxury building while the Corps Command suffers a squalid existence in farms and schools; he enters the command posts of brigades and the corps uninvited or without a pass, while he himself only receives visitors by appointment and with his approval; he makes public statements about the JNA, and so forth.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

It is undeniable that RAŽNJATOVIĆ's involvement in the war is not motivated purely by patriotic reasons, and is also motivated by looting and /illegible/ to make a name for himself as a soldier, which would help him to legalise his unlawfully acquired wealth. His activities /?in liquidating/ the Croatian and Hungarian population have been noted and written about a number of times. This is most frequently done by a man named Milorad STRIČEVIĆ, to whom RAŽNJATOVIĆ

awarded the rank of Colonel, and he wears the insignia of a colonel. STRIČEVIĆ is a driver from Osijek who has a number of criminal convictions. The conferral of ranks on his officers is yet another way of belittling the JNA.

/illegible/ that RAŽNJATOVIĆ is establishing two more Serbian Volunteers' Guard centres, in Brezovica and Zvornik. The centres would be headed by /illegible/ his current assistants and he would be the supreme commander. Thus a Serbian Army would gradually come into being.

/illegible/ also interesting was the somewhat unexpected release of RAŽNJATOVIĆ from prison in Zagreb, as well as numerous telephone /?calls to the USA/ and certain countries in Europe.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

We kindly request your view for further operative work.

/illegible/ for C H I E F

C o l o n e l

Milić JOVANOVIĆ

/signed and stamped/

Report annex

Description of the Erdut facility

The facility has a capacity of 172 beds as per the plan before the ZNG /National Guard Corps/ raided it (11 April 1991). The centre is comprised of seven facilities:

1. Section serving as a dormitory
2. Section serving as a classroom and instruction rooms
3. Section serving as a social area
4. Section serving as the kitchen quarters with mess-hall and canteen
5. Section serving as a storage room for arms and equipment
6. Section serving as a storage room for training equipment
7. Section serving as an auxiliary room for tools and the like

DRAFT TRANSLATION

1. The section serving as the dormitory is known as building no. 3. It has nine twin rooms each with a toilet and bathroom intended for officers and instructors. They are located on the first floor. There are 15 four-bed rooms with a shared toilet block and bathroom on the ground floor, which is used for accommodating those attending training. In addition to the accommodation area, there are instruction rooms in the form of two classrooms, one with 42 seats, the other with 24 seats. As part of this building, there is a laundry room, ironing room, a room containing hot water boilers, shared bathrooms for users on the first floor, and a boiler room. On the first floor of this building there is a social area for meetings and a club room for officers' rest and preparation. The total capacity of building no. 3 is 80 beds, consisting of 78 beds in

the accommodation section plus an apartment with two beds. The building was constructed in 1983 with credit from the Military Service of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

2. Building no. 2: A cinema auditorium with 182 seats; a canteen with high standing tables and a 60-person capacity; canteen store, duty officer's room with a bed and toilet. A kitchen with the latest kitchen equipment; meal preparation area with equipment; dining room with 100-seat capacity and hot service counter. Two dormitories with 24 beds each in the form of bunk beds. A guard room with eight bunks in bunk beds, and a film projectionist's room on the first floor with a bed.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

3. Building no. 1 – Office of the Centre Warden, clinic, clinic waiting room, toilet block and bathroom, janitor's flat (two rooms, a kitchen and a toilet). Five dormitories with six beds each, one dormitory with eight beds, and a toilet block (three showers, three toilets, wash basins and urinals.

4. Building no. 4 – storage area with two rooms for storing weapons and ammunition, and a smaller room for record-keeping. A storage area for training equipment with three rooms, one of which is a garage.

An ancillary room for tools and supplies. Four smaller rooms for storing targets, tools, supplies, fuel and lubricants for maintaining the building and a workshop for maintaining all the buildings of the Centre.

A training area is on the eastern side of Building 3 next to a football pitch, covering an area of around 1.5 hectares.

There is a firing range on the right bank of the Danube for target practice with infantry weapons at 300-400 metres. There are concrete parade grounds measuring 100 x 30 metres. There is a horticulture area between all the buildings. On the southern side is a park, on the western side an old cellar, on the northern side the River Danube, and on the eastern side a football pitch. The Centre is about 200-300 metres from the Danube.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Auxiliary staff employed at the Centre:

Cooks: Radmila SURLA from Erdut
Jelena DOKIĆ from Erdut
Ljubinka RAJČIĆ from Erdut
Rozalija IVOŠEVIĆ from Erdut
Sreten SAPANJOŠ from Erdut
Stevan PETROVIŠ from Palača

Laundresses: Mira PANIĆ from Erdut
Slavica ĐURKOV from Erdut
Dragica VUČIČEVIĆ from Erdut
Mira SELAKOVIĆ

In addition to the above staff, there are a number of women (8-12) in the facility, who probably provide sex, but are dressed in uniform and are claimed to be soldiers.

Vehicle pool:

1. Two ambulances
2. Two Campanolas, one with a yellow, the other with a blue /?rotating/ light
3. Two *Yugos* and one *Zastava 101*
4. Two Puchs, one of which has a metal cabin with no glass panes, for /illegible/ /?women/
5. A van owned by *Šumarija* of Erdut
6. Two *TAM-110* all-terrain vehicles, probably JNA property
7. Two *TAM-4500* vehicles, also probably JNA property
8. Three PA /anti-aircraft/ guns, set up ready to fire at /?guard/ posts around the facility
9. Two T-55 tanks positioned outside the facility

All motor vehicles have strange registration plates, similar to those of NATO vehicles, and a Serbian Volunteers' Guard /?badge/ is visibly placed on each vehicle.

There are 80-100 soldiers of the Serbian Volunteers' Guard in the facility, who are armed with *Škorpions* with silencers as personal weapons, *Hecklers*, and automatic and sniper rifles, also with silencers.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

There is a huge quantity of arms, ammunition and /illegible/ in the depot which is issued as needed. There is a storage depot for food /?which is/ delivered via the Red Cross.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

ANNEX 64

OFFICIAL NOTE CONCERNING INCIDENTS AT DALJ POLICE STATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HANDOVER, 5 OCTOBER 1991

No. 44/91

OFFICIAL NOTE

Compiled at Dalj Police Station regarding incidents on the premises of the police station on 4/5 October 1991.

In an interview conducted with Dalj Police Station officers Rajko Milanović, Savo Stanojević, Blagoje Stanojević, Djordje Radivojčević, Predrag Blagojević and Srboslav Mihaljević, the following information was obtained:

At around 2100 hours on 4 October 1991, Milorad Stričević, Chief of Security at the Dalj Defence Staff, together with Dragoljub Trbić, Djordje Milovanović, Branko Gojsović and an older, unknown man, came to the premises of Dalj Police Station. Milorad Stričević said that he was going to conduct interviews with detainees from Baranja and Eastern Slavonia. He began conducting the interviews, and at around 2115 hours the Dalj Defence Commander Pavle Milovanović and his deputy Djuro Zmijanjac arrived and told them that they were visiting to see what they were doing and whether there were any problems. They then went into the room with Stričević and the others and remained in there for a few minutes and then left. In the period up to 2345 hours, on one occasion there was a telephone call for Milorad Stričević, and after that there were three calls from the Staff asking whether the contact had arrived, with no further explanation.

At around 2345 hours, Zeljko Ražnjatović aka Arkan and some 20 of his men arrived in a TAM 110 (military) truck, a Pinzgauer and a Jeep. Upon getting out of the vehicles, Arkan' s men - who were armed - cocked their weapons and took up positions around the building of the police station. Arkan came into the station, introduced himself and said that he was the TO /Territorial Defence/ commander and was looking for Milorad, after which he and five of his men went into the room where Milorad Stričević was. When Arkan went into the room, Trbić, Milovanović, Gojsović and the unknown man came out, and remained in front of the police station the whole time. Stričević and the others who were in the room brought detainees in through the side door and conducted processing. Throughout the processing Arkan's men were coming out and others were going in. The only thing that was heard during the interrogations were the words: "Come on you, the Guardsman and MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ guy", and occasionally sounds were heard as if an object was being struck against a table, but no other sounds were heard. At around 0040 hours they took three detainees who then carried out 12 dead bodies from the room, loaded them into the truck, and then together with those three

men drove them off somewhere. After that Arkan returned with his men and asked Srboslav Mihaljević or Predrag Blagolević whether the room was clean, and when he received an affirmative answer they left. Stričević, Milovanović, Gojsović, Trbić and the unknown man also left at the same time.

It has been established that Zvonko Mlinarević, Ivan Tomičić, Josip Balog, Zlatko Rastika, Josip Mikić, Rudolf Jukić, Vinko Oroz, Pero Rašić, Janoš Šinaš, Stanislav Strmeč, Ivica Krkalo, Tibor Šileš, Danijel Tomičić, Martin Benković and Mile Grbešić are missing from the detention.

Dalj, 5 October 1991

DELIVERED TO:

1. UP /Police Administration/ Secretary of the AO /Autonomous District/ of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem

2. Special Unit Commander Zavišić

/handwritten:/ 3. Files HERE

Dalj Police Station Commander Zeljko Čizmić /signed/ and Dalj Police Station Deputy Commander Bogoljub Ristić /signed/

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

confirming that, on behalf of the Dalj Defence Staff, Milorad Stričević took over from the premises of the Dalj Police Station /the following persons/: Mlinarević Zvonko, Soldo Ranko,

Tomić Ivan, Hadji Elvis , Mesarić Franjo , /first and last name illegible/, Raić Karlo , Šimun Mihajlo, Mikić Josip, /?Šomođvarić/, Jukić Rudolf, Tolaš Mihalj, /?Šarec/ Pavo, Radoljević Đorđe , Oros Vinko , Rašić Pero , Šim/?o/š Janoš , Maksimović Andrija , Stra/illegible/ Stanislav, /illegible/ Ivica, /?Šileš/ Tibor, Tomičić Daniel, Benković Martin, Milić Pero, Lukač /?Ileš/, Grbošić Mile, on 5 October 1991.

Dalj, 5 October 1991

HANDED OVER BY:

Commander of the Dalj Police Station
Željko Čizmić /signed/
TAKEN OVER BY:
Milorad Stričević
/signed/

Assistant Commander
Bogoljub Ristić
/signed/
/illegible stamp/

ANNEX 65:

DECISION OF 2ND AND 3RD OPERATION ZONE FOR BANOVINA AND KORDUN, NO. 9, 3 OCTOBER 1991

/handwritten note: "03.10.'71. 16.50
signature illegible"/

TO /Territorial Defence/ Staff of 2nd and 3rd OZ /operations zones/ For Banija and Kordun
Number 9
03.10.1991.

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE STAFFOF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF VOJNIĆ

1. – SSNO /Federal Secretariat of National Defence/ made a decision upon which the Territorial Defence Staff was formed for SAO /Serbian Autonomous District/ Krajina. Colonel General ĐUJIĆ ILIJA, currently retired, is appointed as a Commander of the TO Staff, KASUM DUŠAN as Chief of Staff, RADOSLAV MASIĆ for Chief of the Operative-teaching department and Colonel ALEKSANDAR ČULETIĆ for Chief of Communications.

The completion of the staffing is underway about which you will be informed in due time. The Staff began with work on 30.09.1991.

The TO SAO Krajina Headquarters' seat is in Knin.

2. – By order of the President of the Government of SAO Krajina, the active Colonel of JNA, VUJAKLIJA RADE, has been appointed as Commander of the 2nd and 3rd operations zones for Banija and Kordun, while TARBUK MILAN, retired Colonel, is appointed as Chief of Staff.

3. – The standpoint of the Government of SAO Krajina is that the President of the Government of SAO Krajina appoints by an order the Commander of the TO Staff, the Chief of Staff of TO Staff as well as the Commander of the TO detachment.

In relation to the aforementioned stance, submit the name, father's name and family name /proposal/ with the purpose of appointing the Commander of the TO Staff, Chief of TO Staff for municipalities and Commander of the detachment.

In the proposal, emphasise for each officer individually if the person is in reserve, active or retired officer.

State the rank, education degree and duties performed up to now /VES: military occupational speciality/.

4. – Other officers in the TO Staff of municipalities and detachments are appointed by the commanders of the TO staffs of the respective municipality by their order.

UPON AUTHORISATION OF THE COMMANDER
Colonel
Pekić Đuro

/handwritten note: "Strictly confidential number: 30"/

ANNEX 66:
COMMAND OF THE 1ST MD, NO. 160-15, 9 OCTOBER 1991

03643211

Command of the 1st Military District
Strictly confidential no. 160-15
9 October 1991

to be immediately delivered

immediately upon the arrival of volunteer or other units in your forces, start preparing them for the execution of combat tasks as required by the concrete situation.

Chief of Staff
Lieutenant-General
Vladimir Stojanović

to be delivered to: 1st pgmd (Proletarian Guards Motorised Division), 12th k (Command) and 1st gmtbr (Guards Motorised Brigade)

RECEIVED: 10 October at 02:20 illegible
(day and month) (hours and minutes) (signature)
BRANIK 90 7076 110 0 Š-31 KT?? ST
(? name) (telegram no.) (group no.) (urgency) (??) (??)

PROCESSED: 10 October at 02:15 illegible
(day and month) (hours and minutes) (signature)

HANDED OVER: _____ at _____ _____
(day and month) (hours and minutes)

/stamp/
10 October 1991
COMMAND
of the GUARDS MOTORISED BRIGADE
strictly confidential no. 56-1

ANNEX 67:
COMMAND OF THE 1ST MD, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NO. 1614-82 27, 15 OCTOBER 1991

1st VO /military district/ Command – FCP
Highly Conf.No: 1614-82/27
15-Oct-91

Deliver immediately

To the following Commands: 12th K /Corps/; 1st pgma /expansions unknown/; OG /Operation Group/ "Jug"; 152nd mabr /mixed arty bde/; psto apv /Provincial TO Staff of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina/; and the Command of the 1st VO - /illegible/ Command Post

- Personally to the Commander – Chief /of Staff/-

Pursuant to recent problems in the zones of combat activities, and with the aim of regulating the life, work, order and discipline, I hereby
ORDER:

1. Establish full control in the AOR of the units. Pay special attention to the functioning of the military authority in all the settlements and do not permit the local organs of authority to interfere and exert influence, until the civilian control of the liberated territory is established.
2. All paramilitary compositions and the volunteer detachments which refuse to put themselves under the command of the JNA units are to be removed from the territory.
3. Establish appropriate relationship with the residents by following proper procedures and /taking/ positive measures, ensure the full security and normal living conditions for the citizens of all nationalities, party or religious affiliations.
   I most severely prohibit the destruction of or the damaging of the religious, cultural and historical facilities in the liberated areas.
4. The troops and commanding officers who violate discipline are to be most severely punished and all military deserters criminally prosecuted.
5. Form the Military District Command for the AO /Autonomous District/ of Slavonija, Western Srem and Baranja, with the centre in Dalj. Organise the Military Sections in Beli Manastir and Ilok, upon its liberation.

In order to man the Dalj KVO /?Military District Command/ and the military sections, engage the commanding officers that have not yet been deployed and the civilians serving in the JNA.

The 1st VO Command Staff will regulate all questions from within the sphere of work and organisation of the KVO and the military sections and will propose to them the deadline for the execution of this task.

COMMANDER

LtGen

Života PANIĆ

ANNEX 68:

OPERATIONAL GROUP SOUTH COMMAND, DECISION TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK OPERATION VUKOVAR, 15 OCTOBER 1991

OG /Operational Group/ SOUTH Command
Strictly Confidential No. 106-1
15 October 1991
Negoslavci MILITARY SECRET

DECISION to continue the attack operation VUKOVAR

1. I HAVE DECIDED: to simultaneously continue with the attack along the entire front using the main forces on the attack line: forest Mala Dubrava – "Mitnica" – Vodotoranj and auxiliary forces on: Svetozara Markovića Street – "Boško Buha" housing estate, in order to:
capture part of the town called "Mitnica" (to cut it off from the rest of the town) and also to capture the housing estate #6. Proleterske divizije" during the Phase I, then during the Phase II of the operation reach the rivers Vuka and Danube.
Operational deployment: 4 assault squads; infiltrated and sabotage groups, security forces, reserves, fire support forces, PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/, Command and logistics.
Duration of Phase I: 1-2 days.
Duration of Phase II: 1-2 days.
Readiness for the continuation of the attack at 1000 hours on 16 October 1991.
2. Assignments for the units:
a) JOd-1 formation: 1st mtb /Motorised Battalion/, 3-1. tč /tank company/ /okb /Armoured Battalion/, 1-2.č/v. bVP /infantry combat vehicle/ and Volunteers' Company of the current combat deployment will continue the attack and in coordinated action with JOd-2 and 3./211th Armoured Brigade and Petrova Gora units crush the Ustashe units on the following axis: Vladimira Gaćeše Street, 6. Proleterske divizije housing estate and Svetozara Markovića Street-1. Maja Street, capture part of the town called "Hercegovačko naselje"and then continue the attack and capture the 6. Proleterske divizije housing estate and 1. Maja Street thus creating the conditions for the main force to reach the centre of Vukovar.
b) JOd-2 formation: 2nd mtb, čVPPTD/1st bVP, OT / armoured personnel carrier/ Company/1st bVP, /3-2. tč/okb and part of the forces DOd/93. zmtp / motorised protection regiment/ and 1st and 2nd company/2nd bVP and Volunteers' Company of the current combat deployment area will continue the attack with their main force on the axis: Dalmatinska Street – Augusta Šenoe Street, and with their auxiliary force act in coordination with JOd-3 on axis: dr. Mladena Stojanovića Street – part of town called "Mitnica". Assignment: Crush the Ustashe in the area of workers' home, school and cem-

etery and reach Stjepan Radić Street thus cutting off possible retreat route for Ustashe from "Mitnica".
c) JOd-3 formation: 1st mč / mechanised company//1st pgmd / infantry mechanised Guards division/ and part of the forces of mixed DOd/93rd zmtp of the current combat deployment will continue the attack around the road from Mala Dubrava forsest – "Mitnica" with the support of 20th partbr /Partisan Brigade/46th partd /Partisan Division/ in coordinated action JOd-2 crush the Ustashe on the main road through "Mitnica" and reach the area of the water tower from where, engage in coordinated action with JOd-2 on axis Jugoslavenske Narodne Armije Street – Stjepana Radića Street.

d) JOd-4 formation: 2nd bVP (-3 companies) and OdTOK from the current deployment area to be prepared for the intervention along the axis:
-Radnička Street –Dalmatinska Street and
- Radnička Street – Otokar Keršovani Street
e) 20th partbr TO/Territorial Defence/ with okb/544th mtbr from the current deployment area using their main forces in coordinated action with JOd-3 crush the Ustashe in the following directions:
- "Bugarsko groblje" – Mitnica
- Mala Dubrava forest – tt. /trigonometry point/107 – Mitnica
Use the auxiliary forces to block the area of Mala Dubravica forest to search and mop up the area.
f) Engage 2nd OdTOSM to close the most sensitive routes in the area of responsibility.
- Engage one company on Bogdanovačka kosa in formation 3rd okb/211th okbr in the area tt.102 to close of routes leading from Vukovar towards Bogdanovci.
- Use one company on the road Petrovci-Vukovar in economy Dubrava area (s/i for 500 m)
- Use one company on the road Negoslavci-Vukovar in tt.102 area.
g) 3/211th okbr in the area of tt.102 on Bogdanovačka kosa close off the road Vukovar-Bogdanovci and secure the main force during the attack in case of a sudden attack coming from the village of Bogdanovci. Prevent possible retreat of Ustashe forces via road Vukovar –Bogdanovci.
Maintain the action readiness in the direction Bogdanovačka kosa - overpass -6. Proleterske divizije housing estate.
h) okb/Gmtbr / guards motorised brigade/ to serve as the reserves.
Assignment: organise circular defence in the greater area of Dubrava economy, maintain readiness for:
- Provide security in case of Ustashe intervention from Petrovci.
- Provide security in case of Ustashe intervention from Bogdanovci.
- Active engagement on the assault detachments' attack axis.
i) Engage the remaining units of OG SOUTH pursuant to previous decision.
3. FIRE SUPPORT:
a) Air force support:

Implement the air force fire support acting pursuant to call from 2 department in the armament option 4 time RAB-250 kg (or 4 times FAB -250 kg) to be used on targets “Dvorac” /castle/, “Bolnica” /hospital/ (Command Post, Staff), northeast of the River Vuka
b) Artillery support:
Focus on providing support for the forces on 16 October 1991 on axis: Vučedol –Bugarsko groblje –Mitnica –Vukovar centre.
Engage at the centre two batteries of MB/mortar/ -120 mm, had /howitzer battalion/ -122 mm, D-30J, had -155mm M1 and tad-130 mm M46.
On the attack axis JOd-1 and JOd-2 engage as a support two MB-120 mm batteries.
Provide support pursuant to the request of the commanders of the assault detachments.
4. COMBAT ASSETS:
In accordance with the previous decision.
- Forward the PPA / psychological and propaganda activities/ from Snč / medical company //Gmtbr in Ovčara area for more efficient care for the wounded.

Written by: Major R. Trifunović
Typed by: Warrant Officer D. Ristović
OG SOUTH COMMANDER
Colonel
Milan Mrkšić
/signed/
/sealed/

Accuracy of the copy verified by: WARRANT OFFICER
Jovan Radisavljević
/signed/

13 copies made and sent to:

-	Copy no.1	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-1
-	Copy no.2	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-2
-	Copy no.3	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-3
-	Copy no.4	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-4
-	Copy no. 5	k-tu /to commander/	20th partbrTO
-	Copy no.6	k-tu /to commander/	2nd OdTOSM
-	Copy no.7	k-tu /to commander/	3/11th okbr
-	Copy no.8	k-tu /to commander/	okb/Gmtbr
-	Copy no.9	k-tu /to commander/	Dod/93rd zmtp
-	Copy no.10	k-tu /to commander/	11th bVP
-	Copy no.11	k-tu /to commander/	lsard PVO
-	Copy no.12	k-tu /to commander/	PKPO
-	Copy no.13	k-ru /courier/	Engineering Company
-	Original -ONO		

ANNEX 69:
OPERATIONAL GROUP SOUTH COMMAND, DECISION OF COLONEL MILE MRKŠIĆ, 18 OCTOBER 1991

OG /Operational Group/ SOUTH Command

Strictly Confidential No. 140-1
18 October 1991
v. Negoslavci
MILITARY SECRET

Based on the order received and the current situation pertaining to realizing the decision of 15 October 1991,

1. I HAVE DECIDED:

to continue with the attack with a part of the forces, to straighten out the frontline on the left flank and create a more favourable tactical position, to use some forces to strengthen and secure the combat line reached, and to withdraw a part of the forces from combat deployment for reorganisation and expansion, with the aim to:

Improve the operational and tactical position and prepare the units for an organised continuation of operation "VUKOVAR", and create preconditions for total destruction of the Ustasha forces;

Prevent, with security forces, any intervention of the Ustasha forces and their possible withdrawal.

Combat deployment according to the previous decision.

Support for 1st air force corps and ADD and VAG-1.

2. TASKS FOR THE UNITS:

a) JOd-1 in the course of the day and in coordination with JOd-2, continue with the attack in the direction determined.

Task: straighten out the frontline on the left flank, control the following streets: Save Kovačevića, Vladimira Gaćinovića and Pionirsko naselje, which would endanger and possibly allow control of the 1. maja street.

For completing this task, reinforcement of one tank is provided, in addition to an assault anti-artillery cannon.

b) JOd-2 – 1st motorised company/2nd motorised brigade in combat to be re-

placed with 1st MP company/2nd MP brigade and withdrawn in sections for reorganisation and expansion.

After rotation, with artillery support and in coordination with JOd-1, continue with the attack in the direction determined to gain control of the Ratkovićeva and Leva Bara streets, which would create favourable conditions for continuation of the attack.

Support upon demand by artillery group and an assault anti-artillery cannon.

c) 20th PARTBR (partisan brigade): Use a part of the forces to replace JOd-3 at Vučedol, and gain full control of the direction encompassing the road from Ekonomija in Vučedol to the neighbourhood of Mitnica and towards the village of Sotin.

Use some forces to seize and secure the area of Mala Dubrava, Ovčara and Jakobovac forests.

Organise reconnaissance of the Mala Dubrava forest and undertake all necessary security measures to prevent possible activities of the Ustasa forces in direction of the Mitnica – Ovčara neighbourhoods and the forest Mala Dubrava – Ovčara.

Analyse previous actions, consolidate the unit, complete retraining and strengthen the management and command system on all levels.

d) JOd-3 – after rotation in the Vučedol zone, pull out a part of the 20th PARTBR 1st motorised company - 1st armoured brigade/1st PGMD (proletarian motorised guard brigade) and a part of DOd to Ekonomija and to the village of Negoslavci, where rest, equipment reorganisation and unit expansion must be organised.

Units must be ready to join above operations at any time.

e) 3rd/211th armoured brigade with TD company/2nd OdTOSM in coordination with engineer company/motorised guard brigade to block more efficiently the so-called "Ho Chi Minh road". The road between the village of Bogdanovci and Vukovar must not be blocked.

Further actions as determined in the order above.

f) Armoured brigade/GTBR to complete the order obtained previously. In addition, a detailed reconnaissance of the direction Bogdanovci - Vukovar to be completed, and activities to be coordinated with 3/211 armoured brigade to

completely surround and control it, based on my order.

g) Other units in the zone of authority to be engaged based on a previous decision.

3. FIRE SUPPORT:

a) Aviation support:
Support of 1st air force corps and ADD approved to be regulated through VOV upon my demand.

b) Artillery support:
The core of artillery support will be transferred into the direction of attack by JOd-1 and JOd-2 upon demand of the section commander.

4. I am emphasizing again the importance of complying with all measures regulating issues significant for the completion of orders given by the OG "South" command, strictly confidential no. 98-1 of 14 October 1991.

Prepared by: Major R. Trifunović
Typed by: D. Ristović

OG SOUTH COMMANDER
Colonel
Mile Mrkšić
/signed/
/sealed/

Accuracy of the copy verified by: WARRANT OFFICER
Jovan Radisavljević
/signed/

13 copies made and sent to:

-	Copy no.1	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-1
-	Copy no.2	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-2
-	Copy no.3	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-3
-	Copy no.4	k-tu /to commander/	JOd-4
-	Copy no. 5	k-tu /to commander/	20th partbrTO
-	Copy no.6	k-tu /to commander/	2nd OdTOSM
-	Copy no.7	k-tu /to commander/	3/11th okbr
-	Copy no.8	k-tu /to commander/	okb/Gmtbr
-	Copy no.9	k-tu /to commander/	Dod/93rd zmtp
-	Copy no.10	k-tu /to commander/	11th bVP
-	Copy no.11	k-tu /to commander/	lsard PVO
-	Copy no.12	k-tu /to commander/	PKPO

ANNEX 70:

OPERATIONAL GROUP SOUTH COMMAND, DECISION TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK OPERATION VUKOVAR, 29 OCTOBER 1991

OG /Operational Group/ SOUTH Command
Strictly Confidential No. 235-1
29 October 1991
MILITARY SECRET

DECISION to continue the attack operation VUKOVAR

1. I HAVE DECIDED: through simultaneous and energetic action of all the forces with airforce and artillery support, and with insertion of the part of the force to continue with the attack along the entire front using the main forces on the attack axis: Sajmište Street –Dalmatinska Street – A Alijagića Street – Trg Republike, and the auxiliary forces " on "Vučedol" (Mala Dubrava forest) - Mitnica in order to:

capture part of the town called "Mitnica" and cut it off from the rest of the town) and also to capture the housing estate "6. Proleterske divizije" and part of the town in the area of Ognjen Prica Street and Alija Alijagić street during the Phase I, then during the Phase II of the operation reach the rivers Vuka and Danube.

Operational deployment: 5 assault detachments; infiltrated and sabotage groups, security forces, reserves, fire support forces, PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/, Command and logistics.

Duration of Phase I_____.

Duration of Phase II_____.

Readiness for the continuation of the attack _____.

2. ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE UNITS:

1) JOd-1 formation: 1st mtb /Motorised Battalion/, 3-1. 1-3/2nd bVP / infantry combat vehicle/ from Leva Sudoperica to Petrova Gora, Volunteers' Company Novi Sad, one tank M-84, 1/1st Engineering Company , part of TO /Territorial Defence/ units from the present region, continue the attack and in coordinated action with JOd-2 with the insertion of forces crush the Ustashe units in "Cvetno naselje" and "Pionirsko naselje" , reach 1. Maj Street and then in coordinated action with 3./211 okbr /Armoured Brigade/ use the main forces to continue the attack along 1. Maj Street, and use the auxiliary forces to crush the Ustashe forces in the area of the housing estate "6. Proleterske divizije".

Reach the area of Milino Brdo with the main forces and then in coordinated action with JOd-2 engage on the axis Ivan Goran Kovačić Street –Maršala Tita Street and thus create conditions for the main forces to reach the centre of Vukovar.

2) JOd-2 formation: 2nd mtb, 2nd bVP (two platoons less),vABHO / nuclear-biological-chemical defence platoon/, 2./1st Engineering Company and Volunteers' Company of the current combat deployment area will continue the attack with their main force on the axis: Dalmatinska Street – Alija Alijagić

Street, and with infiltration of forces capture the area of the school and the graveyard to reach Stjepan Radić Street, and the auxiliary forces continue the attack in coordinated action with JOd-3 on axis: dr. Mladen Stojanović Street – "Mitnica".
Upon reaching Stjepan Radić Street, use part of the forces to prevent possible withdrawal of Ustashe forces from Mitnica direction, and use the other part of the forces to continue the attack and reach the River Danube.

3) JOd-3 formation: mixed DOd, Recognisance/543rd mtbr/ Motorised Brigade/, 3./ Engineering Company, Volunteers' Company Novi Sad, mč / Mechanised Company/ -1st okb /Armoured Battalion//1st pgmbr / Infantry Mechanised Guards Brigade/, Mixed Company okb/Gmtbr /Mechanised Guards Brigade/, 1st Volunteers' Company Smederevska Palanka, TO Units from Negoslavci and Sotin of the current combat deployment area, contine with the attack along the route Mald Dubrava forest –Mitnica-Vodotoranj with the support of 20/46th Partisan Division, engage in coordinated action with JOd-2 and with infiltration of forces crush the Ustashe forces along the main road through Mitnica in order to reach the area of vodotoranj /water tower/ from where engage in coordinated action with JOd-2 on the axis: JNA Street –Stjepana Radiča Street. .
4) JOd-4 formation: OdTOK, 1/2nd Engineering Company, 2nd Volunteers' Company Smederevska Palanka, use the main force to continue the attack along Stjepan Supanac Street and Josip Kraš Street and in coordinated action with JOd-5 engage in breaking the remaining firing positions, and auxiliary forces are to tie the Ustashe forces in Josip Kraš Street and Stjepan Supanac Street, secure the captured area and mop up the terrain.
5) JOd-5 formation: 1st BVP, 2/2nd Engineering Company, two volunteers' platoons (Sarajevo and Belgrade) from the current combat deployment area together with the formation of infiltration groups and capturing of key facilities continue with the attack along Alija Alijagić Street to reach the area of the water tower from were in coordinated action with JOd-2 prevent a manoeuvre and withdrawal of Ustashe forces from Mitnica direction.
6) 3/211th okbr – at the current combat deployment area secure the route: Bogdanovci-Vukovar and prevent possible intervention from Bogdanovci. Upon the commencement of combat activities use one company to act in coordination with JOd-1 along the overpass-1. Maj Street, and use two companies to conduct a demonstrative attack along Svetozar Marković Street and Proleterskih brigade Street.
In case of more forceful intervention of Ustashe forces coming from Bogdanovci in act in coordination with okb/Gmbr mixed company in order to prevent the intervention and repel the Ustashe forces.
7) Okb/gmbtr (- a mixed company)has a reserve role at the current combat deployment area and is to maintain readiness to prevent possible interventions coming from Bogdanovci, upon the commencement of combat activities give a demonstration of force along Sajmište Street. Maintain readiness

for intervention along assault detachments' attack axes and in order to secure the crossroads at "Slavija".

8) 20th partisan battalion with okb/544th mtbr from the current deployment area secure the greater area of Ovčara, Jakobovac, Grabovo, Mala Dubrava forest. Part of the forces act in coordination with JOd-3 along:

- "Bugarsko groblje" – Mitnica
- Ovčara –Bokovci – tt. /trigonometry point/ 108

After the fall of Mitnica conduct the mop up of Mala Dubrava forest and of Mitnica.

9) OdTOSM from the current combat deployment area use part of the forces to secure the route along Svetozar Marković Street and to prevent possible interventions coming from 8. Mart housing estate. Use part of the forces for coordinated action with JOd-3 along Sajmište Street-"Koreja" – Mitnica and to secure the connection between JOd -2 and 3.

In coordinated action with 20th Partisan Battalion prevent the withdrawal of Ustashe forces along the direction "Koreja" – Ovčara.

10) lsard PVO / anti-tank platoon/ from current positions fire on Mitnica and Alija Alijagić's Street.

Maintain readiness to move and fire along the JOd-1, 2 and 5 axes of the attack.

11) Engage the remaining units of OG /Operational Group/ SOUTH pursuant to the previous decision.

3. FIRE SUPPORT:

a) Airforce support:

Support for 1st KoRV /Ground Forces/ and PVO / Anti-Aircraft Defence/

Airforce fire support to be conducted upon the request of the 2 division with armament option 4 times RAB -250kg (or 4 times FAB-250 kg) fired at facilities that will be precisely marked.

b) Artillery support:

Focus on providing support along the main attack axis during _____1991.

Engage at the centre two batteries of MB/mortar/ -120 mm, had /howitzer battalion/ -122 mm, D30J, had -155mm M1 and tod-130 mm M46.

Provide support pursuant to the request of the commanders of the assault detachments.

4. COMBAT ASSETS:

In accordance with the previous decision.

RT/DT

OG SOUTH COMMANDER

Colonel

Milan Mrkšić

/signed/

/sealed/

ANNEX 71:

1ST PROLETARIAN MOTORISED GUARD DIVISION COMMAND, ORDER FOR COMBAT OF THE 1ST PGMD ARTILLERY COMMANDER, 29 OCTOBER 1991

1st PGMD /Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division/ COMMAND
Strictly confidential no. 851-94
29 October 1991
MILITARY SECRET

Command location - zone Šid

TO THE COMMAND OF: ARTILLERY COMMANDER

ORDER FOR COMBAT OF THE 1ST PGMD ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Sections 1:50000 Vinkovci 2 and 4, Bačka Palanka 1, 2, 3 and 4

1. Enemy forces continue to put up resistance in the villages of Bogdanovci, Nuštar, in Vinkovci, in the villages of Privlaka, Komletinci, Otok, Nijemci, Podgrađe, Apševci and Lipovac. All places indicated were fortified and their defence organised, specially buildings and larger, stronger structures (basements, roofs, upper floors). Mine fields were created in front of inhabited places, by group (mixed) method and by dissemination; anti-tank barriers were positioned. Armour combat resources are available (for close combat); tanks and transporters are expected.

Artillery support provided (mortars), while heavy artillery usage is expected (howitzers and multiple rocket launchers).

Aviation support was not provided previously, but is expected in further military actions, specially the adapted agricultural aviation.

Sabotage and terrorist groups are cunningly used, especially in inhabited towns and in immediate vicinity of inhabited towns.

2. Task of the 1st PGMD: From 29 October to 1 November complete necessary preparations and on 2 November 1991 use all available forces and necessary reinforcements to block inhabited towns and cleanse the area of the villages of Nijemci, Komletinci and Otok, then extend activities to resolve the problem of Privlaka.

Once these villages have been cleansed, the left flank must be secured from the direction of Spačva forests to inhabited places.

Some forces to be positioned on the right bank of the Bosut river, near the village of Podgrađe.

Simultaneously, in coordination with forces of the 12th corps and OG (operation group) "SOUTH" take the village of Bogdanovci.

Upon cleansing of the villages listed, secure control over them with your own TD (territorial defence) units.

Support of air force and AAD (anti-aircraft defence) VAG-1 based on your demand.

3. To the right of us, in conquering the village of Bogdanovci in the wider Vukovar region, some of the 12th corps and OG forces will be engaged.

None of our forces are positioned to the left of us.

4. I HAVE DECIDED: From 29 October to 1 November to complete preparations, and on 2 November 1991 I will initiate a combined attack with main forces of the division (1st and 3rd PGMB) in direction of the villages of: Privlaka, Oriolik, Komletinci, Otok; and with additional forces (46th PARTD - partisan division) in direction of the villages of: Ilinci, Apševci, Nijemci; with the reinforced section of TD "Srbobran" in direction of the village of Đeletovci – Nijemci, with the goal to destroy, cut off, surround and force the enemy to surrender in the villages of Nijemci, Komletinci, Otok, Privlaka, simultaneously securing the direction of Vinkovci – Privlaka, Županja – Privlaka, Lipovac – Apševci – Podgrađe; and from the direction leading from Spačva forests to the villages of Nijemci, Otok, Komletinci and Privlaka.

In the course of 29 October 1991 conquer the village of Bogdanovci.

Combat readiness at 0800 hours on 2 November 1991.

Combat deployment: forces for conquering the village of Bogdanovci, forces for blocking the village of Nijemci, forces for cutting off and destroying the enemy in the villages of Komletinci, Otok, Privlaka; forces for conquering the villages of Adaševci and Podgrađe; forces for blocking the enemy in Vinkovci; support forces, POD; engineering support forces, forces for securing territory.

5. Combat deployment and tasks of support artillery:
1) I VAG-C:
a) - Combat deployment forces to remain in current deployment zones. One VPr to be deployed in the wider zone.

- Observation post and VAG-C (commander's group) in the Stari Jankovci zone (silos). The observation post of the division commander will be determined by the group commander according to operating directions and support.
- Command post in the Šidski Banovci zone.

b) Reconnaissance to be organised in the zone:
Right: Vinkovci – village of Gradište
Left: village of Ilinci – village of Batrovci
RNP-1 village of Otok
RNP-2 village of Privlaka.

I VAG-C supported by main forces division in the direction of villages: St. Jankovci - Privlaka and Oriolik, Komletinci – Otok, and additional forces division in the direction of villages: Ilinci – Nijemci and Đeletovci – Nijemci, as follows:

- With 1/1 VAG supports main forces in the direction of villages St. Jankovci – Privlaka, preparing the terrain for KV-201 in the zone south of tt-84 for 300 metres (bridge over the Bosut river), KV-202 in the zone of the railway tracks and road intersection, and northeast from the village of Privlaka, KV-203 in the zone around the church in the village of Privlaka; KV-204 in the zone tt-84 on the road Privlaka - Andrijaševci, KV-205 in the zone of the railway tracks and road intersection in Privlaka – Otok, and KV-206 in the bridge zone, southwest from the village of Privlaka, on the bridge over Bosut.

- With 2/1 VAG-C support main forces in the direction of villages Oriolik – Komletinci – Otok, preparing KV-207 in the zone south of the Bosut (Bojara) crossing for 100 m, KV-208 in the zone Ekonomija – Penava, KV-209 access to Komletinci from the direction of Oriolik, KV-210 in the church zone in Komletinci, KV-211 in the zone of crossroads, by the "Čukovac" sign; KV-212 in the chapel zone (k-89) on the road to Crnojevci, KV-213 in the zone of crossroads west of Komletinci; KV-214 in the zone tt-88 east of Otok, KV-215 in the zone north of the recreation field in Otok for 150 m, KV-216 in the church zone of Otok, KV-217 in the brickworks zone in Otok, KV-218 in the SR (facility) zone, southwest of Otok, in the direction of Privlaka.

- With 3/1 VAG support additional forces in the direction of villages Ilinci – Apševci – Nijemci and Đeletovci – Nijemci, preparing KV-219 in the zone: access to Apševci from the direction of Ilinci, KV-220 in the church zone in Apševci, KV-221 in the zone of the bridge over Bosut, south of Apševci, KV-222 in the zone of the bridge over Spačva, south of Apševci, KV-223 in the zone of crossroads in the direction of Apševci – Nijemci, KV-224 in the zone of the bridge in Podgađe, KV-225 in the access zone to

Nijemci from the direction of Podgrađe, KV-226 in the zone of Ekonomija PK, next to tt-
83, east of Nijemci, KV-227 in the zone of the bridge in Nijemci, KV-228 in the zone of the west church in Nijemci and KV-229 in the cemetery zone in the village of D. Novo Selo.

2) DAG-1 (without the 2nd HAD mortar 155) with 1/1 LAR (light artillery regiment) AAD supports the attack of the main forces division in the direction: St. Jankovci – Privlaka and Oriolik – Komletinci – Otok.
Group commander – 1st GMAP commander

a) Combat deployment forces to remain in current deployment zones (adapted to support directions).
Include 1-2 VPr in the wider zone of the existing VPr.
Observation post of the group commander in the zone of the mouth of the Ervenica stream into Bosut (wider zone).
The observation post of the division commander will be determined by the group commander according to operating directions and support.
Command post in the village of Oriolik.

For the purpose of supporting forces to block Vinkovci, secure 2 automatic multiple rocket launchers positioned in that direction, ready to use as ordered.

b) Reconnaissance to be organised in the zone:
Right: Vinkovci – village of Gradište
Left: village of Ilinci – village of Nijemci
RNP-1 village of Otok
RNP-2 village of Privlaka.

Secure reconnaissance and artillery fire in these locations.

c) Tasks

Support the attack of main forces in the direction of villages: St. Jankovci – Privlaka, preparing KV-20-206 indicated in item for I VAG-C and in the direction of villages Oriolik – Komletinci – Otok, preparing KV-207 to 218 indicated in item for I VAG-C.

Support for fire to be conducted based on your plan of action.

3) Numeration of targets (for all AG)
- Artillery command divisions 201-250
- I VAG-C 251-300

- DAG-1	301-350
- BrAG-1	351-400
- BrAG-3	401-450
- DAG-46	451-500

4) Correction to be completed as follows:

- Artillery command divisions	201-250
- I VAG-C	on KV-202, 216 and 227
- DAG-1	on KV-203 and 215
- BrAG-1	on KV-205
- BrAG-3	on KV-210
- DAG-46	on KV-220

Correction time is 7:00 hours on 2 November 1991, simultaneously for all.

5) Ammunition used:
- for infantry weapons 1,5 units (for artillery only as needed – MP defence and observation posts)
- for artillery support for all calibres 1,5 units except for the 1st THAD mortar 152mm 0,5 units
- gasoline consumption (only as needed) to 0,5 units

6) Combat deployment and tasks DPOOd-1:
DPOOd-1 composition of 1st GMPOAP
Commander DPOOd-1 – commander of 1st GMPOAP

a) Combat deployment forces to remain in the current deployment zones (based on the strictly confidential order 1098-4 of 25 October 1991).

b) TASK:
Previous tasks (positioning POP in all directions) in the state of readiness for combat with armoured motorised units (OMJ) of the enemy to be completed by DPOOd-1 with batteries of cannons, batteries of rockets, combat ready for:
- operation in the direction of attack of the 1st PGMB (Šid – villages of St. Jankovci – Privlaka – Gradište) and securing brigade flanks during attack.

For this purpose II DPOOd.1 must be trained (temporarily), consisting of two "Polo" rocket batteries, 9P 133, and communication organised through it until the order is complete.

7) Full topographic and geodesic support.

8) Auditory and radar reconnaissance to be organised by I VAG-C based on their plan.

9) Artillery preparation to last 15 minutes. Targets in artillery preparation to be determined by brigade commander and commander of the 46th PARTD.

10) Determining combat deployment forces in the 2nd degree (units not redeployed in the 3rd degree).

11) Background security:
As regulated by previous orders.

12) Combat security:
As regulated in the artillery order no. 4, special security measures to be in force for observation posts and for the combat deployment units supported.

13) PNHBOb: Personal protection items to be properly functioning and ready for usage.

14) Commanding and communication:
As regulated in the artillery order no. 4, with communication in the course of preparatory operation and readiness time determined uniformly for all.

Artillery commander
Lieutenant Colonel /name illegible/
/signed/
/sealed/

ANNEX 72:
COMMAND OF OG SOUTH, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, NO. 464-1, 21 NOVEMBER 1991

English Translation *ET 0340-5685-0340-5685*

OG "Jug" COMMAND
Highly Conf. No: 464-1
06:00 /hrs/, 21-Nov-91
Negoslavci village

Regulating the issue of
re-subordination and the return to the
home units, ORDER:

Further to the newly arisen situation and the order of the 1st VO /military district/ highly confidential no: 115-151, dated 20-Nov-91, I hereby
ORDER:

1. In the course of 21-Nov-91, withdraw the "Leva Supoderica" Volunteers Detachment and dispatch them /re-subordinate them/ to the 12th pmbr/12K.
2. Dispatch /re-subordinate/ the Kragujevac "Šumadinac" Detachment to the 1st pgmd /expansion unknown/ in the course of 21-Nov-91.
3. In the course of 21-Nov-91, return the tč-1/tank Coy/ okb /armoured BAT/ of the 2nd pgmbr /expansion unknown/ to its home unit.
4. Vukovar TO units to be re-subordinated to the 80th mtbr /motorised Bde/ and continue with carrying out the assigned tasks – the provision of security and the control of the captured areas in Vukovar, with an emphasis on the most sensitive facilities (municipality, post-office, hospital, SUP, educational and cultural facilities).
5. All questions with regards the signing out, the issuing of certificates and the payments, will be regulated by the PkPo /Assistant Commander for Logistics/, Org mob and pers. Organ /Organ for mobilisation and personnel issues/ and Assistant Commander for FiB /expansion unknown/.

RT/DR

COMMANDER
Col Mile MRKŠIĆ
/signed and affixed
by seal/

8 copies of the document made, submitted to:
-Commander of the "Šešeljevci" Volunteers Det
-Commander of 1st mtb /motorised BAT/
-Commander of "Šumadinci" detachment from Kragujevac
-Commander of tč-1, okb/2pgmbr
-TO Vukovar Commander
-PkPo, Mob and pers org
-Assistant Commander for FiB.

ANNEX 73:
SAO KRAJINA, HQ OF THE TO, NO 85/91, ORDER NO. 24-272, 26 NOVEMBER 1991

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE MINISTRY OF PEOPLE'S DEFENCE
OF REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

O R D E R number 24-272

TO THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR PEOPLE'S DEFENCE

FROM NOVEMBER 26TH 1991

Pursuant to item 8/j and 18 of the Order on determining competence and on authorisation of officers for decision-making in relations within the services of active duty military personnel ("Official Military Gazette", no. 5/87)

BY WAR FORMATION

IN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA, IN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF OF THE 2. OPERATIVE ZONE

THE FOLLOWING ARE APPOINTED:

1. – for Commander
VES /military occupational speciality/ 31039
FČ Colonel

ORLIĆ Miće RADE, Colonel of armoured and mechanised units, personal VES 31439.

Currently:
By MF /peacetime establishment/: on duty with the Republic Staff of TO of Republic of Serbia, FČ Colonel, garrison Belgrade.

By RF /wartime establishment/: not designated.

IN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA, IN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF OF

THE 3. OPERATIVE ZONE

2. – for Commander
VES /military occupational speciality/ 31039
FČ Colonel

VUJAKLIJA Djure RADE, artillery Colonel, personal VES 31240.

Currently:
By MF /peacetime establishment/: on duty with the Inspection of Armed Forces, FČ Colonel, garrison Belgrade.

By RF /wartime establishment/: not designated.

IN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF FOR THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT OF WESTERN SLAVONIA

3. – for Commander
VES /military occupational speciality/ 31039
FČ Colonel

TRBOJEVIĆ Stojana JOVAN, artillery Colonel, personal VES 31239.

Currently:
By MF /peacetime establishment/: on duty with the Provincial Territorial Defence Staff of the Autonomous Province Vojvodina, FČ Colonel, garrison Belgrade.

By RF /wartime establishment/: not designated.

CHIEF
General Major
Gojko Krstić, personally

The accuracy of the copy is certified by Warrant Officer I Class
Damijan Nikolić
/handwritten signature: illegible/

/square stamp reading as follows:
"SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT KRAJINA
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF
NO. 85/99
28.11.1991
KNIN"/

ANNEX 74:
CONFIRMATION DOCUMENT, SUPREME HQ OF THE SAO SBWS TO, 13 DECEMBER 1991

Translation

00641702

4000 23010113884006 /handwritten/
8 January 1992 /handwritten/
Serbian District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem
Supreme Territorial Defence Headquarters
Number: 10-12/1991
13 December 1991
Erdut

The Supreme Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem hereby issues the following

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Slobodan MILJKOVIĆ has been a volunteer in the Units of Territorial Defence of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem since 1 December 1991. The above-mentioned shall remain a member of the aforementioned Units until further notice.

This certificate is issued in order to regulate the employment status of the above-named and may not be used for any other purpose.

for COMMANDER
Radovan Stojičić
/signed/

ANNEX 75:
JNA, 5TH CORPS., ORDER TO SET UP CAMP STARA GRADIŠKA, 7 JANUARY 1992

C O M M A N D of 5th CORPUS
Strictly confidential number 15-1
07 January 1992

Establishing of the Concentration camps
for war prisoners,
o r d e r - HEAD of (OB) Safety authority
of 5th CORPUS

Based on the Order by the Security Administration of (SSNO) Federal Secretariat for National Defence, strictly confidential, no. 35-14533 of 10 October 1991, and the Guidelines on the treatment of persons who are related to internal conflicts in the territory of the 1st (VO) Military District, strictly confidential, no. 8/178-380 of 24 September 1991 the concentration camps were established for the purpose of accepting and accommodating of war prisoners from the zone of combat responsibilities of the 5th Corpus,

I O R D E R

1. – Concentration camp for war prisoners to be established in the facilities of the former (KPD) Penal Correctional Institution in Stara Gradiška.

For the establishment and the operation of the camp the responsible person is (PK) Colonel for the logistics, who will closely cooperate with the (OB) Security Authority and the moral authority.

2. The Camp Commander will be a senior officer who is not included in the (OB) Security Authority and (VP) Military Police and his deputy will be a senior officer from 5th brigade of the Military Police who is a senior security officer.

3. Camp Security will be provided by the unit (bVP) of 5th military police battalion, which is regulated by the head of department of the corpus Security authority.

4. Life and work in the Camp for the war prisoners of Stara Gradiška will be regulated according to the Rules of Service of the (OS) Armed Forces and the regulations of the Geneva Convention in regard with the Treatment of War Prisoners. The Camp Commander will order and provide all the necessary regulations in respect with the organisation of life and work in the Camp.

5. Entrance of the persons outside the band camp, interrogation of prisoners, visitors by international missions and the (CK) Central Committee shall be approved and regulated by the (NOB) National Security Authority of the 5th Command. Private visitors to the prisoners are forbidden.

6. All the war prisoners shall be treated according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

7. Logistics:

For the logistics of the Camp the responsible person is PkPo (Deputy Commander for Logistics) of 5th Corpus who will, regulate the quartermaster and technical logistics of pozb/329th armoured brigade; provision of medical security with the support to medical units and the facilities of the corpus and the capacities in the zone as well as the transportation security.

8. Reserved region for the Camp for war prisoners shall have within the facilities of the (VU) Military facility "Karadjordjevo" at the polygon "Kozara" in the village Dobrnja-Manjača. Reallocation of the Camp for war prisoners from the region in Stara Gradiška (former Penal Correctional Institution) shall be performed after receiving the order for the transposition.

SM/MK

COMMANDER

Lieutenant Colonel

Vladimir Vuković

/round stamp with the text:

Command of 5th Corpus/

/handwritten signature illegible/

ANNEX 76:
RSK, RECOMMENDATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY PROMOTION, STEVO PRODANOVIĆ, 23 NOVEMBER 1992

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
WESTERN SLAVONIA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE ZONE STAFF
No. 180-5
23 November 1992
OKUČANI
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Proposal for special promotion
delivered. –

ZnŠTO Western Slavonia

Pursuant to the existing Military Service Act as well as to the proposal of OpŠTO / Territorial Defence Municipal Staff/ Personnel Council, in order to provide an adequate work evaluation, please find enclosed with the document a written proposal for a special promotion for Stevo Prodanović from Warrant Officer to 1st Lieutenant.

Warrant Officer Stevo Prodanović had been serving as a communication assistant at the 28th Partisan Division when the war started on Western Slavonia territory. As versatile and responsible officer he joined the planned and organized formation of TO /Territorial Defence/ Western Slavonia units.

Thanks to his determination and perseverance 4000-4500 long barrel weapons were moved from Daruvar Barracks to the territory of Western Slavonia. He did this work during the period from 1 June -17 August 1991.
With the relocation of the Daruvar Barracks Command he took upon himself to organize the communication system for TO Western Slavonia. In a short period of time he managed to provide equipment and personnel for all the units of TO Western Slavonia so they could successfully conduct their assignments. The lack of certain resources he handled by using unconventional and original (not listed in the regulations) solutions. He received verbal commendations for this part of his work on several occasions from highest ranking officers at the Western Slavonia Territorial Defence Staff. He was engaged in this work from 21 August-16 September 1991, after that he worked at the Western Slavonia Territorial Defence Staff until 29 December 1991.
Further development of events has caused the dissolving of the Western Slavonia Territorial Defence Staff and its zone of responsibility was taken over by 5th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ with Command in Omanovac. He worked there in

communications. All his solutions with regard to communications have been retained, confirming the expertise and efficiency of his solutions.

Pursuant to the 5th Corps order he is redeployed for the period from 15 January -14 May to the Military Police Battalion as communications assistant, where he successfully conducts his duties.

Since 16 May 1992 he has served as the Chief of the Communications at OpŠTO Pakrac

ANNEX 77:
RSK, RECOMMENDATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY PROMOTION, DUŠAN SARATLIĆ, 23 NOVEMBER 1992

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA
MILITARY SECRET
ZONE STAFF TO CONFIDENTIAL
WESTERN SLAVONIA
No. 180-4
23 November 1992
OKUČANI

Recommendation for extraordinary
promotion, delivered. –

DUŠAN SARATLIĆ, son of Milka, major, born on 28 May 1950 in Nova Gradiška, commander District Staff TO Okučani.
At the start of July 1991, organized with Narančić and Damjanović and with the approval of the Security Service of the 5th Military District, colonel Boško Kelečević, the supply and distribution of weapons to the population of the Okučani territory. Until 8 August 1991 conducted training of conscripts from this territory on Psunj, distributed weapons and formed units. After having been notified that the Ministry of the Interior Nova Gradiška has information on activities of JNA officers relating to the arming of the population of Okučani, he returned to his home 513rd Engineer Brigade in Zagreb.
As a technical officer was given in the Borongaj barracks the sector of defence at gate No. 2., where he organised the defence of the barracks. When the barracks was blocked and electricity, water and gas turned off, succeeded in clandestinely bringing water to the barracks. During the 37 days of defending the barracks major Saratlić's sector in the barracks did not suffer a single casualty although 161 officers and around 400 civilians had deserted the barracks. Major Saratlić then opposed the possibility of surrendering the barrack as suggested by certain individuals. Because of such conduct he has been recommended to the Command of the 5th Military District at Slunj for extraordinary promotion but for well-known reasons this Command did not process the recommendation.
Upon the conclusion of The Hague Agreement, he pulled out with all human and material resources to the Obrenovac garnison. Following the disbanding of the remnants of the 513rd Engineer Brigade he was assigned to the position of commander of the rear-echelon battalion in the 80th Motorised Brigade of Kragujevac 24th Corps (K).
In the 24th Corps (K) in Kragujevac he applied to be sent back to the Croatian front – Okučani. Was assigned at his own request to the 5th K in Banja Luka where he served as commander of the rear-echelon battalion of the 343rd mo-

torised brigade that held the positions Bijela Stijena-Lipik-Pakrac.
He immediately took up the position of commander of the rear-echelon battalion as well as of commander of the TO unit Laktaši which formed part of the 343rd Motorised Brigade. With that unit he led the attack on the village of Kričke on 29 November 1991 where he was wounded by three bullets in the left leg. He was hospitalised during 65 days at the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade and at his own request discontinued the treatment and with crutches returned for duty to the 343rd Motorised Brigade at Bijela Stijena.
On 17 March assigned to a position at the Zone Staff of Territorial Defence (ZnŠTO) Western Slavonia and under the leadership of colonel Jovan Čubrić formed the 91st rear-echelon base (PoB), made adaptations to facilities for the storage and echeloning of material and technical resources (MTS). In parallel with this, after having been assigned to the post of Commander of the District Staff of Territorial Defence (OpŠTO), he worked on the demobilisation of TO units and the forming of new ones. Demobilisation turned out to be very successful and cooperation with TO forces extremely good with major Dušan Saratlić solving operationally the problems that had arisen during that critical phase.

_____

Original, typescript, latin script
HR – HMDCDR, 26, box 1

[1] Radoslav.
[2] Đorđe.

ANNEX 78:
RSK, RECOMMENDATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY PROMOTION, MARKO VUJIĆ, 24 NOVEMBER 1992

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA
ZONE STAFF TO
WESTERN SLAVONIA
No. 140-8
24 November 1992
OKUČANI

CONFIDENTIAL

Recommendation for extraordinary promotion, delivered. –

Marko Vujić, son of Matija, lieutenant, born on 25 January 1949 in Novska, holding the function of assistant head of staff for recruitment and personnel affairs at Zone Staff TO (ZnŠTO) Western Slavonia, is recommended for extraordinary promotion to the rank of captain.

From 1 March to 24 August 1991 he was engaged as a member of the 329th Armoured Brigade (okbr) of the 5th Military District in the Pakrac area in defending the Srb population from the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia. From Pakrac he was engaged as a member of the 28th partisan division (partd) in misappropriating weapons from the Doljani depot, providing equipment to units and training.

On 9 September 1991 he was appointed commander of a diversion group within the 329th where he successfully carried out operations against the ustasha forces introduced in the Prašnik forest.

On 1 October 1991 he was assigned to the 16th motorized brigade (mtbr)/5th Corps (K) and appointed head of District Staff of TO (OpŠTO) Novska where he is engaged in the forming of a TO detachment that is to be part of the 16th motorized brigade (mtbr).

He especially excelled in conducting combat operations and activities within the area of village Rajić – Krčko brdo. He achieved great success in the forming of the mixed MB troop that produced outstanding results in the mounting of combat operations along the line Novska – village Rajić.

He stayed with the 16th motorized brigade (mtbr) until 15 March 1992 when he was assigned to the Zone Staff of TO (ZnŠTO) Western Slavonia. This is a modest and diligent officer who showed great perseverance in his work.

He performed with success the duties of higher rank. As a civilian, he graduated from the Faculty of All-People's Defence.

He has been recommended for extraordinary promotion three times by now but each of these times the recommendations got mislaid. In view of the fact that he is constantly on the battlefield and that he successfully performed numerous duties, I recommend he be extraordinarily promoted to the rank of captain.

SP/MM

COMMANDER
colonel
Jovan Čubrić [m.p.]
L.S.

_____
Original, typescript, latin script
HR – HMDCDR, 26, box 1

1 Round seal: RSK, Zone Staff TO Western Slavonia, Okučani

ANNEX 79:
INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECRETARIAT KNIN, OPERATIONAL REPORT, 14 JULY 1993

SUP /Internal Affairs Secretariat/ KNIN

Knin, 14 July 1993

OPERATIONAL REPORT

Information

Report drafted on 14 July 1993 in SUP Knin on the account of information obtained from the established contacts with amicable liaisons on July 09, 10, 11, and 12 on the territory of SJB /Stanica Javne Bezbednosti - Public Security Precinct/ Korenica and Vrhovina and on that occasion the following information was obtained:

On 21 November 1991, in Dabar, a group of people in camouflage uniforms and faces masked with coal, armed with rifles broke into the houses of Croatian inhabitants and searched them under the pretence of searching for firearms. During the search they impounded various valuables like: money, cash in foreign currencies and golden jewellery, and also killed Stipe Brajković. When they were finished, the group retreated in direction toward Glavac.

The group was lead by Baklajić Predrag, and the other members were: Luka Srboljub, Gomirac Tihomir, Lekić Damir, Brujić Predgrag, Brakus Nedeljko and other persons whose identity had not been yet discovered.

In October 1991, during a combat for Drenov Klan, Brujić Predrag remained behind the enemy lines. Baklajić Predrag and his group came to help. There were two volunteers /unknown identity/ nearby Prica Dušan's house, thinking that they had been members of "Zenge" /ZNG - Zbor Narodne Garde/ Jelovac Darko, incited by Brujić Predrag, opened fire and executed them.

On 5 October 1991, Baklajić's group consisting of Baklajić Predrag, the commander, Puhar Srboljub, Brujić Predrag, Brujić Nenad and Brakus Nedeljko came in the village Čorci and detained Čorak Vlado, AKA "Brico", Čvorak Kata, Čvorak Marko, Čorak Stipo and Čorak Mato in the police precinct in Vrhovina and handed them over to the Pupavac Milan, the precinct commander. He was instructed to keep them till the next day when they were supposed to be brought to Knin for further investigation.

The next day, Baklajić Predrag, Brakus Nedeljko and Brujić Predrag came to the precinct and put the persons in the custody into a police van /Black Maria/ and drove away in an unknown direction. On that occasion Pupavac Milan was told that the persons were being taken to Knin for further investigation. Our operations revealed that the aforementioned persons had been killed

somewhere on the road between the places Homoljac and Babin Potok and their corpses thrown into a well. Since UNPROFOR established its checkpoint near Homoljac in July 199/illegible/, Brujić Rade, Brujić Predrag and Brujić Nedeljko took the corpses out of the well, wrapped them in plastic foil and loaded them onto an "Ursuz" tractor, drove to a wood road, which leads from Dugi Dol to Brezovac, doused them with oil and burned. Afterwards they covered the remains with birch branches. It has also been reported that as the villagers were detained the village Čorak had been robbed and burned down. Also, on that occasion Čorak Ljubica, a woman of Serbian nationality married to a Croat was killed. Pric /illegible/ Predrag a.k.a "Prego" an employee of DB /Državna Bezbednost – National Security/ from Korenica also participated in this action and took away a hunting rifle.

On 29 November 1991, Baklajić Predrag and Brakus Nedeljko were driving 7 locals of Croatian nationality /not identified yet/ in a "LandRover" from Dabar village and killed them upon the arrival near to Ivančevići village; a day after the corpses were buried in an unknown location.

In October 1991, Brujić Rade drove away 2 trucks with ammunition and firearms in an unknown direction. It is assumed that the firearms had been stored by Gomirac Tihomir and Mile, and Viduk Jovica from Dugi Dol, and later sold to the Muslims on the territory of BiH. It is assumed that a part of that arsenal is still being kept by Viduk Jovica, Gomirac Tihomir and Mile.

One day in October 1991, Brakus Nedeljko and Naranči /illegible/ AKA "Buđin" robbed Ležajić Slavko from Petrinić Polje and took away 9,000 DM /German Marks/ and an unknown amount of cash in domestic currency, with the intention to kill the man after the robbery but Slavko's wife came along and started screaming from the top of her lungs and the group run away.

When JNA /Yugoslav National Army/ took over Drniš and Vrlika, Hinić Marinko, a director of "Autoprevoz" /public transportation company/ from Korenica, a refugee from Otočac, where he worked as a vehicle spare part procurement manager, sent the drivers from "Autoprevoz" to Drniš and Vrlika from which they took: 6 large boat engines, 4 lathes, 2 trailers, a station for motor vehicle tests, 2 or 3 busses, 2 large aggregates, 1 "Ursuz" tractor and a large quantity of car spare parts and tools.

Six boat engines and 2 lathes were sold to Novi Sad, but the station for vehicle tests and 2 aggregates were sold to Belgrade. The money for the goods was most likely kept on the account of Dafinent Bank. According to rumours, "Autoprevoz" Korenica does not longer exist and the employees from Vrhovina took away all valuable vehicles and objects. These things were discussed on 09 July 1993 in Vrhovine.

During October 1991, Baklajić's group intercepted a group of 12 heavy motor vehicles near Žuta Lokva village and drove them to Vrhovine. A "Dajc" lorry

with licence plates GS 303-95 was sold to Kordić Nenad, AKA "Neđo" in Belgrade, heavy motor vehicle "Mercedes" 1419L is at "Autoprevoz" Korenica with licence plates NM 175-879 along with its trailer, heavy motor vehicle "Hennchel" with licence plates VŽ 858 – 35 with the trailer with licence plates 31-95 VŽ was sold to a transportation entrepreneur from Korenica known by name "Šćamo", but our liaison had no information about other vehicles except that 1 Mercedes had been given to SV RSK for use.

A private restaurant owner from Založnice, Budisavljević, AKA "Braco" when moving the furniture from his premises to Belgrade, where he now resides, impounded one rifle with optical sight system and one semi-automatic rifle, hiding them in bags with beans and transported them to Belgrade, where he now resides.

At the end of 1991, the beginning of 1992 Brakus Zdravko, a merchant of "Poljoprivredna zadruga" /Association of agricultural producers/ Korenica, from Založnica stored 18 oil barrels stolen from SV RSK warehouse in Jasenice. He then sold that oil to PZ Korenica.

According to non-confirmed information, Pupavac Đoko a commander of Vrhovina precinct allegedly united /illegible text/ a group which now /part of the text missing/ Brakus Nedeljko, Brujić Predrag, Brujić Nenad, Vidak Jovica /part of the text missing/ Gomirac Tihomir, Gomirac Mile, Gomirac Dane and Grba Milan. The group is engaged in smuggling of food products and probably firearms.

Puhar Srboljub is now a member of SV RSK stationed in the Head Quarters in Škare, where he acts as a commander's deputy; Jelovac Darko is in Belgrade and has not came in Vrhovine since 1992, while the whereabouts of the other members of Baklajić's group are not known, but it is assumed that they have all been enlisted to the RSK army.

CRIME FIGHTING DEPARTMENT

ANNEX 80:

PLAN OF MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITS OF THE 134TH LIGHT BRIGADE ON DEVELOPING MOTIVATION AND DETERMINATION OF UNITS, SOLDIERS AND COMMANDERS FOR THE EXECUTION OF COMBAT MISSIONS

Approved by
Commander 134th light brigade
lieutenant colonel
Dražić Lazar
/signed/
/stamped/
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1-50/8

Plan of measures and activities in the units of the 134th light brigade on developing motivation and determination of units, soldiers and commanders for the execution of combat missions

No.	ACTIVITY	BASIC GOAL	METHODOLOGY	EXECUTING AUTHORITY	COOPERATION	NOTES
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	…	…	…	…	…	…
2.	… -develop wish for revenge, hatred towards the enemy	…	… - When talking about the enemy use words such as: genocide, ustashe, murderers of children, butchers, mercenaries, unorganized mob, traitors etc.	company commanders, commanders of autonomous platoons and all other commanders during their contacts with soldiers and commanders	- commanding staff of brigade -assistant to the brigade commander for moral education	…
…	…	…	…	…	…	…

…

Assistant to the commander for morale

captain
Radaković Nebojša
/signed/

ANNEX 81:

AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE PROSECUTION OF PERPETRATORS OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE BETWEEN THE CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, 13 OCTOBER 2006

AGREEMENT
on cooperation in prosecuting of perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide

State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia and Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor (referred to hereinafter as: parties) expressed mutual preparedness to improve the cooperation in areas of criminal prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against the humanity and genocide (referred to hereinafter as: war crimes), especially those with citizenship or that are residing on the territory of the Republic of Croatia or the Republic of Serbia.

They believe that the direct cooperation and exchange of evidence, other documents and information shall contribute to the joint interest of their respective states in a form of more efficient investigations, proving of crimes and sanctioning of all the perpetrators of war crimes.

Taking into consideration the fact that pursuant to the constitutional provisions the extraditions of their own citizens is not possible, and ceding of criminal prosecution in cases of war crimes is also not possible, the participants feel that the goal could be reached through the exchange of evidence and with providing of help and cooperation in further gathering of essential evidence and information. Meaning ,in order for the perpetrators of these serious criminal offenses to be brought to justice they have reached an agreement on the the following issues:

IMPLEMENTATION AREA

1. Provisions of this agreement shall be applied for the criminal proceedings for war crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, against the citizens of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia by perpetrators residing and/or possessing the citizenship of the Republic of Croatia or the Republic of Serbia.

2. Cooperation in the exchange of evidence and other information in war crime cases is possible during the entire criminal proceeding up to the moment of rendering of the final verdict by the competent court of the participating country.

MODE OF EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION ON EVIDENCE AND OTHER DATA

3. The parties shall inform each other, within 30 days of the signing of this Agreement, of all the ongoing cases stipulated under item 1 of the Agreement. In case a perpetrator is subsequently discovered the parties shall inform the other party of the fact within three moths from the day they learned of the perpetrator.

4. To facilitate a decision takeover of evidence and other information the parties providing the evidence and/or other information shall send with the notice copies of all the information, documents and items related to the committed war crimes subject to this Agreement.

5. The Chief State Attorney, that is, the War Crimes Prosecutor can request, based on his own information, copy of the case file and other documentation related to criminal offenses referred to under item 1 of this Agreement.

FORM AND CONTENT OF THE EVIDENCE CEDING REQUEST

6. After receiving the notice, copy of the case file, information and documentation the party shall, within an appropriate deadline, inform the other party of his opinion on the case, especially with regard to decision whether to prosecute or not. After inspecting the notice, evidence and other reports and information, the State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia or the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia can conduct preliminary investigations, that is procedural actions necessary for the decision making.

7. Written notice on undertaking of criminal prosecutions shall be sent to the Chief State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia or to the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia. The notice can contain information whether the original documentation is requested or just certified copies, what checks need to be conducted before ceding of evidence and the deadline for the delivery of evidence.

EXECUTION OF THE REQUEST

8. The parties agree to handover the requested information and evidence as soon as possible, at the latest within 60 days from the day the request was made. If there are reasons that the above mentioned cannot be done within the set time frame they shall inform the other party in writing

9. Upon the request of the party that decided to start the criminal prosecution the other party shall obtain all the necessary reports, conduct the requisite checks and deliver the certified copies of documentation for certain cases necessary for the continuation of the criminal procedure.

10. The party delivering the evidence or other information shall immediately, upon receiving new evidence or information, inform the other party.

INFORMATION ON THE CASE STATUS

11. The party receiving the information and evidence shall, on request ,inform

the other party of the case status. The party that requested the reports can inform the injured parties and other interested parties of the report content if so indicated in their request. Parties, if they feel it is necessary, can inform the other party of the case status even without the request.

USE OF NOTICE AND DOCUMENTS

12. Party receiving the notice or the request shall do everything in order to keep the content of the request, evidence and other records secret if so requested by the other party.

13. If the fulfilling of the request would or could lead to the breach of secrecy, the party submitting the request shall be informed of this before the request is fulfilled, and then, if possible, continue with the fulfilling of the request.

LIMITATIONS IN USE OF NOTICES AND EVIDENCE

14. Notices, evidence and other information cannot be used for any other purpose beside making the decision on the initiation of the procedure without the permission of the party providing the evidence and other information.

15. Notices referring to other persons can be provided to other competent bodies only upon the express written permission of the party in question, and if the laws of the country in question allow such practice.

16. Nothing in this agreement shall prevent the use or divulging of notices, evidence or requests if so is necessary according to the laws and regulations governing the work of the State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor that submitted the request or notice on the criminal procedure during the preliminary investigation procedure or during the criminal procedure. The Chief State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor submitting the request or notice shall inform in advance the State Attorney to whom the request was submitted of such possible or proposed use or divulging of the materials.

17. Results of checks obtained by the State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor for certain case can be subsequently used for all the legally allowed purposes.

PROVIDING RECORDS AND DETERMINING OF THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS

18. The State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor can request the records of the other participating country that are of importance for the procedure. This record shall be sent in the form of certified copies.

19. The State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor receiving the request can handover the copies of their records that are not available to the general public only up to the point and under the same conditions that they are available to the competent authorities of the country in question if this is not in direst opposition to the legislation of the country submitting the request.

20. If the request is submitted for the competent police bodies to determine

the identity pr the location of a certain person then the State Attorney or the War Crimes Prosecutor receiving the request shall do everything in his power in order to fulfill the request in accordance with the laws and regulations of his country.

RETURN OF EVIDENCE AND OF OTHER INFORMATION

21. If possible, and if requested by the receiving or the submitting party, original documents and other materials shall be returned to the originator.

22. Return of the original documents and other materials cab be postponed if necessary for the implementation of criminal or civil procedure.

23. The party receiving the request or notice can request the protection of the interest of the third parties in relation to the documents, materials and other information.

PURSUANT TO PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

24. The parties hereby agree that their interrelations and individual actions shall be conducted pursuant to the principles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

FINAL PROVISIONS, START AND COMPLETION

25. The party that no longer wishes to participate in this Agreement shall inform the other party of the fact in writing three months in advance.

26. Amendments and annexes to this Agreement can be done upon the written agreement of the both parties. Upon the agreement of the parties other services can be included in this Agreement.

27. This Agreement shall come into force upon being signed.

The above stated record represents the agreement achieved between the Chief State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia and the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia

Signed in Zagreb, on 13 October 2006, in two copies in Croatian and Serbian language, using Latin and Cyrillic, with both texts being equally valid.

Chief State Attorney
War Crimes Prosecutor
Republic of Croatia Republic of Serbia
Mladen Bajić
Vladimir Vukčević

ANNEX 82:

OFFICE OF THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR, DISTRICT COURT IN BELGRADE, WAR CRIMES CHAMBER, INDICTMENT AGAINST LJUBAN DEVETAK ET AL., 28 NOVEMBER 2007

Republic of Serbia
Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor

DISTRICT COURT IN BELGRADE

War Crimes Chamber

28 November 2007

Pursuant to my authority under Article 46 (2.3) re Articles 3 and 4(2) of the Act on Organisation and Competence of State Authorities in War Crimes Proceedings, I raise this

INDICTMENT

Against the following individuals:

1 LJUBAN DEVETAK, born in Lovas, Vukovar municipality (Republic of Croatia), on 17 March 1947; citizen of Serbia; completed a secondary school of economics and employed as an economic technician; married and father of two; has no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings are being conducted against him; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, effective as of 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

2 MILAN DEVČIĆ, born in Lovas, Vukovar municipality (Republic of Croatia) on 23 January 1962; citizen of Serbia; completed a secondary school where he trained as a police officer; married and father of two; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings conducted against him; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 29 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

3 MILAN RADOJČIĆ, born in Vukovar (Republic of Croatia) on 8 July 1959; citizen of Serbia; university graduate in economics; married and father of two; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings conducted against him; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

4 ŽELJKO KRNJAJIĆ, born in Lovas, Vukovar municipality (Republic of Croatia) on 20 July 1960; citizen of Serbia; completed a secondary school where he trained as a machine technician; married and father of three; lives on a disability allowance; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings conducted against him; pursuant to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, KRNJAJIĆ was held in detention since 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty, until 24 September 2007, when he was released further to the said ruling.

5 MIODRAG DIMITRIJEVIĆ, born in Kruševac on 27 February 1939; citizen of Serbia; completed military academy, where he trained as an army officer; awarded several decorations and retired in the rank of lieutenant colonel; lives on a military pension; previously convicted for the criminal offence recognised by Article 195(3) (threat to traffic safety) of the Republic of Serbia's Criminal Act; received a fine penalty which was subsequently suspended; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 29 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

6 DARKO PERIĆ, born in Valjevo on 5 August 1954; citizen of Serbia; grammar school graduate and owner of a business; married and father of two; lives on his business; previously convicted for the criminal offence recognised by Article 233(1) of the Republic of Serbia's Criminal Act; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 29 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

7 RADOVAN VLAJKOVIĆ, born in village Stanina Reka (Valjevo municipality) on 22 August 1958; citizen of Serbia: a college of mechanics graduate, employed as a machine engineer; married and father of two; no criminal record; pursuant to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, VLAJKOVIĆ was held in detention since 29 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty, until 24 September 2007, when he was released further to the said ruling.

8 RADISAV JOSIPOVIĆ, born in Valjevo on 9 June 1959; citizen of Serbia; completed a secondary school of economics and employed as an economic technician; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings conducted against him; pursuant to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, JOSIPOVIĆ was held in detention since 29 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty, until 24 September 2007, when he was released further to the said ruling.

9 JOVAN DIMITRIJEVIĆ, born in Zemun on 6 June 1961; citizen of Serbia; qualified as a milling machine operator; married; unemployed; no criminal record or other criminal proceedings conducted against him.

10 SAŠA STOJANOVIĆ, born in Belgrade on 8 January 1967; completed a college of mechanics, now employed as a machine engineer; married and father of a minor; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings are being conducted against him.

11 DRAGAN BAČIĆ aka Pljoka, born in village Bačići (Vlasenica municipality) on 25 May 1961; completed eight years of primary education; unskilled worker, currently unemployed, has no income; convicted three times for fraud and theft, and duly served his terms; currently under way in Novi Sad is another criminal proceeding against him, for another criminal offence of the kind; pursuant to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, BAČIĆ was held in detention since 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty, until 24 September 2007, when he was released further to the

same ruling.

12 ZORAN KOSIJER, born in Ruma on 5 March 1966; completed a primary school and a training course for waiters; citizen of Serbia; married and father of two; lives on a disability allowance; no criminal record; no other criminal proceedings under way; pursuant to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, KOSIJER was held in detention since 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty, until 24 September 2007, when he was released further to the same ruling.

13 PETRONIJE STEVANOVIĆ, a.k.a. Petronije, a.k.a. Pera Vaška, born in village Brežani (Srebrenica municipality, BH) on 29 September 1952; completed a primary school; formerly worked as a driver, now unemployed; married and father of two; convicted 5 times and duly served his terms; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

14 ALEKSANDAR NIKOLAIDIS a.k.a. Aca Konj a.k.a. Aca Grk, born in Pančevo on 21 August 1959; citizen of Serbia; completed a primary school and two years of secondary education; formerly employed as an unskilled locksmith, now unemployed; unmarried; convicted 8 times and duly served his terms; no criminal proceedings under way; currently in detention further to the ruling Ki.V.7/07 of 30 May 2007, rendered by the investigative judge of the District Court in Belgrade – War Crimes Chamber, the ruling being effective as of 28 May 2007, when he was deprived of liberty.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS AND CHARGES

The accused:

Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ and Željko KRNJAJIĆ, in their capacity as members of the local civilian and military authorities;

Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Darko PERIĆ, Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ and Radisav JOSIPOVIĆ, in their capacity as members of the territorial defence force, which was subordinate to the 2nd Proletarian Guards Motorised Brigade (2.PGMBR), a component of the then Yugoslav People's Army (JNA); and

Petronije STEVANOVIĆ, Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS, Dragan BAČIĆ, Zoran KOSIJER, Jovan DIMITRIJEVIĆ and Saša STOJANOVIĆ, in their capacity as members of the volunteer armed group which called itself »Dušan Silni«

Are criminally responsible for serious breaches of the rules of international law, which are contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention on protection of civilians in warfare (Geneva Convention IV of 12 August 1949), and in its Additional Protocol on protection of victims in noninternational (internal) conflicts (Protocol II). Those breaches were committed throughout October and November 1991, during the internal armed clashes that existed in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), at the time an internationally recognised state. Parties to the conflict were the JNA forces with other armed groups under their command and control, and organised

armed units of the Republic of Croatia (at the time one of the SFRJ federal units), which included members of the National Guard Assembly (ZNG) and Police force (MUP). At the time specified above, the individuals charged by this indictment were involved in the events which took place in village Lovas (Republic of Croatia), specifically:

The accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ and Željko KRNJAJIĆ engaged in a joint random attack on the village and the local civilians, who were not directly involved in the armed conflict. Through his initial contacts with some of the leaders of the Serbian National Renewal Party (SNO) in early October 1991, Ljubo DEVETAK managed to attract and organise a number of the party's members and followers, as well as some locals, among whom were Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ and Željko KRNJAJIĆ. Those people constituted a newly formed armed group of volunteers, whose task was to launch an armed attack on Lovas, although they knew that the village was unprotected and that there were no Croat troops to offer resistance. After a group of around 60 volunteers had assembled in Nova Pazova and Šid, where the local territorial defence organisation supplied them with infantry weapons and other equipment, Ljuban DEVETAK organised their transfer to Tovarnik. Along with members of the local territorial defence and police forces commanded by Željko KRNJAJIĆ, they formed a single combat unit that attacked the village in the morning of 10 October 1991. Among others participating in the attack were Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ, Željko KRNJAJIĆ and several other, still unidentified, inhabitants of Lovas. Being familiar with the access routes and the site itself, these local people directed the advancement of the armed unit, which moved in smaller groups. In a state of chaos caused by their entry into the village, part of the unit opened uncontrolled random fire from their rifles, threw bombs into courtyards, houses, cellars and other premises, killed some of the civilians whom they found inside the houses, cellars and other facilities, whereas they removed others from their homes to subsequently kill them in the streets or elsewhere. In the aftermath of this indiscriminate and unjustified attack, 21 civilians were killed, whereas a number of civilian residential buildings and other facilities were damaged or destroyed. The names of those killed in the described attack are set forth below:

1 Mirko GRGIĆ

2 Mato ADAMOVIĆ

3 Danijel BADANJAK

4 Cecilija BADANJAK

5 Antun JOVANOVIĆ

6 Anka JOVANOVIĆ

7 Katarina PAVLIČEVIĆ

8 Juraj POLJAK

9 Josip KRALJEVIĆ

10 Alojzije POLIĆ

11 Mato KESER

12 Josip POLJAK

13 Ivan OSTRUN

14 Drago PEJIĆ

15 Mijo BOŽIĆ

16 Tomo SABLJAK

17 Vido KRIZMANIĆ

18 Stipe MAĐAREVIĆ

19 Pava ĐAKOVIĆ

20 Stipe PEJIĆ

21 Živan ANTOLOVIĆ.

By their participation in the described attacks, the accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ and Željko KRNJAJIĆ committed grave breaches of Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV, and Article 13 (1,2) re Article 4 (1, 2a) re Article 2 (1) of Protocol II to this Convention.

II

Upon the seizure of village Lovas, the accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ established a new local government composed of civilian and military elements. Though formally director of the local agricultural community, Ljuban DEVETAK held a key position of informal, yet de facto (real) supreme village authority with almost unlimited power. Milan DEVČIĆ seized the position as police commander, whereas Milan RADOJČIĆ took command over the Lovas territorial defence force. In the subsequent period, namely until the former part of November 1991, the three issued a series of (informal) orders that were based on the criteria of ethnic origin and political commitment. As a result, humiliating and discriminatory measures were introduced against the non-Serb population (most of whom were Croats), who were obligated to mark their houses with white towels, wear white cloths around their sleeves, and respond to labour duty in return for minimal compensation and under armed supervision; moreover, they were denied freedom of movement since the village was placed under curfew. In such circumstances, the herein accused individuals, who had ultimate responsibility in the newly established local government, were supposed to conduct fair and lawful interrogations of those reasonably suspected of hiding firearms, or behaving in a manner that posed a threat to general safety. Likewise, they had a responsibility to prevent and investigate any crimes committed against civilians. However, Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ failed to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. Aided and abetted by

individuals from all of the three armed groups – territorial defence, police and the volunteer unit that called itself Dušan Silni – they ordered unlawful hauls, arrests and interrogations of civilian persons, who got tortured and mutilated in the process, whereas Ljuban DEVETAK also ordered killings. Alternatively, they failed to prevent others from such acts, whereby they encouraged, instigated and supported such behaviour.

By the foregoing acts and omissions, Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ committed grave breaches recognised by Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV, and by Article 13 (2,1) re Article 4 (1) (a,e,h) re Article 2 (1) of the Convention's Protocol II. Specifically:

a) The accused, Ljuban DEVETAK instigated some members of the armed group that called itself Dušan Silni to engage in the following:

- killing of a number of civilian persons, among whom was Snežana KRIZMANIĆ, a female local inhabitant. Ljuban DEVETAK urged Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS to kill her (...«take her away, fuck and kill her«), which, however, the latter did not do. On another occasion, asked by three members of the said armed group (a.k.a. Aždaja, a.k.a. Kosta and a.k.a. Nikola) what they should do with citizen Zvonko MARTINOVIĆ, whom they had captured, DEVETAK answered: ... »Do whatever you are supposed to do«, whereafter this civilian did get killed by unidentified members of this armed group and found dead in the village on the subsequent day.

- removal and hiding of a number of civilians, who had previously been brutally beaten, ahead of the arrival of the new military command; later that day (18 October), all of those civilians – Đuro KRIZMANIĆ, Alojz KRIZMANIĆ, Darko PAVLIĆ, Željko PAVLIĆ, Franjo PANDŽA, Marko DAMJANOVIĆ, Andrija DEVČIĆ and Stipo DOLAČKI – were killed by unidentified members of this group.

- beating, torturing and mutilating of the civilians who had attended a HDZ rally earlier organised in Lovas. On 17 October 1991, Ljubo DEVETAK presented the audio/video recording of the rally to some members of the aforementioned armed groups, whereafter, in the night between 17 and 18 October 1991, a list was made comprising the names of those who had been seen in the recording and who had already been illegally arrested and held confined in the courtyard of the farm community. The next morning, on 18 October 1991, the listed civilians were removed into the engineering workshop inside the courtyard and, in the presence of Ljuban DEVETAK, got severely beaten by most of those who had watched the recording. Among those listed and subsequently beaten were Ivica ĐAKOVIĆ, Ivan KRALJEVIĆ, Boško BOĐANAC, Marin MAĐAREVIĆ, Nikola BADANJAK, Zlatko TOMA, Berislav FILIĆ, Marko FILIĆ, Željko SOMBORAC, Mato HODAK, Tomo SABLJAK, Ivan SABLJAK, Marko SABLJAK, Marko VIDIĆ, Luka BALIĆ, Josip TURKALJ, Mijo ŠALAJ, Emanuel FILIĆ and others. During that same morning in the courtyard, DEVETAK called out the detainees and divided them into two groups. One group were sent to labour in the community workshop, whereas the other were told that they would go to the vineyards to »pick up grapes«. Having noticed a visibly injured Đuka LUKETIĆ among other civilians present in the group, DEVETAK ordered him and a.k.a. Kosta (a member of armed group Dušan Silni) to fetch Đuka's father and brother, namely Petar and Ante LUKETIĆ. After the two were fetched, several members of the same armed group (a.k.a. Petronije, a.k.a. Kosta and a.k.a. Marko), observed by Ljuban

DEVETAK, severely beat and otherwise tortured the LUKETIĆ father and his two sons. The three victims were subsequently removed from the courtyard and killed in the village later that day.

b) As he was interrogating the civilian persons whom he had unlawfully arrested, the accused, Milan DEVČIĆ, beat, physically injured and threatened them with liquidation or displacement. Concurrently, he allowed and encouraged individuals from the aforementioned armed groups to beat and injure the victims in his presence. Thus, he:

- Broke the jaw of Đuro ANTOLOVIĆ by hitting him with a boxer;

- Hit Marko GRAČANAC with a police baton in the head, whereafter he forced the victim to lick his blood off the table;

- Intimidated Đuka RADOČAJ by threatening to arrest and butcher both him and his mother;

- urged Marko FILIĆ to move with his family out of their home, with no legal grounds or tangible reason;

- allowed individuals from the aforementioned armed groups to hit with rifle butts and kick Đuro FILIĆ, and did not prevent them from doing so; likewise, when they toppled Franjo PANDŽA on the floor and stamped on him, DEVČIĆ swore the victim's »Ustashi mother«.

c) In the course of the unlawful arrests and interrogations of a number of civilians, the accused, Milan RADOJČIĆ, brutalised Anton KRIZMANIĆ by kicking him in the back; moreover, instead of preventing the abuses, RADOJČIĆ allowed several members of the aforementioned armed groups to physically torture Đuro ANTOLOVIĆ, while he observed the scene. Additionally, on the day of the civilians' departure for the minefields, he sought volunteers who would act as armed guard of »the Croats, who know where the minefields are.«

By their overall behaviour, which included acts and omissions as described above, the accused: DEVETAK, DEVČIĆ and RADOJČIĆ instigated and encouraged a number of still unidentified members of the aforementioned armed groups, who, in the circumstances and at the time relevant to this indictment, killed a total of 27 persons on different locations in the village. The names of the killed are as follows:

1. Darko PAVLIĆ

2. Željko PAVLIĆ

3. Anton LUKETIĆ

4. Đuka LUKETIĆ

5. Petar LUKETIĆ

6. Alojz KRIZMANIĆ

7. Đuro KRIZMANIĆ

8. Andrija DEVČIĆ

9. Stipo DOLAČKI

10. Marko DAMJANOVIĆ

11. Franjo PANDŽA

12. Ivan VIDIĆ

13. Stjepan LUKETIĆ,

All of whom had previously been unlawfully arrested and then removed from improvised prison facilities, and

14. Slavica PAVOŠEVIĆ

15. Jozefina PAVOŠEVIĆ

16. Marija PAVOŠEVIĆ

17. Ana LEMUNOVIĆ

18. Josip RENDULIĆ

19. Božo VIDIĆ

20. Marin BALIĆ

21. Katarina BALIĆ

22. Rudolf JONAK

23. Marija FIŠER

24. Zoran KRIZMANIĆ

25. Josip JOVANOVIĆ

26. Zvonimir MARTINOVIĆ

27. Petar RENDULIĆ,

Who were killed either in their homes or after being removed thereof.

III

The accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ, Miodrag

DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Darko PERIĆ, Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ, Radisav JOSIPOVIĆ, Jovan DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Saša STOJANOVIĆ, Dragan BAČIĆ and Zoran KOSIJER committed serious breaches of Articles 3 and 28 of Geneva Convention IV, Article 13 (1,2) re Articles 1 and 2(a,e,h) re Article 2 (1) of Protocol II to this Convention, specifically:

In the period between 14 and 18 October 1991, Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ, in their capacity as supreme local government representatives, held a number of joint meetings with the accused, Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ, a member of the Valjevo territorial defence zone staff, who had been appointed coordinator of combat activities for villages Lovas, Čakovci and Opatovac. DIMITRIJEVIĆ, who held this office in the period between 10 and 19 October 1991 and was based in Lovas throughout the time between 14 and 19 October 1991, was misinformed by Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ that part of the Croat civilian population engaged in nightly skirmishes and maintained contacts with Croat paramilitary groups outside the village, whereby they allegedly posed a threat to public safety and to the government efficiency. By suggesting that tougher measures be applied against such occurrences, DEVETAK, RADOJČIĆ and DEVČIĆ encouraged Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ to issue a number of unlawful orders, either independently or in concert with others. On his part, DIMITRIJEVIĆ failed to ascertain the received information either personally or through military intelligence services, which was his duty and which would have enabled him to establish the actual facts, namely the consequences arising from the attacks launched on a daily basis against the civilian population and their property. Instead of taking any measures within the scope of his competence in order to prevent such abuses, Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ accepted all allegations and suggestions uncritically and without verification. Thus,

- On completion of a meeting held on 15 October 1991, DIMITRIJEVIĆ issued a »last warning to citizens«, which was publicly announced on posters. The warning contained suggestions of intimidation, terror and retaliation, as well as threats of mass evacuations, destructions of public and personal property and military court trials against any »suspicious« and captured members of »Ustashi« organisations or their harbourers;

- Two days later, i.e. in the morning of 17 October 1991, DIMITRIJEVIĆ held a meeting with Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ, where they jointly formulated the order for the compulsory gathering of all male citizens aged between 18 and 65 in front of the farm community building. The men were summoned on the pretext that it was necessary to establish if someone of them engaged in the armed provocations which allegedly occurred every night. In response to the order, which was publicly read out in the streets, around 70 men assembled at the place specified. Further to the orders issued by DIMITRIJEVIĆ, parts of the armed group known as Dušan Silni and those of the anti-sabotage company (a component of the Valjevo territorial defence force, who had, further to DIMITRIJEVIĆ's invitation, arrived in Lovas earlier that day), carried out individual searches of the locals at the courtyard entry. After being searched, the men were forced into the enclosed compound of the farm community and told that they would spend the night sitting still on rows of wooden benches. The men were thus unlawfully confined in the courtyard, where armed members of the aforementioned units guarded them and occasionally terrorised some of the captives by slapping them in the face. In the morning of 18 December, some members of armed group Dušan Silni (a.k.a. Petronije, a.k.a. Aca Konj, a.k.a. Nikola, a.k.a. Marko, a.k.a. Bokser etc.) engaged in the physical tortures

and maltreatment of around 20 persons out of the total number of the civilian captives, by hitting them with rifle butts, metal bars and lengths of electric cable.

- In the evening of the same day, i.e. 17 October 1991, the aforementioned individuals held a meeting that was also attended by the accused Darko PERIĆ. The meeting resulted in a joint decision that on the following day, i.e. 18. October, a combined armed group consisting of members of the sabotage company (part of the Valjevo territorial defence), armed group Dušan Silni and several locals acting as guides should carry out the reconnaissance and search operation throughout the area. The operation also involved participation of the local Croats who had been unlawfully detained the previous night, and who were supposed to act as a human shield. The decision, formally made as DIMITRIJEVIĆ's order, was carried out by the herein accused individuals, although they knew that some of those locations had been mined by the engineering unit of the 2nd Guards Motorised Brigade a few days earlier.

The accused: Darko PERIĆ, a reserve first-class captain and commander of the anti-sabotage detachment – part of the Valjevo territorial defence; Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ, a reserve colonel and commander of the anti-sabotage company; and Radisav JOSIPOVIĆ, reserve colonel and deputy commander of the same company – a component of the aforementioned detachment, are criminally responsible for the event addressed by this indictment, in the manner as set forth below:

Darko PERIĆ, who was present at the meeting with DIMITRIJEVIĆ and received the order issued thereby, passed the order to his subordinates, VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ. When the two protested saying that they had not been trained for such operations, PERIĆ remained determined that DIMITRIJEVIĆ's order be executed. Moreover, he extended the order specifying that fire ought to be opened at anyone who might attempt to take flight. Eventually, VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ gave in, although they were aware of the fact that the order itself, as well as its execution, were unlawful and impermissible, and that such an act might result in massive losses of human lives and physical integrity.

The destructive effects likely to result from such an operation were also known to the accused members of armed group Dušan Silni: Jovan DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Saša STOJANOVIĆ, Dragan BAČIĆ and Zoran KOSIJER, who, ordered by noone and acting on their own initiative, joined the armed escort along with Mijo VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ and Slobodan HRNJAČKI a.k.a. »Sajdžija« (both of whom have deceased). On 18 October 1991 at around 10 a.m., the herein accused individuals formed a column of around fifty captured civilians, whom they forcefully took towards the village outskirts, in the direction of Borovo factory. The column was moving under armed escort consisting of around forty members of the herein accused's company, six aforenamed members of armed group Dušan Silni, and two local residents accompanying them as guides. As they headed for the village border, the armed men were positioned on both sides of the civilians, who were moving between them. Once outside the village, the order was reversed, i.e. the civilians were moving on the sides, whereas their armed escorts were in the middle. At one point, a still unidentified armed security guard killed Boško BOĐANAC, who, having been brutally beaten in the community courtyard during the previous night and earlier that morning, was unable to proceed. As the group reached a clover field outside the village, they suspected that it might be mined. The accused, Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ, ordered the

civilians to make a line, join hands and move frontally across the field; he also instructed the captives to shuffle through the clover by dragging their feet to the left and right, and to stop if they saw a mine. As the civilians advanced across the field, their armed guards were moving behind them, at what they estimated to be a safe distance. At one point, one of the civilians, Ivica KRALJEVIĆ, who had previously been heavily beaten and injured, fell over a mine, which triggered off a series of explosions. In the chaotic situation that followed, a number of armed guards opened rifle fire on the unprotected civilians. In the aftermath of both the explosions and shooting, twenty civilians were killed, namely the following persons:

1. Marijan MARKOVIĆ

2 . Tomislav SABLJAK

3 . Darko SOLAKOVIĆ

4 . Ivan PALIJAN

5 . Zlatko PANJIK

6 . Slavko KUZMIĆ

7 . Ivan SABLJAK

8 . Mijo ŠALAJ

9 . Ivan KRALJEVIĆ

10. Petar BADANJAK

11. Zlatko BOŽIĆ

12. Antun PANJIK

13. Marko VIDIĆ

14. Luka BALIĆ

15. Marko SABLJAK

16. Mato HODAK

17. Nikola BADANJAK

18. Ivan CONJAR

19. Slavko ŠTRANGAREVIĆ and

20. Josip TURKALJ,

Whereas twelve sustained major or minor bodily injuries, namely:

Stjepan PEULIĆ, Stanislav FRANJKOVIĆ, Ivan MUJIĆ, Zlatko TOMA, Ljubo SOLAKOVIĆ, Josip GERSTNER, Mato KRALJEVIĆ, Josip SABLJAK, Emanuel FILIĆ, Milko KESER, Milan RADMILOVIĆ and Marko FILIĆ.

IV

The accused: Petronije STEVANOVIĆ and Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS committed grave breaches of Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV, Article 13 (2) re Article 4 (1) and (2)(a,e,g) re Article 2 (1) of Protocol II to the Convention. Specifically:

On 10 October 1991, acting as members of the armed group of volunteers who called themselves Dušan Silni, the herein accused individuals participated in the attack on village Lovas, in the course of which they randomly threw bombs on a number of houses and courtyards, opened uncontrolled fire from their infantry weapons, pulled civilian persons out of their homes and took them away. Some of those persons, among whom was Mato ADAMOVIĆ, were later found dead. Furthermore, STEVANOVIĆ and NIKOLAIDIS robbed ADAMOVIĆ's wife and daughter-in-law of their money and gold jewellery to a total value of 10,000 Deutschmarks at the time. Throughout the subsequent period until mid-November of the same year, STEVANOVIĆ and NIKOLAIDIS engaged in the unlawful hauls, arrests, abuses and maltreatment of a number of civilian persons. Their brutal behaviour towards the civilians who were unlawfully confined in the farm community courtyard was particularly manifest in the morning of 18 October 1991, when, aided and abetted by a number of still unidentified members of the same armed group, they brutalised some of those civilians by beating them with riffle butts, metal bars and lengths of electric cable. Among those beaten were Ivica ĐAKOVIĆ, Ivan KRALJEVIĆ, Boško BOĐANAC, Marin MAĐAREVIĆ, Nikola BADANJAK, Zlatko TOMA, Berislav FILIĆ, Marko FILIĆ, Željko SOMBORAC and many others. Furthermore, the herein accused individuals ordered one of the local men to rob the captives of their money and other valuables. The most notorious for his brutality was the accused, Petronije STEVANOVIĆ, who stabbed a number of civilians in various parts of the body, among whom were Pero, Ante and Đuka LUKETIĆ, Ivan VIDIĆ, Ivica ĐAKOVIĆ, Zlatko TOMA, Boško BOĐANAC etc. Additionally, STEVANOVIĆ severely beat Josip TURKALJ and cut his long hair with a knife, whereby he stripped the victim of his human dignity.

By their participation in the above described acts, all of the individuals accused in this indictment jointly committed the criminal offence recognised by Article 142 (1) (war crime against civilian population) of the FRY Criminal Act re Article 22 of the same Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, I PROPOSE that a trial be held before this Court, in view of its territorial, real and functional competence, whereto the following participants should be summoned:

1 The War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia;

2 The accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ, Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Darko PERIĆ, Petronije STEVANOVIĆ, Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS (all of whom are currently being detained in the Belgrade Central Prison), Željko

KRNJAJIĆ, Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ, Radisav JOSIPOVIĆ, Dragan BAČIĆ, Zoran KOSIJER, Jovan DIMITRIJEVIĆ and Saša STOJANOVIĆ;

3 The injured parties – close relatives of the killed civilians;

4 Witnesses – injured parties:

5 Witnesses:

In addition to the foregoing, I PROPOSE that copies of the following

documents be presented and read out during the trial:

- List of the exhumed bodies of Lovas inhabitants, along with the exhumation and identification records;

- Expert findings and opinions submitted to the Vukovar District Court, regarding the causes of the deaths of the persons whose bodies were exhumed from the mass grave site in Lovas;

- Report on the damage caused to St. Archangel Michael's Church in Lovas;

- List of wounded and physically tortured Lovas inhabitants, made by the Vukovar Police Headquarters and submitted to the Osijek District Court on 25 February 1993;

- Minutes taken during the village representatives' meetings with officials of the Serbian autonomous district of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, held on 30 October and 3 November 1991;

- Personnel records of the Lovas territorial defence main staff and platoon, and those of the local community staffs;

- Certificates of membership for 21 volunteers serving in the Lovas territorial defence force;

- List of Lovas inhabitants killed in the minefield outside the Lovas farm community on 18 October 1991, made by the president of the Lovas local community

- List of civilians injured in an antipersonnel mine explosion on 18 October 1991;

- Documents obtained from the Military Archives;

- Record of activities entitled »Some indicators from logbooks«;

- ICTY investigator's records on interrogations conducted with persons who have deceased in the meantime, namely with: Mato KRALJEVIĆ (interrogated on 2 February 1996), Slavko LUKETIĆ (interrogated from 4 to 7 February 1996), Đuka RADOČAJ (interrogated on 4 February 1996), Marko FILIĆ (interrogated on 10 and 11 February 1996), and Andrija BALIĆ (interrogated on 11 and 12 March 1996); Witness statements provided by Janko BOŽIĆ and Nikola KRIZMANIĆ (both of whom have also deceased), during the proceedings conducted before the Vukovar District

Court in case No. K 25/00;

- Reports on the herein accused individuals' criminal records.

Ultimately, I PROPOSE that insight be made into the video and photo recordings made at the scene of the event on 22 November 2007.

Statement of reasons

All facts and circumstances that are relevant to this indictment – and, as such, specified in its enacting terms – were established in the course of a close investigation into the events addressed thereby.

Namely, in the latter part of 1991, a state of armed conflict existed in the Republic of Croatia, which was at the time one of the SFRY republics and, formally, still a federation member. The conflict involved the armed formations of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), which were controlled and commanded thereby, and organised armed formations of the Republic of Croatia, which included the National Guard Assembly (ZNG) and police units (MUP).

In view of the rules of international law contained in Geneva Convention IV of 12 August 1948, which governs the protection of civilians in wartime; and those contained in the Additional Protocols to this Convention (Protocolds I and II), the conflict at issue had a character of a noninternational (internal) armed conflict.

The attack on Lovas and the subsequent seizure of control over this village and its surrounding territories was only one of the military operations launched by the JNA over a larger area that included villages Tovarnik, Sotin and several others. Those operations were conducted in the framework of the event unofficially referred to as the »Vukovar Operation«. Before the breakout of the armed clashes, Lovas had a total of cca. 1,600 inhabitants, out of whom over 86 percent were ethnic Croats, cca. 8 percent were Serbs, whereas the rest declared themselves as Yugoslav or other nationalities. The village is situated in the Republic of Croatia, or more specifically in the Eastern Slavonian region, in close proximity to the border with Serbia (Western Srem) .

The foregoing facts and circumstances are generally known and therefore do not need to be explicitely corroborated by independent evidence.

The enacting terms of this indictment offer a detailed account of the following: the manner in which the attack on Lovas was planned, organised and carried out; its perpetrators and the resulting consequences for the civilian populace and their property; organisation of the newly established civilian and military structures of power; unlawful hauls and arrests; physical abuses, maltreatment and humiliation of the civilian population; unlawful searches of their homes; looting of their movable properties; damaging and destruction of their immovable properties; obligation of the civilians to mark their homes with white towels and to wear white bands around their sleeves; the regime of forced labour for everyone capable thereof; restriction of movement resulting from the curfew; threats to part of local population and pressures on them to leave the area; retaliation threats; brutal liquidations of some of the

prisoners, as well as of those who were found in their homes; the use of the unlawfully confined persons as a »human shield« in the search of the area and the consequences resulting from this operation following their entry into the minefield; killings of additional three persons following the minefield incident; and ultimately, the roles of each of the accused in their individual and joint acts and omissions.

All of the foregoing facts and circumstances, which are essential for the incrimination of the criminal offence charged by this indictment, have been corroborated by the evidence obtained throughout the investigation and proposed for trial presentation.

Specifically: the data contained in the documents of the competent JNA command staffs indicate that the attack on Lovas was ordered by the command of the 1st Proletarian Guards Motorised Division (1PGMD). The order specified that the attack operation was to be carried out by the 2nd Infantry Guards Motorised Brigade (2PGMBR). Consequently, on 9 October 1991, the Tovarnik-based Brigade's command staff issued the order that Lovas be attacked. The attack operation started in the early morning hours of 10 October 1991, when the Brigade opened a brief and low-intensity artillery fire on the village outskirts. As a result of the early attack stage, several barns and houses were damaged, whereas one civilian was killed (Milan LATAS) and another wounded (Marija VIDIĆ). It has been established beyond doubt that the aforementioned order was issued without a reliable operational knowledge of the location of military targets. This explains a cautious nature of the attack, which was of low intensity (only a few shells were fired) and of short duration, and therefore, apart from the aforementioned consequences, did not result in heavier losses of the local civilians. However, in view of the objective circumstances and military needs, there was no justification for any attack whatsoever, since there were no military targets in the village.

A series of infantry attacks launched from various directions was conducted by the volunteer force which included members of the armed group known as Dušan Silni, Tovarnik territorial defence and police. The police units mainly consisted of volunteers, former residents of Lovas and its neighbouring villages, all of whom knew that in the area there were no Croatian armed forces who would offer resistance or engage in the defence of the village. Actually, apart from sporadic fire opened by few individuals, there was no resistance at all, either on the part of the local population or on the part of any Croatian armed groups. The attackers sustained no losses other than the death of one volunteer.

The foregoing facts arise from parts of statements provided by the following individuals: some of the accused charged by this indictment, primarily Petronije STEVANOVIĆ and Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS; some of the witnesses – members of this armed group, who participated in the attack; and ultimately, a number of local inhabitants, including both witnesses and victims of the event at issue .

In the course of the time relevant to this indictment, namely the period between 10 October and 11 November 1991, a total of seventy persons were killed, whereas more than ten were lightly or heavily wounded.

The foregoing facts have been established on the basis of the following documents: a copy of the list of exhumed bodies with records of exhumation and identification conducted between 2 and 8 June 1997; expert findings and opinion on death causes

in relation to the persons whose bodies were exhumed from the mass gravesite in Lovas; a photocopy of the list of wounded and physically tortured Lovas citizens, dated 25 February 1993; a copy of the list of Lovas citizens killed in the minefield, which was made by the Lovas local community president on 18 October 1991; the list of wounded persons; and ultimately, statements provided by a number of witnesses throughout the investigation course. Namely, a total of seventy bodies were exhumed from the mass gravesite, and a while later from two individual graves, in the Catholic cemetry in Lovas. Out of the total number of the bodies exhumed, sixty were males and ten females. Forensic findings and opinion have confirmed that all of the victims died violent deaths resulting from entrance wounds in various parts of the body, inflicted by infantry weapons or fragments of explosive devices (mines).

On the grounds of the foregoing evidence it has been established that, during the attack launched on Lovas on 10 October 1991, one person died as a result of the artillery fire, whereas twenty-one were killed during the subsequent seizure of the village by the above specified armed group. Those who fell victim to the fire from infantry weapons, bombs and other explosive devices were hit in their homes, courtyards and streets, while a number of others were removed from cellars and courtyards, taken to other locations and subsequently killed.

After being physically maltreated, tortured and unlawfully hauled, thirteen persons were pulled from improvised prisons and killed, while additional fourteen (who were seized in their homes) were killed either on the spot or at a later point, after being removed from their homes and taken to various locations in the village.

A total of 21 persons were killed in the minefield or in relation thereto. Namely, one person (Boško BOĐANAC), who had previously been severely beaten, was killed as the column moved towards the minefield; another person (Josip TURKALJ), who was injured in the minefield, died on his way to hospital; ultimately, the death toll in the minefield itself amounted to nineteen persons, who were killed by infantry weapons or detonated mines.

While it is most certain that Boško BOĐANAC was shot dead by a member of the armed escort, the identity of the perpetrator, unfortunately, still remains unknown.

The foregoing facts, which arise from the data contained in the aforementioned documents, are additionally corroborated by statements obtained from a number of injured witnesses, and partly by allegations offered by some of the individuals accused in this indictment.

Over 100 witnesses were heard throughout the investigation stage, whereas a total of 92 have been proposed for trial questioning.

Ultimately, the body of the aforementioned evidence unequivocally leads to the conclusion that all of the killed and wounded were local civilians and non-Serbs, who had no affiliation to any armed groups, and who, at the time relevant to the indictment, were not involved in combat activities whatsoever.

Apart from these salient facts and circumstances which determine the event addressed by this indictment as a criminal offence recognised by Article 142 (war crime against civilian population) of the Yugoslav Criminal Act, a number of collateral

facts and circumstances have been established, which stand apart from the criminal offence at issue, and yet provide a closer explanation thereof.

All of the developments described here resulted from the mutual relations and operational principles of the three power structures existing at the time: formally, the two structures in power were the military (JNA) and the local military-civilian establishment, whereas actual (though informal) power rested with the third structure, notably the armed group which called itself Dušan Silni.

It is a generally known fact that at the time relevant to this indictment, the JNA was faced with considerable problems trying to mobilise its reserve forces in Serbia. In such circumstances, the »mobilisation issue« was removed from the JNA competence to that of other structures, some political parties in the first place. The transfer of competence also occurred in this particular case, with the Serbian National Renewal Party (SNO) mobilising its members and followers, and subsequently sending them to mobilisation points, where they were placed under the JNA command. It is evident that such reinforcements of the JNA units occurred beyond the official, i.e. legally recognised system. The military accepted the volunteers, who were then sent to war zones in Croatia, in this particular case to the area of Lovas municipality. Superior military commands would issue orders to their subordinates in the field, whereby the latter were obligated to accept the volunteer groups, place them under the control and command of their units, and warn them to comply with military laws and international conventions. In practice, however, such orders were largely disrespected. Military commands in the areas of conflict exercised little control over these armed groups; moreover, due to a poor and confusing communication among the subordinate commands, they lacked the overall control of the situation, while their cooperation with the local civil and military authorities was almost nonexistent. As a result of such circumstances, the military commands were faced with numerous problems regarding their exercise of power in the territories under their control.

The local civilian and military authorities, embodied in the personalities of DEVETAK, DEVČIĆ and RADOJČIĆ, acted in an autocratic and uncontrollable manner. Following the seizure of Lovas, they were supposed to demonstrate a sense of organisation and responsibility by employing their armed structures, notably the territorial defence and police, to collect any weapons that may have remained hidden and conduct lawful interrogations of any locals reasonably suspected of connections with the Croatian paramilitary forces or involvement in the alleged nightly skirmishes. Instead of doing so, the herein accused individuals ordered or allowed parts of their armed groups to search civilians' homes and plunder their possessions, to make unlawful arrests of citizens based on their ethnic backgrounds, political commitment or previous relationships; the interrogations of those arrested were commonly accompanied by physical maltreatment and severe beatings, and at times even by physical liquidations.

In the context of this particular event, the armed group which called itself Dušan Silni was a phenomenon per se.

It is an established fact that this group was founded by the Serbian National Renewal Party (SNO). The military authorities accepted this unit, provided its members with weapons and other equipment, and sent them to the area of conflict, notably to village

Lovas. And this is the whole truth about its status. Formally, pursuant to the orders issued by the military authorities in charge of the area, this group was part of the military, under their command and control. Factually, however, the military authorities did not have command or necessary control of the unit in this particular case. Although it is true that, upon the unit's arrival in Lovas, some of its members were included into the local territorial defence and police forces, an overwhelming majority of them remained outside any military or civilian structures of power. On the other hand, the unit lacked internal structure of any kind. Thus, it did not include smaller organisational units, nor did it have a commanding structure. Some of its members enjoyed certain reputation within the group, based on the criteria of personal capabilities or previous war experience (e.g. STUPAR's group, or a.k.a. BATA's group). However, in terms of formal or actual hierarchy, neither anyone of those individuals nor any other member of the civilian or military authorities had command of the unit, and consequently could not issue orders thereto. Any member of the unit could individually choose whether he would obey orders, requests or suggestions made by the above structures, and most members did so on most occasions. For the foregoing reasons, this armed group did not have essential characteristics of a paramilitary armed formation in the broad sense of the term.

The above circumstances can offer insight into a broader context of the events charged by this indictment. However, it is not the purpose of these or any similar proceedings to establish socio-historical and, inhrently, political or ethnic causes and consequences of the tragic events which occurred in the former Yugoslavia, and more specifically in the Republic of Croatia, at the time relevant to this indictment.

These levels of individual guilt of civilian and military officials, i.e. their responsibility for certain acts and omissions (command responsibility), as well as the consequences arising thereof, have been addressed by the Hague Tribunal and, partly, by competent judicial authorities in the region. The goal of these proceedings is to elucidate the events which occurred at the place and time relevant to this indictment, examine relevant facts and establish individual guilt, whereupon each of the accused individuals should be sentenced as required by statute.

The criminal offence recognized by Article 142 (war crime against civilian population) of the Yugoslav Criminal Act, which applies to the case in question, can be perpetrated solely at the time of war, armed conflict or occupation. The hereby charged criminal offence is determined by these objective conditions. Apart from international armed conflicts, the term armed conflict also refers to internal armed conflicts, as specified by Annexed Protocol II (1977) to Geneva Convention IV (August 1949) on protection of civilian persons at wartime. Along with Additional Protocol I to the same Convention, Protocol II provides detailed regulations governing the status of civilians at the times of war, armed conflict or occupation. The commission of the criminal offence charged by this indictment involves several interrelated acts directed against any of the following: life or physical integrity, freedom, personal possessions and other basic human rights, notably the rights of the civilian population as a whole and those of every individual. Since each of the foregoing acts is recognised as a criminal offence under our national legislation, which thereby incorporates the essential provisions of the aforementioned Geneva Conventions, the case addressed by this indictment constitutes a blanket criminal offence .

Being aware of their acts and willfully engaging therein in the above described manner, all of the accused individuals committed serious breaches of the said Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols, whereby they are criminally responsible as charged, notably for the criminal offence recognised by Article 142 (1) (war crime against civilian population) of the Yugoslav Criminal Act .

In their defence cases made during the investigation, all of the accused admitted being present in Lovas when the events occurred and the crimes committed at the time, yet they denied their participation therein or their guilt thereof. Thus:

The accused, Ljuban DEVETAK, denies his role or involvement in the commission of the aforesaid criminal offence on each of the four basic counts contained in this indictment. In the first place, DEVETAK states that he did not plan or organise the campaign intended to assemble the SNO members and followers, as well as part of the local population, with a view to forming an armed group that would subsequently join the JNA in their attack on village Lovas.

Such defence is ungrounded since, on the one hand, DEVETAK failed to indicate a single proof in support of his allegations, whereas on the other, his involvement in the described acts is substantiated by unambiguous, convincing and coinciding statements provided, among others, by the accused: Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS, Petronije STEVANOVIĆ and Borislav MIHAJLOVIĆ, as well as those obtained by numerous witnesses and victims.

Secondly, DEVETAK states that, at the time of the events, he was only the managing director of the local farm community (which is anyhow an unquestionable fact), and that in such a capacity he supervised and participated in production, selling and other operational activities of the company for the benefit of all citizens of Lovas regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. He further states that he was not the »civilian commander« of the village, whom everyone reported to and who had the final say in everything. It has been established beyond doubt that, at the time relevant to this indictment, DEVETAK formally was the director of the Lovas farm community, and acted in that capacity. However, all other allegations offered by him are unfounded. The fact that Ljuban DEVETAK was actual commander of Lovas at the time when the crimes were committed against Croatian civilians in that village, has been supported by a number of statements obtained from some of the accused, as well as those given by victims and witnesses. The fact that several days after the seizure of Lovas, Ljuban DEVETAK addressed those gathered in the local cultural centre by introducing himself not only as the managing director of the farm community, but also as the »key person« responsible for the village defence, has been corroborated by a number of statements. The authenticity of these and all other statements related to the factual status of Ljuban DEVETAK as the village's topmost civilian authority is corroborated by the data contained in the records of meetings between officials of SAO Krajina (Independent Autonomous Region of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem) and the village representatives. All of these documents were signed by DEVETAK, with his command function specified below the signature. The said statements and records unequivocally indicate that the involvement and competences of Ljuban DEVETAK extended far beyond the scope of an ordinary farm community manager solely responsible for production and sales issues .

Thirdly, the accused, Ljuban DEVETAK, argues that he did not order, request or

propose unlawful arrests, tortures, physical maltreatment or killings of any Croatian civilians. I deem the defence arguments offered by this accused individual to be unfounded for a number of reasons. Namely, such arguments are in contradiction to the fact that DEVETAK, being the de facto civilian commander of the village, made all decisions and had the final say in everything. Furthermore, the testimonies of some of the herein accused individuals lend support to the conclusion that DEVETAK had a crucial role at the place and time relevant to this indictment .

In addition to the above, the criminal involvement of Ljuban DEVETAK is further supported by a number of witnesses, who testify that this accused decided whom of the local people he would have hauled, detained and interrogated based on the seized video recordings of the HDZ Lovas board meetings. The statements obtained from these witnesses, i.e. the herein injured parties, leave no doubt to the conclusion that the most prominent HDZ members, who were the first to come under attack, got arrested, beaten and otherwise tortured, whereas a number of them were killed in the process. The above described acts of Ljuban DEVETAK, as well as those of all the other individuals charged by this indictment, were basically motivated by the victims' ethnic backgrounds and their HDZ party membership.

Fourthly, and last, Ljuban DEVETAK denies his role whatsoever in the assembling of the local male population in front of the village farm community in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, in their detention and physical maltreatment, and ultimately in the decision to employ them as a »human shield« in the planned mine clearing operation outside the village. However, these defence arguments are thoroughly groundless. Namely, some of the herein accused individuals unambiguously confirm that, alongside the aforementioned representatives of the armed unit called Dušan Silni, Ljuban DEVETAK was present at all meetings with Lieutenant Colonel DIMITRIJEVIĆ, where he was actively involved in discussions about safety measures due to be taken. Thus, DEVETAK attended the meetings of 15 October 1991 (which resulted in a number of notices displayed on houses and trees, informing the local population of a series of restrictive and retaliatory measures), and of 17 October 1991 (mostly attended by the same participants, and resulting in the decision that all men aged between 18 and 65 assemble in front of the farm community building). DEVETAK also participated in another meeting held later that day (17 October), when it was decided that the captured civilians be used for a mine clearing operation outside the village, which was due to be undertaken the following day. Following that meeting, DEVETAK went to the farm community and informed the detained civilians that they would remain there overnight, and that the following morning they would be taken to work. Having made it clear that they would not be released before they had disclosed who had been shooting at the army, DEVETAK went on to call out the names of those who had specific assignments in the farm community. The foregoing facts and circumstances have been confirmed by a number of witnesses. In the morning of 18 October 1991, DEVETAK arrived in front of the community building in the company of some local Serbs and several soldiers. He read out the names of between 10 and 15 persons and said that they would remain within the farm community compound as they were needed for some specific jobs. The decision about whether someone would stay or join a separate group lay within the exclusive competence of this accused individual. The foregoing facts have been confirmed by several witnesses. Shortly after this event, all of the three formerly mentioned LUKETIĆ family members were killed. The detainees who remained outside the separated group were informed by DEVETAK that they were going to the vineyards to

»pick up grapes«.

All of the above facts arise from the statements of numerous witnesses – dwellers of village Lovas.

Apart from denying his guilt for the events that took place in Lovas at the said time, DEVETAK also states that the responsibility for the above described tragic consequences lies with the military authorities and individuals, yet he fails to offer any evidence in support of his allegations, or names of any individuals that he might deem responsible.

In their defence cases, the accused. Milan DEVČIĆ, Milan RADOJČIĆ and Željko KRNJAJIĆ state that, since they were inhabitants of Lovas (Željko KRNJAJIĆ was also commander of the Tovarnik territorial defence and police), they joined other locals in their attack on the village and its (as they put it) »liberation«. While the accused do not challenge the stated consequences – the destruction and damaging of a substantial number of civilian, residential and other objects, and deaths of 21 persons, they deny their guilt therefore, saying that they did not indicate any particular targets, whether individuals or houses and other objects in the possession of local Croats; the accused further allege that they did not shoot, or order others to do so, at any local civilians, whether inside the houses and courtyards or in the streets. The accused do not challenge the fact that immediately following the village liberation, they were appointed to top positions, namely Milan DEVČIĆ as local police commander, and Milan RADOJČIĆ as local territorial defence commander.

The accused do not admit committing a single crime charged by this indictment in the period between 10 October and 11 November 1991. Consequently, they state that they do not feel responsible for the consequences of the described events. While they do not dispute these consequences, the accused maintain that at the time they were not aware of what was going on (discriminatory treatment of local Croats, unlawful arrests and interrogations, damage to private and public property, and ultimately, murders of numerous local civilians).

The Prosecution holds that such defence allegations as offered by the accused are entirely groundless. Acting as armed members of the said group, the accused participated in the attack on an inhabited area and its residents, although they were positively aware of the fact that the attacked could offer no resistance, which was particularly true for the unarmed people in their homes, in the courtyards and streets. In that context it is irrelevant whether or not they engaged in the shooting, whether they hit or killed someone, and possibly damaged or destroyed someone's property. All essential elements of the charged criminal offence are involved in the acts and omissions of the accused, resulting from the very fact that they participated in an attack on an undefended village and its civilian population. This fact is not conditioned by whether they were aware of the international legal breaches arising from their acts, since the breach of international law constitutes an objective prerequisite to culpability. Likewise, the Prosecution deems the latter part of their defence case to be equally groundless. Namely, the unambiguously established facts regarding the consequences of the events which occurred between 10 October and 11 November 1991, offer reasonable grounds for the conclusion that the aforesaid discriminatory measures against non-Serbs, which included arrests, interrogations, tortures and other physical abuses, could be ordered only by the local topmost

military and civilian structures, whereas it is an undisputable fact that the accused: Ljuban DEVETAK, Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ, in their respective capacities as de facto village commander, police commander, and local territorial defence commander, were the highest officials within these structures. The stated facts are further supported by a number of witness statements. The fact that Milan DEVČIĆ and Milan RADOJČIĆ personally interrogated the detainees, whom they also physically tortured in the process, has partly been confirmed by the accused Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS, and ultimately corroborated by the statements of numerous eyewitnesses – victims of the herein charged crime.

Finally, the fact that formal and factual power rested with the three accused individuals (DEVETAK, DEVČIĆ and RADOJČIĆ) points to the reasonable conclusion that by their acts and omissions they aided and abetted the commission of the crimes which resulted in the deaths of a large number of civilians.

While the accused Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ does not dispute a majority of incriminating facts, he denies any responsibility for the consequences of his acts. Specifically, DIMITRIJEVIĆ does not deny his role in the public announcement of 15 October 1991, whereby local residents were threatened by a series of restrictive and retaliatory measures. DIMITRIJEVIĆ also admits attending the meeting of 17 October 1991, and his role in the decision rendered at the time, further to which all local men of Croatian ethnic background were assembled in front of the farm community building and subsequently detained inside the community compound during the night. The opearation was allegedly intended to identify possible participants in armed provocations that occasionally occurred throughout the area. On the following day, i.e. 18 October 1991, DIMITRIJEVIĆ ordered a reconnaissance and search operation of the area around manufacturing compound Borovo, which would also include the vineyards and orchards on the village outskirts. The order was to be carried out by 1st class captain Darko PERIĆ and part of his unit which had arrived in Lovas the previous day, along with a few local people who were familiar with the area. While confirming the foregoing facts, DIMITRIJEVIĆ maintains that his duty as armed operations coordinator did not involve command authority, and that consequently he could not issue orders to either the local civilian and military staffs or to the JNA armed formations present in the village on the day of the event. Further to DIMITRIJEVIĆ's allegations, his duty was to give recommendations and advice rather than orders. Such defence allegations are thoroughly groundless, and even contradictory at times: within his description of a particular situation, this accused at some points states that he advised or recommended certain actions, whereas at others he makes references to orders issued by himself. Still, the accused Darko PERIĆ, as well as a number of witnesses, testify that Miodrag DIMITRIJEVIĆ, being the highest-ranking army officer and topmost military commander in Lovas at the time, had an unquestioned authority to issue orders, both to the local civilian and military governing structures, and to parts of the JNA units provisionally deployed in Lovas. Beside the aforementioned threats of retaliation, his order of 15 October 1991, entitled »Notice to Lovas Citizens«, contains a series of political derogations including »Ustashas' Organisation« as an allusion to the HDZ Party. Such random and unjustified labelling on ideological grounds, which soon became a prevailing attitude, resulted in the hostility to almost all the local participants in the celebration of the HDZ election victory, who could be seen in the recordings taken during the event and subsequently seized in the Party's local headqurters.

The accused Darko PERIĆ testifies that, while ordering the reconnaissance and search operation (which was intended to locate possible presence of the Croatian paramilitary force and due to be conducted the following day), the accused DIMITRIJEVIĆ was aware that certain locations in the area had been mined by the said brigade's engineering unit. PERIĆ further testifies that DIMITRIJEVIĆ alerted his personnel to that effect, and ordered that the previously detained local Croats move as a »human shield« in front of the military, allegedly to deter possible attacks by the Croatian paramilitary forces .

While he denies issuing any such order, the accused DIMITRIJEVIĆ states that, during the meeting which addressed the planning of the reconnaissance and search operation, he only put forward the proposal that the said operation be joined and assisted by a few locals who had knowledge of the surrounding area.

The defence case presented by DIMITRIJEVIĆ is unfounded, given the fact that it is in flat contradiction to the statement provided by the accused Darko PERIĆ. The truthfulness of PERIĆ's allegations is corroborated by the undoubted facts relating to the manner in which as many as 50 civilian detainees were used during the stated operation, as well as its subsequent consequences in the minefield.

While he basically admits all factual allegations set forth in this indictment, Darko PERIĆ denies ordering his subordinates to shoot at any civilians who might try to lie down on the ground or escape. Again, we deem such defence allegations as presented by PERIĆ to be unfounded in the light of the developments following the first mine explosion. Specifically, in the chaotical situation caused by the explosion, some of the soldiers opened fire at the civilians in the minefield. In the context of that event, it is irrelevant whether or not this accused individual thought of his acts in terms of their permissibility or appropriacy .

In their defence allegations, the accused Radovan VLAJKOVIĆ and Radisav JOSIPOVIĆ unanimously maintain that they opposed PERIĆ's order further to which the two were supposed to take their unit to the reconnaissance and search operation in the morning of the critical day. Explaining the reasons for opposing PERIĆ's request, VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ say that they were aware of mines having been laid over some parts of the area, and therefore thought that their operation might be responded by fire on the part of the Croatian paramilitary. Furthermore, these two accused say that they had never been trained to conduct such operations, nor did they have appropriate equipment therefore. Thus, despite PERIĆ's insisting, VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ ultimately refused to obey his order. The refusal meant that the two did not take their company to the said operation or assume command in the process; still, »for moral reasons«, they joined the operation with cca. 40 members of their unit, whereas they referred command to some members of armed group Dušan Silni. VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ deny their command role in the positioning or moving of the civilians, and allege that, as they reached what they rightly thought to be a minefield, they proceeded and acted in the same manner as any ordinary soldier.

The defence allegations of these two accused individuals, who deny their command responsibility, i.e. participating in the above described actions (removal of the detained civilians from the farm community courtyard, and their use as a »human shield« during the search operation), are false and therefore should be dismissed as

unfounded. The same conclusion applies to their allegations that they referred command to an unknown member of unit Dušan Silni, who then allegedly diverted the civilians from the road, arranged them in a line, and ordered them to move frontally across the clover field.

Primarily, the above defence allegations are in contradiction to the statement offered by the accused Darko PERIĆ. Despite the fact that VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ were but reserve officers, both must have been aware of at least three facts: first, that they could not leave command with an anonymous noncommissioned officer while they were present; second, that the use of civilians as protection against enemy attacks (the so-called »human shield«) was impermissible (irrespective of a particular regulation or rule of international law governing this issue); and third, the fact that the attacks were ordered by their superiors did not release them from personal responsibility. In addition to the aforementioned, even on the assumption that they might not have known that they had reached a minefield, by making the civilians move ahead of them at what they thought to be a safe distance, they demonstrated caution about their own safety and compliance with possible risks to the civilians' lives.

All of the foregoing facts and circumstances lead to the unambiguous conclusion that both VLAJKOVIĆ and JOSIPOVIĆ are criminally responsible for the events charged by this indictment.

The defence case of the accused: Jovan DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Saša STOJANOVIĆ, Dragan BAČIĆ and Zoran KOSIJER, all of whom belonged to unit Dušan Silni, focuses on the events which took place in the minefield and in relation thereto. While these accused admit participating in a joint action with Mijo VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ and Slobodan HRNJAČKI aka Sajdžija (both deceased), which involved the handover of the detained civilians and their subsequent use in the search operation, they deny having command over the operation or ordering the civilians to enter into the clover field which, as it turned out, had been mined.

In his account of the same event, Jovica DIMITRIJEVIĆ states that he was also wounded as he stepped over a limpet mine. The allegations of Saša STOJANOVIĆ, who points out his unhesitating response to the chaos and his substantial assistance in the deactivation of the remaining mines, have been proven to be true.

Nonetheless, the Prosecution holds that the guilt of DIMITRIJEVIĆ and STOJANOVIĆ arises from the fact that they willingly participated in the described events, and that they did so as a result of their personal decision rather than anyone's orders. In the light of this fact, as it has already been mentioned, it is not of essential relevance whether or not they knew that their acts constituted a breach of international law.

The accused Petronije STEVANOVIĆ and Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS partly admit their role in the events charged – specifically in the attack on Lovas and, in that context, the throwing of explosive devices on houses and courtyards, opening random fire from infantry weapons and minor physical abuses of some civilians. In the Prosecution's view, however, the part of their defence case whereby they deny their criminal responsibility for other acts charged against them is unfounded, since it clearly contradicts the statements obtained from a number of victims and witnesses. This is

particularly true in the case of Petronije STEVANOVIĆ, whose brutal treatment of some of the civilians has been almost unanimously confirmed by both the victims and the accused.

In conclusion, the Prosecution holds that all of the foregoing reasons prove beyond doubt that both Petronije STEVANOVIĆ and Aleksandar NIKOLAIDIS acted in the above specified manner, whereby they committed the criminal offence as charged by this indictment.

WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR
Vladimir Vukčević

ANNEX 83:

DECISION OF THE STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA SP-23 07, 8 JULY 2009

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Number: SP-23/07

Zagreb, 8 July 2009

State Judicial Council (hereinafter referred to as: the Council), deciding on the disciplinary responsibility of Gospić County Court Judge Branko Milanović, for disciplinary offenses referred to in Article 20, paragraph 2, items 2,4 and 6 of the State Judicial Council Act (Official Gazette no. 58/93 , 49/99.31/00, 107/00, 129/00, 59105 and 150/05; hereinafter referred to as: ZDSV), in a disciplinary procedure, initiated on the request of the President of Gospić County Court Dubravka Rudelić, number 8-5u-402/07-J, received on 06 September 2007, with amended motion dated 15 October 2007, during the Council meeting of 08 July 2009 held in the presence of the complainant Dubravka Rudelić and in absence of the dully summoned reported Judge Branko Milanović, after the oral presentation given by the President o f the Disciplinary Council Miho Martović, passed the following

DECISION

I. That the reported Judge BRANKO MILANOVIĆ, born on 28 July 1942 in Ćosanlije (BiH), with domicile in Gospić, Budačka 3, Judge of the County Court in Gospić,

is held responsible

for:

in cases:

a\ K-4/03 during the year 2003, he passed a verdict which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the case file was then ceded to another court,

b\ K-6/05 he passed a verdict on 30 April 2005 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

c\ K-10/05 he passed a verdict on 01 December 2005 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the case file was then ceded to another court,

d\ K-14/05 he passed a verdict on 28 June 2006 which was quashed due to es-

sential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

e\ K-7/06 he passed a verdict on 28 September 2006 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

f\ K-l/03 (now K•11/06) he passed a verdict on 9 April 2003 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

g\ K-12/03 (now K-3/07) he passed a verdict on 27 January 2004 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

h\ K-8/07 (previously K-7/04 and K-17/04) he passed a verdict on 29 June 2004, which was partially quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11, and partially due to incorrect establishment of facts, he again passed the verdict on 12 April 2005, which was quashed due to reasonable suspicion in regularity and reliability of establishing of the deciding facts, and the case file was then ceded to another court,

i\ K-l/02 (now K•11/06) he passed a verdict on 29 October 2002 which was quashed due to essential violation of the procedure prescribed in the provision of Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act,

thus committing judicial misconduct

in the form of disciplinary offense referred to in Article 20, paragraph 2, item 2 of the ZDSV,

and pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1, item 3 of the ZDSV he is

RELIVED OF DUTY

/…/

Explanation

The President of the County Court in Gospić, pursuant to provisions in Article 24, paragraph 1 and Article 25 of the ZDSV, initiated a disciplinary procedure against the reported Judge for disciplinary offenses of judicial misconduct, disturbing the work of the Court, significantly influencing the functioning of the judicial authority and damaging the reputation of the Court and the judicial office in some other way, pursuant to prescribed provisions of the Article 20, paragraph 2, item 2,4 and 6 of the ZDSV, all in relation to factual description under I and II of this decision.

On 15 October 2007 the request was amended with additional charges against the reported Judge for his conduct in the case number IK 1-53/07, noting that the reported Judge is not only imputed with the large percentage of quenched

decisions but also the fact that they were quenched due to essential violations of the procedural provisions.

The competent complainant suggested that the reported Judge is to be relieved of duty as the disciplinary action.

In the factual description the reported Judge is charged with rendering bad decisions that were quenched due to essential violations of the procedural provisions and in certain cases the case files were ceded to another court.

The reported judge had in the following cases:

1. K-4/03 rendered the decision during the year 2003 which was quenched on 29 January 2004,

the case was then ceded to another court;

2. K-6/05 rendered the decision on 30 April 2005, which was quenched on 21 February 2006;

3. K-10/05 rendered the decision on 06 July 2005, which was quenched on 14 December 2006,

the case was then ceded to another court;

4. K-14/05 rendered the decision on 28 June 2006, which was quenched on 13 December 2006;

5. K-7/06 rendered the decision on 28 September 2006, which was quenched on 13 December 2006;

6. K-1/03 rendered the decision on 09 April 2003, which was quenched on 08 August 2006;

7. K-12/03 rendered the decision on 27 January 2004, which was quenched on 28 November 2006;

8. K-7/04 rendered the decision on 29 June 2004, which was quenched on 27 October 2004;

9. K-6/04 rendered the decision on 12th of April 2005, which was quenched on 17 January 2007,

the case was then ceded to another court;

10. K-l/02 rendered the decision on 29 October 2002, which was quenched on 04 January 2006;

/…/

Therefore the Council feels: that this is the case of an extended disciplinary offense of judicial misconduct ; that the complainant learned of all the elements of the disciplinary offense (number and type of quenched decisions, causes for quenching) only in July 2007 when, upon the request of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, she had conducted a complete inspection of case files of the reported Judge; and therefore no subjective statute of limitation can be applied to this case pursuant to Article 22, paragraph 1 of the ZDSV.

Inspection of the statistic indicators showed that during the year 2004 the reported judge

had 3 of his decisions confirmed, 2 were quenched and one decision was modified;

in 2005, 6 decisions were confirmed and 5 were quenched;

in 2006, 5 decisions were confirmed, 4 were quenched and one decisions were modified;;

in 2007, 13 decisions were confirmed 2 were quenched and one decision was modified;

Inspection of the first instance case files, for which the reported judge is being charged with, showed that the decisions were truly quenched due to essential violations of the procedural provisions, and that as much as three cases were ceded to another court of general jurisdiction after the decision was quenched. These circumstances indicate the lack of expertise of the reported Judge that resulted in judicial misconduct. In opposition to the opinion of the reported Judge this is not an attempt to take away the right to free judicial opinion but sanctioning of superficial and unprofessional conduct of the Judge in more complex cases that signifies the judicial misconduct.

In the great number of first instance criminal cases for serious criminal offenses the reported judge continuously violated the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, repeating the same essential violation of the criminal procedure (as referred to in Article 367, paragraph 1, item 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act.) With such actions the reported judge had committed the extended disciplinary offense of the judicial misconduct as referred to in Article 20, paragraph 2, item 2 of the ZDSV, for which he is charged and should be declared responsible.

/…/

Considering the issue of sanction (disciplinary action), the Council did not find any particular mitigating circumstances, but the fact that the reported Judge holds no doubts in the appropriateness of his behavior is considered to be an aggravating circumstance.

Contrary to this, the reported Judge is persistent in claiming that the violations of the procedure he had committed were not the result of his mistakes but that this is the case of the wrongful conduct of the Supreme Court whose goal is to defame him as a Judge.

Considering his attitude, it is the Council's opinion that it can be expected that the reported Judge would continue with such conduct and therefore there are no conditions to take more lenient disciplinary action. The Council decided to take the strictest disciplinary action and relive him of duty pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1, item 3 of the ZDSV.

ANNEX 84:
DECISION OF THE STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA SP-23 07, 8 JULY 2009

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
COUNTY STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
D U B R O V N I K
NUMBER: KT-14/92
Dubrovnik, 10 November 2009

DJ/MS
TO THE COUNTY COURT IN DUBROVNIK

Based on the Article 42. paragraph 2. item 4. of the Criminal Procedure Act, I hereby raise this

INDICTMENT

against:
1. JEVREM COKIĆ, son of Marinko, born on May 28, 1934 in Gazdari, Medveđa, Leskovac, Serbia, Serbian, present residence unknown.
2. MILE RUŽINOVSKI, son of Trajko, born on October 30, 1935 in Veles, Macedonija, Macedonian, present residence unknown.
3. PAVLE STRUGAR, son of Andrija, born on July 13, 1933 in Peć, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegrian, present residence unknown.
4. MIODRAG JOKIĆ, son of Miloš, born on February 25, 1935 in Mionica Selo, Mionica, Donja Toplica, Valjevo, Serbia, Serbian, present residence unknown.
5. BRANKO STANKOVIĆ, son of Nikola, born on July 14 1934, Miljevina, Foča, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbin, present residence unknown.
6. OBRAD VIČIĆ, son of Blaško, born on March 22, 1944 Lopari, Fojnica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, present residence unknown.
7. RADOVAN KOMAR - son of Naum, born on June 18, 1951 in Nikšić, present residence unknown.
8. VLADIMIR KOVAČEVIĆ son of Novica and Spasenija, maiden name Todorović, born on January 15, 1961 in Nikšić, Montenegro, Montenegrian, present residence unknown.
9. MILAN ZEC, son of Petar and Ivanka, born on September 20, 1943, Čajnič, Goražde, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian, present residence unknown.
10. ZORAN GVOZDENOVIĆ son of Radojica and Ljiljana, maiden name Lukić, born on June 11 1958 in Ivanjica, residing in Belgrade, Radovana Simića Street 36/63 Republic of Serbia, graduated from Military Naval Academy, married, father of three, Serbian, citizen of Republic of Serbia.
Jevrem Cokić is indicted that :

during the period from October 1st, 1991 until October 5th, 1991 in Kifino Selo - Bosnia and Herzegovina, ranked as lieutenant general of the Second Operational Group of the ex JNA formed in July 1991 by the ex JNA Headquarters in order to attack and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to Neretva river, from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia, that was to be formed, on the territory of ex Jugoslavia, according to the ideas of Great-Serbian nationalists; together with the headquarters of the Second Operational Group he created a plan of attack on the wider area of Dubrovnik and then with a competence to issue orders, ordered the following subordinated units: Second Tactical Group, Second Titograd Corps, 9. Army Naval Sector, 472 Motorized Brigade and 172 Airforce regiment to, according to the plan approved by the Headquarters on October 1st 1991, from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro simultaneously attack the wider area of Dubrovnik, which the subordinated units did, starting on October 1st 1991, with strong artillery and mortar attacks on the villages along the border with Republic of Croatia, and he continued to act as a commander of this action until October 5th 1991, by which time, units under his command partially occupied Konavle and Dubrovnik coast, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under his command excessively and unselectively shelled with artillery weapons and mine throwers populated villages, were killing civilians who should have been protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civilian, cultural and business objects, loot them and set fire on them thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12, 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 4, paragraph 2, items a. and g., Article13, 14 and 16 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts (Protocol II), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he was obligated to do so he omitted to perform any actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead, by behaving as he did, he supported such behaviour, allowing units under his superior authority to continue such activities and agreed on the consequences of such actions and so the presently unknown members of units under his command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from firearms and fighter jets, army ships, artillery and infantry weapons
killed 12 civilians, as follows:
on October 1st, 1991 in village Osojnik, Mate Violić
on October 2nd, 1991 in Kupari, Jela Ferlan

on October 3rd, 1991 in village Gruda, Niko Drašković
on October 3rd/4th, 1991 in village Uskoplje, Ivan Miljanić
on October 4th, 1991 in Slano, Vicko Runja
on October 5th, 1991, in Dubrovnik, Milan Milišić and Rade Hasić
on October 5th, 1991 in Slano, Niko Nodilo, Antun Matić and Pero Sršen
on October 5th, 1991 in village Zvekovica, Drago Miklaušić
on October 5th, 1991 in village Lovorno, Niko Muja
partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Vitaljina, Đurinići, Molunat, Mikulići, Pločice, Palje Brdo, Zastolje, Vodovađa, Dubravka, Ljuta, Gruda, Poljice, Radovčići, Popovići, Komaji, Slano, Kuna, Lovorno causing large scale damages and forced displacemet of 3458 residents ,
thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians, killing of the civilians, infliction of severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, so, he, breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,
committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 Basic Criminal Code of Republic of Croatia (BCCRC) in relation with Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC
Mile Ružinović is indicted that:
during the period from October 6th, 1991 until October 12th, 1991 in Kifino Selo - Bosnia and Herzegovina, ranked as lieutenant general of the Second Operational Group of the ex JNA formed in July, 1991 by the ex JNA Headquarters with a goal to attack from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to Neretva river, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia, that was to be formed, according to the ideas of great-Serbian nationalists, on the territory of ex Jugoslavia, he ordered, having the superior authority , the following units: Second Tactical Group, Second Titograd Corps, 9. Army Naval Sector, 472 Motorized Brigade and 172 Airforce Regiment to, according to the plan approved by the Headquarters, continue with fighting and further occupation of Konavle and Dubrovnik coast, and a wider area around Dubrovnik, which the units under his command did, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under his command excessively and unselectively, with artillery weapons and mine throwers, shelled populated villages, killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance

into populated villages destroyed civilian, cultural and business objects, loot them and set fire on them thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12, 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts (Protocol II), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he was obligated he omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as he did, he supported such behaviour, allowing units under his superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under his command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from firearms and fighter jets, army ships and artillery and infantry weapons
killed 16 civilians, as follows:
on October 6th, 1991, in village Komolac, Stjepo Čikat and Andrija Crnčević;
on October 7, 1991 in front of the shelter in Mokošica, Ivo Maškarić, Alen Vasiljević, Vladimirka Dopsaj, Nikola Liban, Miho Liban, Joško Vuković, Jozo Brajović, Denis Ćimić and Miljenko Kulaš;
on October 7th, 1991, in village Zvekovica, Branko Dragišić, Antun Mišić and Ilija Šaravanja;
on October 8th, 1991, in village Cavtat, Niko Srgota and Lovro Guljelmović;
partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Mihanići, Pridvorje, Drvenik, Gabrile, Uskoplje, Čilipe, Močići, Zvekovica, Osojik, Dubravica causing large scale damages and forced displacement of 2337 residents
thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,
committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC
Pavle Strugar is indicted that:
during the period from October 13th, 1991 until October 26th, 1991 in Trebin-

je - Bosnia and Herzegovina, ranked as lieutenant colonel general of the Second Operational unit of ex JNA and 4 Military Zone of ex JNA formed by the ex JNA Headquarters with a goal to attack from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to Neretva river, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia, that was to be formed, according to the ideas of great-Serbian nationalists, on the territory of ex Jugoslavia, he commanded, having the superior authority , the following units: Second Tactical Group, Second Titograd Corps, 9. Army Naval Sector, 472 Motorized Brigade and 172 Airforce regiment to, according to the plan approved by the Headquarters of ex JNA, continue with fighting and further occupation of Konavle, Župa Dubrovačka,Dubrovnik coast, the area of Neretva Valley and a wider area around Dubrovnik, which units under his command did, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under his command excessively and with no selection of targets with artillery weapons and mine throwers, airforce and army ships shelled populated villages, killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civil, cultural and business objects, loot them and set on fire thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12, 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts (Protocol II), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he was obligated he omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as he did, supported such behaviour, allowing units under his superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under his command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from firearms and fighter jets, army ships and artillery and infantry weapons killed 86 civilians as follows:

on October 15th, 1991 in Čilipi, Stjepo Škobelja;
on October 17th, 1991 in Zavrelj, Pavo Klešković;
on October 21st, 1991 in Mlini, Stjepo Lonza, Pero Elezović and Ilija Duper;
on October 23rd, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 24th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 26th, 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Prčan and Ana Prčan;
on October 26rd, 1991 in Vrbica, Kata Tepšić;
on November 1st, 1991 in Lisac, Ivan Sutić and Kata Sutić;
on November 2nd, 1991 in Sustjepan, Frane Šaban, Maris Šaban, Mara Šaban,

Katarina Gunjin, Hrvoje Gunjin;
on November 4th, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Andra Đuraš;
on November 9th, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Antun Lang, Marin Lučić, Luca Spremić;
on November 10, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Jovo Vasiljević, Ivan Radić, Dubravko Ševelja, Đuro Bokun, Marija Burum, Ivo Martinović, Niko Čupić and Nikica Čupić;
on November 11th, 1991 in Dubrovnik Đuro Perak, Petar Sambrailo, Andrija Rašica, Nikola Krijes, Cvijeta Kisa and Iva Bokun;
on November 12th, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Emilije Jurica;
on November 15th, 1991 in Stravča, Niko Veramenta;
on November 16th, 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Urljević;
on November 20th, 1991 in Mokošica, Zdenko Gavrić;
on November 21st, 1991 in Mokošica, Mate Čeović and Vid Žitković;
on November 23rd, 1991 in Smokovljani, Pero Katičić and Niko Katičić;
on November 24th, 1991 in Riđica, Marko Ivanović;
in November 1991, day undetermined, Niko Baljković;
on December 3rd, 1991 in Ošalj, Katica Milovčić;
on December 6th, 1991 in Dubrovnik Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Fran Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Sjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić, Teo Paskojević;
on December 8th, 1991 by air attack in Topolo, nedjeljko Cvjetković;
on January 12th, 1992 in Lisac, Rade Ljubišić;
on March 30th, 1992 in Lopud, Petar Dubelj;
on April 16th, 1992 in Orsula, Stjepan Gorek;
on April 21st, 1992 in Metković, Anđelka Romović, Ankica Buljubašić and Anđa Ilić;
on May 10th, 1992 in Opuzen, Mladen Bjeliš;
on May 21st, 1992 in Zaton, Bosiljka Jovanka Doer;
on May 22nd, 1992 in Mokošica, Branko Bukvić;
on May 31, 1992 in Postrana, Ljubica Sliško;
on June 3rd, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Božo Bratičević;
on June 4th, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Stjepan Guzzel;
on June 6th, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Lukša Tomić;
on June 8th, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Mario Đerek;
on June 29th, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Antun Kisić, Luka Lukšić, Miho Tomičić, Milo Brajević and Mara Knego;
on June 25th, 1992 Stjepan Kralj;
on July 14th, 1992 in Dubrovnik, Jovanka Popović;
on August 30, 1992 in Orašac, Vlaho Rakidžija;
in September 1992, day undetermined, in Močići, Stjepo Kovačić;
on October 20th, 1992 in Trebinje, Marko Mišić:
on October 21s,t 1992, in Stravča, Božo Raše and Kata Raše;
Josip Glavinić;
Anica Pandža.

-partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Smokovljani, Ošlje, Banići, Podimoč, Trnovica, Točionik, Lisac, Visočani, Smokvina, Doli, Čepikuće, Rudine, Komolac, Mokošica, Šumet, Pobrežje, Petrovo Selo, Zaton, Orašac, Brsečine, Gromača, Kliševo, Mrčevo, Bosanka, Žarkovica, Brgat, Župa Dubrovačka, Soline, Plat, Obod, Cavtat causing large scale damages and forced displacement of 13000 residents and destroyed the Čilipi airport completely and took equipment and vehicles in the value of 10,500,000.00 Deutch Marks, and from ACI marina in Komolac took and transfered to Montenegro 40 yachts and burned tens of vehicles,
thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the attack with no selection of goals which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated, he omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,
committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC

Miodrag Jokić is indicted that:
during the period from October 8th, 1991 until May 8th, 1992 in Kumbor - Republic of Monte Negro, ranked as vice admiral, commander of the Ninth Army Naval Sector within the Second Operational unit of ex JNA and 4 Military Zone of ex JNA formed by the ex JNA Headquarters with a goal to attack from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to Neretva river, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia, commanded the following units within the 9th Army Naval Sector: the 3/5 Motorised Brigade (mtbr) , 3rd Light Brigade, Territorial Defence Department of Trebinje, 107 Coastal Artillery Group, 3/472 mtbr, Territorial Defence Units of Monte Negro, from October 25th to November 20th, 1991 472 mtbr, to follow the existing plan of the Second Operational Group of the ex JNA and attack parts of Konavle from the Adriatic motorway to the sea and Župa Dubrovačka, hinterland of the city of Dubrovnik, Rijeka Dubrovačka, Mokošica and Dubrovnik coast up to Zaton, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under his command excessively and with no selection of targets with artillery weapons and mine throwers, shelled populated villages and killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civilian, culture and business objects, loot them and

set on fire thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12, 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as he did, he supported such behaviour, allowing units under his superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under his command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from firearms and army ships, artillery and infantry weapons killed 56 civilians:
on October 8th 1991, in village Cavtat, Niko Srgota and Lovro Guljelmović;
on October 15h 1991 in Čilipi, Stjepo Škobelja;
on October 17h 1991 in Zavrelj, Pavo Klešković;
on October 21 1991 in Mlini, Stjepo Lonza, Pero Elezović and Ilija Duper;
on October 23rd 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 24th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 26th 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Prčan and Ana Prčan;
on October 26rd 1991 in Vrbica, Kata Tepšić;
on November 2nd 1991 in Sustjepan, Frane Šaban, Maris Šaban, Mara Šaban, Katarina Gunjin, Hrvoje Gunjin;
on November 4th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Andra Đuraš;
on November 9th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Antun Lang, Marin Lučić, Luca Spremić;
on November 10, 1991 in Dubrovnik, Jovo Vasiljević, Ivan Radić, Dubravko Ševelja, Đuro Bokun, Marija Burum, Ivo Martinović, Niko Čupić and Nikica Čupić;
on November 11 1991 in Dubrovnik Đuro Perak, Petar Sambrailo, Andrija Rašica, Nikola Krijes, Cvijeta Kisa and Iva Bokun;
on November 12th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Emilije Jurica;
on November 15th 1991 in Stravča, Niko Veramenta;
on November 16th 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Urljević;
on November 20th 1991 in Mokošica, Zdenko Gavrić;
on November 21st 1991 in Mokošica, Mate Čeović and Vid Žitković;
on November 24th 1991 in Riđica, Marko Ivanović;
in November 1991, day undetermined, in Petrovo Selo Niko Baljković;
on December 6th 1991 in Dubrovnik Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Fran Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Sjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić, Teo Paskojević;
on March 30th 1992 in Lopud, Petar Dubelj;

on April 16th 1992 in Orsula, Stjepan Gorek.

partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Komolac, Mokošica, Šumet, Pobrežje, Petrovo Selo, Zaton, Orašac, Gromača, Kliševo, Mrčevo, Bosanka, Žarkovica, Brgat, Župa dubrovačka, Soline, Plat, Obod, Cavtat causing large scale damages and forced displacement of 8917 residents and from ACI marina in Komolac took and sailed to Montenegro 40 yachts while tens of vehicles were burned,

thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,

committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC

Branko Stanković is indicted that:

during the period from October 4th until October 21h 1991 in village Debelo Brdo - Bosnia and Herzegovina, ranked as general major and commander of the Second Tactical group of ex JNA within the Second Operational group of ex JNA formed by the ex JNA Headquarters in September with a goal to attack from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Monte Negro, and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to Neretva river, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia, issued orders to the following subordinated units -1st Partisan Brigade of the Territorial Defence of Monte Negro, 2nd Partisan Brigade of the Territorial Defence of Monte Negro, had 122mm, MBb 120mm, 3/5 pmtbr, Tank Squad, Mechanized Squad, to follow the existing plan of the Second Operational Group of the ex JNA and attack parts of Konavle from the Adriatic motorway to the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under his command excessively and unselectively with artillery weapons and mine throwers, shelled populated villages, killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civil, culture and business objects, loot them and set on fire thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August

12 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he was obligated to do so he omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as he did, supported such behaviour, allowing units under his superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under his command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from artillery and infantry weapons killed 10 civilians:
on October 3rd/4th 1991 in village Uskoplje, Ivan Miljanić;
on October 5th 1991 in village Zvekovica, Drago Miklaušić;
on October 5th 1991 in village Lovorno, Niko Muja;
on October 7th 1991, in village Zvekovica, Branko Dragišić, Antun Mišić and Ilija Šaravanja;
on October 8th 1991, in village Cavtat, Niko Srgota and Lovro Guljelmović;
on October 15h 1991 in Čilipi, Stjepo Škobelja;
on October 17h 1991 in Zavrelj, Pavo Klešković.

partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Ljuta, Gruda, Zastolje, Kuna, Komaje, Lovorno, Pridvorje, Mihanići, Drvenik, Gabrile, Uskoplje, Čilipe, Močiće, Zvekovica, Obod, Duba, Plat causing large scale damages and forced displacement of 3649 residents, and destroyed the Čilipi airport completely, and took from there equipment and vehicles in the value of 10,500,000 Deutch Marks.

thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians, to kill the killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,
committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC
Obrad Vičić and Radovan Komar are indicted that:

during the period from October 1st 1991 until the beginning of June 1992 in the village Veličani and Cerovac in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Obrad Vičić ranked as a colonel and commander of the 472 mtbr of ex JNA and Radovan Komar ranked as major and head of Headquarters, and Deputy commander of the same brigade which was from October 1st 1991 until October 25th 1991 under direct command of the Second Operational group of ex JNA formed by the JNA Headquarters in July 1991 with a goal to attack from the territory of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Monte Negro and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to the river Neretva, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia and from October 25th to November 20th 1991 under the command of the Ninth Army Naval Sector, and aftewards under command of the Second Corps (Podgorički) of ex JNA, issued orders to 1/472 mtbr, 2/472 mtbr, 3/472 mtbr i 4/472 mtbr to follow orders of the Second Operational unit of ex JNA and 9 Army Naval Sector of the ex JNA and attack parts of Dubrovnik hinterland from the direction of Trebinje towards Brgat, Dubrovnik, Mokošica and Zaton, and regardless of the fact that they witnessed, while visiting the occupied areas, that units under their command excessively and unselectively, with artillery weapons and mine throwers, shelled villages, killing civilians who should be protected from any kind of violence originating from military operations, detained them, harassed and forced them to flee, and upon entrance into populated villages destroyed civil, cultural and business objects, looted them and set on fire, thus acting against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 1 and paragraph 2, items a, 27, 32, 33 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although they were obligated to do so, they omitted to perform actions in order to prevent such illegal behaviour and sanction the perpetrators, instead by behaving as they did, supported such behaviour, allowing units under their superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of such actions, so the presently unknown members of units under their command in the field and during the period previously mentioned, from artillery and infantry weapons killed 65 civilians:

on October 1st 1991 in village Osojnik, Mate Violić;

on October 5th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Milan Milišić and Rade Hasić - provjeriti spol ako je žensko onda treba pisati Rada;

on October 6th 1991, in village Komolac, Stjepo Čikat and Andrija Crnčević;

on October 7 1991 in front of the shelter in Mokošica, Ivo Maškarić, Alen Vasiljević, Vladimirka Dopsaj, Nikola Liban, Miho Liban, Joško Vuković, Jozo Brajović, Denis Ćimić and Miljenko Kulaš;

on October 23rd 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 24th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Grgur Vuletić;
on October 26th 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Prčan and Ana Prčan;
on October 26rd 1991 in Vrbica, Kata Tepšić;
on November 2nd 1991 in Sustjepan, Frane Šaban, Maris Šaban, Mara Šaban, Katarina Gunjin, Hrvoje Gunjin;
on November 4th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Andra Đuraš;
on November 9th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Antun Lang, Marin Lučić, Luca Spremić;
on November 10 1991 in Dubrovnik, Jovo Vasiljević, Ivan Radić, Dubravko Ševelja, Đuro Bokun, Marija Burum, Ivo Martinović, Niko Čupić and Nikica Čupić;
on November 11 1991 in Dubrovnik Đuro Perak, Petar Sambrailo, Andrija Rašica, Nikola Krijes, Cvijeta Kisa and Iva Bokun;
on November 12th 1991 in Dubrovnik, Emilije Jurica;
on November 16th 1991 in Osojnik, Luka Urljević;
on November 20th 1991 in Mokošica, Zdenko Gavrić;
on November 21st 1991 in Mokošica, Mate Čeović and Vid Žitković;
in November 1991, day undetermined, in Petrovo Selo, Niko Baljković;
on December 3rd 1991 in Ošalj, Katica Milovčić;
on December 6th 1991 in Dubrovnik Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Fran Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Sjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić, Teo Paskojević;
on January 12th 1992 in Lisac, Rade Ljubišić;
on March 30th 1992 in Lopud, Petar Dubelj;
on May 21st 1992 in Zaton, Bosiljka Jovanka Doer;
on May 22nd 1992 in Mokošica, Branko Bukvić.

partially destroyed, set on fire and looted villages Komolac, Mokošica, Šumet, Podbrežje, Petrovo Selo, Zaton, Orašac, Gromača, Kliševo, Mrčevo, Bosanka, Žarkovica, Brgat causing large scale damages and forced displacement of 3007 residents

thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although they were obligated to do so, they omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, to forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although they were obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments,

committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime

described and punishable by the Article 130. paragraph 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC

Vladimir Kovačević is indicted for:

on June 6 1991 at 06.00 o clock, ranked as the Captain of the First Class, the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 472 Motorised Brigade of ex JNA, under direct command of the 9th Army Naval Sector commanded by Admiral Miodrag Jokić while the units within the Second Operational group of ex JNA attacked and partially occupied the Dubrovnik area all with a purpose to annex the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to river of Neretva to the so-called Great Serbia, contrary to the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 2a, 27, 32 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), ordered units under his direct command to perform an artillery and mortar attack from the Žarkovica hill and other locations above Dubrovnik, on the historical centre of the Old City of Dubrovnik, which is, as a whole, under the UNESCO protection from 1979 and is a monument of zero category and was adequately marked as such with UNESCO identification symbols, as an act of revenge for the death of several soldiers who died in their attempt to conquer the Fort Srđ above Dubrovnik, as a consequence, units under his direct command, executing his orders fired thousands of grenades at the city of Dubrovnik by 16,30hours, and several hundred grenades at the historical centre of the Old City of Dubrovnik, in which he himself participated and fired several projectiles using mine throwers, on which occasion from the artillery and mortar attack on the historical centre of Dubrovnik that day following persons got killed: Tonči Skočko, Pavo Urban, and in other parts of Dubrovnik: Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Frano Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Stjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić, Teo Paskojević, more civilians were heavily injured, while in the historical centre of the Old City of Dubrovnik - a monument of zero category, the pallaces in the Sigurate 1 street, Sigurate 2 street, Martinušić Palace in the St. Joseph street 1, Pallace in the Puč 11 street, Sorkočević Palace in Miha Pracata street 6, Đorđić - Maineri Pallace in the Široka 5 street burned to the ground, and Pallace Sponza, Knežev dvor, Stay, Gučetić, Bošković house, Pallaces in the Miha Pracata street 3 and 11, Franciscan monastery, Dominican monastery, St. Vlaho church, Sigurate church, Cathedral, St. Clare's monastery, St. Mary monastery with the church, orthodox church, Sinagogue and the church of St. Joseph were partially damaged, and several hundreds of houses and objects were damaged,

therefore, in breach of international law during an armed conflict, he ordered an attack on civilians, settlements and certain civil objects which resulted with death, heavy bodily injuries, unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting heavy bodily injuries, destruction of property on

a large scale unjustified by military purposes and breaching the rules of international law during the armed conflict destroyed cultural and historical monuments under special protection of the international law,
committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130 paragraph 2 and in relation to paragraph 1 of BCCRC
Milan Zec is indicted for:
on December 6th 1991 ranked as the battleship captain, head of the headquarters of the 9th Army Naval Sector of ex JNA wich had superior authority ofer the 3rd battalion of the 472 motorised brigade, together with the commander of this battalion captain of first class Vladimir Kovačević, while the units within the Second Operational group of ex JNA were attacking and partially occupying the Dubrovnik area, and all with the purpose of annexing the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to the river of Neretva to the so-called Great Serbia, was present on the combat position Žarkovica located immediately above Dubrovnik when units under his command, following orders of Vladimir Kovačević, executed the artillery and mortar attack to the city of Dubrovnik and the historical centre of the Old City of Dubrovnik, which is, as a whole, under UNESCO protection from 1979 and is a monument of zero category and was as such adequately marked with UNESCO identification symbols, and regardless of the fact that he witnessed that the wider area of Dubrovnik and the Historical Centre of Dubrovnik is being shelled according to the orders of Vladimir Kovačević, without any cause, and that civilian population is being killed and monuments destroyed and that this is against the provisions of the Article 3, paragraph 1, items 2a, 27, 32 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), contrary to the provisions of the Article 86 and 87 of the of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), although he should have and could, he ommited to do anything in order to prevent such illegal behaviour of the accused Vladimir Kovačević, instead by behaving as he did, supported such behaviour, allowing units under their superior authority to continue such activities and agreed to the consequences of the artillery and mortar shelling of Dubrovnik and the Old City of Dubrovnik, and during which in the historical centre of Dubrovnik following civilians were killed: Tonči Skočko, Pavo urban, and in other parts of Dubrovnik: Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Frano Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Stjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić, Teo Paskojević, more civilians were heavily injured, while in the historical centre of the Old City of Dubrovnik - a monument of zero category

the pallaces in the Sigurate 1 street, Sigurate 2 street, Martinušić Palace in the St. Joseph street 1, Pallace in the Puč 11 street, Sorkočević Palace in Miha Pracata street 6, Đorđić - Maineri Pallace in the Široka 5 street burned to the ground, and Pallace Sponza, Knežev dvor, Stay, Gučetić, Bošković house, Pallaces in the Miha Pracata street 3 and 11, Franciscan monastery, Dominican monastery, St. Vlaho church, Sigurate church, Cathedral, St. Clare's monastery, St. Mary monastery with the church, orthodox church, Sinagogue and the church of St. Joseph were partially damaged, and several hundreds of houses and objects were damaged,

thus, breaching the rules of the international law in war time, although he was obligated to do so, he omitted to prevent it and in the manner already described supported the unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting severe bodily injuries, inhumane treatment, forced displacement, looting of their property and unlawful and arbitrary destruction of property on a large scale which was not justified by military purposes, and breaching the rules of the international law during war time, although he was obligated, omitted to prevent destruction of cultural and historical monuments

committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130 and in relation to Article 1. of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC

Zoran Gvozdenović is indicted for:

in the period from October 1st 1991 until November 20th 1991 as the commander of the battleship number 403 which belongs to a group of several war ships togehter with ground and airforce units of ex JNA under the command of the Second Operational group of ex JNA formed by the JNA Headquarters in July 1991 with a goal to attack from the territory of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Monte Negro and occupy the territory of Republic of Croatia from Prevlaka to the river Neretva, and banish the citizens of Croatian nationality and to annex this territory to the so-called Great Serbia and whose units have executed an attack on the area of Dubrovnik from the border with Monte Negro up to Ston, including the City of Dubrovnik, contrary to the Article 3, paragraph 1, item 2a, 27, 32 and 53 of the Geneva convention for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, from August 12 1949, and especially contrary to the provisions of the Article 51, 52, 53, 54 and 75 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), had ordered that from the cannons placed on the battleship mentioned, several thousands of 57mm grenades be fired on populated settlements in the area of Ponte Oštro to Trsteno, aiming Cavtat, Župa Dubrovačka, Zaton, Trsteno, hotel Croatia, hotel Belveder, hotel Plakir, Tirena and Minčeta where refugees were situated and the wider area of the City of Dubrovnik and the Old City of Dubrovnik which is, as a whole, under UNESCO protection since

1979 and is a monument of zero category and as such was adequately marked with UNESCO identification symbols, and due to the attacks of the aggressor army the population of this area became refugees while numerous civil and business objects, as well as cultural monuments suffered great destruction and damage, and a larger number of civilians was killed or heavily wounded therefore, in breach of international law during an armed conflict, he ordered an attack on civilians, settlements and certain civil objects which resulted with death, heavy bodily injuries, unselective attack which hit the civilians killing them and inflicting heavy bodily injuries, destruction of property on a large scale unjustified by military purposes and breaching the rules of international law during the armed conflict destroyed cultural and historical monuments under special protection of the international law.

committing by that a crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilian population, a crime described and punishable by Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, a crime described and punishable by the Article 130 and in relation to Article BCCRC

I therefore suggest the following:

1. to set up a date for the main hearing at the County Court in Dubrovnik;
2. to summon the defendants Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski, Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokić, Branko Stanković, Obrad Vičić, Radovan Komar, Vladimir Kovačević, Milan Zec and Zoran Gvozdenović to the main hearing;
3. to summon and question as witnesses at the main hearing Ahmet Ališani (file page 61-63), Patricija Veramenta (file page 96, 739), Ivan Kulaš (file page 99-102 and 118-120), Perica Leko (file page 147-148), Ivica Barkidžija (file page 235), Vlado Dolački (file page 264), Nojko Marinović (file page 354-356, 1872-1878), Andrija Jakić (file page 357), Željko Soldo (file page 381), Jure Mrkonjić (file page 671), Miho Trojan (file page 672), Pero Glavić (file page 673), Antun Cvjetković (674), Antun Brailo (file page 675), Mijo Đuho (676), Filip Zadre (file page 677), Ivo Čeović (file page 679), Slavko Natrlin (file page 680), Đuro Bukarica (file page 681), Metodije Prkačin (file page 682), Kristo Bratičević (file page 684), Niko Kisić (file page 685), Ivo Katušić (file page 688), Đuro Banović (file page 689), Božo Deranja (file page 690), Božo Kralj (file page 691), Niko Miljanić (file page 692), Ivan Ćuk (file page 700), Pero Brailo (file page 701), Mato Strujić (file page 702), Antun Laptalo (file page 703), Mijo Jaganjac (file page 704), Andrija Mikić (file page 705), Mato Dragić (file page 706), Davor Bulatović (file page 854-856), Sinša Novak (file page 1146), Nikola Obuljen (file page 1180-1182), Ivo Šimunović (file page 1184-1186), Živko Tolić (file page 1189-1191), Denis Orlić (file page 1194-1196), Milivoj Petković (file page 1203-1205), Pero Bronzan (file page 1259-1260), Božo Goravica (file page 1261-1263), Miho Bokarica (file page 1265-1268), Tonći Kordić (file page 1276), Ivo Vujnović (file page 1279-1282), Davor Vlahović (strna spisa 1288), Milorad Pantelić (file page 1298-1300),

Ilija Ucović (file page 1540-1542), Snježana Klešković (file page 1543-1546), Petar Duper (file page 1547-1548), Jele Miljanić (file page 1549-1551), Smiljan Šetko (file page 1554-1556), Dean Njegovan (file page 1559), Tihomor Milovanović (file page 1581-1583), Mato Katičić (file page 1586-1588), Miho Katičić (file page 1589-1591), Pero Špilj (file page 1592-1594), Ivo Butigan (file page 1595-1597), Niko Miljević (file page 1598-1600), Mario Bazdan (file page 1601-1602), Pero Kraljević (file page 1603-1605), Andrija Glumac (file page 1606-1608), Zoran Mrša (file page 1609-1610), Marko Knežić (file page 1615-1617), Ivo Sibiljan (file page 1618-1620), Božidar Đivović (file page 1621-1622), Nikola Milić (file page 1623-1624), Miho Radić (file page 1625-1626), Ivo Stojanović (file page 1627-1628), Ivo Kraljević (file page 1629-1630), Antun Klis (file page 1631-1632), Nikola Jelić (file page 1633-1635), Đuro Mage (file page 1636-1637), Mato Andrijašević (file page 1638-1639), Željko Štrbinić (file page 1640-1642), Ivo Smokvina (file page 1643-1644), Luka Pleština (file page 1645-1646), Ivan Milišić (file page 1805), Marko Čoić (file page 1807-1809), Mario Gleđ (file page 1810-1812), Ivo Bačić (file page 1813-1815), Vlaho Kristović (file page 1816-1818), Antun Bonić (file page 1819-1821), Andrija Lučić (file page 1822-1824), Ane Matrljan (file page 1825-1827), Jerko Ivanković (file page 1828-1830), Boro Radulović (file page 1831-1833), Rafo Violić (file page 1834-1836), Antun Moretić (file page 1837-1839), Luka Lazibat (file page 1840-1842), Nikola Tičić (file page 1843- 1845), Ilija Belemiečić (file page 1846-1848), Ivo Vuletić Vukasović (file page 1849-1851), Ivan Čeović (file page 1852-1854), Niko Buholov (file page 1857-1859), Ivan Hladika (file page 1861-1862), Luko Musladin (file page 1863-1865), Josip Novak (file page 1868-1869), Petar Perković (file page 28), Ante Jurjević (file page 30), Nikola Prižmić (file page 54), Siniša Bralić (file page 56, 88), Tihomir Erceg (file page 63), Željko Filičić (file page 75), Zdravko Baraba (file page 85), Ane Mišić from the village of Šilješki – municipality of Konavle, Niko Mišić from the village of Šilješki – municipality of Konavle, Nike Kušelj from Mikulići – municipality of Konavle;

4. to read the testimonies of the witnesses Adrien Stringer and Nojko Marinović given at the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, as well as the report on the military and professional aspects of responsibility of Pavle Strugar and Vladimir Kovačević for the breach of international military law, committed by units under their command in the course of 1991 in the Dubrovnik region, composed by Milovan Zorac for the needs of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, as well as Ivan Živogar, Marijan Ferenčak, Ivan Anić, at the main hearing;

5. to read and review the following at the main hearing:

official records of the Police Administration Dubrovnik (file page 15, 16, 18, 30, 32, 34, 38, 40, 178, 179, 182 - 184, 186-188, 192-194, 198-200, 201-202, 203, 204-219, 225- 228, 229, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538-539, 540, 541, 543, 546, 548-549, 550-552, 553 -554, 556, 557, 558, 561, 563-566, 568, 571-572, 574, 576, 578, 581-582, 584, 586, 589-590, 592, 594, 596, 598, 615, 616, 619, 620, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 634, 636, 638, 639, 641, 642, 866 -881,

882 – 910, 912 – 917, 918 – 921), official record of the Dubrovnik-Neretva Police Administration No. KU-404/3-62 as of 15th June 1992, and inspection reports of the Police Administration Dubrovnik (file page 544, as of 26th October 1992 and 547, as of 28th October 1992);
official record of the Maritime Police in Dubrovnik (file page 1235 -1236) ;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 224/91 as of 3rd October 1991;
on-site investigation report and report on the external examination of the body by the investigating judge of the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 225/91 as of 5th October 1991;
on-site investigation report and report on the external examination of the body by the investigating judge of the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 227/91 as of 6th October 1991;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 229/91 as of 6th October 1991;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 232/91 as of 8th October 1991;
on-site investigation report and report on the external examination of the body by the investigating judge of the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 249/91 as of 23rd October 1991;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 258/91 as of 2nd November 1991;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 259/91 as of 5th November 1991;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 266/91 as of 22nd November 1991;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 270/91 as of 13th November 1991 and 26th November 1991;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 274/91 as of 7th December 1991;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 58/92 as of 31st March 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 139/92 as of 4th June 1992;
on-site investigation report by the investigating judge of the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir Kir 140/92 as of 4th June 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 142/92 as of 5th June 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 144/92 as of 7th June 1992;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 189/92 as of 30th June 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 194/92 as of 2nd July 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Du-

brovnik No. Kir 206/92 as of 15th July 1992;
report on the external examination of human bones by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 219/92 as of 22nd July 1992;
on-site investigation report by the investigating judge of the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 259/92 as of 7th August 1992;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 267/92 as of 11th August 1992;
report on the external examination of the bodies by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 460/92 as of 25th October 1992;
report on the external examination of the body by the District Court in Dubrovnik No. Kir 530/92 as of 27th November 1992;
report on the autopsy by the Department of Pathology of the Clinical Hospital Centre Split No. SS-63/93 as of 8th June 1993,

data of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees - Government of the Republic of Croatia - Regional Centre Dubrovnik - on the number of displaced persons from the occupied Dubrovnik area, from specific locations;
medical documentation on the wounded civilians Stijepo Čikat, Kata Mihočević, Ana Labaš, Pero Bjeloš, Nada Grmoljez, Pavo Ucović, Deša Herceg, Pero Perić, Čedomir Lukšić, Marijan Arlović, Kata Djevojić, Ivo Banac, Niko Miličić, Ivan Guriš, Stjepan Milić, Vlaho Violić, Milan Nikolić, Mato Đović, Pero Bandžar, Milan Marković, Antun Miletić, Đuro Jozović, Milo Šarčević, Toni Šućur, Pero Selak, Periša Obradović, Vjera Duličić, Katica Puljizević, Anka Matuško, Mehmedalija Ibrahimović, Marija Čebulc, Marina Sukno, Stijepo Daničić, Stjepo Glavinić, Marija Djurić, Ramo Mehaković, Milivoj Petković, Miho Čupić, Jako Strujić, Đuro Lučić, Luka Maždin, Tonko Sudj, Vjeko Burum, Jela Burum, Mišo Miloslavić, Mirsad Đanović, Milenko Noković, Nada Putili, Mate Knego, Ana Sambrailo, Ivan Bokun, Mate Prkut, Ivo Avdić, Rade Kukuljica, Ivan Vlahović, Mate Jurković, Marija Marušić, Nino Perak, Miho Tomić, Adis Ćimić, Dragan Oberan, Vlaho Karužić, Ivica Ježić, Pero Vuletić, Spasoje Vukić, Ivanko Bogunović, Ivica Devičić, Ivo Vlaštica, Đuro Bijela, Mijo Tomić, Fran Martinović, Nikola Cvetinović, Mate Valjalo, Ćamil Husejnović, Marija Vojvoda, Katica Đurić, Đuro Kisić, Olga Čokljat, Ivica Šeman, Karlo Krijs, Goran Pivac, Antun Kalčić, Jelena Rončević, Mladen Čović, Milan Gudelj, Pero Miletić, Andro Butigan, Vojislav Fiorenini, Stjepan Majdak, Koviljka Kulaš, Nikša Ipšić, Danijela Lesandrić, Huso Ćatović, Niko Kljunak, Jozo Hapna, Jakov Bukva, Tonko Capurso, Vlaho Batinić, Milan Gudelj Velag, Vlaho Ljubenko, Nikša Ipša, Srđan Ivanović, Maro Đurković, Ivo Dubelj, Ivo Dedo, Stjepo Beatović, Miljenko Vuletić, Ivan Vlahović, Ema Trnčić, Miroslav Šarčević, Želimir Sudj, Pero Prokurica, Anamarija Pandža, Luca Klaić, Ana Mrdalo, Pero Martinović, Marija Djeković, Tripo Karužić, Mate Knego, Viktor Kralj, Davor Obradović, Dubravka Mikšić, Ana Miloslavić, Ivo Mihaljević, Slavko Lovrić, Milovan Nožica, Igor Koprivica, Nedjeljka Jerković, Mato Rašica, Ana Gangai, Pero Miletić, Ivo Sibljan, Leana Bianki, Jozefina Pavlović, Ivo Vlašica, Danijel Soldo, Irena Andjušić,

Niko Vukić, Nikola Andjušić, Goran Ucović, Nikša Fiorenin, Željko Prokurica, Nikolina Obradović, Nikola Pavlina, Cvijeto Dučić, Ante Čikat, Lenka Lukšić, Pavle Šmon, Niko Miličić, Nikola Kordić, Jagoda Šimunović;
the death notifications and death certificates of Mato Violić, Marin Lučić, Nikica Čupić, Marija Burum, Đuro Perak, Đura Bokun, Andrija Rašica, Petar Sambrailo, Emilio Jurica, Cvijeto Kisa, Josip Glavinić, Petar Dubelj, Vlaho Rakidžija, Ivan Puljizević, Kata Tepšić, Luka Prčan, Ana Prčan, Niko Baljković, Bosiljka Jovanka Doer;
Overview of the damaged objects, according to damage categories, for settlements in Župa Dubrovačka and Konavle as of 5th February 1993;
Overview of the damage on objects for the village of Šipanska Luka as of 5th February 1993 (file page 1242);
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik No. KU-1128/92 as of 12th November 1992 on war destruction on the locations Radovčići, Đurinići, Močići, Komaji, Poljice, Mikulići, Vitaljina, Popovići, Vodovađa, Čilipi, Dubac – service zone, the Kupari Military-Gastronomic Complex, Mišići, Hotel Mlini, Hotel Župa, Hotel Astarea, Kupari, Srebreno, Mlini, Postranje;
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik No. KU-707/92 as of 10th October 1992 on war destruction on the locations Hodilje, Slano, Česvinicu, Visočani, Doli, Ston, Broce, Slano, Grgurići, Mali Ston, Zamaslina, Majkovi, Dubravice, Uvala Janjska, Kručica, Slađenovići, Smokvina, Banići, Slano – Church of St. Jeremy, Trnovica, Konštari;
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik No. KU-1128/92 as of 11th November 1992 on war destruction of the Airport Čilipi and the locations Drvenik, Mihanići, Uskoplje, Gabrili, Palje Brdo, Dubravka, Komaji, Lovorno, Ljuta – Konavoski dvori, Gruda, Zastolje, Zvekovica, Pridvorje, Cavtat, Duboka Ljuta – Obod, Velji Dol, Brgat, Soline – Plat, Brotnice, Stravča, Duba;
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik on war destruction of the Old Town of Dubrovnik as of 6th December 1991;
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik on war destruction of the locations Sustjepan, Komolac, Rožat, Šumet, Osojnik, Nova Mokošica and Mali Zaton as of 6th August 1992;
photo documentation of the on-site investigation by the Police Administration Dubrovnik on war destruction of Stara Mokošica and Gromača as of 22nd September 1992;
photo documentation of civilian and military victims in the course of the Homeland War in the wider Dubrovnik region by the Dubrovnik-Neretva Police Administration No. 511-03-04-1,850/1-91-MR as of 1st October 1991, 23rd February 1992, 13th December 1992;
video recordings of the destroyed locations Pridvorje, Čilipi, Gruda, Komaji, Popovići, Lovorno, Močići, Brgat, Dubac, Dubrovnik, Zvekovica, Cavtat,

Obod, Plat, Mlini, Župa Dubrovačka, Srebreno, Kupri, Postranje, Zamaslina, Konštari, Mali Ston, Ston, Broce, Česvinica, Hodilje, Sustjepan, Čajkovići, Komolac, Šumet, Rožat, Pobrežje, Osojnik, Gromača, Trsteno, Majkovi, Dubravica, Slano, Grgurići, Slađanovići, Kručica, Banići, Smokvina, Doli, Lisac, Visočani, Smokovljani, Ošlje, Stupa, Topolo, Štedrica,Stara Mokošica, Nova Mokošica, Vitaljina, Đurinići, Molunat, Mikulići, Palje Brdo, Radovčići, Poljica, Ljuta, Zastolje, Uskoplje, Gabrile, Drvenik, Mihanići;
video recordings with the names "Attack on Konavle 1", „Attack on Konavle 2", „Konavle 1", „Konavle 2", „The War for Peace", „Serbian Attack on Konavle", „Dubrovnik on 6th December 1991" , five DVD-s „The Great War" by TV Montenegro;the list of war damages on cultural monuments on the area of Dubrovnik-Neretva County by the Administration for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia Class:612-08/97-01/09 as of 18th March 1998;
on-site investigation reports on the damages of cultural monuments, residential objects, as well as churches and monasteries in the Old Town of Dubrovnik;
the list of destroyed objects of the Roman Catholic Church in the area of the Dubrovnik Diocese,
the list of war damages on the Dubrovnik airport as of March 1993;
the radio journals of "Dubrovnik Radio" from 1st October 1991 to 10th August 1992,
the protest of the Croatian government minister Davorin Rudolf addressed to Lieutenant General Pavle Strugar because of the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6th December 1991;
war journal of the former JNA member Veseljko Koprivica, written on the Dubrovnik front, under the title "Everything Was Target";
the book by Veljko Kadijević "My View on the Break-up";
excerpt from the book "The Beginning of the End" by the defendant Jevrem Cokić;
final judgements of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague in the trials against the defendants Pavle Strugar and Miodrag Jokić;
report on the combat action of Miroslav Jovanović, commander of the 3/5 Infantry Motor Brigade, as of 6th December 1991, addressed to the command of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector;
Attack plan of former JNA units on the directions of Čapljina - Metković - Ploče and Trebinje - Dubrovnik as of 21st September 1991, signed by the Operational Group commander, Lieutenant Colonel General Jevrem Cokić;
the directive for the attack on the Dubrovnik area by the command of the 2nd Operational Group, TS No. 33-1 as of 28th September 1991, the directive for the attack TS No. 32-1 as of 29th September 1991 and the order by the command of the 2nd Operational Group, TS No. 108-1 as of 4th October 1991 to subordinate units on performing combat missions, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Jevrem Cokić;
the Decision on Further Actions by the command of the 2nd Operational

Group, TS No. 131-1 as of 6th October 1991, the order by the command of the 2nd Operational Group, TS No. 187-1 as of 9th October 1991, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Ružinovski;Decisions on Further Actions by the command of the 2nd Operational Group, addressed to subordinate units, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, TS No. 311-1, 292-1, 327-1, 351-1, 416-1, 250-1, 272-1, 438-1, 449-1, 462-1, 314-1, 325-1, 336-1, 343-1, 375-1, 444-1, 402-1, 466-1;

Order by the command of the 2nd Operational Group, TS No. 456-1 as of 25th October on the return of the 472nd Motor Brigade into the set-up of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar;

Command by the Commander of the 2nd Operational Group, Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, to the Command of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector, TS No. 825-1 as of 18th November 1991 on the continuation of the full maritime blockade of Dubrovnik;

Regular Combat Reports of the Command of the 4th Military District, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, TS No. 1009-1, 1032-1, 1044-1, 1049-1, 1057-1, 1057-2, 1066-1, 1073-1, 1096-1, 1218-1, 1260-1, 1270-1;

"Decisions on Further Actions" by the Command of the 4th Military District, signed by Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, TS No. 1010-1, 1029-1, 1045-1, 1157-1, 1215-1, 1236-1, 1261-1, 1334-1;

Decree No. 1/50 as of 8th October 1991 by the Presidency of the SFRY on the appointment of Viceadmiral Miodrag Jokić for the commander of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector;

"Combat Orders" by the commander of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector, Viceadmiral Miodrag Jokić, TS No. 27-64/46-1, 27-64/84, 27-64/80-175, 27-64/80-181, 27-64/80-192, 27-64/80-198, 27-64/80-202, 27-64/80-266, 27-64/80-327, 27-64/80-374;

Report on the operation of the 3/472 Motor Brigade on Srđ as of 6th December 1991, delivered by Viceadmiral Miodrag Jokić to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army;

Order by the commander of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector, combat ship Captain Krsto Đurović, No. 34-162 as of 21st September 1991 on the appointment of combat ship Captain Milan Zec as deputy commander of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector;

Combat order No. 1 on the attack on the Dubrovnik region by the commander of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector, combat ship Captain Krsto Đurović, TS No. 27-64/33 as of 1st October 1991

Report on the reception of duties by the head of the command headquarters of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector Milan Zec, signed by Viceadmiral Miodrag Jokić;

Combat orders by the head of the command headquarters of the 9th Military-Maritime Sector by the combat ship Captain Milan Zec, TS No. 27-64/35 as of 5th October 1991 and TS No. 19-21/273 as of 6th October 1991;

Regular combat reports, signed by Milan Zec as head of the headquarters of

the 9th Military-Maritime Sector No. 19-21/289, 27-64/80-78, 27-64/80-370, 27-64/80-81, 27-64/80-385, 27-64/80-374;
Order for Further Actions, signed by the commander of the 2nd Strategic Group, Major General Branko Stanković, TS No. 2-18 as of 8th October 1991;
Order for attack by the commander of the 2nd Tactical Group, Major General Branko Stanković as of 18th October 1991;Regular combat report by the commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, Colonel Obrad Vičić, TS No. 20-8 to 20-108;
Order for attack by the commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, Colonel Obrad Vičić, as of 29th September 1991 and 14th October 1991;
Decision by the commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, Colonel Obrad Vičić, TS No. 312-101 as of 13th May 1992;
Regular combat reports by deputy commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, Major Radovan Komar, TS No. 20-80, 20-142, 20-139, 20-81, 20-83, 81-4, 20-82, 132-4, 20-46;
Report by Major Radovan Komar, head of the 472nd Motor Brigade headquarters, as of 21st October 1991, on the malpractices, plunderings and violence of a group of soldiers and their superiors;
Letter by the Croatian War Navy Command OTG Dubrovnik Class: 035-01/93-01/88 as of 13th May 1993;
Notification by the Dubrovnik-Neretva Police Administration No. 511-03-04/02-2686/95 as of 25th September 1995;
Daily reports by the Police Administration Dubrovnik watch from 26th August 1991 to 6th January 1992;
Tabulation of the former JNA units which operated in the Dubrovnik area, composed by General Nojko Marinović (file page 1879) ;
List of ships and the damages caused on marine vehicles during the attacks of the former JNA on the Dubrovnik area, composed by the Dubrovnik Port Captaincy, as of 26th September 1997;
Data of the ACI Marina Miho Pracat in Komolac on stolen and damaged ships;
List by the Dubrovnik Port Captaincy - Branch Office Cavtat on damaged, stolen and destroyed marine vehicles;
6. to set detention for all defendants, pursuant to article 102, paragraph 1, items 1 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act and to issue a warrant;
Explanation:
The investigating judge of the County Court in Dubrovnik has conducted an investigation against the defendants Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski, Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokić, Branko Stanković, Obrad Vičić, Radovan Komar, Vladimir Kovačević, Milan Zec and Zoran Gvozdenović based on reasonable suspicion that they have committed the crimes as factually described and legally qualified in the dispositive part of this indictment.
In the course of the investigation, the defendants Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski, Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokić, Branko Stanković, Obrad Vičić,

Radovan Komar, Vladimir Kovačević and Milan Zec were not questioned, as their whereabouts are on unknown addresses outside of the Republic of Croatia and they are not available to our criminal prosecution bodies. By means of international legal aid, we have questioned the defendant Zoran Gvozdenović, who refused to state his defence or answer the questions asked, ie. he chose to defend himself by silence.

Against the defendants Pavle Strugar and Miodrag Jokić, criminal procedures were conducted by the International Tribunal in The Hague for the war crimes committed in the shelling of Dubrovnik on 6th December 1991 by the former JNA units, and in those cases, a valid sentence of unconditional prison was imposed. Therefore, the defendants Pavle Strugar and Miodrag Jokić are not charged for this event in this indictment.

With regard of the defendant Vladimir Kovačević, nicknamed Rambo, commander of the 3rd battalion of the 472nd Motor Brigade, charged with the shelling of Dubrovnik on 6th December 1991, the International Criminal Tribunal has ceded criminal prosecution to the War Crimes Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Serbia, which indicted the above named for war crimes against the civilian population on 26th July 2007, based on article 142, paragraph 2 , in relation with paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in relation with article 22 of the Criminal Act of the FRY. There was no first instance judgement in this case, nor has a main hearing been set up at this point, for reasons of the alleged mental illness of the defendant. Thus, this criminal procedure represents no obstruction to conduct a criminal procedure against him in the Republic of Croatia.

Before stating the facts which lead us to believe that during the attack of the former JNA, war crimes have been committed in the Dubrovnik area, we deem it necessary to briefly describe the circumstances prior to the attack of the former JNA and the goal of that attack.

In the course of 1991, the referendums on independence conducted in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia lead to the break-up of former Yugoslavia. The referendum in the Republic of Croatia showed Croatia's wish for independence. Thus, on 21st June 1991, the Croatian Parliament reached the decision on the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia, and on 8th October 1991, the Republic of Croatia declared its independence.

Before the attack of the former JNA on the Republic of Croatia, the Presidency of Yugoslavia had control over the armed forces of the former JNA and the territorial defence of Yugoslavia, and before the declaration of independence of the Republic of Croatia, the former JNA units attacked the city of Vukovar with armed forces, under the pretence of defending the Serbs in Croatia from the "Ustasha regime", aided by the propaganda of the Greater-Serbian nationalists, who claimed that Yugoslavia could only fall apart in the way that all territories of former Yugoslavia with Serbian population would become part of the Republic of Serbia. That was the excuse for the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, after its break-up.

According to the latest population census, there were less than 5% Serbs in

the Dubrovnik area, and their rights were by no means threatened. For this reason, the attack of the former JNA units on this area was justified by the attack of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia on Montenegro, with the intention of conquering the Boka Kotorska Bay. Thus, on 1st October 1991, in the Montenegro Government headquarters, the defendant Pavle Strugar, the then-commander of the Montenegro Territorial Defense, along with the President of Montenegro, Momir Bulatović, announced that Montenegro had been attacked, ie. that around 30 000 Ustashas were ready to attack Montenegro. At the same time, the head of the Trebinje Municipality Assembly, Božidar Vučurević, announced by mass media that the Trebinje municipality area had been attacked by the Croatian forces and that the former JNA had to counter-attack.

The facts that all the heavy weaponry remained under the control of the former JNA units, that the Republic of Croatia was under an international embargo on the import of weapons and that the National Guard Corps was at that time armed only with light infantry weapons, prove that the allegations were common lies. Even though the military reports of the former JNA from 1991 state that around 30,000 armed Croatian soldiers were stationed in the Dubrovnik area and thus represented a security threat for Montenegro, it is indisputable that the allegations were lies used in an attempt to justify the attack on the Republic of Croatia, but also for propaganda purposes, in order to motivate the citizens of Montenegro and Serbia for war. The intelligence services of the former JNA most definitely knew how small the number of Croatian soldiers in this area was and what their weaponry was like.

According to the documentation of the Croatian Armed Forces, the witness testimony of the Croatian Army General Nojko Marinković, commander of the South Front, as well as the European Community observers, who had been situated in Dubrovnik and have given a testimony to the International Criminal Tribunal, the armed forces had only approximately 700 members of the National Guard Corps, armed with light infantry weapons, with a couple of mortars and small-calibre cannons, distributed over the 75 kilometres long area from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, at the time of the attack by the former JNA on the Dubrovnik region.

Therefore, the motive for the attack of the former JNA on the Republic of Croatia, ie. the Dubrovnik region, was neither the security threat to the Serbian population in this area, nor the attack of the Republic of Croatia on Montenegro, ie. the municipality of Trebinje, but solely the idea of Greater-Serbian nationalists to create the so-called Greater Serbia, which would also encompass the Dubrovnik region, by occupying parts of the Republic of Croatia after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

This was the goal of the attack of the former JNA on the Dubrovnik region, which started on 1st October 1991. The war activity and occupation of this region lasted until 26th October 1992, when the former JNA units withdrew from the occupied area in consequence of attacks by the Croatian Army and the pressure of the International Community. The former JNA had all loca-

tions from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, ie. the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, under occupation, except the city of Dubrovnik.
During the investigation procedure, many witnesses, participants of the war events in the Dubrovnik area, were questioned, and the International Criminal Tribunal procured the documentation of the former JNA on the units which operated in this area, their commanders, the combat orders they issued and the weaponry of the units. Also, the testimonies by witnesses questioned by the International Criminal Tribunal, the expert analysis of Major General Milovan Zorac, the reports on on-site investigations of damages on cultural monuments, religious and residential objects in the Old Town, reports on the damages caused in the areas of Sustjepan, Pobrežaj, Mokošica, video recordings of the on-site investigations of 74 locations from the Montenegrin border to Pelješac, which had been occupied and demolished by the former JNA, photo documentations of the on-site investigations of the 30 most demolished locations in the Dubrovnik area, data on the destroyed and stolen marine vehicles in the Miho Pracat Marina in Komolac, list of damages at the Dubrovnik airport in Čilipi, journal of the shelling of the Dubrovnik area from 1st October 1991 to 26th May 1992, amateur video recordings of the shelling of Dubrovnik, video tapes of Montenegrin television shows on the war activity of the former JNA in the Dubrovnik area, official records, ie. reports on on-site investigations of the deaths of civilians, autopsy reports and reports on the external examinations of murdered persons, medical documentation on the civilian victims from the Dubrovnik region, photo documentation of murdered civilians, as well as the list of displaced persons from the occupied areas, were procured. Books by the defendant Jevrem Cokić, "The Beginning of the End", the journalist Veseljko Koprivica "Everything was Target", Veljko Kadijević "My View on the Break-Up" and Vojislav Beloić "The Prevlaka of Herceg Novi", were also procured.
Nojko Marinković, Ahmet Ališani, Ivan Kulaš and Željko Soldo testified on the situation in the former JNA immediately before and during the attack on the Republic of Croatia.
During the investigation procedure, but also at the International Criminal Tribunal, the Croatian Army General Nojko Marinković gave a detailed testimony, which depicted the situation in the former JNA immediately prior to the attack on the Dubrovnik area and the organization, numbers and weaponry of the Croatian Army at the time of the attack of the former JNA on this area. The above named had been an active military person in the service of the former JNA for more than 20 years, until 17th September 1991, when he went over to the Croatian Army. His last service had been in Trebinje, where he was commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, and also commander of the Trebinje garrison, encompassing the area from the river of Neretva to Montenegro. That was one of the best elite brigades in the former JNA. In 1991, he noticed that men of Serbian nationality were handed out weapons in the Herzegovina region, while most of the former JNA officers, in service in Trebinje, often communicated and cooperated with Serbian politicians, such as the

head of the Trebinje Municipality Assembly Božidar Vučurević, and others. From their reactions, as well as the facts that the mobilisation of reserves from the wider area of Trebinje had been initiated, and that the restructuring of personnel in the former JNA represented the begin of the implementation of Greater-Serbian policy, he gained the impression that an attack on the Dubrovnik region was under preparation. Thus, he decided to leave the JNA and go over to Dubrovnik on 17th September 1991. Upon arrival in Dubrovnik, he noticed that the city was utterly defenceless and reported to the Crisis Management Committee of the city of Dubrovnik. Along with them, he took the most basic actions to organize the defence of the area. There was only one Battalion of the National Guard Corps in Dubrovnik by that time, with 87 members, while there were similar units in the areas of Neretva and Korčula. The only unit with a high level of training was the Special Police Unit with 37 members. When he was appointed deputy commander for South Dalmatia, he persuaded some other officers of the former JNA, of Croatian nationality, to go over to the side of the Croatian Armed Forces, after which he put efforts in procuring weapons, in order to organize the defence of the Dubrovnik region more effectively. On the day of the attack, ie. 1st October 1991, there was a total of 670 soldiers in the Dubrovnik area, consisting of members of the National Guard Corps, Ministry of the Interior as well as mobilised people. They were distributed along the border, in a 75 kilometres long area. Besides the infantry weapons, they had four 85 mm calibre cannons, two anti-tank cannons, two mortars of the 120 mm calibre and 13 mortars of the 82 mm calibre. The weapons were also distributed over the 75 kilometres long area. With regards to their weaponry, the Croatian forces could not even think of provoking the former JNA, who only waited for an attack motive, especially as there were around 36 howitzers, 60 heavy mortars, 240 bazookas, 60 anti-aircraft cannons and 44 tanks in the former JNA units that attacked Dubrovnik. Apart from that, the forces that attacked Dubrovnik also had the air support of squadrons from Mostar, Tivto and Podgorica, three missile and two patrol ships, as well as three batteries of earth-sea missiles with an 80 kilometre-range. Predicting the location from which the attack on the Dubrovnik region would ensue, he distributed his units along the whole front line, while 150 men were distributed around the very city of Dubrovnik, armed with light infantry weapons of the former Dubrovnik Territorial Defence, mostly M-48 rifles. After the former JNA units occupied Konavle and Župa Dubrovačka, ie. the region east of Dubrovnik, most members of the Croatian Army, along with the weaponry, withdrew to the wider area around the city of Dubrovnik. He categorically points out that there was no heavy weaponry within the city walls for the whole duration of the war, and that he had strictly banned the setting up of those in the proximity of the Old Town and the hospital. He had issued the order that UNESCO flags be hanged on the Old Town walls, a culture monument. The flags remained there for the whole duration of the war. In this way, he avoided that the Old Town became a military target and enabled the Dubrovnik citizens to find shelter there. According to his orders, no heavy

weaponry was allowed at a distance closer than a couple hundred meters from the Old Town walls, and there was therefore no reason to shell the Old Town as a military target. The attacks on the Old Town were by no means provoked by the Croatian side, and they were performed along with the infantry attack by the former JNA units on the positions of the Croatian army on the mountain of Srđ, because the former JNA wanted to conquer the mountain and the Imperial fortress at any price, for that would have enabled them to gain a view over the whole of Dubrovnik from that position. Therefore, he directed all the artillery situated in the proximity of the Old Town towards Srđ, in order to be able to open fire on the former JNA units in case of an attack, thus improving the position of the Srđ defenders. The heaviest shelling of the Old Town took place on 6th December 1991. On his opinion, it could never have taken place without the knowledge of the supreme military commanders of the 2nd Operational Group, because it lasted all day and it was of too much significance for the former JNA, to be kept silent even before the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav army. He points out to have overheard a conversation of the defendant Admiral Jokić, who said at one point: "I don't know why we needed this, who is going to explain it to that fool", by which he probably meant General Adžić - Chief of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav army.

The witness Ahmet Ališani, who was questioned in the course of the investigation, stated to have been appointed commander of the background battalion of the 472th Motor Brigade in Trebinje as active military person before the war. After the brigade was abandoned by its commander Nojko Marinković, the defendant Colonel Obrad Vičić became commander, and the defendant Major Radovan Komar his deputy. The defendant 1st class Captain Vladimir Kovačević was commander of the third battalion of the 472nd Motor Brigade, who operated from the areas of Ivanica, Brgat, Bosanka, Čajković and Žarkovica. He has knowledge that the Dubrovnik littoral and the village of Slano was conquered by the Montenegrin brigades, and when he arrived in Slano in November 1991, 90% of its houses had been destroyed, and almost all of the population from all of the surrounding villages, as well as Slano itself, apart from a small number of senior citizens, had escaped. Upon arrival of the 472nd Motor Brigade to the Dubrovnik littoral, the burning down of houses and the plundering continued, mostly performed by members of the military police, while no one took efforts to prevent them. The military police was under the authority of the defendant Radovan Komar, deputy commander of the 472nd Motor Brigade, and all of the described events took place with his silent consent. During the occupation of the Dubrovnik littoral by the 472nd Motor Brigade, the complete equipment from the Mironj quarry was dismantled and transferred to Titograd, while all of the motor fuel present was also taken away. Apart from that, the soldiers had also pillaged all of the inventory from the elementary school and the hotel "Admiral" in Slano.

The former active military person in service in the former JNA Ivan Kulaš was questioned in the course of the investigation. He stated to have been in the 472nd Motor Brigade prior to the beginning of the war. Performing the func-

tion of cryptographer, he was in command of his department. When the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nojko Marinković, joined the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, he was first replaced by the defendant Radovan Komar, and subsequently by the defendant Obrad Vičić. While the defendant Radovan Komar was commander of the brigade, he often said that all Croatians should be liquidated, along with all the persons who disagreed with the JNA policy. Being Croatian, he was dismissed from the position of commander, as they did not trust him. When he first arrived in Slano, he saw that the whole village had been demolished and burnt down, that the houses had been plundered and there were scattered objects and furniture on the streets. While he was in Trebinj, he listened to Božidar Vučurević on radio and television several times, who always repeated that Dubrovnik was a Serbian city, and after the attack on the Dubrovnik area began, Radio Trebinje informed the citizens that the Ustasha forces had attacked the municipality of Trebinje, and thus the former JNA was only performing a counter-attack.

The witness Željko Soldo, who was a deputy commander of the 3rd battalion within the 472nd motorised brigade during the aggression of the former JNA on the territory of Dubrovnik, i.e. of the defendant Vladimir Kovačević who ordered the bombardment of the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991, was convicted with finality at the County Court in Dubrovnik for an act of war crime against the civilian population, with a ten-year sentence. Obviously due to this, when giving a statement to the County Prosecution in Mostar, where he was questioned as a witness, he stated to have no knowledge about the attack on Dubrovnik. However, he was also questioned as a witness at the International Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. In the statement provided there, he described the functions he had in the 3rd battalion within the 472nd motorised brigade of the former JNA, and the commander in charge of this brigade. According to his statement, before the attack on Dubrovnik, the 3rd battalion within the 472nd motorised brigade of the former JNA was withdrawn from the 472ndmotorised brigade and put under direct command of the 9th military maritime sector under admiral Jokić. Information about the defendant Vladimir Kovačević indicates that he often socialised with admiral Miodrag Jokić and general Pavle Strugar, and that he was dissatisfied with a Croatian being his deputy, which he indicated early on. The 3rd battalion consisted of about 600 people, with headquarters in the village of Brgat above Dubrovnik. They were equipped with 120 mm and 82 mm mortars, guided Malyutka missiles, 4 recoilless cannons and a tank. The battalion command post was located at Žarkovica. Around 6:00 o'clock on the morning of 6 December 1991, he heard detonations that he concluded were from artillery. Having previously been informed that units of the former JNA were preparing for an attack on the mountain of Srđ and fortress Imperial, he concluded the attack was under way. Around 10:00 o'clock he received a telephone call from the military maritime sector, the headquarters of which were in Kupari. They wanted to know the target of the artillery attacks, as they allegedly could not get into direct contact with Žarkovica, which was the command post of the 3rd bat-

talion, and where defendant Kovačević was located. The officer from Kupari asked him clearly whether defendants Kovačević and Zec were at Žarkovica. Since he was unable to contact them, he decided to go there in person. When he arrived at Žarkovica, around 13:00 hours, he found captain Milan Zec - deputy commander of the 9th military maritime sector, and defendant Vladimir Kovačević there. At the time, the 3rd battalion of the 472nd motorised brigade was under the command of the 9th military maritime sector, and as a deputy commander of the 9th military maritime sector, defendant Milan Zec was a superior officer to defendant Vladimir Kovačević. They were watching the ongoing battle for Srđ, and defendant Kovačević was coordinating the action. At the time, he did not notice the Old Town was shelled, but had seen a lot of smoke from the Old Town, particularly from within the city walls. In his opinion, the attack on the Old Town was initiated after unsuccessful attacks on the mountain of Srđ, where several soldiers of the former JNA were killed, so the Old Town was shelled in revenge and frustration. He could not state who ordered the shelling of the Old Town, but believes it was impossible for defendants Kovačević and Zec to not have known what was going on, since they had a grandstand view of the Old Town from Žarkovica. He believes the attack on the Old Town began from Žarkovica, since Malyutka missiles fired at the Old Town were positioned only in this location. Around 15:00 hours he returned to Žarkovica, because the 9th military maritime sector command demanded that defendant Zec return to Kupari immediately. He found the defendants Kovačević and Zec there again. Having conveyed the message from Kupari to defendant Zec, the latter told defendant Kovačević to "wrap it up already, because he had to go to Kupari". He further states that Croatian forces had scarce amounts of weapons and used them rarely. They were able to fire only a few grenades around Srđ when attacked by JNA units. In his opinion, capabilities of the Croatian Army were limited in the territory of Dubrovnik, and were never a significant threat to the former JNA. He later heard that the former JNA adopted a position that the shelling of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991 was accidental, which is not true since defendant Kovačević and defendant Zec were at the Žarkovica command post all day, from where they had a clear view of the Old Town and controlled the entire situation. Several days after the shelling of the Old Town, defendant Kovačević went to see admiral Jokić with the mortar platoon and anti-armour company commander, however, no disciplinary action was initiated against him, since he remained a commander of the 3rd battalion until April 1992. After 6 December 1991, he occasionally saw defendant Kovačević with defendant Jokić and Strugar, who were quite friendly with one another. After the attack on Dubrovnik, his unit went to the area of Orašac, where members of the former JNA entirely looted the hotel complex "Vrtovi sunca". On one occasion he found reservists loading stolen items onto a bus, and shot at the bus tyres, which resulted in an armed conflict with the reservists. He stressed to have feared for his life for the first time on that occasion, about which he wrote to colonel Obrad Vičić, commander of the 472nd motorised brigade, indicating that the looting of

property became a standard practice of the army, and that he did not complete officer's training only to become a thief. He never received an answer to his letter from colonel Obrad Vičić, however his unit was soon withdrawn from Orašac, and replaced by Montenegrin reservists. Once they arrived, the town of Orašac and the surrounding villages were looted to the ground.

The following witnesses were questioned in regards to the ruthless shelling, killing and wounding of civilians in the area of Konavli, Župa dubrovačka, Dubrovačko primorje, Stonsko primorje and Dubrovnik, and pertaining to imprisoning civilians in camps, to looting and setting houses on fire: Jure Mrkonjić from Komaji, Miho Trojan from Mikulić, Pero Glavić from Poljice, Antun Cvjetković from Đurinić, Antun Brailo from Močići, Mijo Đuho from Čilipi, Filip Zadre from Čilipi, Ivo Čeović from Zvekovica, Slavko Natrlin from Obod, Jure Bokarica from Velji Dol, Metodije Prkačin from Cavtat, Kristo Bratičević from Vitaljina, Niko Kisić from Makoše, Ivo Katušić from Gabrile, Đuro Banović from Pridvorje, Božo Deranja from Gruda, Božo Kralj from Pridvorje, Miho Miljanić from Zvekovica, Ivan Ćuk from Uskoplje, Pero Brailo from Duba Konavoska, Mato Strujić from Lovorno, Antun Laptalo from Uskoplje, Mijo Jaganjac from Čilipi, Andrija Mikić from Dubravka, Mato Dragić from Pridvorje, Ilija Ucović from Cavtat, Snježana Klešković from Mlini, Petar Duper from Mlini, Jele Miljanić from Gabrile, Marko Čojić from Brgat, Mario Gleđ from Šumet, Ivan Bačić and Vlaho Kristović from Rožat, Antun Bonić from Gornji Prijevor, Andrija Lučić from Mokošica, Ane Matrljan from Petrovo Selo, Jerko Ivanković from Osojnik, Boro Radulović and Rafo Violić from Zaton, Antun Moretić from Gromača, Luka Lazibat from Mrčevo, Ivo Vuletić Vukasović from Brsečine, Ivan Čović from Zvekovica, Mato Katičić and Miho Katičić from Smokovljani, Pero Špilj from Točionik, Ivo Butigan from Imotica, Niko Miljević from Štedrica, Mario Bazdan from Topolog, Pero Kraljević from Majkovi, Andrija Glumac from Lisac, Zorna Mrša from Trnovica, Marko Knežić from Slano, Ivo Sibiljan from Slano, Božidar Đivović from Slađenovići, Nikola Milić from Kručica, Niko Radić from Podgora, Ivo Stojanović from Konštari, Ivo Kraljević from Visočani, Antun Klis from Ston, Nikola Jelčić from Trnova, Đuro Mage from Doli, Mato Andrijašević from Čepikuće, Željko Štrbinić from Zamaslina, Ivo Smokvina from Smokvina, Luka Pleština from Mravinci and Patricija Veramenta from Dubrovnik.

The conclusion from their statements is that all villages in Konavli, Župa dubrovačka, Dubrovačko primorje and Stonsko primorje, as well as Dubrovnik itself and the area of the Neretva river, were ruthlessly shelled by the former JNA, although there was no direct cause for it, since Croatian Army units were not stationed in inhabited places, and the resistance of the Croatian Army units from the surrounding area was not strong enough to justify such ruthless and unselective shelling, in which civilians were killed in their homes, in shelters and on the streets. Because of the intensity of shelling, inhabitants of Konavle, Župa dubrovačka, Dubrovačko primorje and Mokošica would abandon their homes during the night when the shelling stopped, and

flee to Dubrovnik, where they were received by the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, and provided lodging in Dubrovnik hotels. They took only the bare necessities with them, leaving all of their valuable property in their homes. The elderly and others who were unable to leave their homes due to the shelling, thus remaining in their villages, indicated in their statements that soldiers of the former JNA would ruthlessly shoot at houses with infantry weapons once they entered the village, killing and wounding civilians, forcing them out of their homes, beating and harassing them, and would imprison them in the Bileća and Morinje camps. In the area of the city of Dubrovnik, which was the only place not occupied by units of the former JNA, a huge number of civilians was killed, and a significant number of them wounded.

In addition to harassing and killing civilians and taking them to camps, members of the former JNA would systematically loot houses, churches and farm houses, then set them on fire.

During the aggression on the Dubrovnik area, 116 civilians were killed and several hundred of them wounded. Based on testimonies from the witnesses, official police records and on-site investigation reports of the investigating judge, reports on external autopsies of bodies and confirmations of injuries issued by the Dubrovnik Medical Centre, the time, place and manner of death were established beyond doubt. During the occupation of the areas of Konavli, Župa dubrovačka and Dubrovačko primorje, representatives of the former JNA had on several occasions handed over the remains of the killed and murdered persons to representatives of the Red Cross and international monitors, and reports were drafted about this. After the liberation of these areas, more killed and murdered persons were found, about which exhumation minutes and autopsy minutes were drafted. The file also contains photo documentation of the killed civilians, attesting to the fact that they were killed after being wounded with explosives or shot with infantry weapons.

All civilians were killed or murdered in their homes, in the street or in shelters.

It is clear that members of the former JNA, in addition to excessive, unselective shelling of inhabited places where civilians were killed, also deliberately shelled places where they noticed civilians. The best evidence for this lies in the facts that seven civilians were killed with a single grenade in Mokošica on 7 October 1991, who had just left a shelter, and that one grenade killed six firemen on 6 December 1991, who were putting out the fire in Hotel Libertas on 6 December 1991. From their positions above Dubrovnik, the former JNA had a grandstand view of the shelter in Mokošica and Hotel Libertas.

The force and extent of unselective and ruthless shelling of inhabited places and the city of Dubrovnik are best illustrated by amateur videos taken during the war in the Dubrovnik area, and from the Montenegrin TV shows "Veliki rat" (Great War), which showed authentic videos of the aggression by the former JNA on the Dubrovnik area and consequences of this aggression.

Pyrotechnician Ivo Butigan also testified about the amount of shells fired on this area, who indicated in his statement that he participated in demining the

villages of Konštar, Zamaslina, Doli and Trnovica in Stonsko primorje, where several thousand unexploded shells were found and removed, including cannon shells, mortar shells, Zolja manual rocket launchers and other mines and explosives.

In addition to witnesses questioned regarding the destruction and looting of the occupied villages, testimony was also provided by Smiljan Šteko, who served his military duty in the former JNA and was sent to the frontlines around Dubrovnik. He stressed to have been forced by a captain of the former JNA to shoot randomly at houses in Kupari, and to shell the church in Kupari, Tito's villa in Kupari and the town of Srebreno with a Malyutka missile.

Veseljko Koprivica described the behaviour of the former JNA in the occupied territory in his book entitled "Sve je bilo meta" (Everything was a target), who participated in the aggression on the territory around Dubrovnik as a reservist in the territorial defence units of Montenegro. He described the looting and setting houses on fire in the area of Konavli and Dubrovačko primorje in detail, which all officers of the former JNA were familiar with. Watching the news aired by the Montenegrin state television and radio, he was surprised with the lies about the number of Croatian Army soldiers in this area and the resistance put up by the Croatian Army during the aggression of the former JNA on the Republic of Croatia.

The extent of shelling and looting are best illustrated by the investigation photo documentation, compiled after the withdrawal of the former JNA from the villages of Zastolje, Gruda, Ljuta, Palje Brdo, Dubravka, Komaji, Lovorno, Uskoplje, Gabrile, Drvenik, Mihanići, Pridvorje, Čilipi, Zvekovica, Cavtat, Duboka Ljuta, Velji Do, Konavoska brda, Soline, Plat, Gornji and Donji Brgat, Komolac, Sustjepan, Stara Mokošica, Nova Mokošica, Osojnik, Gromača, Šumet, Rožat and Slano, and from videos of the destroyed and burnt towns in the occupied area of Dubrovačko primorje, taken by police officers.

It is clear that all occupied places were looted, while some were partially or entirely burnt. All hotels and farm buildings in the territory of Konavli, Župa dubrovačka and Dubrovačko primorje were entirely looted. Evidence to the fact that this looting was organised and that officers of the former JNA units knew about it also lies in the fact that Dubrovnik Airport in Čilipi was entirely looted, and its navigation equipment stolen and transported to Montenegro, which could only have been done by professionally trained individuals. Criminal charges filed by Dubrovnik Airport indicate that the value of equipment and airport vehicles stolen amounted to DEM 10,500,000.00. Moreover, the printing house "Čubelić" in Župa dubrovačka was dismounted as well and transported to Montenegro, while all facilities of the former construction company "Dubrovnik" were dismounted and looted. About 40 yachts were stolen and taken to Montenegro from the ACI Marina in Komolac, some of which were re-registered in Montenegro, while tens of other vessels were set on fire or sunk. The extent of the looting clearly indicates that commanders of the former JNA units knew and tacitly approved it.

The list of destroyed facilities of the Roman Catholic Church in the area of

the Dubrovnik diocese indicates that 98 churches and monasteries were either damaged or destroyed during the war in this area.
Data of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees indicate that during the aggression on Dubrovačko primorje, some 22,510 inhabitants were exiled from their homes, of which 7038 from Konavle, 5084 from Župa dubrovačka, 6334 from Rijeka dubrovačka, 3479 from Dubrovačko primorje, and 575 inhabitants from Bosanka and Brgat.
During the occupation of this area, members of the former JNA would harass and kill the civilian population, and the following persons were killed with infantry weapons in their homes by members of the former JNA, who remain unidentified at this time: Mato Violić in Osojnik, Ivica Puljizević in Štikovica, Kate Tepšić in Vrbica, Nike Baljković in Petrovo Selo, Luko Urljević, Luko Prčan and Ane Prčan in Osojnik, Mato Čeović and Zdenko Gavrić in Mokošica, Pavo Klešković in Zavrelje, Stjepo Kovačić in Močići, Božo Raše and Kate Raše in Stravča, Marko Mišić in Šilješci, Marko Ivanović in Riđica, Rade Ljubišić in Lisac, Jovanka Bosiljka Doer in Zaton and Stijepo Kralj in Pridvorje.
Based on the plan of the Greater Serbia nationalists, to create the so-called Greater Serbia in the territory of the former Yugoslavia after its break-up, the former JNA supreme command had formed the 2nd Operational Group in July 1991, which was not a typical military formation, but was exclusively created to attack and occupy the territory of the Republic of Croatia from Zadar to Dubrovnik, and the wider Livno and Kupres areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Documentation of the former JNA pertaining to the 2nd Operational Group, enclosed herein, gathered during the investigation procedure and delivered by the International Tribunal in the Hague, along with Jevrem Cokić's book "Početak kraja" (Beginning of the end), clearly indicate the reasons for creating the 2nd Operational Group, its tasks and activities, from its founding until its withdrawal from the area of Dubrovnik. The evaluation of the 2nd Operational Group condition regarding the territory of Dubrovnik, dated 21 September 1991, the order to attack, dated 28 and 29 September 1991, and combat orders of the 2nd Operational Group, all indicate that it had prepared a plan of occupying the territory of Dubrovnik in seven days, with the plan for its units to reach the Neretva river, thus accomplishing a full maritime siege of Dubrovnik and its wider area. These documents stipulate that the territory under authority of the 2nd Operational Group extended from Boka kotorska to the Neretva river, and deep into Bosnia-Herzegovina, all the way to Mostar. The documents further specify commanders of the 2nd Operational Group, and units under their command.
The book by the defendant Jevrem Cokić and military documents clearly show that the 2nd Operational Group was formed in July 1991. Head of the supreme command of the former JNA, Blagoje Adžić, held a meeting with defendant Jevrem Cokić in July 1991, informing him about the decision of the military command to form a special operational group for activities in Dalmatia and Herzegovina, appointing him as a commander, and ordering him to

start working on an operation plan. The tasks of the 2nd Operational Group were to conquer Kninska krajina, Ravni kotari, Zadar and Šibenik, and to lay siege to Split, to control the wider area around Livno and the Kupres plateau. In the second stage, units of the former JNA were planning to attack the wider Dubrovnik area from the direction of Montenegro and Trebinje, seizing control of southern Dalmatia. The plan was to cut off the main road along the coast (Jadranska magistrala), thus isolating Dubrovnik, and to lay a maritime siege to it with its navy. In the subsequent stage, they planned to conquer Split, gaining control of the entire Dalmatia. The deadline for achieving these goals was two weeks. This is why the forming of the 2nd Operational Group included the JNA 9th (Knin) corps, parts of the 4th (Sarajevo) corps, 37th corps (Užice), 2nd corps (Titograd) and the military maritime sector of Boka. Defendant Jevrem Cokić prepared an operation plan with his command, consisting of the 2nd corps commander, major general Radomir Eremija, 9th corps (Knin) commander, colonel Ratko Mladić, 27th corps commander, major general Milan Torbica and commander of the military maritime sector of Boka, captain Krsto Đurović. In regards to the situation in the former Yugoslavia at the time, and resistance of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia in the territory of Dalmatia, the supreme command of the former JNA reached a decision whereby activities of the 2nd Operational Group were to encompass exclusively the areas of eastern Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia, with the goal to attack the Republic of Croatia from the area of Trebinje and Montenegro, to reach the Neretva river valley and cut off the main road along the coast at the mouth of Neretva, and cut off, isolate and conquer the entire territory from there to the Montenegrin border. The 9th and the 4th corps were withdrawn from the 2nd Operational Group then, replaced by the 2nd territorial defence partisan brigade "Veljko Vlahović" and the Trebinje territorial defence section.

In his book, defendant Jevrem Cokić states that his plan to attack the wider area of Dubrovnik was approved by the supreme command, and that units encompassed by the 2nd Operational Group consisted on about 23,000 soldiers. The plan for attack prepared by defendant Jevrem Cokić together with the 2nd Operational Group headquarters is described in the "Order to attack" the wider Dubrovnik area, which he personally signed on 28 and 29 September 1991. Immediately before the attack, he travelled to Belgrade for a meeting with the supreme command headquarters of the former JNA, chaired by the federal secretary for national defence, general Veljko Kadijević, who gave him the order to initiate the attack on the area around Dubrovnik on 1 October 1991.

This order for attack of the 2nd Operational Group commander, dated 28 September 1991, clearly shows that units encompassed by the 2nd Operational Group began the attack on the area of Dubrovnik from the direction of Ljubinja – Zavala – Slano, Trebinje – Dubrovnik, Trebinje – Grab – Poljice, with the goal to reach the main road along the coast, cut it off in the area of Slano, Zaton, Kupari and Molunat, and to lay a full siege on Dubrovnik, the airport

in Čilipi and Prevlaka from land and sea, then to destroy the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia. This first stage of the operation was planned to last two days. The second stage of the attack on the Dubrovnik area, planned to last three days, was aimed at entirely destroying the Croatian forces in this area, and to focus the JNA attack on western Herzegovina.

Under command of defendant Jevrem Cokić of the 2nd Operational Group, units of the former JNA had taken the town of Slano and surrounding villages in Dubrovačko primorje, conquered Golubov kamen above Mokošica and reached the zone of Donji Brgat, simultaneously occupying all areas in Konavli up to Čilipi.

On 5 October 1991, defendant Jevrem Cokić was in a helicopter of the former JNA, which was shot down in Konavli. Captain Krsto Đurović, commander of the 9th military maritime sector had died on this occasion, while Jevrem Cokić was seriously injured and thus withdrawn from the position of the 2nd Operational Group commander. On 6 October 1991, his successor became lieutenant general Mile Ružinovski.

Defendant lieutenant general Mile Ružinovski remained the commander of the 2nd Operational Group until 12 October 1991, when he was replaced by lieutenant general Pavle Strugar, who acted as a commander of the Montenegrin territorial defence until then, and was in this position until 26 October 1991.

In early October 1991, the 2nd Operational Group consisted of five units: 2nd (Titograd) corps under command of general Radomir Eremija, 37th (Užice) corps under command of general Milan Torbica, 9th military maritime sector under command of captain Krsto Đurović until 5 October 1991. From 5 - 7 October 1991, captain Milan Zec was appointed as an acting commander of the 9th military maritime sector, and from 8 October 1991 to 8 May 1992 command of this sector was under admiral Miodrag Jokić. The 472th motorised brigade was under command of the 2nd Operational Group, whose commander was colonel Obrad Vičić, including the newly formed 2nd tactical group, under command of general Branko Stanković. All units and their commanders were directly subject to commanders of the 2nd Operational Group. The 2nd tactical group was dismantled on 21 October 1991, and its units redeployed elsewhere. From this date on, based on the order of general Pavle Strugar, commander of the 2nd Operational Group, the 472nd motorised brigade, which was directly under his command until this time, was transferred under the command of the 9th military maritime sector in Boka, remaining under this command until 20 November 1991, when admiral Jokić issued an order to transfer it under command of the 2nd (Titograd) corps, with the exception of the 3rd battalion, under command of defendant Vladimir Kovačević. In early December 1991, the 2nd Operational Group consisted of only 3 units: the 37th (Užice) corps, the 2nd (Titograd) corps, and the 9th Boka military maritime sector.

This state prosecutor's office conducted an investigation of the 2nd (Titograd) corps commanders, Radomir Eremija and Radomir Damjanović, whose units

took part in the aggression on Dubrovnik. Due to the fact that they died, criminal proceedings against them were dropped. The 37th (Užice) corps, although under command of the 2nd Operational Group, was not active in the Dubrovnik area, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Defendants Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski and Pavle Strugar were commanders of the 2nd Operational Group which was attacking the area of Dubrovnik from its creation until the former JNA withdrew from this area. The time frame during which they commanded the 2nd Operational Group was established beyond doubt based on their orders, directives and commands for combat activities, which they personally signed and forwarded to subordinate units. These military documents also indicate the places conquered and occupied during the time that defendants Cokić, Ružinovski and Strugar were commanders of the 2nd Operational Group. In addition to the documents mentioned, video recordings exist, showing commanders of the 2nd Operational Group going to the occupied territories, and seeing first hand the killings, wounding, imprisonment and harassment of civilians in destroyed, burnt and looted villages, from which practically all the population was exiled, as well as the destroyed and looted religious and cultural structures. Moreover, all foreign journalists and TV stations were reporting about the aggression on the area of Dubrovnik, the number of casualties and wounded civilians, and about the ruthless looting, destruction and arson. Having obtained actual information about the condition and number of Croatian Army units in this area, it was clear to them that this destruction was excessive and disproportionate to the resistance put up by the Croatian Army in this area. All three defendants had completed higher military educational institutions of the former JNA, and knew that with these acts they were violating the Geneva Convention about the protection of civilians during war, as well as additional protocols to this Convention, mandating them to prevent such behaviour and punish the perpetrators.

Beside the commanders of the Second Operational group, such behaviour of ex JNA should have been and must have been prevented by their immediate subordinate commanders of the Second Tactical group general Branko Stanković, commander of the 9th Army Naval Sector admiral Miodrag Jokić, commander of the 472 mtbr colonel Obrad Vičić and his Deputy Radovan Komar whose units directly participated in unscrupulous and unselective shelling of populated settlements, killing of civilians, looting, destroying and burning houses, as well as forced displacement of the population. They visited occupied areas on daily basis and received daily reports from subordinated units about the status in the battle area. As such behaviour of the ex JNA units was present on daily basis from the beginning of the aggression on Dubrovnik area from October 1st 1991 until the withdrawal of the ex JNA units on October 26th 1992 it is clear that the defendants omitted to do anything to prevent such behaviour, instead they, acting as commanders of the Second Operational group with their omission to act, in fact supported it and agreed to the consequences.

Therefore, the actions of the defendants Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski, Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokić, Branko Stanković, Obrad Vičić and Radovan Komar have all important characteristics of the crime against humanity and international law - war crime against civilians - a crime described and punishable by the Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, mentioned by the Article 130 , paragraph 2 , in relation with paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 BCCRC.

Attack on Dubrovnik and the Old City of Dubrovnik started in the morning hours on December 6, 1991. According to the military documentation and statement of the witness Željko Soldo the positions on the slopes of Srđ, above Dubrovnik, were held by the 3rd battalion 472 mtbr commanded by the defendant Vladimir Kovačević. Commanding post of the battalion was located on the Žarkovica position, eastward from the Old City, from which the Old City was clearly visible. Shelling of the Old City within the walls, started around 08,00 hours and lasted almost the entire day. On that occasion several hundreds of mortar shells were fired at the Old City. During the shelling of Dubrovnik and the Old City of Dubrovnik, following 13 civilians died: Tonći Skočko and Pavo Urban in the Old City, and Luka Crnčević, Koviljka Kosjerina, Niko Mihočević, Frano Martinović, Đuro Kolar, Stjepan Salmanić, Andro Savinović, Ante Jablan, Drago Obradović, Ilija Radić and Teo Paskojević in other parts of Dubrovik, at the same time in the Old City 9 palaces were destroyed completely and set on fire, while several hundred of buildings were damaged.

It is an indisputable fact that the Old City is under the protection of UNESCO as a monument of the zero category from 1979 and was during the entire war properly marked with UNESCO flags and all officers of ex JNA indisputably knew of that fact because some orders of the Second Operational Group explicitly forbid the shelling of the Old City. The fact that the Old City was marked by the UNESCO flag can be seen in the amateur video recordings which recorded the shelling of Dubrovnik on December 06, 1991 and the statement of the EU observers questioned by the International court in Hague.

General Nojko Marinović in his statement mentioned, and this was confirmed by the questioned EU observers that in the Old City of Dubrovnik no heavy weaponry of the Croatian Army was placed, nor were ex JNA members shot at from it.

Shelling of Dubrovnik and the Old City, according to the statement of Željko Soldo was lead by the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 472 mtbr, the defendant Vladimir Kovačević who, immediately before that, by an infantry-artillery attack made an attempt to conquer the Imperial fortress located on the hill Srđ which was held by the Croatian army and which dominates the City of Dubrovnik. This position was an important strategical point for ex JNA because from there all access roads to Dubrovnik and the City of Dubrovnik could be controlled entirely. Attack on the fortress Imperial was re-

sisted by the Croatian Army and on that occasion several soldiers of the 3rd battalion of the 472 mtbr were killed and wounded. As an act of revenge for the killed soldiers the defendant Vladimir Kovačević ordered the shelling of the Old City of Dubrovnik and the attack started at 08,00 hours. Because of the attack on the Old City the EU observers issued a protest note to the commander of the 9th Army Naval Sector, Admiral Jokić under whose command the 3rd battalion of the 472 mtbr was, and the same protest note was sent by the Crisis Headquarters of the Dubrovnik Municipality and the Minister of the Government of Republic of Croatia, Davorin Rudolf. In spite of that the shelling of Dubrovnik continued until the evening hours.

After the shelling of the Old City, records were made of the civilian losses, records of the external examination of the dead bodies, records of the damages to the cultural monuments and residential houses and photo-documentation of the damages to the monuments listed in the UNESCO register of world heritage.

Within the city walls civilians Tonći Skočko and Pavo Urban died, whereas in other parts of Dubrovnik 11 civilians died, among them six fire-fighters who were putting out the fire in the Libertas Hotel. They all died of wounds caused by explosions of mortar shells.

Damages made by the shelling of the Old City Centre were recorded in detail in the records of inquest of the Dubrovnik Police Department made on December 20th, 1992 and January 18th, 1992 on which occasion on a map of the Old City of Dubrovnik, hits from artillery weapons were marked. It is clear that on the Old City, several hundred grenades were fired, and from a detailed list of damages, apart from already mentioned burned and destroyed palaces in the Old City, more than 563 civil objects were damaged. So, only in the Puč street, 31 houses and commercial properties were damaged and in Miha Pracata street 28 houses and commercial properties.

From the statement of Željko Soldo, it is clear that on that morning the defendant Milan Zec was the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion of the 472 mtbr who was deputy commander of the 9th Army Naval Sector, i.e. immediate superior officer to the defendant Vladimir Kovačević.

By issuing the order to shell the Old City of Dubrovnik, the defendant Vladimir Kovačević breached the provisions of international law during wartime i.e. the Geneva Convention of the protection of civilians in times of war, the Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. These provisions clearly forbid unselective actions in populated areas hitting civil population which does not participate in the direct combat and by which destruction of the cultural monuments is forbidden. Such activities of the defendant Vladimir Kovačević contain all important characteristics of the war crime against civil population from the Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, mentioned by the Article 130 , paragraph 2 , in relation with paragraph 1 of BCCRC.

It is an indisputable fact that the defendant Milan Zec knew about the shelling of the Old city of Dubrovnik which was ordered by the defendant Vladimir Kovačević, because on that morning he was present at the command post of the 3rd battalion of the 472 mtbr, beside Vladimir Kovačević. As the immediate superior officer to Vladimir Kovačević, he had the authority and should have stopped the shelling of the Old City, what he did not do, instead by tolerating such behaviour he supported the defendant Vladimir Kovačević and agreed to all consequences of the shelling. Due to all mentioned his activities meet all important characteristics of the war crime against the civil population proscribed by the Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, mentioned by the Article 130, paragraph 2 in relation with paragraph 1 of BCCRC related to the Article 28 BCCRC.

In relation to the war crime against the civil population and destruction of cultural and historical monuments, perpetrated by the defendant Zoran Gvozdenović the commander of the 403 battleship, during the investigation procedure following witnesses were questioned Petar Perković, Ivan Živogora, Ante Jurjević, Marijan Ferenček, Ivan Anić, Edi Bulić, Aljoša Nikolić, Nikola Prižmić, Siniša Balić, Tihomir Erceg, Željko Filičić, Zdravko Baraba, Patricija Veramenta and Marin Stošić and notices of the Croatian Navy and the Dubrovnik Police Department were acquired.

According to the statements of the witnesses Edi Bulić, Nikola Prižmić, Željko Filičić, Zdravko Baraba from the beginning of the attack on the Dubrovnik area and until the end of 1991 in the aquatorium of Dubrovnik three patrol boats and one battleship baring the number 403 of ex JNA were active. During that time the ships fired at the General Hospital in Medarevo, hydro power plant in Plat, Adriatic motorway from Slano to Orašac, marina in Rijeka Dubrovačka and cultural monuments in the Old City Centre, and at the same time blocked the approach to Dubrovnik from the sea.

During the investigation procedure Siniša Bralić was also questioned who during his regular army service in ex JNA served on the 403 battleship until 26 November 1991. He stated that the commander of the 403 battleship was the defendant Zoran Gvozdenović who sometimes, when it was not possible to make contact with the Headquarters made independent decisions on firing weapons and selecting goals. So, he, apart from Dubrovnik, shot at islands Šipan, Lokrum, Cavtat, Hotel Croatia and Old City of Dubrovnik and the battleship had a large fire power. He recalls that on one Sunday artillery fire was open from the battleship to the Hotel Belvedere and that an entire combat package of cannon grenades was used. New combat packages were acquired almost on daily basis, and it sometimes happened that in one day until 13,00 hours all grenades carried by the battleship got fired. After that new combat packages were acquired which would then be fired out until the evening of the same day. There were occasions when in one day two combat packages were fired out and usually, as a rule, one was always shot.

The witness Predrag Stipanović, emphasizes that he served in ex Jugoslav

Navy (JN) as the frigate colonel and during one period before the war he commanded the 403 battleship, and that around the end of May 1991, the defendant Zoran Gvozdenović came to the 403 battleship as the commander, and by the end of July this battleship was sent to Boka Kotorska. The battleship was armed by two 57mm cannons, carrying a combat package of 572 grenade each. Apart from this, the ship carried two counter-ship missiles of Russian production with 450 kilograms of explosive.

Tihomir Erceg questioned during investigation, stated that by 15th of July 1991 he was the commander of the 404 battleship of the ex JN and that few months before that Zoran Gvozdenović took command of the 403 battleship and according to his knowledge the battleship sailed to Boka Kotorska during the same month. From the television reports he had seen, he concluded that the battleship fired at the Old City , because of the kind of impact of the explosion visible on the walls, he concluded that these were 57mm cannon projectiles, which the battleship carried.

According to the statements of witnesses and especially the statement of Siniša Bralić from the 403 battleship, according to the orders of the commander, the defendant Zoran Gvozdenović, from October 1st, 1991, several thousand grenades were fired at targets from Ponte Oštro to Trsteno, the settlements in Župa Dubrovačka, Dubrovnik and the Old City, so it is indisputable that the consequences of such shelling were civil losses and destruction of cultural monuments. So, in all mentioned activities of Zoran Gvozdenović all important characteristics of the war crime against the civil population can be found proscribed by the Article 120, paragraph 1 of BCCRC with the concurrent crime of destroying cultural and historical monuments, mentioned by the Article 130, paragraph 2 in relation to the paragraph 1 of BCCRC.

All defendants are at large and not accessible to judiciary bodies of Republic of Croatia, and due to especially difficult circumstances and consequences of the crimes of which they are accused, and for which a long-term imprisonment is proscribed we propose their detention to be set according to the Article 102. paragraph 1 , items 1 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act and a warrant issued consequently.

This indictment was to be issued, since the facts and data collected during the investigation procedure and which relate to the crimes and perpetrators provide sufficient ground for indictment.

COUNTY STATE ATTORNEY
Damir Jasprica

ANNEX 85:

SPLIT COUNTY COURT, STATEMENT BY COURT PRESIDENT, ANTE PERKUŠIĆ, ON THE PROGRESS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LORA CASE, 2 JULY 2010

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
SPLIT COUNTY COURT
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
Number: 21 Su- 992/10
Split, 02 July 2010

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
OFFICE FOR COOPERATION
WITH THE CRIMINAL COURTS
ZAGREB

Your reference number:
CLASS: 018-04/10.09/40
ENTRY NUMBER: 514-09-02-10-1

Subject: The Republic of Croatia suit against Serbia before the International Court of Justice

With regard to the request in the letter, dated 30 June 2010, on the progress of the proceedings in Lora case we are informing you as follows:

The County State Attorney's Office in Split issued an indictment number K-DO-121101 for this case on 27 March 2007, which was entered into records under number K-30/02. Defendants Tomislav Duić, Tonći Vrkić, Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić, Davor Banić, Emilio Bungur, Ante Gudić and Anđelko Botić are charged with committing the war crimes against the civilian population as referred to in Article 120, paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia

The main hearing was held during the period from 10 June 2002 until 20 November 2002, and altogether 35 hearings were held, that is, 35 court days were used.

By the verdict of this Court number K-30/02 dated 20 November 2002 all the defendants were acquitted.

During the appeal proceedings the mentioned verdict was annulled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia number IKž-2S9/03

dated 25 March 2004 and the case was sent back to this Court for a retrial.

During the renewed procedure defendants Tomislav Duić, Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić and Emil Bungur were tried in absentia as we were not able to ensure their presence at the main hearing during the renewed procedure. The decision on trial in absentia was made by the Out of Court Council of this Court on 18February 2005, under number Kv-69/05, and this was confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia number IKž-213/0S dated 15 March 2005.

After the completion of the renewed main hearing this court rendered the verdict number K-93/04 dated 02 March 2006 finding defendants Tomislav Duić, Tonći Vrkić, Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić, Davor Banić, Emilio Bungur, Ante Gudić and Anđelko Botić guilty of war crimes against the civilian population as referred to in Article 120, paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia and sentencing them to a prison sentence as follows: defendants Tomislav Duić and Tonći Vrkić sentenced to prison sentence in duration of 8 years, defendant Davor Banić sentenced to prison sentence in duration of 7 years, defendants Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić, Emilio Bungur, Anđelko Gudić and Anđelko Botić sentenced to a prison sentence of 6 years.

The above mentioned verdict was confirmed in the appeal procedure before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia by the decision number l Kž-456/(06 dated 06 February 2007.

Josip Bikić, who was tried in absentia, surrendered himself to the judicial bodies on 18 November 2008 and begun serving his prison term and simultaneously filed a motion for reopening of the procedure which was granted by the decision of this Court number Kv-398/09.

During the retrial that was held in his presence the defendant Josip Bikić was found guilty by the verdict of this Court number K-98/09 dated 29 December 2009 of the war crimes against the civilian population as referred to in Article 120, paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia and was sentenced to 4 years in prison. As this verdict was not appealed it became the final verdict and the defendant Josip Bikić is serving his sentence pursuant to this verdict.

Defendants Tomislav Duić and Emilio Bungur, who were tried in absentia, are still out of reach of judicial bodies, while defendants Tonći Vrkić, Davor Banić, Ante Gudić and Anđelko Botić are serving their prison sentence pursuant to final verdict K-93/04 dated 02 March 2006.

During the renewed main hearing together with the inspection of case file documentation testimonies were heard of the following witnesses from the

Republic of Croatia, as well as witnesses from Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina that responded to the summons of this Court. Following persons were heard both as witnesses and as injured parties: Uglješa Bulović, Rade Krivić and Miroslav Katalina while statements of Marija Knežević, wife of the late injured party Nenad Knežević and of injured party Đorđe Katić were read with the permission of the parties. During the main hearing 37 witnesses from the Republic of Croatia were heard, and with the permission of the parties statements of eight more witnesses were read. Of witnesses from Serbia, 8 following witnesses were questioned: Vojkan Živković, Velibor Tomović, Milanče Tošić, Nenad Filipović, Dragomir Miljković, Goran Pantić, Darko Milijanović and Miroslav Petrović; and from Bosnia and Herzegovina the 10 following witnesses: Jelenko Kovačević, Milorad Oro, Mirko Bjelica, Mićko Koprivica, Veso Deretić, Slobodan Ćaušić, Vladimir Žarković, Mirko Babić, Ljubiša Gernu and Miroslav Čućak.

Expert forensic medical examiner opinion was provided in this case by the Forensic medical examiner dr. Jakša Ivanović with regard to injuries sustained by the injured party Đorđe Katič, as well as the autopsy and forensic opinion on the causes and mechanism of sustaining of injuries, and the cause of death for now deceased injured parties Nenad Knežević and Gojko Bulović, by the Forensic medical expert dr. Šimun Anđelinović.

During the renewal or the proceeding the main hearings were held on the following dates:
12 and 13 of September 2005; 15 and 16 September 2005; 19 and 20 of September 2005; 22 and 23 of September 2005; 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of September 2005; 24 to 27 of October 2005; 08 to 10 of November 2005; 22 to 25 of November 2005; 29 and 30 of November 2005; 18 and 19 of January 2006; 23 and 24 of January 2006; 31 of January 2006; 08 and 09 of February 2006; 20 to 22 of February 2006 and 27 and 28 of February 2006. Therefore, as above stated, in this case 38 hearings were held, that is, 38 court days were used for the purpose of the renewed main hearing.

Please find attached responses of the judges in the mentioned case Slavko Lozina, Spomenka Tonković and Neven Cambijo.

In Split, 02 July 2010

COURT PRESIDENT
dr.sc Ante Perkušić

ANNEX 86:

SPLIT COUNTY COURT, STATEMENT BY JUDGE SPOMENKA TONKOVIĆ, ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LORA CASE, 2 JULY 2010

K-93/04

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
SPLIT COUNTY COURT

FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTY COURT IN SPLIT
dr. sc. Ante Perkušić
- here-

In the criminal case of the County Court in Split known as Lora case I have participated as the President of the Court Council in the procedure held under number K-93/04 in which all the defendants were found guilty and validly sentenced.

As the President of the Court Council in this case I would like to state that the allegations stated in the counter suit of the Republic of Serbia against the Republic of Croatia before the International Court of Justice for genocide are completely untrue in parts referring to myself.

Considering your request to provide concrete response to those allegations I am hereby stating that I have never shook hands with any of the defendants, not in the courtroom or anywhere else. I did not suggest to a witness to testify that he does not remember rather than providing confusing answers. I did not express an opinion that Serb witnesses have to travel to Croatia nor did I refuse to take into consideration their concerns for their personal safety after being told by them that they had received threats. Quite the contrary, the witnesses from Serbia that responded to the summons and arrived to the hearing at the County Court in Split had their physical and legal safety completely guaranteed by undertaking all the measures to ensure a safe stay for them in the Republic of Croatia as well as protection of the mentioned witnesses during their testimony at the main hearing.

I would like to stress that each of the summoned witnesses was guaranteed a free passage to and out of the Republic of Croatia even if there was an ongoing criminal procedure against them or an arrest warrant or a request to render them into custody, all of this in accordance with the legal protection provided for the witness by our laws (Article 25 of the International Legal Aid Act for Criminal Issues "Official Gazette"178/04) and bilateral agreement between the two countries.

In Split, 02 July 2010

JUDGE
Spomenka Tonković

ANNEX 87:
SISAK COUNTY COURT, STATEMENT BY JUDGE MELITA AVEDIĆ ON THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST JAKOV VELEMIR, 2 JULY 2010

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
SISAK COUNTY COURT

K-15/96

TO THE COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTY COURT IN SISAK

Subject: Response regarding the criminal case against the defendant JAKOV VELEMIR

In the final verdict of the County Court in Sisak number K-15/96 dated 26 September 1996, the defendant Jakov Velimir was found guilty of Criminal Offense against Humanity and International Law - by organizing a group and inciting genocide and war crimes - as referred to in Article 123, paragraph 2 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia and sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison;

No appeal was filed against the verdict so it became final verdict on 18 November 1996.

The main hearing was held in the presence of the defendant Jakov Velimir, who, during the main hearing, confessed to committing the crimes he was charged with.

Besides the defendant's confession, the Court also inspected the substantive evidence in the form of a permit number 224, issued by " the Serb Army of Krajina - 39th Corps", clearly showing that the defendant was the member of so called " the Serb Army of Krajina" and from "revers - personal issue" it is clear that he was a First Sergeant issued with weapons and ammunition.

Taking into consideration that the defendant confessed to the crime as well as mentioned substantive evidence, the Council of the County Court in Sisak found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to aforementioned prison sentence.

Days that the defendant spent remanded in custody, from 04 August 1995 to 21 February 1996 and from 19 April 1996 to 18 November 1996, were counted as time served. He served the remnant of his prison sentence and was released on 26 March 1997.

Sisak, 02 July 2010

JUDGE

ANNEX 88:

LETTER FROM SPLIT COUNTY COURT JUDGE, SLAVKO LOZINA, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTY COURT IN SPLIT, 5 JULY 2010

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
SPLIT COUNTY COURT

SPLIT COUNTY COURT
Number: 21 Su-992/10
Split, 05 July 2010

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTY COURT IN SPLIT

Reference: Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia letter dated 30 June 2010 - 07 - 05
CLASS: 018-04/10-09/40
ENTRY NUMBER: 514-09-02-10-1

Subject: The Republic of Croatia suit against Serbia before the International Court of Justice

With regard to the Republic of Croatia suit against the Republic of Serbia for genocide before the International Court of Justice, as the President of the First Council before which this proceeding was held I am giving the following report on the progress of the proceedings in "Lora" case:

In their counter suit the Republic of Serbia states that in the case called "Lora", held before the County Court in Split, the President of the Court Council shook hands, on several occasions, with the defendants when they entered the courtroom. They also state that the Judge suggested to the witness that had problems to clearly express himself when testifying to state that he did not remember rather then to give confusing answers. And it is stated at the end of the counter suit that the Judge handling the proceeding expressed his personal opinion that Serb witnesses must travel to Croatia disregarding their concerns for their personal safety although they informed him that they had received threats.

All this allegations contained in the counter suit of the Republic of Serbia are pure insinuations.

With regard to the thesis that the President of the Court Council shook hands on several occasions with the defendants after they entered the court room, I can say that this allegation is completely untrue, as this is not in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act and it is also physically impossible consid-

ering the fact that the proceedings were held in the Great Hall of the Palace of Justice in Split. The stand where the judges and jurors are sited is quite far away from the place where the defendants are sitting - on one hand, and on the other hand there is clear substantial evidence showing that this is not true, as there are recordings of all the main hearings held in the aforementioned courtroom as HRT - National Television recorded all the hearings.

Regarding the Council President warning the witness, a standard caution was given to witnesses before their statement is taken. After the identity of the witness is confirmed then the witness is informed of his duty to tell the truth and not to withhold anything and that giving false testimony is a criminal offense, the witness is also reminded that they are not under duty to answer particular questions if it is likely that he would thus expose himself or his close relative to serious disgrace, considerable material damage orcriminal prosecution (Article 324 in relation to Article 236 and 238 of the Criminal Procedure Act.)

Regarding the unclear formulation in the counter suit allegations that "the judge disregarded the concerns of the witness from Serbia for their personal safety although they had informed him that they had received threats", I can say that the Court summoned the proposed witnesses from Serbia through the Ministry of Justice as witnesses in the ongoing proceedings. After some of the witnesses informed the Court of the reasons why they failed to appear, and the reasons were most often the before mentioned fear that they personally might be a subject to criminal proceedings in the Republic of Croatia, the President of the Court Chamber in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia send the guarantees to all the witnesses that if there is an ongoing criminal procedure against them in Croatia that it would not be activated during their visit to the Republic of Croatia thus guaranteeing the absolute safety for the arrival and also for their departure from the Republic of Croatia. For that purpose a detailed plain for the reception of witnesses from the Republic of Serbia was developed and adopted. I do not recall witnesses mentioning any specific threats against them in their explanations why they failed to appear before the court as stated in the counter suit, but only their personal fears for the above mentioned reasons.

There is substantial evidence confirming what I have stated, first and foremost there are HRT recordings of the hearings and the fact that the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, upon the request of the County State Attorney's Office in Split for the referral of jurisdiction of the County Court in Split, denied the motion and in their decision they stated that all the main hearings were inspected and no essential violations of the Criminal Procedure Act were determined and that there was no objective reason for the referral of jurisdiction ,and that there is no reason for the proceeding to be held before some other County Court of general jurisdiction in the Republic of Croatia.

Although the first instance verdict of this court was quashed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia I Kž-259/03 dated 25 March 2004, in the explanation of the decision and in response to the appeal the Court's position was that the Court of First Instance did not commit any essential violations of the Criminal Procedure Act but "it ordered" the County State Attorney's Office in Split how to write the indictment, and also that during the renewed proceedings everything legally possible needs to be done in order to hear all the witnesses from the Republic of Serbia.

Respectfully,
Split, 05 July 2010

Split County Court Judge
Slavko Lozina

ANNEX 89:

KARLOVAC COUNTY COURT, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OVERVIEW OF THE *KARAN* PROCEEDINGS, 13 JULY 2010

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
KARLOVAC COUNTY COURT
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Number: 2 Su 326/10
Karlovac, 13 July 2010

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR COOPERATION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
Mesnička 23
ZAGREB

Subject: The Republic of Croatia suit against Serbia before the International Court of Justice
Case number: Class: 018-04/10-09/40
Entry no.: 514-09-02-10-7

With regard to your request dated 01 July 2010, we are sending you a short overview of cases against the defendant Svetozar Karan as follows:

- against the defendant Svetozar Karan for criminal offense of war crimes against the civilian population as referred to in Article 120, paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia and for war crime against the prisoners of war as referred to in Article 122 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, on 31 October 2002, County State Attorney in Gospić filed the request for the investigation with motion for detention;
- on 31 October 2002, defendant was questioned in the presence of the court appointed Defense Counsel (later on he hired a Defense Counsel of his choice), during the questioning the defendant denied committing the criminal offenses;
- on 01 October 2002, the County Court in Gospić granted the request for investigation and motion for detention on the grounds referred to in Article 102, paragraph 1, items 1 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act;
-during the investigation from 13 November 2002 until 24 February 2003 there were seven days of hearing and 14 witnesses were heard, and on 22 December 2002 a motion to widen the investigation was filed and was granted on 21 January 2003;
- on 27 February 2003 the County Court in Gospić confirmed the indictment against the defendant Svetozar Karan for two counts of war crimes against the

prisoners of war as referred to in Article 122 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia
- after rejecting the objection against the indictment the main hearing was held on 12 April 2003 and after that there was six additional days of hearing, up to 30 July 2003, when Gospić County Court rendered the verdict founding the defendant guilty and sentencing him to 13 years in prison;
- the defendant appealed the first Court verdict and on 29 January 2004, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia held the Council Session in which the appeal was granted and the contested verdict was quenched with explanation that the facts were incorrectly and insufficiently established, providing the detailed reasoning for this claim;
- With this decision the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia also decided that the retrial is to be held before the entirely different Council because the contested decision, that is, in writing the explanation for the decision notice in this case, the Court of First Instance had significantly breached the framework for necessary elements for the decision notice, therefore the Supreme Court states that in the decision notice the Court of First Instance polemicized regarding the reasons behind the defendants return to the Republic of Croatia, but it also determines that the Court of First Instance itself does not elaborate this as a deciding fact, either with regard to the culpability or with regard to the type and length of the sentence, but states these circumstances in the verdict as his personal opinion without the need to establish the facts essential for the determination of the individual culpability and the type of punishment. As the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia fells that there is a "belief" by the Court of First Instance in "500 years of destruction of Croats" and "genocide committed by a certain collective to which the defendant belongs" which puts the impartiality of the Court of First Instance under serious suspicion, and therefore finds that it is necessary that the main hearing is to be held before a different Council;
- upon the proposal of the State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Act on Application of the International Criminal Court Statute and Prosecution of Criminal Acts against the International Law on War and the Humanitarian Law (Official Gazzette175/03) the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia ceded the case to the County Court in Karlovac as another court of general jurisdiction;
- 10 hearing days were held before the County Court in Karlovac and five defense witnesses testified per viam supplicationis with the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, the verdict was then rendered on 30 June 2005 and the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 7 years in prison;
- on 07 February 2006 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia upon deciding on the defendant's appeal upheld the verdict of the County Court in Karlovac.

COURT PRESIDENT
Ivan Perković

ANNEX 90:

STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES RELATING TO WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS, 30 SEPTEMBER 2010

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES relating to war crimes proceedings as of 30 September 2010
(prepared by State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia)

	FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION *IN ABSENTIA*									PER PERSON		
State Attorney's Office	Initial balance on 31 December 2008	Total number of submitted requests for the reopening of proceedings	Court decision on the request			Proceedings ongoing	Judgement			Appeal lodged against rejected request (column 5)	Supreme Court decided the appeal of the State Attorney's Office	Final balance on 30 September 2010
			Request for reopening accepted	Request for reopening not accepted	Decision not rendered	Returned to investigation phase	Returned to trial phase	of conviction	of refusal	of acquittal			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
BJELOVAR	**2**												**2**
DUBRNOVNIK	**1**							**1**					**1**
GOSPIĆ	**43**	7	7	0	0	0	7	0	7	0	0	0	**36**
KARLOVAC	**17**												**17**
OSIJEK	**67**	5	4	1							1		**62**
POŽEGA	**24**	8	6										**16**
SISAK	**75**	36	15	21			36		2		21	21	**34**
SL. BROD	**2**						2	1			1		**2**
ŠIBENIK	**53**	15	15			15							**37**
SPLIT	**50**	1	1				1	1					**49**
VARAŽDIN	**3**	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**3**
VUKOVAR	**40**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**40**
ZADAR	**87**	19	19			19							**68**
TOTAL	**464**	**93**	**67**	**24**	**0**	**34**	**46**	**3**	**9**	**0**	**23**	**21**	**367**

ANNEX 91:
EXTRACTS FROM THE CRIMINAL CODES OF THE SFRY, SERBIA AND CROATIA

Extracts from the Criminal Codes of the SFRY, Serbia and Croatia

CRIMINAL CODE OF THE SFRY

("Službeni list SFRJ", br.44/76-1329, 36/77-1478, 34/84-895, 37/84-933, 74/87-1743, 57/89-1441, 3/90-63, 38/90-1217, 45/90-1340, 54/90-1773 i "Službeni list SRJ", br. 35/92-651, 37/93-816, 24/94-273, 61/01)

Genocide

Article 141

Whoever, with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, orders the killing of members of such a group, or orders serious bodily injury to be inflicted on them, or orders the physical or mental health of the members of such a group to be impaired, or orders the forcible displacement of the population, or conditions of life to be inflicted on the group which are calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, or orders measures to be imposed which are intended to prevent births within the group, or orders the forcible transfer of children of the group to another group, or whoever with the same intent commits any of the foregoing acts, shall be punished by imprisonment … .

CRIMINAL CODE OF SERBIA

("Službeni list", 85/05)
[in force 2006-present]

Genocide

Article 370

Whoever, with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, orders the killing of members of such a group, or orders serious bodily injury to be inflicted on them, or orders the physical or mental health of the members of such a group to be impaired, or conditions of life to be inflicted on the group which are calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, or orders measures to be imposed which are intended to prevent births within the group, or orders the forcible transfer of children of the group to another group, or whoever with the same intent commits any of the foregoing acts, shall be punished by imprisonment… .

CRIMINAL CODE OF CROATIA

(Narodne novine 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01, 111/03, 105/04, 84/05, 71/06, 110/07, 152/08)

Genocide

Article 156

Whoever, with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, orders the killing of members of such a group, or orders serious bodily injury to be inflicted on them, or orders the physical or mental health of the members of such a group to be impaired, or orders the forcible displacement of the population, or conditions of life to be inflicted on the group which are calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, or orders measures to be imposed which are intended to prevent births within the group, or orders the forcible transfer of children of the group to another group, or whoever with the same intent commits any of the foregoing acts, shall be punished by imprisonment … .

ANNEX 92:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721, 11 DECEMBER 1991

Report S/23280, 11 December 1991

should be undertaken as rapidly as possible in order to enable Mr. Vance to conclude his consultations with the parties and make a recommendation to me on the possible establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia.

Having received from Mr. Vance today in Rome the report of his visit to Yugoslavia, and of the meeting which he chaired yesterday in Geneva, I have asked him to continue his important mission, and in particular – together with Under-Secretary-General Goulding – to carry forward the work referred to in the preceding paragraph.

It would be my intention, Mr. President, to report further to the Council in the period ahead. In the meantime, I am arranging for the present letter to be circulated as document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Javier Perez De Cuellar

Annex

The undersigned agree that:

(a) Croatia will, with immediate effect, lift its blockade of all JNA barracks and installations in Croatia;

(b) The JNA will, with immediate effect, begin the withdrawal from Croatia of the personnel, weapons and military equipment in those barracks and installations and complete this process in accordance with the schedules already agreed upon by the parties;

(c) They will immediately instruct all units under their command, control or political influence to observe an unconditional cease-fire with effect from tomorrow, 24 November, and they will make sure that any paramilitary or irregular units not formally under their command, control or political influence also observe the cease-fire from that date;

(d) They will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons affected by the recent hostilities.

Lord Carrington will seek to ensure that the international Monitoring Mission does everything within its power and mandate to ensure that the cease-fire holds.

Geneva, 23 November 1991

3. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) (S/23280, 11 December 1991)

1. It will be recalled that resolution 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, which was adopted unanimously, reads, in its operative parts, as follows:

'*The Security Council*,

1. *Approves* the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties, as rapidly as possible, so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;

2. *Endorses* the statement made by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation cannot be envisaged without, *inter alia*, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991 and annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General (S/23239);

3. *Strongly urges* the Yugoslav parties to comply fully with that agreement;

4. *Undertakes* to examine and take appropriate action without delay upon the recommendations of the Secretary-General mentioned above, including in particular any recommendation for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;

5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.'

2. Following the adoption of resolution 721 (1991) I asked my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, to travel once again to Yugoslavia on my behalf. He did so and remained in Yugoslavia from 1 to 9 December 1991. Once again, as was the case on two of his earlier missions, Mr. Vance and his party travelled on a special aircraft generously made available by the Government of Switzerland. I wish to express here my profound appreciation for this further gesture of support on the part of Switzerland for the work of the Organization. The composition of the official party that accompanied Mr. Vance on this occasion, together with the programme of the mission, are set out in annex I to the present report. This was Mr. Vance's fourth mission to the area since the adoption of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) on 25 September 1991. His first mission had taken place from 11 to 18 October 1991 and is described in my report (S/23169) of 25 October 1991 to the Council. His second mission spanned the period from 3 to 9 November 1991 and on 11 November I provided an informal briefing to the members of the Security Council about its outcome. The third mission extended from 17 to 24 November 1991 and by a letter which I subsequently addressed to the President of the Security Council on 24 November (S/23239), I reported thereon to the Council. It was during that mission that the Geneva Agreement, which is appended to that letter, was signed on 23 November 1991.

3. The main purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent visit to Yugoslavia was twofold: first, to urge the three Yugoslav parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November to comply fully with the commitments into which they had entered on that occasion; and, second, to carry forward with the same parties discussions which he and Under-Secretary-General Goulding had initiated during the preceding mission, with a view to defining a concept and operational plan for a peace-keeping operation which would be acceptable to the

parties, and which I might recommend to the Security Council if the conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. At the same time as Mr. Vance's mission, a small team led by the Director of Field Operations Division visited Yugoslavia to undertake a preliminary examination of the logistical environment in the country.

I. Implementation of the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991

4. In connection with the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, Mr. Vance focused in his discussions in Yugoslavia on the lifting by Croatia of the remaining blockade of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) barracks and installations inside Croatia and the withdrawal from that Republic of the personnel, weapons and military equipment in those barracks and installations. He urged all parties most strongly to give effect to the unconditional cease-fire to which they had agreed at Geneva. Additionally, he gave serious attention to the humanitarian situation in the country and urged that humanitarian assistance be provided as fully and rapidly as possible – particularly to displaced persons.

A. *Unblocking and withdrawal of JNA units in Croatia*

5. Following the signature of the Geneva Agreement on 23 November, the unblocking of the hitherto blockaded JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the withdrawal from Croatia of unblocked personnel, weapons and military equipment had proceeded at a somewhat quickened pace. This process was, however, still attended by difficulties and these were apparent at the Marshall Tito barracks in Zagreb and at other military bases/facilities, especially in the port of Split. As a result of the latter difficulties, Mr. Vance asked his Special Adviser, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, to travel ahead to Zagreb in an effort to assist the parties in the process, and this he did on 26 November.On 29/30 November, Ambassador Okun visited the blockaded facilities at Split together with the head of the European Community-led Monitor Mission. Ambassad or Dirk van Houten. Subsequently, a very serious difficulty arose when, on 3 December, the ZMAJ military aircraft repair and maintenance facility of JNA, located on the outskirts of Zagreb, was blockaded.

6. Following his own arrival in Yugoslavia, Mr. Vance was informed by both the JNA leadership and by the Croatian authorities that the difficulties over the future disposition of plant and equipment at the ZMAJ facility represented a potential breaking point in the entire process. On 6 December, Ambassador Okun, who had by that time joined Mr. Vance at Belgrade, was once again dispatched to Zagreb to help to resolve the difficulties over ZMAJ. During the next 48 hours, he was in touch with all concerned parties, including the leadership of the ZMAJ and other facilities. Thanks to the round-the-clock work of Ambassador Okun, Ambassador van Houten and others, I was advised on 8 December that the parties had reached full agreement at Zagreb resolving all outstanding issues with respect to the lifting of the blockade of all JNA facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved. A facsimile reproduction of the text of the joint statement of 8 December is attached to the present report as annex II.

B. *The unconditional cease-fire*

7. In the days following the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, there arose an increased level of hope that the cease-fire agreed to on that occasion would take hold. That hope was sustained by a certain reduction in the incidence of armed exchanges. During the week of 25 November, however, there took place a number of artillery and other attacks against various points in Croatia. At the same time, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, the unblocking/withdrawal process slowed down. In this connection, Mr. Vance was informed by senior defence officials at Belgrade of their view that these two developments were linked. In this period Mr. Vance continued to urge full resumption and the earliest conclusion of the process of unblocking and withdrawal, while on the other hand stressing the need for full and immediate implementation of the cease-fire agreement. None the less, in those days, a number of artillery and rocket attacks were launched against parts of eastern Slavonia in the Republic of Croatia, and especially on the town of Osijek and its hinterland. Then, in addition to a further attack on Osijek there took place, at almost precisely the same moment on 6 December, a deeply shocking artillery attack on the civilian population in the historic centre of Dubrovnik. Mr. Vance, who was in Sarajevo when he learned of these developments, immediately protested against these outrageous acts to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, for he could see no possible justification for them. I myself reiterated these sentiments in a public statement issued in New York on the same day. It remains unclear as to whether the two above-mentioned attacks were linked. Subsequently, there have been armed clashes on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, including again in eastern Slavonia, and in western Slavonia. There have in the past two weeks also been credible reports of tactical advances by regular military units of JNA and by Serbian irregular armed groups in the direction of Osijek, in violation of the unconditional cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile Croatian forces have for their part been accused by JNA of numerous provocative violations of the cease-fire agreement. At least some of these charges are not without foundation. It is the view of my Personal Envoy that all sides, and especially the irregular forces, have been wanting in observing the Geneva Agreement in respect of the cease-fire. It also appears to be the case that the cease-fire violations by JNA have been more numerous and certainly more violent.

C. *Humanitarian aspects of the Geneva Agreement*

8. The humanitarian aspect of the Geneva Agreement is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 below.

II. Feasibility of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia

9. As stated above, the second purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent mission to Yugoslavia was to pursue discussion of the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping operation there.

10. It will be recalled from my letter of 24 November 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/23239) that during his previous mission, from 17 to 23 November 1991, Mr. Vance had been told by the Yugoslav participants at the meeting convened at Geneva on 23 November 1991, namely Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, and General Valkjo Kadijevic, Secretary of State for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that they wanted to see the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation as soon as possible; they had generally welcomed a possible concept for such an operation, its mandate, its organization and the areas where it would be deployed, which had been put forward in preliminary form by Mr. Vance in Geneva.

11. During his most recent mission, in the course of further meetings with the above-mentioned leaders, as well as with a number of other personalities, including Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding further defined and elaborated the concept which they had put forward at Geneva. Their basic approach was to concentrate a United Nations peace-keeping force in those areas of Croatia in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. It was hoped that by thus tackling the heart of the fires which have recently blazed in Yugoslavia, a further spread of the conflagration could be avoided and the necessary conditions created for successful negotiations on an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

12. On this basis, United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in these areas, which would be designated as 'United Nations Protected Areas' (UNPAs). They would be demilitarized and all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the UNPAs, all of the JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside the Republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

13. All aspects of this concept were discussed at length by Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding with their interlocutors. By the end of their visit, they were in a position to prepare a working paper which described in some detail the concept and an operational plan for putting it into effect which had emerged from the discussions, and with which their three principal interlocutors had all expressed a wide measure of agreement. Copies of this paper, the text of which is contained in annex III to the present report, were given to Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman and to General Kadijevic on 8 December 1991. Initial reactions which Mr. Vance received from them before he left Yugoslavia confirmed their support for his approach. However, it has become clear, both from his discussions with other interlocutors and from statements to the press, that at least one leader of the Serbian communities in Croatia was not at that time able to accept all aspects of the concept and operational plan.

14. Throughout his discussions, Mr. Vance made it clear to his interlocutors that he had not yet decided whether to advise me that the necessary conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. He said that his decision would continue to depend on sustained evidence that the Yugoslav participants at the meeting at Geneva on 23 November 1991 were seriously implementing all aspects of the agreement signed on that occasion. It would also depend on his receiving from those participants categorical assurances that all concerned would accept an operation on the lines discussed and that they would give it the cooperation it would require to carry out its mandate. For the reason described in the preceding paragraph, the assurances sought from President Milosevic would be especially important in this regard.

III. Humanitarian aspects of the situation in Yugoslavia

15. The humanitarian dimensions of the Yugoslavia problem, on which I dwelt at some length in my report of 25 October 1991 (S/23169), have continued to grow. The number of persons displaced by the conflict now exceeds 500,000 and is increasing still. Two thirds of the displaced persons are women and children. Indigenous resources for assistance to this population are rapidly being depleted, and the local hospitality which to date has permitted the placement of well over half of the displaced persons with host families is eroding. The ever more difficult economic situation, shortages, the high cost of certain basic household items and of fuel, as well as rising unemployment, and the onset of winter are likely to compel even more displaced persons to seek shelter in collective facilities. Although most of the displaced remain within the frontiers of Yugoslavia's six Republics, a growing number have sought refuge in other countries, in particular in Hungary, which now hosts over 40,000 persons.

16. In response to a request on my part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has taken the lead in coordinating humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system to the displaced within Yugoslavia. A joint funding appeal for an initial six-month programme, valued at US$ 24.3 million, was issued by the High Commissioner on 3 December 1991, covering the coordinated programmes of the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ($16.47 million), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) ($5.11 million), and the World Health Organization ($2.72 million). The United Nations programme will be implemented in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The assistance foreseen consists, in the first stage, of staple food and household items, essential medicines and medical equipment, infant and children's foods, child-care articles, educational support, and specialized care for persons suffering from war-related trauma. UNHCR is delivering emergency aid in December in the form of blankets and basic foodstuffs, while the programme outlined in the joint appeal will be implemented as from 1 January 1992. Although aid from bilateral, multilateral and private sources is flowing into various parts of Yugoslavia, prolongation of the conflict and the spectre of even larger displacement make imperative an early and strong donor response to the coordinated United Nations assistance programme. For its part, UNICEF has in particular been active at Dubrovnik, where a senior official has been present throughout the past weeks.

17. Alongside the provision of material assistance, attention must be devoted to the protection of the displaced population. Incidents of detention of displaced persons, of organized movements of displaced persons into areas from which others have fled and of pressure on specific groups to evacuate certain villages or towns have given rise to serious concern. Mr. Vance raised this matter with his interlocutors, including with President Milosevic on 2 December and again on 5 December. A full and detailed response to his enquiries is awaited. The impossibility for many displaced persons to avail themselves of their acquired rights (such as pensions or other social benefits) limits their ability to be self-reliant and places additional burdens on the local authorities and on the international community. Prospects for displaced persons to avail themselves of the right to return to their homes seem in many areas to be dim. In addition, the very nature of the war makes the delivery of assistance to civilian victims of the conflict in some areas difficult or impossible.

18. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) now has some 50 delegates based at Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Ljubljana, Osijek (Slavonia), Rijeka, Split and Zagreb. Since mid-October 1991, ICRC has participated in a multilateral negotiating commission, meeting almost daily at Zagreb to discuss, among other issues, the release of prisoners and the protection of the civilian population. On 9 November, more than 700 prisoners were released simultaneously by the two parties to the present conflict in Bosanski Samac (Bosnia Herzogovina) under ICRC supervision. Then, following an agreement reached at Zagreb on 8 December between the Croatian Government and the Federal Army, under the auspices of ICRC, the simultaneous liberation of 1,600 prisoners was to have taken place on 10 December 1991.

19. At the invitation of ICRC, plenipotentiary representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Army met at Geneva on 26 and 27 November 1991 and made a common reaffirmation of their willingness and intention to apply the provisions of international humanitarian law.

20. Other activities being carried out at present by ICRC in Yugoslavia include visits to some 4,000 prisoners, the operation of a tracing agency, the provision of relief supplies to displaced persons, the operation of two relief ships on the Dalmatian Coast, the provision of medical aid and, as indicated above, the promotion of respect for humanitarian principles and for the Red Cross emblem.

IV. Observations

21. The conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist. The Security Council in its resolution 721 (1991) underscored the position expressed by Mr. Vance that such an operation could not be envisaged without full compliance by the parties with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In this connection, it is important to note that while the process of unblocking and withdrawal from Croatia of those JNA units hitherto blockaded is at present proceeding, the unconditional cease-fire remains unimplemented. As regards the humanitarian aspects of the agreement, the situation is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 above.

22. In the circumstances prevailing today, there is a most urgent need for the three Yugoslav parties who signed the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 (namely President Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia, President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia and General Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to ensure full compliance with the terms of that agreement. This is not only required of them by virtue of their signatures on the document, it is also essential in order to facilitate the resumption of the political negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the problems of Yugoslavia and her peoples.

23. In the period immediately ahead, the parties must – as confirmed most recently in the Zagreb Joint Statement of 8 December 1991 – complete expeditiously the unblocking of all remaining JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the relocation of blockaded personnel and military equipment to points outside that Republic. The parties need also to observe, and to ensure that all others observe, the agreed unconditional cease-fire. An effective cease-fire as an essential precondition for the deployment of a peace-keeping operation does not mean that random and occasional violations of the cease-fire would rule out such an operation. What it does mean is that before I could recommend that the Security Council take so expensive and innovative a step, there would have to be sustained evidence that the Yugoslav leaders are willing and able to implement agreements which they have signed. Indeed, I see no reason for further cease-fire agreements in the present conflict. What is needed is immediate and continuing compliance with commitments already entered into by the parties. The Security Council may wish to consider ways by which it would seek to ensure such compliance.

24. Full compliance with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 would permit accelerated consideration of the question of establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. I believe that a solid basis for such consideration is provided by the Concept Paper which is attached to the present report as annex III and which has met with a wide measure of agreement from the parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In the meantime, I and my Personal Envoy await the assurances which we have sought in particular from President Milosevic, that all presently armed elements would extend full support to the kind of peace-keeping operation described in the Concept Paper. The importance of this consideration cannot be over-emphasized.

25. A soundly-based and effective cease-fire would further open the way for constructive negotiations between the representatives of the Republics. In this respect, the Conference on Yugoslavia, under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington, enjoys the full support of the Security Council, as reflected in resolution 713 (1991). The Conference has been adjourned since 5 November, although Lord Carrington held an informal stock-taking session with the Presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics on 9 December. The Conference, it will be recalled, is guided by a number of considerations, including those set forth in the Declaration issued by the Twelve member States of the European Community at Rome on 8 November 1991 (S/23203). That declaration stated *inter alia* that 'the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement'. The Conference has also, with the agreement of its participants, ruled out any changes in external or internal borders by means of force. I believe that any selective, uncoordinated departure from those principles could hold very serious dangers, not only for the republics of Yugoslavia, but for all of her peoples and indeed for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. It was in this connection that, on 10 December 1991, I addressed a letter to the current President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, Foreign Minister van den Broek of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the text of which is reproduced as annex IV to the present report.

26. It seems clear that the peoples and Republics of Yugoslavia will continue for a considerable time to suffer the adverse consequences of the conflict, even if there is an early end to the present hostilities. Even in that event, the effect of the conflict on the domestic economy and on future relations with traditional trading partners will be long-lasting. These consequences will of course be greatly magnified by continued fighting.

27. The general situation in Yugoslavia continues to worsen. The crisis in the humanitarian area in particular is deepening. In this respect, I strongly urge Governments to respond positively to the appeal that has been made on my behalf by the High Commissioner for Refugees for the joint humanitarian programme being coordinated by her Office. The present conflict and its attendant suffering can be brought to an end, if there is sufficient political will among the country's senior political and military leaders. The international community, already responding to many crises elsewhere, has been, and is, I believe, prepared to assist the Yugoslav peoples if the conditions described in this report are met. It is my most sincere hope that the Yugoslav political and military authorities will grasp the opportunity afforded by such readiness.

28. I and my Personal Envoy will remain actively seized of this matter and, with his most valued collaboration, I shall keep the Security Council informed of developments, in particular as to whether the unconditional cease-fire envisaged in Geneva on 23 November 1991 is taking hold effectively.

Annex I

Fourth mission to Yugoslavia of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance (1–9 December 1991)

A. *Composition of the official party*

1. The mission was led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, and comprised also the following members:

Mr. Marrack Goulding
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun
Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy

Mr. J. P. Kavanagh
Senior Officer
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Colonel H. Purola
Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

Mr. H. Heitmann
Political Affairs Officer
Office for the Research and Collection of Information

2. Further United Nations Secretariat staff members participating in the mission were: Miss Susan Dicey, Social Sciences Assistant; Mr. Robert Balzer, Operations Officer, and Mr. Ernesto Triana and Mr. John Linehan, Communications Officers.

B. *Programme of meetings during the Fourth Vance Mission*

[omitted]

N.B. As indicated in the body of the present report, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy, was engaged throughout the period 6 to 8 December in a negotiation at Zagreb with all concerned parties regarding the unblocking of all remaining JNA facilities in Croatia.

Annex II

Joint statement by Dr. M. Granic, Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia, and General A. Raseta, Commanding General of the 5th Army District of the Yugoslav National Army, issued at Zagreb on 8 December 1991

We, the undersigned, meeting today, Sunday, 8 December 1991, in Zagreb as plenipotentiaries for our respective parties, and after careful examination and discussion, have reached agreement with regard to all outstanding issues for implementation with immediate effect:

1. With regard to the barracks at Dugo Selo:

   – Completion of removal of mines:

   – Evacuation of the garrison and its relocation;

Adequate transport capacity may be deployed to this end.

2. A formula for sharing facilities and equipment of the ZMAJ facility, thus permitting evacuation of servicemen and agreed equipment from the facility and from Pleso airbase. Combat aircraft currently undergoing servicing or otherwise located at the facility will also be free to leave. Adequate Air cargo capacity will be allowed in to complete the evacuation.

3. A formula for sharing outstanding equipment at the Ivan Gosnjak Technical Training Centre, thus permitting its immediate evacuation.

4. Evacuation of the Military Hospital and its release to the Croatian authorities for treatment of all patients.

The parties further note that in addition to successful evacuation arrangements concluded for Sibenik and Pula, arrangements for Split are well in hand. They further noted that mine-clearing arrangements at the Marshall Tito barracks are well in hand.

With this agreement the parties concur that all outstanding issues have been resolved with respect to the blockade lifting of all Yugoslav National Army (JNA) facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved, as set out in the Hague Agreement of 18 October 1991 and the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, as well as the Zagreb implementing Agreement of 22 November 1991.

Both parties wish to express their recognition of the roles played by Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten and Ambassador Herbert S. Okun in helping to bring this agreement to its final, successful conclusion.

For the Republic of Croatia

(Signed) Dr. Mate Granic

For the Yugoslav Army

(*Signed*) General Andrija Raseta

Witnessed by

(*Signed*) Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten

(*Signed*) Ambassador Herbert S. Okun

Annex III

Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, as discussed with Yugoslav leaders by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

November/December 1991

General principles

1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. It would not prejudge the outcome of such negotiations.

2. The operation would be established by the United Nations Security Council, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General. Before making such a recommendation, the Secretary-General would need to be satisfied that all concerned in the conflict were, in a serious and sustained way, abiding by the arrangements, including an unconditional cease-fire, agreed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. He would also need to receive, through his Personal Envoy, categorical assurances that all the Yugoslav parties concerned in the conflict accepted the concept which he intended to recommend to the Security Council and that they would provide all necessary assistance and cooperation to enable the peace-keeping operation to carry out its functions.

3. The military and police personnel required for the operation would be contributed, on a voluntary basis in response to a request from the Secretary-General, by the Governments of Member States of the United Nations. The contributing States would be approved by the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties.

4. All members of the peace-keeping operation would be under the operational command of the Secretary-General and would not be permitted to receive operational orders from the national authorities. They would be required to be completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence.

5. In accordance with its normal practice, the Security Council would probably establish the operation for an initial period of six months. Subject to the Council's agreement, the operation would remain in Yugoslavia until a negotiated settlement of the conflict was achieved. The Secretary-General would submit regular reports to the Security Council, normally every six months. These reports would contain his recommendations on extension of the operation's mandate.

6. The operation would be financed collectively by the Member States of the United Nations. But the various Yugoslav authorities would be expected to make available to the United Nations, free of charge, as much as possible of the accommodation and other facilities and supplies, such as food and fuel, that would be required by the operation. They would be asked to conclude with the United Nations agreements concerning the privileges, immunities and facilities which the operation and its members would need in order to carry out their functions, especially complete freedom of movement and communications.

Basic concept

7. United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as 'United Nations Protected Areas'. These areas would be demilitarized; all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), all JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside that republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

The United Nations Protected Areas

8. The UNPAs would be areas in Croatia in which the Secretary-General judged that special arrangements were required during an interim period to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. They would be areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. As already stated, the special arrangements in these areas would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

9. There would be three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. They would comprise the following *opstine* or parts of *opstine*:

Eastern Slavonia:	Beli Manstir
	Those parts of Osijek which lie east of Osijek city
	Vukovar
	Certain villages in the extreme eastern part of Vinkovci
Western Slavonia:	Grubisno Polje
	Daruvar
	Pakrac
	The western parts of Nova Gradiska
	The eastern parts of Novska
Krajina:	Kostajnica
	Petrinja
	Dvor
	Glina
	Vrgin Most
	Vognic
	Slunj
	Titova Korenica
	Donji Lapac
	Gracac
	Obrovac
	Benkovac
	Knin

Before deployment of the Force began, the exact boundaries of the UNPAs would be decided by an advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local leaders.

The deployment and functions of the United Nations Force

10. The function of protecting the inhabitants of the UNPAs would be shared between the United Nations Force's infantry units and its civilian police monitors. The infantry would ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized. The police monitors would ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discrimination against any nationality and with full respect for the human rights of all residents of the UNPAs.

11. The infantry units would be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be lightly armed but would use armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. They would control access to the UNPAs by establishing check-points on all roads and principal tracks leading into them and at important junctions inside them. At these check-points they would stop and, if necessary, search vehicles and individuals to ensure that no military formations or armed groups entered the UNPAs and that no weapons, ammunition, explosives or other military equipment were brought into them. They would patrol extensively inside the UNPAs on foot, and by vehicle and helicopter. They would also investigate any complaints made to them about violations of the demilitarized status of the UNPAs. Any confirmed violations would be taken up with the offending party and would, if necessary, be reported by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. If serious tension were to develop between nationalities in a UNPA, the United Nations Force would interpose itself between the two sides in order to prevent hostilities.

12. The civilian police monitors would also be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be unarmed. They would have no executive responsibility for the maintenance of public order but they would closely monitor the work of the local police forces. To this end, they would be co-located with police headquarters in each region and *opstina* and would accompany the local police on their patrols and in their performance of their other duties. They would investigate any complaints of discrimination or other abuse of human rights and would report to the Chief of the United Nations Force any confirmed cases of discrimination or abuse. They would require free and immediate access to all premises and facilities of, or under the control of, the local police forces.

13. The United Nations Force would also include a group of military observers. They would be unarmed, in accordance with normal United Nations practice. They would initially be deployed in the UNPAs to verify the demilitarization of those areas. As soon as demilitarization had been effected, the military observers would be transferred to parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina adjacent to Croatia. Their functions there would be to patrol extensively, to liaise with the local authorities and to warn the Chief of the United Nations Force if

inter-communal tension threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity established by the Force in the UNPAs. Their good offices would be available to help resolve local difficulties and to investigate allegations of inter-communal tension or aggression. The exact locations in which the military observers would operate would be decided by the advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local authorities. There would also be a small detachment of military observers at Dubrovnik.

14. The military and police personnel of the United Nations Force would arrive in Yugoslavia as soon as possible after the Security Council decided to establish the Force. They would be deployed simultaneously in all three UNPAs. The Force's assumption of responsibility for the protection of these areas would be synchronized with the demilitarization process. To this end, close coordination would be required with the commanders of the forces currently deployed in each of the UNPAs and agreed timetables would be established in order to link deployment of the United Nations Force with the demilitarization of each area.

Demilitarization of the UNPAs

15. On the basis of the agreed timetables, demilitarization of the UNPAs would be implemented as rapidly as possible, in the following way:

(a) All units and personnel of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Croatian National Guard, as well as any Territorial Defence units or personnel not based in the UNPAs, would be withdrawn from them;

(b) All Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be disbanded and demobilized. Disbandment would involve the temporary dissolution of the units' command structures. Demobilization would mean that the personnel involved would cease to wear any uniform or carry any weapons, though they could continue to be paid by the local authorities;

(c) The weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be handed over to units of JNA or the Croatian National Guard, as the case might be, before those units withdrew from the UNPAs. Alternatively, they could be handed over to the United Nations Force for safe custody during the interim period, if that arrangement was preferred by the units concerned;

(d) All paramilitary, irregular or volunteer units or personnel would either be withdrawn from the UNPAs or, if resident in them, be disbanded and demobilized.

16. It would be the responsibility of each unit, before it withdrew or was disbanded, to remove any mines which it had laid while deployed in the UNPAs.

17. The implementation of the above arrangements for demilitarization of the UNPAs would be verified by the United Nations Force.

Relocation of the Yugoslav National Army

18. In parallel with the assumption by the United Nations Force of its protective functions in the UNPAs, any JNA units deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated to places outside that republic. A timetable for this relocation would be agreed between the Chief of the United Nations Force and the Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All Serbian territorial, paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units (other than those disbanded and demobilized in the UNPAs) would similarly withdraw from Croatia. These withdrawals would be verified by the military observers of the United Nations Force.

Local police forces

19. The maintenance of public order in the UNPAs would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the UNPA in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing *opstine* councils in the UNPAs. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces.

Return of displaced persons to their homes

20. In accordance with established international principles. the United Nations policy is to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the recent hostilities who so desire. The lead in this matter is being taken by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations. If a United Nations Force were established in Yugoslavia, it would provide all appropriate support to this effort in the UNPAs. The United Nations police monitors would have an especially important role in this regard.

Organization of a United Nations Force

21. If a peace-keeping operation were established to carry out the above-described functions, it would be commanded by a civilian Chief of Mission who would receive his instructions from, and report to, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As already stated, the Secretary-General would himself report regularly to the Security Council, whose guidance he would seek if any difficulties arose in implementation of the Force's mandate. Under the authority of the Chief of Mission, there would be a Force Commander, with the rank of Major General, who would command the military elements, and a Police Commissioner, who would command the civilian police monitors. The headquarters of the Force would be located at Banja Luka, with sub-offices at Belgrade and Zagreb.

22. To carry out the functions described above, the Force would require approximately 10 infantry battalions, 100 military observers and 500 police monitors, together with the necessary civilian and military support personnel. This would indicate a strength of somewhat over 10,000 persons.

Annex IV

Letter dated 10 December 1991 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

I wish to share with you concerns which I have in regard to the situation in Yugoslavia.

These concerns have been deepened by the report that I have just received from my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, who returned last evening from a fourth mission to Yugoslavia. They have also been deepened by the outcome of yesterday's informal meeting of the Presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, which Lord Carrington convened at The Hague in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia.

I shall shortly be reporting to the Security Council on the outcome of Mr. Vance's mission. As far as a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia is concerned, difficulties persist – owing to the fact that the Geneva agreement of 23 November is not being fully implemented. A paper comprising a concept and operational plan of a potential peace-keeping operation has, however, been left with the principal parties by Mr. Vance. It has met with a wide measure of agreement from them.

In his report to me today, Mr. Vance has described widely expressed apprehensions about the possibility of premature recognition of the independence of some of the Yugoslav republics and the effect that such a move might have on the remaining republics. Leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia were among the many political and military figures who last week underscored to Mr. Vance their own strong fears in this regard. More than one of his high-level interlocutors described the possibly explosive consequences of such a development as being a 'potential time bomb'.

Given these anxieties, I believe that the Twelve were correct when they reiterated, at their special European Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting held at Rome on 8 November, that the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, 'can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement . . .'. As we know, that overall settlement is being pursued by the Conference on Yugoslavia under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington.

Let me be clear: I am not in any way calling into question the principle of self-determination which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. However, I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina and also Macedonia; indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region. I believe, therefore, that uncoordinated actions should be avoided.

I should be grateful if you could bring my concerns to the attention of your partners among the Twelve, given the particular responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

4. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) (S/23363, 5 January 1992)

Introduction

1. The present further report is being provided to the Security Council pursuant to its resolution 721 (1991), which was adopted unanimously on 27 November 1991. In addition, it takes into account the contents of resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, which the Council also adopted unanimously and by which, *inter alia*, it approved the report of my distinguished predecessor dated 11 December 1991.[1]

2. It will be recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 721 (1991), among other things, envisaged that the Secretary-General would present early recommendations to the Council including the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. At the same time, resolution 721 (1991) also endorsed the statement of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, that the deployment of such an operation could not be envisaged without, *inter alia*, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed at Geneva on 23 November 1991.[2]

3. Having generally reaffirmed resolution 721 (1991), the Security Council by resolution 724 (1991) endorsed my predecessor's offer to send to Yugoslavia a preparatory group, including military personnel, as part of the continuing mission of the Personal Envoy, to carry forward preparations for the possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation.

I. Fifth Mission to Yugoslavia by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, 28 December 1991–4 January 1992

4. On 18 December 1991, three days after the adoption of resolution 724 (1991), Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy, arrived in Yugoslavia at the head of the 20-person Preparatory Group, comprising 11 military officers, as well as senior civil police officers and civilian political and legal officers of the Secretariat. The Preparatory Group was successful in carrying forward preparations for possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation. In the period from 18 to 30 December 1991, the Preparatory Group developed and refined contingency plans in the event that the Security Council later approved the establishment of a peace-keeping operation on the basis of the concept paper set out in annex III to the report of 11 December 1991.[1] During this period, Ambassador Okun also continued discussions on political matters with the principal political and military leaders concerned. A description of the work of the Preparatory Group is contained in annex I to the present report.

5. On 25 December 1991, Ambassador Okun returned to New York and reported to my predecessor

ANNEX 93:

UNPROFOR, CODED CABLE FROM GENERAL STATISH NAMBIAR TO MARRACK GOULDING, 14 SEPTEMBER 1992

CBN. 183

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
U N P R O F O R

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

M O S T I M M E D I A T E

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK ONLY ONLY

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 14 SEPTEMBER 1992

NUMBER : UNPROFOR. Z. 113

SUBJECT: PERUCA DAM

1. As you know, two experts, O'Flaherty and Long, came last week to inspect Peruca. For our meetings with Secretary Vance and Lord Owen at the weekend, we obtained their interim report (attached). It is somewhat alarming. At a meeting with Panic and Panic, at which Vance was accompanied by me and Thornberry, copy of the interim report was handed to them. Ahtisaari, meeting simultaneously with Milosevic, also gave him copy. Owen was fully briefed on the situation before his departure for the EC/FM's meeting. We asked Gen. Panic for full JA cooperation on the matter of the dam's preparation for demolition, as suspected by the experts on their inspection, and he and the Prime Minister agreed. After a full briefing by the experts yesterday evening, Thornberry has written today to General Panic on this subject (attached), and has also asked the Knin authorities for their full cooperation. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that UNPROFOR would assume full responsibility for this installation, and Vance then asked us to follow up and implement this agreement. I accordingly directed Kenbatt to send at least a platoon to take over the dam, the TDF and militia having been told to leave, and the UN flag is now flying at Peruca. As you know, there were, previously, UNMOs and occasional ECMM teams there. But this is not enough and, in view of what we regard as the emergency situation which evidently exists, and the Serbian agreement given in Belgrade and previously in the Joint Commission, I decided on appropriate emergency action by UNPROFOR's military component in Sector South.

2. The experts reported verbally to Thornberry last evening. They are departing for Dublin today and will complete their report in the next days. We have asked that the main body of the report be couched in language that is widely accessible, with the technical details in annexes, and that, if necessary, the report should be sent in advance of the annexes.

CBN. 183

3. O'Flaherty and Long say that both sides seemed unusually happy to see them. The Croats are really fearful of the dam's destruction: the Knin Serbs, the experts said, had evidently concluded that they have "a tiger by the tail". They were given full access to all documentation by the Croats, who had removed it before departing. They were troubled by the very apparent lack of expertise on the Serb side in Krajina. The dam has three exit channels, of which the central one drives turbines to generate power in situ. The top gate is the flood gate; the bottom takes water through a channel into the river below; its content is utilised further downstream by the Croats to supply southern Dalmatia. This bottom channel was left open by the Croats. For a couple of months after UNPROFOR's takeover, it was inspected by one of our officers who has some technical expertise. However, around 14 June the channel was closed by the Serbs and our people were warned not to approach it. The experts found that there was circumstantial evidence of explosive charges having been placed in this channel. The Knin "Minister of Economic Affairs", Bjegovic, told them he knew that this channel must be brought into service as soon as possible.

4. The top, flood-gate is operated either manually, or by machinery on top of the dam which has been damaged by mortar-fire. The gate is only partly open, and most be fully lowered without delay, manually. The experts were somewhat concerned that this mechanism might be booby-trapped, and said that it would have to be expertly inspected before it was utilised.

5. While the water-level is, currently, somewhat below danger-level, flood conditions greater than a once-in-five-years calculation would put water over the top of the dam, unless both channels were fully open. This would probably lead to the dam disintegrating in 24-48 hours, and a wall of water moving down the valley from the lake behind the dam. With autumn rains approaching, no time can be lost. The dam's future, at this point, is dependent on the weather, which, in that mountainous region near the coast, can be very changeable, especially over the next weeks.

6. Thus, we believe, based on the experts' report, that the necessary course of action is as follows: - (i) take exclusive control of the installation and get the two sides to back off; (ii) using extreme care, and conscious of possible booby-trapping, get the (top) floodgate fully open, the manual process perhaps taking two hours, as the gate is very gently lowered; and leave it open; (iii) survey the bottom channel and gallery for ordnance; (iv) (probably) de-mine; (v) open the bottom channel - and leave it open; (vi) under UNPROFOR management (until an eventual agreement on user) get the generating capability (central channel) repaired and hooked up again (power for Krajina); (vii) have the top gate machinery repaired.

CZN. 183

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7. The experts told us that, as they are civil engineers, they did not, themselves, have the requisite expertise to carry out all these steps. Instead, their suggestion was that a mechanical engineer, with hydroelectric career experience, was now required. To Thornberry's enquiry, they said that their organisation - ESB Ireland - could provide the necessary consultants. It might necessitate direct representations from the UN to ESB, stressing the urgency of the situation. They gave the chief executive's name as Joseph Moran, tel. no. (353) (1) 765-831, fax no. (353) (1) 616-600 ("urgent attention of Michael Long").

8. They believed the dam's generating capability "readily reparable" at a "ball-park figure" of approximately $2M.

9. The most important consequence of opening top and bottom channels would be the avoidance of a major environmental disaster; the other would be that Croatia would have - they believed - all the flow that was needed to run their downstream power station.

10. I should like to ask for your urgent assistance, at this time, in seeking the next appropriate consultancy, to provide us with the necessary engineering management skills, until we can divest ourselves of this responsibility.

Endall

ANNEX 94:

UNPROFOR, CODED CABLE FROM GENERAL STATISH NAMBIAR TO MARRACK GOULDING, 19 SEPTEMBER 1992

7.40 WS

CZN 213

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
U N P R O F O R

TNLY

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, UNOG ONLY

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1992

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-143

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KNIN AUTHORITIES

1. We received an urgent request from the Knin authorities that Thornberry, as Joint Commission (JC) Chairman, should meet with them as soon as possible to discuss "matters of great concern'. As he had planned to look over what was now happening at Peruca and at Maslenica Bridge prior to yesterday's JC meeting, this took place on Thursday evening. Hadzic was absent; instead, they featured the new, and uneasy, Martic - Spanovic duo, with Zivkovic (JC representative) and others. We also had General Rob, Andreev and Echard. An at times rousing (not to say noisy) meeting was followed by a video show and dinner at the conference table for all concerned. At one point we had to warn that we would, if necessary, resist by available means any attempt to seize back Peruca, and while this chilled the atmosphere for a while, the Krajina people then began to settle down.

2. Spanovic began by reading an hour-long presentation and analysis of the RSK's history of cooperation with UNPROFOR. He said that they had heard that a new report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council was being prepared, and were concerned that their side would be accused of being uncooperative, while the Croats would be praised for their conduct. This would be a travesty: Croatia was engaged in daily ceasefire breaches; there had been many armed incursions; the Croats were flying across the UNPAs to re-supply the Moslems with ammunition in BiH with fixed-wing and helicopters; and there had been two major invasions by the Croats of Sector North, seeking to establish a corridor to the Bihac area. Yet it was the Krajina which was being concretely cooperative in the JC, and which had offered a peaceful solution for the Cazin Krajina. They were eager to cooperate on more projects of common concern in the JC. He listed their various areas of cooperation (all of which have begun to occur over the last two weeks; most remaining, at this time, at the level of promise only). Yet UNPROFOR and Croatia were putting intolerable

NYK

PLEASE PASS ON TO GENEVA

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pressure upon them. If they yielded even further, they would be thrown out by the people (Martic said: "they will kill us as traitors") and there would be a return to war. We proposed - (a) that UNPROFOR finish its deployment of mobile teams all along the ceasefire line and greatly improve the security climate in the whole zone, this enabling their special police to return to barracks; (b) a joint assessment to be made by UNPROFOR and the RSK in one month of the overall situation, after which plans could be made for the next period; (c) the JC should establish a special sub-commission to deal exclusively with the question of refugees; this being a very complex issue for both sides; (d) a further special sub-commission should be established for traffic and communications; they were ready to support efforts to open the autoroute and were ready to finalise the matter in terms of the respective obligations of themselves and Croatia; (e) they were ready for talks about Maslenica and other questions; however, these raised complex issues which, if not taken into account, could endanger the whole mission.

3. As regards Peruca, he said that although we had deployed Kenyan troops there, his regular police would control it like any other area. Their workers would immediately begin work on the dam to produce power. If, he said, "we should give the dam over to you it would probably be the end of any of us who agreed to it, Martic and me". Others would seize it (meaning extremists on their side) and that would be the end "for all of us and of the dam". UNPROFOR statements that it would be taken under its control and management created great problems for them. The dam was, indeed, mined (it transpires that Spanovic's former military command when a JNA colonel included the dam) but they were ready to demine it. But they had to have a guarantee that it would not be handed over to Croatia. If that happened, the Krajina would be kept in constant darkness, and they would be held guilty by the people of high treason. They were ready to accept a constant presence of experts from the Security Council and their help.

4. As regards Zemunik airport, they were ready for it to be taken over by UNPROFOR, with the presence of a decreased number of their civil police. The use of the airport should be looked into by the Joint Commission. The airport was heavily mined and prepared, in an extremely complicated way, for destruction. There were many technical problems which were beyond their power to resolve, but they were ready to help as much as possible. They had suggested to the Yugoslav Army that they provide "some details which we do not have".

5. We had gathered that the basic problem might be that, on the very day on which Dalmatia got its power back, there began to be no electricity whatever in the Southern Krajina, with winter approaching. The Croats had (of course) been crowing loudly over this situation. The Krajina people felt that they had been

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betrayed by UNPROFOR when they had withdrawn their "special police", i.e. irregular forces.

6. Therefore, we explained, as best we could, the technical problems that the experts had found, and the imperative resultant need for us to assume interim control and open the crest-gate. We emphasised that it was, even now, in a very dangerous condition, and that further emergency work would have to be done as soon as possible. In this connection, we had called in further international consultants to oversee repairs and operations, and had asked Prime Minister Panic and General Panic, last weekend, for their immediate assistance in having the explosive charges removed. This was a task in which we would seek their help. We had, however, no intention of handing the installation over to anyone, Serb or Croat, at this time. But we would do all in our power to ensure that repairs were completed as rapidly as possible (without saying by whom) and that electrical supplies were provided to Krajina, from whatever source. We mentioned that we had given the Croats a strong warning to stay away from the vicinity, and that there was no question of them receiving back the facility, unless and until there had been agreement, whether in the Joint Commission or elsewhere.

7. On the "special police", we recalled the terms of my letter to them and the agreement they had given to Morillon on 11 September:- withdrawal and confinement to base by 20 September; full disarmament and demobilisation by 15 October. (We shall publicise this agreement today). We had the utmost confidence that they would stand by their promise.

8. Martic then said that Spanovic had not accurately conveyed their position on the dam. It was theirs, and the ground around it was Serb ground. Any idea of giving it to anyone was unthinkable. His people would have to take it back. We observed that while there were limited numbers of Kenyan troops there, they had their orders. We hoped that no one, not even Martic, who had indicated his personal intention of re-possessing the dam, would create a most unhappy and unfortunate incident, which might also, given the situation, lead to a massive environmental disaster. After a little while, Martic said that he was "glad that the Kenyan battalion has authority to use force", because the Croats had been making threatening noises and moves in the vicinity. (In fact, the security situation around Peruca has calmed down almost entirely since 14 September.) He also stated that, for his part, he was fully willing to arrive at a negotiated agreement with the Croats about water and power from the dam, because it could usually generate plenty for all who needed it. He went on to confirm that the "special police" were already being decreased; this was also essential to them for economic reasons. He said, however, that they were at present obliged to keep many more than they wished because of the conduct of the other side on the ceasefire line, and

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the failure (he said) of the Polish and Nigerian battalions to stand up to the Croats when they threatened.

9. After this he asserted that the Pink Zones were Serbian and that Croatia would never be allowed to control them again, nor would Croats be allowed to come back. "It is better to start the war again than to give back this territory, piece by piece". We recalled that everybody had agreed to 762, and everybody knew what it said and meant, and everybody around the table stood by their promises. Were we now to tell the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council that the Krajina meant to break its word? In this case, the Council would have to decide what was to be done. Did anyone really want to expose the people of Krajina to a new war, when 762 provided a practical compromise to a problem which was deeply painful for all?

10. At this point Zivkovic, who had been watching the process with unconcealed amusement, said that such discussions were unnecessary. Neither the Vance Plan nor 762 had any precise time frame. Time itself would help to heal and resolve. But Krajina's interests were not being fully protected in the implementation of 762. UNPROFOR was not being tough enough with the Croats about the conduct of their military, while squeezing Knin intolerably; and gave a long list of incidents of Croatian military misbehaviour.

11. Martic chimed in to say that, in order to open the motorway, the Croats would have to agree to withdraw from around the highway at Slavonski Brod and "to stop shelling our corridor - then we can agree on almost anything". But he wondered if they would agree to this: "the Croats are very hard: or, they could put their troops there under the control of UNPROFOR".

12. Spanovic intervened to wind up the three-hour meeting:- the situation at Peruca could and should remain as UNPROFOR had explained it; they would consult their experts as soon as we all had the report, and "we shall then find one another".

13. The next item was a video which purported to show the range of weaponry, documentation, etc. seized by the "special police" when they intercepted the Croat/Moslem infiltration on or about 24 August, and a lengthy press conference given by Serb commanders on the subject, out of which UNPROFOR did not come well (especially Polbatt). In comparison to slick local standards, it is amateurish, but earnest. It is a troubling film. The usual Krajina dinner was served during transmission, and drinks were somewhat re-built.

14. The sometimes robust deliberations had, we think, some consequences the following day (see separate cable). We have increasingly the impression that Spanovic and Martic have done a deal, according to which Spanovic provides the political thinking

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and gloss, and Martic the popular knee-jerk appeal. Zivkovic is probably brighter than either, and, as a person, stronger but without, as yet, a base. There is some talk of elections, but, for the moment, Hadzic, Martic and Spanovic are on the top of the small but unstable Krajina political pile.

15. We have just received the attached cable. There is undoubtedly an element of bluff in it; but it seems in our interest to have these people - rather than some of the nuttiest extremists - in charge. I shall consider the question overnight; but it would vastly help if the civil engineering consultant we asked for most urgently would get over here, fast, to provide management; and if the Croats would take some of the heat off e.g. by publicly turning on some power to the Krajina.

Endall

ANNEX 95:
UNPROFOR, LETTER FROM CEDRIC THORNBERRY TO PRIME MINISTER MILAN PANIĆ, 21 OCTOBER 1992

CZN-290 CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

EXTREMELY URGENT 21 October 1992

Dear Prime Minister,

Demining of the Peruca Dam

At your and General Panic's meeting on 12 September in Belgrade with Mr. Secretary Vance, General Nambiar and myself, we discussed the very dangerous situation of the Peruca Dam. On 23 September, in response to my letter of 14 September, Colonel Cadjo, on behalf of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, offered to provide specialist assistance to UNPROFOR to demine the dam with UNPROFOR protection, a request to which I agreed on 26 September. Since this time, several written messages have been sent to your military authorities requesting, with increasing urgency, such assistance, and the matter has also been taken up with President Cosic.

We are becoming increasingly concerned by the situation at the dam. The water level, already above flood level, is rising daily. If the dam is not demined in the very near future, thus enabling a further channel to be opened, we face the prospect of a major economic, ecological and possibly humanitarian disaster.

Should it, after all, have proved impossible for you to provide the technical assistance which has been offered, I would greatly appreciate being informed of this as soon as possible and, in any event, by the end of this week. At that time it will become necessary for UNPROFOR to seek emergency assistance from whatever quarter it can be provided in order to avert disaster.

I have to reiterate, dear Prime Minister, that the situation cannot be allowed to continue for more than another 72 hours before UNPROFOR institutes emergency action.

- with best personal wishes

Yours sincerely,

Cedric Thornberry
Deputy Head of Mission
and
Director of Civil Affairs

His Excellency
Mr. Milan Panic
Prime Minister of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade

ANNEX 96:

JOSIP MACAN, "CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS ON THE DAM SINCE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE MINING", 17 SEPTEMBER 1991

JOSIP MACAN, BSc Electrical Eng.
HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA /Croatian Electricity Power Industry/
CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS ON THE DAM SINCE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE MINING
17 September 1991

An ordinary workday at the plant began. Generator No. 1 was operating until 9 o'clock, when it was replaced by generator No. 2 so as to maintain the usual operating regime of the machines. The normal working environment was disrupted only by the echoes of detonations of mortar and tank shells in the nearby village Maljkovo. The generator was stopped at 10 and the control gate on the bottom outlet was opened. Biological minimum was being released from the impoundment.

Around 12 o'clock, the detonations drew closer to the plant, so the necessary orders were issued for preparatory actions in the case of evacuation of the object.

At 12:30, the people on duty spread the news that the first shells were falling into the lake, close to the dam, and that several grenades had hit the dam itself, and that around ten had fallen downstream of the powerhouse. Because of this, an order was issued to the people on duty to implement the tasks to disable the operation of generator No. 1, and to prepare for the evacuation of the power plant.

Because artillery fire intensified, at 15:30 hours an order was issued to the people on duty to evacuate the power plant, and the facilities were left in the condition as follows:

The bottom outlet was left open and 35 m3/sec were being released from the impoundment;

The spillway gate was completely open and water level in the lake was lower than the overflow threshold of 355.00 m.s.l.;

Power distribution 0.4 kV, plant power distribution and 220 V were under voltage and ready for operation;

The switchyard 35 kV was under voltage and all control mechanisms were ready for operation;

The generators were disabled by dismantling the parts necessary for their

activation and safe operation of the generators: pre-turbine butterfly valves were closed as well as the turbine guide vane;

Drainage systems were undamaged and ready for operation.

On the same day, supervision began of the water level of the River Cetina on the measuring chain at the Han Bridge, because by monitoring this section conclusions may be drawn about the quantity of water discharge from the lake and potential damage.

18 September 1991

Around 10 o'clock, the dispatch centre in Split recorded the shutdown of the 110 kV transmission line Peruča - Sinj and the transmission line Peruča - Buško Blato. The shutdown of these transmission lines meant that the switch-yards, 110 kV and 35 kV, were left without power, and consequently the town of Vrlika and power distribution for own consumption 0.4 kV were left without power. The cause of shutting down of the transmission line was a direct shell hit in the transmission line tower Peruča - Sinj in Hrvace.

22 September 1991

Until this day, there had been no change in the River Cetina water level at the Han Bridge, meaning that the hydro-mechanical equipment in the plant was not being manipulated. A sudden drop in the water level was recorded around 15 o'clock, so that the flow at the measuring chain was only 5-6 m3/sec. This meant that the control gate on the bottom outlet was completely closed, so the Cetina riverbed from the power plant to the first larger downstream springs Šilovka and Rumin was virtually dry. This was upsetting because it was obvious that someone was trying to increase the water level in the lake.

October - December 1991

In the second half of October and in November, heavy rains fell in the wider area of the lake. An overflow was registered in mid November, and at the beginning of December the spillway gate was closed, so that by mid December the water was overflowing the gate. By further monitoring of the water level at the Han Bridge measuring chain, we concluded that the water level in the lake was growing, having reached the level which could jeopardize the dam, so we persistently requested from the EC observers to organise an inspection of the dam and to open the spillway gate. Finally, on 25 December 1991, in the presence of the EC observers, representatives of the former Yugoslav Army (YA) and Serbs from Knin, the facility with the drive mechanism for the spillway gate, the facility with the drive mechanism for the hydroelectric power plant headrace tunnel and 2/3 of the road on the dam crest were inspected. The reply to our request to open the spillway gate and to allow us the inspection of the powerhouse and the control gallery was negative.

1 January 1992

The next visit to the dam with the EC observers took place on 1 January 1992. The lake water level was at 360.92 m.s.l., which was seriously threatening the safety of the dam, so, at our request, the spillway gate was opened to reach the level that would ensure the water level in the lake measuring between 359.00 and 360.00 m.s.l.

February 1992

Large quantities of oil were noticed on the surface of the River Cetina, covering the entire surface, which we assumed were from the HE Peruča plant. Such an amount of oil was endangering the flora and the fauna in the River Cetina. It was also threatening the drinking water pumping site for the areas of Omiš, Makarska, and the islands of Brač, Hvar and Korčula.

Chemical analysis of the oil showed that it was transformer oil with the traces of hydraulic oil used in the Peruča plant, thus confirming our assumptions. Because of this, through the EC observer mission, we supplied a programme for oil removal from the surface of the Cetina next to the power plant, but we got no reply to this.

The Serbs who were controlling the dam and hydroelectric power plant Peruča set the oil floating on the Cetina surface on fire. The traces of this arson are still visible today on the façade of the powerhouse and diffuser valves.

Since February to July 1992, no significant events took place on the Peruča dam, apart from manipulating the spillway gate so that the lake water level was constantly kept at 359.00 - 360.00 m.s.l.

We expected that the arrival of the UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia would speed up the developments in the situation around the plant. However, we had no such luck. At our constant insisting with the representatives of the UNMO Team and the UNPROFOR, our visit to the Peruča dam was organised, in the presence of the representatives of the UNMO UNPROFOR and the EC. This took place on 14 July 1992.

14 July 1992

On this day, the dam and the powerhouse were inspected in the presence of the EC observers, representatives of the UNMO and UNPROR, which is evidenced in our report to the EC observes and the UNPROR. The plant was heavily damaged. The reply to our request to inspect the facility with the drive mechanism for the auxiliary gate and the dam control gallery was negative.

After this inspection, the representatives of the company ESB International paid two visits, organised by the UN, in order to assess the safety of the dam and the plant. Based on their report, a resolution was adopted whereby the UNPROFOR took over the control of the dam.

We were continuously in contact with the representatives of the UNMO requesting to open the spillway gate on the dam and the valve on the bottom outlet for using the impoundment water on the downstream power plants. The representatives of the UNMO Team from Košute near Sinj opened the spillway gate all the way, but they did not get approval to open the bottom outlet. After our warnings, the representatives of the UNMO Team in Košute inspected the control gallery after which the UNPROFOR made on official statement that the Peruča dam was mined and that they would take further action to remove the explosives.

Since then up to 27 January 1993, there had been no significant activities around the Peruča dam. On that day in the afternoon, the area around the dam was recaptured, and probably the dam itself.

The morning of 28 January 1993 began as any other workday, with the sounding of the general siren. Detonations could be heard in the distance and we knew that fighting was going on. At 10:48 hours strong detonations were heard from the dam, and soon afterwards reconnaissance confirmed beyond any doubt that the DAM HAD BEEN MINED!

ANNEX 97:
LOVAS COMMUNITY COUNCIL, PASS PERMITTING MOVEMENT FOR ĐUKA RADOČAJ, 19 OCTOBER 1991

COMMUNITY COUNCIL
LOVAS

(PERMANENT)
PASS
VALID FOR _____/_____ 1991
(date)

For Radočaj Đuka

Permitting movement for the purpose of: WORK IN A WORKING GROUP

Escort is permitted for: _____

Lovas, 19 October 1991

FOR THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL
/signature illegible/
/sealed/

ANNEX 98:

LIST OF PERSONS FROM THE VILLAGE OF BERAK IMPRISONED IN AN IMPROVISED CAMP IN BERAK, RADIĆEVA 6 IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2 OCTOBER 1991 AND 13 DECEMBER 1991

Ref. no.	First and last name	Personal ID no.	Status	Remark
1.			CZ (civil protection)	taken away
2.			civilian	missing
3.			civilian	killed
4.			civilian	-
5.			civilian	-
6.			civilian	-
7.			civilian	killed
8.			civilian	-
9.			RSZNG (Croatian National Guard reserve)	taken away
10.			civilian	-
11.			civilian	-
12.			civilian	died while
13.			CZ	taken away
14.			civilian	raped
15.			civilian	-
16.			civilian	-
17.			civilian	killed
18.			civilian	hanged
19.			civilian	-
20.			civilian	-
21.			civilian	-
22.			civilian	-
23.			civilian	-
24.			CZ	taken away
25.			civilian	-
26.			civilian	-
27.			civilian	-
28.			civilian	-
29.			civilian	-
30.			CZ	killed
31.			civilian	-
32.			civilian	-
33.			civilian	disabled, paralysed
34.			civilian	-
35.			civilian	-
36.			civilian	-

37.	[redacted]		taken away
38.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
39.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
40.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
4L	[redacted]	civilian	-
42.	[redacted]	civilian	died/killed
43.	[redacted]	CZ	-
44.	[redacted]	civilian	-
45.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
46.	[redacted]	civilian	-
47.	[redacted]	civilian	-
48.	[redacted]	civilian	disabled
49.	[redacted]	civilian	-
50.	[redacted]	civilian	-
51.	[redacted]	civilian	-
52.	[redacted]	CZ protection)	taken away
53.	[redacted]	civilian	-
54.	[redacted]	civilian	-
55.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
56.	[redacted]	civilian	-
57.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
58.	[redacted]	civilian	-
59.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
60.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
61.	[redacted]	civilian	-
62.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
63.	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken away
64.	[redacted]	civilian	-
65.	[redacted]	civilian	killed
66.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
67.	[redacted]	civilian	-
68.	[redacted]	civilian	-
69.	[redacted]	civilian	-
70.	[redacted]	civilian	-
71.	[redacted]	civilian	-
72.	[redacted]	civilian	-
73.	[redacted]	civilian	-
74.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
75.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
76.	[redacted]	civilian	
77.	[redacted]	civilian	killed
78.	[redacted]	civilian	-
79.	[redacted]	civilian	-
80.	[redacted]	civilian	-
81.	[redacted]	civilian	-
82.	[redacted]	civilian	-
83.	[redacted]	CZ	taken away
84.	[redacted]	civilian	died
85.	[redacted]	civilian	
86.	[redacted]	civilian	disabled, paralysed
87.	[redacted]	civilian	

All persons marked as "taken away" were separated in the camp and interrogated by the Serb paramilitaries and the local police in Radićeva street 4 following which they were taken away in several groups in the period from 10 October 1991 and 15 October 1991 not to be seen again; they are listed as missing persons.
The following people were also in the group taken away:

1.	[redacted]	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken
2.	[redacted]	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken
3.	[redacted]	[redacted]	RSZNG	taken
4.	[redacted]	[redacted]	CZ	taken
5.	[redacted]	from Vukovar	unknown	taken

who were captured on 2 September 1991, during occupation of Berak by the Yugoslav army, were taken to the Bubanj Potok barracks. From there they were returned to Berak (except [redacted] who was already in the military investigation jail in the Bubanj Potok barracks).

All other persons who did not die, were not killed and taken away, were expelled after release, with the exception of persons under reference number 19120, who still live in Berak today. Civilian victims also include the following persons, who were not in the camp, but were hurt:

1.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	killed
2.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	killed
3.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	killed
4.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	wounded
5.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	killed
6.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	died
7.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	seriously ill
8.	[redacted]		civilian	
9.	[redacted]	[redacted]	civilian	sick

Persons under reference numbers 7, 8 and 9 are still living in Berak.

The list was compiled based on statements from the people listed here. The list was prepared by Stanko Penavić (deputy defence commander of Berak and member of the crisis headquarters of the Berak local community).

Amendments permitted only based on statements of the people listed.

Head of TOMPOJEVCI municipality Stanko Penavić */signed/ /stamped/*

ANNEX 99:

REPORT FROM HELSINKI WATCH TO PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ AND GENERAL BLAGOJE ADŽIĆ, 21 JANUARY 1992

HELSINKI WATCH

485 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10017-6104 TEL (212) 972-8400 FAX (212) 972-0905
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Leon Levy
Leon Lipson
Wendy Luers
Elizabeth J. McCormick
Theodor Meron
Arthur Miller
Toni Morrison
Daniel Nathans
Matthew Nimetz
Eleanor Holmes Norton
John B. Oakes
Jane Olson
Yuri Orlov
Bruce Rabb
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Sanford Solender
George Soros
Susan Weber Soros
Michael Sovern
Svetlana Stone
Rose Styron
Jay Topkis
Liv Ullman
Gregory Wallance
Rosalind Whitehead
Jerome R. Wiesner
Roger Wilkins

January 21, 1992

His Excellency Slobodan Milošević
President of the Republic of Serbia
Marsala Tita 14
11000 Belgrade
Serbia

General Blagoje Adžić
Acting Minister of Defense and
Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army
Kneza Miloša 35
11000 Belgrade
Serbia

Dear President Milošević and General Adžić:

The U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee is deeply troubled by reports of serious human rights abuses by the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Army. Our own investigations of these reports, conducted during a series of fact-finding missions to Yugoslavia over several years, indicate that many of these reports are well founded. We call upon you to investigate the abuses enumerated in this letter and to punish those responsible for them. We call upon you to take immediate measures to ensure that such violations of human rights do not occur again.

The abuses described in this letter include violations of the laws of war in the Croatian conflict, including the summary execution of civilians; the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilian targets; the torture and mistreatment of detainees; disappearances and the taking of hostages; the forced displacement and resettlement of civilian populations; and the killing of journalists covering the war. In addition to violations connected with the armed conflict in Croatia, Helsinki Watch has also documented restrictions on the press and on free expression in Serbia and the harassment and repression of opposition political figures and people who have spoken out against the war. Finally, we object to the continuing persecution of the Albanian population of Kosovo.

Helsinki Watch is an affiliate of Human Rights Watch. Robert L. Bernstein, Chairman • Adrian W. DeWind, Vice Chairman • Aryeh Neier, Executive Director
Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director • Holly J. Burkhalter, Washington Director. Helsinki Watch is a member of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Rules of War Violations in the Croatian Conflict

We hold the government of the Republic of Serbia responsible for violations of the rules of war by two groups of rebels -- local Serbian irregulars organized in Croatia, and those organized in Serbia and sent to Croatia.

The government of Serbia has provided military, economic and political support to locally-based insurgents in Croatia. Moreover, President Milošević has asserted that if Croatia were to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serbs in Croatia and the territory on which they live could not be part of an independent Croatian state. The Serbian government's statements that Serbs in Croatia need protection from Croatian government persecution has stirred up fear and hysteria among the Serbian population and contributed to the tension that has led to violence.

The Serbian government has also condoned and, in some cases, supported the formation of at least three paramilitary groups in Serbia which operate in Croatia. What appears to be the most brutal of these groups is led by Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka) and the Serbian Četnik Movement (Srpska Četniki Pokert). Seselj's group of paramilitaries call themselves "Četniks" and operate throughout Croatia. A second paramilitary force is commanded by Zaljke Danjatović (a.k.a. Arkan) and a third group is led by Mirko Jović. Both Arkan's and Jović's forces are most heavily concentrated in the eastern Slavonian region of Croatia. In addition, various Serbian paramilitary groups are organized and trained by the so-called Captain Dragan, described by the *Washington Post* as "a half-Serb mercenary with Australian citizenship who refuses to give his real name."[1]

We hold the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the federal Yugoslav government responsible for the conduct of these groups as well, since the JNA has conducted military operations in which it commands the irregulars or operates in conjunction and/or in coordination with them. Both local insurgents and Serbian-based paramilitary groups have been armed, either directly or indirectly, by the JNA and provided with army uniforms and possibly military intelligence.

We therefore request a response from both the Serbian President and the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army to the following very serious and credible reports of violations of humanitarian law during the conflict in Croatia.

Summary Executions

Serbian rebel forces appear to be responsible for the extrajudicial executions of at least 200 civilians and disarmed soldiers in at least 14 separate instances in five months, committed in areas where these forces had exclusive military control or shared that control with the JNA. In several cases, the victims were tortured before their execution. Some were captured because they were not to able to flee before advancing Serbian insurgent forces due to advanced age or physical incapacity.

July 22, 1991 - Benkovac

Three Croats were arrested in Benkovac by Serbian paramilitary police. Ivica Kjnez, 39, was beaten to death and the whereabouts of the other two men, Tomislav Ceranja and Tomislav Kolerić, remain unknown.

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[1]Mary Battiata, "Serbian Guerrilla Camps Operate Inside Croatia," *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1991, p. A1.

July 26, 1991 — Struga (municipality of Dvor)

During a Serbian assault against the predominantly Croatian village of Struga (population 254), three Croatian police officers surrendered after Serbian insurgents encircled a house in which they had taken up positions. According to eyewitnesses,[2] the police officers were stripped of their clothing, humiliated and ordered to run through a field, where they were shot and killed by the insurgents.

August 1 — Dalj (municipality of Osijek)

On August 1, Serbian insurgents attempted to take over the local police station in Dalj.[3] Police trapped inside the station refused to surrender to JNA troops and a battle for the town ensued. After the JNA occupied Dalj, Serbian paramilitary groups reportedly searched the village for Croatian soldiers, police officers and civilians, and killed many of those who were found wounded. Some victims had been killed by a bullet to the head at close range, apparently after being wounded or beaten, according to autopsy reports.[4] Pjetar Djevelekaj, a baker of Albanian origin was first beaten and then executed by two close-range gunshots to the head.

Between August 5 and 14 — Lovinac (municipality of Gracac)

Serbian paramilitary groups attacked the village of Lovinac (population 499) on August 5 and reportedly kidnapped five Croats (Ivan Ivezić, 38, Stejepan Katalinić, 55, Marko Pavičić, 75, Jure Sekulić, 57, and Martin Sarić, 40). Their bodies were found 10 days later.

August 16 — Pecki (municipality of Petrinja)

After the village of Pecki (population 374) was occupied by Serbian forces, four Croatian men were killed when they returned to the village to feed their livestock. Three of the men appear to have been tortured prior to their execution. According to autopsy reports,[5] Ivica Bugarin, 23, was shot and stabbed repeatedly, most probably with bayonets. His left arm was amputated, probably with an ax.

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[2] Interviewed by Helsinki Watch in late July 1991. Serbian insurgents launched an offensive from the town of Dvor against Croatian police in the village of Kozibrod. En route, the insurgents captured approximately 40 civilians, including some of these witnesses, and used them as human shields during their advance through the villages of Struga and Zamlača. Their testimony is contained in "Yugoslavia: Human rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict," Helsinki Watch, September 1991, pp. 6-10.

[3] Dalj has a population of 5,492, in which Serbs constitute a slight majority over Croats and Hungarians.

[4] The information was obtained from reports of autopsies performed by doctors form the Department of Pathology and Forensic Medicine at Osijek Hospital and the Department of Anatomy at Zagreb University's School of Medicine. The autopsy reports cited herein were performed by Croatian and non-Croatian doctors, including Serbian pathologists and forensic experts. Helsinki Watch interviewed some of the doctors who performed the autopsies in Osijek and Zagreb.

[5] The following information is contained in reports of autopsies performed by doctors from the Department of Pathology and Cytology at Sisak Hospital and the Department of Anatomy at the Zagreb University School of Medicine.

Hand axes were probably used to kill Djuro Hrvat, 28, and Mate Horvat, 32, whose skull was fractured after his head was held firmly to the ground while heavy blows were inflicted with a blunt object. Stjepan Horvat, 70, died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.

September 3-4 — Četekovac, Čojlug and Balinci (municipality of Podravska Slatina)

On September 3-4, the villages of Četekovac (population 310) Čojlug (population 86) and Balinci (population 295) were attacked by Serbian forces. After the villages fell to Serbian forces, two policemen and 21 civilians (16 men and five women) were killed. The dead ranged in age from 18 to 91 years. According to autopsy reports,[6] 15 civilians were killed by gunshots to the chest or neck. J.B., 65, died from two wounds inflicted by a sharp object, presumably a knife. The body of M.S., 36, was set on fire.

A man from Četekovac recounted how his 58-year-old sister was shot in the knees and then killed with a knife by local Serbian insurgents, many of whom were known to him. A 67-year-old man said that he was dragged from his home and then witnessed his house and barn set on fire by Serbian paramilitaries.[7] Four separate witnesses interviewed by Helsinki Watch all identified Boro Lukić, a Serb from a nearby village, as the main perpetrator and organizer of the massacres in Četekovac and Balinac.

October 13 — Široka Kula (municipality of Gospić)

Reportedly 13 people (mostly elderly persons and at least one child) were shot or burned to death after a mob, led by a Serbian police officer, looted Croatian homes and set them on fire. Eight remaining survivors identified their attackers and those who looted their homes.

Of the 536 people who lived in the village of Široka Kula, approximately half were Serbs and half Croats. According to eyewitness statements, most of the Croats had fled by late September after being threatened and intimidated by local Serbian authorities, who had occupied the village. On October 13, the Serbian leader of the local police, Iso Poskonjak, promised to evacuate the remaining Croats from the village and instructed Dane Orešković (a Croat) to gather the Croatian villagers in two houses. As the Croats assembled in the buildings, Serbian paramilitary groups began looting the homes and shot at the assembling villagers. Most of those killed were members of the Orešković family. They were killed with shotguns and their bodies were thrown into their homes which had been set on fire.

Mande Baša and Ana Niksić, both over 70, were reportedly found with their throats slashed in Mande Baša's home.

October 31 -- Grubišno Polje and other villages in western Slavonia

Reports by the news agency Tanjug accused Croats of having committed war crimes against Serbs in the areas near the town of Grubišno Polje[8] in Croatia. The allegations were

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[6]The autopsy reports were prepared by doctors from the Department of Pathology and forensic Medicine at Osijek Hospital and the Departments of Forensic Medicine and Anatomy at the Zagreb School of Medicine.

[7]Interviewed in the village of Četekovac and Balinac on January 7, 1992.

[8] The population of the municipality of Grubišno Polje is 14,186, of which 42.3 percent are Croatian, 32.1 percent are Serbian, 13.7 percent are Czech, 3.5 percent are Hungarian, and 4.5 percent are Yugoslav.

investigated by members of the European Community (EC) monitoring commission who found that Serbian forces, not Croatian forces, were guilty of summary executions and destruction of civilian property in the area. The EC report concludes:

> We established evidence of crimes which were committed by the [Serbian forces] during the two- and three-month period that they controlled that particular zone [western Slavonia]. Our team did not find evidence of killings later, nor of the systematic destruction of Serbian property by the Croatian National Guard or Croats from the area.[9]

The EC report also found that Czechs and Croats were killed in 16 villages visited by the mission, homes were destroyed and residents were terrorized.

November 10-11 -- Bogdanovci (municipality of Vukovar)

A 46-year-old Albanian woman, Z.B.,[10] had lived in Bogdanovci (population 1,208) for 18 years with her family. In early July, members of the Croatian National Guard had taken up positions in the village and many slept in the cellars of people's homes, reportedly with the proprietors' permission. After hostilities in the surrounding areas commenced in early July, many villagers fled. When the JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups launched a mortar attack against Bogdanovci on July 24, only about 100 people remained in the village. Z.B. hid in the cellar of a house with nine other people ranging in age from 46 to 83. At the time of the attack, approximately 50 members of the Croatian National Guard were stationed in the village. Z.B. recounted the attack:

> We were shelled from the Serbian-controlled villages of Petrovci, Bršadin and Pačetin. We hid in a basement for nearly two months, including my blind 83-year-old mother-in-law. The Croatian Guardsmen would bring us food during that time. On November 10, the village fell to Serbian insurgents and the JNA and they told us to leave the cellar.
> After three hours of detention in a local store,[11] the Serbian forces told us to go home. When we got outside into the yard of the store, they told us to form a line. Two elderly Croats -about 80 years old - who they had evidently found in the village, were also put in the line with us. One of the soldiers started shooting at each person in the line with a machine gun. When he got to

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[9] Excerpts of the European Community monitoring mission's report were published by the Paris-based newspaper *Liberation* on November 20, 1991, and in Blane Harden's "Observers Accuse Yugoslav Army," *Washington Post*, January 17, 1992. See also Stephen Engelberg, "Villagers in Croatia Recount Massacre by Serbian Forces," *The New York Times*, December 19, 1991, p. A1.

[10] The woman was interviewed on December 12, 1991, in the village of Drsnik (municipality of Klina) in Kosovo.

[11] Four men who had hid with the witnesses and others were severely beaten by Serbian forces. The beatings are described below.

> me, he said "I am going to spare this one" and I was the only one who wasn't killed. During this shooting, a crowd of [JNA] soldiers stood by but did nothing to stop him from killing us.
>
> They left me alone and I hid behind a wall. I saw them loading videos and televisions into a truck; they were confiscating property from abandoned homes. A soldier later saw me and they put me into a house. I was taken to a room where I was interrogated and raped repeatedly for twelve hours by several men. One of the men raped me twice and took away my wedding ring.
>
> At 9:00 the next morning, two soldiers took me out of the house and I saw that the dead bodies had been covered with blankets during the night. I was then interrogated by a Serbian lieutenant colonel in his mid-fifties who greeted me in Albanian. He told me that he was a friend of my late husband's and that he was from the village of Lukavac in Kosovo. He saw the bodies of the people who had been killed the night before and asked me who these people were and I identified the bodies. He told me that maybe the Croatian Guardsmen had killed them but I replied that I saw a man in Yugoslav army uniform shoot them. The lieutenant colonel frowned and appeared angry. He said that he would spare my life because he knew my husband. The two soldiers and the lieutenant colonel drove me to the predominantly Ruthenian village of Petrovci, where I stayed with a Ruthenian couple for ten days. I was then put in a truck full of soldiers and driven to Valjevo [in Serbia]. Two soldiers gave me money for a bus ticket to Belgrade, from there I took a train to Kosovo.

November 18 — Vukovar

The city of Vukovar[12] was under constant siege by Serbian forces for three months. When the city fell on November 18, 15,000 people who had not fled the fighting emerged from the basements in which they lived for 12 weeks. After Vukovar's fall, civilians and soldiers *hors de combat* were beaten or arrested by Serbian paramilitary groups and the JNA. On the basis of interviews with displaced persons from Vukovar and foreign journalists and humanitarian workers who visited Vukovar immediately after its fall,[13] Helsinki Watch has reason to believe that many Croatian men, both civilians and combatants who had laid down their arms, were summarily executed by Serbian forces after Vukovar's fall.

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[12]Prior to its occupation, Croats comprised a majority of the population of the city of Vukovar (population 44,342) while the villages surrounding the city are predominantly Serbian. Croats comprised 43.7 percent and Serbs 37.4 percent of the population of the entire Vukovar municipality (population 84,024). Hungarians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs accounted for the remaining 18 percent of Vukovar's population.

[13]These interviews were conducted in Zagreb on January 2-6, 1992.

November 18 — Škarbrnje (municipality of Zadar)
and Nadin (municipality of Benkovac)

On November 18, at approximately 7:15 a.m., the JNA and the Serbian paramilitaries launched a mortar and artillery attack against the Croatian village of Škabrnje (population 1,964). At 11:00 a.m., a JNA tank reached St. Mary's Church in the center of town and fired a mortar at the main door. Serbian paramilitaries then sprayed the church with machine gun fire and one paramilitary took up position in the bell tower and shot at the village from the tower. On November 19, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the same forces attacked the neighboring Croatian village of Nadin (population 678). By 4:30 p.m., both Škabrnje and Nadin had fallen to Serbian forces.

Reportedly after Croats[14] destroyed a Yugoslav army tank at the western end of Škabrnje, the Serbian forces turned against the civilians. Serbian paramilitaries began plundering and shooting throughout the villages, killing 48 civilians (41 from Škabrnje and seven from Nadin). Most of those killed were elderly persons and, according to autopsy reports, the vast majority were killed by a bullet to the head shot at close range.[15] A tank crushed the head and chest of K.R., a 59-year-old woman. B.S., F.R., and S.S., were severely beaten and were subsequently killed by blows to the head with a blunt instrument.

A 19-year-old woman recounted her experience during the attack on Škabrnje:[16]

> About 500 insurgents and 20 tanks entered Škabrnje and occupied the village. They told us that we were all Ustašas and that they were going to kill us. Approximately 35 of the villagers were taken to the basement of the local church, where the insurgents beat many of the men, most of whom were elderly, with fists, rifle butts and sticks. My 80-year-old grandfather was beaten to death. We were later removed from the basement and taken to a detention center in Benkovac. When we emerged from that cellar, I saw approximately 10 bodies in a pile. The victims were both men and women and I recognized one of the dead women. I also saw that my house had been ransacked and sprayed with machine gun fire.

The local Zadar Red Cross and members of the European Community monitoring mission were denied access to the area after Škabrnje's and Nadin's occupation. Despite the fact that Nadin had been under control for over 24 hours, the JNA claimed that access to the villages was restricted because fighting continued. After a week of negotiations, the JNA agreed to deliver several corpses from Škabrnje to the Croatian authorities. Thirty-five bodies were delivered on November 23, and 13 more bodies were delivered on November 26.

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[14] Eyewitnesses claim that neither members of the Croatian police force nor the Croatian army were stationed in Škabrnje or Nadin at the time of the attack. The resistance with which the Serbian forces were met was apparently organized by local Croats.

[15] The autopsies were performed by the Pathology Departments at Zadar Hospital and Sibenik Hospital (three bodies).

[16] Interviewed by Helsinki Watch on January 7, 1992, in Zagreb.

Mid-December - Joševica (municipality of Glina)

Serbian paramilitary groups reportedly killed 20 Croats (ages five to 65) in the village of Joševica (population 120), which is part of the Serbian-controlled municipality of Glina.

Reportedly, members of the JNA and Serbian paramilitary units attacked Joševica and conducted a house-to-house search. Twenty people were taken from their homes and brought to the center of the village, where they were subsequently executed. According to the Serbian press, the killing of civilians in Joševica was meant to avenge the recent deaths of 21 Serbian paramilitaries killed during a Croatian offensive in the village of Gračanica, near Pokupsko. The Serbian authorities in Glina are said to be conducting an investigation of the killings.[17]

December 19 - Hum and Vočin (municipality of Podravska Slatina)

In August, Serbian insurgents seized control of several villages in the western Slavonian region of Croatia, including the predominantly Serbian village of Hum (population 245) and Vočin (population 1,558). The area was reportedly held without any support from the JNA.[18] After Croatian forces launched an offensive to regain lost territory in western Slavonia in early December, over 20,000 Serbian civilians and an undetermined number of paramilitaries fled the area. As the Serbian forces withdrew from the villages, they killed 43 Croats and burned many Croatian homes in both Hum and Vočin. The Catholic Church in Vočin, which served as a storage area for the Serbs' munitions, was completely destroyed after the paramilitaries exploded the ammunition to prevent it from falling into Croatian hands.

Eyewitnesses[19] claim that members of the "White Eagles" (Beli Orlovi) paramilitary group, which is headed by Mirko Jović, were responsible for the massacre and destruction. According to one witness:

> Serbian irregulars from Valjevo and other parts of Serbia came to our village by bus on December 1. Using these same buses, they evacuated the Serbs from our village; they were reportedly taken to Bosnia and then to Belgrade. Četniks [members of a paramilitary group led by Jojislav Seselj] were coming in small trucks packed with trunks of body bags. They spread rumors throughout the village that hundreds of Serbs had been massacred by Croats in Podravska Slatina and that they [the Serbs] would retaliate.

Another witness from Hum recounted her father's murder:

> Some time around December 1, 1991, my children and I were at my parents' and brother's home. Five or six police officers from the Krajina region came to our door dressed in army camouflage uniforms. They had driven in a car with "Z-101 - SAO Krajina" registration plates. They demanded that we turn over a radio transmitter which we did not have.

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[17] "Ubijeno 20 Hrvata," *Borba*, December 18, 1991, p. 7.

[18] Stephen Engleberg, "Villagers in Croatia Recount Massacre by Serbian Forces," *The New York Times*, December 19, 1991, p. A1.

[19] Interviewed by Helsinki Watch on January 5, 1992, in Vočin, Hum and Podravska Sistina.

> They did not believe us and searched the entire house but found nothing. They took me, my parents, my children and my brother to Vočin. They put my brother in handcuffs and called him an Ustaša, because our other brother was in the Croatian Guard in [Podravska] Slatina. When we got to the Vočin police station, they told us that "this is where you will be seeing throats slashed." We were put in a room and periodically people would come in and say, "Ustaša, we are going to cut your throats and kill you." We were kept in detention from 2:00 pm to 8:00 pm and were periodically interrogated by an inspector who was in his early 30s and claimed to be from Daruvar. At 8:00 pm, we were released and we went to our friend's home in Vočin. We were told to report back to the police station at 8:00 am the next morning.
>
> The next morning we went to see the police inspector. A second man in a white overcoat was also present and he told us that he had to kill us because we were all Ustašas. At 3:30 pm they took us back to Hum and we saw that my father's home had been burned. More Četniks then arrived in the village. My mother, children and I were forced into the house and my father was left in the yard. When we got into the house, they threw something that sounded like a bomb outside. Three Četniks were yelling "The old man stays." I recognized one of the voices as that of Jovan C., with whom I went to school for many years. I heard my father say, "Don't shoot," but shortly thereafter, we heard shooting and when we came out into the yard we saw my father's body; only half of his head remained. We then hid at the home of B.D., a Orthodox [Serbian] man who helped us remove my father's body from the yard.

According to autopsy reports,[20] many of the victims had multiple gunshot wounds to the face and neck, usually from the back. Some also were shot in the legs and arms. Ten bodies were badly burned. I.S. had his hands bound, was strangled and then stabbed in the thorax. M.S. and V.A. were hit on the crown of the head with a sharp object, probably an axe. F.M. and M.M. were both shot in the eyes with a 9mm handgun. T.M. and M.M. appear to have been chained to a table and then set afire while still alive, according to the autopsy report.

The body of a 77-year-old Serb, S.N., was severely beaten and bruised; his arms appeared to have been branded with a hot iron. S.N.'s body was found a few meters from the bodies of an elderly Croatian couple who were chained and burned in their backyard. The village priest believes that the Serb may have been beaten and then killed for coming to the defense of the Croatian couple.

Among the civilian victims was a 72-year-old American citizen, Marija Majdanžić, nee Skender, who was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, but moved to Croatia at an early age. She appears to have died of smoke inhalation after being trapped in her burning home.

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[20] This information is taken from autopsy reports from Osijek Hospital and photographs of the dead bodies. When a Helsinki Watch representative visited Hum and Vočin on January 7, a local parish priest who had identified the bodies at the site of their murders also described the condition of the bodies and houses one day after the massacre. The bodies of burned animals and remains of the victims' clothing were still visible when Helsinki Watch visited the villages in January. Chains with which some victims were reportedly shackled also were found at the site where the bodies of the dead were burned.

December 16-17 -- Jasenice and Zaton Obrovački (municipality of Obrovac)

In the evening of December 16, five civilians were executed in the village of Jasenice (population 1,280). The predominantly Croatian village was situated between the Maslinički bridge and the town of Obrovac, which had been under the control of Serbian forces for several months. Two men (Stipe Žubak, 71, and Ive Maruna, 71) and three women (Zorka Žubak, 67, Božica Jurjević, 66, and Manda Maruna, 67) were killed in Jasenice. On the same day, Luka Modrić, 66, was killed in the town of Zaton Obrovački (population 464). Reportedly, the bodies remained unburied 15 days after the murder.

December 21 - Bruška (municipality of Benkovac)

Ten Croats and one Serb were reportedly killed in the village of Bruška (population 366), in the Serbian-controlled municipality of Benkovac. All 10 Croats were surnamed Marinović and were between 20 and 70 years of age. A deaf woman was among the dead.

Reportedly four Serbs entered the Marinović home, where the Serb was having dinner with the Marinović family. They stabbed four victims and shot the other seven with rifles, according to autopsy reports.

General Vladimir Vujović, the commander for Knin-based corps of the JNA, confirmed to a Zadar-based newspaper that the killings had taken place and that he had formed a commission to investigate the matter and send a written report to the Croatian authorities in Zadar.[21]

Court Martial and Execution

It was reported that Nemania Samardzic, an advocate against Serbian extremist groups, was hanged after a court-martial for urging the expulsion of Četniks from Mirkovci in late August.[22] Such grounds for condemnation to death violate free speech and due process.

Torture and Mistreatment in Detention

Serbian forces maintain approximately 36 detention camps throughout Vojvodina, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Krajina (where approximately 18 such camps exist).[23] Helsinki Watch has received reports that the conditions in these detention areas are often appalling and in many cases, detainees are tortured and beaten by their captors and guards.

Begejči Camp, Vojvodina

Dr. Malden Lončar, who worked at the Novi Sad hospital in the Serbian province of Vojvodina, was arrested by Serbian police reportedly after a package of medicine he was carrying to his parents in Ilok, Croatia, was found on his person. Lončar was beaten for 30 hours and then released. He was subsequently arrested several times thereafter and finally

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[21] *Vjesnik*, December 27, 1991.

[22] "Report on Civilian and Non-Combatants Killed as of 31.08.91," United Nations, Center for Human Rights, Geneva, p. 21.

[23] According to and interanational humanitarian organization, some of the camps are located in the following places: Niš (about 500 prisoners), Sremska Mitrovica (about 1,000 prisoners), Stajičevo, Bjeliči, Stara Gradiška, Marinj, Kotor, Knin, Glina, Begeči, and Manjača (near Banja Luka). See also Mary Battiata, "Serbian Guerrilla Camps Operate Inside Croatia," *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1991, p. A1. See also

ended up in Begejči camp near Zrenjanin, Vojvodina. According to Lončar's written statement received by Helsinki Watch:

> The camp was an old barn filled with hay. There were over 550 people packed in this camp and we had to sleep on our sides for lack of space. People were tortured and beaten regularly. They would even put a barbed wire around your neck and beat you: if you moved, your throat would be cut from the wire. One old man died before my very eyes after he had been severely beaten.
>
> Over 90 percent of the people held were Croats and many were old. Some people were sick, some were paralyzed while others just needed immediate medical help. This maltreatment was not the work of individuals acting on their own accord. The orders came from above, from the commanders.

Lončar was released on December 10.

Sremska Mitrovica camp, Serbia

Helsinki Watch interviewed people who had been released from Serbian detention centers, many of whom were tortured, beaten and otherwise maltreated. Dr. Jure Njavro, a surgeon at the Vukovar Hospital, was taken to a detention camp in Sremska Mitrovica by Serbian forces after the fall of Vukovar on November 18. During his 22-day detention, Dr. Njavro was also physically maltreated and was forced to attend to people who had been severely beaten in the prison on a daily basis.

> Every day I was called to attend to someone who had been badly beaten by his or her captors. I was usually awakened at night, which is when many people were beaten. I saw a prison guard beat and kick a medical technician. When I examined the technician, I saw that he had four broken ribs and that he was badly bruised.[24]

Bogdanovci

On November 10, as Serbian forces were advancing on the village of Bogdanovci, three grenades were thrown into the cellar in which Z.B. and nine other people had hidden for over three months during the conflict. Z.B. told Helsinki Watch:

> None of us were killed [by the grenades] because we hid in a narrow concrete corridor in the basement. A tank also fired at the house. At 9:00 the next morning, two bearded men dressed in Yugoslav army uniforms told us to leave the basement and go to our homes. We put my mother-in-law in a cart and started to move toward our house only to be stopped by a crowd of about 50 soldiers who kept asking us why we came to Bogdanovci and did we come because of our Catholic faith. They shouted vulgarities

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[24] Interview by Helsinki Watch on January 4, 1992, in Zagreb.

> at us and took us to a store where the army had set up a headquarters. They searched all of us and I saw a soldier drop a bullet into the pocket of Nikola Palushi who had hidden with us in the basement the entire time. When they searched Palushi and found the bullet in his pocket, the four men who had been hiding with us in the basement for over three months were beaten. They separated me from the rest of the crowd and put me in a room where I could see them beating Krist Lleshi in the corridor with machine gun butts and fists: he was also kicked repeatedly. I never saw Krist again and I presume that he died from the beatings.[25]

Benkovac

On July 22, 1991, three Croats were arrested in Benkovac by Serbian paramilitary police. Ivica Kjnez, 39, was beaten to death and the whereabouts of the other two men, Tomislav Ceranja and Tomislav Kolerić, remain unknown.[26]

Vukovar

One week after Vukovar's fall, only 128 of a total of about 440 patients from the Vukovar Hospital were handed over to the Croatian authorities. In some cases, it is feared that medical treatment was denied to the sick after their capture. More than 200 members of the hospital staff were captured and removed to Serbian detention centers.[27]

Disappearances

Vukovar

According to independent humanitarian organizations, at least 3,000 prisoners, including many noncombatants, were captured after the fall of the city of Vukovar on November 18. During half the day on November 20, the JNA denied journalists and the ICRC access to Vukovar Hospital. Helsinki Watch interviewed medical personnel who were in the hospital when it was sealed off to outside observers by the JNA.[28] According to these eyewitnesses, the JNA interrogated the director of the hospital, Dr. Vesna Bosanac, and other doctors. In the interim, Serbian paramilitaries evacuated male medical personnel and wounded individuals who were identified as Croats by some Serbian members of the hospital staff.

Helsinki Watch is concerned about the arrests and disappearances of wounded Croatian forces and civilians, most of whom are males between the ages of 16 and 60. While most of the disappeared come from Vukovar, many Croatian males were captured by Serbian paramilitary groups after the fall of other villages, towns or cities.

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[25] An American journalist who visited Vukovar two days after its fall saw two Serbian irregulars beat a man's head against a concrete wall while she looked on. Thereafter, a JNA officer ordered the two to stop beating the man.

[26] "Report on Civilian and Noncombatants Killed as of 31.08.91," United Nations Center for Human Rights, Geneva, p. 14.

[27] Interviews by Helsinki Watch, January 2-6, 1992, in Zagreb.

[28] The interviews were conducted between January 2-6, 1992, in Zagreb.

Families have not been notified of their whereabouts and many missing are feared to have been the victims of extrajudicial executions. Ljubo Voloder was captured by Serbian forces after having spent three months in a basement in Vukovar. According to Ms. Marija Voloder, five army soldiers abducted her 58-year-old husband on November 19. She was forced to join a group of women, children and elderly persons who were being led away from the city. Ms. Voloder claims that her husband was not a member of the Croatian security forces or a combatant during the siege of Vukovar. Because she has not seen or heard of her husband since, she fears that he has been either imprisoned or executed.

As of January 10, 1992, about 3,000 people from Vukovar remain missing, according to the Association of Evacuated Vukovar Residents in Zagreb, which is keeping a list of names.

Hum and Vočin

Approximately 100 villagers from Hum and Vocin have been missing for over four months, according to the local parish priest in Vočin.[29] Local Serbs from the village raided Croatian homes and took some Croats prisoner in early September. According one witness:

> Franjo Banovac and Drago Jukić were taken to Gudnog, near the village of Sekulinac. Those who weren't captured fled and hid in the forests and cornfields. In later raids, Serbs came in trucks and entered only Croatian homes. The local Serbs stayed in their homes and did not help the others hunt down the Croats.

Zadar

The whereabouts of over 110 people from Serbian-controlled villages in the Zadar municipality remain unknown.

Benkovac

Some 1,500 persons residing in the villages of Bruška, Popovići, Lisičić, Rodajlice, Šopot and Podlug in the Serbian-controlled municipality of Benkovac are missing. On July 22, 1991, three Croats were arrested in Benkovac by Serbian paramilitary police. Ivica Kjnez, 39, was beaten to death and the whereabouts of the other two men, Tomislav Ceranja and Tomislav Kolerić, remain unknown.[30]

Obrovac

Some time around December 20, many of the 354 Croats who remained in the Obrovac municipality (from the villages of Kruševo, Jasenice, Zaton and Medvidja, including the town of Obrovac itself) were reportedly taken to Knin jail. Most were elderly persons who had remained in their homes after Serbian insurgents assumed control in the Obrovac municipality.

Dalj

The fate of over 100 police officers and 200 civilians after the August battle for Dalj remains unknown.

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[29] Interviews by Helsinki Watch were conducted in Hum and Vočin on January 5, 1992.

[30] "Report on Civilian and Noncombatants Killed as of 31.08.91," United Nations Center for Human Rights, Geneva, p. 14.

Hostages

Hostages are defined as "persons who find themselves, willingly or unwillingly, in the power of the enemy and who answer with their freedom or their life for compliance with the orders of the latter and for upholding the security of its armed forces."[31]

Helsinki Watch has received many reports of persons who have been captured for the purpose of exchange, as set forth in our publication "Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict."

Indiscriminate and Disproportionate Attacks Against Civilians and Civilian Targets

Serbian forces indiscriminately shelled the cities of Dubrovnik, Vukovar and Osijek for prolonged periods. The Yugoslav military justified its attack against these and other Croatian cities by claiming that it aimed to protect the Serbian population in Croatia and to liberate JNA barracks encircled by Croatian forces. However, such an argument cannot explain the shelling of Dubrovnik, a municipality in which the local Serbian population numbers only 6.7 percent and in which no JNA barracks exist. Dubrovnik was shelled from the beginning of October and the shelling of Osijek and Vukovar began in late August. The shelling of Vukovar lasted until November 18, when Croatian forces capitulated to Serbian troops, who occupied a city that had been reduced to rubble. Although the attacks against Dubrovnik and Osijek have subsided since the recent cease fire took effect, the shelling of the two cities was indiscriminate and caused much damage to civilian, historical and cultural objects. In all three cases, the use of force by Serbian troops was disproportionate to the threat posed by Croatian troops, and the indiscriminate shelling resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and casualties.

Approximately half of those killed and one-third of those wounded in the conflict in Croatia are estimated to have been civilians. Most independent observers believe that at least 10,000 people have been killed since hostilities began in late June 1991 although Croatian officials say that less than 3,000 people died.

In addition, considerable civilian property, including hospitals, churches, and cultural monuments have been damaged or destroyed by the JNA's and Serbian rebels' shelling of towns.

Hospitals

Yugoslav armed forces have shelled hospitals in Croatia. Hospitals in Osijek, Pakrac, Vinkovci, Vukovar and Zadar have all been damaged or destroyed by aerial, mortar and artillery attacks. During the course of three days, from September 14-17, Osijek hospital was hit 56 times by mortar shells, 21 times by tank shells, and 17 times by rockets from multiple rocket launchers. The hospital was also hit by bullets from light weaponry. During one attack a 38-year-old nurse was killed and two doctors were wounded. Most of the hospital wards, including the intensive care unit, were damaged during the attack.

Dalj

Reportedly, at least 80 Croatian police officers and 195 civilians were wounded during or after the battle for Dalj on August 1. The JNA restricted access to journalists and the local Red Cross for several days after the attack. Initially, only 25 cadavers (only two of whom were civilians) were taken to Osijek hospital. By August 5, 70 dead and 195 wounded civilians were

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[31] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977* (Geneva 1987) at 874.

received by the Osijek morgue and hospital. More people were reportedly killed as they fled Dalj into the nearby town of Erdut during the siege.

Vukovar

During the four month siege against Vukovar, the hospital was repeatedly attacked and badly damaged, forcing the medical personnel to grant medical assistance, and even perform surgery, in the basement of the hospital.

International and local medical personnel have been hampered from evacuating the dead and wounded and delivering humanitarian aid because of continued fighting and disrespect for the red cross emblem.

Churches

Z.B. from the village of Bogdanovci said:

> Although there were no Guardsmen in the Catholic Church at the time of the attack, the shells seemed to be aimed at it. All the other shells fell indiscriminately throughout the village. Planes bombed the village and at one point 12 people were killed from aerial bombardment.

In addition, members of the Croatian Catholic Bishops' Conference have compiled a list through November 1991 of 348 churches destroyed or damaged during the conflict.

Osijek

In mid-1991, a woman travelling in a trolley car was killed after a mortar fell in Osijek's city center during rush hour.

Split

On November 15, 1991, three crew members on board a ferry in the port of Split were killed when federal gunboats opened fire.[32]

Indiscriminate Use of Land Mines

A 12-vehicle convoy, organized by Doctors Without Borders, evacuated 108 seriously injured people from the besieged town of Vukovar on October 19. Leaving the town on a road designated for their travel by the JNA, one of the trucks hit a mine and two nurses (from Luxembourg and Switzerland) were injured.

Targeted Attacks on European Community Helicopter

On January 7, 1992, a helicopter carrying five members (four Italians and one Frenchman) of the EC monitoring mission was shot down by a Yugoslav Air Force MIG fighter. The clearly marked helicopter had left Belgrade for Zagreb via Hungary and was shot down over Novi Marof, Croatia (30 miles east of Zagreb). All five persons aboard the plane were killed.

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[32]"Yugoslavia Says Withdrawal Offer Made; Split in Command Seen," The Associated Press, November 15, 1991.

Shortly after the attack the Yugoslav military command announced that an air force chief, Zvonko Jurjević, had been suspended pending an investigation.[33]

Robbery

Dalj

Four days after Dalj's fall to Serbian forces on August 1, the army command put local Serbs in charge of all civilian functions. As of October 7, 533 non-Serbs (about 165 families) remained in Dalj and were forbidden from leaving the town. Families from Dalj were forcibly made to sign over their belongings and property to the local Serbian authorities before they were finally allowed to leave the town.

According to a written statement by Stjepan Papp, a member of the town council before Dalj's occupation, armed men in Yugoslav army uniforms entered his home on October 8. The Papp family was ordered to lock up their home and go to the local defense center, where Milorad Stričević, appointed by the Yugoslav Army as Minister for Ethnic Affairs for Dalj, Erdut and Aljmaš, took the Papp's car and apartment keys. Their belongings were subsequently confiscated by Serbian paramilitaries. While at the defense center, Ms. Ruža Papp was robbed of gold coins, money and a bank book which she had in her purse. The Papps were forced at gunpoint to sign over all their belongings to the defense center of Dalj. The statement claimed that the Papps were giving all their belongings to the local Serbian authorities as "gifts." After they signed the statement, they received passes allowing them to leave Dalj.

Forced Displacement and Resettlement

The JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups are responsible for the displacement of thousands of people.

Helsinki Watch is concerned that Croats, Hungarians, Czechs and others are being forced by Serbian rebels from their homes in Serbian-occupied territory in order to create purely Serbian regions in areas that are otherwise of mixed population. We are concerned that this non-Serbian population is being discriminated against and being forcibly displaced on the illegal grounds of ethnic origin. We are also concerned that displaced Serbs are being resettled in Serb-occupied territory in Croatia to consolidate Serbian control over regions captured from Croats and prevent the original non-Serbian inhabitants from returning.

According to *The Washington Post*, displaced Serbs who fled from western Slavonia in November "have since been advised by Serbian officials in Belgrade to resettle" in Serbian-occupied territory in the region of Baranja,[34] where the most active resettlement campaign is currently taking place. Serbia plans to resettle 20,000 Serbs into 17 occupied villages in Baranja, some 4,000 homes and 100 stores are to be taken over by prospective Serbian settlers in Baranja and Serbian officials say "they have no intention of allowing tens of thousands of displaced Croats and ethnic Hungarians to return to their Baranja homes and force out Serbian

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[33] Slobodan Lekic, "Five EC Observers Die in Yugoslav Attack," Associated Press, *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1992, p. A16.

[34] **Ibid.**, p. A18. Baranja is located north of the city of Osijek, between the Danube and Drava rivers. This fertile region is populated by Croats, Serbs and Hungarians and has been occupied by Serbian forces since late August.

settlers . . . . People are to be moved to conform to the Serbian notion of where a new border" between Croatia and Serbia should be drawn.[35]

We are also concerned that Serbian insurgents have evacuated Serbian women and children, presumably for reasons of safety, just prior to the launching of an offensive against Croatian positions or prior to an attempt to take over Croatian government institutions and the police station in various localities, particularly in eastern Slavonia. In almost all such cases, no non-Serbs were told to evacuate an area prior to a Serbian offensive. In instances where a Croatian offensive was anticipated (such as in western Slavonia in late November, for example), Serbian forces evacuated occupied territory and demanded that the local Serbian population flee with them. In almost all cases, Serbian insurgents frightened the villagers into fleeing, claiming that Croatian "Ustašas" were planning an attack and slaughter of the Serbian population and the burning and looting of Serbian homes, a fear reinforced by the Belgrade press. In television interviews, Serbian refugees from western Slavonia "have themselves disputed that it was the Croats who forced them to leave their homes. . . . [Rather,] Serb refugees said the federal army gave them 48 hours to flee."[36]

Killing, Assault and Harassment of Journalists

Helsinki Watch is concerned about the large number of journalists who have been killed, wounded, physically assaulted or otherwise attacked while reporting on the war in Croatia. According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Yugoslavia was "the most perilous site for journalists" in 1991.[37] According to the IFJ, some of the journalists killed in Yugoslavia were deliberately targeted because of their professional affiliation.[38]

Since July 26, 1991, at least 16 foreign and domestic journalists have been killed while covering the war in Croatia. Nine journalists have been captured and subsequently released by Serbian forces and four remain missing. At least 28 journalists have been wounded while covering the war in Croatia. At least 63 have been attacked and over 38 have been otherwise harassed (i.e., threatened, property confiscated).[39]

Deaths

The following journalists were killed while covering the war in Croatia under circumstances in which Serbian forces or JNA were or may have been responsible:

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[35] **Ibid.**

[36] Blaine Harden, "Serbia Plans Resettlement of Croatian Region," *The Washington Post*, November 25, 1991, p. A14.

[37] "Record Number of Journalists Reported Killed in 1991," Associated Press, January 6, 1992. According to the IFJ, of the 83 journalists killed worldwide in 1991, 21 were killed in Yugoslavia alone. More journalists have been killed since the IFJ released its report in late December.

[38] **Ibid.**

[39] The figures in this section were gathered in Helsinki Watch interviews with witnesses and information from the International and American PEN Centers, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Foreign Press Bureau in Zagreb, Croatia, and non-Yugoslav press and wire reports.

• On July 26, Egon Scotland, a 42-year-old German reporter for the Munich-based *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and his colleague, Peter Wuest, were fired upon reportedly by armed Serbs. The two men were driving in a clearly marked press car when they were attacked as they left the village of Glina. Scotland was wounded by gunfire and bled to death on the way to the hospital.

• Stjepan Penić, a Vukovar radio producer and correspondent for *Glas Slavonije*, was killed on August 4 near the town of Dalj. His body was discovered on August 19.

• Gordan Lederer, a cameraman for Croatian Television, was critically injured in Kostajnica on August 9. Despite a request by his colleagues, the Yugoslav army refused to transport the wounded Lederer to the hospital and he died.

• Žarko Kajić, a cameraman for Croatian Television, was killed in Osijek on August 28, reportedly after he was fired at by an armored Yugoslav army vehicle.

• On August 29, Djuro Podboj, a technician for Croatian Television, was killed in the town of Beli Manastir reportedly during an attack by Serbian forces.

• Nikola Stojanac, a technician for Croatian Television, was killed on September 15 in the Gospić area reportedly while he was trying to film Yugoslav army jets.

• On September 19, Pierre Blanchet, a correspondent for the French weekly, *Nouvel Observateur*, and Damien Ruedin, a correspondent for Radio Suisse Romande, were killed when their vehicle hit a mine outside army barracks near Petrinja.

• Zoran Amidžić, Bora Petrović, Dejan Miličević and Sreten Ilić of Belgrade Television were killed on October 9 on the road between Petrinja and Glina in circumstances still unclear.

• Živko Krstičević, a cameraman for WTN, was killed in the town of Turanj, near Karlovac, on December 30, by a mortar reportedly launched by Serbian forces.

Arrests

On September 4, two French journalists, Jean-Pierre Musson and Eric Micheletti, were captured by Serbian paramilitaries and taken to Yugoslav army authorities in Banja Luka. Although their equipment was confiscated, both men were released three days thereafter.

On September 6, Maciej Maciejewski and Marcin Kowalczki, journalists for the Polish *Dziennik Lodzki*, were captured by armed Serbs near Vrgin Most and were accused of spying. Their release was negotiated by diplomats. On September 26, WTN reporters, Diviek Quemener

and Jacques Languein, their guide, Alan Bubalo, and two French journalists reportedly were captured by Serbian paramilitaries near Pakrac. After three days, they were handed over to the Yugoslav army and were subsequently released.

Disappearances

The whereabouts of four journalists remains unknown.

On September 1, Viktor Nogin and Genadi Kurinoj, a reporter and cameraman for Soviet Television, left Belgrade for Zagreb, via Osijek, and have not been heard from since. They were driving a dark blue Opel Omega with diplomatic license plates. They are presumed to have been killed.

Radio Vukovar correspondent Siniša Glavašević and cameraman Branimir Polovina have been missing since the city of Vukovar fell to Serbian forces on November 19. It is believed that they were removed from a column of civilians evacuating Vukovar Hospital and that they are being held by Serbian forces within Vukovar or in a detention camp in Serbia.

Restrictions on Free Expression

Forced Mobilization

Helsinki Watch is alarmed by what appears to be an effort by the Serbian government to silence anti-war activists and opposition figures by sending them to the battlefields in Croatia. This practice is most widespread in Vojvodina and Belgrade. The most notable example of such forced mobilization is the case of Nenad Čanak, President of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina/Yugoslavia (Liga Socijaldemokrata Vojvodine/Jugoslavije - LSV/J) and a vocal anti-war activist and opposition figure. On November 7, Čanak[40] was arrested by local police and taken to the police station: he was subsequently transferred to military police custody and taken to a military detention center. Čanak was then sent to Ilok, Croatia, as a member of the volunteer corps of the army. Čanak's arrest and forcible mobilization was vehemently protested by many domestic and foreign organizations and he was subsequently released on December 12.

Although Čanak's case received much publicity, Helsinki Watch has received reports of similar cases of arrests and subsequent mobilization of anti-war activists by Serbian authorities and the Yugoslav army, particularly in the province of Vojvodina and among independent-minded journalists in Belgrade. Repression against ethnic Hungarian anti-war activists is also taking place. Reportedly, after peaceful anti-war demonstrations were held in the Hungarian communities of Zenta and Temerin, special police forces intimidated ethnic Hungarians in Zenta and Ada, the seat of the Hungarian community in Vojvodina. The organizers of the demonstration, Janos Szabo, Jozsef Bodo, and Jozsef Papp were arrested and their whereabouts were not disclosed to their families.

Criminal Charges

The Serbian government has also tried to silence and intimidate opposition politicians and political groups by bringing criminal charges against them. In early January, charges were brought against Vuk Drašković, leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Party (Srpski Pokret Obnove -- SPO) that has criticized President Milošević's policies in Croatia and Serbia. On March 9-10, 1991, demonstrations were held in Belgrade to protest Serbian government control of the media. Excessive police force and an ensuing riot resulted in the deaths of a 17-year-old

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[40] Čanak was interviewed by a Helsinki Watch representative on December 17, in Novi Sad.

youth and one police officer. At least 203 were wounded. Demonstration participants and organizers -- including Drašković -- were arbitrarily arrested and harassed.[41] Almost one year later, charges have been brought against Drašković purportedly because of his role in organizing the March demonstrations. Drašković is charged with bearing the responsibility for the deaths of two men, the injuries of 29 individuals and 15.5 million dinars worth of material damage. If convicted, Drašković could face fifteen years in prison.

Helsinki Watch believes that the charges brought against Vuk Drašković are unjustified and are being used as a means of political intimidation. Although Drašković was one of the main organizers of the March demonstrations, it was the excessive use of force by the Serbian police against demonstrators that resulted in the ensuing riot. Criminal charges were filed against Drašković after he and other Serbian opposition figures voiced their discontent regarding President Milošević's policies toward Croatia, continued government control of the media and stifling of the Serbian opposition. Helsinki Watch believes that Drašković's arrest is being used as a means to intimidate opposition groups in Serbia and cow them into submission.

Persecution of Anti-War Activists

The Serbian government now portrays anti-war activists as fascists and traitors to the Serbian nation. Many prominent intellectuals such as Mirko Kovač, Bogdan Bogdanović, Filip David and Vesna Pešić have been threatened with bodily harm and are otherwise harassed for their opposition or anti-war activities.[42] In some cases, groups and persons who refer to themselves as "Yugoslav," rather than "Serbian," are targets of attacks and harassment. The Serbian government's propaganda campaign has resulted in the political marginalization of Serbia's once-active opposition movement.

Moreover, members of Serbian paramilitary groups and individual vandals have harassed members of the Serbian opposition, the anti-war movement and the independent or non-Serbian press. In some cases, Serbian authorities appear to have condoned, if not encouraged, such harassment and assaults. In November, the headquarters of the Center for Anti-War Activities was vandalized. On November 11, five men vandalized the headquarters of the Reformist Party of Serbia, an opposition group that advocates the maintenance of a single, democratic Yugoslavia.[43] The Belgrade headquarters of Yutel, a pan-Yugoslav television program based in Sarajevo, was also ransacked and members of its staff were physically assaulted. Helsinki Watch is not aware of any arrests by the Serbian authorities of individuals responsible for such violence.

Press Restrictions

Helsinki Watch is concerned about reports that the Yugoslav army is forcing local newspapers in Kragujevac and other areas in inner Serbia to print lists of persons whom the JNA claims are army deserters who fled from the battlefields in Croatia. Military authorities reportedly intended to post such lists in public areas. At anti-war rallies in Serbia, petitions

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[41]For an account of human rights violations and the excessive use of force by the Serbian police, see "Yugoslavia: The March 1991 Demonstrations in Belgrade," Helsinki Watch, May 1, 1991.

[42]See Slobodan Kosti, "Grafit na jasenovačkom cvetu," *Borba*, December 12, 1991, p. 22.

[43]See Dušan Stojanović, "Yugoslav Military Bombards Dubrovnik, Appears Near to Capturing Vukovar," Associated Press, November 11, 1991.

were signed protesting such action by the Yugoslav military. According to the Center for Anti-War Activities, 680 people signed such a petition at an anti-war meeting in Belgrade on December 29. Thereafter, the military authorities revoked their demands that such names be publicly disclosed. Helsinki Watch does not question the JNA's role in maintaining discipline in the army. However, Helsinki Watch is concerned that the public disclosure of the names of purported deserters could lead to reprisals against them or their families by paramilitary groups or individual extremists. Moreover, by demanding that local newspapers publish such lists, Yugoslav military authorities are interfering with freedom of the press.

The Albanian-language press in Kosovo has either been banned by the Serbian authorities (as in the case of the Albanian-language daily *Rilindja*) or completely subordinated to the Belgrade media (as in the case of Radio/Television Priština). The governments in Vojvodina and Montenegro have effectively wrested all control of the press from journalists. Journalists, regardless of their national or ethnic affiliation, have been harassed throughout Vojvodina for their support of the political opposition. The managing directors and editors of the Radio/Television Novi Sad were replaced by the provincial government. In addition to Vojvodina's Serbian-language media, Hungarian-, Ruthenian-, Romanian-, and Slovak-language presses also were purged. Directors, editors and journalists unsympathetic to the new provincial government or Belgrade's politics were replaced at the following newspapers: *Dnevnik, Poljoprirednik, Hlas Ljudu, Libertatee, Ruske Slovo, Het Nap* and *Magyar Szo*.

Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo

The Serbian misdemeanor law, which allows for up to 60 days imprisonment, has been grossly abused by Serbian authorities in Kosovo. Instead of prolonged detention, ethnic Albanians are being imprisoned several times for short periods. Many Albanians are arrested for committing so-called "verbal crimes," such as "insulting the socialist, patriotic, national and moral feelings of the citizenry," "insulting a public official, institution or organization," and "conveying disturbing news." In many cases, Albanians are charged with such "crimes" for their support of Albanian nationalism, of independence from Serbia and of republic status for Kosovo or union with Albania. Those convicted are usually given 30- to 60- day prison sentences and by the time an appeal is filed and a hearing is granted, an individual has already served his or her prison term. Many Albanians have served multiple misdemeanor sentences, and the practice is being abused so as to silence, intimidate and harass opponents and critics of the Serbian regime in Kosovo. Moreover, some Albanians are summoned by the police for interrogations or, what is commonly referred to as an "informative discussion" (informativni razgovor). In some cases, ethnic Albanians have been beaten during such interrogations.

Rilindja, the only daily Albanian-language newspaper in Kosovo, remains banned; it has been eighteen months since its forcible closure in July 1990. From October 25 to December 1, 1991, four Albanian journalists were arrested and imprisoned for publishing a book, a map and two articles which were deemed to be subversive by the Serbian authorities. Journalists who have been imprisoned for similar "offenses" in the past have been beaten while in police custody.

Albanians have lost their jobs for refusing to sign loyalty oaths to the Serbian government or the new management which was installed by the Serbian authorities. Others have been dismissed from their jobs because they organized and participated in peaceful demonstrations. Some Albanians who have lost their jobs have also lost their apartments, in which their employers often hold a share. Approximately 300 Albanian families have been evicted from their homes without a court hearing, to which they are entitled. Dismissals of Albanians from their jobs and evictions from their homes have led to further economic and

social marginalization of Albanians in Kosovo, where reportedly 86 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.[44]

The medical profession in Kosovo has also been purged of Albanians. Reportedly 2,000 Albanian medical personnel have been dismissed from their jobs. The quality of health care has deteriorated so drastically that cases of tetanus, diphtheria and child paralysis are appearing among the population. The delivery and receipt of humanitarian aid by local relief groups is impeded. In some cases, stocks of humanitarian aid have been confiscated by the Serbian authorities.

After the Serbian authorities revised the school curriculum so as better to reflect Serbian culture and history in Kosovo's education, ethnic Albanian students boycotted classes. The Albanians claimed that Albanian history and culture were reduced to a bare minimum so as to accommodate the Serbian curriculum. Moreover, ethnic Albanians object to the institution of Serbian as the main language of instruction in Kosovo's schools. Although provisions are made for Albanian-language use in primary and secondary schools, Albanians claim that they are deprived of the right to use their language. Helsinki Watch urges the Serbian government to respect the rights of ethnic minorities in accordance with principles set forth in various documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), particularly the two documents that summarize the results of the July 1991 experts' meetings on ethnic minority rights in Geneva.

* * *

Dear President Milošević and General Adžić:

This lengthy letter contains only a portion of the information on human rights abuses compiled by Helsinki Watch. We urgently call on you to end these violations.

We call upon the Yugoslav Army and Serbian forces in Croatia to:

- Investigate reports of summary executions and torture of civilians and disarmed combatants by Serbian military or paramilitary groups and to prosecute and punish all those guilty of such crimes.

- Refrain from the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, which has caused thousands of civilian deaths and injuries, and cease all discriminate attacks against civilians -- including journalists -- and civilian objects.

- Immediately and unconditionally release all civilians held hostage. We urge that all captured combatants be treated humanely and that torture and other mistreatment cease.

- Make known the whereabouts of all missing persons abducted by Serbian forces.

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[44] *Borba*, December 6, 1991.

- Cease the robbing, pillaging, and forcible confiscation of homes and property.

- Refrain from forcibly displacing persons for non-war related reasons and allow all persons forcibly displaced to return to their homes without reprisals or mistreatment against such persons.

- Refrain from mobilizing members of the anti-war movement and political opposition in Serbia as a means of silencing government critics.

- Refrain from interfering with freedom of the Serbian press by demanding that it print the names of purported army deserters.

We call upon the Serbian government to:

- Investigate reports of harassment of, and attacks upon, anti-war activists, opposition groups, and the independent-minded media.

- Drop all criminal charges brought against Vuk Drašković for his role in organizing the March 1991 demonstrations in Belgrade.

- Cease all harrassment, arrest, demotion and dismissal of independent journalists and respect freedom of the press.

- Cease all arrests, prosecution and imprisonment of ethnic Albanians who have peacefully exercised their right to free speech and expression in Kosovo.

- Cease the mistreatment of Albanians held in detention.

- Immediately and unconditionally lift the ban against *Rilindja*.

- Cease all forms of discrimination against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, including the arbitrary dismissal of Albanian workers from their jobs and their subsequent eviction from their homes.

ANNEX 100:

PHILIP COHEN, "SERBIAN ANTI-SEMITISM AND EXPLOITATION OF THE HOLOCAUST AS PROPAGANDA", 20 JULY 1992

CONFIDENTIAL

July 20, 1992

"Serbian Anti-Semitism and Exploitation of the Holocaust as Propaganda"

Philip J. Cohen, M.D.

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In conjunction with the war in the former Yugoslavia, Serbia has undertaken a campaign to persuade the Jewish community of Serbian friendship for Jews. This same campaign alleges rising fascism in neighboring Croatia and portrays Croats as a common threat to both Jews and Serbs. These claims, however, are based upon the deliberate misrepresentation of both current and historical events and appear to be an attempt to gain Jewish sympathy and support at a time when most nations have isolated Serbia as a Balkan pariah.[1-5] Even as Serbia courts Jewish public opinion, their propagandists conceal a history of well-ingrained anti-Semitism, which persists in 1992. Moreover, Serbs portray themselves as victims in the Second World War, but conceal the systematic genocide that Serbs committed against several peoples, including the Jews. As such, Serbs have usurped for their own propaganda purposes the Holocaust that occurred in neighboring Croatia and Bosnia, but do not give an honest accounting of the Holocaust as it occurred in Serbia.

Serbian Anti-Semitism in the 19th Century

During four centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Jewish communities of Serbia enjoyed religious tolerance, internal autonomy, and equality before the law,[3] but this ended with the breakup of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of the Serbian state. Soon after the temporarily successful Serbian insurrection against Turkish rule led by Karadjordje Petrovic in 1804, Jews were expelled from the interior of Serbia and prohibited from residing outside of Belgrade.[4] Renewed expulsions of Jews followed in 1856 and 1861, in conjunction with laws forbidding Jews the right of domicile.[4-6] Jews were also specifically prohibited from travel between districts for the purpose of trade.[7] Extensive diplomatic records from the late 19th century depicted the cruel and harsh treatment of the Jews of Serbia,[8,9] which British diplomatic observers attributed to religious fanaticism, jealousy from commercial rivalry, and the belief that Jews were the secret agents of the Turks.[5,6,10] In 1865, shortly after a series of highly inflammatory anti-Semitic articles appeared in the Belgrade newspaper *Svetovidje*, two Jews were murdered. A British diplomat commented pointedly, "...it is a notorious fact that the outrages complained of by the Jews were perpetuated shortly after publication of these articles." [11] The Serbian government did not permit publication of the replies of the Jewish community, including that of a rabbi.[11] In 1867, the Israelite Alliance Society at Paris delivered to Lord Stanley of the British Foreign Office a detailed description of the habitual persecution of the Jews of Serbia, causing Lord

Stanley to write, "...it appears that the complaints of the Jewish community are too well founded...Servia [archaic spelling] cannot but suffer in the estimation not only of England, but of all civilized nations from the persecution of an active, industrious, and inoffensive religious community residing in it."[10] In 1869, the Jews of Belgrade appealed directly to the British government for protection.[12] In 1871, a British diplomat recorded the appalling condition of the Jewish community of Belgrade:

> I have accompanied Dr. Levy, the late representative of the Société Israélite at Belgrade to the Jewish quarter, and can hardly believe any poverty can exceed in misery what I have seen there...people literally starving by inches from -- though most willing to work -- being deprived by law of means of earning their subsistence.
>
> The number of Jews of Belgrade is fast diminishing. When two years ago a Report was made respecting them, they numbered 200 families; they now reckon 150, of whom only 20 are in a position to help their poorer brethren; they are mostly located in the most unhealthy part of town, close to the Danube, and are as much shut off from their so-called fellow-subjects as if contact with them would communicate the plague.
>
> Illnesses and fevers, caused by want of nourishment, make greater ravages amongst them than among the other poor of the place...
>
> Some of these poor people would willingly emigrate to the neighboring Austrian provinces, but impediments are indirectly thrown in their way by the Servian authorities, who pride themselves on the number of immigrants who flock to the country, and like to be able to boast, in their so-called statistics, that there are no emigrants.
>
> I doubt if the Servian Government has ever been in earnest in any of the measures which it has proposed or professed to take in behalf of the Jews; it has passively resisted every pressure put upon it at various times by the majority of the guaranteeing Powers, thinking the support of the mercantile interest of Belgrade, which looks with great jealousy at the Jews, as being of more value."[5]

Article 23 of the Serbian Constitution granted equality to every citizen, while Article 132 forbade Jews the right of domicile.[5] The treaty of Berlin of 1878, which formally established the Serbian state, accorded political and civil equality to the Jews of Serbia, but the Serbian parliament resisted abolishing restrictive decrees for another 11 years.[13] Although the legal status of the Jewish community subsequently improved, the view of Jews as an alien presence persisted.

Serbian Complicity in the Holocaust

Serbian conventional wisdom regards Serbs as the primary victims of the Second World War and accuses Croatia of genocide against the Serbian people.[14] This same conventional wisdom denies that the fascist government of Milan Nedic maintained significant military and civilian authority under the German occupation; that Serbia participated in the destruction of Serbia's Jews; and that Serbs themselves ran concentration camps. Thus, Serbian "historians" contend that the persecution of the Jews of Serbia was entirely the responsibility of Germans and began only with the German occupation…but this is a self-serving fiction.[15] Even before the German invasion of Yugoslavia, indigenous Serbian anti-Semitism found vigorous expression, when, in October, 1940, Serbia issued legislation restricting Jewish access to higher education and commercial licenses.[16] One year later on October 22, 1941, the Grand Anti-Masonic Exhibit opened in occupied Belgrade, depicting a Jewish-Communist-Masonic plot for world domination.[17] The exhibition, funded primarily by the city of Belgrade,[18] was well attended.[19,20] Newspapers such as *Obnova* (Renewal) and *Nasa Borba* (Our Struggle) proclaimed that Jews were the ancient enemies of the Serbian people and that Serbs should not wait for the Germans to begin extermination of the Jews.[21-23] An article entitled "The Struggle for the Purity of

Race" vowed that Jews "will never again be pharmacists, lawyers, or judges in Serbia."[24] In January, 1942, Serbian authorities issued postage stamps to commemorate the opening of the Grand Anti-Masonic Exhibit. These stamps, which juxtaposed Jewish and Serbian symbols (but did not contain Nazi symbols), portrayed Judaism as the source of world evil and advocated the humiliation and violent subjugation of Jews (Fig. 1).

As was true in neighboring Croatia,[25] Serbia was under Axis occupation during the Second World War.[25] Although the efficient destruction of Serbian Jewry within the first two years of German occupation has been well documented,[26] the extent to which Serbia participated in that destruction has been less appreciated. The Serbian version of history portrays wartime Serbia as a helpless, occupied territory, but Serbian newspapers indicate that Serbia retained significant civilian authority. Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the Serbian wartime government, provisionally under Milan Acimovic from April-August, 1941 and subsequently under the former Yugoslav Minister of War, General Milan Nedic, cooperated extensively with the Nazis. In November, 1941, Mihajlo Olcan, a minister in Nedic's government, boasted that "Serbia has been allowed what no other occupied country has been allowed and that is to establish law and order with its own armed forces."[27] With Nazi blessings, Nedic established the Serbian State Guard, a part of the Serbian State Security under the command of Dragomir Dragi Jovanovic, a former Belgrade municipal official.[28] The Serbian State Guard numbered about 20,000, compared to 3,400 German police in Serbia.[29] Recruiting advertisements for the Serb police force stated that "applicants must have no Jewish or Gypsy blood."[30] Nedic's second in command was Dimitrije Ljotic, a fascist ideologist who, years before the Nazi occupation, had founded the Serbian Fascist Party. Ljotic organized the Serbian Volunteer Corps, whose primary function was rounding up Jews, Gypsies, and Partisans for execution.[31] In January, 1942, *Obnova* reported and praised the capture of seven Jews in Nis by twelve members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps.[32] As late as September 19, 1943, Nedic made an official state visit to Adolf Hitler.[33] (Fig. 2)

The Serbian Orthodox Church openly supported the Nazis, and many priests theologically justified the persecution of the Jews. On August 13, 1941, approximately 500 distinguished Serbs signed "An Appeal to the Serbian Nation," which called for loyalty to the occupying Nazis. The first three signers were bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church.[34] In November, 1941, a Serbian Orthodox priest Dusan Popovic declared at the Church of St. Mark in Belgrade, "We have been betrayed and sold out. The worm of betrayal and corruption as embodied by Judaism has penetrated the core of Yugoslavia."[35] On January 30, 1942, Metropolitan Josif, the acting head of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, officially prohibited conversions of Jews to Serbian Orthodoxy,[36] in cooperation with Nazi authorities, thereby blocking a means of saving Jewish lives. At a rally, after the government minister Olcan "thanked God that the enormously powerful fist of Germany had not come down upon the head of the Serbian nation" but instead "upon the heads of the Jews in our midst," he was then publicly blessed by a high-ranking Serbian Orthodox priest.[37]

A most striking example of Serbian Orthodox anti-Semitism combined with invented history is the case of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956), revered as one of the most influential church leaders and ideologists after Saint Sava, founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church.[38] To Serbs, Bishop Velimirovic was a martyr who survived torture in the Dachau prison camp.[39] Indeed, he was brought to Dachau (as were other prominent European clergy), held for approximately two months, and then released.[40, 41] As an *Ehrenhäftling* (honor prisoner), he lived in a special section in private quarters, dined on the same food as the German officers, and made excursions into town under German escort.[41, 39] There is no

evidence for the oft-repeated contention that his life was threatened.[41] Although he must have been aware of the enormous suffering of the Jews near him, Bishop Velimirovic's writings from Dachau reflected his greater preoccupation with ridiculing the Jews: "When our Lord was healing the sick on a Saturday, the Jewish elders, much more stupid than the Jewish people themselves, screamed at him for doing it on a Saturday instead of on any other day of the week."[42] From Dachau, this venerated bishop endorsed the Holocaust:

> ...Europe is presently the main battlefield of the Jew and his father, the devil, against the heavenly Father and his only begotten Son...[Jews] first need to become legally equal with Christians in order to repress Christianity next, turn Christians into atheists, and step on their necks. All the modern European slogans have been made up by Jews, the crucifiers of Christ: democracy, strikes, socialism, atheism, tolerance of all religions, pacifism, universal revolution, capitalism, and communism...All this has been done with the intention to humiliate Christ...You should think about this, my Serbian brethren, and correspondingly correct your thoughts, desires, and acts.[43]

Despite Serbian claims to the contrary, Germans were not alone in killing the Jews of Serbia. Banjica, a concentration camp located in Belgrade, was staffed primarily by Serbs.[44] Funding for the conversion of the former barracks of the Serbian 18th infantry division to a concentration camp, as well as operating expenses for the camp, came from the municipal budget of Belgrade.[45] The camp was divided into German and Serbian sections, and the Serbian section was headed by the policeman Svetozar Vujkovic.[46] Prisoner lists from Banjica survive which were written entirely in Serbian in the Cyrillic alphabet.[47] At least 23, 697 victims passed through the Serbian section of this camp.[48] Many were Jews, including at least 798 children.[48] At least 120 children were shot by Serbian guards.[49] The use of mobile gassing vans by Nazis in Serbia during the early months of 1942 for the extermination of Jewish women and children has been well documented.[50] However, it has been less appreciated that a Serbian business firm obtained a contract from the Gestapo office in Belgrade to purchase the clothing of these same victims.[51] In August, 1942, following the virtual liquidation of Serbia's Jews, Nedic's government attempted to claim all Jewish property for the Serbian state.[52, 53] In the same month, Dr. Harald Turner, the chief Nazi civil administrator for Serbia, proudly announced that Serbia was the only country in which the "Jewish question" had been solved.[54, 55] Turner attributed this "success" to Serbian help.[56] Thus, 93% of Belgrade's 11,970 Jews [57] and 94% of Serbia's 16,000 Jews [58] were exterminated, with the considerable collaboration of the Serbian government, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian State Guard, the Serbian police, and the Serbian public.

Although Jews were sporadically sheltered and saved in Serbia, more Serbian Jews survived by joining the Croatian-led Partisans, the only major organized resistance against Nazis and Fascists in occupied Yugoslavia.[31, 58, 59] Today, many Serbs proudly cite the Chetniks as a Second World War resistance force, even claiming that the Chetniks were somehow allied with the United States, but this is simply fabricated history. Chetnik resistance against the Nazis came to a complete stop as early as the end of 1941.[60] Moreover, the Chetniks actively collaborated with both Nazis and Fascists,[61] and for this reason Jewish fighters found it necessary to abandon the Chetniks, in favor of Tito's Partisans.[60] In reality, the Chetniks, dedicated to the restoration of the Serbian throne and the territorial expansion of the Serbian state,[60] were the moral counterpart of Croatia's Ustasha. Illustrative was the systematic genocide that the Chetniks committed against Muslims,[62] who for nearly all of 500 years had lived peacefully with the Sephardic Jewish community. Under explicit orders of their leader Draza Mihajlovic, the Chetniks attempted to depopulate Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia of all non-Serbs.[61-64] Between

86,000 and 103,000 Muslims perished during the war,[65,66] the overwhelming majority at the hands of the Chetniks.

In the post-war era, when information about Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbian authorities, one form of historical revisionism was to conceal the resistance among specific (non-Serbian) ethnic groups, by invoking a global "Yugoslav anti-Nazi movement." This practice of blurring history was poignantly illustrated in the request by Yugoslav officials to the French government that a Croat and Muslim anti-Nazi insurrection known as "the revolt of the Croats" be remembered as "the revolt of the Yugoslavs."[67]

Serbian Anti-Semitism Today

Since the end of World War II, Serbs have overwhelmingly dominated the Yugoslav institutions connected with international relations, with clear Serbian control over the diplomatic corps, the Yugoslav Peoples Army, and the Yugoslav Central State Security (intelligence and secret police). This was true even during the era of Marshal Tito, who ruled from 1945 until his death in 1980.[68-72] The Yugoslav government, initially friendly towards Israel (as was then the Soviet Union), became progressively hostile,[13] as the Nonaligned Movement, centering on Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt, took shape. Thus, in 1955, when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion sought admission for Israel to the Nonaligned Movement, Belgrade denied the request, favoring Arabs.[13] For years, the Belgrade government has supported and trained PLO terrorists.[73] Immediately after the murder of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro in 1985, the terrorist mastermind Abu Abbas was welcomed in Belgrade.[73] Since the late 1980's, Abu-Nidal has maintained a large terrorist infrastructure in Yugoslavia, in coordination with Libyan, Iraqi, and Yugoslav intelligence services.[73] During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as Iraqi missiles landed in Israel, Belgrade supported its ally Iraq,[73] (as has Iraq reciprocally supported Belgrade with rocket launchers and jet fighters.[74]) Such sponsorship of anti-Israeli terrorism may be interpreted as a consequence of support for nonaligned Arab states rather than anti-Jewish sentiment.

Although the Jewish community of Serbia is not currently persecuted or selectively endangered,[75] anti-Semitic sentiment does surface in such mainstream institutions as the Serbian Orthodox Church and the official news media. The January 15, 1992 issue of the official publication of the Serbian Orthodox Church, *Pravoslavlje* (Orthodoxy), carried an article entitled, "Jews Crucify Christ Again."[76] In this polemic, "treacherous" and "surreptitious" Israeli politicians were said to be constrained from openly expressing their "pathological" hatred of Christians, because "they know that Christian countries gave them the state." Allegedly, nuns were so frequently beaten in Israel, that one nun was actually "happy, because they only spit in her face." Only weeks later, when Russia extended diplomatic recognition to the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia, the official Belgrade-based news agency *Tanjug* blamed Russian recognition on a "Jewish conspiracy" against Serbia,[77] hauntingly reminiscent of the theme of the 1941 Anti-Masonic Exhibit.

Serbian Exploitation of the Holocaust as Propaganda

Given the history of distrust of Jews and the recurring Serbian belief in a world-wide Jewish conspiracy,[6,17,77] it is ironic that the Serbian government in 1992, while waging war against multiple nationalities and minorities of the former Yugoslavia, seeks the sympathy and support of Jews. The essential strategy of Serbian propaganda is to portray Jews and Serbs as equally victims of the Holocaust and endangered by demonic Croats. This

concept is disseminated through the Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society, founded in Belgrade in 1988 with the support of the Serbian government. Dr. Klara Mandic is the secretary-general and principal voice of this organization. During January and February of 1992, many North American Jewish newspapers carried Dr. Mandic's chilling article, which graphically described the alleged brutal murder of an elderly Jewish woman, Ankica Konjuh, by "Croatian extremists," during September, 1991.[78] Offering this as evidence of rising Croatian anti-Semitism, Dr. Mandic concluded with the unsettling question, "Who among us will be next?" However, even as she released this story to the press, Dr. Mandic knew better that Ankica Konjuh was neither a Jew nor had been killed by Croats. As early as December 23, 1991, the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia had met in Belgrade and demanded that Dr. Mandic cease and desist misrepresenting Ankica Konjuh as the first Jewish victim of the war.[79] Furthermore, *bona fide* witnesses had attested that Ankica Konjuh, a 67-year-old Croat, was one of 240 civilians massacred by Serbian forces after the last armed Croatian defenders were driven from the region.[80, 81]

Nevertheless, when Dr. Mandic lectured at the Hillel House of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. on February 20, 1992, she provided a copy of her misleading article to the rabbi without further elaboration. Dr. Mandic called herself a "Jewish leader," [78] but Jews have been notably absent from her constituency. Less than one half dozen Jews belong to her society of thousands. From the inception of Dr. Mandic's organization, Serbian Jewish intellectuals were wary of its propensity for manipulation by the government.[82] Dr. Mandic described herself as an "eyewitness" to the war, speaking on behalf of "endangered" Jews of Croatia. However, since the war began, she has had neither contact with any of the nine Jewish communities of Croatia [83] nor a working relationship with any official Jewish organization within the former Yugoslavia.[75] Beginning with the proposition that anti-Semitism has simply never existed in Serbia, Dr. Mandic described Croatia as preparing to repeat the Holocaust, a portrayal contradicted by the testimony of Jewish leaders within Croatia, American Jews who have visited or lived in Croatia, and observers from international Jewish agencies, all of whom find that there is no evidence of state-sponsored anti-Semitism; that the rights of the Jewish minority are respected; and that anti-Semitic incidents are indeed very rare.[83-86] In fact, the Croatian government has committed to the rebuilding of the synagogue of Zagreb in its original location in the center of the city.[87] When Dr. Mandic was asked to comment on Serbian (Yugoslav Army) shelling of the synagogue of Dubrovnik, the second oldest surviving synagogue in Europe, she vigorously denied that any attack had occurred at all. In contradiction, the affidavit of the president of the Jewish community of Dubrovnik, herself a concentration camp survivor, detailed the Serbian attack on the synagogue and resultant damages.[88] Thus, Dr. Mandic's presentation left the inescapable impression that she was distinctly more concerned with Serbian public relations than Jewish well being. In fact, Dr. Mandic's February, 1992 speaking tour of North America was not arranged by any legitimate Jewish organization, but rather by Wise Communications, a Washington-based public relations firm representing the Serbian oil company Jugopetrol, a thinly veiled proxy for the Belgrade government.

One cornerstone of the Serbian strategy to manipulate public opinion has been the portrayal of a book by Dr. Franjo Tudjman,[89] president of Croatia, as a glorification of anti-Semitism and Nazism. In 1990, a report on Eastern European anti-Semitism was submitted to the U.S. Congress, and, based on incomplete excerpts from Tudjman's book, concerns were raised about the Croatian leader's own anti-Semitism.[90] Subsequent investigation revealed that the anti-Semitic remarks attributed to Tudjman were actually direct quotations from a Serbian source and that Dr. Tudjman had specifically identified these remarks as anti-Semitic. Thus, a retraction and public apology followed in the

Congressional Record on July 11, 1991.[90] Since this time, a Serbian-supplied compilation of excerpts from Tudjman's book has been circulated to the Jewish community, under the mistranslated title Wastelands: Historical Truth.[91] Dr. Mandic herself distributed this compilation to Jewish organizations on her North American tour. This Belgrade-derived translation, which contains numerous subtle alterations and critical omissions, has been uncritically received in many Jewish quarters, including the Simon Wiesenthal Center in California. Furthermore, these excerpts have been the basis for a number of articles alleging anti-Semitism in Croatia. In an example, one Jewish journalist at the Jerusalem Post depicted Dr. Tudjman as the reincarnation of Goebbels.[92] Betraying his source, however, this journalist used the Belgrade mistranslation of the book's title and the same excerpts. Although supposedly quoting from Tudjman's book, he had evidently never read the original text (it is in Croatian) and, on later questioning, admitted this.[93] In contrast, a Jewish professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem did read the original text, and his balanced critique found the charges of anti-Semitism to be false.[94]

Essentially, the book explores man's inhumanity towards man and reviews the tragedy of genocide throughout human history. The title of the book, which has never been correctly translated by Serbian sources, is better translated as Wilderness of Historical Reality: A Treatise on the History and Philosophy of Evil Brutality. The author reveals his own personal tragedy in dedicating the book "To the memory of my father and brother and my step-mother, who perished [at the hands of Communists and Nazis] as victims within the wilderness of history." [95] Although Jews are not the principal focus of this work, massacres of Jews at various times in history are recounted. Regrettably, the profound subject of this work is approached in a rather clumsy and convoluted way. The book indeed contains passages which lack sensitivity for Jewish feeling, and Jewish leaders in Croatia were the first to express criticism of this book. Nevertheless, any honest reader can tell that this book is not, as has been alleged by Serbian sources, a justification of the Holocaust or of any act of genocide against any people at any time. Moreover, in a passage conspicuously never included in the Belgrade excerpts, Tudjman describes the Jews as one of the oldest and most civilized nations in the world.[96] Thus, it would appear prudent to approach these Serbian-supplied excerpts with considerable caution, since the text and its interpretation have been manipulated. Proper evaluation of this book must await a *bona fide* translation.

Jewish sensitivity to the Holocaust is similarly exploited by the California-based Jewish-Serbian Friendship Society of America, an offshoot of Dr. Mandic's organization. Their newsletter equates the Jewish and Serbian positions during World War II, both as victims of Croats, and is filled with recollections of Ustasha atrocities (as well as fictional elaborations).[97] This selective recounting of history, however, omits any mention of the Holocaust in Serbia; Serbian genocide against Jews, Croats, Gypsies, and Muslims; and Serbian collaboration with the Nazis. The Jewish-Serbian Friendship Society professes its concern for Jewish well being, yet offers no protest, as Jewish community centers, synagogues, and cemeteries have been indiscriminately bombed by Serbian forces.[86, 88, 98] The Society is ostensibly rooted in the shared opposition of Jews and Serbs to Nazism, but has been strikingly indifferent to Serbian reformulations of Nazi concepts. In 1991, Vojislav Seselj, a member of the Serbian parliament and leader of the White Eagles, a Serbian irregular Chetnik faction, declared, "We want no one else on our territory and we will fight for our true borders. The Croats must either move or die." [99] Croats in Serbian-controlled regions are forced to identify themselves with red-and-white armbands -- hauntingly reminiscent of the yellow armbands worn by Jews in Serbia during the Holocaust.[100] Croat prisoners of war are tortured and killed in Serbian labor camps.[101, 102] Croats are systematically mass deported from their homes, which are then resettled with

Serbs.[103-106] The same pattern repeats with even more ferocity against non-Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbian forces pursue a bold campaign of "ethnic cleansing," [107-110] which the New York Times has characterized as "a one sided war… reminiscent of the Nazis." [111] To all of this, the Friendship Society remains conspicuously silent.

Conclusion

Belgrade has promoted the myth of Serbian kinship with the Jews as fellow victims of Nazi oppression, at the same time concealing the true extent of Serbian collaboration with the Nazis. It is indeed ironic that Serbia is now seeking Jewish support for a war in which both the ideology and methodology so tragically echo Nazism. The indigenous non-Serbian populations of the invaded territories are being driven from their homes, exterminated, or imprisoned in concentration camps, as Serbian leaders openly endorse their program of "ethnic cleansing." The European Community, the Helsinki Commission, the United Nations, the United States, and the human rights advocating Helsinki Watch have all clearly identified and condemned Serbia as the aggressor.[112-115] Western diplomats have pointedly characterized the current Serbian regime as "a lying, terrorist criminal organization." [116] Serbian propaganda, however, portrays Serbs as victims [116-118] and campaigns for Jewish sympathy and support, exploiting the powerful symbolism of the Holocaust. In this context, Serbia's professed solicitude for the Jewish people must be reexamined.

The author is a medical doctor engaged in scientific research and clinical practice.

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FIGURE LEGENDS

Fig 1. Four semi-postal stamps issued by Serbian authorities on January 1, 1942 (Scott Standard Postage Stamp Catalog, numbers 2NB15-18). Each stamp is labelled "Anti-Masonic Exhibition" and "Serbia" (Cyrillic) and commemorates the opening date "22X1941" (October 22, 1941). The theme: Serbia crushes a Jewish-Communist-Masonic plot for world domination.

.50 + .50 dinars: A faceless prisoner, identifed by the Jewish star on his chest and Masonic apron and baton on his lap, is blinded by the symbolic light of Serbia. Amidst the light is the traditional Serbian symbol representing the phrase, *Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava*, i.e., only unity saves Serbs.

1 + 1 dinars: A serpent whose back is covered with numerous six-pointed Jewish stars writhes over a Masonic square-and-compass, which surmounts the globe. A strong (Serbian) fist crushes the serpent.

2 + 2 dinars: A crucifix stylized to represent the traditional Serbian symbol pierces the red, five-pointed communist star atop the globe, tearing asunder the hammer-and-sickle.

4 + 4 dinars: The heel of a sturdy Serbian peasant tramples upon the Star of David, which surmounts the globe, as the Serb topples two pillars representing Bolsheviks and Jews.

Fig 2. General Milan Nedic on a state visit to Adolf Hitler on September 19, 1943.

ANNEX 101:
MLADEN MARCIKIĆ ET AL., "CIVILIAN MASSACRE IN DALJ", CROATIAN MEDICAL JOURNAL, VOL. 33, WAR SUPPL. 1, (1992), PP. 29-33

CROATIAN MEDICAL JOURNAL

War Suppl. 1 1992;33:29-33

Civilian Massacre in Dalj

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Abstract. On August 1, 1991, the Yugoslav Federal Army and Serbian extremists attacked the village of Dalj, near Osijek. The civilians took refuge in Osijek and Hungary, but many of them were captured by terrorists. Their fate is still unknown, and the number of missing persons is more than 300. The Federal Army denies the entry to the village and permitted only 25 cadavers to be taken to the Osijek Hospital. Two out of 25 were civilians: P.D., a baker of Albanian origin, and N.T., a bakers assistant, a Croat. The decedent N.T. was killed from the back by rifle fire, while the decedent P. D. was first beaten and then executed by two close-range gunshots in the head.

Key words: *civilians, Croatia, forensic expertise, war crime*

Description of the Event

Combined forces of Serbian extremists and Yugoslav Federal Army attacked the village of Dalj near Osijek on August 1, 1991. Under heavy artillery fire, the civilians tried to flee Dalj, but many were captured by terrorists. Busses and medical personnel were sent from Osijek to help evacuate the wounded and the refugees, but the terrorists took hold of the busses and took the drivers as captives. It is still impossible to estimate the death toll in Dalj, since all visits have been restricted, and the village is under heavy terrorist guard. Only several members of the Federal Committee for the Cease-Fire Surveillance and some civilian officials were allowed the entry. Reporters were denied access to any information. According to the last census, the population of Dalj numbered 2500 inhabitants, with approximately 40% Catholics, as stated by the local vicar. A hundred and fifty of them are now left in the village, and several hundred among the refugees in Osijek, some of them recovering at the General Hospital. The fate of others is not known. Witnesses state that more than a hundred person, members of the National Guard and civilians, were barbarously killed and massacred. Many of them were buried in the open fields or thrown in the Danube. The terrorists and the Federal Army allowed transportation of only 25 cadavers to the Hospital Center in Osijek. The medical personnel was locked up with the cadavers in a refrigerated lorry during the trip back to Osijek. Of the 25 dead transported to the morgue, two were civilians, P.D. (Albanian) and N.T. (Croat).

Forensic Findings

After the official investigator of the Osijek Distric Court, Mr. V.S., had opened the inquest, the autopsy of the decedents was performed at the Department of Pathology and Forensic Medicine, Osijek General Hospital, on August 3, 1991. The following is a transcript of the relevant parts of the autopsy reports.

DECEDENT: P.D.
Autopsy Code: K:1422/91;S.312/91
Age: 31
Occupation: baker
Comment: found dead by his bakery



Figure 1. Decedent P.D., aged 31. Two entrance gunshot wounds in the right temporo-parietal region. The histological examination of the dermis and epidermis around the wounds revealed traces of a dark foreign material, corresponding to firing byproduct, indicating that the wounds were inflicted from a close range.

External Examination: The cadaver is of a well-built, 180 cm-high male. Two entrance gunshot wounds are found in the right temporo-parietal region (Fig. 1). The wound No. 1, measuring 0.9 cm and encircled by a 3 mm-wide contusion band, is found 7 cm from the external auditory meatus and 11 cm from the midline. The wound No. 2, measuring 0.9 cm and encircled by a 3 mm-wide contusion band, is found 6 cm from the external auditory meatus and 13 cm from the midline. In the left fronto-parietal region, a single stellate exit gunshot wound is found, measuring 12:3 cm. The wound margin is ragged and suffused with blood, with fragments of bone and brain tissue protruding from the opening. The wound canal is directed to the left and penetrates the right and the left cerebral hemisphere. In the left frontal region, several smaller abrasions, measuring 1-2 cm, are found (Fig. 2). Both eyelids are swollen and suffused with blood. The right conjunctiva is suffused with blood. An abrasion measuring 2 cm is found in the right zygomatic region and two abrasions, measuring 1 cm each, are found on the chin.

On the right side of the chest, an abrasion is found below the right nipple, surrounded by a livid bruise and measuring 4:1 cm. In the upper part of the back, three linear 6-7 cm-long abrasions and one circular, measuring 2 cm in diameter, are found.

A laceration, measuring 5:3 cm and surrounded by a hematoma, is found on the inner side of the right upper thigh. On the lateral and posterior parts of the right thigh, 55 cm from the soles of the feet, two livid bruises are found, measuring 7:2 and 12:8 cm, respectively.

Internal Examination: The scalp is suffused with blood in the frontal region and around gunshot entrance wounds in the right temporo-parietal region. It is considerably ragged around the exit wounds. In the right parietal region, a round defect is found, measuring 1 cm. Next to it is another triangular defect with fracture lines radiating towards the frontal, parietal and occipital region. In the left parietal region, a large calvarial defect is found, measuring 10 cm in diameter. On the base of the cranium, several fracture lines are found from the crista galli towards the sphenoidal plane. The dura is thorn in the left and right parietal regions. A thin layer of blood (less than 1 mm) is found on the inner side of the dura. The pia is thorn over both parietal lobes. The arteries are medium sized and the lining surface is smooth and shiny. The brain tissue is soft; extensive lacerations of the cortex and white substance are found in the right temporo-parietal region and the left parietal region, with brain tissue squashed into a bloody mash. The brain cavities are filled with blood.



Figure 2. Decedent P.D., aged 31. Brill's hematomas are found around the eyes. Hematomas and excoriations on the forehead, right cheek and chin were inflicted by a blunt mechanical force.

On the parietal pleura of the right hemithorax, blood suffusions are found. Multiple rib fractures (ribs III-VI) in the mamillary line are also found.

Histological Findings: In the region of the gunshot wounds, defects of dermis and epidermis are found. The epidermis is elevated on the wound margin and the surface covered with microscopic brown-black grains. Similar grains are found in the dermis.

Pathoanatomical Diagnoses:

Gunshot wounds of the head
Vulnera sclopetaria capitis

Bruises of the head, trunk and extremities
Hematomata cutis capitis, corporis et extremitatum

Skin excoriations of the head and trunk
Excoriationes cutis capitis et corporis

Multifragmented fracture of the cranial vault and base
Fractura comminutiva cranii

Brain conquassation
Conquassatio cerebri

Fractures of the ribs III-VI
Fracturae costarum III-VI lateris dextri

Cause of Death:

Head gunshot wounds
Vulnera sclopetaria capitis

Opinion: The external examination and autopsy of the decedent P.D. revealed that the death was homicidal, caused by several gunshot wounds of the head.

The entrance gunshot wound No. 1, measuring 0.9 cm in diameter, was found in the right parietal region, 7 cm from the external auditory meatus and 11 cm from the midline. The contusion band measured 0.3 cm in diameter. The entrance gunshot wound No. 2 was similar to the first one and was found in the same region, 6 cm from the external auditory meatus and 13 cm from the midline. Common stellate exit gunshot wound was found in the left fronto-parietal region, measuring 12:3 cm. The histological examination of the dermis and epidermis revealed traces of dark a foreign material, corresponding to firing byproducts. The wounds are classified as close-range gunshot wounds.

Hematomas of the upper and lower eyelids and conjunctivas and skin abrasions of the forehead, right zygoma, the chin and the chest were found. Striatal excoriations and bruises were also found in the dorsal and lumbar region and on the medial side of the right thigh. These wounds were inflicted by unspecified mechanical force. Their location suggests that they were not incidentally inflicted, but were probably the result of a blunt mechanical force.

DECEDENT: N.T.
Autopsy Code: Kir:1422/91; S.314/91
Age: 22
Occupation: baker's assistant

Comment: found dead by the bakery

External Examination: The cadaver is of medium built, 185 cm high male. On the outer side of the right thigh, an entrance gunshot wound (No. 1) is found 74 cm from the soles of the feet, measuring 1 cm and encircled by a 3 mm-wide contusion band. The wound canal is directed backward and to the left. The exit gunshot wound with ragged margins, measuring 6 cm in diameter, is found on the back of the right thigh. The lower margin of the wound is 68 cm from the soles of the feet.

On the right side of the face, a large laceration with contused and ragged margins in found (wound No. 2). Lacerated muscles and broken bones are protruding from the wound opening.

In the right parietal region, 9 cm from the external auditory meatus and 13 cm from the midline, an entrance gunshot wound is found (wound No. 3), measuring 1 cm and encircled by a 0.3 cm-wide contusion band. The wound canal is penetrating the skull, the right cerebral hemisphere and the base of the cranium. The exit wound is found on the left side of the face, below the external auditory meatus and measures 6 cm in diameter. The direction of the wound canal is downward and to the left.

In the left parietal region, a large laceration with ragged margins, measuring 13:10 cm, is found (wound No. 4). Brain tissue and bone fragments are protruding from the wound opening.

On the left side of the back, an entrance gunshot wound is found 125 cm from the soles of the feet and 4 cm from the midline (wound No.5) measuring 1 cm in diameter and surrounded by an eccentric contusion band (width: 0.3 cm in the lower, and 0.1 cm on the upper margin). The wound canal is penetrating the left chest wall through the 10th intercostal space and then through the upper and lower lobes of the left lung, grazing the left ventricle. The exit wound is found in the 2nd left intercostal space in the midclavicular line and measures 3 cm in diameter.

On the back of the right shoulder, an entrance gunshot wound is found 150 cm from the soles of the feet and 18 cm from the midline (wound No. 6). The diameter is 1 cm, and the contusion band eccentric, measuring 0.3 cm medially and 0.1 cm laterally. The wound canal is penetrating the dorsal musculature and the exit wound is found on the right side of the neck, 158 cm from the soles of the feet and 7 cm from the midline, measuring 5 cm in diameter. The wound canal is directed upward and to the left.

An entrance gunshot wound (wound No. 7) with ragged margin and measuring 5 cm is found in the upper part of the arm and in the armpit. The wound canal is penetrating the chest wall through the 2nd intercostal space, injuring the upper lobe of the right lung and the visceral pleura at the level of the 4th intercostal space. The surrounding spine musculature is suffused with blood. The projectile could not be found.

Two lacerations in the left occipital region are found close to each other, measuring 2 and 3 cm in diameter.

Two lacerations with ragged margins and measuring 5 and 6 cm, respectively, are found on the back and front of the right forearm in the carpal region. The muscles are torn and both ulna and radius fractured. On the front side of the right forearm, two abrasions are found. A large wound with ragged margins and measuring 5 cm is found on the outer side of the right forearm. In and below the left elbow, two abrasions, measuring 2 and 2.5 cm, are found.

Several smaller abrasions are found on the right knee and foreleg, measuring 1 cm in diameter.

Internal Examination: Large wound (No. 4) is found on the left side of the scalp. The vault is medium-sized, symmetrical. In the right parietal region, a 15 cm-wide circular defect is found, with fracture lines radiating to the temporal and basal regions of the skull. On the left side of the vault, a large bone defect is found in the frontal, temporal and parietal region, measuring 13 cm in diameter.

The dura is lacerated in the right and especially left parietal region. Several fractures are found on the base of the skull in the anterior cranial fossa around the lamina cribrosa, and on the right side, encircling the whole cranium in the frontal plane. A bone defect, measuring 4 cm is found in the middle cranial fossa. Fracture lines radiating from the defect are continuous with the fractures in the anterior cranial fossa.

The pia is lacerated in the right parietal and left basal region. In the right parietal and left temporal lobe, discontinuities of the brain tissue are found and the brain tissue is squashed. The brain cavities are filled with brown substance.

In the 10th, the anterior part of the second left intercostal space and the 4th right intercostal space near the spine, muscle lacerations are found. The lacerations are found on the left and right visceral pleura.

On the left side of the heart, a laceration of the left ventricle is found, measuring 3 cm in diameter.

On the posterior side of the left lower lobe, the laceration of the visceral pleura and the lung is continuing in a similar laceration of the frontal aspect of the upper lobe. The right lung is smaller and of green-purple color. On the side of the upper lobe, two smaller lacerations of the visceral pleura are found, continuing in the laceration of the lobe and medial visceral pleura.

Pathoanatomical Diagnoses:

Gunshot wounds of the head, trunk and extremities
Vulnera sclopetaria capitis, corporis et extremitatum

Multifragmented fracture of the cranial vault and base
Fractura comminutiva calvariae et basis cranii

Brain conquassation
Conquassatio cerebri

Multiple fractures of the mandible
Fracturae comminutivae mandibulae

Rupture of both lungs
Ruptura pulmonum

Fracture of the scapula
Fractura scapulae lateris dextri

Multifragmented fracture of the right forearm
Fractura comminutiva antebrachii dextri

Cause of Death:

Gunshot wounds of the head and trunk
Vulnera sclopetaria capitis et corporis

Opinion: The external examination and autopsy of the decedent N.T. revealed that the death was homicidal, caused by several gunshot wounds of the head and the trunk.

The external examination revealed the entrance gunshot wound No. 1, measuring 1 cm in diameter, on the outer side of the right thigh, 74 cm from the soles of the feet. The wound canal penetrated the right thigh and the exit wound was found on the inner side of the thigh, measuring 6 cm in diameter. The direction of the canal was upward and to the left. The wound was a long-range gunshot wound.

The entrance wound No. 2 was found on the right side of the face. The wound margins were ragged and the wound was filled with squashed muscles and several fragments of the lower jaw. This wound was probably caused by one deformed projectile or several secondary projectiles, formed after the first one had passed through a barrier.

The entrance gunshot wound No. 3, measuring 1 cm in diameter and encircled by a 0.3 cm-wide contusion band, was found in the parietal region, 9 cm from the external auditory meatus and 13 cm from the midline. The wound canal penetrated the cranial cavity and the brain, exiting in the front of the left external meatus as a wound measuring 6 cm in diameter. The wound canal was directed downward and to the left. This wound was a long-range gunshot wound.

The entrance gunshot wound No. 4 was found in the left parietal region. It was large, with ragged margin and filled with bone fragments and brain tissue. This wound was probably caused by a single deformed projectile or several secondary projectiles.

The entrance gunshot wound No. 5 was found on the left side of the back, 125 cm from the soles of the feet and 4 cm from the midline. It measured 1 cm in diameter and had eccentric contusion band measuring 0.3 cm in the lower and 0.1 cm in the upper part. The wound canal penetrated the 10th intercostal space and upper and lower lobe of the left lung, exiting through the 2nd left intercostal space. The exit wound was found below the left clavicle and measured 3 cm in diameter. The wound canal was directed forward and upward. This wound was a long-range gunshot wound.

The entrance gunshot wound No. 6, measuring 1 cm in diameter, was found on the back of the right shoulder, 150 cm from the soles of the feet and 18 cm from the midline. The eccentric contusion band measured 0.3 cm on the left and 0.1 cm on the right side. The wound canal penetrated the musculature of the back and neck. The exit wound was found in the base of the neck, 150 cm from the soles of the feet and 7 cm to the left of the spine. It measured 5 cm in diameter. The wound canal was directed upward and to the left. The wound was a long-range gunshot wound.

The large irregular entrance gunshot wound (No. 7), measuring 5 cm, was found on the right arm and in the armpit in the anterior axillary line at the level of the 2nd intercostal space. Two lacerations were found on the medial side of the right upper lobe. A small laceration of the right visceral pleura was found in the 4th intercostal space, near the spine. The wound canal was horizontal, directed to the left. The appearance of the entrance wound suggests that the wound was inflicted by a fragmented projectile or a secondary projectile.

Two large wounds with ragged margins, measuring 5 and 6 cm in diameter and accompanied by multifragmented fractures of the ulna and radius, were found on the lower end of the right forearm. They may have been caused by a fragmented projectile or secondary projectiles.

Conclusion

The fate of more than 300 inhabitants of Dalj is not known at the moment, but two civilian deaths described in this report may be the ominous sign. The decedent N.T., a baker's assistant, was killed from the back by rifle fire, and the baker, P.D., was executed by two gunshots in the head. The forensic expertise showed that the contusions and lacerations found on his body were inflicted by blunt mechanical force, suggesting that he was beaten before the execution. It is important to point out his Albanian origin, which may have brought about his ruthless execution.

Received: September 25, 1991

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ANNEX 102:

RSK, KNIN DISTRICT COURT, CRIME SCENE REPORT ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF PAVAO PARAĆ, 5 FEBRUARY 1993

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
KNIN DISTRICT COURT
Crime Scene Report
No. Kri-16/93

as of 5 February 1993, composed on the behalf of the District Court, on the crime scene in the village of Puljane – Oklaj, on the occasion of the death of Pavao Parać, son of the late Paško, Ana Parać, wife of Paško, Ivica Bračić, son of the late Luka, Ana Bračić, wife of Ivica, Marija Bračić, daughter of the late Ivo, Kata Parać, daughter of the late Nikola, Krste Bratić, son of Ivan.

Representatives of the court present: Željko Lalić, examining judge, Marica Bjelanović, record keeper

Also present at the crime scene investigation: Milojko Jarić, operating officer, Željko Martić, crime technician, /illegible/, doctor

Upon the notification of the Police Administration Knin on the finding of seven bodies in the village of Puljane – Oklaj, I visited the crime scene for the purpose of conducting an investigation.

Investigation commenced at 12:00 P.M.

1. In the kitchen on the upper floor of the house of Ivica Bračić, son of the late Luka, born on 16 February 1914, the bodies of Pavao Parać and his wife Ana and Ivica Bračić and his wife Ana were found on a couch by the left wall of the kitchen, facing from the direction of the door. The bodies were found in half-sitting position, with feet on the room floor. On the couch opposite from them, the body of Marija Bračić, daughter of the late Ivo, was found in half-sitting position with her head leaning on a pillow and feet on the floor.

a) The body of Pavao Parać, son of the late Paško, born in 1923, was situated on the couch next to the door, with head leaning on the back of the couch and feet on the floor. It was an older man, wearing a tartan jacket, green work trousers and black boots. Two entrance wounds were found in the abdomen area, while the exit wounds were in the area of the back.

b) Ana Parać, wife of Paško, born in /illegible/, was found next, on a couch in half-sitting position. It was the body of an older woman. She was wearing a blue handkerchief on her head, a black sweater, black shoes and a

blue work coat. An entrance wound was found on the body in the area of the left shoulder blade, with the exit wound in the abdomen area.

c) The body of Ivica Bračić, son of the late Luka, born on 16 February 1914, was found third on the couch, also in half-sitting position. It was the body of an older man, wearing a blue work suit and black boots. Three wounds were found on the body. Entrance below the neck on the right, exit in the upper part of the right shoulder blade, gunshot wound in the area of the right fist and a gunshot wound in the area of the left thigh.

d) The body of Ana Bračić, wife of Ivica, born in 1921, was situated fourth in the row in half-sitting position on the couch. It was the body of an older person wearing a brown female tartan coat, a red sweater and black female shoes. In the head area, i.e. on the position of the left eye, the entrance of the gunshot wound was on the front side, while the exit was on the right side of the nape.

e) The body of an older woman, the name of whom has been established to be Marija Bračić, daughter of the late Ivo, born in 1926, was situated on the upper part of the couch placed on the right side of the room facing from the door. The body was in half-lying position, with head leaning on a pillow and facing the pillow, while the feet were on the ground. She was wearing a black handkerchief and a black sweater, a black skirt, black wool tights, black female boots. In the vertex area, there was a gunshot wound. Entrance from the vertex side and exit through the center of the forehead, while there were no other traces of evidence.

2. In the village of Oklaj, the settlement of Puljani, the home of Kata Parać, daughter of the deceased Nikola, born in 1920, the body of the owner was found. The body was situated in her house, a one-story house, in the kitchen with a separate entrance. An antique cupboard was situated opposite from the door. On the left side from the door, there was a stove on solid fuel. Next to it, there was a brown chair with a back, on which a body in seated position was situated. It was the body of an older woman, wearing a green sweater, a black skirt, and a checked dressing gown. Beside the chair, on the left side from the door, a pair of crutches were found. The body had two visible gunshot wounds in the area of the thorax. Two bullet shells were found in the room and taken as evidence by the operating officers of the Police Administration Knin. There were no other traces of evidence.

3. In the village of Oklaj, the settlement of Puljane, the home of Krste Bračić, son of Ivan, born in 1940, the body of the owner was found. It was a one-story house, while the ground floor consisted of three rooms: the kitchen and two supporting rooms, connected to the tavern on the left facing from the entrance. The kitchen is on the right side from the entrance. In the left corner facing from the eastern side of the kitchen, the body of a middle-aged man, of medium height, wearing a beige jacket, blue trousers and black shoes, was

found. On the left side of the thorax area, two gunshot wounds were found. In the room right from the entrance, four bullet shells were found, probably from a machine gun, taken as evidence by employees of the Police Administration Knin. There were no other traces of evidence.

Photographs of the crime scenes under 1, 2 and 3 were taken by operating officers of the Administrative Office Knin. A photo-study will be a constituent part of this report. An expert doctor will describe the above listed injuries on the discovered bodies in more detail in his written report.

Concluded at 2:00 P.M.

RECORD KEEPER /signed/

EXAMINING JUDGE /signed/

ANNEX 103:

MARIN VILOVIĆ ET AL., "FACTS AND ESTIMATES OF THE CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM MINING OF THE PERUČA DAM BY SERBIAN FORCES ON JANUARY 28, 1993", CROATIAN MEDICAL JOURNAL, VOL. 34(4) (1993), PP 280-284

34 (4) 280-284, 1993

CROATIAN MEDICAL JOURNAL

Invited article

Facts and Estimates of the Consequences Resulting from Mining of the Peruća Dam by Serbian Forces on January 28, 1993

Marin Vilović, Mijo Zec, Josip Macan[1], Josip Raos, Josip Rupčić[2], Zvonimir Sever[3], Petar Grgić and Tomislav Megla[4]

Croatian National Electricity, Split, Croatia, [1]Peruća HPP, Croatian National Electricity, Sinj, [2]University of Zagreb, Faculty of Civil Engineering, [3]Elektroprojekt Consulting Engineers Ltd., Zagreb, [4]Agency for Reconstruction, Government of the Republic of Croatia

The Peruća dam is situated on the Cetina river, in the hinterland of the city of Split. The top component of a cascade of development plants, the Peruća dam has three other dams downstream. The dam was seized by Serbian forces on September 17, 1991. They threatened to blow it up, prevented the regular overflow of surplus water, and intentionally released quantities of water above the determined rates. In September 1992, UNPROFOR took control of the site, but Croatian engineers were rarely allowed to inspect the dam. In the autumn of 1992 UNPROFOR reported that the dam had been mined and promised to remove the explosives. On January 27, 1993, to revenge the Croatian liberation of the Maslenica Bridge, Serbian forces took the dam from UNPROFOR; next day at least five explosive devices were detonated. Croatian Army threw Serbian forces back the same night and found the dam severely damaged. In a rapid rescue action of experts, soldiers and local population, 3,000 inhabitants downstream were evacuated, and the critical craters on the dam filled within only three hours. Thus, the catastrophy was avoided at the last moment. It is estimated that the floodwave released by dam collapse would have destroyed the fertile soil, dams, settlements and cattle downstream, at the same time killing at least 3,000 inhabitants of the region.

Key words: Croatia; hydroelectric power plant; ecology

Introduction

During the war in Croatia, a number of power plants and associated power supply equipment on the Croatian territory have been attacked (1). Some have been completely or partly demolished, for example the Sisak and Osijek thermal power plants and their transmission lines. Various power plants in Croatia were occupied: the Obrovac pumped-storage station, and the Manojlovac, Peruća, Krčić I and II, and Golubić hydroelectric power plants.

The occupation of the Peruća power plant, its misuse, damage to its equipment and, finally, its blowing up, have demonstrated that power plants and reservoirs can also be used as dangerous weapons (2).

The Peruća Dam

The dam and the hydroplant are situated on the Cetina river, in the hinterland of the city of Split on the Adriatic coast. Peruća, constructed between 1955 and 1960, is one of a cascade development plants.

Several other structures were constructed downstream from it. The total installed capacity of these plants was 615.2 MW, and the normal average annual production was 2,973 GWh.

The Peruća power plant was extremely important for the whole area. It supplied power to a major industrial and tourist region. Moreover, the Peruća storage reservoir regulated the supply of water to the three plants downstream on the Cetina river. The reservoir was also a source of drinking water and provided irrigation supplies for agricultural areas near the town of Sinj. Thanks to its markedly clear water, the Cetina river is also very important for water supply. In addition to the settlements in the immediate vicinity, the Cetina river also supplies water to the settlements in the area of Makarska on the Adriatic coast, as well as the islands of Brač, Hvar and Šolta.

The Chronology of War Events in the Area of the Peruća Dam

Peruća was initially seized by Serbian forces on September 17, 1991. For the following 16 months, the plant remained out of operation. On several occasions Croatian experts, who continually monitored the situation downstream, were allowed to visit the dam with the EC-monitors. However, their requests to inspect the dam and control room and to reduce the risk of overflooding were repeatedly refused. During 1992, the occupying forces filled the reservoir to a level far beyond the normal operating level, closed the gates, and issued threats that the dam could be demolished by overtopping. The situation was particularly critical in the autumn, the time of the year when the reservoir is traditionally drawn down to provide flood routing capacity. To make the threat about overflooding the dam more serious, the spillway gate operating device was demolished. The dam suffered a series of uncontrolled releases of water. The discharge rates varied from almost 0 to 140 m^3/s. The required minimum flow for ecological reasons and for the three downstream power plants was not respected. All this was accompanied by a continuing threat that explosives had been placed in the dam body.

In September 1992, UNPROFOR took control of the site and designated the area a protected zone. On a few occasions, Croatian experts were again allowed to visit the plant with UNMO, UNPROFOR and EC representatives. Their requests to reduce the water level were again unheeded. On the last such visit, the UNMO Team representatives examined the control gallery and the UNPROFOR announced that the Peruća dam had been mined and that they would undertake further activities in order to remove the explosive. Nothing significant happened until January 27, when the sounds of fighting revealed that the environs of Peruća dam and the dam itself were most probably taken from UNPROFOR by Serbian forces. Immediately on the following day, January 28, 1993, at least five explosive devices, placed on the 65-meter-high Peruća embankment dam, were detonated. One was on the right wall of the spillway, and four in an inspection gallery under the clay core (Fig. 1).

The crater in the right dam abutment was in shape of a cone, 20-25 m in diameter, and 6-7 m deep. It was located above the junction of the first access gallery and inspection gallery, symmetrically to the dam axis (Fig. 1, point 1). The gallery entrance was caved in and the forest below the entrance destroyed and burnt by the blown out material and hot detonation gases within the radius of some 50-100 m. A longitudinal crack was formed running from the crater towards the dam center, 1.5 m from the upstream edge and 77 m long (Fig. 1, point 2). The largest visible damage was detected in the left dam abutment, where a crater 25-30 m in diameter and about 10 m in depth formed (Fig. 1, point 4). The access bridge over the spillway was completely destroyed (Fig. 1, point 5). The access gallery entrance was completely caved in, and the forest within the radius of 50-100 m below the entrance destroyed and burned by hot detonation gases. The lowest section of the gallery which is on elevation 305 m a.s.l., below the downstream support structure of the dam, had a connection to 1 m dia. drainage outlet, with the vertical shaft on the switchyard plateau located between the downstream dam toe and the power house (Fig. 1, point 6). The water which gushed out into the gallery flew through the drainage outlet and vertical shaft in the form of a 2-3 m high jet, falling on the switchyard plateau and carrying the pieces of clay core sometimes 0.5 m in diameter.

This fulfilled threats which had been issued by Serbian forces during 1992. The explosion was registered by seismographs at three different seismological stations (one 242 km away). The first news of explosion did not make it possible to determine the extent of destruction, and the access to the dam immediately after explosion was impossible because fighting was going on in the dam's surroundings. By the same night, the Croatian Army succeeded in moving the battle lines for some kilometres upstream the dam. About 8 p.m. the inspection of the expert crew from Croatian National Electricity and Civil Engineering Institute from Split was organized. Although the inspection was performed under very limited illumination by hand torches, the following damage on the dam crest was detected: a crater (swallow hole) in the right abutment, crest subsidence in the dam top section, a crater in the left abutment, heavy damage of the right spillway wall and completely demolished access bridge over spillway. In the night, about 3,000 inhabitants were evacuated from the high risk area downstream the dam, and 20,000 more prepared for evacuation. A major disaster was averted by the rapid action of Croatian engineers who, by the first light, started remedial actions of filling and closing the gapes and craters. The dam still threatened to collapse. Numerous cracks appeared on its surface and there was a serious risk of seepage. Finally, around noon of the same day (January 29, 1993) it was possible to at-




Figure 1. The Peruća Dam and hydroelectric power plant (HPP) layout (top) and the Peruća Dam longitudinal section with the assumed blasting points (bottom).
1 = right abutment crater, 2 = longitudinal crack, 3 = subsidence in the central section, 4 = left abutment crater, 5 = right spillway wall, 6 = drainage outlet and vertical shaft, 7 = caved-in gallery entrance, 8 = burned forest, I, II, III, IV and V = assumed blasting points.

tempt the opening of the bottom outlet which would result in reservoir level drop. Such action was highly dangerous since Serbian forces had repeatedly issued threats that the bottom outlet gate had been mined. The Peruća hydroelectric power plant crews and soldiers of the Croatian Army opened the gate without adverse effects at 2:15 p.m. and the discharge from the reservoir started. Although this did not mean that all threats of further deterioration of the dam condition had been deferred, the risk of its complete destruction was mostly eliminated by an action of the crews, Croatian soldiers, and the local population who successfully built about 3,000 m^3 of material into the damaged parts of the dam in only three hours.

Estimates of the Consequences of the Peruća Dam Collapse

Perhaps it is difficult to imagine what would have happened had the dam collapsed. We can, however, consider the results of the investigation of flood wave propagation in case of destruction of the Peruća dam carried out on the physical model in 1981 (3). It is important to note that these investigations were performed at the time when Croatia was a part of ex-Yugoslavia, that the results were classified as military top secret, and all documentation had to be handed over to the former Yugoslav army. Currently, the data are available to the public (3).

The destructive force that would be caused by collapse of the Peruća dam was proven to be the highest directly downstream the dam. The wave would move almost frontally through Hrvatačko Polje to the Han ravine. On this stretch the wave velocity would be 37 m/sec (133 km/h). The wave would damage and partly destroy the Peruća hydroelectric power plant, destroy the bridge and all settlements situated immediately along the river bed, and cause severe erosion of fertile soil. The wave front would reach the Han ravine in 15 minutes, while the maximum flood level of about 25 m at the Han ravine, resulting in flooding of several villages, would be reached in 1 hour and 45 minutes (Fig. 2). In the ravine between Hrvatačko Polje and Sinjsko Polje, at the settlements of Han and Otok, forceful flow would be formed. In this stretch, the torrent would destroy a bridge at Han and the houses close to the bridge, also causing severe soil erosion. Entering the wide Sinjsko Polje, the wave front would begin to expand. Also, its velocity would be considerably reduced and its destructive force decreased. Progressing at 5.5 m/sec the flood wave




Figure 2. The Cetina river power system. The area within the dotted line would be flooded had the Peruća Dam collapsed. Consequences would be the gravest in the Hrvatačko Polje (Hrvatačko Field) and the Sinjsko Polje (Sinjsko Field).

would reach the settlements of Trilj in 1 hour and 30 minutes and enter another narrow canyon. Due to the reduced discharge area in the canyon downstream Trilj, the water would begin to accumulate in Sinjsko Polje, reaching the highest flood level. Water would flood a part of the town of Sinj, some industrial plants, roads and several villages. The Orlovac hydroelectric power plant Power House would be damaged. Also all flood control works and structures in Sinjsko polje would be destroyed or heavily damaged.

In Trilj, the torrent would destroy the bridge and the settlement would come under 11 meters of water. The flood wave would reach the maximum level at Trilj within 10 hours from destruction of the Peruća dam.

In the canyon downstream Trilj, the 10 m high flood wave would destroy the Đale dam and heavily damage the power plant. Collapsing of the dam would occur approximately 2 hours after the destruction of the Peruća dam.

Downstream the Đale dam, the 4 m high flood wave would flood and damage the Prančevići dam and stop at the Zakučac hydroelectric power plant operation. According to calculations for such conditions of flooding the Prančevići dam would not collapse.

Downstream the Prančevići dam, the wave would flood the access plateau and the Zakučac hydroelectric power plant switchyard, and the town of Omiš on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. The maximum water depth in this area, reached about 5 h after destruction of the Peruća dam, would be approximately 2.8 m, measured from the level of the bridge at the confluence of the Cetina and the sea.

Heavy casualties would occur in Hrvatačko Polje only, directly downstream the Peruća dam. In this stretch, the flood wave would travel at more than 130 km/h, with a very high front. The population of several villages in the area, numbering 3,000 to 4,000, would practically have no time to escape, as the flood wave would reach them in less than 10 minutes. No casualties should be expected in Sinjsko Polje as, thanks to the Han ravine, the wave front would arrive there 1 hour after the destruction of the Peruća dam, and the maximum water level would follow after 10 hours so that, with timely warning, there would be enough time for evacuation. The situation would be the same for the rest of the downstream area. According to the estimates, the casualties would be about 3,000, while about 40,000 to 50,000 people would have to be evacuated.

Destruction of the Peruća dam would also result in a real environmental catastrophy. The force of the flood wave in Hrvatačko Polje would cause severe erosion of fertile soil. As in this area the layer of fer-

tile soil is comparatively thin, it is reasonable to assume that this area would be permanently lost for agriculture. Erosion would also affect a part of the fertile Sinjsko Polje. Settling of the material from the destroyed Peruća dam, totalling about 870,000 m^3 would render the entire area practically lifeless. The Cetina river would certainly, due to severe erosion, alter its course, thus causing additional difficulties. As the Peruća stocks about 90 tons of fuel oil for regular operation, its spilling into the Cetina river would result in pollution of ground water and Karst springs supplying water to the population of 300,000 in Split and its surroundings.

The initiators of this insane action were well acquainted with the possible effects of the dam destruction as they were in possession of the study containing the description of investigations on the physical model, which were kept as top secret with the General Staff of the Yugoslav army in Belgrade. This is confirmed by the fact that the Yugoslav army, while controlling the dam, kept the water level in the reservoir around the maximum elevation of 361.5 m a.s.l. This level corresponds to the Variant I of investigations of flood wave propagation on the model, affecting the most severe effects (3).

Consequences of the Dam Occupation and Damage

Fortunately, such a large scale ecological disaster has not happened. Still, the occupation of the dam and damage to it have resulted in many grave consequences: due to the war, the electric power system of the southern part of Croatia, the Dalmatia region, has been isolated from the remaining part of Croatian electric power system. In Dalmatia, electricity is generated solely in hydro power plants utilizing the hydro potential of the Cetina river. Peruća is one of river basins built in the Cetina river basin. It has great significance since it regulates the larger water flow and has excellent impermeability so that annual and long-term flow levelling could be performed. Due to such characteristics, Peruća is crucial for reliable electricity supply to the consumers of Dalmatia. The loss of this reservoir in unfavourable hydrological conditions led to a large scale energy crisis and shortage of electricity. At the beginning of March 1993, a strict reduction measures lasting 15 h a day were effected, but did not help much. The damage caused by undelivered electricity is significant, but cannot be compared with the damage imposed on economy, and, consequently, the quality and standard of everyday living.

From an ecological point of view, considerable damage has already been done to the Cetina river bed downstream. The flora and fauna, particularly cray fish in the Cetina river, have been destroyed.

Agriculture has also suffered, as it has not been possible to irrigate the Sinjsko polje area. This was exacerbated by an extremely dry period of four months, during which temperatures in the area reached 30°C (3-5).

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ANNEX 104:

ILOK TOWN COUNCIL, LIST OF CIVILIANS FALLEN IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE BEFORE 17 OCTOBER 1991, 7 NOVEMBER 1995

VUKOVARSKO-SRIJEMSKA COUNTY
TOWN OF ILOK
TOWN COUNCIL
ZAGREB, Ulica grada Vukovara 27/IV

LIST OF CIVILIANS FALLEN IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE BEFORE 17 OCTOBER 1991

1. FRANJO DROBINA, born on 7 May 1956, Ilok, V. Nazora 13. Died on 25 August 1991 on the street in Vukovar in a car during bombardments.

2. SAMUEL FABRI, Ilok, resident in Vukovar. Died on 25 August 1991 on the street in Vukovar in a car during bombardments.

3. NADA VRBANIĆ, born on 7 October 1949, Ilok, Radićeva 119. Killed on 14 October 1991 in Bapska, Braće Radić street, by the Yugoslav National Army.

4. TOMISLAV BOŠNJAK, born in 1963, Ilok, Fruškogorska 2. On 16 October 1991 left the occupied Ilok. According to the International Red Cross buried in Šid.

5. GORAN ŠTIPAK, born in 1963, Šarengrad, S. Radića 25, police officer. Killed from a short distance during his shift. Executors: Yugoslav National Army – commander Petar Grahovac – Novi Sad Corps.

6. KREŠIMIR ĐAKOVIĆ, born in 1964, Šarengrad, Zagrebačka 16. Killed on 10 October 1991 in Sotin in a car.

7. MIROSLAV KOLAK, born in 1955, Šarengrad, Osječka 1. Killed on 14 October 1991 in Bapska, Braće Radić street, by the Yugoslav National Army.

8. JULE SARAČEVIĆ, born in 1937, Šarengrad, Z.Sremeca 1. Killed on 4 October 1991 by a mortar grenade during the attack of the Yugoslav National Army to Šarengrad.

9. BORISLAV SABO, born in 1971, Bapska, Junačka 16. Killed on 6 October 1991 by the members of the Yugoslav National Army at the exit from Bapska towards Šid.

10. MATO JOSIP RUMBERGER, born in 1952, Bapska, Palih boraca 26. Killed on 14 October 1991 by an army patrol in the Braće Radić street.

11. IVAN MIJIĆ, born in 1952, Šarengrad, Z.Sremeca 16. Killed on 14 October 1991 in Bapska, Braće Radić street, by the Yugoslav National Army.

Zagreb, 7 November 1995
Number: 122/95
Mayor:
Stipan Kraljević, engineer /signed/

ANNEX 105:

ILOK TOWN COUNCIL, LIST OF CIVILIANS FALLEN IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AFTER 17 OCTOBER 1991, 7 NOVEMBER 1995

VUKOVARSKO-SRIJEMSKA COUNTY
TOWN OF ILOK
TOWN COUNCIL

LIST OF CIVILIANS FALLEN IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AFTER 17 OCTOBER 1991

1. JOSIP VULETIĆ, born on 14 February 1951, Ilok, Radićeva 30. Wounded on 4 October 1991 in Bapska, transported on 15 October 1995 to the Province hospital in Novi Sad, died on 15 November 1991. Questioned and tortured in the hospital.

2. MATIŠA SOPTA, born on 18 October 1931, Ilok, Fruškogorska 50. Killed on 18 October 1991 in front of his house by a patrol of the Yugoslav National Army (commander: Petar Grahovac).

3. MATO MATIĆ, born on 25 March 1912, Ilok, Hercegovačkih brigada 7. Committed suicide in November 1991 following abuse.

4. IVAN VRBANAC, born on 23 November 1928, Ilok, Strossmayerova 20. Committed suicide in November 1991 following abuse.

5. PERO LEVENSKI, born on 23 November 1930, Ilok, Strossmayerova 13. Committed suicide in November 1991 following abuse.

6. MATO PAPAK, born on 16 July 1930, Ilok, Strossmayerova 63. Died in January 1992 due to torture in the militia headquarters.

7. JOSIP HORVATIĆ, born on 5 February 1948, Ilok, Faluge bb. Died in January 1992 due to torture.

8. JANKO DEMITER, Ilok, Faluge bb. Tortured and killed in November 1991 in Radoš by the Yugoslav National Army – Valjevo unit.

9. BOŽO MARIĆ, born on 23 May 1938, Ilok, I.Gundulića 7. Died on 2 February 1992 in Opatija as a result of beating with a gunstock by Blagojević Ranisav from Ilok, S.Radića 128, on 17 October 1991.

10. ANĐA LONČAR, born on 26 May 1926, Ilok, V.Nazora 118. Killed and her body burned on 26 May 1992 next to her house.

11. FRANJO KRALJEVĆ, born on 10 April 1919, Ilok, Zagrebačka 30.

Died in January 1992 in Ilok as a result of beating.

12. JANKO CESNAK, born on 24 April 1919, Ilok, Masarikova 58. Died in September 1992 in Ilok as a result of injuries inflicted by burglars.

13. PERO MILIČEVIĆ, born on 14 January 1961, Ilok, Z.Jovina 73. Died in February 1993 in Ilok as a result of the torture by militia forces (Ćulibrk Đuro).

14. DRAGUTIN NOVAKOVIĆ, born in 1951, Ilok, M.Tita 6. Committed suicide on 10 April 1992 by ingestion of herbicides due to repeated detainment by the militia forces and torture.

15. ZORAN URBAN, born in 1972, Ilok, M.Gupca 60a. Killed during the night between 14 and 15 November 1993 in M.Gupca street in Ilok.

16. JANKO MAHNJEC, born in 1964, Ilok, I.G.Kovačića 156. Found dead in the stream in front of the workshop of Ivan Zec. His body was presenting injuries.

17. MARIJA MARKO, born in 1932, Ilok, Crvenkova strana bb. Killed on 2 June 1994 in her house (by a group of Serbs from Bačka Palanka lead by Mato Pivić, Ilok).

18. IVAN MARKO, born in 1961, Ilok, Crvenkova strana bb. Killed on 2 June 1994 in his house (by a group of Serbs from Bačka Palanka lead by Mato Pivić, Ilok).

19. STJEPAN BEVANDA, born on 16 June 1949, Ilok, Strossmayerova bb. Died in the hospital of S.Mitrovica as a result of torture by the militia from Šid.

20. MARA SOLDO, born in 1914, Ilok, M.Gupca bb. Died in July 1994 as a result of abuse by a group of Serbs in her house.

21. ŽELJKO JELIĆ, born in 1956, Ilok, Fučije bb. Killed on 1 May 1995 in his sleep in his house by a Serb, Vikendaš Đorđe, from Belgrade, former member of the Yugoslav National Army.

22. MIRKO MERČEP, born in 1914, Ilok, V.Nazora 89. Found dead in the morning around 20 February 1995 on the entrance to his house with an injury on the back of his head.

23. JOSIP SABADOŠ, born on 17 October 1962, Ilok, Alvaluci 361. Held captive by the Yugoslav National Army for about 5 months. Gone miss-

ing or killed in spring 1992.

24. STEVO CINKOCKI, born in 1952, Šarengrad, Pajzoš. Killed in 1992 on Pajzoš by the reserve members of the Yugoslav National Army.

25. FRANJO HIŽA, born in 1939, Šarengrad, Zl.Sremeca bb. Killed on 3 March 1993 in his house.

26. STJEPAN DIR, born in 1960, Šarengrad, Dunavska 11. Gone missing after the fall of Vukovar on 18 November 1991.

27. MARKO KONTA, born on 1936, Šarengrad, Radićeva 153. Missing since Easter 1992.

28. ANA KONTA, born in 1937, Šarengrad, Radićeva 153. Missing since Easter 1992.

29. ANDRIJA BOŠNJAKOVIĆ, born in 1921, Bapska, Br. Radić 1. Died on 26 October 1991 immediate after release from the Šid militia where he was tortured.

30. ZDRAVKO TUSTONJIĆ, born in 1944, Bapska, Br. Radić 1. Killed on 18 October 1991 by the Yugoslav National Army at the entrance of Bapska when returning from Šid.

31. JOSIP RADOVANOVIĆ, born in 1938, Bapska, Fruškogorska 6. Wounded on the street when leaving from the militia station. Died at the end of 1991 in the hospital of S.Mitrovica.

32. ANTUN REGLER, born in 1935, Bapska, Šidska 7. Committed suicide around 22 October 1991 following abuse by Serbian authorities.

33. BRANKO TODOROVIĆ, Bapska. Killed by the soldiers of a Serbian patrol in a truck transporting bricks.

34. ĐURO TKALEC, born in 1938, Bapska, V.Nazora 60. Committed suicide or killed in February 1992 in the wood Kardoš near Bapska.

35. ALOJZIJE RUKAVINA, born in 1955, Bapska, M.Gupca 28. Taken away at the end of 1991 (October or November 1991) from Sot by the Šid militia. No information is available on him since then.

36. ANA SUPEK, born on 27 November 1933, Ilok, S.Radića 94. Died around 8 August 1995, a day after abuse committed by the Serbian immigrants.

37. PAVLE ŠIRKA, born on 10 April 1943, Ilok, I.Gundulića 32. Brought home dead from forced labour on 7 October 1995.

38. SAMUEL DUBOVSKI, born on 1 September 1932, Ilok, I.G.Kovačića 91, killed from an automatic rifle on 15 October 1995 around 6 PM in front of his house.

39. MIHAL CEROVSKI, born on 21 July 1936, Ilok, Radoš 441. Killed or died in a car accident around 5 October 1995.

40. VLATKO GULKA, born on 18 May 1938, Ilok, Keršovanijeva 49. Killed by a landmine during forced labour near Tovarnik-Ilača. Buried in Ilok on 2 November 1995.

41. KAROL VELKO, born on 15 September 1967, Ilok, Preradovićeva 64. Killed by a landmine during forced labour near Tovarnik-Ilača. Buried in Ilok on 2 November 1995.

42. ŽELJSKO STREŠNJAK, born on 16 February 1967, Ilok, I.Gundulića 56. Killed by a landmine during forced labour near Tovarnik-Ilača. Buried in Ilok on 2 November 1995.

43. FRANJO ŠETULA, born on 16 August 197, Ilok, S.Radića 126. Died around 1 October 1995 in the hospital in Vukovar as a result of abuse during forced labour.

44. MAGDALENA NOVAK, born on 4 February 1978, Ilok, Skandala bb (Z.Sremeca 3). Run over by car on the road Ilok-Šid near Principovac around 1 June 1995.

Zagreb, 7 November 1995
Number: 122/95

Mayor:
Stipan Kraljević, engineer /signed/

ANNEX 106:

R. DE LA BROSSE, "POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND THE PLAN TO CREATE A 'STATE FOR ALL SERBS' – CONSEQUENCES OF USING MEDIA FOR ULTRA-NATIONALIST ENDS", REPORT COMPILED AT THE REQUEST OF THE OTP OF THE ICTY, 4 FEBRUARY 2003

IT-02-54-T p.
D97-1/17147 BIS
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Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create a "State for all Serbs"

Consequences of Using the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends

Report compiled at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by Renaud de la Brosse, senior lecturer at the University of Reims, Champagne, Ardennes, France

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I. Political propaganda: definitions, fundamental principles and Yugoslav particularities

1. Many reports, studies, articles and first-hand accounts reveal that the ethnic policies observable in the former Yugoslavia from the end of the 1980s until the beginning of the new century shared the common feature of having been supported and made possible by media which became some of the most loyal supporters of the nationalist parties in power in the various republics[1].

2. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special Rapporteur appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Commission noticed early on the harmful influence some of the media were having on Yugoslav public opinion. In his *Special Report on the Media* of December 1994, he explained in particular that *since the fighting began, the information put out by the media of the former Yugoslavia has mainly consisted of nationalist discourse and generalised attacks and insults aimed at the other peoples*. He went on to add: *it comes as no surprise that the phenomenon has directly led to the perpetration of horrible atrocities on the fields of battle and throughout the entire territory*[2].

3. Those that came to power following the implosion of the former Yugoslavia used the media like a weapon which could help them to attain their political goals in the short and long term. To do this, those in power in each republic sought to control the media in their territory, and in particular television, and transform them into the regime's instruments of propaganda responsible for getting the population to subscribe to their political conceptions and actions.

4. With the media acting as go-between, nationalist political propaganda prepared and conditioned public opinion for the war – so fostering the worst atrocities perpetrated in furtherance of the ethnic policies. A few rare media professionals, witnesses at the centre of events, were the first to be unsettled by this. Such was the case with Nenad Pejic,

[1] In descending order, Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.
[2] *Special Report on the Media* by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur appointed in resolution 1994/72 of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, E/CN.4/1995/54 of 13 December 1994, p. 35.

former Sarajevo TV programme controller until April 1992, who believes that "*without the media, and especially without television, war in the former Yugoslavia is inconceivable*"[3].

Slobodan Milosevic knowingly used and controlled the media in Serbia to impose the themes of nationalist propaganda to justify to the citizens the creation of a State – which would be home to all Serbian people – and also to strengthen his authority. For the propaganda disseminated through the press and audio-visual media to be fully effective, Milosevic personally ensured control over the public media, restricted the freedom of speech of the existing independent media by using all measures to prevent them from informing the citizens and made sure that the journalists followed the official line and adhered to the ideas and programme of the government – in short made sure that they bowed to the discipline imposed. The testimony of one of Milosevic's closest collaborators, Borisav Jovic, demonstrates perfectly the way in which he used the media to establish his nationalist political projects. "*For years*", wrote Borisav Jovic, "*he paid the biggest attention to the media, especially television. He personally appointed editors-in-chief of the newspapers and news programs, especially directors-general of the radio and television. Perhaps in no other area but this was he in direct communication with all editors who "fed" the public with the news, comments and generally with information. He was deeply convinced that citizens formed their view of the political situation on the basis of what they were presented and not on the basis of their real material and political position. What is not published has not happened at all – that was Milosevic's motto*"[4].

Different methods and types of pressure were used by Milosevic to exercise his strict control[5] over the news organisations and the professionals. Amongst the measures most frequently used by the Milosevic regime were, in particular:

- journalists considered too independent in the public media were demoted and concomitantly those who enthusiastically served the authorities were promoted. Those journalists who most valued their independence were publicly condemned if not simply dismissed;

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[3] See the interview of Nenad Pejic by Anne Brucy, in *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, December 1992, p. 24.

[4] In *Last Days of the SFRY*, Journal of excerpts translated by David Stephenson for the ICTY, p.15.

[5] "(...) *Milosevic had complete domination over the media* (...)", idem p.44.

- heavy taxes and fines were imposed, broadcasting licenses withdrawn, permits for more powerful transmitters were refused, supplies of equipment necessary for newspapers and radio stations were stopped, strong-arm operations were organised to restrict and sometimes wipe out the independent media's capacity to provide the Serbian public with alternative information;
- the independent journalists were attacked, some of whom were arrested, convicted, mistreated and accused of treason on account of their writing;
- the political authorities used their influence over the economic sector and judicial system to put pressure on the media and the independent journalists.

The measures noted above were used throughout his reign by Milosevic and his regime to regulate the dissemination of news and to ensure control over the content of the messages conveyed by the media. We can, for example, illustrate this fact with the particularly aggressive campaign conducted from 1998 onwards against the independent press, preceding the international community's intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, which was to silence every critical voice by banning independent media[6] or, in October 1998, by adopting a new Information law threatening the professionals and press bodies with the most dissuasive[7] economic retaliatory measures should they oppose the regime[8].

5. However, while the media paved the way for the war which erupted with Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of independence on 25 June 1991, television channels, radio stations and newspapers also knowingly sustained it by devoting themselves to the war effort and waging an intense media battle of hateful propaganda and biased and untrue

[6] The *International Committee to Protect Independent Media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* thus reports that *TV Pirot* (at Pirot) was banned on 21 April, then *Radio Kontakt* (at Pristina) on 2 July, *Radio City* (at Nis) on 18 August, *Radio Senta* (at Senta) on 9 October, *Radio Index* (at Belgrade) on 10 October, *Danas* and *Dnevni Telegraf* on 13 October, *Nasa Borba* on 15 October and on 8 October the broadcasting of the news in Serbian by the international media such as *Voice of America*, *BBC*, *RFI*, etc. was also banned. See http://www.free2000.opennet.org/bans98.html.

[7] The *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia* thus calculated that between the adoption of the law in October 1998 and 1 November 1999, thirty press organs had to pay fines totaling 18 million dinars equivalent to 1.125 million $US. See *Report on the Escalation of Repression in Serbia*, pp. 7-8.

[8] Here again the testimony of Borisav Jovic is one of the most explicit accounts of the real intentions of the authorities: "*As political and social problems in the country increased, the release of information for the public came under tighter control, until a law was passed stipulating that anyone could be deprived of all their property, without a trial and only through minor-offence procedure, if they published something which the government considered untrue, in other words something that did not suit it*". In *Last Days of the SFRY*, Journal of excerpts translated by David Stephenson for the ICTY, p.18.

information. By way of example, one might cite the false information passed on by the Serbian media regarding the supposed massacres of (Serbian) babies and/or children by Croats and Muslims.

On 20 November 1991, as the siege of Vukovar by the Federal Army and Serbian troops drew to a close and at a time when the number of anti-war demonstrations in Belgrade was growing, a *Reuters* correspondent, Vjekoslav Radovic, obtained information that 41 Serbian children, aged between five and seven years old, had been massacred in an elementary school in the village of Borovo Naselje[9]. *Belgrade Television* would devote hours of viewing time to the unconfirmed news. Described for the first time in a war report, the story would later make the front page of the newspapers and be the lead story of the television news[10] that evening. In a news programme specially devoted to the events in Vukovar and Western Slavonia, the guest speaker was the freelance photographer, Goran Mikic, the first person to have reported the news. Photos of massacred adults were shown during the interview[11] but none of the massacred children. The next day, 21 November, a denial from the Federal Army, followed by one from

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[9] "41 Children Found Dead in School after Croats Flee", *Reuters*, 20 November 1991.

[10] On the early evening news, the presenter reported: "*The news of the massacre of 41 children in the elementary school in Borovo Settlement has made local and international headline news. Independent British ITV carried the testimony of photo-reporter Goran Mikic, according to whom retreating Croatian guardsmen perpetrated a real bloodbath of entire Serb families. He says that all of Borovo Settlement is full of the dead bodies of people murdered with knives and axes. ITV says this photojournalist has transmitted statements of Yugoslav People's Army soldiers who say that 41 Serb children had been slaughtered. This news has been labelled on ITV Teletext as urgent. It's the first time that someone has reported on crimes committed by Croatian guardsmen. Reuters says that Croatian soldiers have been accused of butchering 41 children during their retreat from advancing Yugoslav People's Army forces. Reporters from Television Belgrade and, according to the latest information, all television stations worldwide are making huge efforts to provide public evidence and photographs of this hideous carnage*".

[11] Interview:

- Goran Mikic: "*We saw plastic bags full of little dead bodies. I managed to creep up to about twenty meters distance. It was plain to see that they were children between five and seven years of age. Their throats were slit. There was a lot of blood around their heads. It was so sickening, even the soldiers wept, and so even at the cost of our lives we wanted to...*"
- Editor: "*Do you have an estimate for the number of dead bodies that could be called children's?*"
- Goran Mikic: "*It was all a big pile. They were putting heads and bodies together. It was all so horrible. There must have been around forty according to their count, but it was impossible to be more accurate.*"
- Editor: "*You had a camera. Did you try to take pictures?*"
- Goran Mikic: "*I did. I got up. However, bullets were whistling all around me. A soldier pointed his rifle at me and ordered me to lie down because otherwise I would have been killed.*"
- Editor: "*You were explicitly forbidden to take pictures? Do you have any idea whether anyone took some pictures?*"
- Goran Mikic: "*Well, I don't know. I assume the Army did. That could be reasonable and those pictures needed to be taken*".

Reuters,[12] was made public as the follow-up to the news programme looking at the massacre was being shown - forcing the presenter to provide justification and apologise[13]. Although quickly denied by *Reuters*, the story was given widespread coverage by the media controlled by the Belgrade regime[14], while the *Reuters* employee behind the story was fired but purportedly later appointed New York correspondent for *Tanjug*. None of the journalists from these media questioned the authenticity of the information even though the children from the village, which had been besieged for several months, had been evacuated and no elementary schools within the combat zone had been open for a long time. The substantial media coverage given to the "death" of the 41 children "*who had had their throats slit by blood-thirsty Croats*" would serve to reinforce the image nurtured by the Serbian media of a "*criminal and genocidal*" Croatian people just as it would undermine those who opposed the war and lead to a flood of fresh volunteers departing for the front[15].

- Another lie meant to feed the hatred of the enemy that was bandied around by the Serbian media concerned the allegation that the besieged Muslims of Sarajevo were feeding Serbian children to the municipal zoo's starving animals. This fictitious piece of

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[12] *"Photographer Retracts Key Elements in Account of Massacre"*. The article reads: *"A Yugoslav photographer who reported that 41 children had been massacred near Vukovar, allegedly by Croatian troops, retracted key elements of his story on Thursday, admitting he had not seen or counted any bodies. Reuters, which issued the story headlined '41 Children Found Dead in School after Croats Flee' on Wednesday, has withdrawn the story on the grounds that it contained incorrect information and has apologised to subscribers..."*

[13] Presenter of the special programme: *"It's easy to admit a reporter's blunder now. The young man, that photojournalist from Reuters, was very convincing. First of all he had several dozen close-up photographs which were drastic in what they showed. He's young, he seemed appropriately excited all the time, and if he had managed to convince Reuters... We received the news from the Italian ANSA network via Tanjug, and we traced the news story and found a man. We were really happy, as reporters, that we finally found someone whose account had been cited by news agencies worldwide. Assuming the news story was not authentic, now we can't say whether it is or is not, because we have no convincing proof, and it's always easy to apologise when a wrong piece of information slips though under normal circumstances, not to mention this atmosphere of war, where people sometimes hallucinate in such terrible circumstances".*
For the different interviews, see *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*, 1995.

[14] In its 22 November issue, *Politika* published an article on the front page entitled *"A Crime Committed Openly"* setting out basically that journalists worldwide were reporting on the murder of Serbs and that Croatian fascism had taken hundreds of lives. The massacre of the 41 Serbian children was reported on page two. In the 23 November issue, a retraction – in the form of an announcement that was as terse as it was low-key – was published in the back of the paper.

[15] On this episode, see Katarina Subasic, *"Role of the Media and the Internet as Tools for Creating Accountability to Poor and Disadvantaged Groups: Former Yugoslavia"*, in Human Development Report Office, Occasional Paper, Background for HDR 2002, 2002/18, United Nations Development Programme,

news carried by *TV Pale* and its presenter Risto Djogo, the voice of Radovan Karadzic's regime[16], and also the *SRNA* press agency would be used by *Tanjug* and the media controlled by the Milosevic regime without any checks being made. In its 19:30 news watched by several million viewers, TV Belgrade broke the news via a radio link with its correspondent on location in Sarajevo: "*The Muslim extremists have come up with the world's most horrible way of torturing people. Last night, they threw Serb children to the lions in the local zoo. So says the Serb patrol.*"[17]

As such, with the collusion of media "professionals", certain individuals on the political scene deliberately diverted the media from their primary purpose of informing and entertaining to turn them into mere propaganda tools serving their cause.

6. On all sides, the feelings and resentment of the peoples making up the Federation were indisputably manipulated and used – with everything orchestrated by true propaganda specialists - in order to stigmatise differences in identity and make it quite impossible for these peoples to live together within the Yugoslav region. The systematic undertaking by the Serbian media of Bosnia and Herzegovina to denigrate the Bosnian Muslim community, picked up by the Serbian media, constitutes a good example. Risto Djogo, *TV Pale*'s star presenter, proclaimed the superiority of the Serbs and the degeneration of the Bosnian Muslims, while his repeated attacks sought to wound the Muslims as a community deeply and to make the Serbian public wonder whether the Muslims belonged to the human race. The journalist, Katarina Subasic, reported: "*One of the most notorious examples of Djogo's presentations was when the sound of (Bosnian President) Alija Izetbegovic's speech was followed by the images of a monkey*"[18].

Use of propaganda: background and definitions

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p. 13; and Lazar Lalic, Three Years in TV Serbia, Independent Media Union, Belgrade, 1995, pp. 106-107 and 111-112.

[16] Zlatko Dizdarevic, "*Macedonian Media War*", Institute for War and Peace Reporting's Balkan Crisis Report, no. 284, Friday, 28 September 2001.

[17] Source: *"Images and Words of Hate: TV News at 7:30 P.M."*, B92 video & film production and *Right to Pictures and Words Foundation*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, 1998.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

7. The use of propaganda by the belligerents in the Yugoslav conflict was not new. In the event, they did nothing but reuse certain techniques and methods tried and tested in other contexts, especially, Nazi Germany of the thirties where the techniques of manipulating crowds using propaganda and disinformation[19] had prepared and conditioned German public opinion for the Second World War and the genocide that came with it.

What propaganda is

8. It is difficult to explain what political propaganda is with a single definition as this would be overly simplistic and for this reason people have chosen to explain the "propaganda" phenomenon using all the existing definitions – each of which may stress one particular aspect or point.

9. Originally, the term propaganda had a religious meaning – more specifically the *congregatio de propaganda fide* (Congregation for Propagating the Faith) established by the Church during the Counter-Reformation – and did not assume its current (secular) meaning until the end of the C18th century with the advent of the French Revolution. It was during this period, in a Europe fundamentally unsympathetic towards the new republican regime, that ideology would band together with weapons to conduct modern warfare and that propaganda would become the aide of strategy[20]. At issue was not only spreading the revolutionary ideas among the population and armies – which would be done by "propaganda" associations – and to build and bolster national republican cohesion, but also to create fear and disorder among the enemy. Historically, political propaganda is closely linked to war and may certainly be viewed as war prosecuted by other means.

10. Generally, people talk of propaganda when dealing with "*activities designed to shape opinion so that people share certain political and social ideas or support a policy, government or representative*"[21]. Using specific techniques, propaganda seeks to

[19] On this point, see Serge Tchakhotine, *The Rape of the Crowds by Political Propaganda*, 1939.
[20] Jean-Marie Domenach, *La propagande politique*, "*Que sais-je?*", P.U.F., 1973, p. 18.
[21] Definition taken from the *Nouveau Petit Le Robert*, Dictionnaire de la langue Française 1, Paris, 1993.

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influence the fundamental attitude of the individual and in this sense "*is an attempt to influence the opinion and behaviour of society in such a way that people adopt an opinion and specific behaviour*"[22].

11. The techniques for establishing such influence have considerably evolved with the scientific progress made since then. From this viewpoint, the 20th century led to a quantitative and qualitative break with the past. Photography, the cinema, wide-circulation press, especially radio, and subsequently television, replaced the traditional means of spreading political propaganda such as music, oratory, poetry and sculpture. The new vehicles or means of political propaganda are now aimed at and reach out to many more individuals – helped by the urbanisation phenomenon – with new techniques (instantaneous sound and especially images) promoting emotion more than demonstration and tending more towards suggestion rather than explanation. This change which also occurred in advertising - from which propaganda borrows its techniques - leads us to a third, more exhaustive definition which explains propaganda as the "*language for the masses (which) employs words or other symbols conveyed by the radio, press and film*[23]. *The propagandist's aim is to influence the attitude of the masses on points which are subjected to propaganda or are matters of opinion*"[24].

Lawful and unlawful propaganda

12. All politicians and governments naturally seek to establish their legitimacy, gain support for their ideas and obtain the backing of the greatest number of people possible. The use of political propaganda, as means to achieve this, is therefore employed everywhere, irrespective of the political regime under consideration. Propaganda becomes harmful and reprehensible when it is used in a totalitarian manner to promote

[22] Barlett, *Political Propaganda*, quoted by Jean Marie Domenach, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[23] List of media to which the television and internet must now be added for the definition to be fully up-to-date.
[24] *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion* (Princeton), quoted by Jean-Marie Domenach, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

political objectives flying in the face of the respect of human rights and international law[25].

Effectiveness proved in the past

13. The historical precedents exist to demonstrate the effectiveness of political propaganda and the ravages that it can cause. Stalinist propaganda, especially under the strict control of a man like Andreï Jdanov, would pervade every sector of society (politics, science, cinema, sports, painting, literature, music etc.) with a view to the coming about of a "New Man": "a being" to be created to which ultimately any form of opposition would be sacrificed – through political purges, deportation of population groups and murders of opponents. Obsessive and focused on the cult of the leader (Stalin) and the repetition of dogma and slogans, Stalinist propaganda – to which Maoist propaganda could be likened – included censorship, centralised control of broadcasting

[25] In this regard, it should be recalled that there are some partial definitions in international law. Such is the case in Article 20 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and which entered into force on 3 January 1976. It stipulates that "any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law" and that "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law". (Yugoslavia was one of the States which signed and ratified the Covenant). Article 4 of the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965 and which entered into force on 4 January 1969 invites the States party thereto to condemn "*all propaganda and all organisations [...] which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form*" and "*declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race [...]*".
It may also be noted that the far-reaching effect of radio propaganda was widely recognised in international circles very early on. The States sought to guard themselves against it by attempting to establish a convention prohibiting propaganda programs from being broadcast on the territory of foreign States within the framework of the League of Nations. Signed in Geneva on 23 September 1936 and effective as of 2 April 1938, the "International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace" provided in particular:
Article 1: "The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party".
Article 2: "The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure that transmissions from stations within their respective territories shall not constitute an incitement either to war against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto".
See *Treaty Series* (1938), League of Nations, Geneva, p. 302.

means (media), and the use of news or staged events. Any other form of critical expression was excluded[26].

14. It was however the Nazi regime, under the guiding influence of Hitler and Goebbels, which would break the most ground in using propaganda as a weapon in and of itself[27] to mobilise the German masses around slogans such as the conquest of *lebensraum* and the defence of the German people (supposed to be the pure and superior component of the white race, the Aryan) – preludes to the establishment of a thousand-year Aryan empire. Unlike communist propaganda which generally sought to mobilise people around tangible objectives, Nazi propaganda did not any assign itself any specific goals but instead looked to cause emotional shock and played greatly on the irrational feelings of the masses. It sought to stimulate the hatred and hunger for power lying dormant in them. What makes it possible to characterise it is that the idea counted for less than the psychological shock it sought to produce on the masses by using techniques and procedures exploiting the psychic, physiological and unconscious mechanisms of crowds.

15. We have seen that Stalinist and Nazi propaganda was wholly directed at achieving totalitarian objectives, the coming about of a "New Man" and a thousand-year Aryan empire. The totalitarian dimension and the particularity of the propaganda used by Slobodan Milosevic's regime from 1987 onwards reside in the desire to bring together the Serbian ethnic group within a single State[28] and therefore implicitly to drive the non-

[26] See Louis Bodin, Jean Touchard, Pierre and Irène Sorlin, *Lénine, Trotski, Staline: la presse et l'évolution du pouvoir en Russie soviétique, 1921-1927*, Librairie Armand Colin, Collection Kiosque; and Georges Mond, *Le système d'information et de propagande en URSS et dans les Pays de l'Est*, Polycopiés, Institut Français de Presse, Université Paris II.

[27] See Alfred Grosser, *Hitler, la presse et la naissance d'une dictature*, Librairie Armand Colin, Collection U2, 1972.

[28] A great many threatening declarations by the main Serb leaders implicitly or explicitly conveying the idea that the non-Serb populations must leave the territory where the Serbs are living or else submit.. were systematically broadcast by the media.

Slobodan Milosevic:

"The Kosovo myth unified the entire Serbian people scattered throughout Yugoslavia(...) Today it still plays a considerable role as regards the position of the Serbian people in Kosovo and also in all of Yugoslavia(...) Today, six hundred years later, we find ourselves at battle and facing battle once again. This is not a battle with weapons although weapons may yet be used." (*Politika*, 29 June 1989).

"Those who here in Yugoslavia support the terror in Kosovo are dealing a serious blow to Serbia and Yugoslavia (...) The Serbs and Montenegrins have not remained alone these past few days. Each home in Serbia is by their side. And each home in Serbia is ready to leave tomorrow for Kosovo (...) because they

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know (i.e. the "Albanian chauvinists") and must know also in the future that they will not nor will never occupy a single inch of Serbian territory. And, in particular, they will not have or occupy Kosovo and Metohija" (Politika, 6 February 1990).

"Only the peoples of this Yugoslavia have the right to decide its destiny because it was not the republics which created Yugoslavia but the peoples (...) The Serbian people want to live in a single State. For this reason, any division into several States which would separate the various parts of the Serbian people by placing them in different sovereign States cannot, in our opinion, be accepted, that is - and I will be more specific still - cannot even be considered"(Danas, 15 January 1991).

Vojislav Seselj, President of the Serbian Radical Party:

"*Our point is perfectly clear. We are in favour of the renewal of the Serbian State in the Balkans, a state that would unite all Serbian territories: the present-day Serbian federal unit, Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia and Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Slavonija and Serbian Baranja*", interview by Branko Akarmic, in *Tribuna,* 1 October 1990.

"We have nothing against the fact that the new "poglavnik" of the oustachis, Franco Tudjman, is forming his independent State of Croatia but only to the west of the Karlovac-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. We will avenge the Serbian blood and present the bill for all the crimes and a million Serbian victims to the new Oustachi movement. All Serbism; Serbism has no price! (...) 100,000 Croats must leave Serbia, otherwise Serbia will quite simply not be able to accommodate the unfortunate Serbs driven out of Croatia. This will just be an exchange of population, carried out under the pressure of the Croatian government's terror." (*Politika,* 14 May 1991).

"*Muslims should know that the best thing for them would be to live in a single state, just like the Serbs. And if they don't want that, let them form their Jamahiriyah in those areas where they are the majority population, and even then they cannot have a compact whole. They will remain scattered: otherwise we would resettle the population. The Serbs from areas with an absolute Muslim majority would be resettled and vice-versa, but not a single Serb is going to live under the Jamahiriyan regime*", interview by Olivera Miletovic, in *ON,* 1 March 1992.

"*(...) As for the people of Croatian nationality, all of them, except those who fought with us for the freedom of Serbian Slavonija, i.e. those who went to the frontline as members of the reserve forces, will have to go, following the principle of retaliatory duty. If TUDMAN expelled more than 300,000 Serbs, what are the Croats in Serbia waiting for? We will have to provide those Serbs with accommodation somewhere...*", *TV Politika* with Seselj, interviewed by Vera Radovic on 12 June 1992.

Mirko Jovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement:

"If we ever have the right to decide in our State, no one will be able to say that he/she is Macedonian, Muslim or Montenegrin by nationality(...) In the future Serbia we are striving for, they (i.e. the Macedonians) can even consider themselves as extra-terrestrials, but let them keep this feeling to themselves; we know that they are Serbs" (*Nedjeljna Dalmacija,* 20 May 1990).

"The Serbs must understand that this war (i.e. in Bosnia) cannot end with an agreement. It is a war for territories and where the fighting is taking place at the moment there will be either no more Muslims or no more Serbs" (*Politika,* 27 May 1992).

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia:

"*This is the third or the fourth republic to want out of Yugoslavia....The path they embarked on is the same highway which led Croatia to hell, but the hell of war in B&H would be even more terrible, for Muslims could perhaps become extinct...Hence don't try to negotiate things in Europe to which you are not entitled*" (*Vecernje Novosti,* 16 October 1991).

Bozidar Vucurevic, president of the Self-Proclaimed Region of Eastern Herzegovina:

"I would like to inform the Serbian people that we are going to correct all the injustices regarding the borders traced by Josip Broz with his dirty finger out of boredom. He sold Serbian territories cheap to the Croats and Muslims. The Muslims are only a negligible minority which must yield to the majority Serbian people. We will not stop, we will chase them all the way to Zagreb if necessary. We have revenge in our blood and in our oath" (*Danas,* 29 October 1991).

Vuk Draskovic, president for the Serbian Renewal Movement:

"We are in favour of a Serbia which (...) comprises firstly the Serbian territory at the current time including, of course, its two provinces which will no longer have the status of provinces: then Barania, Macedonia, that is southern Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, the Serbian nationalist revival is

Serbian populations out of all the territories in which Serbs lived whilst re-joining these territories to "historical Serbia". A careful review of media coverage in Serbia at the time demonstrates that the "need" to expel the non-Serbs is a recurrent theme in the media[29] - whether the message is conveyed by politicians, intellectuals, military personnel, journalists etc. The entire press repeated systematically and all together the inflammatory declarations referring to the dangers[30] confronting the Serbian peoples and explicitly or implicitly threatening the non-Serbs with reprisals[31].

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demanding the incorporation into Serbia of the historical and ethnic regions of our people in Bosnia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Lika, Kordun, Banija and Knin, Krajina (...) No Serb killed or injured must remain unavenged. In Croatia those who announce new persecutions must know that these Serbian graves have not yet been avenged. We will have to draw up files on our enemies." (Quoted in *Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe*, collected, translated and commented on by Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara and Neven Simac, Fayard, Paris, 1993, p. 316).

[29] A good example is the declaration made by academic and novelist Dobrica Cosic who, by skilful use of rhetoric, begins by saying that he never called for ethnic cleansing while in fact wishing for it: "*We need not aspire to ethnically clean Serbia, but we should liberate those who don't feel free with Serbs and who limit Serb freedom"* (*Promene, Dnevnik*, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 176). Momcilo Selic, an ultra-nationalist historian, calls for the expulsion of the non-Serbs: "*The thing we must do is expel many to their places of origin, close down borders like Enver Hodja did in Albania, make a unitary Serbia, and then they can complain as much as they want*" (*Duga*, 12-26 September 1992). Mirko Kulic, a parliamentary member of Milosevic's socialist party, hesitates between an expulsion taking into account humanitarian criteria and more radical measures: "*In this situation, when Croats are committing genocide against Serbs, the question is whether we should thus react towards Croats...I don't favour the same measures, for it would mean that we would have to kill and slaughter Croats in Serbia, but humane re-settlement of population could be effected voluntarily...*" (*Borba*, 3 April 1992). Commander of the Novi Sad army, General Andreja Biorcevic, opts for the hard-line approach: "*All Serb countries and Serb people must be in one state. And if you cannot provide for that diplomatically, we shall ensure that by war and there shall be rivers of blood...*" (*Vreme*, 30 March 1992). For Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the existence of a unitarian Serbian State cannot even be called into question: "*No force or power can prevent us from creating a Serb state....only God may, and God shall not do it, because he is on our side*" (*Radio Belgrade II*, 1 March 1993). As regards the union of Serbian territories, metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic states that: "*The backbone of those United Countries is perhaps known and, in the face of all misfortunes, it is taking shape. And that backbone is Serbia and Montenegro, perhaps Eastern Herzegovina, a good part of Bosnian Krajina, Serb Krajina... The outlines of those Serb countries are emerging amid all these developments and it is a pity that we did not respond to the woes and screams from Srpska Krajina on time*" (*Duga*, 20 April 1992).

[30] "*For decades, the Serbs in socialistic Croatia have not had the ethnic rights which they had under the Austria-Hungary Empire. They endure it as the heavenly doom, and we, their compatriots, keep silent out of fear, indifference, greed... Is the Serbian fate in the war in Croatia – genocide and in socialistic peace – discrimination and assimilation*", Dobrica Cosic, *Duga*, n° 406,16-29 September 1989.

[31] "*Serbs must not renounce their age-old objective to live in one state. That idea is priceless. We must act like other serious peoples in history in similar circumstances (...) Serb people must regain their confidence and dignity. And must defend themselves. Even if it were the only people in the world, or the only one putting up resistance to the whole world"* Gojko Dogo, poet (Politika Ekspres, 6 April 1992).

"*The Serbian people do not accept IZETBEGOVIC as their President. They don't want him and there is no power that is going to make them accept IZETBEGOVIC. The Serbian people had to arm and to organise themselves as military units. And it was our common duty to support them as much as our circumstances would allow us: with material, financially, with arms, and by sending volunteers, etc., for they are our brother Serbs*", Vojislav Seselj, *Studio B*, November 1990.

Propaganda and a State for All Serbs

16. The policy of establishing a "State for all Serbs" included ethnic policies that skilful propaganda justified in the eyes of Serbian public opinion. It must be underscored that although the media were one of the lynchpins of the propaganda this was because a particular context also created favourable conditions for the political power to control them. Strictly speaking, there was not at the time any tradition of independent media within the Yugoslav Federation. Within press firms owned by public institutions, journalists were viewed as "political workers"[32] who had to defend the Party's ideas. Any criticism was punished severely. With the implosion of the Federation, the independence of the various republics and the outbreak of the war, professionals turned into nationalist "patriots"[33]. The "traitors" to the nation were systematically pushed aside[34].

17. The situation in which the media were brought under the power of the Communist Party, which controlled all of the news channels leaving room ultimately for only secret counter-propaganda, was succeeded by one in which the media, in a context of political

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"*We have already deployed several Chetnik groups in Zagreb, and in some other cities in Croatia, which are trained for sabotage and terrorist actions, and, should a massacre of the Serbian civilian population happen, the Chetniks will strike against Zagreb and other Croatian strongholds with all their force. You see, revenge is blind during the process of retaliation. We might have innocent victims: however, nothing can be done about that. Let the Croats think first. We are not going to strike first, but if they strike, we will not pay attention to our target anymore. If the Army does not disarm the Ustashas urgently, a lot of blood is going to be shed*," interview by Verica Milievic, *ON*, 24 May 1991.

[32] Milica Pesic, journalist at *Television Belgrade* and *Serbian Radio Television* from 1983 to 1992, said on the matter: "*According to the Code of Journalists of Yugoslavia, a journalist was defined as a 'socio-political worker who, conscientiously adhering to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, [...] participates in the establishment of socialist self-management of society'* ". In *Manipulations on Television Belgrade*, A Thesis in International Journalism Presented to the Department of Journalism, City University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree, Department of Journalism, City University, London, September 1994, p. 12.

[33] On this transformation of the concept of journalist, see Dragica Mugosa, "Alternative Information Network", AIM, Alternativna Informativna Mreza (Alternative Information Network). Free speech, free media: rights under threat? Public hearing before the Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy Commission, Human Rights Sub-Commission of the European Parliament, Brussels, 25 April 1996. http://www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/speech/reseau_en.htm

[34] Purges were the preferred method for dealing with rebellious journalists. After Milosevic's takeover of *Politika* with Zivorad Minovic's intervention (see paragraph 41 footnote) more than 70 editors were removed from their posts; the audio-visual media journalists were not spared either by the many purges if they demonstrated too much independence. A little book entitled *Purges in Belgrade radio and television*

transition, fell under the control of the new nationalist powers in each republic[35]. In Serbia, it was Slobodan Milosevic's political formation which would, to its advantage, control the media scene[36]. Although there was no break with communist ideology, it would nonetheless experience as of 1986-1987 a drift towards nationalism in which the media would be closely associated. Under the control of Milosevic and his party, they

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published in April 1993 by the independent radio and television syndicate provides thus a detailed account of the purges with the dates, names and persons concerned, their positions, etc.

[35] The very structure of the media scene in the former Yugoslavia encouraged the nationalist development of the media. The observation of Borisav Jovic, one of Milosevic's closest collaborators and president of the Yugoslav Federation at the time, on 17 October 1990 is revealing: "*The wave of hatred and national prejudice threatens to return us to our bloody past. This has become the greatest danger to the security and integrity of the country. All of this has been furthered by the open information and propaganda war in Yugoslavia's completely divided media market. Relations between the individual federal entities have become so bad that contacts at the level of responsible institutions have been severed or reduced to confrontation through the media*". His letter of resignation from Yugoslav presidency which he addressed to the citizens via Belgrade Television read similarly: "(...) *The media are completely divided and the media war has assumed such intensity that the opposing sides can be considered belligerents* (...)". In *Last Days of the SFRY*, Journal of excerpts translated by David Stephenson for the ICTY, pp. 177 and 258.

[36] The Serbian media were conceived principally by the members of Milosevic's party and his nationalist radical allies as political instruments to support the régime, responsible for contributing to the achievement of his ultra-nationalist objectives. The quotations from politicians and/or journalists below show the strength of their belief in the power of the media and, consequently, the importance they placed on their control over it:

"*(...) as editor-in-chief I have certain obligations and certain authorisations, and my priority is to conduct and implement the policy of the communists' association...I am saying that I am obliged to prevent anything that is not in line with the Communists' association and its program policy from being published in Politika*", Zivorad Minovic, editor-in-chief of *Politika*, in Miodrag Marovic, *"Politika" and Politics*, Helsinki Committee for Yugoslavia, not yet published.

- "*On 9 March Serb people were swindled. 9 March was organised in Belgrade by Ante Markovic and the foreign intelligence services!... The one who raids the TV station, intends to topple the authorities. The one who takes the TV station, has taken over power! And nowhere in the world would any regime let it happen without much blood being shed. Hence Draškovic is the main culprit for the bloodshed*", Dr. Vojislav Šešelj, "the Chetnik duke", in *Duga*, 13 April 1992.

- "*Serb people know well who should receive the most credit for the establishment of a unified Serbia, and Ekspres spearheaded that fight. Hence we shall not allow that master-minds of such a policy, leading to the current democracy, be groundlessly persecuted*", Tomica Raičevic, member of the SPS Executive Committee, in *Politika Ekspres*, 22 April 1992.

- "*The spirit of democracy has taken root in our Public Information Law and information houses. We initiated personnel changes in RT Belgrade*", Radoslav Zlatanovic, SPS deputy at the Serbian People's Assembly.

- "*I am displeased with the smear-campaign against our house. It is spearheaded by those who work in our house, and don't want to leave it. Gentlemen, follow your convictions, that is only fair enough. Don't daydream, be rid of any illusion of your staging a coup in TV (...) What do they want? They get their salaries, have incentives, enjoy all elements of social standard, including a holiday resort in Zlatibor (...) I am pleased that RTV Serbia stepped into the world, and became world TV, liberated from the protectorate of Croat TV. We have our international channel, which is also used by Macedonia, Montenegro and B&H. I am pleased with the help we gave to Serb people in Croatia. We prevented both their mental and physical deaths at the hands of Ustashi. Our TV and radio programs can be followed in the whole of Croatia. I am glad that we have helped the Serb people in Croatia, notably in Krajina, to launch their own radio and TV program*", Dobrosav Bjeletic, former executive Secretary of the central committee of the Serbian League of Communists and director of RTS, interview in *Večernje Novosti, 30 March 1992.*

would be given the responsibility of distilling the venom of hatred and fear in the Serbian population whose very existence, according to the propaganda, was directly threatened by the presence of the other minority ethnic groups[37]. To do this, the Milosevic regime would use classic propaganda techniques and principles tried and tested in other places at other times.

Fundamental principles of all propaganda

18. The history of political propaganda shows that there are a certain number of fundamental techniques which were again used in the former Yugoslavia by the print media, radio, television, images, cinema and staged spectacles.

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[37] As demonstrated by the inflammatory declarations of Vojislav Seselj systematically broadcast by the media:
- "*If barricades or a Muslim revolt emerge in Sandžak we shall immediately send in our war-hardened voluntary units. So Muslims had better be more cautious. And our war veterans shall continue their campaign, if necessary up to Anadolia. Many Islam fanatics from Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin have already perished in their capacity of Croatian mercenaries and soldiers of Izetbegovic in Bosnia*", in *Borba*, 17 May 1992.
- "*I think that all Croats should be expelled, barring those who responded to the call-up. Also exempt should be Serb Catholics (Šokci and Bunjevci) who enjoy full equality. We shall give the addresses of exiled Serbs from Zagreb and Varaždin to the Croats*", in *Vecernje Novosti*, 17 April 1992.
- "*I would expel Croats on several grounds. Firstly because they are utterly disloyal inhabitants of Serbia, the vast majority of them are members of the HDZ, or collaborate with that party, and they do their utmost to internally destabilise Serbia. They are close collaborators of Ustashi. We shall have to retaliate because Tuđman expelled 160,000 Serbs. In view of the latter, what are Croats in Serbia waiting for? Thirdly, the largest number of Croats living today in Serbia were settled by Ante Pavelic in Zemun, Slankamen and other places....at work is the principle of the state reason in the situation when the state is at risk. We must foil those fifth-columnists. We would do that in an utterly humane way. We would give them addresses of Serbs driven out of Croatia. Those are clear-cut, simple and utterly humane solutions. We cannot treat Croats in a human way, and our own people in an inhumane way*", in *Osmica*, 22 April 1992.
- "*Members of all national minorities shall have the same rights as citizens of Serbia.... We appeal to Hungarians not to back adventurers like Andras Agoston, for they might not fare well.... And they should remember that Serbs can be extremely spiteful and revengeful, and that we shall use arms if necessary (...) the expulsion of Croats from Vojvodina and Serbia and the repatriation of Serb refugees to Serb territories ensured by the presence of Blue Helmets who would also make it possible to hold a referendum on the issue of the Serbian border, which was not in Karlovac, but rather in a Karlovac suburb, not in Virovitica, but in Pakrac (...) Once the Serb Republic of Krajina and Republika Srpska join B&H the newly-emerged Yugoslavia shall easily proclaim itself the federal state of Serbia and thus finally get its Serb army (...) We fight for the state whose name shall be Serbia, but we have accepted the concept of this rump Yugoslavia because of international circumstances*", in Borba, 3 May 1992.
Another example: instead of interviewing the authorities and local people, an *RTS* reporter dispatched to Vojvodina to report on the calls for autonomy allegedly made by the Hungarians peremptorily announced" "*They [the Hungarians] have never stopped dreaming of once again becoming a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. They even want to change the names of the streets in this town and call the old square by the name the Germans called it during the Second World War - Hitler Square!*" Quoted by Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p. 35.

Keep it simple

19. The first fundamental principle is to "keep it simple". That is to say, in order to be sure that the public remembers what the propagandist wants them to remember, it is more effective to broadcast a short and concise message which summarises or, where need be, distorts a program, policy or idea. The message is conveyed by various brief but striking phrases in keeping with advertising principles: issue a marching order which summarises the goal to be attained and has the weight of a command common to the members of a party, group or community; put out a slogan, which is more like a war cry and whose contents are imbued with much more passion (which plays on hatred, exaltation, etc.); or provide a symbol (an image, drawing, tune) which has magical or mystical connotations for a given social group (community, ethnic group or people). Ultimately, it is a question of finding the short and clear phrases which make it possible to condense a programme or political doctrine in a way easy for the masses to remember.

20. The rule of simplification holds all the more true when the adversary or enemy has to be stigmatised using the most derogatory terms possible[38]. For example, by choosing to

[38] Many simplistic, caricatured and pejorative nationalist political declarations were thus relayed by the media controlled by the Belgrade authorities to discredit Albanians, Croats and Muslims. In its edition of 5 July 1991, *Duga* magazine published the words of a campaign of the ultra-nationalist radical Vojislav Seselj who stated that "the Croats had to have their throats cut, not with a knife but with a rusty spoon".
The day before, on 4 July, he informed *ON* of his intentions were he were leader of Serbia: "*I would first order the army to pull out its troops and weapons from the area of what today is Slovenia and thus enable the secession of Slovenia. Then I would order Croatia to be cut off and the army withdrawn, and weapons to be placed along the line Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica. I would suspend all federal bodies and set up a committee of the Serbian National Saving with sweeping powers until the end of year elections for the Constitution-Making Assembly. It would be painless since the Croats would hide immediately. They are cowards. Cowardice is in their genes. In Western Srem 22 Serbs defeated over 300 Ustashi special forces. Bosnia is indisputably Serbian, and all those Muslim fundamentalists who disagree with that idea, may pack up and leave in a timely manner. I think that by virtue of the genetic make-up of Serbian people, they are always ready for warfare. Every Serb is a born soldier, and Europe knows that well. Many Balkan nations who underrated Serbs paid dearly for it. I don't believe that anyone would dare to impose on us solutions which are contrary to our national interests*".
"*The Croats are a rotten nation. I have never yet met a decent Croat*", he again stated on 6 August 1991 in an interview with *Der Spiegel* (reported by the Belgrade *Tanjug Press* agency in its bulletin of 8 August, pp.14-15). Still in the same vein, he stated to *Iskra* (Birmingham) on 1 December 1991: "*The Croats are a decadent people. I have never met an honest Croat" (pp.4-6).*
Another example, the declaration of Biljana Plavsic, quoted by Borba on 8 February 1993: "*Rape unfortunately belongs to the war strategy of Muslims and some Croats towards Serbs. For Islam rape is normal, for that religion tolerates polygamy. Throughout 500 years of Turkish occupation both begs and*

demonise the enemy soldiers in the eyes of one's own people or community, it is the image of the entire opposing community that the propagandist seeks to tarnish and on which disrepute is cast. In this way, propaganda is the enemy of nuance and always seeks to exaggerate the trait to make an impression on people's minds.

21. It is also common to use an incisive phrase to summarise to extremes the evils with which the authorities are faced and which it means to ascribe to its many enemies. In this case, the conspiracy theory is put forward, a very convenient procedure which makes it possible to cast all enemies in the same light[39] – as did Hitler's propaganda which dwelt at great length on the pseudo-conspiracy of the democrats, plutocrats and Bolsheviks against Europe.

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agas were entitled to spend the first night with a recently married woman from the 'mob'. Also under the Islamic religious tenets nation of a child is the one of his father..."

[39] See for example Dobrica Cosic's declaration in *Nada* in July 1994: *"The break-up of Yugoslavia by dint of national secessions in which Germany, together with the EC, America and later Islamic powers played a major role was tantamount to a declaration of WW3 with the same goals as WW1 and WW2. Serb people responded by a war of defence, a war for their survival and their democratic state. Despite that war and its goals, Serbs shall survive and attain their fundamental national objectives. Serbs shall create a new state, whose character shall deny and prevail over national and ideological goals of all sides and participants in the Serb civil war, waged under occupation in 1941-1945 period. This current war and its objective – a single, unified state of Serb people – should suspend our ideological antagonisms and divisions originating in the civil war and WW2.....Hence the national reconciliation was set in place by history itself"*.

See also the following articles which appeared in *Politika*:

- ""*I hate all things Serbia, and Serb people". This motto is still the rallying cry of unprincipled coalition. It is obvious that anti-Serbism is still fashionable in the "West" in certain circles. It has been present in the political scene since the end of WW2, but now its aggressive and destructive manifestations are in full swing. Western politicians and theoreticians can no longer tolerate the Serbian syndrome of liberator, and thus they try their best to prevent and thwart Serbia's further development and prosperity*". Randjel Janicijevic, in *Politika*, 26 May 1989.

- "*Anti-Serb hysteria in Croatia, Slovenia and B&H had a major impact on foreign public opinion, the one traditionally under the influence of Catholic circles, hostile towards Serbs, considered schismatic, and under the influence of Muslim fundamentalist centres working full-throttle on the islamisation of the planet. Many anti-Serb articles who maintain that Serbia stripped the Kosovar Albanians of their "fundamental autonomous rights" are written by people bankrolled by the powerful Albanian drug-peddling mafia and financed by the state coffers of Albania*" Batric Jovanovic, in *Politika*, 31 May 1990.

- "*In Yugoslavia there is a long-running political war....but few know its causes, political goals and plans or the character of any possible armed conflict. And that war should bring about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, that is, the recovery of Austro-Hungary and the formation of a Greater Albania. Hence, underway is the organisation of a political war against Yugoslavia on anti-Serb grounds. The US, NATO and Vatican are engaged in carrying out that division. They took on the roles of Germany, Italy and Great Britain from WW2. The post-war anti-Serb policy of those countries envisaged a more far-reaching genocide than WW2 against the Serb people. The initial phase of that war should unfold in Kosovo and Metohija and elsewhere. And that war would not be feasible without the obvious and decisive backing of external factors*". Radivoje Jovanovic-Bradonja, in *Politika*, 4 December 1990.

Project your own faults onto others

22. A second frequently applied principle is to project on your enemy your own faults or ascribe to him the will to commit acts which you yourself are on the verge of perpetrating. In this regard, it is typical to hear some of the most belligerent regimes swear that they do not want war and that, in fact, it is the opposing camp that is solely responsible for it. This deceptive logic leads to attack being presented to your own public opinion as the only possible form of defence and as an imposed course of action, for which the only choice ultimately lies between life or death.

The public opinion campaign relayed through the media to justify the war against the Croats is a good example of this. In its special edition of July 1990, *Duga* magazine applied itself to the task in its own way. Mihajlo Markovic, Marxist and philosophical ideologist and close collaborator[40] of the Serbian president, wrote that *"the tragedy of the Croatian Serbs has still not ended - it is ongoing and in the near future could reach tragic proportions"*[41]. In the same edition, doctor Jovan Raskovic, leader of the Serbian democratic party of Krajina, took up the same idea: *"Status of Serb people in Croatia is worse than the status of any, even the smallest national minority in Yugoslavia. Everyone has the right to language, culture mass media, etc. We, the Serbs in Croatia, are the only ones who are deprived of that right. To strip one people of their right to mother tongue and alphabet is a kind of crime"*[42].

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[40] An academician, he was appointed a member of the *Committee for Preparing the Memorandum on Society's Present-day Problems* in 1985 and became vice-president of the SPS shortly after the position was created in June 1990. In the weeks that followed and in the run-up to the December 1990 elections, he himself would travel to Negotin, Novi Sad, Krusevac, Smederevo, Nis and Uzice in support of the SPS. On this point, see the historian, Olivera Milosavljevic, "*Du mauvais usage de l'autorité scientifique*" in *Radiographie d'un nationalisme: les racines serbes du conflit yougoslave*, under Nebojsa Popov, Les Editions de l'Atelier, Paris 1998, p. 220. On the closeness of Markovic and Milosevic, see Florence Hartmann, *Milosevic, La diagonale du fou*, Denoël, Paris, 1999, pp. 77, 176, 234, 320 and 372.

[41] Further on, he continues that: *"Today Serbs are second-class citizens. The theory that only Croatian people enjoy sovereignty in the Republic of Croatia, while Serbs are treated as the disenfranchised "mob" who owe loyalty to the Croatian state, is openly espoused. Systematic denial and underrating of the genocide committed against Serbs during WW2 make it precarious for Serb people to live in Croatia. The denial of responsibility for the crime clears the way for its repeat..."*

[42] See also the examples below:

- "*Everyone should know that Serbs and Serbia in Croatia must be defended unless, in the near future, we want to defend ourselves from Tuđman in Zemun*", Pavic Obradovic, Vice-president of the People's Assembly of Serbia, at a Kraljevo rally, *TVB*-Prime news, 23 September 1991.
- "*In its defence the Serb people shall turn Vienna into Hiroshima*", Vojo Kuprešanin, President of SAO Bosanska Krajina, *Večernje Novosti*, 27 October 1991.

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Use the news to your advantage

23. A third principle is to turn the news to your advantage to guide people's minds, in particularly, by exercising tight control over the media. Here too, it is a question of exaggerating the importance or significance of a reported fact – for example, through a title and comment playing on enthusiasm or hatred – or conversely distorting its meaning (especially by using out-of-context quotations) or remaining silent on the subject[43] when it contradicts the official version of matters[44].

- "*This variant of the rump Yugoslavia is the first clever game played by Serbs and is likely to be successful...For the first time we are creating a state bigger than Dušan's Kingdom, with minimal efforts and minimal casualties... In this war, we must avenge Jasenovac, Golubnjača, and all those mass graves with Serb victims. So when Montenegrins conquer Dubrovnik and we conquer Tovarnik, we shall all meet in Zagreb ultimately. Only after a definitive military rout of the Croats, can we create our state in peace*", Mirko Jović, President of the SPR, *Pogledi*, 29 November-13 December 1991.
- "*I think that it is important that our people in Krajinas are now de facto exempted from the Croatian authorities, since they were bent on destroying it...*", Irinej Bulovic, Episcope of Bačka, *NIN*, 20 March 1992.
- "*27 members of my family were killed in WW2. My mother grew up in an orphanage in Belgrade. I am involved in the whole story through the tragedy of my grandmothers and grandfathers...I feel sorry for young Ustashi when we take them before the firing squad ...But when I am at the front, when I fight and see my enemies die I feel happy, for thus people who threaten my people are eliminated. It has nothing to do with murder....Croats used all the means available – fascism, democracy, civil society – to promote the idea of the destruction of Serbs in these territories*", Dragoslav Bokan. Leader of "*Beli orlovi*", *Duga*, 29 March-11 April 1992.

[43] For instance, on 16 January 1993, when an umpteenth massacre resulted in 8 dead and 18 wounded in Sarajevo and Serbs were killed in the Bosnian village of Skelane, *Belgrade Television* reported only the second incident.
Belgrade Television also remained totally silent on certain news stories: no information would be given on 5 February 1992 about the fact that a very famous Bosnian Muslim actor had been viciously beaten up in Belgrade, and the same held true, on 19 October 1992, when 17 people were killed and 150 wounded in Sarajevo and again, on 18 March 1993, after Serbs destroyed five mosques in Bijeljina, one of which was protected by UNESCO. Milica Pesic, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[44] *RTS* thus said nothing about the forced exodus of the Croats from Hrtkovci village in Vojvodina in the summer of 1992; in its report of 20 August, none of interviewees expressed concern about the fate of the Croats. See Rade Veljanovski, *"Le revirement des médias audiovisuels"* in *Radiographie d'un nationalisme: les racines serbes du conflit yougoslav* under the direction of Nebojsa Popov, Les Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, 1998, p. 316. On this episode, see also Milica Pesic, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

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Repeat your message endlessly

24. Another characteristic of all political propaganda is the systematic and recurrent repetition of the main theme or themes in such a way as to leave an indelible trace in the minds of people[45]. In order not to tire the masses, the message (the meaning) must however change form and be adapted to the characteristics of each public as often as required. For propaganda to be effective it requires accurate follow-up which constantly feeds it new information, "evidence", revelations and shock phrases and gives it fresh impetus when an event considered noteworthy occurs.

Rely on myths and history

25. In order to be fully effective, propaganda must also rely on and start with a pre-existing support or fertile ground. Usually it uses mythology or exploits the conscious and unconscious feelings (historic prejudices and hatred) in the psyche of the peoples –

[45] In this vein, we can take as an example the threatening propaganda set in place and relayed through the media to dissuade the Muslims from leaving the Federation of Yugoslavia:
- "*It is true that Slovenians and Croats want to secede. But in my mind Muslims don't have any interest in secession from Yugoslavia. As regards Muslims a large part of them are heavily indoctrinated, but we nevertheless assess that most Muslims want good, tolerant, civilised, and, I would say, civil, friendly and good-neighbourly relations with Serb and other peoples in Yugoslavia....They don't want the break-up of Yugoslavia, for there are deep roots, blood ties....*", Slobodan Milosevic in *NIN*, 12 April 1991.
- "*An agreement should be reached with Serbs while they are ready for such an agreement. No war should be waged with Serbs. It is beautiful to live together with them and lethal to wage wars with them. We shall not be at peace until Foča and Goražde are annexed to Herzegovina, as historically and geographically they belong there*", Biljana Plavšić in *Intervju*, 21 September 1991.
- "*War in B&H is avoidable because Muslims don't feel like waging war. Muslims in Bosnia are the majority population, but they inhabit only 18% of the territory, mostly along the river Bosna, and perhaps there they stand a chance of forming their independent Djamahiria. Most Muslims are not against cohabitation with Serbs*", Vojislav Šešelj in *NIN*, 21 January 1992.
- "*I would like for us to cleanse Eastern Bosnia, but I don't mean ethnically cleanse...The International community has started using that term for a natural phenomenon and has, moreover, qualified it as a war crime. Even if we kept 70% of the territory, there shall be no peace there. To tell you the truth I am not well disposed towards them. But if I want to be at peace I must give them something, let them organise their lives, because then they would not keep disturbing me. This is how I perceive that 30%*", Biljana Plavšić in *Svet*, 6 September, 1993, Novi Sad.
- "*Muslims are genetically spoiled material who converted to Islam. And those genes have been reinforced generation after generation. They have become worse and they dictate and express the Muslim way of thinking and behaving. The latter is embedded in their genes*", Biljana Plavšić in *Svet*, 6 September, 1993, Novi Sad).
- "*We are upset by a rising number of mixed marriages between Serbs and Muslims, for they allow genes to be exchanged between ethnic groups, and lead subsequently to the degeneration of Serb nationality*", Biljana Plavšić in Oslobodjenje, May 1994, Sarajevo.

following in the footsteps of Nazi propaganda which used this procedure to exacerbate antagonism between the Serbs and Croats with the success that the world was to witness. Propaganda always nurtures preconceived ideas, prejudices and preconceptions and is all the more effective as it reassures the masses in their beliefs and opinions[46].

Create a national consensus

26. Another function or characteristic of propaganda is to seek to develop a feeling of unanimity in the population by anticipating that individual opinions will conform with publicly professed opinion. Propaganda strives to gain general acceptance through the media or demonstrations and parades. To make people conform in the way they think, intellectuals, sportsmen and stars are frequently held up as examples. Through the prestige they have, their subscribing to what is presented as general opinion (or the common cause) may be conveyed as a "pulling-in" or contagion effect[47]. Propaganda can

[46] Such was the case of the crimes ascribed to the Croats during the Second World War, as illustrated by the following examples:
- "*Genocide is one of the most inhumane, dishonourable and undemocratic actions. It was committed in Croatia in WW2 (the then Independent State of Croatia) by Ustashi against Serbs, Jews and Romany. No-one can resurrect those killed in Jasenovac, Staro Sajmiste, Jadovna and other concentration camps and detention centres. And only a small gesture of good will is needed ....to prove once again that the current locals of Croatia don't accept the ideology of genocide*". Dr. Stojan Adasevic, in *Politika*, 5 March 1990.
- "*... The myth of the Oustashi Movement is re-born. This must increase the concern of all Yugoslavs, regardless of their nationality, religion, and political convictions. Croats must be concerned too, and not only Serbs in that republic. A repeat of 1941 is not possible, but blood may shed again... We don't want vengeance or oblivion, although we have been trying to forgive these crimes for decades. And the sons of those who committed those crimes should be concerned about the consequences of the current escalation of the ideas about a Greater Croatia, and notably those of Mr. Tuđman, the charismatic leader of the ICD, who is emerging in the political arena of Croatia in Yugoslavia. Crimes ascribable to the nationalist folly can be traced back to the recent past and hence cannot be easily forgotten*". Dara Slobotka-Peles, *Politika*, 22 May 1990.

[47] The procedure would be used in particular during the war in Croatia by *Serbian Television* which was seeking to forge a spirit of national unity and encourage volunteers to enlist to fight there. To this end, it would often take "individual role models" as examples whom it would interview to influence the conduct and/or way of thinking of the television viewing masses. One could offer two examples from the time of the Vukovar siege.
The first portrayed a Serbian member of parliament who swapped his civilian clothes for uniform and chose to serve his country at the front rather than on the benches of the Assembly:
- News editor: *"Among the volunteers and reserve soldiers going off to fight the war in Croatia are many members of the Serbian Parliament. So far more than twenty Serbian members of Parliament have donned military uniform. On the territory of Western Srem we can also find the Serbian member of Parliament Dragoslav Aleksic."*
- Dragoslav Aleksic: *"It's my patriotic duty and that is why I am here to fight together with the Yugoslav People's Army, to fight for the Serbs who live outside Serbia, and to prevent any enemy incursions into the territory of the Republic of Serbia, which have regrettably been happening*

arouse fear or exaltation in people through mass media and spectacles. The stated aim is of course to occupy the ground, multiply the shows of force and demonstrate superiority over the enemy. Such a logic naturally leads people to denounce as traitors those who cast doubt on or oppose the propaganda or common cause.

In this way the function of the media under Milosevic was to denounce[48] and ostracise those who, at one time or another, were in a position to publicly question or protest against the prevailing ultra-nationalism. The independent media, the only ones to open up

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recently. But with our military campaigns and our unity, which is essential, Serb unity, I believe we can accomplish our goals."

- Reporter: *"Where is it more difficult, in Parliament or here in the war?"*
- D.A.: *"In the Parliament."*
- Reporter: *"Why?"*
- D.A: *"Because here we are more united, there, I am sad to say, the situation is completely different."*

Departing from the norm, the second showed an interview of a young woman in uniform explaining what had driven her to enlist in the Serbian fighting forces:

- Reporter: *"This is rather unusual, a young woman going to war, isn't it? What do you think?"*
- Young woman: *"I don't think it is. We need to answer the call to arms. I am a mother of two small children."*
- Reporter: *"Where are you from?"*
- Young woman: *"I am from Pirot."*
- Reporter: *"How old are you?"*
- Young woman: *"Thirty-three."*
- Reporter: *"What made you decide to go?"*
- Young woman: *"Well, when I watch television, I see what's going on and I want to help, and it's worth sacrificing my life for this here Serbia of ours."*

For these two examples, see *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*, 1995.

[48] Here again media and ultra-nationalists – be they political leaders, orthodox dignitaries, intellectuals, etc. – worked hand in hand to spread the message and encourage the homogenisation of Serbian society while the few rare independent media organisations attempted to denounce them. The press extracts below are a good example of this:

- "*And there where Serbian blood is shed and Serbian bones fall must be Serbian land. Those who think otherwise, are on the side of our enemy*", Priest Nikanor, *Borba*, 3 April 1991.
- "*In Serbia, thank God, we are not in agreement, although we should be when the existence of the people must be defended... those who are against their own people, are traitors*", Ljubomir Tadic, *Duga*, 5-29 July 1991.
- "*It seems to me that, at this moment in time, Belgrade is unfortunately a veritable fifth-columnists city. It is full of rogues, cowards, false pacifists, backers of the other side, but Serbia cannot shoulder the burden of that menagerie for ever*", Moma Kapor, *Borba*, 7 - 8 March 1992.
- "*Perhaps Vukovar need not be repaired, but rather left as a warning to our offspring... if we had not heeded the warning in the shape of Jasenovac, they might be wiser. All Serb traitors who have led their people to the brink of survival, should be brought here and tried at the scene, under the shadow of these ruins, before the ghosts of butchered children*", Srđan Stanišić, "*Đilas should be hanged*", *Pogledi*, 27 March -10 April 1992.
- "*We are speaking about islamicized Serb traitors during the Ottoman enslavement, but we gloss over an important fact that our modern traitors are much more dangerous and lethal than traitors in the distant past...their treason imperils the very being of Serb people*", Metropolitan of Montenegro and Coastal Area, Amfilohije Radovic, *Borba*, 28-29 March 1992.

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to the opposition, would be the first targeted by the accusations of betrayal, especially during the electoral campaign. On 5 December 1992, the journalist and commentator, Stefan Grubac, one of the principal voices of nationalist propaganda on *Belgrade Television*, stated for example: "*So-called independent journalists collaborate with foreign forces and continually betray their fatherland. The media where these people work are actually among those who want civil war in Serbia and want war in Kosovo...*" The following day, an "expert" in religion, Dr Milan Jevtic, asserted: "*If there is anybody to be blamed for war in Bosnia, it is the so-called independent newspapers BORBA and VREME from Belgrade. By campaigning for peace they actually prevented Serbs from being properly prepared for fighting with Muslims. So they are responsible for so many dead Serbs*"[49]. Similar procedures would used against the sections of the political opposition and other active members of society opposed to the war in Bosnia. On 3 April 1993, during an item about a peaceful demonstration in Belgrade held that same day by the Civic Movement against the War shown on *RTS*, Stefan Grubac condemned the demonstrators as being anti-Serb: "*Belgrade intellectuals and so-called anti-war activists are under the protection of Izetbegovic. They do not have Serbs from Bosnia in their hearts but Muslims and foreign agency money*". Commonly branded as traitors to Serbia and spies in the pay of the CIA, the members of the opposition would be subjected to frequent attacks by *Belgrade Television*, such as on 26 September 1992 when a commentator said of them: "*They are just so-called opposition, they want to sell our brother Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, they want power just to help our enemies destroy Serbia and Serbs*".

Summary of Serbian Yugoslav propaganda

27. For these various fundamental principles to have maximum effect, the condition for propaganda to succeed, it is necessary to fight and prevent the circulation of information and alternative ideas – or at the very least to take action to ensure that the information and ideas remain limited to a narrow circle and do not cross over to the mass media. Like others, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic sought to do this by taking total control over

[49] Milica Pesic, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

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the media owned by the state or public institutions, by restricting the independent press' freedom and using all means to prevent it from informing people, and by exerting constant pressure on journalists so that they would respect certain limits, agree to support the program and ideas of those in power, and bow to discipline.

Milosevic realised very early on, in fact, the importance of controlling and using the Party and the media to win over and maintain power. He made sure that he replaced the leaders of the Party with his own troops and personally ensured that his most faithful[50] allies within the party were placed in the most important positions in public media. Traditionally the directors of radio and television channels, like, moreover, the director of the press group *Politika* were members of the Party's central committee. Milosevic relied on support from *Duga*[51] magazine and, in particular, the daily newspapers *Politika* and *Politika Ekspres* - overseen by Zivorad Minovic and Slobodan Jovanovic[52] respectively, close political allies of Milosevic assigned to their positions as editors-in-chief by the Serbian League of Communists in 1986 - to eliminate all opposition to his nationalist position on Kosovo within the central committee of the Serbian League of Communists in September 1987[53]. The 8th session of the Serbian League of Communists, followed shortly afterwards by Milosevic's definitive victory over his adversaries, was his opportunity to identify the journalists which should dismissed because they did not support him on this occasion. Ivan Stojanovic, director general of *Politika* group, was then replaced in November by Zivorad Minovic who took over the group's publications. *Svet* was recast, youth publications, *Non, Mladost* and *Student* were done away with...; The same happened to Mirko Djekic, editor-in-chief of *Nin* (publication of the *Politika* group) whose editorial reorganisation Milosevic had sought some months previously[54].

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[50] As confirmed by Borisav Jovic, a person's loyalty to him was the primary criteria in Milosevic's choice of collaborators: "*The key factor for him was who he trusted, not who the people trusted. It did not matter if the person was capable and honest, diligent and active, it was important to be loyal to him*". In *Book on Milosevic*, op.cit. p.31.

[51] *Duga*, criticised as early as 1985 by the Serbian League of Communists, adopted a new nationalist editorial policy following the removal of its editor-in-chief in spring 1987.

[52] It was also Slobodan Jovanovic who would transform the respected press agency *Tanjug* into an agency for Milosevic's sole use some years later.

[53] See paragraph 41.

[54] "*The Editor-in-chief of Duga has been changed, but the situation in Duga will not change before Duga's editorial office has been changed in the wider sense. We are talking also about a new editor of Nin. Regardless of the decision we reach, we will not solve problems in Nin, unless a there is a serious*

This was also the case with Mihailo Eric, editor-in-chief for the news on *Belgrade Television (RTB)*... The autonomous provinces were also affected by these purges within the media some time later. In Vojvodina, after the "Yoghurt Revolution", the main journalists of *Radio-Television Novi Sad* and the daily newspaper *Dnevnik* were replaced. In Kosovo, the Serbian government retook control over the media in the summer of 1990: the editor-in-chief of *Radio-Television Pristina* was replaced and some 1300 people were dismissed on 5 July; *Rilindja* newspaper, the only one in Albanian, was discontinued, resulting in 200 journalists being laid off; six local stations in Albanian were also closed etc. The control of the audio-visual media by Milosevic's regime began in 1986-1987 and was complete in the summer of 1991. The day after an opposition march organised in Belgrade on 9 March 1991 to protest, in particular, against the control of Milosevic's party over Television, Milosevic passed a new law unifying radio and television throughout the entire territory of the republic: the centres of Novi Sad, Pristina and Belgrade would subsequently form only one single network which would be easier to control. The new Law on Radio and Television in Serbia transferred the assets of *RTS* to the State, which became the owner, and in fact to Milosevic's party... The entire radio and television management was replaced and new appointments were decided on[55].

Media set up as a propaganda lynchpin

28. The media were used as weapons of war, sometimes to achieve political goals – for instance to launch and defend the theme of a State for all Serbs – and sometimes to accomplish strategic objectives – such as the capture of territories by force[56], the practice

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reconstruction of the whole editorial office", declaration made on 18 February 1987 at a rally of the municipal committee of the League of Communists.

[55] In August, Dobrosav Bjeletic, former executive secretary of the central committee of the Serbian League of Communists, was appointed director general; Krste Bjelic, responsible for war propaganda for the Serbian Republic of Krajina for a time, was appointed editor-in-chief of the news programs...

[56] Whilst war was breaking out in Slovenia and clashes between Croatian and Serbian autonomist forces were growing in number in Croatia, the Belgrade regime's entire propaganda machine would work towards preparing public opinion for the need to protect the Serbs living outside Serbia and so for the war with Croatia. When interviewed on *Serbian Television*, Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, stated: "*I don't think force should be used to prevent Slovenia from seceding from Yugoslavia. Their leaving us is to our mutual advantage. As for Croatia, things are a bit different. We can't have the same attitude towards the Croatians as towards the Slovenes. The Croatians can go as well, but without Serbian territories. Since the federal government practically does not exist, the Serbian government should assume*

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of ethnic cleansing and the destruction of targets described as symbolic and having priority. To reach its ends, the Milosevic regime would therefore do everything within its means to ensure control over the television, radio, and written press. Such control over the most important broadcasting channels would be accompanied by a method combining propaganda, partial (and biased) information, false news, manipulation, non-coverage of certain events, etc. This entire arsenal would be mobilised to help justify the creation of a State for all Serbs[57] - and so legitimise an ethnic policy which was presented as a fight for freedom, a measure taken to protect the Serbian people's native soil – and, lastly, reinforce the power and position of the Milosevic regime.

Sometimes Milosevic himself issued the most open threats against those who opposed Serbian unity. On 16 March 1991, in his address to the leaders of the communal counsels of Serbia, he stated for example that: *"We must ensure our unity in Serbia if we, as the largest and most populated of the republics, wish to dictate what will follow the events. These are questions of borders, questions of State. And it is always the powerful, never the weak, who dictate the borders. It is therefore vital that we be powerful. And in order to be powerful, we must be united as regards our national interests (...) Yesterday I again ordered the mobilisation of the police reserve contingent and also the mobilisation and formation of new police forces; the government received the instructions for preparing suitable formations which would ensure our security in all eventualities, that is those which would make it possible for us to defend the interests of our republic and, I say, also the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia (...) I have been in contact with our people in Knin, Bosnia, the pressure is huge (...) I hope that they will not be stupid enough to fight us because even if we don't know how to work well and manage the*

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authority over the entire territory or what remains of Yugoslavia. The military high command has to accept it, otherwise the army will fall apart. The Serbian army can be formed within 48 hours, since the majority of Serbian officers would join it. The withdrawal of troops and arms to the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line should be ordered, thus amputating Croatia". It was again on television that the regime's figureheads would set out the objectives to be achieved – following the example of a certain Mihajlo Markovic, an academician and Vice-President of the party in power, when he announced in a televised interview: "*It is more and more evident that the Croatian leadership will not have the power to impose its will upon the Serbs in Krajina, Slavonija, Western Srem...and Raranja. By establishing a new ethnic border and withdrawing the Yugoslav Army to this new border of Yugoslavia, we will prevent the further prolongation of this war*". See "*Images and Words of Hate: Year Two*", *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

[57] See also the examples in paragraph 15.

economy, at least we will know how to fight"[58]. Generally, the media would be used to dissuade[59] the non-Serbs from remaining in territory considered as historically Serbian – even if this required the use of force[60] to purify that territory[61].

A rule: pit the Yugoslav communities against one another

29. Certain key words would be used over and over again to stir up a defensive reaction among the Serbian citizens who would then support the government's plan to create a State for all Serbs. For example, the terms "Ustasha fascists" and "cut-throats" were used to stigmatise the Croats and "Islamic Ustasha" and "Djihad fighters" to describe the Bosnian Muslims pejoratively[62]. Systematic recourse to such key words imposed on the media by the Milosevic regime undoubtedly provoked and nourished hateful behaviour toward the non-Serbian communities.

Use the media as a fully-fledged weapon

30. As we shall attempt to show later, the use of the media for nationalist purposes was thought of as a fully-fledged component of a military campaign and, in this sense, we can truly speak of "war media". By making up lies, inventing differences and overplaying oppositions between communities, the television, radio and written press played a dangerous game. Systematic recourse to false, biased information and non-coverage of certain events made it possible to inspire and arouse hatred and fear among the communities. The media prepared the ground psychologically for the rise in nationalist hatred and became a weapon when the war broke out.

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[58] *NIN*, 12 April 1991, pp.40-41.

[59] *"We don't need a Greater Serbia, only realistic borders within which only Serbs shall live and engage in self-rule"*, Dr. Jovan Raškovic in Čačak, *Politika*, 15 May 1991.

[60] *"What we conquer is ours. Only what we conquer is ours. Whoever wants to join us is OK, whoever does not: a bullet in his back"*, General Andrija Biorčevic, Commander of Corps of the Yugoslav Army, *NIN*, 21 August1992.

[61] *"I would like us to completely cleanse Eastern Bosnia from Muslims. I am not referring to ethnic cleansing. But they have thus termed pejoratively a natural phenomenon, and qualified it as a war crime"*, Biljana Plavšić, *Svet*, Novi Sad, 6 September 1993.

[62] A typical example of such a procedure is the report made at Bratunac in Bosnia and Herzegovina (broadcast by RTS on 31 July 1992) where, in the words of the journalist, 114 Serbs had been massacred "in the name of Allah"...

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31. This can be illustrated using a few examples which we will examine in greater detail below. Historical facts were imbued with mystical qualities to be used as nationalist objectives so that the Serbian people would feel and express a desire for revenge directed at the prescribed enemies, the Croats and Muslims – who were presented as the Devil. In an atmosphere of patriotic euphoria, the regime-controlled media also widely broadcast the lie that the political opposition and independent media were responsible for all of the evils afflicting Serbia. Under the pressure of the political authorities, the media had to attempt to convince the citizens of Serbia that they were the victims of an international conspiracy to eliminate them and remove Serbia from the face of the earth. The fact that the media and, in particular, national television[63] built up such hateful stereotypes incontestably laid the necessary emotional foundations for conducting a wartime propaganda campaign.

[63] As a well-placed observer, the writer Philip David, who was dismissed from *RTS* in 1993 and criticised for participating in setting up an independent union within the company, provides a good summary of *Serbian Television*'s specific role: "*Today it is clear to everyone that without the role played by television, that war would perhaps not even have happened, or at least it would not have been so bloody. Television played the key role in creating hate speech, in other words preparing the war, and later in war propaganda. That role was expressed in creating stereotypes. For example, one of the stereotypes was the genocidal character of Croats, another was the suicidal character of Muslims, then there were the stereotypes of the existence of an international conspiracy against Serbia, and a stereotype that all independent reporters and independent intellectuals were in the service of foreign intelligence agencies, etc. If you tried to do something, write or think outside of the stereotypes, you would be proclaimed a traitor*". In *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*, 1995.

II. Media in the Service of War

32. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrates that there can no longer be war without catchwords or slogans, that is, without propaganda and communication. In Serbia specifically, the use of the media for nationalist ends and objectives formed part of a well-thought through plan – itself part of a strategy of conquest and affirmation of identity.

33. As such the expression "media war" assumes its full meaning since, as in any war situation, we are dealing with a context of clashes and conflict linked to political goals and objectives not only related to strategic ends (conquest of territory, take-over or destruction of specific targets, ethnic cleansing...) and appropriate means (control of the media) but also requiring a method or tactic in order to "hit" the enemy (propaganda, disinformation, manipulation, lies, etc.).

34. The temporal dimension of the media war allows us to distinguish three types of action at work[64]. First, the long-term actions of education, conditioning minds and shaping mentalities, in a word contamination, which approximately corresponds to the phase of development of the Serbian nationalism from the early 1980s until June 1991[65]. This phase is marked by an attempt to hijack and manipulate History in order to mobilise Serbian public opinion against fresh dangers. These themes were conveyed by the entire Serbian intellectual and artistic scene, whether this be the theatre, literature, painting etc. Next, the medium-term actions: opinion-forming campaigns meant to propagate certain arguments or ideas in line with well-defined objectives. The column *"Echoes and reactions"*[66] in the daily newspaper *Politika* played an essential role here in the sense that it provided Serbian nationalism with a "scientific" cover. The quality of the contributors

[64] See the article by Admiral Pierre Lacoste, *"La guerre médiatique"*, in *Défense Nationale*, December 1987, pp. 25-33.
[65] Supported by the political situation, the contribution of certain audio-visual programmes, which drew open parallels between the past and the present, hastened the awakening of Serbian nationalist sentiment. Examples of such programs are *"When all the saints"* broadcast by *Radio-Belgrade* and *Radio-Novi Sad* in 1988 or the drama *"Welcome to Gallipoli"* broadcast on the second programme of *Radio-Belgrade* on 11 April 1991 recounting the adventures and misadventures of the Serbian army during the First World War.
[66] See paragraph 49.

– academics, doctors, university professors, judges, etc. – gave it an authority and a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the Serbian public[67]. Lastly and more directly linked to the beginning of the hostilities point-specific tactical actions indissociable from the previous ones, such as rumours and lies.

History manipulated to nationalist ends

35. A climate of distrust and then hatred fed by ancestral fears and exploiting exacerbated nationalism gradually took hold in each republic beginning in the late 1980s. Although there is nothing surprising about how receptive public opinion was to the simplistic and xenophobic messages conveyed by the media, such receptiveness can be explained by the fact that the ground was exceptionally fertile. The impact of the media messages on opinions still marked by the scars of the 1940 war could be compared to the effects of an hallucinogen. We know that the memory of those tragic events was completely repressed and covered up by a federal power and the will of one man, Tito, out of fear that any reminder or allusion to those events would reawaken the worst demons and cause the break up of the Federation.

36. Ultimately it was through maintaining the taboo for decades and not undertaking a beneficial collective

exorcism after the war ended – through a true public analysis of the historical facts and responsibilities – that it became easier for history to be manipulated[68] by the nationalist

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[67] For the historian Olivera Milosavljevic the *"active participation of the intellectual élite [in Politika] provided an appearance of objectivity, specific to a scientific dialogue and not a political one. The backing of the intellectuals served only to lend more weight to the propaganda, in comparison with the transparent discourse of the purely political propagandists, although the content of the declarations of both groups came down to the same"*. See her article *"Du mauvais usage de l'autorité scientifique"* in *Radiographie d'un nationalisme: les racines serbes du conflit yougoslave* under the direction of Nebojsa Popov, Les Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, 1998, p.233.

[68] On this point see Gordana Igric, *"Relectures guerrières de l'histoire yougoslave"* in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1995. Through a reading of the new school textbooks, the article uncovers the work done to destroy the Federation's history. Thus: *"(...) young Serbs learn at the age of ten that their "fellow citizens" were ignored by the Croatian constitution, then reduced to the rank of a national minority and stripped of their rights.* As regards *"the Catholic church and its fanatic believers" they "undertook to fight against the Orthodox Church and the Serbs"*. The external enemy then comes on the scene: *"Due to the bias of the European Community, and above all of Germany, as it is the influential and most aggressive member of the Community, the fight never stopped (...) For the third time in the 20th century, Germany and Austria repeated their "Drang nach Osten" ("March Eastwards") but this time politically and*

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political parties that had already existed for a long time or had come to power in the former federal republics when free elections were held in 1990.

37. The very structure of the media system set in place under Tito – characterised by considerable decentralisation to guarantee to each culture the opportunity to express itself and in which each republic had developed its own media complex[69] - encouraged these nationalist parties to take control of what they henceforth considered their own media.

Responsibility of the intellectuals

38. In Serbia, the issue of nationalism would be raised openly in the mid-eighties in an atmosphere of economic stagnation and social crisis. At the start of 1986, under the influence of the Serbian novelist and academician, Dobrica Cosic, the *Serbian Writers' Association* transformed into an instrument for amplifying the Serbian identity claim by multiplying the calls and demonstrations for a petition to be signed condemning the "genocide" of which the Serbian population in Kosovo was allegedly victim.

39. However, it was the publication through a deliberate leak of several extracts from a *Memorandum on contemporary social issues in our country* by the *Serbian Academy of Arts and Science* in *Vecernje Novosti*[70] several months later which would truly spark things off and raise the issue of Serbian nationalism publicly. In the text prepared by sixteen academicians and largely inspired by Dobrica Cosic[71], all of the nationalist

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economically, lending their support to the secessionist forces of the Yugoslav Republics". Serbia and Montenegro therefore defended themselves fighting side-by-side for Yugoslavia. This *"aroused the anger and the desire for revenge of the instigators of the new world order who decided to punish them".* In their geography classes, the Serbian children of fourteen years of age learn not only the characteristics of the "*Serbian Republic of Krajina*" and the "*Serbian Republic of Bosnia*" but they are also to know how to interpret the break-up of Yugoslavia: *"The Serbian Republic of Krajina was established during the religious war in Croatia which began in 1991 (...) In order to end the national and religious war, the United Nations made the decision to place Krajina under the protection of their armed forces".*

[69] To cite only the example of television, Yugoslav Radio Television (YRT) was in fact only a co-ordination network for the 8 television centres in the various republics. It was a central structure based in Belgrade, the JRT, that was responsible for co-ordinating program exchanges between these centres.

[70] 25 and 26 September 1986.

[71] Dobrica Cosic plays a special role as academic and novelist and also as the person formerly responsible for the propaganda of the Serbian Communist Party who used the frustrations of the Serbian people and the rise of Serbian nationalism. Already in 1977, in his address at his becoming a member of the Academy on

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arguments which would fuel the ethnic hatred and provoke the war were set out through the analysis of the crisis in the socialist federal system. The *Memorandum* condemned the political, social, economic[72] and cultural discrimination shown toward the Serbian people

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29 March, he stressed the "tragic" fate of the Serbian people (particularly in Kosovo) who had *"won all the wars but lost all peace"*... Through his repeated anti-Yugoslavian stances and his numerous attacks against the non-Serbian peoples, Dobrica Cosic had a direct responsibility in the rise of inter-ethnic hatred – even aggravating the situation during the wars of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On 20 June 1989, he stated in an interview for *Danas* magazine: *"For a long time now I have no longer been convinced that Yugoslavism is a priori a Serbian interest, and less still that this Yugoslavism means democracy and socialism (...) Serbian Yugoslavism, in its current form, is being transformed in the experience of the other Yugoslav peoples into the opposite of what it is: it gives rise to feelings of anti-Yugoslavism and anti-Serbism. I see no reason for us, as Serbs, to support Yugoslavia more than any other Yugoslav people(...)"*.
When war broke out in Croatia, he stated in *Politika* on 15 September 1991: *"Our State has become a country of misfortune and shame; peace has become war; the peoples we used to consider as brothers are repaying us with unbrotherly, oustachi and VMRO hatred and enmity; our neighbours have again become our persecutors and murderers; the Serbian people in Croatia are seeking refuge and conducting a defensive war, while a hundred thousand of them are fleeing to Serbia. In this protracted time of misery we are not only victims; we too are causing others to suffer, with little thought as to why or how much (...) Europe, which presents itself as new Europe, is acting like old Europe with regard to Serbia: it is accepting the chauvinist lie as a political truth, nazism as democracy, it depicts victims as oppressors (...)"*.
Similarly, while fighting was taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he addressed his peers of the Academy as follows: *"The worst has happened to us: the break-up of Yugoslavia undoes two centuries of fighting for freedom for the lives of the Serbs in one State; the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatened by the return of Oustachism and militant Islam and frightened by the new genocide, they are forced to conduct a terrible war of defence against chauvinist-oustachi Croatia and the Muslim djihad; we are being punished by banishment from the world community; we are sentenced to a long ordeal, humiliation, exodus and assimilation. We respond to the crimes being inflicted on us with crimes and we sometimes dishonour ourselves to the point where we no longer recognise ourselves."* In *Politika*, 16 June 1992, p. 7.

[72] The economic exploitation which Serbia and the Serbs supposedly suffered was very soon to be denounced in the columns of *Politika*:
- *I demand satisfaction on behalf of all workers of Heavy-Duty Vehicles "Prag" in Rakovic who lost their jobs when their plant was fully dismantled in the post-war period and transferred to Maribor, where the "TAM" was founded. Thus Serbia had to be a blood-donor for those who are insulting it now. It had to give up its modest industry for the sake of the industrialisation of purely rural Slovenia!"*. Engineer Sava Maksimovic, in *Politika*, 15 November 1988.
- *"I have never understood the real goal of the cross-border trade, but I fully understood its results. Namely in a very small, underdeveloped country very strong commercial companies have emerged which, under the guise of cross-border trade, amassed enormous wealth by importing from Italy, Austria, Germany, France, England and Switzerland, the countries allegedly "bordering" Slovenia, at the expense of a "border belt" comprising in addition Slovenia, Croatia, B&H, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. I hope that it is not necessary to explain how much money Serbia and other federal units of the SFRY had to give to powerful Slovenian commercial machinery for this kind of favour/service. It should be stressed that numerous wheeler-dealer Italian companies have profited from such trading"*. Momčilo Gačic, in *Politika*, 22 April 1989.
- *"I remember how a deceased high official from the northern part of the country justified the decision to erect a "TAM" plant in Maribor by stating that the local availability of a highly skilled workforce shall boost development in all our regions!"*. Ilija Devic, in *Politika*, 12 May 1989.
- *"Information that Vojvodina and part of Serbia were to be inundated during the Informbiro pressure provoked disappointment and consternation in the population at large. People were not aware of the conspiracy. They believed that all action was taken for the benefit of socialism and the working people.*

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by the other republics of the Federation[73], an anti-Serbian coalition which, through the 1974 coalition, allegedly relegated Serbia and the Serbs to a position of inferiority. Starting with the Serbian people's own interests, the sixteen academicians called for the lost territories to be recaptured and for the Serbs to reassume control over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This call to reunite the Serbs scattered to the four corners of the Federation – allegedly victims of "cultural genocide", "extermination" and "forced assimilation" in Kosovo but also in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – demanded that the Serbs have and run freely their own State, failing which they would resort to force and call into question the borders they shared with the other Federation republics[74].

40. Slobodan Milosevic managed to ensure that the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists did not comment on the explosive text - no one would be

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After many years the people have finally learned that military and economic experts planned to put a dam on the Danube (Djerdap gorge) in order to erase part of Serbia and Vojvodina from the world map". Dimitrije Govedarica, in *Politika*, 27 August 1989.

- "It was publicly stated recently that the external debt of Yugoslavia is $15 billion. The debt is being repaid by the National Bank of Yugoslavia from the state coffers. Since that bank has the relevant data of the break-down of the debt, a Solomonic solution was found: each republic should repay its part of debt, even those republics which have not received foreign currency from the granted loans". Ružica Despotovic, in Politika, 6 November 1990.

[73] Four essential points or grievances are outlined by the academics; the first point refers to the *"continuing discrimination against the Serbian economy in the post-war period"* and its state of underdevelopment with regard to the other Republics and, in particular, Croatia and Slovenia; the second point refers to *"Serbia's constitutional status, undefined and fraught with internal conflict"* which prevents its *"political consolidation"*; the third point discusses *"the physical, political, judicial and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija"* which *"is the greatest defeat ever suffered by Serbia in its struggles for liberation"*; the last point denounces the *"discrimination"* and *"the refined and efficient policy of assimilation"* affecting the *"Serbian people in Croatia"*. See *"Mémorandum fait par un groupe d'académiciens de l'Académie Serbe des Sciences et des Arts sur des questions sociales actuelles de notre pays, Deuxième partie: La position de la Serbie et du peuple serbe"*, published in *Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe*, collected, translated et commented on by Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara et Neven Simac, Fayard, Paris, 1993, pp. 236-269.

[74] The academicians stated: *"Establishing the total national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people - irrespective of the republic or province in which it is to be found - is its historic and democratic right. Achieving equality and developing independently have a deeper historical meaning for the Serbian people. In less than fifty years, within two generations, the Serbian people, twice subjected to physical annihilation, forced assimilation, religious conversion, cultural genocide, ideological indoctrination, the depreciation and abnegation of its own tradition under an imposed guilt complex and intellectually and politically disarmed, was exposed to ordeals too harsh for them not to have left deep scars in its psyche (...) If it intends to have a future within the family of civilised peoples, the Serbian people must have the opportunity to find itself again and become a factor in history, to rediscover the consciousness of its historical and spiritual being, to see its economic and cultural interests clearly and to develop a modern, national and social programme which will inspire today's generations and tomorrow's (...)". Ibid*, pp. 265-266.

demoted or dismissed. He himself would not pass comment straight away or personally condemn the *Memorandum*. Certain information[75] suggests that Milosevic and his entourage could not have been unconnected to the leak to *Vecernje Novosti*. The fact that the prestigious Serbian Academy addressed the issue of relations between the Yugoslav

[75] Although Slobodan Milosevic himself did not actually adopt any stance when the Memorandum extracts were published in *Vecernje Novosti* and he managed to avoid being condemned by the League's Central Committee, he would publicly acknowledge several years later that the Academy had acted legitimately in intervening in Serbian politics: "*I really don't see why the Academy wouldn't have any influence on politics in Serbia. Where is there a people or State in the world which claims to be reasonable that would be ashamed of its Academy?*" (in *Politika*, 22 December 1989). This complicity with the Academy was reciprocal: at its general assembly in May 1989, the Academy would declare: "*As a result of the praiseworthy struggle and unity of its people, which required daring, bold and honest positions, and as a result of the unity of the Party and State's new leadership, headed by president Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia has recovered its sovereignty, statehood and unity and has become an equal member of our socialist, federative and multinational community. The Academy has supported and still supports today the efforts and programme of the new Serbian leadership*". Statement reproduced in the 26 May 1989 issue of *Politika* which ran, in bold, the headline "*The Academy supported and supports the programme of the new Serbian leadership*".
Moreover, beginning in 1990, Milosevic would be very open about his contacts with the authors of the *Memorandum* - in order to sound them out about his plan to unite the entire Serbian people within a single state. Borislav Jovic recounted how Milosevic received Dobrica Cosic in the winter of 1990 several times (See *The Last Days of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, a Diary Extract*, *Politika*, 1995, Belgrade, p.130). In April 1992, Milosevic would place Dobrica Cosic, the real inspiration behind the *Memorandum*, at the head of the new Yugoslav Federation.
In January 1992, the academician and Serbian parliamentary deputy for Milosevic's Socialist Party, Antonije Isakovic, stated: "*The fundamental thing is that the 'Memorandum' had its impact - some accepted it, while anti-Serbs were mostly against it*", *Duga*, 1-14 February 1992.
There would be another indication of the collusion between the Milosevic group and the people behind the *Memorandum* in June 1992 when some of the academicians would have the misfortune to demand Milosevic's resignation. Rados Smiljkovic, leader of the Socialist Party and a loyal ally of Mira Markovic (Hartmann, *op. cit.*, p. 31), Milosevic's wife, declared at the time: "*The members of the Academy do not have the right to harm this institution's place in the life of the nation by signing the petition for the president of the republic to resign. The academicians cannot call for one thing in the Memorandum and the absolute opposite now*". In *Politika*, 15 June 1992, p. 11. On the very evening that 65 academicians called for Milosevic to step down from power, Mihajlo Markovic, an academician and vice-president of Milosevic's party, said in a programme on *National Television*: "*(...) Raising questions about the position of the Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia, the Academy has advocated for a beginning of the battle which has brought us to the situation we're in today. From the way these questions were raised it was obvious we had to fight for the right of the Serbs to survive in these parts. And we had to express our human solidarity, thus getting into conflict with great powers and the New World Order. So it's immoral that some members of the people who stood up in the name of the whole nation, that came to a complete consensus with very few exceptions, today blame others for the consequences of this policy. The whole thing is immoral. It can be excused for pragmatic reasons, for fear of the consequences, because of the need to submit to those who are stronger, but not for moral reasons*". See the documentary *The Academicians*, directed by Mirko Bojovic and produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, 2002.
Lastly, it should be recalled that the political execution of Dragisa Pavlovic, orchestrated by Milosevic in September 1987, was directly linked to the attack Pavlovic made upon the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and its Memorandum. Borisav Jovic wrote on this subject: "*Dragisa Pavlovic was, at the time, the most prominent Serbian politician who had been attacking the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences for the contents of the well-known draft of the Memorandum, but also because he openly sided against Milosevic himself, concerning the way of solving Serbian problems in Kosovo and Metohija*", in *Book on Milosevic, op. cit.* pp. 9-10.

partners and raised the matter of Serbia's position within all of Yugoslavia would give legitimacy to the anti-Yugoslav, nationalist programme that emerged in the public and political arenas. Architect Bogdan Bogdanovic who left the Serbian Academy in 1981 confirmed that, in his view, the publication of the document pointed to complicity between certain political and intellectual circles in Belgrade and that the *Memorandum* constituted an encouragement, scientific backing, for Serbian nationalism: "*Such a document couldn't have come out without collaboration between the academicians-national leaders and some of the Party's members. Not Stambolic for sure (...) In Belgrade it was welcomed as a start for a race: 'our intellectuals are telling us to go forward'. To what? To Greater Serbia, of course. To wars, to fulfilment of our great traditional ideals, etc.*"[76]

Milosevic was later to take over the programme for his own ends and use it to come to power before truly starting to apply it, with the direct assistance of certain academicians[77], after he had been elected President of Serbia. Like his use of Serbian history and mythology, the media were to prove Milosevic's most worthy allies in his consolidation of power.

Milosevic relies on the media to consolidate power

41. During the decisive battle which S. Milosevic won over the reform wing of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987 – first over Dragisa Pavlovic, the president of the Belgrade communists and then Ivan Stambolic, the Serbian President – the most important Serbian media were going to play a crucial role. Dusan Mitevic, *Belgrade Television*'s number two and a close ally[78] of Milosevic, Zivorad Minovic, *Politika*'s editor-in-chief[79], and Slobodan Jovanovic, director of *Politika Ekspres*, would support

[76] *The Academicians, op. cit.*

[77] Bogdan Bogdanovic stated: *"This will sound horrible, but I think it is true. I heard they had committees of demographs, historians, psychologists to see, as they were sure about the war, how many lives the Serbian nation could afford to lose, what Serbian casualties would be in the war. Can you imagine that horror? Old men counting how many young men they could send to war to get killed!". Idem.*

[78] "*Mira Markovic: Power behind Milosevic*", *BBC News*, Saturday, 13 January 2001.

[79] It was Zivorad Minovic who would provide Milosevic with *Politika*'s support in the power struggles within the Serbian League of Communists. After Milosevic's victory, he would be appointed general director of the group in place of Ivan Stojanovic. At the same time, he would be put in charge of "hearts" and "minds" within the Central Committee as, from that point on, the two responsibilities of "training" the cadre "in ideological and political matters" and of disseminating "propaganda and stirring people up" fell to

Milosevic against his enemies within the Party, accused of being anti-Tito and anti-Yugoslav. Won in a hard struggle during a meeting of the Party's Central Committee, Milosevic's victory over the reform wing of the Party would lead shortly after to a media coup orchestrated by Dusan Mitevic[80]. The "eighth session" of the Party was the first ever to be broadcast "live" on television in front of millions of Serbian viewers who would witness Slobodan Milosevic take control of the Serbian Communist Party[81]. Borislav Jovic, a loyal ally of Milosevic and the former President of the Yugoslav Federation, would confirm that the media coverage of the "eighth session" played an important role in legitimising Milosevic's take-over of power[82].

42. This scene would be reminiscent of another, that of 24 April 1987 when, dispatched to Kosovo to meet the Serbian minority there which was complaining about the violence committed by the Albanian autonomous authorities, Milosevic would build his legend as defender of the Kosovo Serbs based on a pre-planned incident and speech[83]. An incident alleged to have been completely arranged with the local police which would give Milosevic the opportunity to tell the Serbian minority that "*no one has the right to beat*

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him. He would turn the *Politika* group's publications into the Serbian government's ideological weapon. See Mark Thompson, *Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Article 19, "International Centre against Censorship", Avon, May 1994, p. 69.

[80] On 29 September 1994, Dusan Mitevic would clarify his role in an interview given to the *BBC* team preparing a documentary on the suicide of the Yugoslav nation: "*(...) In socialist countries, as you know, sessions were not broadcast live. We reported from the sessions but there were no live broadcasts. But this time we created a precedent. It lasted for two days and it was broadcast live on one of our channels. The decision was made by me personally because I thought it would be better to air it instead of having many TV crews covering the event. But the basic reason it was possible to implement the decision was that I didn't consult anyone and nobody actually banned the broadcast (...) And President Milosevic scored a major point there because with that coverage he gave the people the opportunity to support him and it made things easier for him greatly because, you know, a month later some top state leaders were replaced, including Ivan Stambolic, so the public was prepared in advance with the live coverage of the session.*"

[81] Florence Hartmann, *Milosevic, la diagonale du fou*, Denoël, Paris, 1999, pp. 19 – 21.

[82] Borisav Jovic wrote: "*The echo of the discussion at the CK session was enormous. All the media, television, radio and the daily papers, broadcast every word that was spoken. The citizens "glued" themselves to their TV and radio sets and started in huge numbers to take part in the debate by sending telegrams of support to Milosevic and criticism about the current way of conducting the policy. These telegrams were read out loud at the session in order for all CK members to be familiar with them, which stirred resistance and dissatisfaction in the Stambolic group, but also encouraged new telegrams to be sent, and so on indefinitely. As never before, headlines in the newspapers, almost from the front page to the last page, were as huge as if they had been on posters, with highlights from speeches of all the speakers. Politicization reached its climax. By public vote Milosevic's policy was accepted and the responsibility of Dragisa Pavlovic established, with only seven voices against*". In *Book on Milosevic*, Belgrade, 2001 (draft translation by ICTY), p. 44.

[83] Daniel Vernet, "*Milosevic, l'homme du malheur serbe*" in *Le Monde*, 7 October 2000.

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the people" was in fact filmed by *Serbian Television* present on the scene with Dusan Mitevic's complicity[84]. Shown and re-shown on the air and the subject of much commentary in the written press, the pictures would set the seal on Milosevic's image as the saviour and unifier of the Serbian people and consolidate his power within the Party.

"Serbian identity under threat"

43. The first demonstration of collusion between Milosevic and the Serbian media united by nationalist aims would be followed in the summer of 1987 by an intense media campaign which lasted until 1990 designed to stir up the Serbs against the Albanian majority in Kosovo accused of all the evils.

44. The image of a Serbian identity threatened by its neighbours, and above all by the Albanians, would be greatly exploited by a daily newspaper such as *Politika* which would become one of the regime's main instruments for manipulation and misinformation[85].

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[84] Rémy Ourdan, "*Les guerres perdues de Slobodan Milosevic*", *LeMonde.fr*, 31 March 2001.

[85] One might cite the example of the alleged exponential increase of the Albanian population, which was purportedly part of a plan knowingly devised and which threatened all Serbian presence in Kosovo, a region depicted as the historical cradle of the Serbian people:

- "*The current numerical superiority of the Albanians in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and in some other areas represents the mainstay of the demands for a Greater Albania. However, that numerical superiority and the high birth-rate are not a natural consequence of historical development but rather a result of their political will. It is obvious and need not be proved (there's a design to their settling and re-settling; high birth-rate is propagated; bigamy is tolerated, etc.). It is essential that we understand this as an act of violence against ordinary social development and handle it accordingly, using violent means. While the creation of a Greater Albania is the publicly proclaimed goal of the Albanian separatists, their covert goal, in the foreseeable future, is the break-up of Yugoslavia. This is best attested to by the direction of Albanian population-settling. There is a conspicuous absence of Albanians in areas which, under the post-First Balkans War treaty, were to be annexed to Bulgaria. The moment is approaching when the Serb and Macedonian people shall be finally separated by the buffer zone inhabited by the non-Slavic nations. Thus, the Macedonians shall be practically isolated from the rest of Yugoslavia. Similar developments are taking place in Sandzak, which used to be the link between Serbia and Montenegro*". Djordje Jankovic, in *Politika*, 5 November 1988.

- "*Every state, especially one characterised by a major disproportion in the population birth-rates, must monitor "the national distribution of babies." This also applies to Yugoslavia, for its two big republics and one big province (Vojvodina) cannot attain the birth-rate in Kosovo. More babies are born in Kosovo than in the federal units of Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina! It is an inalienable right of all of our citizens to procreate and multiply, but it is also his or her obligation to ensure the future of all the children in Yugoslavia. Yet nations with high birth-rates and those with low ones should be equally concerned by the upset biological scheme of rejuvenation of the SFRY's entire population. A high birth-rate for a people in a joint state can be accepted only if all the other peoples agree to it, that is they give their consent to "sustain" the increased number of children and share with them all of the resources and territories. Any*

Spreading the worst of rumours without checking them and yet presenting them as authenticated, the newspaper would describe an apocalyptic situation nothing like what was actually happening in Kosovo but which aroused Serbian resentment while inciting hatred and stirring people to violence. This course of action used a technique already

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forcible socialisation would run counter to the crystal-clear democracy formulated by Comrade Kardelj: "The rights of every citizen of the SFRY are limited by the rights of the other people in the country"". Miodrag D. Ignjatovic, in *Politika*, 20 November 1988

- "*Though hemmed-in, the surviving Albanian nationalists and separatists did not renounce their mindless goals in the post-WW2 period. They changed their tactics but their strategic goal remained the same as in 1912, 1919, 1944-1945. Armed rebellion was replaced by hellish plans to conquer the territory of the South Slavs by means of a demographic boom in the Albanian population within our country, plans which aimed to create an "ethnically pure Kosovo". The strategy entailed all kinds of open and perfidious pressure on the indigenous Serbs and Montenegrins to force them to emigrate, the penetration of separatists into all of the institutions of the socio-economic system in Kosovo and Metohija, and measures aimed at Albanising Kosmet and separating the province from the FR Serbia as well as plans to legally transform Kosovo and Metohija into a republic, which would later secede from Serbia and the SFRY and unite with the People's Republic of Albania*". Dr. Gavro Marjanovic, in *Politika*, 6 December 1988.

- "*While the birth rate of the Serb people is rapidly decreasing, the Albanian baby boom has been Yugoslavia's most salient problem for quite some years. It used to be the taboo topic. Many glossed over it, and some stated that they were too ashamed to discuss the topic of birth rates. However the Albanians are not ashamed of having the highest birth rate in Europe and are instead striving to make it the highest in the world. Our federal constitution guarantees the right to give birth freely but has forgotten to add "in line with society's economic potential". It is impossible to meet the megalomaniac demands of a demographic conqueror*". M.A. Dusan Nikolic, in *Politika*, 30 October 1989.

- "*The Yugoslav political leadership's Albanian policy from the mid 1960s until 1981, that is until the fifth-column mutiny of Albanian separatists and chauvinists, was a total failure. It contributed greatly to the forced changes made to the ethnic map of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, to the forced Albanisation of the old centre of Serb statehood and spirituality*". Batric Jovanovic, in *Politika*, 5 May 1990.

A similar mechanism would be employed against the Croats, who would be portrayed as the heirs to those responsible for crimes committed against the other populations, including the Serbs, during the Second World War. The drawing of unjust parallels also played a role in manipulating and disinforming the public:

- "*The world is not sufficiently informed about the Ustasha genocide, for if it were some countries would not tolerate its supporters and Jasenovac would not have been omitted from the list of Europe's worst concentration camps during WW2. I do not know whether it had the highest death toll but I do know that the deaths there were the most...*". Dr. Ljubomir Ramcevic, in *Politika*, 8 May 1989.

- "*Croatia, the so-called Democratic Community, is proud of Ante Starcevic! According to a folk saying, the wise shy away from places where fools tread. Croatia is proud of the so-called Independent State of Croatia and is covertly and stealthily preparing a fresh slaughter of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. If these honest, but passive and indifferent, Croats allow Tudjman and his followers to be installed...then the bloodiest civil war Yugoslavia has ever seen shall break out...this is more than feasible in view of the recent statement made by Tudjman's close aide, Seks, who said that they intended to eliminate all unitarianists in Croatia*". Radoslav Blagojevic, in *Politika*, 3 March 1990.

- "*Your intentions are to compel the entire Croat nation to feel responsible for the genocide committed by the roguish elements of the Croat people, the Ustashas. You, like your backer and name-sake Dr. Franjo Kuharic, have the courage to speak about "only" 40-50,000 victims in the concentration camp of Jasenovac but, to date, we have discovered six times as many victims in mass graves in Gradina*". Cudomil Huber, "Open letter to Dr Franjo Tudjman", in *Politika*, 8 March 1990.

- "*The genocide was forgotten thanks to the efforts of the party and the partisan leadership of Yugoslavia, and in particular high-ranking politicians, because of their passivity. A gesture similar to Brandt's has never been made by our head of state. Even lesser gestures of tribute or memory have not been made...and those which have always focused on the general humanistic aspect of the event and not the concrete historical element*". Mr. Miroslav Zivkovic, in *Politika*, 5 June 1990.

employed by Nazi propaganda in order to justify in advance aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland under the pretext of defending the German minorities. "Information" and "accounts" from these minorities describing the atrocities they were suffering were faithfully reproduced by the German press, so giving the propaganda an air of authenticity[86].

45. As of 1987, Milosevic would rely the media which he used directly and cynically to impose his obsessional themes. The Belgian journalist Jean-Paul Collette confirms that "*according to various people's testimony*" he "*personally inspired the televised propaganda messages through which he vented his nationalist hysteria*"[87]. Milosevic's actual take-over of the media and what they broadcast was also confirmed by Borisav Jovic, one of his closest collaborators, who wrote on 2 August 1990 in the notebook he kept every day as vice-president and then president of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: "*I wrote a series of three articles, 'The Truth about Ante Markovic', and sent them to Slobodan. He instructed that they be published in Politika. They will appear as instalments on the 5th, 6th and 7th under some pseudonym. We must expose him, because the people are seriously mistaken about who he his and what he is. Many see in him some sort of saviour, but he is an ordinary impostor and enemy of the Serb nation*"[88].

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[86] Judge Antoine Garapon and university professor Muhamedin Kullashi accurately analyse how the procedure was applied in Kosovo in their article *Les ressorts du discours de la haine autour du Kosovo*, especially when they write: *"Unity was re-established by demonising the Albanians and more specifically espousing three themes which resurfaced unendingly to the point of being hammered home by the media and by the intellectuals themselves who played a decisive relay role: invasion, genocide and exodus. All of the themes reveal that this was no ordinary nationalism staking a claim to a territory but more fundamentally a racist discourse, that is to say, one based on the demonisation of others who are transformed into outsiders. The propaganda used classic methods, namely, the weaving of a big lie on a framework of "small truths" (ordinary law conflicts systematically transformed into inter-ethnic conflicts, real tension between the Albanians and Serbs in periods of political and economic crisis), the accounts of atrocities based on made-up facts or mostly falsified information and, in particular, the incessant repetition of lies ("genocide", "terror", "ethnic cleansing") which, with time, Serbian public opinion took to be true."* http://www.col.fr/cera/pays/kosovo.htm
http://www.col.fr/cera/pays/kosovo.htm

[87] In "*Un monstre d'opportunisme*", on-line edition of the *Le Soir* newspaper, 12/02/2002. http://www.educweb.org/Alterfocus/Dossiers/Delponte/Milosevic.htm

[88] In *Last Days of the SFRY*, Journal of excerpts translated by David Stephenson for the ICTY, pp. 145-146. Another interesting example provided by Borisav Jovic: "*It happened very often that Milosevic received for talks various foreign statesmen, who had different views and opinions than him on the issues discussed. The rule was never to stand in front of TV cameras, where everybody could express their views, but to publish a press release, which had been personally edited by Milosevic and which featured his views as the subject of*

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Serbian mystique exploited by those in power

46. The use of history and the revival of ancient Serbian myths for nationalist ends would lead to cultural and political events being orchestrated to keep the Serbian masses mobilised. Nazi propaganda had shown that myths bind the masses together tightly. Indeed, it was through myths and, therefore, the appeal to the forces of the unconscious, to fear and terror, the instinct of power and the lost community that the propaganda orchestrated by Goebbels had succeeded in winning over the Germans and melding them into a compact mass. The Serbian regime would use a similar technique. To weld the population together official propaganda drew on the sources of the Serbian mystique, that of a people who were the mistreated victims and martyrs of history and that of Greater Serbia, indissolubly linked to the Orthodox religion[89].

47. From 1987, the most nationalist intellectuals took turns on the television to extol the Serbian nation's past whilst the papers saw a rise in the number of historical features[90] glorifying medieval Greater Serbia and articles listing the injustices and attacks suffered by the Serbs[91], beginning with the battle of *Kosovo Polje* in 1389 – which the Ottomans

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the talks, without the views of the other party". In *Book on Milosevic*, Belgrade, 2001 (Draft translation by ICTY), p.16.

[89] In the summer of 1991, a ban was introduced at *RTS* on any music written or played by non-Serbs and increasing importance was given to the Orthodox religion and its representatives. Reports on Orthodox festivals were at that point a matter of course.

[90] Citing the case of *Politika*, Mark Thompson writes in this regard: "*From 1987, Politika was swiftly monopolised by hate- and fear-mongering articles about a growing roster of internal and external enemies (the Albanians of Kosovo and, later, the Croats, the Slovenians, the Bosnian Muslims, the Vatican and the CIA). The back pages of the paper, meanwhile, were 'given over to interminable obsessive features on Serbia's past: its battles, its dynasties, its unique sufferings'*". In *Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Article 19. "International Centre against Censorship", Avon, May 1994, p. 69.

[91] Of the many television and radio historical programmes broadcast to illustrate the threats weighing down upon the Serbian people and which justified the attacks upon the non-Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could cite:
"*Red is the Sky*", a docu-drama aired by *Radio Belgrade* in August 1991 which, using eyewitness testimony, dealt with the exodus of the Croatian Serbs; the programme "*The Consecration of the Kupresko Polje Grave*", into which Serbs, with their throats slit, were thrown during the Second World War, shown on *TV Belgrade*; the report "*The Monument*" aired on *Radio Belgrade*'s second station, which dealt with the "cleansing" of a Serbian village in Herzegovina during the Second World War; as well as "*The Sword Does not Cut off the Heads of Those who Submit*", a radio report in which the present was interpreted in the light of the past and in which the hapless Serbs massacred by the Ustasha were discussed. For more details, see Rade Veljanovski, *op. cit.* pp. 314-315.

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won and which put an end to Serbia's autonomy – and going through to the 1943 "genocide" committed against the Serbian populations by the independent Croatian state[92] recognised by Hitler and Mussolini and run by Ante Pavelic, leader of the nationalist movement of the Ustasha responsible for the assassination of King Alexander in 1934. On 9 February 1990, *Politika* published a letter signed by Vojislav K. Stojanovic, president of the *Association of University Teachers and Scholars of Serbia*, which very clearly exaggerated the number of Serbian victims during the Second World War and the supposed demographic explosion of Kosovo Albanians: "*The Serbian people has never been a conquering nation and has never sought to oppress other peoples. Yet, as its tragic destiny has been played out, the other peoples have sought to subjugate and oppress it (...) In the crime of genocide committed by the Croatian ultra-nationalists, the Serbian nation lost over two million innocent victims simply because they were Serbs (...) The Albanians acted in an immoral and inhuman way. They conducted an unprecedented campaign for their wretched and pitiful women to bear children and this led to a demographic explosion the like of which has never been seen anywhere before - the biggest in the world. As a result, they have multiplied 50 times over in just forty years in Kosovo and Metohija.*"

Media coverage of "political masses"

48. Artistic, religious and ritualistic ceremonies would become increasingly common countrywide to commemorate the "Serbian victims" through history. Milosevic who understood the psychological impact of such scenes on the crowd and did not omit to attend in person ensured that they were at the top of the media's agenda[93]. Thus, in April

[92] One example among others: during the summer of 1990, *Politika* daily newspaper devoted five of its six pages in its feature "*Echoes and Reactions*" to articles listing the Ustashas' crimes during the Second World War.

[93] The sociologist, Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, recalls that "*'The rebirth of the Serbian people' was the main subject of Orthodox propaganda from 1987 onwards. Religious ceremonies which 'reburied the dead' (old anthropological theme), Serbian martyrs of past genocides whose remains were supposed to seed 'Serbian soil', were widely broadcast on Belgrade television. During such ceremonies the bones of martyrs were held up for show*". In *Systematic Rapes in the Former Yugoslavia – 1991-1995*, International Symposium "Children of War. Changes, Memory and Traumatism" organised by the International Centre for Childhood and the Family, CEDRATE program, 6-8 March 1997, Paris.
http://psydocfr.broca.inserm.fr/colloques/cr/cedrate/intervcedrg.html

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1990, two editors-in-chief of news programmes for *Radio-Television Novi Sad* in Vojvodina were dismissed for not making the celebration of a Serbian feast attended by Slobodan Milosevic the main headline[94].

49. From a symbolic viewpoint, the most successful "political mass" was indisputably that organised by the regime on 28 June 1989 for the six hundredth anniversary of the defeat at the "Field of Blackbirds" at Kosovo Polje which saw the Ottomans establish themselves in the region for several centuries. In front of a million Serbs gathered for the occasion, Slobodan Milosevic promised the Serbian people "new battles" to cleanse it of the sacrificial defeat which had left tens of thousands dead, and called upon the nation to awaken. *Serbian Television*, like all of the media, would give special importance to this scene which cast Milosevic as the saviour who had given back to the Serbian people their collective dignity by reclaiming "the lost paradise" of ancient Serbia[95]. As Florence Hartmann correctly writes, "the regime's propaganda machine exploited emotions, glorified the past, and manipulated the collective memory in order to prepare people's minds for the war that Slobodan Milosevic had just announced"[96]. In this respect, a special place must be reserved for the *Politika* daily newspaper and its column "*Echoes and Reactions*" renowned for advocating hatred and xenophobia. Between July 1988 and March 1991, over 4,000 contributions from intellectuals, trade unionists, soldiers, teachers, doctors and public institutions would be published. Using different themes directly drawn from the grievances or aims set out in the Serbian Academy's *Memorandum* of 1986[97], the same message was tirelessly repeated like a leitmotiv, that of the historical injustices done to the Serbian "people"[98] ... it being understood that the

[94] *Reporters sans frontières, La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Report 1991*, p. 179.
[95] On 28 March 1989, amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia were adopted which from then on deprived the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of the autonomy they had enjoyed since 1974.
[96] *Op. cit.*, p. 53.
[97] It should be noted that the academicians would make a significant contribution to the column. The first contributions to "*Echoes and Reactions*" dated back to November 1988 and supported the policy then conducted by the government which consisted of propagating anti-Slovenian and anti-autonomist sentiment. See the articles by the academicians Dejan Medakovic ("*We will not allow anyone to deprive us of our future*", special issue "*The Fight for Truth*" of 19 November 1988) and Vasilije Krestic ("*The Historical Bases for the Autonomy of Vojvodina*", 4 and 5 November 1988).
[98] Below are a few examples of contributions of intellectuals to the "*Echoes and Reactions*" column addressing these different issues. The same message repeatedly appeared in their subtext - that of a people destined always to be victims:

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By Prof. Dr Marko Mladenovic, writer, Radomir Smiljanic

- *"(...) Today the exodus of the Serbs from the south is being helped by Europe, notably Catholic Europe, for it hopes to win over the Muslim Albanians in Yugoslavia (Albanians are 98% Muslim, although the West literally lies that only 40% are of that faith). By demonstrating such open support, it hopes to convert them all to Christianity during the next stage. But they are forgetting that the Muslims and Orthodox people have cohabited for centuries and are therefore closer... Thus, the Vatican would like to hurt the Serbs (and Slavs) again, in the same way that it damaged the Slovenians and Croats by latinising them earlier on in history (...) And the Croats? Why do they keep silent? And are they silent? Suvar made a cautious remark that "despite the continuing love, people need not live together any longer." Why then did the Slovenians and Croats want to join Yugoslavia so much, even though we knew that they did not like us very much and were wary of such unification? Well, it was well known that they wanted to seize 'their' territories from the victorious Serb army. And yet they could not do anything without that army. By force of historical circumstances, they were on the opposite side and we Serbs understood that and we accepted them within a joint state. But then, in the last war, they paid us back with mass graves and knives in Herzegovina and Dalmatian (...)"*, in *Politika*, 13 December 1989.
- *"(...) However the vaguest is the stance of the USA, the diplomacy of the USA, which is heading towards diplomatic bankruptcy by opposing the Serb nation, the biggest and most state-making nation in the Balkans. Does America know that it is still at war with Croatia? The notorious Independent State of Croatia declared war on the USA in late 1941 and the Croatian Democratic Community has naturally taken on that State's rights and obligations."* in *Politika*, 3 June 1990.
- *"Today in the heart of Europe, the West only sees the Serbs, their former allies from both WWs, through the Vatican's merciless propaganda (through Croatian and Slovenian tribalism). At the heart of the dispute is obviously Kosovo, which the Western and Comintern politicians firmly decided to hand over to Albania, the most retrograde and obscure construction in the world (I always feel sorry for our Kosovo Shiptars when I imagine how they will live when they find themselves in their state, on the other side of* prokletije*). The poor Westerners also talk about how the Serbs have firmly embraced orthodox Bolshevism, so that they cannot eliminate it... The terrible fate of the Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia was not a clear enough warning of the heralded rage. The Serbs are becoming "notorious" even though we have given to the Shiptari national minority more than they have merited under any criteria (Academy of Sciences, University, National Library, TV, radio, press, all in their mother tongue) and we even allow foreign commissions to work in all parts of our country... and we are forgetting that we started the war in 1914 because we banned one such commission from entering... We rejected that ultimatum and the whole world had to wage that war! At the time, our move was prompted by the need to preserve the dignity of a people (...) Milosevic has become the symbol of the Serbs' restored dignity and he might become a key prime mover in the next elections for head of state, even if his newly-emerged party fails to win 30% of the vote at the next elections. He is the only serious candidate in the upcoming general, popular referendum: republic or kingdom. I talked to him once for a full 6 hours and found no fault with him"*, in *Politika*, 6 September 1990.

By Dr. Mileta Markovic, Zagreb

(letter to the President of the European Parliament in Strasbourg)

- *"(...)It is tantamount to asking the Nazis and not the Jews about the genocide against the Jews. In Kosovo, the Serbian people are being persecuted and not the Albanian people. The persecution started three hundred years ago. Although it may sound paradoxical, the fact is that the most far-reaching persecution and most extensive exodus of the Serb people happened in post-war socialist Yugoslavia. All of the other Slav and non-Slav people in Kosovo are also being intimidated and threatened, the Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, Turks, Croats and Romanies, and all the peoples living close to the borders of the so-called "Greater Albania", which was conceived and gradually made a reality by "a fire and sword" campaign stage-managed by the power-holders in Tirana (...) According to the 1948 census, 58% of the population in Kosovo was Albanian (350,000) and 42% (about 300,000) Serb and other peoples. Since 1948 incredible things have happened in Kosovo. Now there are nearly 2 million Albanians in Kosovo, and only 300,000 Serbs and other peoples! And this happened because three bombs were planted in Kosovo by the political and State leadership:*

The first 'bomb' was the birth-rate. The Albanian population in Kosovo (and outside Kosovo) has the highest birth rate in Europe and one of the highest in the world. The birth-rate is being boosted by the Albanian separatists, using all means available, for they are waging a demographic war, or a campaign to

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conquer foreign territories. Relevant data may be found in the recently published Bela Knjiga *(White Book). The second "bomb" was the mechanical growth of the population. Although NR Albania has been considered a country hostile to Yugoslavia since 1948, many families have crossed that border and settled in Yugoslavia, and no-one has tried to stop them. On the contrary, they have immediately been given houses and property belonging to the local population (Serbs, Montenegrins, etc.) and even social assistance. Currently, no one knows how many Albanians have illegally emigrated to Yugoslavia, but no Serb or Montenegrin (and there are quite a few of them in Albania) has managed to escape to Yugoslavia, because in Albania they are stripped of their national, cultural and religious rights. The third "bomb" is a political one: under the 1974 Constitution, Serbia was divided into three parts which, practically, made it possible to create an Albanian state in the Balkans. As such, the Serbs and other peoples in Kosovo became national minorities, and the Albanians a ruling nation, for the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo practically became a state within the state. It was not an Albanian experiment or error. It was the result of a wrong conception of the Yugoslav (con)federation. It was very risky*", in *Politika*, 1 July 1989.

By Radomir Smiljanic

- "*(...)Both the deaf and the blind are aware that the Ante Markovic way out of a crisis entails the further "exploitation of all resources" by Slovenia and Croatia, at the expense of the central and southern republics of the SFRY. The depreciated prices of electricity and coal (Serbia is its largest producer), railway and PTT services (the longest railway lines run through Serbia and the south of Yugoslavia) and ferrous and non-ferrous products (Serbia, B&H, Montenegro and Macedonia are the largest producers thereof) clearly indicate that the federal government, composed of representatives from 6 republics and 2 provinces, are catering to the needs of the two republics in the north west, Slovenia and Croatia (whose representatives make up over half the government)*", in *Politika*, 24 December 1989.
- "*(...)If, as it clearly stems from the conduct of many of Tudjman's faithful, the Croatian secession comes to pass and Yugoslavia is broken up, the Serbs will then also obtain their right to chose with whom they will live outside the right-wing, neo-Nazi Croatia - for, in the latter, their existence would be threatened, given the still raw memories of the terrible genocide committed by most Croat sons in Pavelic's Croatia. Tudjman calls the country "the historical dream of all Croats". Perhaps the Serbs will also avail themselves of the right to secede as a people, like the Croats, and then they will probably join the most likely "vestiges" of Yugoslavia. In the territory adjoining Bosnia, for example*", in *Politika*,22 August 1990
- "*(...)I had to ask the lady minister from Slovenia what the Slovenian foreign policy would be like in view of the fact that, for example, Yugo-Italian Osim Agreements would remain in place as long as the Yugoslav federation existed.(And she told me that Yugoslavia no longer existed..) Yet, it is a well known fact that Italy had legitimate territories in the whole of Istria as far as Susak, Zadar and many other islands and peninsulas. Slovenia, therefore, would be land-locked (like Serbia) and Croatia would get only one fifth of its current coastline*", in *Politika*, 22 October 1990.

By Veljko Guberina

- "*(...) After WW2, the Serb people was the first to embrace the slogan "Brotherhood and Unity" and instead of extending support to the Serb people in their justified struggle for the rights already enjoyed by other peoples in the country, they were attacked in the most brutal way...and their only fault was their belated reaction to the discrimination against their own people by the Albanian national minority which, in this country, enjoys superior rights to any other national minority in Europe - rights SUPERIOR TO THE ONES EXERCISED BY THE SERB AND MONTENEGRIN PEOPLES IN KOSOVO...*", in *Politika*, 20 January 1989.
- "*(...) Slovenia which is proclaiming full sovereignty should be ready to defend its territorial integrity. However, as Slovenia is aware that it cannot do so successfully, it needs the confederation as a way to ensure the deployment of Serb soldiers (renowned for their qualities) to protect its borders, which Slovenia got because the Yugoslav state existed! If it no longer wants Yugoslavia, then it cannot count on Serbia*", in *Politika*, 9 October 1990.
- "*(...) And who is throwing their weight behind the current leaders? Only five million people bearing an onerous legacy from the recent past. A people whose name has not gone down in history because it earned glorious war victories, had famous warriors or created empires, but a people whose name was put on the map of the world in 1102 when they gave their freedom to foreigners on a plate. Had Serb soldiers not gone to Croatia in 1918, it would have never been recovered*", in *Politika*, 25 January 1991
- "*(...) In that regard, he needs to be explained two things which he should have known a long time ago: the Shiptari are a national minority in Yugoslavia but they enjoy rights superior to those exercised by any*

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time had come to set matters straight. The feature, which played a key role in manipulating Serbian public opinion, was used by the electronic media controlled by the authorities, *TV Politika* and *TV Belgrade*. The very many contributions were presented as the expression of the Serbian "people's" will and so served as so much justification for implementing the Milosevic regime's nationalist arguments – a classic propaganda procedure to artificially create unanimity or cohesion around a leader and his policy.

Attack on the media

50. The regime's official propaganda would be all the more effective since Slobodan Milosevic took control[99] of Belgrade television just after "imposing" himself as the leader of the Communist Party[100]. The management was replaced by trusted men and party members responsible for building up the ideological pressure of "Serbian nationalist renewal"[101]. Several hundred journalists who did not subscribe to the Slobodan Milosevic policy were dismissed by the television stations[102] and newspaper companies[103] in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Pristina.

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other minority in the world, and they were accorded those rights during the Vatican-Vienna and Comintern harangue against Serbia and the Serb people. The second thing we have to explain is their current number - 3 million! He is probably referring to the golden era of Tito when all of the Romanies, Muslims, Turks, and Gorani, etc, who lived in Kosovo and Metohija were simply declared -Shiptari", in *Politika*, 21 February 1991.

[99] He would gain tighter control in July 1991 with the passing of a *Radio and Television Law* which created a single enterprise (*Serbian Radio Television*) henceforth State-owned – the government having complete control over *RTS*.

[100] The journalist, Véronique Soulé, states that in the weeks following the eighth plenum of the League of Communists of Serbia, the "*new leader of the Serbian CP put his men in charge of the main media: Belgrade Television (two channels received throughout Serbia) and the powerful Politika group which owned in particular two daily newspapers and ten or so weekly publications* ". Libération, 21 March 1991, p. 20.

[101] A privileged witness to this umbilical link between Milosevic's party and the *RTS*, having worked for the *RTS* from 1983 to 1992, the journalist Milica Pesic made clear this point: "*Officially and formally, RTS is a public enterprise. However, in practice it is a television station controlled primarily by the Serbian government – in other words, by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) – the party in power – and its allies. All the leading men in RTS, instead of being appointed by the Parliament of the Republic, as is laid down in the relevant law, are actually chosen by the ruling party (SPS). And the extent to which the RTS and the regime are linked is illustrated by the following : The Director of RTS, Milorad Vucelic, is simultaneously a member of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia. Many journalists are also officials or members of the SPS, in contradiction to the Law on Public Information*", *op.cit.* p.16.

[102] *RTS* would be purged regularly. In January 1993, for instance, the management fired *de facto* and according to political and ethnic criteria 1,500 journalists, workers and technicians who were denied access to their Belgrade and Novi Sad offices. Challenged by those involved, the decision would however be

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51. In July 1991, in the wake of the decree ending Kosovo's autonomy and following the dissolution of the government and parliament, it was decided to stop all radio and television programs in Albanian in the province – thus depriving over two million Albanians of news in their mother tongue – and to ban *Rilindja* newspaper there[104]. At the same time, twenty or so Albanian-speaking journalists from Kosovo were arrested and imprisoned by the Belgrade authorities and some five hundred radio and television journalists working in Kosovo were dismissed.

Television, the system's lynchpin

52. Locking the media down almost completely would allow the Serbian leader and his party, the Serbian Socialist Party, to run away with the first free elections in December 1990[105]. Aside from the *Politika* written press group, television would prove to be the essential instrument for turning the history of Serbia into mystique. The traditional dispenser of official ideology, television remained the most important medium by far

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upheld the following September by Belgrade Supreme Court. Reported by *Reporters sans frontières, La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Rapport 1994*, p. 391.
See also the testimony of Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* pp.48-51.
Vukar Jokanovic, the president of the Administrative Council, justified the sidelining of the journalists who opposed *RTS*'s belligerent editorial line in the following terms: "*RTS, the national and State television station, is of special importance. In times such as these when we are being subjected to all kinds of pressure and genocide is being perpetrated against the Serbian people stripped of all its national rights, RTS must take a national position and come to the defence of the interests of the nation, which are vital (...) The people who work for the media institutions arrived at various times. None of them has ever left. As such, Belgrade RadioTelevision is more a Yugoslav institution than it is a Belgrade or a Serbian one. The same goes for certain newspapers and magazines. Within all of these media there are people working against Serbia. They are Ante's Serbs. They are undermining these companies by setting the members of staff at odds with one another. As a result of being weakened in this way, they are no longer able to organise themselves effectively*". In *Epoha*, March 1992.

[103] *Nin*, Serbia's best known weekly publication, would have its editorial staff completely reshuffled in June 1988 on the order of Milosevic who would decide to use the newspaper to announce in an interview on 30 June "the awakening of the humiliated Serbian nation", so foregoing any reference to communist ideology in his programme.

[104] *Reporters sans frontières, La liberté de la presse dans le monde*. Report 1991, p. 180.

[105] Despite the fact that multiparty elections were authorised, the official media remained closed off to the growing opposition, to whom they gave no chance and whom they set about discrediting: "*On TV, the demonstrations by thousands of people are hardly mentioned and Milosevic's potential rival, Vuk Draskovic, the president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, is caricatured as a dangerous hothead*". *Idem.*

since for a long time it would constitute[106] the only source of information for over 90 % of the Serbs[107]. As such, by re-writing history and relying on snippets of truth – through a selective memory which "*involves exonerating oneself from (one's own) crimes while stirring up memories of the crimes committed by the others*"[108] – the media would contribute to demonising the other communities, especially the Kosovo Albanians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims.

53. In 1990, to prepare and justify Milosevic's reassuming control of the province of Kosovo[109], Serbian television launched a campaign of generalisations against the Kosovo Albanians who were accused of "*poisoning wells and slitting the throats of children*", a campaign followed up by *Politika* which published readers' letters – often fabricated – confirming that the Albanians were raping hundreds of Serbian women there[110]. In the 9 February 1990 issue of *Politika*, Vojislav K. Stojanovic, president of the *Association of University Teachers and Scholars of Serbia*, wrote that "(...) the savage Albanian terrorists are now running amok in Kosovo and Metohija attacking and destroying everything that is Serbian, breaking into the homes of Serbs and terrorising the few people who have stayed behind. Kosovo and Metohija are gripped by the fear of terrorists armed to the teeth (...)".

Slobodan Milosevic himself was to take part in the stigmatisation of the Kosovo Albanian community, providing an extremely Manichean version of the situation and closing the door to any non-nationalist solution in the autonomous province. Thus he stated in a address retransmitted by *TV Belgrade*: *"Even children know the truth about*

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[106] The restricted number of news organisations existing in Serbia up until 1995 – including the few and far between media organisations which were independent but extremely limited in what they could broadcast and so had small followings – were more than ever under threat. After control was reassumed over *Borba*, the only independent daily newspaper (early 1995), and *Svetlost*, which had the largest regional circulation in Serbia in September, the independent television station *Studio B* (limited to Belgrade) was nationalised in February 1996.

[107] In this regard, the journalist Nicole du Roy notes that "*in this country (Serbia) where 46% of people are illiterate (nearly one in two), the only form of media which covers the whole territory and reaches out to the countryside is State television*". In "*Serbie: la télé parano*", *Télérama*, no. 2257 of 14 April 1993, p. 12.

[108] Stanko Cerovic, "*Is Information Possible in the Face of Propaganda?*", in *Dialogues and Documents for the Advancement of Mankind/Experiences and Reflections on National Reconstruction and Peace*, working documents of the Foundation for the Advancement of Mankind, no. 64, p. 190.

[109] On 28 September 1990, Belgrade promulgated a new constitution revoking the autonomy of its two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

[110] See Catherine Humblot, "*La manipulation de la mémoire*", *Le Monde*, 22 July 1993.

Kosovo and Serbia, so it is quite superfluous to say anything more about it. To those who think otherwise I should say that I refuse to talk about it because we need never try to find excuses for Serbia's determination to put an end to the murders of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and for our unwillingness to accept any discussion on establishing an Albanian state on Serbian territory. To avoid any confusion, I hasten to add that anyone seeking concessions along these lines would first have to depose the ruling Serbian leadership"[111]. This door closed to any discussion led in July 1990 to the proclamation of the Independent Republic of Kosovo and immediately after the suspension of the Pristina Assembly by the Serbian government which introduced emergency management in *TV Pristina* and in the Albanian newspapers.

54. Generally, before Serbia triggered the war, Belgrade's audio-visual media broadcast many programs recalling historic events always likened to the persecutions allegedly suffered by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs.

The taking of power by the HDZ in Zagreb during the April-May elections 1990 was to be a jump forward in this respect. With the pretext that the new constitution voted by the Croatian parliament turned the Serbs into a national minority and supported by the signal given to them by Slobodan Milosevic in an address to the Serbian parliament and broadcast by *TV Belgrade*[112], organised on-the-ground resistance. Thus a new kind of propaganda "war reporter" came into being at *Serbian Television* and a great many interviews of Croatian Serbs were carried out and broadcast, all tending towards an exacerbation of the on-the-ground situation[113] and only the most extremist positions were

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[111] See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year One"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1996.

[112] *"Recent events and, above all, grave conflicts and acts of state-terrorism in Croatia, aggravated the Yugoslav political crisis, which already had a long history of ethnic strife, and assumed proportions of an armed conflict with elements of a civil war, with numerous casualties, columns of refugees, break-downs in traffic and supply... What we have now is a natural and legitimate self-defense immanent in the historical dignity of any nation. All efforts directed at qualifying it as banditism through loud, well-organised propaganda and ballyhoo only reveal a counterproductive and non-effective concept, essentially chauvinistic and pro-fascist, which stifles the national interest and human dignity of a people fighting a just battle for equal national and civil rights". "Images and Words of Hate: Year One", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1996.

[113] After interviewing several Croatian Serb citizens, a reporter, facing the camera and in front of an audience of Serbs in favour of autonomy, concluded his report as follows: *"Is this the opinion of all inhabitants of Knin, all Serbs in Kranija and Croatia? It is hard to tell. The people we interviewed don't*

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permitted to appear. At the same time as such reports which were the lead story on the televised evening news, there were special programmes, some of up to 90 minutes, whose primary aim it was to pit the Serbian public against its designated enemies and to prepare the way for war[114].

In another attempt to intimidate public opinion in late January 1991, *Serbian Television* broadcast a document – *"The truth about the arming of the HDZ terrorist groups in Croatia"* – filmed by the the defense ministry counter-espionage service (KOS) in mid October 1990 which had "proved" the direct responsibility of the leaders in power in Zagreb in the illegal arming. In the black and white video, the public can see the Croatian Minister of Defence, Martin Spegelj, filmed by a hidden camera, setting out his plan of action against the Yugoslav barracks and promising liquidations. At least that was what was announced by *Serbian Television* because, on screen, the words spoken by Martin Spegelj are inaudible and it is an off-screen voice which repeats them for the Serbian viewers: *"And if something should happen, just give orders to all your men : kill the extremists. On the spot. On the street, in the barracks, wherever. Just shoot right in the stomach. It is not going to be a war, but a civil war without mercy. Not even for women and children. Just plant bombs in family apartments".*[115] Whether or not it was true, the video, broadcast twice the same evening, created the desired effect, that is an electric shock in Serbian public opinion which thus saw the confirmation of the intrinsically evil

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represent all of them, but their feelings are quite indicative and should be counted by those who make decisions in their names". Idem.

[114] In these programmes we find the themes of Serbian resentment as expressed in the *Mémorandum* of the Academy of Belgrade in 1986. There again the interviews with the Croatian Serbs appeared over and over again. One woman stated for example:

- - *« Serbs were ready to forget their names and heritage, their ancestors, all for brotherhood and unity, mass graves and concentration camps... I have a lot of ancestors in those graves. However, if the policy towards Serbs in Croatia continued... »*
- - *« You mean communist policy ? »*
- - *« Yes. The majority of Serbs would be assimilated in 10 years ».*

One man being interviewed said: "*Baranja and West Srem ethnologically and historically absolutely belong to the Serbian people. So do all other territories inhabited by Serbs. It would be absurd to turn Croatia, or any other territory into a Serbian one"*... To the question of what, in his opinion, should be the boundaries of the new Serbian State, another man answered: "*The boundaries of the Serbian autonomous Region will be... There is a historical link. Where Serbian blood was shed by the Ustasha knives, there will be our boundaries"*. In another interview, a third man said that: *"If the Croats really want to create an independent state they can do so on their ethnic territory. Could you imagine that these people would disappear, that these mountains would fall, or a Croatian flag would be hoisted instead of the Serbian one?"*. See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year One", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1996.

[115] *Idem.* See also F. Hartmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

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nature of the authorities in Zagreb... The highest Serbian moral and intellectual authorities were involved in conditioning public opinion to justify the upcoming war with Croatia. On national television, from the heights of their unchallenged authority, they participated in interpreting what the vital interests of Serbia were. The incessant reminders of the Independent Croatian State and atrocities committed by the Ustachas were an alibi for the political objectives of the regime and were at the root of the development and strengthening of inter-ethnic hatred. A televised report on 4 August 1991 was thus devoted to a ceremony held during the excavation of the remains of martyrs of Ustasha crimes, presented to the public in dozens of small coffins, presided over by the academic Dobrica Cosic: *"One of the greatest sins of my generation, is this funeral which we perform fifty years too late, the funeral of Prebilovac martyrs. We committed this sin because we foolishly believed that by forgetting the Ustasha crime we contributed to the brotherhood of the Serbian and Croatian peoples"*[116]. The parallel between the past and the present comparing Frandjo Tudjman's regime to that of Ante Pavelic, was made to raise anti-Croatian hatred to fever pitch. Thus we see Jovan Raskovic, psychiatrist, academic and leader of the Croatian Serbs on *Serbian Television* at the time state at a rally at the time: *"The genocide has begun, and it depends on the Serbs in Croatia and in Serbia and the international factor, Europe and the world whether their movement will reopen its concentration camps and the pits used as collective tombs. But one thing is for sure : Serbs will never again be led to the pits by just a couple of Ustashas. Serbs have to put up a great resistance and the genocidal idea will collapse along with the genocidal Croatian state"*[117].

This tendency would continue to grow when the war with Croatia began, especially with the showing of a documentary called "*Umetnici o genocidu*" ("The Genocide Professionals")[118] which, drawing on the testimony of many people, recounted the crimes

[116] "*Images and Words of Hate; Year Two*", *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92 – ARHITEL, 1997.
[117] *Idem.*
[118] The supposed "genocidal nature" of the Croatian people was originally discussed in the work of a Croatian Serb psychiatrist, Jovan Raskovic, who, in a book entitled The Mad Country (Luda Zemlja), would contribute to awakening the Serbian people and justifying the creation of a Greater Serbia. There was not a single debate or Serbian TV programme on the issue of the Serbian minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo to which this special guest and specialist in such matters was not invited. Meanwhile, his book was the subject of a media campaign throughout the Federation in 1990 (newspapers and television) during which he was described as the greatest scientist and psychiatrist of his age. Radovan Karadzic, his

of Ante Pavelic's Croatian government in 1941. The intention of the program was to awaken in the collective memory a feeling of persecution identical to that felt by the Serbs during the Second World War and ended with the entire Croatian people being cast as criminals[119].

55. The images of the Turks and the lengthy Ottoman domination in Serbia would also be widely used to blacken the Bosnian Muslim community which was presented as the bridgehead of the Turk's natural expansionism and, therefore, implicitly as a threat that the Ottoman Empire of yesteryear might be re-established.

56. The media propaganda was especially successful because it exploited deep-rooted reflexes relying on feelings enduringly entrenched in the Serbian collective consciousness. A systematic contrast was made between the Serbian people characterised as innocent and just and those who had made martyrs of them down the centuries and who now had to be stopped to prevent new misfortunes from befalling the Serbs[120]. In this regard, the countless and suspect "historical parallels" truly prepared public opinion day in day out for the outbreak of the conflict.

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psychology student from the groups in Zagreb in 1988-1989, would draw greatly on Raskovic's ideology to alert the Bosnian Serb population to the threat of genocide fomented by the Bosnian Muslims which allegedly hung over them. The action of Karadzic, who rose to head of the SDS thanks to Raskovic's protection and that of his party, followed in the steps of Raskovic. See for example the declaration "Nation and State Above All" which he delivered to the Pale Assembly in June 1996; *SRNA News*, June 28, 1996 (http://www.4cbiz.net/kosta/tar/RS/dean/rs_news/rs_news_info.html).
The "genocidal nature" of the Croatian people would especially be exploited by *Duga* magazine in the column by the journalist and intellectual, Brana Crnevic. The radical, Vojislav Seselj, would himself state on several occasions that, as a genetically cowardly people, the Croats were disposed to perpetrating genocide. During a meeting with the Orthodox bishop, Lukijan, in Borovo Selo, near Vukovar in Croatia, in September 1991, he openly described the Croats as a "genocidal" and "perverted" people. See *Stav*, no. 82, 9 September 1991, p. 29.

[119] On this subject, Florence Hartmann writes: "*During prime time on 27 July 1991, Belgrade television broadcast a programme juxtaposing edited footage of speeches by Franjo Tudjman and Ante Pavelic, the ally of Hitler and Mussolini. The columns published by the press stirring up memories of the massacres perpetrated by Pavelic's Croatian State, the Serbian martyr appearing endlessly on Belgrade television, the reminder of the past which ended up devouring the present in people's minds and the fusion of past persecution with the one then being suffered by the Croatian Serbs all contributed to inciting and justifying the violence which would follow. Under the sway of propaganda, the Serbs would no longer call the Croats by any other name than Ustasha or fascists and they looked upon them as instruments of the hegemony of a Germany creating the Fourth Reich*". Milosevic, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[120] What a coincidence then that, as Stanko Cerovic wrote, "*before the Serbs set the war in motion, Serbian television showed only dreadful accounts, all of which were invented and backed up by "false" witnesses,*

57. By exaggerating some of the facts and simplifying others, the entire media would become stays for the Serbian nationalist ideology. By creating "*simple oppositions, clearly defining enemies and using shock phrases and carefully chosen words*" they would offer to millions of people a simplistic and narrow reading of a reality that was otherwise complex and ambiguous[121].

58. The anti-Albanian propaganda of the early days would be followed by anti-Slovenian, anti-Croatian and then anti-Bosnian propaganda – multifaceted propaganda used for one and the same political goal: the creation of a State for all the Serbs.

At the same time as the propaganda was directed against the external enemies, the total control exercised by Milosevic's socialist party on *Serbian Television* allowed it to silence the dissenting voices internally. When not simply ignored, the action of the opposition was systematically distorted and compared to acts of treason against Serbia. The typical disinformation procedure at work, whenever media coverage was involved, is perfectly illustrated by the way in which *TV Belgrade* presented the great opposition demonstration of 9 March 1991 to the viewers. When 200,000 people gathered in Belgrade in front of the seat of the *RTS* to demand the departure of its management, the gathering turned to a confrontation during which a policeman and a demonstrator lost their lives. The same evening the television news reader presented an incomplete version of the events[122]. The news, which focused on the death of the policeman with pictures of the widow in tears being carried, was widely broadcast. Nothing was said however of the second person killed, a 17-year old demonstrator, whose death the communiqué of the Minister of the Interior, read out on television, did not acknowledge[123]. Images, filmed

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of the crimes and rapes committed by the Muslims and Croats (...)". In "*Is Information Possible in the Face of Propaganda?*", p. 190.

[121] On these processes in action, see Henri Madelin, "*Information et idéologie, Télévisions en guerre*", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1990.

[122] *"Thanks to the rampage of vandals, so far 76 people have asked for medical help in Belgrade. The majority of them are policemen. One of them, guarding law and order, lost his life on the sidewalks of Belgrade. Nedeljko Kosovic, father of two, was killed by the demonstrating mob. Our crew visited the Nedljko Kosovic family...".*

[123] *"While trying to prevent the violent attacks by the Serbian Renewal Movement supporters against the TV building, the National Assembly and the Republic Presidency during the SRM demonstrations in Belgrade, so far, a few dozen policemen have been wounded. One of them succumbed to his wounds. The Serbian Home Ministry also warns in its statement that if these destructive and terrorist acts by the SRM*

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and broadcast by the independent television channel *NTV Studio B*, whose broadcasting area was limited to the capital, presented a very different version of the official truth. These pictures showed a crowd listening calmly to the speeches of the opposition leaders and that it was the use of gas by the police forces to break up the demonstrators which started the bloodshed. Such pictures, contradicting the official truth, were not shown on national television where the scenes of police brutality were censored and where only those "proving" the violence of the opposition were seen by the viewers. When the student demonstrations took place the next day, the events of the day before dominated the television news. Pictures of President Milosevic making a speech to Parliament in which he pointed to foreign involvement in the acts of the opposition[124] were widely broadcast. At the same time, the régime encouraged all the social classes to support him and condemn the student and opposition demonstrations. National television threw open its doors to them, in particular on the television news where appeals were read out to participate in a large support demonstration which was to take place that same day[125]. This support demonstration received wide coverage from *TV Belgrade* which assigned a central position to the speech of the academic and Vice-President of the party in power, Mihajlo Markovic, condemning the traitors of Serbia and praising Slobodan Milosevic: *"Just when the neo-ustashas are getting ready for the decisive attack on Knin, an invisible hand has started the mechanism for the destruction of Serbia. Since the time of Peter I, we haven't been blessed with such an extremely capable, honest and courageous leader, Slobodan Milosevic"*[126].

Media at the heart of the Yugoslav war

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supporters do not cease right away, in order to protect the constitution and people's lives, all means will have to be used, including firearms".

[124] *"There is not a single citizen of Serbia or not a single Serb outside Serbia who can gain from destroying peace and democratic institutions in Serbia. Only an enemy of Serbia could have such an aim: to divide the citizens of Serbia from within so that Serbian people will quarrel among themselves instead of striving for prosperity and welfare, to destroy a united Serbia, or to install a puppet regime to rule it, executing, without question, orders from abroad".*

[125] *"Our Women's Movement calls upon all women and all citizens who have a free and proud Serbia at heart to come to the rally at Usce today at 1 P.M. There we shall defend Serbia and its president, who are endangered by their enemies' plots".*

[126] For this quotation and the previous ones, see *"Images and Words of Hate: Year One", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1996.

59. The propaganda action to make the population support the nationalist war policies took the form of genuine opinion-forming campaigns. Sometimes, it was a matter of justifying the capture of territories termed ancestral but occupied by the enemy – an enemy that had to be "driven out" – and sometimes it was a matter of blackening an ethnic group or nation to better legitimise the violence used against it (that is, in fact, to cast yourself as the victim of the others' nationalism to better feed your own) or even reducing to nothing or almost nothing any form of opposition[127] to the nationalist powers within each of the republics.

Milica Lucic Cavic, a journalist in the Serbian public audio-visual sector during the war, summarises the cant of the State television and certain professionals in their action during the conflict: *"In these wartime years television has completely pushed aside its initial function – to provide information – and has became a propaganda tool, a propaganda vehicle that serves the state. Many reporters working on television forget that there is a codex, that a journalist's duty is to provide timely and accurate reporting and they served some other aims. These other aims were to kindle disposition for war, to ignite ethnic hatred, which naturally made it easier for the war to flare up. In those news reports, in those news stories, there were always the good guys and the bad guys. Ours are the good guys, they are not murderers, they are members of a celestial people, a heroic nation; the others are the killers, the others have perpetrated crimes against us, the others are supported by a world-wide conspiracy, the Vatican, America, the CIA, the KGB, the masons, and who knows what not"*[128].

The war was to accelerate the cant of professionals who were becoming actors, if not soldiers, in the conflict. In contradiction with the ethics of the profession, we see for example, reports participating in interrogating Croatian and/or Bosnian Muslim prisoners[129], taking sides with one of the protagonists in the conflict[130], presenting people

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[127] In the media industry for example, Belgrade tightened its control over information by creating in 1993 a government *Media Council* mostly made up of "patriotic" journalists. The Council was set up on the initiative of Brana Crnevic, a nationalist intellectual close to the authorities who worked for *Duga* magazine. In parallel, a battle against foreign journalists began in April with the introduction of a compulsory visa for entering Yugoslavia.

[128] In *"Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991"*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*, 1995.

[129] See *"Images and Words of Hate" "Year Two" and "Year Three". Op.cit.*

[130] This example is quoted from a report by a journalist from *TV Novi Sad*, interviewing a Serbian or Montengrin pyrotechnist shelling the enemy lines on the front around Dubrovnik:

who were too close or too far away from the events being reported as witnesses to the crime, etc.

The feeling aroused in the Serbian public by the broadcasting of images of bodies of innocent Serbian civilian victims or the relating of such facts, was a technique that was to be widely used by *Serbian Television* to provoke a reaction of horror towards the enemy and so support for the regime – which we think of as the war in Croatia and Bosnia. Television played on the emotions of the public by presenting individual tragedies without given prior warning as to the programme content with whom the viewer would always sympathise, particularly when it concerned children, the most fragile group. This is illustrated by the following three examples.

When the fighting was raging in Croatia, *TV Belgrade* broadcast the "testimony" of an Orthodox religious dignitary from a monastery in Zenum – Friar Filaret – who, sitting in front of a table, on which was lying a blackened human skull which the camera zoomed in on, told the following story:

- *« Ustashas raided a Serbian village near Kukuruzari. They captured little Llija and made his mother watch them cut the boy's throat. Then they took his body away"*
- Reporter : *"It happened on his birthday ?"*
- *"Yes, on August 2, this year. The boy's mother ran after them begging them to give her son's body, but they carried him away and later burned his corpse. The skull is the only thing left. But she wouldn't have got even his skull if it hadn't been for one woman who, although a Catholic, was humane and compassionate enough to show her the place where her son was buried. So she went there and found only this charred skull"*[131].

Another example is this "portrait-report" of a young Bosnian Serbian boy told by a war reporter from *TV Belgrade*: *"This is my new friend, Cvetko . It was the war that made our paths cross. I wish it hadn't, not in this way. Until the war, he used to live here*

- Reporter : *« How long have you been here ? Do you have visitors ?"*
- Pyrotechnist: *"It has been... two months. A month and a half"*
- Reporter: *"Have you had any reporters or TV crews ?"*
- Pyrotechnist: *"Apart from this crew from TV Novi Sad, no one else came"*
- Reporter: *"TV Novi Sad wishes you luck"*.

And the pyrotechnist resumes his shelling again in front of the camera. *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Two", op.cit.*

and he had everything (pictures of a looted house are shown). Now, at 14, he has his youth and nothing else and no one else (the young boy is filmed praying at three graves with appropriate music). It was 7 in the morning that Saturday, January 16th, 1993. When Muslim troops raided his village, they killed his mother Ivanka, father Novak and sister Mitra, while his elder brother vanished without a trace. Just for the record, this is the fate of little Cvetko Ristic, the fate of a small nation"[132].

A third example is the war report on the death of two Serbian boys during fighting at Testic, Bosnia, broadcast on *RTS*: *"Instead of a truce, there were new victims in Testic (...). Alija's missiles have killed two boys in the streets of Testic, a 9-year old Marko Parovic and 12-year old Igor Jotanovic"* (broadcast of pictures taken at graves with flowers and photos of children). Pictures follow of the father and one of the two children collapsed in front of his house and saying to the report: *"Let's go home, please... I can't stand it... He was playing right there... Ustashas shot him... The motherfuckers!"*. The father then grabs the microphone and shouts: *"I swore at my son's grave that I will get my revenge!"*. The viewers are then taken into the house; with the photo of the boy behind her the mother crying: *"They took away your joyful youth, my son! How am I going to live without you? Oh, God, where are you now? Help us if you are out there"*. Then again, pictures of the father, injured: *"The world doesn't see this curse on it! Cursed be America! Milosevic, my precious! Help us, please!"*[133]

Justify the use of force against the enemy

60. The political and military goal of a State for all the Serbs, which presupposed annexing Bosnian and Croatian territory in which Serbs lived, was supported by the Serbian media that served as tools to legitimise the use of force and violence. In July 1991, Slobodan Milosevic would again choose *Serbian Television* to deliver a speech in

[131] *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Two"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.
[132] *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.
[133] *Idem*.

which he announced that war had become inevitable[134]. Similarly, the most senior military authorities took over the television resulting in an increase in the number of reports on Milosevic's visits to the Armed Forces and the Army's high level of readiness in case it was required to act. Furthermore, the Defence Minister, Veljko Kadijevic, announced the decision to intervene in Croatia in a speech retransmitted on national television. From that point on, everything possible was done to swing public opinion firmly behind the regime. Messages of support flooded in to *RTS*, such as those for the Army convoys leaving Belgrade for the front "cheered on by the students": "*We filmed the long convoy around 2 a.m. on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. Several hundred students came down onto the highway cheering the Yugoslav Army convoy*". The following day, messages from hand-picked Serbian citizens filmed in front of the endless procession of military convoys were shown one after another on television to galvanise public opinion and promote a united front: "*This should have happened long ago. Tonight we will all go and defend our country*"; "*You are ready to defend it?*";[135] "*Any time.*"

Above the ensuing noise of weapons and fighting, only those opinions most strongly behind the objectives of territorial conquest would be heard. Systematic media coverage was given to Vojislav Seselj's positions, such as the declaration he made in September 1991 before the Serbian parliament which was broadcast by *Belgrade Television*: " *Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitaca must be our option and the army must withdraw its troops to this line. If they cannot be withdrawn from Zagreb without a fight, they should pull out under fire, and constantly shell Zagreb. The army still has unused resources. If its troops are in danger it has the right to use napalm bombs and everything else it has in its arsenals. It is more important to save an army unit than to fear there might be casualties. It's their own fault. They wanted war, now they have it*".[136]

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[134] *"Serbia cannot protect itself from the war to which it may be exposed if it is not ready for it and if it becomes lulled into a belief that it cannot happen. Its readiness should, for now, be expressed, firstly, within the Yugoslav National Army and, secondly, within its own armed forces, comprised of the Serbian Territorial Army units which are trained to defend the Republic of Serbia. The Serbian Territorial Army forces have modern equipment and, when it comes to their number and quality of training, they are superior to similar forces outside Serbia, including their so-called 'para-military units'. This is what the citizens of Serbia should know and take into account". "Images and Words of Hate: Year Two"*, Foundation for Rights to Pictures and Words, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

[135] *Idem.*

[136] *Ibidem.*

61. Belgrade television systematically strove to justify the use of force and therefore violence by the Serbs by bombarding the public with simplistic statements which contained only very rarely any exact information or indications, even as concerned dates or places. *Serbian Television*'s coverage of the fighting in Vukovar was especially illuminating: in the way in which the events were portrayed, and in particular the losses inflicted upon the enemy, all possible means were used to make the public think that it was the Serbs that were defending the town.

Through reports and commentaries interwoven with images, television sought to foster inter-ethnic and religious hatred towards the Catholic Croatian community: general opinion portrayed them as inhuman - thereby making their humiliation, destruction and elimination easier and indeed more legitimate. To achieve this end, special correspondents carried out more and more interviews of forces, personnel and civilians. The interview of Ljilja Kojic, commander of the Slavonia and Baranja Region Territorial Defence Headquarters, which was filmed with the front-line in the background, demonstrates that the Yugoslav Federal Army participated in the demonisation process. Questioned by the *Serbian Television* journalist about the Ustashas' use of Serbian women and children as human shields (it should be noted that the question was not framed as an allegation), the officer confirmed that it was true without providing any evidence in support: "*Well, that is unfortunately correct, it proves they are weak, it proves they are inhuman, it shows how far they are prepared to go, they are not only sacrificing Serbs, whom they have imprisoned and arrested and kept as hostages, but also their own Croats who did not go along with them.*"[137] The accounts of supposed Ustasha atrocities obtained from civilians by the reporters on location in Vukovar did not provide a shred of evidence supporting the allegations and the witnesses were never eye-witnesses. In a report which examined the issue, a journalist showed to the camera some gold teeth in the palm of his hand and asserted: "*I am holding in my hand some gold teeth, they told me these teeth were extracted with a knife, from practically living people, whom they killed.*" Later on during an interview of an elderly man in green uniform, the journalist asked:

[137] See *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*,1995.

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- *"Do you have any examples of anyone being killed, slaughtered or having suffered similar atrocities?"*
- *"I left earlier but as far as I know there were other kinds of torture."*
- *"What happened?"*
- *"Well, they slaughtered, gouged out eyes, cut off children's fingers. In baking pans on liberated territories we found children they wanted to roast. Soldiers with heads cut off, the injured were disembowelled."*
- *"They have no mercy even on those wounded?"*
- *"They have no mercy on anyone, I don't know how that is, what are they, animals or what, they are not human."*[138]

Everything possible was done to stigmatise the enemy. From this angle, the Serbian media constantly emphasised the crimes committed by the Croatian regime during the Second World War. As such, television viewers were to led to believe that the Croatian people were all genocidal and the Serbian public was conditioned to lapse into inter-ethnic hatred. Again during the Vukovar siege, *Serbian Television* announced, very appropriately, that a newly-published, historical account referring to Italian sources confirmed that the Croatian Ustashas had indeed intended to annihilate the Serbian people during the Second World War - allegedly an intention also implicitly shared by Franjo Tudjman's Croatia: "*A very special historical testimonial has just recently been published on Croatian Ustasha crimes against the Serbs during the so-called Independent State of Croatia. Previously undiscovered secret documents of the Italian Army say, among other things, that Zagreb had a Church-State project of total Serb annihilation (...) In those several months in 1941, practically from the birth of the Independent State of Croatia on April 10, all through April-May 1942, inasmuch as the Italians were there to record the events, the number of casualties reached a number probably greater than 80,000. Every serious researcher could easily confirm this, but regardless of this figure, here it says 46,286 people – Serbs, and it gives the dates, places, names of perpetrators and indicates where those documents can be found.*"[139]

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[138] Idem.
[139] *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991, op. cit.*

Another example, though this time concerning Bosnia, featured on the televised news on 2 August 1992, when the presenter stated: "the Croatian and Muslim forces want to eliminate everything that is Serbian in these places. Terror, fanatical hatred, the physical and mental genocide of the Bosnian Serbs, aggressive actions on Serbian territory all fall within their military and political vision".

62. To lend more weight to these assertions, the edited version of the pictures shown played fully on the suffering of men and women to incite hatred. During its 7:30 p.m. televised news, that is when 2.5 million Serbs were glued to the screen, *RTB* would show disturbing images (the dead bodies of men, women and children - said to be Serbs although it was impossible to identify them as such – in close ups: splattered brains, decomposed bodies etc.; houses and churches destroyed, graves desecrated...) which were presented as proof of the aggression against the Serbs. As if that were not enough, the pictures were backed up with simplistic but effective war rhetoric whose aim was to single out the enemies of the Serbian people. The Muslims were called "Mujahedin", warriors of the "Jihad" or Muslim fundamentalists. All of these terms were of course closely associated with the reminder of the Ottoman occupation and the forced conversions to Islam.

Stigmatise the opponent

63. The comments of Serbian journalists, including in the newspapers, banished the words "Bosnian" or "Bosnian forces" and instead used derogatory expressions with the most negative connotations, for example, the "warriors of Ali[140] armed by Saddam Hussein" conducting "a holy war in the name of Islam". On 17 August 1992, the journalist from *Television Belgrade,* Ranko Elez, indiscriminately called the Muslim Bosnian forces *"Islamic fundamentalists"*, *"Islamic chauvinists"* and branded them as the *"the cruel hoards of Alija [Itzebegovic]"*[141]. In addition, Serbia was historically described as the bulwark against the Islamic invasion of Europe.

[140] That is, Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the Bosnian State.
[141] Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.36.

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64. Meanwhile, the Croats and their soldiers were bluntly singled out as "Ustasha"[142] or fascists fighting on behalf of Germany. Serbian television and press tried to show the public that the Croatian government led by President Tudjman was nothing other than an echo of the Second World War Ustasha power. *Politika Ekspres* drew this parallel in its 27 July 1991 edition when it reported on the fear of the Croatian Serbs faced with the "Croatian militia" and its checkerboard emblem (the "Sahovnica") inspired by the flag of the Croatian fascist regime allied to the SS and Hitler.

More generally, the war reports prepared by *Serbian Television* correspondents at the sites of the fighting were entirely shot around this objective of branding the enemy. In one of the first war reports devoted to the fighting in Croatia and broadcast on the news at 19:30 hours, the description given to the viewers of the opponent's camp was symptomatic of the media coverage in the months to come: *"The panic-stricken Tudjman mercenaries and villains, calling themselves the guards, have barricaded themselves in the centre of Kostajnica, shooting at everything. We also found out that a horde of butchers from Tudjman's Black Legion is headed towards Banija. The horde of mercenaries and murderers thirsty for Serbian blood barricaded in Kostajnica seem to realise that they have been written off"*[143].

65. The Serbs' enemies were compared to demonic forces using carefully chosen vocabulary designed to stir up fear and hatred[144]. On 21 January 1993, a report from

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[142] Croatian fascists allied to Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy during the Second World War.

[143] See "*Images and Words of Hate: Year Two*", *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

[144] The terminology used by the Serbian media to stigmatise the enemy was imposed on them by the policies set out in unwritten directives. They were requested not to say things such as "the Croatian forces attacked the village" any more but instead to speak about the "Ustasha hordes" or "Vatican, fascist, barbarian hordes" who "attacked the village". See, for instance, the testimony of Backo Diklic, a *Tanjug* journalist, reported by Catherine Humblot in "*Ex-Yougoslavie: médias fauteurs de guerre - II. L'Hystérie 'patriotique'*", *Le Monde*, 23 July 1993, p. 5.

We note that this terminology had an effect on the way of thinking and speaking of the public in general. The vocabulary created by the Serbian media under control, principally of the *RTS*, became the way people spoke. In a great many accounts of and interviews with civilians, the same expressions and turns of phrase figure endlessly. As on television, the word "genocide" was used indiscriminately. We hear this in the report on the blockade at Ljubovija of the UN humanitarian aid meant for Srebrenica and Bratunac, in which the reporter interviews several Serbian women on their motivations. Their answers follow more or less the language of the journalistic propaganda: *"My son was killed in this war. I don't want this aid to feed his enemies! They committed genocide against the Serbs, they slaughtered, castrated, gouged eyes and*

Belgrade Television carried out on the Croatian front line warns the Serbian viewers to: *"Be careful with Ustashas. Even when they are dead they can kill you"*[145]... The good and evil Manichaeistic approach was also valid for describing the fighting. Reports showing the Serbian forces manoeuvring presented no images of destruction or civilian victims. When the Serbian forces attacked a town, the action was presented as a means of defence. According to official terminology, the Serbs never attacked first[146]. The contrast

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now we should feed them so that they could kill us all!"; *"My only son and a 22-year-old grandson got killed ! I don't want anyone to help the Ustashas ! They burned down my home ! What more do they want!"*; *"I lost a 17-year-old daughter and my husband ! I won't let them kill again !"*, etc. *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three"*, Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.

The words and expressions used by the people interviewed are those learned from the television and mentally structure their way of talking and serve as ready-made terms.

[145] Quoted by Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.36.

[146] Thus, when Vukovar in Slavonia was captured, Belgrade TV's evening news on channel 1 described the battle triumphantly: "*Our army has the situation under control, the Ustasha fascists had to withdraw*". Reported by Jean Ariel, "*L'écran non aligné*", *Télérama*. No. 2180 of 23 October 1991, p. 68.

It is true that on *Serbian Television* the fighting at Vukovar was always presented as another "liberating" act of the town – this extract from a report by one of the special on-site envoys when control was taken of one of the districts of the town by the Serbian troops is evidence of this: "Another in a series of victories in the battle for Vukovar – the fall of the infamous Milovo brdo, the last oasis of Ustasha fighters in the upper part of the town, proving that army assessments were absolutely realistic. As of today, the Yugoslav flag is flying on the town's highest point. The citizens from this part of town have come out of their shelters to embrace the freedom they had waited for so long. In this military operation, Yugoslav People's Army units were accompanied by brave local territorial defense units. This successfully completed operation has become one of the most significant victories in the campaigning to liberate Vukovar. Fighting side by side, the Army and territorial defense units made a significant drive into Pionirska Street, finally taking and connecting with the liberators of Milovo brdo. It needs to be said that enemy resistance was crushed without losses. Presently the Army is pulling out the exhausted civilians in the occupied areas and moving them to safety. The suffering and pain in their eyes have given way to tears of joy, kissing and embracing the liberators, and a thousand and one "thank you, thank yous"". See *Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991*, produced by Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, *The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media*, 1995.

The journalistic commentary provided to the Serbian public on the television news on *TV Belgrade*, as the key to understanding the conflict, does show any distance either and becomes a charicature. The siege of Vukovar is thus justified by Ratko Dmitrovic, the presenter of the news at 19:30 hours: *"In Vukovar more than a thousand Serbs are feared to have been butchered by the Croatian neo-fascists, including several dozen Serbian children who have fallen victim to the Ustasha knives. Bodies of entire families are still being found slaughtered on the very doorsteps of their homes. This town is a great Serbian martyrdom. For the past months, Vukovar's outskirts have just been the outer limits of a huge concentration camp". "Images and Words of Hate: Year Two", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

Another example is this extract from the programme "*No-one is like me*" broadcast on *Radio Belgrade*'s second station on 12 December 1991 during which Milos Bojovic, a Socialist Party deputy in the Serbian parliament, declared: "*Why are you asking me about war? You must also know that Serbia is not at war! Serbia is not at war! Nor is Krajina. At war are Ustasha authorities in Croatia, and you have witnessed how they do it - in a wily, perfidious way. They have prepared a genocide against Serbs. They simply want to eradicate us. But it is not only war. At stake are the interests of Germany, Italy and Austria. Small people get a handful of dollars and you can do anything with them. But Serbs are different, they cannot be bribed, or bought. They are always ready to defend their homeland, their state, their freedom. That is*

with the reports on the offensives conducted by the Croatian troops who spared nothing, destroyed everything and systematically slit the throats of Serbian civilians is startling! Croatian and Muslim soldiers said to be "dirty, cowardly and drugged up" were compared with Serbian fighters who were praised as brave and rash, always ready to come to the aid of the victims and the innocent[147]. When the idealised image was shown to be seriously flawed, like for example on 2 August 1992 when the *New York Newsday* revealed the existence of Serbian camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, through the UN, the international community appointed a special reporter for the Human Rights Commission on 14 August, the *RTS* came to the rescue of Radovan Karadzic. During a live interview on the evening television news, he quietly denied the accusations without being in any way embarrassed by the questions of the presenter or by the reports contradicting what he was saying.[148]

66. For Catherine Humblot, a journalist for *Le Monde*, an entire "*war mythology arose, glorified by Belgrade television through heroes worthy of featuring in strip cartoons, such as Captain Dragan who suddenly materialised from the depths of the age-old*

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history. That is a genetic legacy in Serb genes. But all the cards are now on the table. Now everything is clear. There are the three largest denomination: the Catholics, the Muslims and the Orthodox - the best and brightest among them. All possible efforts are now being made to enslave all of the Orthodox peoples living in these territories, to turn us into galley -rowers. But that shall not happen! ".

[147] Two war reports of *TV Belgrade*, Mostar, illustrate this manner of speech. The first reports on the destruction of an army barracks: *"Current events in Bosnia were recently anticipated in Mostar. Right after the peace talks and on the very eve of Bairam, the army barracks "Severni logor" were blown up. It was planned by Ustasha and carried out by jihad warriors with a cruelty typical of both. It marked the first time jihad set foot on European soil"*. In another report, the current enemy is more explicitly compared with yesterday's enemy: *"The day on the Mostar frontline has been relatively peaceful without significant military provocation. In places, however, the Ustashas launch occasional attacks, but they are obviously too weak to mount an all-out offensive. Their commando unit now choose to raid the liberated territory. Especially worrisome are reports of what's happening to the Serbs of Roska Gora and Bogodol where two to three hundred Serbs were savagely massacred and all their property destroyed. The crime resembles those committed by the Ustashas in 1944"*. *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.

[148] Presenter: *« Mr. Karadzic, good evening. May we please have your comment on the allegations that there are camps in which Serbs torture Croats and Muslims ? "*

Radovan Karadzic : *"Good evening. During my stay in London, we invited British reporters to come and visit all locations with such alleged camps. They visited four locations in Serbia, including Loznica. They visited Pale and saw there was no camp there. They saw a penitentiary in Kula, where criminals and POW's are kept in decent conditions. Today they have visited Omarska and Prijedor. We offer every corner of our territory for international inspection"*.

"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three", *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.

shadows with his militiamen"[149]. From this angle, *RTS* and the press bore particular responsibility for misrepresenting war crimes as heroic actions conducted by "warlords" (such as Arkan, Dragan and Seselj[150]) who were held up as examples or models for television viewers and readers[151].

67. Admittedly, the Croatian and Bosnian media can also be criticised for making so much use of terms discrediting the Serbs, including "Chetnik terrorists"[152]. If a comparison is made between Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian nationalist propaganda, it is noticeable that Serbian propaganda surpassed the other two both in the scale and content of the media messages put out[153].

Conspiracy paranoia

68. However, what set Serbian nationalism far apart was its paranoia. This can be illustrated by the fact that in the media and politicians' speeches the idea of a conspiracy against the Serbian nation was ever-present. The principle vehicle for the theory of the international conspiracy of which Serbia was allegedly the victim, in its reports *Serbian Radio Television* systematically advanced this argument and denounced "*the world (which) wants to make us submit, and sacrifice our honour and our brothers in Bosnia and Croatia*" against a background of Serbian people in exile and massacred Serbian soldiers[154]... Shortly after the start of the war with Croatia and in light of the support

[149] *Le Monde*, 23 July 1993.
[150] Speaking of Seselj and his troops and with regard to events which had taken place in Borovo Selo near Vukovar, the 4 April 1991 issue of *Politika Ekspres* paid tribute to "the volunteers who left to defend the threatened Serbian people".
Purposely confusing the issue and distorting the facts, Seselj told *NTV Studio B* shortly after on 3 May that "*Borovo Selo demonstrated that the Serbs are armed...They killed 12 Ustashi. That is Serb heroism....I have contacts with those Serbs in Borovo Selo....where the major role was played by the Chetnik movement. Chetnik arms triumphed on 2 May in Borovo Selo. Not even 15 Ustashas could take one Serb Chetnik. We have sent our volunteers everywhere. The best ones are in Zagreb - those trained for special raids and terrorist actions*". This statement was later printed by *Borba* on 10 May.
[151] "*I met Arkan and kissed him. I always kiss heroes*". Biljana Plavsic, *Duga*, 22 January - 4 February 1994.
[152] Serbian extremists.
[153] At the time, Serbian "perfection" and "know-how" was expressed in the former Yugoslavia by a cliché claiming that "Goebbels was a child" in comparison – implying thereby that Serbian propaganda was even more effective than Nazi propaganda and its main creator.
[154] *Reporters sans frontières, La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Report 1993*, pp. 338-339.

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which certain sections of the international community were giving to Croatia – *Belgrade Television* was often to target the Vatican and Germany, seen as historical allies of Croatia. As such, it was to broadcast a report covering a street demonstration accusing the Vatican of supporting the "Ustasha fascist regime". An elderly woman waving a banner on which was written "Vatican Satan" stated: "The Pope should go to Jasenovac! The Pope is an Ustasha" In the same report pictures were broadcast of the historian, Ratko Petrovic, with a loud-speaker in his hand, addressing the demonstrators in these terms: "The genocide of the Serbian people has been going on under the auspices of the Vatican. This is now going to stop!"[155]... At almost the same time, Germany was directly accused of being at the head of a conspiracy by the Serbian Minister of Defence, Veljko Kadijevic, whose communiqué was read by the presenter of the television news on *TV Belgrade*: *"Germany has openly attacked our country for the third time. It now resorts to modern methods, but it also uses the fascist methods from World War II. Germany then made use of the so-called "fifth column". Now it is opting for various other methods of special warfare, in preparation for economic and military action"*[156]. The written press also spread the notion of a conspiracy supposedly hatched abroad, which recurred like a leitmotiv[157].

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[155] See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Two"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

[156] *Idem.*

[157] See for example:

"The fate of our state no longer depends on our will power, courage, honesty, intelligence, and orientation towards the heavenly empire - all the virtues in which we have excelled throughout history. We now depend on international carpet-baggers, wheeler-dealers, financiers, and the masterminds of the policy whose aim was to break up the state which was created by the shedding of much blood", Academic Radovan Samardzic, *Epoha*, 5 November 1991.

"Saint Sava opted for a humiliated and weakened Byzantium for he saw in it the indomitable spirit of Orthodoxy, and he turned his back to the all-powerful Rome, from which the foul smell of the first inquisitional pyres was coming - hints of Auschwitz and Jasenovac. We fear that a new world order is emerging, and that it is based on a trilateral alliance between America, Japan and Europe... A planetary anthill is being created and only the laws of hedonist society shall have their place there...We should do penance in order to have a pious and kind tsar, in both Serbia and Russia .... It would mark the return to the sense of the cult and not to the formal rite (which we are frequently witnessing now)". Mr Danilo Krstic, bishop of Budim, *Pogledi, Kragujevac*, 18 October - 1 November 1991.

"It is better for all of us to perish than to accept dubious foreign decisions regarding our fate", Momcilo Djujic, Chetnik Duke, *Borba*, 14 January 1992.

"The international community is immoral. It shall kill us all", Priest Amfilohije Radovic, *Borba*, 13 July 1993.

"By carving up Yugoslavia through national secessions, in which Germany played a decisive role and which were made possible by EC, US, and Islamic forces, the Serb people was de facto declared WW3. All

69. The conspiracy took different forms depending on a context which itself changed. In the final analysis it mattered little who was actually behind the conspiracy since each time this classic technique was used the purpose was to divert Serbian public opinion away from those actually responsible for the problems experienced by the population within the country. Belgrade, and the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs in turn, would bring up the "Vatican[158]/Ustasha/German" conspiracy[159] (so directly alluding to the massacre of Serbs during the Second World War), the American conspiracy (a resurgence of communist propaganda is evident in places) and international conspiracies which would be most clearly demonstrated by the United Nations embargo on Serbia beginning in May 1992[160].

As the attitude of the international community hardened towards Serbia and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular after the strikes against Serbian targets around Gorazde, *RTS* and the Bosnian Serb media introduced the notion of an international conspiracy to commit genocide against the Serbs. Following the NATO bombing, the news presenter explained to viewers: "*The bombs dropped on Gorazde hit the UN building in New York. The USA, which, in fact, initiated the air-strikes, have destroyed the UN in an effort to gain full control of war and peace in the world and in*

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those factors had goals similar to the ones pursued by the Axis Powers in both WW1 and WW2", Dobrica Cosic, *Nada*, 29 June 1994.

[158] In its 10 February 1991 issue, *Politika* would state that Croatia had received a $US 4 billion loan from the Vatican with which to pull Yugoslavia apart...

On 21 September 1992, Dragan Krivacevic, editor-presenter of the television news stated for example: *"The International community led by the Vatican wants Serbs on their knees. Together with our enemies from inside, Muslims and Croats from Serbia, they want us to beg them. But, they are not going to see that scene"*. Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.34.

[159] For example, on 30 August 1995, TVB1 broadcast extracts from a report shown on a German channel in which young Nazis expressed their hatred for the Serbs and boasted of having fought alongside the Croats and exterminated a good number of Serbs. The report also showed Nazis in France and Italy suggesting, through presenting such extremist figures, that the programming for exterminating the Serbian people was indeed part of a world-wide conspiracy.

[160] The embargo and its consequences were usually presented in a biased manner. Thus on 20 November 1992, during the television news, the presenter Stefan Grubac distorted the content of a Security Council resolution which exempted food and pharmaceutical products, when he explained: *"They [the foreigners] deny food and offer news, they deny medicine and offer comments instead"*. Quoted by Vojin Dimitrijevic and Jelena Pejic, University of Belgrade Law School, in *"The effects of UN Sanctions Against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): Theory and Conventional Wisdom in the Current Context"*, note no. 43. http://www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/publications/journals/ kentpapers/dimitri.html.

this way possibly started an era of new colonialism. And every colonialism implies genocide, which was, unfortunately, first committed against the Serbs. The civilian casualties in this attack are proof of that." Applying this same logic, the statements made by the academic and writer, Dobrica Cosic, in his capacity as Yugoslav President during a meeting with the leaders of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would also be shown on *RTS*. They too took up this obsessional theme: "*It is a total war waged against our nation. We are victims of all sorts of genocide: physical, spiritual and moral, by our being denied the right to be one nation. It is waged by armies, politicians, churches, the media, by an entire universe set on winning this war against us. I believe the most important thing of all is to do everything in our power to defend the truth. We must tell the world that these are the times of shame and deceit in which no means are spared to spiritually annihilate an entire nation. This spiritual genocide against our nation is committed by an entire civilisation through the so-called mass-media.*"[161]

70. At the same time, the international community's successive peace plans were denounced as machiavellian ruses to make the Serbs abandon their brothers in Bosnia and Croatia. As such, on 10 April 1993, the newsreader of Serbian television declared that signing up to the Vance-Owen plan was tantamount to approving "the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs". Faced with the pressure and threats of the international community, the media's propaganda would take a new tack, as would Slobodan Milosevic who, in early May, called upon the Bosnian Serbs to ratify the plan[162]. Milosevic's power over the *RTS*

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[161] *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words,* Lazar Lalic, B92, ARHITEL, 1999.

[162] Borislav Jovic recounted how Milosevic did everything within his power to make Karadzic give in and how he organised a campaign to satanise him in which the media participated: "*When Radovan Karadzic, President of the Republika Srpska, refused to accept the so-called Vance-Owen plan, which Milosevic himself supported, Milosevic organised a campaign to demonise Karadzic that was below not only any personal moral dignity but also the high-ranking positions they both occupied*". In *Book on Milosevic*, Belgrade, 2001 (draft translation by ICTY), p.29.
Another interesting episode shedding light on how the media were bent to Milosevic's will took place at *RTS* itself when the Vance plan was being negotiated in 1991-1992. The editor-in-chief of *RTS*, Krste Bjelic, was fired because he was deemed too close to Milan Babic, the "president" of the Serbian Republic of Krajina, who had rejected the Vance plan and who opposed Milosevic. Bjelic was replaced by Dragoljub Milanovic from the daily *Politika Ekspres*.
It is interesting to note that from the moment Milosevic accepted the Vance plan, the pejorative terms "oustaha" and "throat cutters" were replaced by the words "Croatian army" or "Croatian forces". Moreover, the war reports became shorter and were broadcast at the end of the television news... *Serbian Television* presented the Vance plan as a victory achieved through Serbian action and its leader. During its

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was confirmed once again on this occasion. The journalistic comments about the Vince-Owen project changed completely in a month, loyally falling into line with the about-face of the Serbian leader. Milica Pesic notes in this regard: *"At the beginning of April 1993 Bosnian Serbs were offered a new solution: the Vance-Owen plan. The Serbian regime was against the plan. So was the TVB. And on 2 April commentator Ratko Dmitrovic*[163] *says: "The plan is a way for ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Bosnia. If they sign that plan there will be nothing else for them but to commit collective suicide or convert to*

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adoption, the presenter of the national television news stated the following in his editorial: *"The Serbian people's intense craving for peace was once again confirmed by the official Serbian policy. By adopting the peace plan drawn up by Cyrus Vance, acting as the UN Secretary General's personal envoy, and enjoying the unambiguous support of the Unites States, Serbia has finally and definitively cast off the stigma of belligerence forced on her by the neo-Nazi forces of Croatia and Europe. If any Balkan nation has ever reached maturity through hardship and the pain of a war fought for peace and freedom, it is the Serbian nation. From such a nation and its government nothing could have been expected but a policy of peace. But by the same token, no one could have expected it to capitulate and renounce its national dignity and rights in the name of somebody else's illusion of peace. The Serbian peace policy cannot be regarded as an attempt to save face or preserve the regime. Rather, it is an expression of full moral, political and historical adherence to its principles. The policy that Serbia and its president Slobodan Milosevic have pursued so far leaves not even a shred of doubt when it comes to protecting the interests of the Serbian nation"*. See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Two", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

Borisav Jovic provides another interesting example of the umbilical cord between Milosevic and "his" media. Milosevic was opposed to Slobodanka Gruden becoming the head of Belgrade municipality - he had his own candidate - and so he would destroy Gruden's reputation by conducting a smear campaign against her: *"Since all of the media were under the complete control of Slobodan Milosevic, and since Slobodanka was elected against his will, the already proven mechanism of isolation and discrediting went into operation. Then, it clearly showed how powerful Slobodan was within the SPS leadership compared to us, who benevolently and trustingly left him with all the influence over the media (...) Within the media a campaign against Slobodanka Gruden started. They said that she had been bribed to allocate some plots of land to Dafina Milanovic, owner of the Dafiment Bank, but it was never proved. It was only to dishonour her and to show that persecuting and overthrowing her were justified. The machinery for discrediting her continued to operate right up until Slobodanka had enough of it all and resigned"*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-188.

[163] Politika correspondent in Zagreb before becoming a figurehead of ultra-nationalism on television, Ratko Dmitrovic was to become particularly well-known for his positions with regard to war: *"Despite claims of some military-political analysts that artillery and missile attacks on some towns failed to bring the war victory or help Krajina prevail in armed conflicts, I tend to share the view that this is the best way for Krajina to keep Croatia in a checkmate situation. Serbian heavy artillery forces can thus control Sisak and a large industrial zone (refinery, ironworks, thermo-power plant, chemical industry "Radonja"), Karlovac and its industrial potential, Zadar, Šibenik, Osijek... As regards Zagreb is it only 25 km away from the range of the Serbian heavy artillery"*, in Argumenti, July 1994. Quoted by Petar Lukovic, *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia*.
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/authors_singletext.php?lang=en&idteksta=448.
Some years later, interviewed about his role on *RTS* where he had been news presenter from 1991 to 1993, Ratko Dmitrovic attempted to exonerate himself: *"I resented the way RTS presented the events at the time. It has all got far worse by now, it has hit rock bottom. I tried to raise it with the editors. I was not one. I was just a commentator with no say in shaping the programme. I requested that we enter the media war and wage it through the most powerful of its media – television. They never fought one. It was all cheap, party propaganda, a total disaster"... "Images and Words of Hate : Year Three", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.

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Catholicism or Islam or leave Bosnia". Just a month later, after Milosevic changed his attitude towards the plan and became an advocate of it, TVB had all news bulletins full of politicians and ordinary people appealing for a signature of the plan because Serbs in Bosnia "had enough of war there and it is time for peace now"[164]. The same about-turn took place at *Radio Belgrade I*. While in April propaganda in favour of the war had reached its peak and the maps of the Vance-Owen plan were shown as unjust and anti-Serbian, the tone changed radically as of early May[165].

71. Another facet of the anti-Serbian plot was the conspiracy purportedly orchestrated by the internal "traitors"[166]. The journalists accused of not adhering to the Milosevic line[167] would be dismissed from their posts after being called "traitors" by the regime's heralds. At several press conferences covered by the official media, the ultra-nationalist leader of the Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, who announced the government's true intentions in advance[168], would draw up lists of the "uncontrollable or partisan" journalists who would

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[164] *Op.cit.* p.23.

[165] Lola Stamenkovic, who studied the programmes of *Radio Belgrade* between February and May 1993 (the programmes between 15:00 and 19:00 hours) notes the following: *"After the Bjeljina Assembly the style of reporting on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina changes. Unlike in the previous period, this new style sees the transmitting of statements which endorse the Vance-Owen plan as a whole and point to the danger of prolonging the war and risking military action against Yugoslavia if the peace is not signed. The statements of Serb leaders in Bosnia that the Vance-Owen plan does not guarantee peace are criticised. Less radio and television time is devoted to accounts from the war front; reporters are called to quote new sources of information (diplomatic sources, etc.)".* See article *"Radio Belgrade I – Domination of Ethnic Stereotypes"*, in *Hate Speech. An Analysis of the Content of the Domestic Media in the First Part of 1993, Centre for Antiwar Action*, Belgrade, 1994, p.38.

[166] When the war with Croatia began to become exposed to criticism from the Serbian civilian society, and at a time when the new boundary which had come about through the territorial conquests needed to be strengthened, *Serbian Television* read on the television news a communiqué by the socialist party in power which sounded like a warning to all dissenting voices: *"The Socialist Party gives its full support to the Army and calls upon all its members and citizens to fulfill their civic duty, defend their homeland from fascism and prevent the extermination of the Serbs in Croatia. The Serbs have always managed to pinpoint and eliminate traitors, and we believe they will be able to do it again"*. See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Two", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1997.

[167] Such public pressure on independent journalists was a phenomenon not only in Serbia but also in Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro.

[168] This collusion, not to mention confusion, between the Socialist Party and the Radical Party was public knowledge as the following three examples demonstrate:
- *"I respect Seselj because he is consistent in his political convictions and because I believe that his party and he are not financed from abroad"*, Slobodan Milosevic in *Tanjug*, Belgrade, 22 March 1992.
- *"We share with the Radicals their love for Serbia, their patriotism, and the air that we breathe"*, Radovan Radovic, SPS deputy, during the parliamentary session, *RTS*, 28 January 1993.

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later be sidelined[169]. When a six-day strike broke out in April 1992 at the radio's second (culture and music) station in protest against the fact that the services had been taken over by the political authorities, Vojislav Seselj held a press conference at which he made public a list of radio and television journalists whom he believed had to be eliminated[170]. The list was read out on the television news programme during prime time. Most of the striking journalists, who were described as "pro-Bulgarian", such as Ana Koteska, were subsequently put on compulsory leave or marginalised[171]. On 6 January 1993, Vojislav Seselj again made an announcement at a press conference in which he stated that there would be a fresh purge against the "*uncontrollable or partisan journalists in order to set matters at radio-television to rights once and for all*". He threatened: "*there will be purges wherever we hold power and wherever we share it*"[172]. On 9 January 1993, a high-ranking official within Milosevic's party, Goran Percevic, made a similar announcement on the television news when he explained: those who do not think like us cannot work in public institutions. A few days after he uttered these portentous words, 1,500 journalists and other technical or administrative staff were banned from entering the premises of radio-television and put on "compulsory leave". The journalists who were dismissed, most often members of the trade union for independent journalists, were then replaced by newcomers whose deficient training and experience was less important than their obedience and patriotism, which thus resulted in tension within the editorial staff. Amongst the new arrivals were, in particular, the journalist Aleksandar Ljubicic in the information service at *TV Belgrade*, who was to become a news editor and who used to threaten those who thought "differently" with his revolver"[173]...

The independent media were subject to just as much condemnation and were likewise attacked as traitors. For instance, on 27 May 1992, the presenter of the second edition of the Television-Belgrade (RTS) "News" announced: "*For the first time in Belgrade since the war erupted, the supposed supporters of peace are wearing a black armband as a sign of mourning. The international media are trying to outdo one another in anti-*

- "*Milosevic is powerful because of the strength of his power and because he has the backing of the second most powerful party - the Serb Radical Party*", Vojislav Seselj, *NIN*, 20 August 1993.

[169] John Mckay, "*Working for a Beta [sic] Day*", in *War Report*, May 1995, p. 18.

[170] Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.18.

[171] See C. Humblot, "*Résistances et purges*", *Le Monde*, 24 July 1993, p. 4.

[172] *Politika*, 7 January 1993.

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Serbian hysteria. Even within the country, the Belgrade publications Borba and Vreme are now doing the same thing".

Triumph of disinformation

72. If disinformation consists of using "information - and especially mass information - techniques to mislead or to conceal and misrepresent facts", we may truly say that it triumphed in the Yugoslav conflict. From whatever angle the problem is considered – and although it is again true that the Serbian media "distinguished themselves" in the field – all the media (press agencies, newspapers, radio and television…) or almost all of them regularly falsified the truth, imposed blackouts on certain "crucial" information or invented false news. Some of the "media" would use the whole range of possibilities afforded by the three techniques indiscriminately.

73. Generally, any information contradicting the official propaganda was methodically swept aside. Indisputably, one of the most flagrant examples of this was the shelling of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik by Serbian forces. The images shown of Dubrovnik came with a commentary accusing those from the West who had taken the film of manipulation and of having had a tyre burnt in front of their cameras to make it seem that the city was on fire[174]. As for the shells fired at Sarajevo and the damage caused, for several months it was simply as if it had never happened in the eyes of Serbian television viewers because Belgrade television would show pictures of the city taken months and even years beforehand to deny that it had ever occurred[175]. Through the voice of its presenter Risto Djogo, *TV Pale* was to assert throughout the siege of Sarajevo that the Muslims were

[173] Reported by Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.18.

[174] On 11 August 1992, the president of the board of directors of *Belgrade Television* acknowledged the damage inflicted on the town but specified: *"There are just four houses in Dubrovnik which are destroyed and these belong to Serbs"*...

[175] The journalist, Daniel Deluce, formerly a *Reuters* correspondent in Sarajevo, would write in this regard: "Serbian Radio Television created a strange universe in which Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, had never been besieged and in which the devastated Croatian town of Vukovar had been 'liberated'". He went on to say: "the media offensive launched by Belgrade contributed to the appearance of equally detestable propaganda in other Yugoslav republics and its after-effects would be felt for years". In "The Media War", NATO Review, Vol. 48, no. 3, Winter 2000-2001, p. 16.

"shelling themselves"[176]. This negative reconstruction of the facts was to be widely relayed by *Television Belgrade* which stated on 26 December 1992 for example that the siege of Sarajevo was being carried out by the Muslims: *"Muslims are keeping Sarajevans under siege from inside the city, and Serbs are just protecting their own hills around the city..."* Along the same lines, the *TV Belgrade* commentator attributed the fire in the Sarajevo University Library to the Muslims and gave the following account of the event: *"Last night in Sarajevo, there was a fire in the University Library. Luckily, the invaluable cultural treasure had been moved out of it two months before. It is now difficult to establish what exactly caused the fire. True, there was heavy fighting near Trebevic last night. We scrutinised the façade for shell-damage close-up, but were unable to find any. We noticed, however, that the flames licked from within. It all points to yet another Muslim manipulation like the one in Dubrovnik when car tyres were set on fire"*[177] ...

Disturbing news automatically minimised or distorted

74. The significance of a disturbing piece of information was frequently minimised. The simple announcement in July 1995 that the Srebrenica enclave had fallen was thus relegated to a spot at the end of the televised news by *RTB*[178], far behind the day's headlines, namely, the economic affairs of the country and the war in Chechnya... The meaning given to the event by the Serbian media was, to say the least, distorted. Katarina Subasic wrote in this regard: *"As the world's attention was fully focused on the mass deportation of Muslim civilians and still unclear number of victims estimated between 6 and 8.000, both the Bosnian Serb media and Milosevic-controlled outlets in Serbia described it as a "liberation of the town run by Islamic fundamentalists", not mentioning*

[176] Katarina Subasic, *op. cit.* p.16.
[177] *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three"*, *Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92, ARHITEL, 1999.
[178] Whereas it is well known that, at the time, *"Mladic's soldiers were machine-gunning the refugee columns, murdering people and slitting throats"* as Rémy Ourdan writes in *"Ratko Mladic le barbare"*, *Le Monde*, 9 February 1996.

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at all any of the widespread atrocities committed during the weeks of the Serb offensive"[179] ...

75. When despite everything certain information directly implicating Serbian responsibility for the perpetration of atrocities managed to filter through it was distorted. On 27 May 1992, seventeen inhabitants of Sarajevo were killed and one hundred and fifty wounded by a Serbian shell as they were queuing for bread. The pictures of the massacre would be broadcast by *RTS* only with the Serbs' official version of events which accused the Sarajevo government of having organised it to cause the West to intercede[180]. From Sarajevo, a journalist reported commented on the event with images of the carnage shown in the background: "*There has been another atrocious massacre today in Sarajevo. A mortar shell fell amidst a group of civilians who were queuing for bread in Vase Miskin Street. Twelve people were killed and more than a hundred wounded. The scene shocked the local people. With reference to this, General Nedjo Boskovic, who is negotiating the withdrawal of the Army from the barracks said it was unbelievable that there could be such a monster who could shoot people who came out of shelters to buy bread. 'The perpetrators and their commanders must be found' said Boskovic, and since he did not see the scene of the crime, he refrained from commenting on who the possible culprits were"*. This was followed by an interview of Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who declared: *"Having gathered all information about this incident, I can claim that the Serbian Army never fired a single shell on Sarajevo today or violated yesterday's truce. We must certainly preserve peace in Sarajevo at all costs"*. A short while later in another report from Sarajevo, *TV Belgrade* broadcast the following commentary which disputed that a shell could have caused the carnage and blamed the Bosnians: *"Serbian forensics claim that anti-personnel contact mines had been planted there the night before. They also claim that they have evidence that the bombing was planned by Mirza Jamakovic, a police*

[179] *Op .cit.* p.17.

[180] A scenario which would be repeated with the 68 people killed and 142 wounded by a Serbian mortar shell which landed in Sarajevo market on 5 February 1994. On 9 February, "Pale Serbian Television showed images from Western television stations and, using freeze frame, analysed every detail and fact which the Serbs thought proved that it was a Bosnian set up" In this regard, see the interesting masters

specialist for precisely this type of assignment, and Halil Rusmir. They also say it was a planted device and not a mortar shell because the blast caused no damage on the pavement and the casualties mostly suffered wounds on the lower extremities. Ballistics experts add that it was impossible that a single shell could have been so precisely lobbed into this street surrounded by many high-rises"... As if to lend more weight to this interpretation, a statement from the Bosnian Serb Army would also be broadcast on *TV Belgrade*: *"During this day, May 27th, this year, the Army of Republika Srpska did not open fire from either infantry or any other weapons, on any target in the Sarajevo area. As for the TV shots of alleged explosions in downtown Sarajevo, we are sure this is a malicious propaganda scheme aimed at achieving certain effects from here and abroad. This is even worse than the alleged bombing of Banoki Dvori, or Dubrovnik."*[181]
Three months later, on 8 September 1992, the *RTS* journalist Lidija Duvancic, without waiting for confirmation, ascribed an explosion which had caused four casualties in Sarajevo to the Muslims *"who are continuing with their plan, now well known, of demonising the Bosnian Serbs with the intention of provoking international military intervention"*.

76. *RTS* was not the only one to take such a course. *Politika* also tirelessly justified the Bosnian Serb party's war effort, accrediting only information received from the Bosnian Serbs. Using tendentious presentation and offering no analysis of the conflict – notably by providing no explanation of the Bosnian government's position whatsoever – the Belgrade daily newspaper also actively contributed to blinding Serbian public opinion.

Broadcasting false news to stigmatise the enemy further

77. The making up of false news is another form of disinformation, perhaps the most harmful. *SRNA*, the Bosnian Serb television station, would speak *"of the starving lions in Sarajevo zoo to whom 'the Muslims threw the Serbian children and women to eat' at a*

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thesis "*Le rôle de la télévision d'État dans la montée du nationalisme extrémiste en Serbie*", Sonja Milenkovic, University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 1994/1995, pp. 79-82.
[181] *"Images and Words of Hate: Year Three", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B92, ARHITEL, 1999.

time when Sarajevo was cut off from the world"[182]. This propaganda technique which involved hammering home and repeating the same words and expressions over and over again to make the masses believe they were true was previously employed by Nazi Germany. The war in Bosnia was to be particularly favourable to the invention of false information and coarse lies by *Television Belgrade*, like for example the information broadcast on the television news of 20 August 1992 in which a reporter sent to the scene stated that 4,000 Serbs from the left bank of the Drina were being threatened with genocide; or the alarming news broadcast on the news bulletin of 16 October 1992 referring to a plan hatched by the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo whose objective was to murder some 200 Serbs[183]...

78. Other equally insane lies used by the Serbian media without checks being made – such as the existence of "*necklaces that the Croats made from fingers cut off Serbian children*"[184] - were invented to fanaticise the Serbian populations scattered over various territories and ultimately to justify policies of conquest and ethnic cleansing[185]. Implicit in the crude set ups was the notion that all means were valid against such demons.

[182] In "*Les émules de Goebbels*", *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, Jelena Ponorac, November 1992, p. 7.
[183] Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.28.
[184] C. Humblot, *Le Monde*, 23 July 1993.
[185] In its report *Restriction on the Broadcast Media in FR Yugoslavia*, the International Committee to Protect Independent Media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia writes: "*News programs modify or even create information in order to fit the political objectives of the government. Often that objective is to create and foster enemy images among the population. Before and during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, RTS whipped up Serbian nationalism by dehumanising non-ethnic Serbs and promoting visions of Serbia's historical glory. The media campaign aimed at instilling and fostering fear among the public, a feeling of threat, of helplessness, and the need for resistance*". Free Slobodna 2000, September 1998, p. 7.

III. Bringing into line any alternative information or opinion as a condition for official propaganda to succeed

79. In any given regime, official propaganda has all the more impact since there is no opposing counter-propaganda, or at least the contradictory political ideas and opinions are not voiced through broadcasting channels which can reach the masses. S. Milosevic's regime understood this well, in that by following the political circumstances of the moment, it systematically ensured that the embryonic independent press was confined within narrow boundaries. The recourse to legal and extra-legal means to still the voices of dissension and the pressure exerted by the regime on professionals in the field of information ultimately account for why no real public arena for discussion emerged and explain the ease with which the large majority of the Serbian population was deliberately manipulated for over ten years. In this respect, the propaganda used during the Kosovo war would serve to demonstrate this one last time.

Serbian press under tight surveillance

80. We have seen that, as of 1987, Milosevic used the State or State-controlled media for his own ends. This take-over first became evident when close collaborators of Milosevic were appointed to the highest positions in those media. All were members of his political party. Dusan Mitevic, Milorad Vucelic[186], Dragoljub Milanovic, Ratomir Vico[187] were appointed to RTS and personally ensured that directives from Milosevic himself were put into operation. At the same time, purges were organised within press companies to separate the wheat (the "patriotic" journalists) from the chaff (the journalists considered too independent who fervently supported presenting information fairly)[188].

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[186] He was vice-president of the SPS. Furthermore, prior to the war against Croatia, he was in charge of TV Novi Sad, from where most of the belligerent Serbian propaganda was transmitted to Croatia. His successes whilst in this post would earn him an appointment to *RTS* when the war against Croatia ended.

[187] In April 1982, whilst *Radio Belgrade's* political editor-in-chief, he became a member of the presidency of the Municipal Committee of the Belgrade League of Communists. He would later become Minister for Information.

[188] Marie-Claude Vogric states that "*Tanjug, the famous press agency set up by Tito, (...) and the most widely read daily newspapers, Politika, Ekspres, Vecernje Novosti, were put back in their place in 1987 with a purge of the directors and editors-in-chief, who were accused of not having supported Milosevic.* In

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Psychological pressure on recalcitrant journalists

81. In general, the regime would have recourse to a whole arsenal of psychological terror already tried and tested by the fascist regimes between the two wars and meant to convince even the most recalcitrant individuals to support Milosevic's nationalist policy. This involved "journalists fired overnight or victims of persecution, physical threats, intimidation, and anonymous phone calls"[189]. Certain names were even blacklisted as "enemies of Serbia" requiring elimination[190].

Rejection of all media broadcasting federal information

82. It must also be stated that in keeping with his wish to maintain an absolute monopoly over information in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic would do everything to oppose the project for the federal television station *Yutel* sought by the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic who wished to broadcast an unbiased information programme to the entire country. As of its launch on 23 October 1990, the project was sabotaged by the Serbian authorities who ordered the mobile transmitters throughout the territory of the republic and further afield to be dismantled[191]. Some months later, the *Yutel* offices in Belgrade were destroyed and the staff roughed up by a unit from the Serbian extremist movement "the White Eagles"[192].

Plan of action against the independent press

"La presse de Belgrade sous la férule de Milosevic", *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, February 1995, p. 16.

[189] Jean-Claude Raspiengeas, *"Le dernier espoir démocratique"*, *Télérama*, 17 February 1993.

[190] For example, see the testimony of Nenad Pejic, former programme controller for *Sarajevo TV*, who states: *"In late April 1992, Serbian television showed a report on the journalists who had to be killed. My name was on the list." La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, op. cit., p. 24.

[191] Jean Ariel, *op. cit.*

[192] Reporters sans frontières, *La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Report 1992*, p. 321.

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83. As opposed to the media under the authorities' direct control, the few and far between independent media channels barely had more than a tenth of the national media space[193]. The main reason for keeping and tolerating such media – of symbolic importance – appears to lie in foreign policy considerations. Serbia exhibited this media to provide, when necessary, a democratic image of itself to the international community[194].

84. Despite the obvious concern for respectability, the government of Belgrade used and abused legal and extra-legal means to counter these troublesome voices[195]. It was in fact through this independent media that Milosevic's political opposition managed to voice its opinions since they did not have access to public media. The incident of the municipal elections won by the opposition coalition *Zajedno* ("Together") on 17 November 1996 whose outcome was recognised by the authorities only after more than three months of almost daily demonstrations in the large towns, would confirm that, as soon as it got into political difficulties, the regime closed the door it had left partly open to seduce the international community.

85. In fact, the independent press was to be taken over again in late 1994 when a *putsch* was organised against the daily *Borba* which had dared *"to denounce the responsibility of the Belgrade regime in the Bosnian war"* and *"to condemn the shelling of Vukovar and Sarajevo"*[196]. After declaring the corporation which published the newspaper illegal, the state Minister for Information, Dragutin Brcin, was appointed to run *Borba*.

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[193] See *"Situation of the Media in Former Yugoslavia", Report to the Commission of the European Union,* AIM, Paris, March 1995, p. 1.

[194] Véronique Soulé gives a good account of this strategy when she writes: "rather than ban them, they (the authorities) put the independent media under financial and legal pressure; more infrequently the Serbian police carries out seizures or raids. The aim is to limit their audience as much as possible whilst maintaining an appearance of pluralism which Belgrade parades before the international community in order to drive home the message that "there is greater democracy in Belgrade than in Zagreb". In *"Serbie: la difficile survie de la presse indépendante", Libération,* 10 January 1996.

[195] In 1993, for example, while the consequences of the embargo were being fully felt, particularly by the independent media, the Federal Minister for Information had an amendment added to the Law on Public Information which authorised the Federal Parliament to veto foreign aid provided to the media.. See Milica Pesic, *op. cit.* p.19.

[196] Florence Hartmann, *"Le quotidien serbe 'Borba' tente de résister à Slobodan Milosevic", Le Monde,* 12 January 1995.

Direct involvement of the Milosevic couple

86. The entire private press sector was then kept under close scrutiny by the regime, as announced more or less officially by Mira Markovic, ideologist and wife of president Milosevic, in her column published in the weekly newspaper *Duga* in early January 1995[197]. The independent media and the professionals who worked for them were excoriated and, in keeping with classic propaganda, depicted as traitors of Serbia[198]: "*We will know very quickly who participated in financing certain parties and certain information media in eastern Europe. However, by identifying the financiers, we will identify those who were financed, those who were paid to turn their countries into colonies (...) Dead or alive, it doesn't matter, the perpetrators of these acts will not avoid judgement by history. It is of course unfortunate that the mark of shame will inevitably be borne by their descendants (...). Those mercenaries and informers who, for hard currency, organise "democratic" parties and "independent" media naively believe that their activities will never come to light (...). Traitors have always attempted to present their treachery as an act which defends the highest interests of the Nation. Fortunately most of them did not succeed. Therefore politicians and journalists who are now serving as envoys to modern-day* conquistadores *in eastern Europe will not be successful either...*"[199]

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[197] The magazine *Duga* came under the control of the authorities in spring 1987, when the editorial team was restructured. From that time on it published articles backing Milosevic's nationalist arguments.
In her column - humorously described as a "horoscope" by her detractors - Mira Markovic would systematically announce in advance the decisions that the authorities would take. A close ally of Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, wrote on this subject: "*This became evident in practice in the early 1990s. Milosevic's wife started to publish a series of articles in the Duga magazine in the form of her diary and thoughts, in which she touched on numerous political and social issues but also announced what could later happen or what should happen. Everything she announced really did happen. What she objected to would be publicly attacked. Those she criticised would be dismissed. All of this could happen only in one way, through the support of the state and the political machine, led by her husband, which put in practice what she only announced (...) Her texts even attracted huge attention. They often contained, between the lines, real intentions and hints as to whom the texts referred to. A phantom which could destroy one with a single sentence hovered above the people. After each new issue of Duga the main topic of analysis for the political public would be the new text by Milosevic's wife, with guesses as to what she wanted to say this time and what would happen afterwards*". In *Book on Milosevic*, Belgrade, 2001 (draft translation by ICTY), pp. 23-24.
[198] Part of the column would also be published in the daily newspaper *Vecernje Novosti* which had the highest circulation figures in the FRY, with 230,000 copies sold (*BETA News Agency*, 10 January 1995).
[199] Quoted in *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, February 1995, p. 18.

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87. With a view to launching the election campaign for the municipal elections of November 1996 and resorting to the same procedure as against *Borba* in December 1994 and against the weekly newspaper *Svetlost*[200] in September 1995, the authorities entrusted the municipality of Belgrade with control of the private television channel NTV Studio B in February 1996, the main forum for the opposition parties at the time[201].

88. Using the same logic, Slobodan Milosevic had the last two radio stations – *B 92* and *Radio Index*, the Belgrade student station[202] – which reported on daily anti-government demonstrations, closed for 48 hours at the beginning of December 1996. From November 1996 to March 1997, the opposition demonstrations were however deliberately covered up by the state media[203], like RTS which, during the huge new year's demonstration which brought 250,000 people together in Belgrade and thousands of others in the country's large cities, broadcast views of London and New York in its television news[204].

89. The electronic media which had increased in all the towns in Serbia following the Dayton Accords would also be attacked by the authorities. Their vague legal structure would at the appropriate moment allow those authorities to hamper or stop the activity of municipal and private radio and television stations in spring 1997[205]. This was

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[200] The newspaper, published in Kragujevac some 120 kilometres south of Belgrade, was linked to twenty or so regional newspapers which advocated pluralism.

[201] *Correspondance de la Presse*, Monday 19 February 1996.

[202] *Correspondance de la Presse*, Wednesday 4 December 1996.

[203] In its December edition, *AIM* writes in this regard: *"The state-controlled media have totally ignored the mass protests in Serbia, but have given wide coverage to those in... Zagreb. Politika only informed its readers that opposition supporters had 'demolished' its building"*. In *"The Struggle for the Cities"*, *AIM Review*, no. 43, December 1996, p. 5-6.

[204] *"Serbie: propagande, mode d'emploi"*, in *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières*, 13 January 1997.

[205] Mirko S. Mandrino notes: *"Most of the 'private', 'independent' or 'local' stations have no licenses and are therefore operating illegally according to the national and international norms. The only exceptions are those stations which belong to people close to the authorities (like the family members of high-ranking civil servants) or which are run by them. The others do not have the correct papers and so the authorities organise police raids on their premises from time to time and confiscate their equipment. The last police raid, which was better organised and on a scale the like of which we have never seen before, took place in May-June 1997. With police assistance, "official" State radio inspectors accompanied by engineers and technicians carrying provisional police i.d. carried out these lightening raids. Most of the time, not only was the building sealed off but the equipment confiscated too. More than 100 radio stations and fifty or so television stations were "visited" like this – including Radio Bum in Pozarevac, Radio Velinka Kikinda in Kikinda, Radio N in Nis, Radio 021 in Novi Sad, Independent TV in Pancevo, TV in Nis and many others"*. In *InteRadio*, Vol. 9, no. 2. Internet site of A.M.A.R.C.
http://www.amarc.org/interadio/Vol9_No2/Francais/html/europe/htm

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instrumental in causing the opposition coalition to split. Many municipalities which had been won by the opposition in November 1996 were in fact to be taken over again by the authorities on this occasion. In the same way, through the annual procedure for giving out broadcasting licenses, a number of electronic media were be got rid off. "In June 1997, the authorities closed down 55 radio and television stations"[206].

90. Milosevic was personally behind this general take-over. Very recently elected to the presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 15 July 1997, he was to publicly voice his aversion to independent media which were tiresome because they were outside his control and financed from outside[207]. On 23 July he declared before the Yugoslav Assembly that "*it is high time that we put some order into the media, swift action must be undertaken to this end*"[208].

91. The political situation and climate in late 1997 was worsening: Milosevic's candidate, Milan Milutinovic, had difficulty in getting elected as the Serbian president; a coalition government with Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Mira Markovic's Yugoslav Unified Left was formed; Montenegro experienced vague stirrings for independence; the first signs of the Kosovo conflict appeared. With this deterioration, the last remaining room for free expression was threatened. Here again, "*the propaganda methods would allow no doubt to remain as to the objectives of the regime; full control over the areas of possible opposition*"[209]. Employing a technique already seen, the external threat was to be systematically used as a pretext to silence the dissonant voices in the country.

See also "Independent media under pressure from all sides", *AIM Review*, no. 49, July 1997, p. 5.

[206] Reporters sans frontières, *Dossiers et rapports de missions, RFY: un Etat de censure.*

[207] A hate campaign would be launched against the media receiving subsidies from abroad who were described as "traitors to Serbia". *Politika* would publish a list of independent press organs who had received funding from the European Commission (*Vreme, Nasa Borba, AIM,* etc.). Certain of their editors were depicted as driving around in Mercedes and living in luxurious villas which they allegedly obtained through subversive activities undermining Serbia. Reported by Gordana Igric, *"The Regime's Operation 'Media'"* in *AIM Review*, no. 35, April 1996, p. 10.

[208] Reported by Bénédicte Chesnelong, "*Serbie. Le trou noir des Balkans*", report of a fact-finding mission of the International Human Rights Federation (19-22 September 1977).
http://www.fidh.imagenet.fr/rapports/r251-2.htm

[209] Anne Madelain, *"Les médias indépendants en RFY: Où se trouve la société civile?"* in *Le Courrier des Balkans*, 9 May 1999.

War propaganda and national cohesion during the Kosovo war

92. In the crisis which preceded the war and during the war itself, every effort by Slobodan Milosevic's regime went into strengthening national cohesion around an authoritarian power[210] discredited by its failure in previous wars - Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - by its economic and social management of the country and by the personal enrichment of its leaders when the majority of the Serbian population was growing poorer. Belgrade again used a communication strategy already tried and tested in the past which was to work against independent journalists but also against the opposition. This was true for both foreign and Serbian journalists to whom all free access to information on what was really happening in Kosovo was denied. In the same way, the media controlled by the authorities, which was the great majority of media in the national landscape, were all busy denouncing the internal enemies (the political and media opposition to Milosevic) and the external ones (NATO and the western press). Serbian citizens were to be gradually classed into two categories, patriots or traitors according to whether they supported or criticised the authorities.

A set "reading list"

93. As regards the Yugoslav independent press - or at least what remained of it after Milosevic had personally imposed ten years of severe repression and brought it into line – the vice was tightened in early 1998 with intensified attacks on the media and divergent

[210] Nebojsa Popov, editor-in-chief of the magazine *Republika*, shows how, relying on an "authoritarian pluralism", the "new" Serbian authorities were completely focused on waging their war against the Serbian opposition. He explains, in particular, that *"Two months before the NATO bombing, which began on 24 March 1999, a meeting starkly exposed the difficulties of democracy in Serbia. Three vice-Prime Ministers of Serbia who were also doctors and university professors – Mr Ratko Markovic (Serbian Socialist Party, SPS), Mr Vojislav Seselj (Serbian Radical Party, SRS) and Mr Milovan Bojie (Yugoslav United Left) – held a press conference at which they condemned the eight pillars of democracy: opposition, media, universities, students, trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), judges and members of the future electoral commissions. In their opinion such a threat required the highest courts in the country to be mobilised. Thus an entire apparatus, initially ideological and propagandic but later administrative, was set in place to eliminate "the bogeyman of democracy".* In *"La voix étouffée des démocrates serbes"*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1999, p. 6.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/06/POPOV/12121.html

information sources. In the months before the start of air strikes on 24 March, four radio stations and one television channel were banned and *Nasa Borba*, a leading daily newspaper in Serbia, stopped publishing[211]. Refusing to bow to the "reading list" relating to events in Kosovo which the Minister for Information attempted to impose on journalists of the free press on 10 March 1998 - the date they were summoned to report to the police - *Nasa Borba* and later *Danas* or *Dnevni Telegraf* would not survive the adoption of a new law on information the following October providing for very high fines for dissonant voices[212].

Punitive policy against the "traitors"

94. As of the first air strikes a *de facto* censorship would be imposed on all the media, which, because of the heavy penalties in force since the press law was passed in October 1998, would merely reproduce the official communiqués from the government and army general staff. Soldiers would be posted in the offices of each media company to ensure that the reports on Kosovo matched the ideology and official directives communicated to the press by the Ministry for Information. The first NATO strikes were to be the opportunity for the regime to close Belgrade's *Radio B92*, the last independent media in Serbia. A few days later, on 11 April, the owner of *Dnevni Telegraf*, Slavko Curuvija, who had been close to the regime and "defected" some months earlier, was assassinated in the streets of Belgrade, shortly after being described by a local daily newspaper as a "traitor" who had "to be dealt with"[213]. This was reiterated by *Serbian Radio Television*[214]. In Kosovo itself, the local independent press also disappeared[215], like *Koha Ditore*, the main Albanian language newspaper which was to stop printing on 23 March.

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[211] Cf. Hélène Despic-Popovic, *"Belgrade a décrété l'état de guerre: Milosevic muselle les médias indépendants"* in *Libération*, 25 March 1999, p. 3.

[212] *Nasa Borba* would be suspended for publishing on its front page the government letter setting out the instructions for "reading" events – that is for refusing to call the KLA a "band of terrorists" and describe their activities as "criminal" and for refusing to talk in terms of Serbian police "operations to maintain law and order" and "to keep the peace". See Florence Amalou, *"Comment Belgrade a progressivement muselé la presse libre"* in *Le Monde*, 2-3 May 1999, p. 21.

[213] On the authorities' political manipulation of the concept of treason see Aleksander Ciric, *"Post-war Serbia. Hunting Traitors", AIM Podgorica*, 22 June 1999.

[214] Cf. Hélène Despic-Popovic, *"Slavko Curuvija, l'homme qui en disait trop"*, in *Libération*, 15 April 1999, p. 10.

95. Closing down or bringing into line the few independent media, none of which, it must be recalled, had national coverage, was to preclude any version differing from that of the propaganda media responsible for spreading the official truth. This unique press situation explains why Serbian citizens saw the massacres and pillage committed against the Kosovar population as the destruction of KLA bases during "pacification operations" and the exodus of that very population as unfortunates not fleeing the violent acts of politicians and soldiers but the "NATO bombing"[216].

Serbia as the victim of an umpteenth international plot

96. Serbian public opinion, which had not been informed of the violence committed in Kosovo or the evidence of refugees, was fed effective propaganda whose main support was *Serbian Radio Television*[217] which played on nationalist sentiment and reduced the air strikes to an international plot against Serbia. *The propaganda is intense* wrote Natalie Nougayrède, special envoy of *Le Monde* who was still in Belgrade the day after the first strikes. *The bulletins are quite frequent, interrupted with musical interludes, videos to the glory of the armed forces or films on the resistance of Serbian anti-Nazi fighters during the Second World War*[218]. The connection made between Bill Clinton and Adolf Hitler and the showing of Charlie Chaplin's cult film *The Dictator* allowed the Serbian public to believe, for example, that it was once again the victim of Nazi aggression and therefore threatened in its very being.

New war waged against the "Serbian people"

97. This war propaganda, based on hatred of an enemy with many faces, was the extension of the propaganda which accompanied the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Researcher Jacques Sémelin considers that the propaganda was directly

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[215] Cf. *"Kosovo: mort de l'information indépendante"*, in *La lettre de Reporters sans frontiéres*, April 1999, no. 137, p. 1.
[216] *Le Monde*, editorial, 13 April 1999, p. 19.
[217] See Marc Semo's review, *"La RTS, télé haine"* in *Libération*, 26 April 1999.

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in keeping with the history of Serbia *at least since the Second World War*[219]. The priority of Milosevic's regime was therefore *to convince public opinion that NATO was waging a war with the Serbian people and not with his regime and war machine*[220].

98. That observation explains how the Serbian media continued to ignore the tragedy of the Kosovars and how the regime, which refused to allow NATO journalists to report on the war, expressly organised a convoy for them in order to show them the wreck of an American F-117 stealth bomber, which had either crashed because of a technical problem or had been shot down by anti-aircraft defence. The slightest "collateral damage" caused by NATO aircraft was exploited in the media for both external and internal consumption in order to try to substantiate the idea that it was indeed a war against the civilian population.

99. The regime's propaganda generally ignored the facts and constructed its own "reality", as demonstrated *inter alia* by the meeting broadcast by *RTS* between Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, who was taken out of his monitored residence in Pristina for the occasion. The main purpose of this strange and surrealist meeting was to make people believe that the Serbs wanted to re-launch negotiations at a time when ethnic cleansing operations in the field were increasing.

100. Therefore, from the moment the first air strikes hit to the time the peace plan was announced, the Serbian media were to put out propaganda which replaced the simple truth of the facts[221], while the silencing of independent voices - which alone might have enlightened Serbian public opinion - made it impossible to process honestly and fairly any information on the Kosovo conflict and NATO's intervention.

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[218] *"La population est privée d'informations indépendantes", Le Monde*, 28-29 March 1999.
[219] *"Les médias dans la guerre au Kosovo"* in *Le Monde*, 25 June 1999, p. 17.
[220] Florence Hartmann, *"Une semaine devant la télévision serbe"* in *Le Monde Télévision*, 4-5 April 1999, p. 5.
[221] For a more precise and exhaustive insight into how the regime's main propaganda tool re-interpreted the facts, it can be helpful to refer to the column *"Vu à la télévision serbe"* written by the *Le Monde* journalist Hector Forest from early April until the moment the peace plan was announced the following June.

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International press in quarantine

101. At the same time that the national press was being brought under control, foreign journalists were denied access, or at least full access, to information about what was happening on the ground in Kosovo and Serbia once the NATO air strikes began because the Serbs completely limited their ability to report on the news.

102. After the first air strikes, the Serbian police in Belgrade arrested about thirty western journalists who were interrogated and then expelled, mostly from Yugoslavia[222]. This was the case of *inter alia* the correspondents from *Libération* and *Le Soir,* the ABC News producer and the journalist from the *Washington Post.*

103. Also at that time, the Serbian authorities attempted to block the free circulation of broadcast images by shutting down the satellite *European Union Radio Broadcasting Network* (EUR) and ordering that Serbian television not allow *CNN* to use its technical resources to distribute its reports[223].

104. It was in Kosovo and its capital Pristina that repressive measures were applied against foreign corespondents the most strictly. This was done in accordance with the communiqué of the Serbian Ministry for Information dated 25 March which stated that "on the basis of article 8 of the Law on the Defence of the Republic of Serbia, the Ministry for Information orders that journalists from the media of those countries participating in the NATO aggression against our country or allowing their territory to be used for the purposes of that aggression shall be expelled[224]." Paul Watson of the *Los Angeles Times* was the only independent journalist who succeeded in slipping through the net. He was able to travel throughout Kosovo[225] during the approximately 78 days of air strikes whereas the other foreign correspondents were forced to move to Macedonia,

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[222] *Libération*, 22 March 1999, p. 5. See also *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières,* May 1999, no. 138, p.4.
[223] *Le Monde*, 26 March 1999.
[224] Quoted by Denis Hautin-Guiraut, *Le Monde*, 27 March 1999.
[225] Cf. Paul Watson, *Témoin de guerre*, in *Les Cahiers de Médiologie, Croyances en guerre: l'effet Kosovo,* no. 8, second semester 1999, pp. 111-119.

Albania or even Montenegro from where they could report only about the refugee problem.

105. In practice, the conditions necessary for a minimum of transparency in respect of information were completely lacking. Freedom of movement was eliminated which made verifying facts or interviewing witnesses on-site impossible. Statements could not be cross-checked, investigations could not be carried out. The impact on the very essence of the journalist's work was tremendous: information could not be collected, facts could not be checked and cross-checked, processing could not take place. All this was denied to foreign journalists by the Milosevic regime. The fact that journalists were unable to gather and process information explains why they were forced to rely on second-hand sources with all the concomitant risks of error and imprecision. This was even more so when it came to reporting about the on-going ethnic cleansing since the journalists were made dependent on what they heard instead of what they saw with their own eyes in a Kosovo transformed into a session not open to the media[226].

Reasons for the impact of propaganda on public opinion

106. An overview of how propaganda was used in the former Yugoslavia during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and elsewhere as well, demonstrates how war is today more than ever before linked to the control of information and communications. The fact that controlling them is in itself a stake or an additional resource to be used to reach pre-set objectives again shows the importance of "informing" and "making others believe". The total or partial lack of alternative information, the locking out of the media and the enormous power of television are all factors which explain why the great majority of the Serbian population did not see things clearly and accepted the official version.

[226] Jean-Paul Marthoz illustrates this when he writes: "we were thus exposed to a war in delayed time. The information about the situation in Kosovo arrived in drips and drabs through refugees interviewed by the representatives of the humanitarian organisations posted in Albania and Macedonia. Although valuable, the information provided only a partial and delayed view of the violence committed by the Serbian forces and the consequences of the bombings". See "*Une presse qui a refusé le garde-à-vous*" in La guerre du Kosovo: éclairages et commentaires, Bernard Adam, GRIP, Editions Complexe, Brussels, 1999, p. 141.

A population disoriented by a widespread crisis

107. In order to explain why the official propaganda was effective and to understand why it had a permanent impact on the population, it is necessary to keep in mind the conditions in the country which were exceptionally favourable for this in the late 1980s. In addition to the serious social and economic crisis affecting Yugoslavia, and Serbia in particular, which was unable to modernise its industrial infrastructure – not unlike the case almost everywhere else in eastern and central Europe – there was also the gradual rethinking of the regime's ideological nature. The great transformations taking place within the social and economic structures had a direct effect on people's daily lives as did the loss of reference points inherited from many years of Yugoslav communism. Disoriented within its collective beliefs, the Serbian population would be easy prey for nationalist propaganda. Like the critical situation in czarist Russia after 1910 or Germany in the 1930s, Serbia's negative political, economic and social conditions in the late 1980s were fertile ground for the appearance and development of those preaching nationalism and xenophobia.

Support of the regime by the major opinion-formers

108. The propaganda processed by media like *Politika* or *Belgrade Radio and Television* (later known as *Serbian Radio and Television*) prepared and manipulated public opinion thus giving to the Milosevic regime the ability to garner a national political consensus for his policy. Obtaining this consensus was facilitated by the support for him of other opinion-formers: the intellectuals[227], the unions, the educational institutions and especially the Orthodox Church. As an example, we point to the Church's support for the regime's 1989 celebrations of the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of the Field of Blackbirds which organised a travelling media exhibition throughout the republic during

[227] Journalist Stanko Cerovic places great importance on the role of the intellectuals as a factor explaining the passivity of the masses. For him "*the role and betrayal of the intelligentsia are decisive in ideological systems. No totalitarian system can survive without the contribution of the intellectuals. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, at one time or another 90% of the intellectuals lined up behind Milosevic's power and supported the purifying nationalist project. This class had an immense influence on the people*". In *"Is*

which mortuary relics of Prince Lazar were displayed and buried at that symbolic site. Such support convinced many Serbs to back the nationalist program. When we consider that most people tend to define themselves in relation to the opinions prevailing in the groups of which they are members, we can understand that opinion-formers like the Orthodox Church, the intelligentsia and others, helped the State media to forge a general consensus around the Serbian national question. In such a consensual atmosphere, nobody questioned the validity and possible dire consequences of such a plan, at least, nobody among the major opinion-formers to which the Serbian masses had access. The independent press itself found it very difficult not to give in to reflexes touching on issues of identity. As Anne Madelain writes: "*when collective identity is at stake, the 'independent' media often find it difficult to avoid reflexes based on identity and to ensure pluralism. War merely bolsters the phenomenon and although war feeds on propaganda, propaganda also feeds on war*"[228].

Official press: sole source of information for 90% of the Serbs

109. The alternative information and opinions which did run through Serbian society were never made available to the majority of the population. The explanation for this can be found first in the fact that the only media covering all of Serbia were the State radio and television[229]. Although some independent electronic media were tolerated, they had only a limited, sometimes confidential, broadcast range. For example, Radio B92, which was the main provider of information challenging the regime and a podium for the opposition, could be heard only in Belgrade and several large urban centres but almost nowhere else in Serbia. Attempts to widen their broadcast range were all thwarted by the authorities: their transmitter was seized, they were not allowed to broadcast other radio programmes, and so forth.

Information Possible in the Face of Propaganda?" Foundation for the Advancement of Mankind, working document, no. 64, p. 191.

[228] "*Où se trouve la société civile?*", *op. cit.*

[229] "*Milosevic veut serrer la vis aux médias privés*", *Libération*, 11 March 1997.

110. The second factor is that the rest of the republic was carefully kept away from the independent media in the large cities – and Belgrade especially – which were the strongholds of the regime's opposition because it was outside those cities that Milosevic found his greatest support. Belgrade did in fact have the best coverage by the independent media but "*Milosevic's power relied on rural Serbia which was under the domination of the official press*"[230]. In this respect, State television occupied a significant position as the prime medium in the country[231]. Official propaganda therefore reached more than 3.5 million people every evening and was the single source of information for 30% of the population that had not completed primary schooling[232]... The producer Lazar Lalic provides an example which captures the impact of the *RTS* propaganda on certain audiences. Questioned by the *RTS* on the reasons which had led her to volunteer to fight at Vukovar, a young Serbian woman in uniform, mother of two children, said: *"Well, when I watch Television, I see what's going on and I want to help, and it's worth sacrificing my life for this here Serbia of ours"*[233].

Impossibility of a democratic changeover of political power

111. The State television monopoly over information, and to a lesser degree the national radio monopoly, was a guarantee that Slobodan Milosevic would cash in on extraordinary political royalties. The opposition's voice was limited to the urban centres – that is to an audience it had already mostly captured – and reached rural Serbia only now and again. The media advantage would of course pay off in many elections. This was the case in the

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[230] Véronique Soulé, *"Serbie: la difficile survie de la presse indépendante"*, op. cit.

[231] *Alternativna Informativna Mreza* provides extremely interesting viewer statistics: *"Research shows that TV Belgrade was (...) the most significant information medium. In October 1990, the central information program of TV Belgrade, 'Dnevik 2', (Daily News 2, at 7.30 p.m.) on the territory of Serbia with no provinces, was watched by 2.5 million people, i.e. more than 50 per cent of the population (Plavsic, P., Mavric, G., 1991). A year later, in full swing of the war in Croatia, this figure went up to 3 million or 60% of the inhabitants of Serbia over the age of 10 (Group of authors, 1992). Should about thousands spectators in Vojvodina be added to this (according to the data of the RTV Novi Sad), TV news were watched by at least 3.5 million spectators on the territory of Serbia towards the end of 1991"* [as printed]. *Situation of the Media in the Former Yugoslavia, Report to the Commission of the European Union, AIM,* March 1995, pp. 57-58.

[232] Reporters sans frontières, *La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Report, 1993*, p. 338.

[233] *Op.cit.* p.92.

December 1990 elections[234] and the December 1992 elections[235] as well. Shortly before and during the electoral campaign, the official media doubled efforts to ensure victory for the incumbents, Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian Socialist Party, even if the messages put out by the opposition had to be ignored or distorted[236]. The flagrant inequality of the campaign conditions was condemned in an official report drafted by 119 observers sent by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which was particularly critical of the "*shameful propaganda of the State-controlled media and, in particular, television which ignored or altered the message of the opposition.*"[237]

112. The independent print media had barely any impact on the majority of the Serbian population. Hard-hit by the paper shortages caused by the international embargo during the war, written publications were reserved for a privileged urban elite. Although the print media were an important symbol for the democrats who saw the written word as the way to preserve their "mental health", over a ten-year period, they watched their editions dwindle away under the weight of all sorts of obstacles created by those in power and their readers become bankrupt. This did not apply to Serbs living in the countryside and so it was, in fact, the urbanites who suffered the most from the international embargo and the consequences of the war in Kosovo.

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[234] Speaking of the first multi-party elections of December 1990, Dusan Mitevic, an ally of Milosevic and managing director of *RTS*, openly stated: "We must do everything within our power to ensure that the socialists win". Reported by Rade Veljanovski, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
Shortly after the elections in December 1990, Predrag Vitas, the editor-in-chief for news at the *RTS*, stated publicly that the *RTB* had helped Milosevic's party to accede to power (Milica Pesic, *op. cit.*; p.16).

[235] Another example of the media's bias: Milan Panic, a candidate for the presidency and an opponent of Milosevic, would be portrayed as being in league with the enemies of Serbia and as "a drunken sailor roaming the high seas to convince foreigners to support his policy" during the news programme of *Radio Belgrade's* first channel, 1 December 1992. Idem p. 318.

[236] Such a procedure was used as of 30 June 1990 during the first opposition rally of Milosevic's régime: gathered in front of the main television studio and calling for the freedom of the press and multi-party elections, the demonstrators were violently dispersed by policemen who beat them with truncheons. That same evening no pictures of the broken up demonstration were to be seen on *TV Belgrade*'s news. Instead a statement from the Ministry of the Interior was read out: *" The rally is now over, leaving in its wake idle boasts about its "huge attendance". It only served to show that the united Serbian opposition does not enjoy legitimate support of the Serbian people. Mud slinging at the government and primitive anti-communism proved to be of no avail. The united opposition clearly showed its readiness to sacrifice not only democracy on the altar of a power struggle but also our constitution and even territorial integrity. In their blind lust for power they would sacrifice even Kosovo. The rally only taught us that no opposition party, regardless of the ostensibly democratic face it puts on, can count on the support of the Serbian people if it disregards the country's vital interests".* See *"Images and Words of Hate: Year One", Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words*, Lazar Lalic, B 92-ARHITEL, 1996.

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Lack of any critical spirit

113. These characteristics of the Serbian media landscape help us to understand why the population was extremely vulnerable to the propaganda the regime put out, a regime which successful destroyed any critical spirit. It was easier for it to achieve this end because the Yugoslav masses had already been conditioned by decades of communist propaganda. The lack of information, or availability of one-way information only, explains the docility of the Serbian masses in the face of a nationalist regime and policy whose criminal features they did not clearly discern. The people either did not wish to see what was happening or were content to receive their information from official sources only and so were kept ignorant of what was really going on in the federation and Serbia. They were psychologically disposed to believe any type of lie. In this regard, Florence Hartmann reported on the significant work of a team from the Belgrade Institute for Political Studies in July 1992. The team concluded that *"only 20% of the persons interviewed correctly answered the question "Who shelled Sarajevo from the hills overlooking the city in May and June?"*[238]. The remaining 80%, that is the overwhelming majority of those questioned, based their information on only the official sources and were misinformed by the regime's propaganda[239]. This serious situation which deprived the opposition of the chance to express its criticism and convince public opinion to hand over to it the reins of power was made possible by the overwhelming power of State television over all of Serbian society. The journalist from *Le Monde* wrote: *Television in Serbia is playing an increasingly important role in forming opinion. Its deliberate Manichaeism is projected over the entire society which has surrendered all critical spirit to television. The effects of this are disturbing according to the specialists who speak of viewers being hypnotised and of their unbelievable gullibility. Certain studies,* they add,

[237] Reporters sans frontières, *La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Rapport*, p. 343.
[238] *"La presse serbe sous haute surveillance. M. Milosevic contrôle les médias officiels et fait pression sur les indépendants pour promouvoir ses buts de guerre", Le Monde*, 21 November 1992.
[239] In its report *Situation of the Media in the Former Yugoslavia, Report to the Commission of the European Union, Alternativna Informativna Mreza writes about the populations' degree of trust in televised information: "The central information of TV Belgrade is distinguished by great credibility. According to data collected by TV itself, 33.7% of spectators absolutely believe its information, and only 13% express*

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assert that 60% of the population 'blindly believe' in the information they get from television.[240] "

This particularly difficult context explains why clairvoyants of all kinds became more numerous and achieved success throughout the 1990s and why they were omnipresent in the Serbian media. Having perceived the potential value of the occult sciences, the Milosevic regime would exploit them as did Joseph Goebbels. In his personal diary, Goebbels noted "*the need to incorporate the occult sciences into our propaganda (...) we must put pressure on all the clairvoyants to get them to work for us* "[241]. From 1994 onwards, the *Politika* press group, which then owned several magazines devoted to magic, served as a springboard for almost a hundred clairvoyants and fortune-tellers who, according to a Belgrade divination agency owner, had been asked by "*those in power not to speak ill of the government and to propagate positive energy*"[242]. To cite one example amongst others: *The Third Eye*, one of the oldest magic magazines founded by the Yugoslav government, would assert in its "Horoscope" column that Slobodan Milosevic's destiny was to lead Yugoslavia: "*The stars are favourable to Slobodan Milosevic. He has many enemies but this was to be expected. He is the best of all men and it is not unusual that many people wish to drive him from power. He was born a Leo and Yugoslavia under the sign of Taurus, which proves that they cannot be separated.*"[243]

Yet, it was again *RTS* that would push the use of parapsychology to its limits for propaganda purposes by broadcasting the messages of hate it conveyed during peak viewing hours. In early 1993, the weekly programme "*Milja's Horoscope*", presented by Milja Vujanovic who claimed to be an astrologist, historian and reporter (and was in addition a former actress and Miss Yugoslavia), would be rescheduled from its late evening slot on *RTS*'s Channel Three (3K) to peak viewing time - at 20:15 hours on Tuesdays. The researchers, Elena Popovic and Vladimir Badinovac, who studied the political astrology programmes from March to May 1993 summed up their role as follows: "*What Milja Vujanovic explains, regardless of the occasional invoking of*

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disbelief (Timotic, M., 1991). Young spectators express much less trust in this medium (B. Dzuverovic et al., 1992)", op. cit., p. 58.

[240] *Idem.*

[241] Quoted by Jelena Grujic in "Milosevic brandit l'arme parapsychologique", The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 June 2000.

[242] *Idem.*

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astrology symbols (...) easily translates into everyday political language. What we have here is the glorification of the Serb nation, the total negation of everything that is different and the justification for spreading the policies of this state authority. And so, astrology is usually found in the role of an instrument of hate speech."[244] The women who depicted the Serbs as "a people chosen by Heaven" and who spoke of "the Satanism" of the western powers at a time when the Federal Army was shelling Vukovar in Autumn 1991 would officiate over such ceremonies for the Belgrade regime for a whole decade. The regime would find ways to express its gratitude to her. After her husband shot and wounded her in spring 2000, *Vecernje Novosti*, one of the regime's two leading newspapers, would publish a daily health update on the former Miss Yugoslavia for several weeks.

The blurred boundary between information, astrology and propaganda could not be better illustrated than by the 1993 New Year's message which was broadcast to Serbian television viewers on the *RTS* 19:30 news whilst war was raging in Croatia and Bosnia: *"The 'Dnevnik' magazine in its New Year issue reports on clairvoyant predictions for this year, Zorika Cvetkovic, astronumerologist from Belgrade, whose predictions about this war have come true, sees the boundaries of the third Yugoslavia expanding and the Serbs living in a confederate state".*[245]

January 2003

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[243] *Ibidem.*

[244] *"RTS Channel Three, Astrology in the Function of Hatred"*, in *Hate Speech, An Analysis of the Content of Domestic Media in the First Part of 1993, Centre for Anti-War Action*, Belgrade, 1994, p. 62.

[245] *"Images and Words of Hate: TV News at 7:30 P.M."*, B92, Foundation for Right to Pictures and Words, Lazar Lalic, ARHITEL, 1998.

ANNEX 107:

LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE DUBROVNIK-NERETVA POLICE TO THE HEAD OF THE CRIME POLICE ADMINISTRATION ZAGREB, 1 APRIL 2010

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
DUBROVNIK-NERETVA POLICE ADMINISTRATION

No.: 511-03-01-OGR-244/3-09
Date: 1 April 2010

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THE RoC
POLICE DIRECTORATE
CRIME POLICE ADMINISTRATION
for the attention of Mr. Vitomir Bijelić, head
ZAGREB

SUBJECT: Application of the RoC filed against Serbia before the International Court of
Justice, Republic of Serbia's Counter-Memorial,
report, delivered.-

Dear Sir,
(...)

In this respect and with regard to the allegation on the number of dead in this area during the Homeland War, stated in para. 921 of the said Counter-Memorial, we wish to inform you that the policemen of this Police Administration, in cooperation with the County State Attorney's Office in Dubrovnik and the SOA (Security and Intelligence Agency), have established that between 1 October 1991 and 3 August 1995, 123 civilians died. For all dead civilians there are either records on the external examination of the corpse written by the investigating judge of the then District Court in Dubrovnik or notices of death and coroner's certificates or witness statements on the circumstances of death of certain persons given to the investigating judge, while for a certain number of the dead there are also photo-documents of civilian (and military) victims.

(...)

Yours sincerely,

HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION
Tonči Glumac

ANNEX 108:
LETTER FROM THE COUNCIL FOR SUCCESSION TO MILITARY PROPERTY TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 23 NOVEMBER 2010

URGENT
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

COUNCIL FOR SUCCESSION TO MILITARY PROPERTY

CLASS: 720-09/10-01/01
REG. NO.: 512-12-10-60

Zagreb, 23 November 2010

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Office for Cooperation with International Criminal Courts
Head
Mr. Gordan Markotić

SUBJECT: Request from the Office for Cooperation with International Criminal Courts,
dated 22 November 2010
- reply given below.

Dear Sir,

in reply to the email enquiry of 22 November 2010 relating to the case brought by Croatia before the International Court of Justice against Serbia, the Council for Succession to Military Property, by availing itself of the results obtained and knowledge gained during the writing of the study "Reconstruction of the JNA Military Leadership From January 1990 To May 1992", states the following:

1. as regards the number of generals who crossed to the Croatian Army:

The greatest number of high-ranking JNA corps of Croatian ethnicity or any other ethnicity, who had been born in the Republic of Croatia, did not put themselves at the disposal of the Republic of Croatia, i.e. the Croatian Army

(hereinafter referred to as: the "HV"), either at the start of the war or later. Out of a total of 235 generals who were active during the said period, only seven generals and admirals, i.e. around three per cent of the total general corps, did this. Specifically, no more than three active generals (Josip Ignac, Petar Stipetić and Ivan Štimac), two retired generals (Anton Tus and Tomislav Biondić – retired at the start of the 1990's) and two active admirals (Josip Erceg and Božidar Grubišić) joined the ranks of the HV. All other active generals and admirals remained on the opposite side (in active service or retired or they stayed on in the Republic of Croatia and did not put themselves at the disposal of the HV as, for instance, Major-General Zvonimir Tonković). Only three generals (Janko Bobetko, Stanko Matić and Martin Špegelj) and one admiral (Sveto Letica) came out of retirement into which they had gone before 1990, i.e. before the period in question. If one takes into account the total number of officer corps, the situation regarding senior JNA officers holding the ranks of major – colonel (around 6-7%) was almost identical.

2. as regards the number of Croats – commanders of "A" classification army units west of the river Drina from the level of regiment and upwards (brigade, corps, military district) and their ethnicities:

On the basis of the knowledge gained by members of the Council for Succession to Military Property during their two years of work on the study "Reconstruction of the JNA Military Leadership from January 1990 to May 1992" it follows that in the territory of the SFRY west of the river Drina only one Croat (Colonel Vlado Hodalj) had commanded an "A" formation brigade (the 13th Proletarian Motorised Brigade based in Ilirska Bistrica). Colonel Hodalj left the JNA at the end of July 1991. The Council is not aware of any other JNA officer of Croat ethnicity who had commanded an "A" formation brigade in the territory of the SFRY west of the river Drina either at the start of the Homeland War (summer of 1991) or, in particular, during the Homeland War (from the autumn of 1991 until the end of the Homeland War).

Yours faithfully,

COUNCIL PRESIDENT

Želimir Latković

To be delivered to:
1. addressee
2. Mr. Pjer Šimunović, State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of the RoC,
3. archives, here.

ANNEX 109:

LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE CRIME POLICE DIRECTORATE TO THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE FOR COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, 1 DECEMBER 2010

RESTRICTED

Copy 1 of 2

2nd NVD /expansion unknown/
- By courier

/Coat of Arms of the Republic of Croatia/
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
POLICE HEADQUARTERS
CRIME POLICE DIRECTORATE
Sector for General Crime, Terrorism and War Crimes
Department for War Crimes

Number: 511-01-88/3-ORG-2135/09
Zagreb, 01 December 2010

To: MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Office for Cooperation with the International Criminal Courts
Attn.: Mr. Gordan Markotić, Head of Office

ZAGREB
Mesnička 23

Subject: Lawsuit of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ against Serbia
Submission of the Report

Dear Sir,
…….

Civilians killed in the territory of the Dubrovnik – Neretva County

In the course of the Homeland War, in the territory of the Dubrovnik – Neretva Police Directorate 123 civilians were killed in the period from 01

October 1991 until 03 August 1995. The said number of the killed civilians has been adjusted to the data of the County Public Prosecutor's Office in Dubrovnik and with the SOA /Security and Intelligence Agency/ of the Dubrovnik Centre.

With regard to the figure stated in the previous Report of the Dubrovnik - Neretva PU /Police Directorate/ of 161 killed civilians, we herewith inform you that this number included the killed members of the active and reserve formations of the RH MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, Dubrovnik – Neretva Police Directorate as well as the volunteers who took part in the defence of the sovereignty of the RH together with the reserve police formations.

……

Yours sincerely,

CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT
Branko Turić
/illegible signature/

/round stamp/: The Republic of Croatia
Ministry of the Interior
Zagreb

ANNEX 110:
ZVONIMIR SEVER, "CONSEQUENCES IF THE PERUČA DAM WAS DESTROYED", ELEKTROPROJEKT

ZVONIMIR SEVER, BSc Civil Eng.
ELEKTROPROJEKT

CONSEQUENCES IF THE PERUČA DAM WAS DESTROYED

SUMMARY

The Peruča Dam was deliberately mined on 28 February 1993, which was an event thus far unprecedented in the world.

The dam was mined by the Serbian paramilitary forces with the intention of destroying it, thus causing the flooding of hundreds of millions of cubic meters of water from the impounded lake to devastate the area downstream of the dam.

The dam was badly damaged, but it was not destroyed. The reason for this lies in the fact that the water did not overspill over the dam crest because the water level in the lake was approximately 5 m lower than the one that was counted upon by the devisers of the plan to destroy the dam. The credit for this goes to United Nations Peace Forces, which, at the time when they had control over the dam, kept the weir overflow at the dam lowered and blocked, so that the water level in the lake was maintained at 356 m above sea level (m.s.l.).

This article gives an overview of the possible consequences that would have occurred had the dam been destroyed.

The consequences were estimated based on the examination of propagation of the water wave that would have occurred in the case of destruction of the Peruča dam, which was carried out on a physical model.

1. MAIN DATA ON THE THREATENED AREA

For the purposes of a better understanding of the potential damage that would have occurred in the case of destruction of the Peruča dam, this article presents the main data about the dam and potentially threatened downstream area.

The Peruča dam is located in the canyon of the River Cetina, 76.5 km from the river mouth where it flows into the Adriatic Sea. Downstream from the dam, the Cetina exits the canyon and flows through the fertile fields Hrvatačko and Sinjsko Polje, while the lower Cetina enters the gorge again, creating magnifi-

cent waterfalls Velika Gubavica (48 m) and Mala Gubavica (10 m), and flows into the Adriatic Sea by the town of Omiš. (See images No. 1 and No. 5)
A number of towns are situated along the River Cetina, most of them in Hrvatačko and Sinjsko Polje, with the total of 60,000 inhabitants. The largest town is Sinj with around 20,000 citizens, and it is located 19 km downstream of the Peruča dam.

Intensive agricultural production is developed in the area of Hrvatačko and Sinjsko Polje and there are many agricultural facilities.

Downstream of the dam four hydroelectric power plants have been built: Peruča, Đale, Kraljevac and Zakučac, including balancing reservoir Prančevići for the hydroelectric power plant Zakučac.

Due to very high water purity, the River Cetina is very important for water supply. Apart from the built-up areas next to the Cetina itself, it is used to supply water to the towns in the Makarska Riviera on the Adriatic Sea cost, including the islands of Brač, Hvar and Šolta.

2. EXAMINING THE PROPAGATION OF THE WATER WAVE IN THE CASE OF DESTRUCTION OF THE DAM

Examining the propagation of the water wave in the case of destruction of the Peruča dam was carried out on the physical model.

These tests were carried out twice, first in 1981 while the downstream dam and Đale hydroelectric power plant had still not been built, and the second time several years later when the impact of the dam and Đale hydroelectric power plant on the water wave propagation were taken into account in the testing.

The physical model was built directly downstream of the Peruča dam, and it included the impoundment and the entire Cetina River area downstream of the dam to its mouth into the Adriatic Sea. The model is not scaled equally in horizontal and vertical direction, so for lengths it measures 1:1000 and for heights 1:100. The roughness was modelled by spraying with a compound of the particles with grain-size distribution 0-2 mm, bonded with cement slurry. The model spread across the area of 1000 m2.

Chainage was marked along the entire length of the configuration and contour lines were marked to facilitate the monitoring of events. The model also simulates all larger built-up areas and significant objects, such as factories, hydroelectric power plants, bridges etc.

The process of water wave propagation was recorded electronically at 30 mea-

suring points. In order to obtain authentic results, testing of each version of destruction was carried out three times.
Along with the electronic recording, all tests were shot with a TV camera.

Destruction of the Peruča dam was simulated as immediate and total. The spatial and temporal features of water wave propagation on the model were examined for four water levels in the lake:

a)	the maximum level	361.50 m.s.l. -	Version I
b)	lower operating level	350.00 m.s.l. -	Version II
c)	mean operating level	340.00 m.s.l. -	Version III
d)	lowest operating level	329.50 m.s.l. -	Version IV

In Version I, the simulated inflow in the impoundment corresponds to the maximum capacity of the Peruča dam evacuation facilities. In all the above versions the forming of the water wave downstream of the Peruča dam was simulated by its destruction at the moment of flooding and the maximum height of the Adriatic Sea at the level of + 1.5 m.s.l.

It has to be noted that these tests were performed at the time when Croatia was still part of the former Yugoslavia and they were treated as military secret, while the documents on the testing had to be handed to the former Yugoslav Army for safekeeping.

3. WATER WAVE MOTION DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING

3.1 Water wave motion and destructive force

The water wave caused by the destruction of the Peruča dam has the highest force directly downstream of the Peruča dam. With a prominent wave front, the wave is moving almost head-on through Hrvatačko and Sinjsko Polje to the Han ravine. On this stretch, the wave speed measures 37 m/sec (133 km/h). The wave damages and partially destroys Peruča hydroelectric power plant, it destroys one bridge, all the built-up areas next to the riverbank, and it causes strong erosion of the fertile soil. The wave front reaches the Han ravine in 15 minutes, while the maximum flooding level of approximately 25 m at the Han ravine, when several villages become deluged, occurs after 1h 45'. (See image No. 6).

In the narrow ravine between Hrvatačko and Sinjsko Polje, near the towns of Han and Otok, supercritical flow is formed. On this stretch, the torrent topples down the bridge at Han and the houses near the seacoast, causing serious soil erosion.

When it reaches the wide-stretching Sinjsko Polje, the wave front starts to spread considerably in altitude and spatially. The speed of the wave is also significantly reduced, and consequently its destructive force. At the speed 5.5 m/sec, the flood wave reaches the town of Trilj in 1h 30', where it re-enters a narrow canyon. Due to the reduced flow profile in the canyon, downstream of Trilj, the water accumulates in Sinjsko Polje and reaches the highest flooding level. In this case, the water floods part of the town of Sinj, certain industrial facilities, roads, several villages, and it threatens and damages the power-house of Orlovac hydroelectric power plant. All the facilities of the flood protection system in Sinjsko Polje would be either destroyed or heavily damaged (See image No. 6).

In the town of Trilj, the torrent would destroy the bridge, while the town itself is flooded under 11 m of water. The flood wave in Trilj reaches its maximum in 10 hours after the destruction of the Peruča dam.

In the canyon downstream of Trilj, a 10 m high flood wave floods and destroys the Đale dam and seriously damages the hydroelectric power plant. The flood wave hydrograph at the Đale dam is presented in image No. 6. This dam would be destroyed in around 2 hours after the devastation of the Peruča Dam (see image No. 3).

Downstream of the Đale dam, a 4 m high flood wave inundates and damages the Prančevići dam, and it terminates the operation of hydroelectric power plant Zakučac. According to the calculations for such flooding conditions, the Prančevići dam would not be destroyed (see image No. 4).

Downstream from the Prančevići dam the flood wave inundates the access area and switchyard of hydroelectric power plant Zakučac and part of the town of Omiš on the Adriatic Sea coast. The maximum depth of water in this area measures around 2.8 m from the bridge level at the mouth of the River Cetina, and it is reached about 5 hours after the destruction of the Peruča dam. The water wave would subside after 20 hours from the destruction of the Peruča dam (see image No. 5).

These consequences correspond to the case when the level of water in the lake in the moment of the destruction of the dam measures 361.50 m above the seal level.

For lower lake water levels, 350.00 m.s.l. and 340.00 m.s.l., the consequences are slightly less severe, relating mostly to the height of the wave front, which, in the two latter cases, is a little lower. However, the flooding level is approximately the same as for the highest water level in the lake.

3.2 Death toll

A larger number of casualties may be expected mainly in Hrvatačko Polje, directly downstream of the Peruča dam.

On this stretch, the flood wave flows at the speed exceeding 130 km/h with a very high wave front. The inhabitants of several villages in this area, around 3000 to 4000 people, would virtually have no time to evacuate because the wave would reach them in less than 10 minutes.

There should be no casualties in Sinjsko Polje as, owing to the Han ravine, the wave front would reach this area in 1 hour counting from the destruction of the Peruča dam, while the maximum water level is reached after 10 hours, so that with a timely notification there would be time for evacuation (see image No. 6).

The situation is the same in the rest of the downstream area.

According to the calculations, 2000-3000 people would die, and 40-50 thousand would have to be evacuated.

3.3 Environmental consequences

Destruction of the Peruča dam would also cause a genuine environmental disaster.

Due to the force of the water wave in the fertile Hrvatačko Polje next to the dam, the fertile soil would erode. Since the layer of fertile soil in this area is relatively thin, it is justifiable to assume that agricultural production in this field would disappear. The erosion would also partially affect the fertile Sinjsko Polje.

Due to sedimentation of the debris from the devastated dam, the volume of which is 870 000 m3, the entire area would be left virtually dead.

The River Cetina, due to strong erosion, would surely change its riverbed, thus causing additional difficulties.

Considering that hydroelectric power plant Peruča stores almost 90 tons of oil for regular running of the hydroelectric power plant, its spillage into the River Cetina would pollute ground waters and the karst springs, which supply with water 300.000 inhabitants of Split and the surrounding area.

4. CONCLUSION

Luckily, the Peruča dam was not destroyed.

The people planning this preposterous action were well aware of the consequences of the destruction of the dam because they had a study describing the testing on the physical model, which was kept as a military secret in the Yugoslav Army General Staff in Belgrade. The proof of this is the fact that, during the entire period when they were in control of the lake, the Yugoslav Army kept the lake water level at its highest point of 361.50 m.s.l. This level matches Version I of the testing of the water wave propagation on a model, resulting in the gravest consequences.

Owing to the efforts of international institutions, urgent and correct intervention of the experts from Hrvatska elektroprivereda (Croatian Power Company) after explosives were laid, and selfless help of the locals, the disaster was prevented after all. Honourable contribution was provided by ICOLD, in particular its president dr. Wolfgang Pircher, who was actively participating in the events on the dam since December 1991.

It may be assumed that the consequences of the destruction of the Peruča dam, supposing it was destroyed instantly, would not fully correspond to those obtained in the testing on the physical model, that they would be somewhat diminished. If, very optimistically, it is assumed that the consequences would be lessened by as much as 50%, even then we can talk about a genuine disaster that would destroy the results of labour of several generations, people would be killed and a huge area would be ecologically ruined.

We can only hope that something like this will never happen again anywhere in the world.

ANNEX 111:
EXTRACT FROM A. MILETIĆ, KONCENTRACIONI LOGOR JASENOVAC [JASENOVAC CONCENTRATION CAMP], VOL. III, 1987, BELGRADE, P. 573

A. Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac ("Jasenovac Concentration Camp"), vol. III, 1987, Belgrade, p. 573



Radna grupa Odbora SANU za sakupljanje grade o genocidu protiv srpskog i drugih naroda u XX veku u poseti Spomen-području Jasenovac 11 i 12. oktobra 1985. godine. Sleva: Milos Macura, akademik, Mile Drugic; direktor muzeja NOB u Novskoj, dr Duro Mesterovic, general-pukovnik u penziji, Vladimir Dedijer, akademik, Antun Miletic, pukovnik JNA i Dr Milan Bulajic.

SANU Committee working group for collecting material on the genocide against the Serbian and other nations in the 20th century in a visit to Jasenovac Memorial on 11 and 12 October 1985. From the left: Milos Macura, academician, Mile Dragic, director of NOB museum in Novska, Ph.D. Duro Mesterovic, retired Lieutenant General, Vladimir Dedijer, academician, Antun Miletic, JNA colonel and Ph.D. Milan Bulajic

ANNEX 112:
"TRUCE IN CROATIA ON EDGE OF COLLAPSE", THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 AUGUST 1991

The New York Times

World

Truce in Croatia on Edge of Collapse

By CHUCK SUDETIC
Published: August 20, 1991

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Aug. 19 — Fighting in the Yugoslav republic of Croatia over the weekend and today has brought the teetering cease-fire declared 12 days ago to the verge of collapse.

Fierce gun battles and mortar attacks between ethnic Serb rebels and Croatian militias and police units were reported in Pakrac, Vrgin Most and at least a half-dozen other Croatian towns today, but casualty figures are still unavailable.

At least 42 people died in fighting in Croatia over the weekend, a Croatian Internal Affairs Ministry statement released today said.

The most serious exchanges between rebel Serbs and Croatian forces erupted on Friday and Sunday near Okucani, a town in a strategically important strip of land linking Serb enclaves in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with some Serb-populated villages in Croatia's eastern panhandle. The area also contains key sections of the main highway and rail line between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Armored units of the Yugoslav national army moved into the Okucani area to separate the warring sides on Saturday. Similar actions in the past by the army, while sometimes resulting in a falloff in fighting, have solidified gains made by Serb rebels.

A prominent military leader of the Serb rebels battling with Croatia said in a newspaper interview published in Belgrade today that the Serbs are aiming at a seaport and two other key Croatian towns outside the area they presently control.

"We will soon gain control of Petrinje, Karlovac and Zadar because it has been shown that it is in our interest and the interest of the army to have a large port," said Milan Martic, a Serb who calls himself the "defense minister" of Krajina, the region of Croatia held by the rebels. Zadar is an Adriatic port city mostly populated by Croats.

"The mood of the Serb people is such that they will no longer accept any kind of autonomy, not even the territorial autonomy being offered," Mr. Martic said, referring to offers issued by Croatian officials in Zagreb. "The territory that the Krajina militia and territorial defense forces control will forever be Serbian." 'No Need to Hide It'

Mr. Martic admitted that the uprising of Serbs in Croatia was organized and not spontaneous, adding that he sees no chance that the crumbling cease-fire will regain strength.

"We answered their regrouping and arming, because we have artillery and air support and the army on our side, and there is no need to hide it," he said, referring to Serb military action against the Croats since the cease-fire was declared.

The rebels have taken over about 15 percent of the Croatian republic's land area in the uprising that began last August.

Croatian leaders have long accused the Yugoslav federal army of siding with the rebels, an allegation that top army officers deny. Jewish Building Bombed

Early this morning a bomb exploded in the offices of a Jewish organization in Zagreb, damaging the front of the building but injuring no one. A bomb also exploded in the Croatian capital's Jewish cemetery.

No individual or group has taken responsibility for the blasts, but Croatia's Government was quick to call the acts a provocation by forces attempting to drive a wedge between Croats and the republic's tiny population of Jews s, which along with the republic's Serbs suffered severely from atrocities carried out by Croatia's Nazi-installed Government during World War II.

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Index by Keyword

ANNEX 113:
EXHIBITION SITES OF "THE DEAD OPEN THE EYES TO THE LIVING"



Traveling Exhibition "Jasenovac Concentration Camp" 1941-1945

Data taken from Poruka, Report on the work of SPJ 1988, newspaper article for Petrinja

ANNEX 114:
EXCERPT OF TRANSCRIPT, "THE UNIT" SERBIAN TELEVISION DOCUMENTARY (B92 NETWORK)

THE UNIT

The Wednesday of the March 12, 2003 rose as a sunny, almost spring day. Things were as usual in Kula, at the "Radoslav Kostić" Centre of the Special Operation Units of the Serbian Government Awakening, exercise, training according to the plan and programme. In fact, only a few knew what these people were doing. The media sucked up to them, the politicians respected them, the army and the police bowed to them and the entire Serbia was afraid. They were also known as "The Red Barrettes" or by a short and bloody simple name "The Unit" The news that at 12 hours and 15 minutes the Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was hit by a sniper shot reached Kula in twenty minutes. Quarantine was announced at once. Members of "Red Barrettes" started arriving to the main base. From the Headquarters of the Scuba diving - diversion team located on Sava river, members of the department for security of persons and buildings, logistics people from Lipovica base, advanced combat group in Vranje. On the same evening, during the gathering the Unit experienced a collective shock.

ANNOUNCER: The Government of Republic of Serbia in tonight's announcement accused Milorad Luković Legija and a group known as "Zemunski klan" as the person behind the killing of the Prime Minister of Serbia Zoran Đinđić."

Although, at that time, he was only 35, Legija had already been retired as a colonel. But, for The Unit, he still was the first, the real and the only commander. Although in Serbia state of emergency was declared, the Red Barettes have eagerly been waiting on any kind of assignment for days. They never got one. Accused for a whole series of crimes, on March 22, 2002 a larger part of the commanding officers and several members of the Unit were apprehended. Three days later this formation was dismissed in silence. How did it happen that a man, who once was described by Đinđić as one of the heroes of the "5th Octobre", became accused as the main organizer of his murder? How was it possible that the assistant commander of SOU (Special Operations' Unit), lieutenant colonel Zvezdan Jovanović, was accused as the person who pulled the trigger? How come that the most severe political crimes in Serbia - murders, assassinations, abductions were performed by members of The Unit? In order to reach at least some answers, we must go back to the very beginning.

PART I

This beginning could be the night between the third and fourth of April 1991 when a group of armed, glum and nervous men left Belgrade for Knin. Out

of these five, two were important, Franko Simatović Frenki and Dragan Vasiljković, later known as Captain Dragan.

CAPTAIN DRAGAN: On 3rd April I called him and said to him: "Frenki, I'm not waiting any longer; I'm going down, with or without you."

Was it really exactly like that? Today, a golf instructor, in 1990 Captain Dragan, as he said himself, knew very little about the problems in ex Yugoslavia. In return, for a long time the public will know even less about this former resident of the Home for abandoned children in Belgrade, and the army officer in Australia and a hireling of the mining companies in East Africa, not even his last name.

In fact, Frenki was Captain's Dragan boss. Of Croatian origins, from a partisan family, Frenki was a rising star of the State Security of Serbia at that time and also the leader of the trip. He was active in Kninska Krajina since the summer of 1990 and had a strong influence on local Serbian politicians. The Unit will be the peak of his career. The very formation in which thirteen years later Legija and his closest associate Zvezdan Jovanović will have the final word. Frenki and Captain Dragan were no tourists. The war was on the horizon. Serbian Democratic Party from Knin has not accepted Croatia's independence - the main goal of Franjo Tuđman's ruling Croatian Democratic Association. While Zagreb was reinforcing its police in a threatening way, SDP has pronounced Serbian Autonomous District - "Krajina" in municipalities with Serbian majority. SDP has blocked the borders of Krajina with road barricades, puting its trust in Serbia and the last remaining pole of the federal, socialistic state - JNA.

BLAGOJE ADŽIĆ (Chief of the Headquarter JNA): In fact, the breakdown of Yugoslavia has already been going on for some time. It was end of the 80's when Slobodan Milošević was the first one to open the Pandora's box of ethnic confrontations. He was a populist, hungry for power who manipulated with the dissatisfaction of Serbia caused by the situation in Kosovo, and who turned to nationalism in order to avoid democratisation of the country in the eve of the fall of Berlin wall. Soon, all national leaders in other republics followed his footsteps. However, in the moment when Frenki and Captain Dragan were rushing towards Knin, Milošević was not doing so well. Some twenty days earlier, on March 9, 1991 protests of the Serbian democratic opposition shook Milošević's authoritarian regime by its foundations. He was saved, and barely, by his ideological ally JNA and its tanks. Although, Milošević stood behind Krajina from its establishment, the position of Serbs in Croatia managed to divide the opposition and weaken its demands for democratisation of Serbia, calling it to national unity, while, as he claimed, the survival of the part of Serbian people was severely endangered, which additionally increased the nationalistic passion. But, the rallies and propaganda were not enough any more. In his speech on March 16, 1991, at a closed session with the presidents

of municipalities of Serbia, Milošević, among other things, promised to establish The Unit as a way to help Serbs in Krajina. "The Goverment got a task to prepare appropriate formations that will ensure our security at all times, and make us capable to defend interests of our Republic, and by God, the interest of the Serbian people outside of Serbia as well", Milošević said. The execution of the order to establish The Unit was entrusted to one of the most trusted and most capable Milošević's associates.

JOVICA STANIŠIĆ (Head of the State Security of Serbia): I am Jovica Stanišić, the chief of State Security of Serbia.

Stanišić, after finishing high school, took the enrolment exam at the university to become a film director. He failed. He enrolled the Faculty of Politic Sciences and as soon as he graduated, started working at the State Security. He started in 1975 as a basic operations officer. 15 years later Stanišić was the Head of the Service that was one of the pillars of the Milošević regime. Stanišić was not an office type. During 1990 and 1991 he visited Knin on several occasions and talked to all important Serbian politicians and policemen. A year later, they will, during the Day of Security celebration, thank Stanišić for his support and understanding.

DRAGO KOVAČEVIĆ (Knin city Mayor) Jovica Stanišić was known as the follower of Krcun, Ranković, etc. tradition. He, on that Day of Police, I think it was then, in 1992, which also seemed as a very improvident act when I heard about it, was awarded by the plaque of Krajina Police which was handed to him by Martić. It was done publicly, in the JNA Hall, on some celebration.

Frenki was at that time constantly present in this area acting as Stanišić's eye, ear and right hand.

CAPTAIN DRAGAN: Frenki is an intelligence officer. During that period this segment of the service worked on collecting information from the field.

Frenki not only collected but delivered as well. Through the State Security of Serbia, which he represented, the leaders of the SDP acquired guns for their activists. Since he was doing very well at that, Stanišić entrusted him, being and operative capable of anything, with the formation of The Unit in the field. However, Yugoslavia still existed, so, The Unit was not supposed to have a formal connection with Belgrade. For this reason, Frenki, could not count on the Serbian Police. With complete logistic support of the State Security he was supposed to find and recruit people by himself. Captain Dragan, was exactly the type of man Frenki was looking for, absolutely unknown, with military education and with a spirit for adventure. Frenki probably remembered that Captain Dragan was in Knin as early as October 1991 and that his offer to train Krajina policemen remained unanswered.

16.30 - 21.32

In spring 1991 the number of armed incidents increased in Eastern Slavonija, followed by increased JNA involvement. The State Security was facing serious challenges in this part of Croatia, along the border with Serbia. Serbs had no dominant majority here, nor the political infrastructure as in the remaining parts of Krajina. SDP, thus, much more depended on the support from Belgrade, and had much more need for The Unit. During the night between 1st and 2nd of May 1991, things revealed in their true colours. On that occasion, along with one villager of Serbian nationality, twelve Croatian police officers were killed, and several dozen more were wounded during the big clash in Borovo Selo. Was the local Serbian police capable and organised enough for such an action? Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, a Party established by the State Security, hurried to explain how a group of his četniks was the first to clash with the Croatian police, and that the villagers joined them afterwards. However, six years later, during celebration of the Day of The Unit, Frenki, in his speech, implicated that someone much more serious and better trained was present in Borovo Selo at that time.

FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ FRENKI: It has been constituted on 3 May 2009, during the period of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and from its establishment it acted in the function of protecting national security in conditions of direct existential danger of the Serbian people in its entire ethnic area.

Why was May 4th chosen for the Day of The Unit and not some other day connected with Knindža or Golubić? Was it because during the clash in Borovo selo, two days earlier the collaborators of the State Security, that will later on form the core of The Unit, participated as well, or did Stanišić formally sign the decision on its establishment that day? Be as it may, a group of most trusted associates gathered around Milošević. They shall be the ones who, with the help of The Unit, will develop a mechanism for financing Krajina armed forces and the regime in Serbia, through state supported smuggling of arms, oil, cigarettes and similar goods. This group was informally called "The Army Line". Apart from Frenki and Stanišić, it included the president of the parliamentary committee for Serbs outside Serbia, Radmilo Bogdanović, the Minister without portfolio Mihalj "Bracika" Kertes and the commander of the Special Police Antiterrorism Unit, Radovan Stojičić Badža . The Army Line clearly knew that in Eastern Slavonia, the leadership of SDP had neither the authority, nor the capacity to organise the Serbian army, and that it was not possible to organise The Unit, as it was done in Knin. Therefore, someone with much stronger mandate then Stanišić, should be sent to this area. Energetic, obsessed with martial arts and respected after the success of his special units in breaking the strike of Albanian miners in Stari Trg, Badža proved to be the right choice. Eastern Slavonia, located on the very border with Serbia, significantly richer than rest of the Krajina, was an irresistible bait for self-proclaimed vojvodas and weekend warriors. As soon as he was appointed the commander of the Serbian Territorial Defence, Badža promptly formed his

part of The Unit, presenting it as just another out of many volunteer groups.

Arkans tigers (singing): Serbia is rising, Serbia is rising, it is sleepy no more, it is sleepy no more, sore wound of Kosovo, sore wound of Kosovo, all for peace of days from long ago, all for peace of days from long ago.

What to say about the most popular Serbian paramilitary commander, Željko Ražnjatović Arkan?! Although, a lot of people think that Arkan and his Serbian volunteer guard are somewhat indigenous occurrences, they were merely the Badža's part of The Unit formed by the State Security, same as Frenki's part in Knin. After a series of spectacular armed robberies and even more spectacular prison escapes in Western Europe, Arkan settled in Belgrade at the beginning of 80's. He had no problems with the law, regardless of the fact that he was placed on the red warrant of Interpol, among other things for wounding two Swedish policemen. He had no problems in 1986 either, when he again wounded two policemen, this time Yugoslav. The word on the street was that he participated in liquidations of political emigrants engaged by the State Security Service Alliance, the fact he proved himself at a court proceeding when he presented a loan contract verified by the police. In the eve of the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Arkan was caught in the public eye as the leader of Delija's - Crvena Zvezda football club fans.

ANNEX 115:
EXCERPT OF TRANSCRIPT, "BLOODY GRAPE HARVEST", SERBIAN TELEVISION DOCUMENTARY (B92 NETWORK), JULY 2007

BLOODY GRAPE HARVEST
Author: Drago Hedl
Production: B92 Network
Date: July 2007
Television documentary, transcript

GENERAL ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIĆ [Hague, 12 March 2003, testifying in front of the ICTY, Case no. IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic]: "Incomplete information from Security Department of the 1st Military District... that a larger group of civilians was killed in a mine field and that those civilians were forced to go into the mine filed as a human shield by Dušan Silni Detachment. The following day I composed short information regarding the event for the Federal Secretary and the core military leadership, his closest associates, and I requested more detailed information on the event from the Security Organs. I received it on the 24 and it contained a more detailed description of the event: first of all that Dušan Silni Detachment, in that village, was under the jurisdiction and supervision of Commander Ljubo Devetak, then that they, before this, before this crime occurred, members of Dušan Silni Detachment had been interrogating some Coats from the village and during the interrogation they had killed four of them. The following day, when a Territorial Defence Detachment from Valjevo was supposed to conduct a search of the terrain around the village, members of Dušan Silni selected some 30 villagers, Croats, they were mostly elderly people, and used them as a human shield as they searched the terrain. They encountered a mine field where 17 people were killed, 14 villagers and 3 members of Dušan Silni Detachment. This is a short recap of the event."

ANNOUNCER: "On 10th of October 1991, JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ units and paramilitary formations consisting of volunteers from Serbia occupied Lovas, a village situated at the border between Serbia and Croatia, some 120 km north of Belgrade. At the time, Lovas had a population of 1700, and according to a census from that year, 86% of them were Croats. There was no significant resistance because poorly armed Croats could not do anything, as they were outnumbered and the enemy, JNA members and the paramilitary volunteers' formations, were better armed. In the chaos that followed, no one could tell who was actually in control, JNA, paramilitary formations that mostly looted, or the haphazardly established military civilian government of the local Serbs with the newly appointed director of the agricultural co-operative Ljuban Devetak."

Ljuban Devetak, director of the agricultural co-operative in Lovas '91-'93: "A

TO /Territorial Defence/ unit came to the village, about 400 men, with their Commander Captain Veljević, and one troop even spend the night, 10 to 11, at the co-operative facilities situated before the village, where they went after that, I do not know. And we did, so to say, they took over the village completely, they held all the roads towards the village and controlled comings and goings, it was impossible to leave the village without their pass."

SLAVKO BOŽIĆ, villager from Lovas: "What I know about Ljuban, the day after they arrived to the village, it was, and they arrived on the 10th of October '91, so the following day, a community meeting at the village hall was arranged for an important announcement. We were in the hall, sitting, when Ljuban came from the back on our right, wearing camouflage military pants, thick military winter vest, the kind that soldiers wore, that kind of vest, and in one hand, I do not know left, right, he was carrying an automatic rife and he came to stand before us as we were sitting on the benches. In front of us, there was a stage, and he did not climb on the stage but stood between the stage and us, the people who were there, and said: "I do not need to introduce myself, you all know me, I am a local man", he was born in Lovas. "I am local", umm, "This meeting is held in order to take care of some business, and this is that I am the Commander of all the soldiers, army, police, Territorial Defence and manager of the co-operative. Therefore, he openly stated, that he was the man."

LJUBAN DEVETAK, [text: director of the agricultural co-operative in Lovas 1991-1993]: "Nothing was done, even apples were not picked, vineyards were not harvested, seed-corn, corn, sunflowers, nothing was done. I have tried my best to get everyone in the village working, you know. I had support in this, I reported to the Army every night regarding the plans for the following day, on the movement of the people in Atar, so they would know about it."

MATO MAĐAREVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "They were marked usually with white, umm a white cloth, they had to wear it every day regardless if I was working at the shop or moving around, and later on around the village as I still would go to make repairs if a water pipe had broken, because that aggregate when it was pumping water, we had a normal supply of water, then, the pipes broke, had to fix it and I always had an armed escort with me, meaning, one of the soldiers or should I call them Chetniks, never mind, one of them always had to escort me and I had a pass allowing me to move around the village."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "There was no discrimination, and regarding the arm bands I believe I have explained this, it was of their own initiative, in order to protect themselves people started wearing arm bands, no one, I am sure, ever ordered these arm bands to be worn. Regarding the compulsory work order, this was not really a compulsory work order, it was me, I really introduced this compulsory work order to complete the harvest, meaning so that the grapes and apples are picked, corn harvested, umm, this compulsory work was paid."

ANNOUNCER: “There was an unsafe atmosphere in Lovas under the tyranny of the members of paramilitary formations, and the local population was robbed and maltreated. Men of military service age were taken into custody to newly formed police station to be questioned; questioning and interrogation were accompanied by beatings, harassment and abuse.”

LJUBAN DEVETAK: “How many volunteers there were, I cannot say, because their numbers varied from day to day, for example today there were 20 of them, tomorrow 5, and three of four days later there was possibly 50 of them. They were coming and going and looting was always an issue.”

REPORTER: “Were there occurrences that these groups, those paramilitary groups you are mentioning, did they abuse the local population, did they beat and tortured them?”

LJUBAN DEVETAK: “Well, when this would happen then murders usually happened as well, that was only a reason for the looting.”

MARKO FILIĆ, villager of Lovas: “Petronije, he is,”

UNATTRIBUTED VOICE: “Stupid?”

MARKO FILIĆ: “it is POL /?/, him and that little guy Kosta, they were the most dangerous ones, and that Nidžo aka. Demonac, this is what they did at my house: they ransacked my hose, beaten my daughter, took all my gold, poor me.”

REPORTER: “Was there a way for you, to be the first through the Army, to react to what was going on?”

LJUBAN DEVETAK: “Well, the Army knew about this, I cannot say that they had blindly observed because this always happened when no one was looking.”

ANNOUNCER: “Lovas was saturated in fear, people did not leave their houses unless absolutely necessary; so in order to inform the population that all the work able men needed to gather at the agricultural co-operative the local authorities had sent drummers to all the important streets to read this order out loud. The day before leaving for the mine field for the bloody grape harvest, on 17th of October 1991, Tomislav Šelebaj received an order he had to read:

TOMISLAV ŠELEBAJ, villager of Lovas: “Prodanović told me that I had to go, that I would only be with them at the municipality and he told me that I would go out with this drum to read the announcement out loud, the drum belonged to the village from before, and I also received a piece of paper with the text I had to read. At the beginning Mijo Klisurić took me around the village with a weapon, I think he had a rifle, later on I had to go by myself, on that they I was ordered to go to Dobovac, also a list where, I could see at the end who gave the order for this announcement, it was a certain Marko Kovač, an

officer, then they had rotated but this announcement was ordered by Ljuban Devetak."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "We had no communication with this, there was no electricity, no water, there was nothing, you know, the phones were not working, and then we did, when something needed to be proclaimed for the co-operative or for the Local Community. I proposed the idea of a town crier, a drummer, to be formed; I remember when I was little there was such a drummer in Lovas, so this is not something I made up, I had seen this."

TOMISLAV ŠELEBAJ, villager of Lovas: "Well, I did read what they wrote , umm, what was it; it was mostly regarding the gathering, everyone from 18 to 55 years old had to gather, they had to come to the machine work shop for some sort of meeting, there outside. We were gathered there and forced inside and searched; benches were already set up, so this is where we were sitting. Then, they came later in the evening and made a list of persons present; in the morning Ljuban was there, he was reading some list and talked, then people were lead into the kitchen, they were mostly beaten, we saw them coming out badly beaten; later on we were gathered and the Army took us down there to the mine field."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "He has betrayed and he is saying, reading the announcement, I asked him who had given him that and he said it had been Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrijević, because he came, I said that before, this Valjević he came with that unit on the very first day on the 11th, after two to three days later, three days at the most, Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrijević who was his commander arrived, with additional forces, that is with one entire additional unit. And he, I said, gave this to him to read."

REPORTER: "Did Devetak know that people were being beaten here?"

TOMISLAV ŠELEBAJ: "There was no way he could not have known when people were being beaten some 5m behind his back."

IVAN MUJKIĆ, villager of Lovas: "One man was beating me with a crow bar, and the other one with a cable, using various things to beat me with, the third man was stabbing me with a knife, so they did, there was blood gushing, and then the other Peton went to the face, who ever looked at his face or anything he would stab that person, then he would go to someone else and stab or hit that person, an so on."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "That man was, if you saw him you would be scared, he was very loud and he had some teeth missing, it was very arbitrary behaviour."

IVAN MUJKIĆ, villager of Lovas: "They cut the hair of one young man wiht a knife, he later on died at the mine field, actually he died in Šid, he had long hair; it was a horrific sight."

ANNOUNCER: "The most horrifying event happened on 18th of October 1991 when a group of 50 villagers from Lovas was forced to enter a mine field. The night before they were collected from the village and they spent the night at the co-operative where they were maltreated and tortured. In the morning they were told that they are going to grape harvest, and then they were escorted by members of JNA and paramilitary formations and forced into a mine field covered with clover. It all happened some 2-3 km from the village, on Vukovar-Šid road. 22 people were killed at the mine field, some form the mine explosions and some were shot in the back by soldiers."

ĐUKA RADOČAJ, villager of Lovas: "We were brought here on the 17th after completing our compulsory work, which we did every day, mostly physical labour, but it wasn't something that was planned long-term but from one day to another. Of the jobs, during those exact days I was, down there, there was some kind of cauldron, and I do not know, to make apple and grape brandy, I was there and we worked there, and towards the end they came and said: "All of you here must come to a meeting". However, here at the entrance they had already started to search the people, even finding objections to a plain nail clipper, they had beaten people because they had nail clippers with them, can you imagine, for nail, nail clipper or how it is called. The first search happened there, we spent the entire night awake there, of course we were beaten and so on; I can remember the details very well. One man was killed, Nikola Badnjak, here, he was sitting next to me on one side, on the other Vlado Bošnjak or Bošnjaković, what was his last name, was sitting. They spent the whole night hitting us, especially Nikola in the ribs area, although he was a pretty strong man he collapsed several times from the beating. Especially ardent was some Marko, which was the name they called him or he had said that that was his name. I could tell that he was under the influence of alcohol and so, umm, and that whole night, we were thin? dressed because when you work, you move around, it wasn't cold during the day but the night was difficult. In the morning, before going to the mine field, they allegedly threw some cigarettes at us so we could smoke them and then go to grape harvest. Before that, they had already selected one villager to go with us and collect any money that people had in their pockets, it was strictly ordered that all money must be taken to the last dinar, to take out if any were left in pockets. The man to my right, poor guy had received his salary some two days before this, he had all his money with him and he asked me what to do. I said: "Vlado, you can hear what they are telling you, I cannot advise you because I do not know what is going to happen to us", so then, those men they took all the money and afterwards we were beaten some more with various cables, hydraulic pipes and similar, bats, knifes all of it together, and then they left in colon to that mine field."

UNKNOWN PERSON: "We started from the co-operative, in front of us there was Milan Randulić aka. Buba, he was a Croat from Lovas, he was dressed in a military uniform and carried a rifle. He was walking in front of us and we followed him, and those soldiers, who were all dressed in the identical camou-

flage uniforms, they walked beside us with their guns pointing at us forcing us to walk. When we reached the last bend, there Boško Bođanac, who had been stabbed and could no longer walk, he said that he can go any further and one of the soldiers turned around and killed him."

ĐUKA RADOČAJ, villager of Lovas: "Of course, we had to go on and we looked only forwards, we were not allowed to turn around, to watch what was happening behind us, one of the soldiers said "Stop. I'll help you" and then we heard burst and that man was left there. I think even now a candle is there, that is lighted on there every year at the spot where he was simply executed."

LOVRO GERSTNER, villager of Lovas: "They killed a man, I saw it myself. In front of me, some ten or so meters, a man fell to the ground, he had been stabbed and he fell to his knees and said that he cannot go on, one of the Chetniks kicked him, the men fell into a ditch and he then shot him. I saw it personally, when he was killed, there was a lot... I said we were not going to grapes harvest, I saw that immediately. We entered /the field/, they positioned us diagonally and we had to rake the clover with our feet, we came there, there the mines were tied to little stakes, they asked us why we had stopped. We stopped because there were mines in front of us, and one of the Chetniks pushed Ivo Kraljević and he fell and the mines exploded. Now, I think not many, very few, even one is too much, were killed by the mines but those cowards were shooting us in the back with automatic rifles, I was shot in the leg."

IVAN MUJKIĆ, villager of Lovas: "We had to cover the whole width of the field, hold each other hand and walk down the entire field. Young clover covered the field and they ordered us to mimic the scythe with our legs while walking. They kept their distance, the distance from there, on this hill, little further down the road they had us in their gun sights and shouted that they would kill anyone who tries to run away. We reach the middle of the field where we stopped because we saw the mines. Out of the corner of my eye I saw a Chetnik approach the first man in the line and he fell down. As he was falling I threw myself backwards and then the explosions and shooting started, and we fell to the ground. When I fell I saw that I was wounded, I draw off my hand under me and the hand was bloody. Next to me was Zlatko Božić, he was having problems breathing, I asked him if he was all right -yes, are you -yes, and a few minutes later he was shouting to kill him and end his suffering a soldier approached him and killed him. Then I heard, as if through a fog, some vehicle arriving and someone was shouting - what are you doing, what are you doing to those people, here and there, and all in all, those who were unhurt, they stood up, they had to stand up, and those on the road called out - you take a two steps forward, and there you find a mine - they had to demine it, they had nothing to do it with so they had to improvise, using teeth, nail clippers, I do not know what, this is how they demined it. And then we knew that they laid it there because they knew exactly the position of every mine.

After we finished demining, the wounded were ordered to stand up, and those who couldn't do it by themselves had to be helped to get out. I had the most serious injury and my friend Stjepan Peulić together with my cousin; they picked me up under my arms and started to drag me out. After few steps there was another explosion and we fell down. Then I saw that Stjepan Peulić's shoe was all bloody and broken and I saw that his big toe was gone."

MILAN CONJAR, villager of Lovas: "What were my thoughts at that time? I do not know. Perhaps, as they say your entire life flies before your eyes. Maybe I thought that as well. The moment when we stood up I did not care anymore. When we were picking up the wounded and when Uncle Stipa stepped on non-magnetic anti-personnel mine, I was some two steps from them. It all seemed unimportant."

IVAN MUJKIĆ, villager of Lovas: "He was even shouting, telling us "let's run away, they will kill us anyway, we will not survive, and we will just get butchered". And one man then said "don't, I might still see my wife and children once more". So simply we, how to say, we fought, whether or not we will survive, we did not know what was going to happen to us. We, the wounded, we were put on a truck and taken to Šid, and two Chetniks followed us in a private car to make sure no one escaped from the truck. When we arrived to Šid, we got out and went to the waiting room of Šid Health Centre and there, not only did we not receive any first aid but we were insulted, there, one seriously wounded man, late Josip Turkalj, he died there. In the waiting room we were bleeding all over the floor. Those two Chetniks that followed us brought a bucket of water and a mop and we had to mop up our blood from the waiting room floor."

ĐUKA RADOČAJ, villager of Lovas: "After that we were brought back to the co-operative, across the road where we were at the machine work shop. There was a man there, I remember well, from Valjevo, they called him Cane, that was the nickname I heard, he said: "you can celebrate today", meaning the 18th, "as your birthday". Because, as he said, it was pure luck that we had survived."

REPORTER: "What happen to the dead, to those that were killed?"

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "They were properly buried. A military excavator dug a communal grave and we buried them there nicely. When we managed to get some body bags from, because we did not have any caskets, I managed to get some body bags from Colonel Lončar, but not enough, so we, um, they put them in blankets and so on."

REPORTER: "So how many dead, how many bodies were there?"

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "I think 17. I am not sure, 17-18; there were some 15 wounded, some seriously and some with minor wounds."

MATO MAĐAREVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "Well, how to say this, as I saw it, Ljuban was alpha and omega, I mean beginning and end. In order...Is it clear? I mean, did I say enough? This is how I saw it; we can all conclude that this was his role. That he was, meaning, he was asked about everything, all is here, normally, he had his executors."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "During a lunch, umm, I asked Trpotin Dimitrijević why did he create Jasenovac in the village, you know ...and he, verbally, he protested and screamed at me.

In the evening, around 17.00 hours a Pinzgauer /personnel carrier/ arrived, umm, on the 18th, in the evening. A Pinzgauer came for him and for me, it was sent by comm... that is, Colonel Lončar, Dušan from Tovarnik. I was in the office, somebody came in to tell me and then I, you know, with some trepidation, I said: "why Pinzgauer to take me to Tovarnik at this time", you understand. This happened, I had nothing to do with it, but things are as they are. The two of us were alone in Pinzgauer with driver and escort in the front. We arrived there and as soon as we came to Lončar's, he was very, very nervous and he addressed me immediately, because he knew me from before, from Osijek, an acquaintance, you know, we had a contact or two. He asked me what had happened, I said "Comrade Colonel the best thing would be for me to get out so you can speak with Lieutenant Colonel, umm, I really do not know what caused this to happen and how or why", and then he looked at the Lieutenant Colonel and nodded, and said all right, and I left the room. I was waiting outside, not more than a few minutes passed when Dimitrijević shot out of the room. I moved away so the man could enter, and I was about to enter the vehicle when I was called by an orderly to go back, the man, that commander, that Lončar was waiting for me in the hallway, and he just said to me: "Ljuban, I am glad you had nothing to do with this", we shook hands and he turned around and went into his office. He was really shook up by, umm, this event."

TOMISLAV ŠELEBAJ, villager of Lovas: "After the mine fields we were reassigned to do tasks around the village, and then some new order came, from them, I do not know, to collect those of us who were there. There was a truck parked up there, we used a ladder to carry those dead guys to the truck, where they were, to say so, they were thrown around like logs. Then we were brought back to the village, and they parked the car at the village entrance and it stayed there for two days and nights, the blood was dripping from the truck, and it served as a kind of warning, as to see what will happen to the rest of you if there is any sign of resistance."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "We have to separate the mine field event from the rest of the situation in the village because this was a clear nonsense that was done, it was something that was absolutely not all right, I mean you cannot even use those words "not all right". I mean, it was a crime that really cannot be denied

and something that only sick people could do."

MATO MAĐAREVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "Now, here, two months have passed with Lovas under occupation, the mine field event happened and all, and then it was 22nd of December in the afternoon when I was brought here, around 4 o'clock, to the Municipal Hall building, to this basement, I was simply pushed; look at this stairway, see how steep it is, they were waiting for me here, there were people already down there, villagers from Lovas."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "Look, I knew that things were going on. In this building, that private house where the police were, I do not believe anything special happened there, but that basement at the village hall ... it was held by the volunteers. What was happening there.... even I did not dare to go there. However, it couldn't go on I don't know for how long, because the Army begun to control things."

MATO MAĐAREVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "They gave me a chair to sit on. When I sat down, they said to put hands on my knees. I did, hit, these were, let's say, wooden bats, baseball, not to say it, these were wooden bats they had, being hit with the bat, the hand was broken immediately like so. I moved my hand; I got hit on the knee. "Why are you moving your hands? Get up." Then "put your hands on the kitchen", like so. Of course, I was beaten on the back. "Keep your hands in the air" and they are beating me. Later on, I sat on the chair again, and the guy with a bat hits me across the mouth like this, you can see the scars here; of course my teeth were kicked in, and here they broke my jaw, all this is deformed. The other one simply warped the kitchen cloth like this and hits me in the eyes so I was swollen all over; this left side, the eye, I do not know if you can see my face, it is still slightly deformed, it is permanent."

BERISLAV FILIĆ, Deputy Chief of Lovas Municipality: "And then they begun to beat me, one hit me in the genitals, and the other one was hitting me with, I do not know what was it, a metal rod or a police baton or a baseball bat, and I got it here, I did not know it until I came to Zagreb as a refugee, because we were in the dark. And I fell down on the floor. As I fell down, they started to kick me. I began to defend myself automatically, so I wouldn't be hit in a face. He told me to lower my hands. When I moved my hands, they started to hit me again and I was struck in a face, there was blood. When I stood up again I had to lower my hands so that they could beat me. And this happened many times during the night, they would get drunk and come in to beat us and then leave. After I came to Zagreb as a refugee, when I removed my clothes for an x-ray, because I had fractured ribs, spleen, face, I was simply broken, then I saw that my entire body was black and blue, the colour of blue jeans, my entire body was such because of the beating."

ĐUKA RADOČAJ, villager of Lovas: "Then several of them came and they began to pull my teeth using pliers, those pliers used to pull teeth of pigs, they

pulled my teeth. And then, because I had this wound too, they stuffed a cup of slat into my mouth. And then various interrogations regarding some weapons, which I had never had or used in my entire life."

ĐUKA ANTOLOVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "There was no food. One litre of water for the ten of us, altogether, me included, there was ten, beside me nine others. One litre of water for three days and nothing to eat. Although, they did come to ask if anyone was hungry. I remember one of the men, I cannot be sure now who, his name, he said that he was hungry, they took him outside kicked his teeth in completely, and threw him back down, after that no one else dared to say that they were thirsty or hungry."

MATO MAĐAREVIĆ, villager of Lovas: "In the evening, they drove each of us to our homes. They probably thought that we cannot survive this any longer, so they took us to our homes to die, because then we were nor murdered but died of natural causes, I mean that is what they would write. But in the house, I spent two days in bed and then on 26th of December we had to move out, meaning, they came again to get me in a van of some kind and they drove me to Šid, from Šid to Bjeljina, from Bjeljina we arrived to Tuzla where we spent the night in a school. On 27th of December we went from Tuzla towards Zagreb, so we crossed somewhere in Bosanski Brod? Or somewhere, it is not important where the crossing was, oh yes in Šamac, Šamac Bosanski and then Slavonski Šamac."

IVAN MUJKIĆ, villager of Lovas: "Here, in this house the Army Command was situated. Here, people who wanted to leave the village; here they would receive a certificate from the Army Command allowing them to leave the village. Here you had to write the vehicle number and who was driving and everything. So you could not leave the village without the certificate from the Command. I also have a copy of this permit issued by the Army Command allowing me to leave the village. And here across the road, at this corner, police was here. SAO /Serbian Autonomous Region/ Krajina Police were stationed here. They had SAO Krajina Police insignia and this was their headquarters where they brought people to interrogate and torture. And they further killed and did I do not know what in the village."

ANNOUNCER: "Many of the villagers were forced to leave Lovas, but before they were forced to leave they had to sign a statement that they wish to leave voluntarily, of their own free will, with their movable property. During SAO Krajina Government, what used to be a peaceful and rich village before the war was completely cleansed of its Croatian population."

LJUBAN DEVETAK: "Until the fall of Vukovar and even later on those from Western Slavonia started to arrive, you know... And it just started to calm down. At first families, people that actually run away, who wanted to leave, you know..., later, umm, it was, when those from Western Slavonia begun to arrive, you know... and when the policemen from Serbia begun to investigate,

I do not know... from Apatin and Bačka Palanka, that came to the village. Let's say, today you are being interviewed and at the same time you ask them to give you the paperwork so you could write a request to move out, and we as police officers, I as a police officer I have this printed form that I give to you to sign."

ANNOUNCER: "According to official information of the Office for Detained and Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, altogether 85 villagers were killed during the occupation of Lovas, and another two are listed as missing. This makes 5.5% of population of Lovas in 1991 before the war."

BERISLAV FILIĆ, Deputy Chief of Lovas Municipality: "We are now standing in front of the site where the mass grave was, meaning that the mass grave was situated above these monuments, here next to us. This grave was one meter wide, and we used it bury people, that is me and other 5-6 of us, I have buried 35 people, everyone except the last ones from the mine field. A tractor would come here, with bodies piled on a trailer, bodies we collected in the village, and then we threw them into the ditch and in the beginning we buried them by hand, on the other side there was soil and we covered them by hand. The reservists were standing at the edge and they were laughing at us, because we did not know what would happen to us, those who were there doing the burying. Several days later, when we came back to bury other people, because the earth staged you could see parts of arms and legs sticking out from the ditch. We spent days burying them here."

AUTHOR'S NOTE [text]: "On 28th of May 2007, Members of MUP /Ministry of Interior/ of Serbia arrested 12 persons under reasonable suspicion that they were responsible for torture, inhumane treatment and murder of 70 civilians, villagers of Lovas.

Of the persons arrested four are members of the former JNA, four were members of Civilian-Military Government in Lovas, and four were members of the armed formation "Dušan Silni".

All of the suspects have been detained following the arrest. Lovas case investigation lasted for two years during which 50 persons were interviewed.

State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia worked together with the War Crimes Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Serbia on Lovas case, as part of the regional cooperation."