INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING

THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(CROATIA v. SERBIA)

REPLY

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

VOLUME 5

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20 DECEMBER 2010

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ANNEX 116:

REPORT ON THE SHELLING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS AND THE VICTIMS OF THOSE SHELLINGS, APRIL 1992 – JULY 1993

/coat-of-arms/

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Office for UNPROFOR and PMEZ /European Community Monitoring Mission/

Class: 004-01/93-01/01
File no: 50303-03-93-128
Phone: 469-262, fax 452-002
Zagreb, 26 July 1993

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Attn. Mr Mate Granić, Minister

Minister,

Please find attached a report on the persecutions of the Croats and other non-Serbs in the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia, and a report on the shelling of civilian targets and victims of those shellings carried out by the Serbs in the period between April 1992 and July 1993.

Yours sincerely,

HEAD OF OFFICE

Milivoj Tomaš

/signed/

REPORT

on the shelling of civilian targets and the victims of those shellings,

April 1992 – July 1993

The rebelled Serbs, assisted by the volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, are shelling on a daily basis the towns, settlements and villages locat-

ed mainly in UNPA sectors South and North, from the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia (the UNPA zone and the „Pink Zone“). From UNPA Sectors West and East the Serbs are firing from infantry weapons and occasionally from mortars and heavy-machine guns.

The target of the Serb artillery, particularly in the recent period, is Šibenik, Zadar, Gospić, Ogulin, Karlovac, Biograd, Vodice, Konavle, Sinj, Pirovac, Duga Resa, and from time to time also the islands (e.g. the island of Ugljan). The objective of those artillery attancks are only the civilian facilities and the civilians, so that, apart from extensive destruction of the civilian facilities, we also have a large number of killed and wounded civilians. The fact is that, the more intense the peace talks under the auspices of the international community are, the more intense is the shelling of Croatian towns, i.e. civilian targets. The shelling of Karlovac, Ogulin and Duga Resa carried out by the Serbs from the UNPA Sector North on 14/15 July 1993 from the territory, caused wounding of twelve persons and a severe damage to residential and industrial facilities.

A very frequent target of the Serb artillery is the area south of Dubrovnik and the area of Županja. The shelling of those areas is carried out by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The physical damage done to the towns, settlements and villages /several words illegible/ being targeted by the Serb artillery are most often sacral and residential facilities and children's institutions.

AN OVERVIEW OF CASUALTIES

BETWEEN APRIL 1992 AND JULY 1993

SECTOR	KILLED CIVILIANS	WOUNDED CIVILIANS
EAST	73	159
WEST	77	317
NORTH	8	29
SOUTH	29	123
TOTAL	187	628

REPORT

on established and documented cases o violation of human rights in the territory of the Republic of Croatia under the protection of the UN (UNPA) in the period between April 1992 and July 1993, with an emphasis on the period from March to July 1993

(persecutions, killings, maltreatment)

Since the arrival of the UN forces and until 20 July 1993, a great number of cases of abuse and drastic violation of human rights were registered in

the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia under the protection of the UN forces (UNPROFOR) in UNPA zones and „Pink Zones". Victims are predominantly Croats, but also other non-Serb population living in UNPA and „Pink Zone". Maltreatment, abuse and persecution are committed by the local Serb authorities, members of various "police forces" and other armed formations that are active in UNPA and „Pink Zone" in the Republic of Croatia. In terms of security, the situation has not changed much since the arrival of UNPROFOR; the rebelled Serbs assisted by the volunteers from Serbia keep implementing the policy of ethnic cleansing and destroying everything if there is the least proof that Croats or other peoples (non-Serbs) once lived there.

The attacks on persons of non-Serb nationality and their property, and even on Serbs who oppose to the abuse, maltreatment or persecution of people, are carried out on a daily basis.

According to our records, since the arrival of the UN protection forces (UNPROFOR):

- around 10,000 persons were expelled with the escort provided by UNPROFOR, UNHCR or some other international organisation;

- 13,742 persons were expelled without any escort,

which totals around 23,472 persons. Among the refugees there are also around 1,000 persons of the Serb nationality. Assisted by the UNHCR, five Croats and eight persons of some other nationality have returned to the occupied territory. At their own request, around 1,200 Serbs crossed form over the free territory to the occupied territory.

Around 2,500 Serbs have returned to the UNPA West alone, to the territory under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia (the municipalities of Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac). Evidently, the migrations that took place in 1992 and 1993 are far more frequent from the UNPA to the free territory of the Republic of Croatia than in the opposite direction, and the persecution of Croats and other non-Serb population continues regardless of the presence of he UN protection forces in those areas.

The persecution of the people is always preceded by the burning of farming facilities, family houses, unlawful and illegal arrests, seizure and plunder of property. The Croats who live in the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia are being maltreated and humiliated on a daily basis, and the Serb local authorities organize work brigades and engage people as labourers –from farming and construction works to the building of bunkers.

From January 1993 to 20 July 1993, some 500 persons were expelled from the territory of UNPA East, both Croats and other non-Serbs. All our

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efforts have failed to provide the citizens of the Republic of Croatia living in the occupied areas with some security and protect them from maltreatment and persecution.

The reason for the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR lies in the fact that the UN protection forces tend to look for a solution to the security of the citizens of the Republic of Croatia living in the occupied areas by communicating with the local Serb authorities, their police and judicial organs, and the fact is that all organs in power just implement the policies of the Greater Serbia and carry out ethnic cleansing in the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia.

We have registered camps – prisons in the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia, in Knin, Titova Korenica, Glina, where the elderly people, women and children are maltreated on a daily basis, both mentally and physically.

Annex 1

A SUMMAR OF ESTABLISHED AND DOCUMENTED CASES
OF VIOLATION O HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNPA ZONES
IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN APRIL 1992 AND JULY 1993

SECTOR	Civilians forcibly expelled, escorted by UNPROFOR and UNHCR	Killed civilians	Rapes	Physical maltreatment and other forms of violation of human rights
EAST	2,950	132	5	572
WEST	28	2	-	24
NORTH	494	25	5	2
SOUTH	6,526	114	-	42
Total, from April 1992 to July 1993	9,998	273	10	640

ANNEX 117:

LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTON TUS TO ADMIRAL SVETO LETICA, 24 JULY 1992

/Republic of Croatia Coat of Arms/
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN STAFF OF THE HV /Croatian Army/

CLASS: 81/92-02/16
FILE NUMBER: 5120-01-92-10
Zagreb, 24 July 1992

TO: HRM /Croatian Navy/ COMMANDER

Admiral Sveto Letica

The latest incursions of the parts of the HV in the area of Unešić on 22 July and the previous incident by Nos Kalik and Miljevac Plateau prove that the actions are being launched without the knowledge and consent of the senior commands – the OZ /?Military District/ and the HRM. Investigate this on a commission level and determine which forces or persons have done that and whether this was done on purpose with the aim of jeopardizing the plan of the UN peace operation and inform me about it by 08:00 hrs on 26 July 1992. There are certain indications that the HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ has been planning those actions.

Having learned the lesson from those events, establish a system of command in order to prevent such incidents from happening again. After the obligations have been signed, the HV cannot enter the UNPA areas or other areas outside the UNPA where the HV units should not find themselves.

C H I E F
Lieutenant General
Anton Tus
/illegible signature

/round stamp/: The Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defence
Main Staff

ANNEX 118:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 871, 4 OCTOBER 1993

UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/871 (1993)
4 October 1993

RESOLUTION 871 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3286th meeting, on 4 October 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

Reaffirming also its resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993 (S/26470 and Add.1),

Having also considered the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia dated 24 September 1993 (S/26491, annex),

Deeply concerned that the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia (S/23280, annex III), and all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 769 (1992), have not yet been fully implemented,

Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993 (S/26470), in particular its paragraph 16;

2. Takes note of the intention of the Secretary-General to establish, as described in his report, three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR - UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - while retaining the existing dispositions in all other respects for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia;

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3. Condemns once again continuing military attacks within the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where UNPROFOR is deployed;

4. Reaffirms the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia including the provisions of the plan concerning the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and calls upon the signatories of that plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation;

5. Declares that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council or external interference, in respect of the full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia would have serious consequences and in this connection affirms that full normalization of the international community's position towards those concerned will take into account their actions in implementing all relevant resolutions of the Security Council including those relating to the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia;

6. Calls for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, mediated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and urges them to cooperate fully and unconditionally in its implementation, as well as in the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the Council;

7. Stresses the importance it attaches, as a first step towards the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, to the process of restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the "pink zones", and in this context calls for the revival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR;

8. Urges all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures including the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of the Republic of Croatia, and stresses in this context the importance it attaches to the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and Split, the highway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the Adriatic oil pipeline, securing the uninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica strait, and restoring the supply of electricity and water to all regions of the Republic of Croatia including the United Nations Protected Areas;

9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement;

10. Decides to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the territory of the Republic of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 20 September 1993 (S/26470);

11. Decides in this context to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1994;

/...

12. Requests the Secretary-General to report two months after the adoption of the present resolution on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the negotiations within the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate in the light of that report;

13. Requests further the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on developments in regard to the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANNEX 119:

EXAMPLE OF AN IDENTITY CARD ISSUED BY THE RSK, 26 NOVEMBER 1992

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Office for UNPROFOR and ECMM
Cl. 004-01/93-01/01
Reg. No. 50303-03-93-206
Tel. 469-262, fax. 452-002
Zagreb, September 6th 1993

Mr. Cedric Thornberry, DCA

UNPROFOR HQ

Dear Mr. Thornberry,

We came into posession of personal documents issued by the local authorities of the Serbs in the UNPA of the Republic of Croatia, which are actually the personal documents of the so-called RSK. It can be seen from those documents that Serbia already includes the UNPA of the Republic of Croatia into the composition of the so-called "SRJ"/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/. The members of UNPROFOR should get an insight into such occurrences and to profess upon the question.

We kindly ask you to investigate the events taking place in the village of Petrovci near Vukovar which is populated mostly by Rusnaks and to inform us urgently about the actual condition in that village.

Best regards,

HEAD OF THE OFFICE

Milivoj Tomaš

/on the image: „IDENTIFICATION CARD"/

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA

Municipality: Vukovar

First name: Martin

Family name: Varga

Name of one of the parents: Valentin

Day, month and year of birth: 08.09.1933.

Divoš

Place of birth: Sremska Mitrovica

/ designation: PCK0019411 – note: probably RSK0019411/

Personal number:

Opatovac, SO Vukovar

I.L. Ribara 27

/text under line: illegible/: Permanent

Registration number: 1941

Date of issue: 26.11.92.

Signature of the authorised person

/Signature illegible/

/Round stamp over the signature/

ANNEX 120:

RSK, MINUTES ON THE THEMATIC SESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RSK, 6 JULY 1994

/hand-written/: HIC – A 157/4

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
GOVERNMENT

MINUTES

of the Thematic Session of the Government of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ held on 06 July 1994 at 10:00 AM in the Government Building in Knin

The list of those who were present at the Government session is attached and it is a constituent part of the Minutes.

The following were absent: Dragutin Bolić and Borivoj Rašuo

The following attended the session at the invitation: Ljubomir Domazetović, Neđo Krajnović, Milan Šuput, Mile Vignjević, Mirko Bjelanović, Sava Milović, Branko Dobrijević, Dmitar Arula and Siniša Ćakić.

The Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić presided over the session.

The following

AGENDA

has been scheduled for the session.

1. PROBLEM AREAS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
   (The outlines are in the attachment)
2. THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE SVK /Serbian Krajina Army/ AND THE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS OF THE RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ IN ENSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE RSK

Minister Rade Tanjga – divided the political and security situation into several segments.

1. Assessment of the situation and intentions of the RH /Republic of Croatia/

All the information indicates that we can expect a new aggression - it is obvious from the Croatian mass media as well as from the additional preparations and training of the Croatian Army. There is a question of the form of their aggression and the axis of their attack. Most probably the aggression will take place on the local axis, not along the entire front line. The examples of such aggression so far are Miljevac Plateau, Maslenica, Medak Pocket. The aim of the aggression most probably would be cutting of the Corridor and an

attack along the entire front line

2. The assessment of the situation and the intentions of the AP /Autonomous Province/ of Western Bosnia

Fikret Abdić is gradually becoming dependent on the Serbian help and his area for

balancing between us and the Ustashas is becoming smaller. This gives us opportunity to have a more active and efficient role in providing help to the AP of Western Bosnia.

3. The assessment of possibilities of the help from the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/ and the VJ /Yugoslav Army/ in case of the aggression on the Republic of Serbian Krajina

There is a large number of professional soldiers from Yugoslavia who are at the first line of the front while their families live in Serbia in the barracks in terrible conditions.

The situation regarding the Civilian Defence

We will prepare the initial war plan by 08 August 1994, together with the Ministry of Industry.

There are problems in the field – the infrastructure and the services that were functioning in peacetime have not been developed, so the units of the Civilian Protection took over that segment (water supply to the population, health care, etc.). The Civilian Protection will have to be relieved of those duties and the municipalities shall take them over.

The problems of the legal regulation of the defence

We have to bring into line the legal regulations with the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/. It does not mean that we will blindly copy the legal regulations of the SRJ. We will have to enact four important laws, namely the following:

Law on Defence;

Law on the SVK;

Law on Military Courts; and

Law on Military Prosecutor's Offices

We will change the following laws:

Law on Pension Insurance and Social Security; and

Law on Health Insurance

Problems with supply

It is necessary that the money is not taken out of the RSK (the little money we have).

We have three types of suppliers from the SRJ, RS /Republika Srpska/ and RSK.

From the Republika Srpska – 58 suppliers

From SR of Yugoslavia – 112 suppliers

From the Republic of Serbian Krajina – 257 suppliers

Totally – 427 suppliers.

The biggest debts are towards our suppliers such as the following enterprises: VUPIK, PIK Okučani, Gavrilović, etc.

Problems regarding the financing of the defence

It is necessary to provide 280 million for the SVK in order to cover the expenses for providing weapons and military equipment. There are several proposals for the models of financing. One of the models is from the RSK budget, from the Directorate of Commodity Reserves, then the tax of 3% which has been voted, loans – maybe the foreign loan should be taken into consideration. The rebalance of the budget shows that 80 million dinars are required for the import of weapons and military equipment.

After the introductory speech of the Minister Tanjga, Colonel Lalić took the floor and he speaks about four important segments, namely the following:

Characteristics of the theatre of war of the RSK;

Armed Forces of Croatia;

Purpose and the organisation of the SVK; and

Activities of the SVK

The theatre of war has an unfavourable geographic position and the size and shape of

the SRK theatre of war falls into the category of small territories. In the relief of the RSK we distinguish the highland and Karst terrain of Lika; territory for the manoeuvres and lowlands.

The rivers in the RSK flow in the north-south direction which is an aggravating factor for the manoeuvre of the forces at the front.

The material capacities are poor. Economic potentials of the RSK have managed to

produce for the minimal combat requirements.

In order to have a successful defence, it is necessary to bring the communications into the RSK. The railway network meets the requirements only partly.

It can be concluded that the Armed Forces of Croatia are probably preparing for the war against the RSK. That will take place most probably on a chosen and not on the entire axis. In the attack, they would have the support of the artillery and aircraft. Even the chemical weapons can be used.

Possible axes of attack of the Croatian Armed Forces are the following:

Zadar – Benkovac – Knin;

Šibenik – Drniš – Knin;

Šibenik – Oklaj – Knin;

Sinj – Vrlika – Knin

Colonel Lalić has pointed out that a detailed assessment of the theatre of war

has been made within the framework of the purposes and organisations of the SVK.

The activities of the SVK can be seen in the upgrade of the system of command, repair of the material and technical equipment, removal of the mine obstacles, etc.

After the expose of Colonel Lalić, Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić asked several questions, purely military questions:

I do not see the reason why we do not know what the SVK has at its disposal and how, if we already know what the HV /Croatian Army/ has at its disposal. (What is our power and strength to defend ourselves?)

In your expose I have not heard how we are going to defend ourselves against Croatia (method and our strength).

I have not heard about our connection with the SRJ and their obligation (Yugoslav Army) towards the RSK, either.

If there is no help from Yugoslavia, our prospects here are very weak.

Minister Perić, Funduk, Budić, Vojnović, Ratković, Bosnić and Krička also asked questions.

Colonel Lalić – about the number of commanding officers from the Yugoslav Army – We in the SVK have 1,227 professional officers and non-commissioned officers who were sent from the Yugoslav Army and who were born in the former territories of the RH. That is around 50% of the total number of officers and non-commissioned officers born in the former territories of Croatia. Around 50% of them are still in the Yugoslav Army.

Many of them have not resolved the issues of the apartments.

A brief commentary about the Western Slavonia – It is a very sensitive area. We have formed 2 brigades and we will rely on the Republika Srpska as well.

Major General Mirko Bjelanović has talked about the current situation regarding the material and medical supplies.

We have minimum reserves of the basic means. The age structure of basic resources is between 20 and 30 years.

The essential equipment that the SVK has at its disposal is the following:

Mortars;

Recoilless guns of 82 mm

Howitzers;

PA /anti-aircraft/ guns

Combat vehicles of all types;

RV /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/ equipment is the following:

"Jastreb J 21" aircrafts;

Helicopters of "Gazela" type;

"Jastreb J 20" aircrafts

"Jastreb" aircrafts have been in usage for 26 years. Their usage life is expiring.

There are enough mines and explosives.

There is a shortage of ammunition for complex combat systems. The Yugoslav Army is in an identical situation.

Now briefly about the propellant:

The daily consumption is between 16 and 18 tons. That amounts to 480 to 500 tons per month, under the condition that there are no combat activities. If all the corps were engaged in combat activities, the consumption would amount to around 80 tons a day. The RSK has 21,300 tons of fuel in the warehouses. The relocation after the agreement cost us around 700 to 800 tons of fuel.

Let me point out that we have not filled up the systems during this war, which is a very serious problem.

With regard to the problem regarding the overhaul and the equipment, we have to get out of the RSK borders.

At this moment, the SVK does not have a stable source of financing of medical and material supplies.

Conclusion: the SVK is the biggest consumer in the RSK, but it should have a priority.

We need to have an economical approach to what we have at our disposal.

Lieutenant General Ljubo Domazetović:

He has pointed out that he is satisfied with the interest of the members of the Government in the matters of defence. It is already a one step forward.

The inside enemy is only the Serbian disunity.

The defence must be united. The war production should be ensured. We have to inform the population about all the important issues regarding the defence. It is very important to organise the civilian structure of the population, which has not been done so far.

In order to put this in practice, it is necessary to have the legal regulations.

He has proposed that the Ministry of Defence and the Army practically take over the proposed Laws, copy them, then the Government should take its position and after that they should be urgently referred into the Assembly procedure and the Assembly should adopt them.

What is important with those laws is the complete separation of the function of the Ministry of Defence and the Army. One country does not have two masters.

The Ministry of Defence has to work on the concept of organisation of the development of social structure (Ministry of Defence has to tell the Government which organisations should work; people of importance, experts should be exempted from the military obligation).

Prime Minister Mikelić – Mister Domazetović has talked about a very important issue of regulation the relations within the RSK.

It would be good that in the second part we open a discussion (although not all of those who were scheduled for discussion took part in it) based on the expose of the Major General Bjelanović, who has presented it in detail (he has presented the whole picture of the SVK).

The discussion is opened after the exposes of Bjelanović, Lalić and Domazetović.

Colonel Neđo Krajnović has briefly talked about the problems of financing of the SVK.

He has pointed out that the following has been provided for in the draft plan:

- for the peacetime alternative – 418 million dinars;
- for the wartime alternative – 624 million dinars

The plans have not been implemented and the obligations towards the SVK have not been met. The reserves have been used up and we have found ourselves in a very difficult situation. The solution must be found.

Discussion

Minister Veselinović – he has talked about the shortage of funds in the budget. Efforts have been made to provide minimum funds for the Army of the RSK. We have issued a bond in the monthly amount of 4,000,000 (2,000,000 Dinars and DM 2,000,000).

We plan to design a model regarding the supply of the Army with food in order to resolve that problem.

We plan to ensure around 40,000,000 Dinars for the Army until the end of the year. We think that even that amount would be insufficient.

We cannot bear the burden alone and the SRJ should get involved in order to help us. We have to involve our Directorate of Commodity Reserves.

(We have a surplus of around 17,000 calves, 50,000 of small stock, we have the surplus of certain agricultural products.)

We hope that, together with the Main Staff and the responsible Ministries, we will try to alleviate the problems, however we will probably not be able to resolve them.

Thereafter, a very important issue has been tackled – a problem regarding the cooperation with UNPROFOR which was briefly dealt with by Colonel Dmitar Arula, and after that Prime Minister Mikelić has drown the attention to the important issues regarding UNPROFOR.

There was a big oversight in the Agreement:

The Central Commission and all military persons have omitted a very important element which is to work out the details as to where the line of separation would be drawn.

For example, there are villages in the Western Slavonia where they did not talk with people in the field. Moving of the lines is to their detriment.

There is a buffer zone on the Serbian side, but there is no such zone on the Croatian side.

The military structures must know that it is a very serious issue and it has to be taken into consideration. Had the work been done professionally, this would not have happened. Another thing, we have the text of the Agreement, but we do not have maps.

Other problems are the following:

UNPROFOR has started with its deployment in the close vicinity of the cross-roads, which is the place were they should be present the least.

In one word, UNPROFOR is on the Ustashas' side. We have to stop that what they are doing by exerting a big pressure, but it not so simple.

The responsibility of the Army, the police and the people is necessary.

Prime Minister Mikelić has pointed out that we will break the Agreement with UNPROFOR. (they owed us 10 million dollars). Everything should be under the control of the payment transactions of the RSK. We have informed them about it in writing.

UNPROFOR represent a serious threat to us.

Mikelić has added that we should not be preparing only for the defence in case of an attack. It is a mistake and we have lost a lot of our areas in such way (Karlovac, Sisak, parts of Slavonia). If they opt for an aggression, we have to attack Croats at certain locations and take our part of the territory from them.

The closing speech of the Prime Minister Mikelić

From everything said today, it can be concluded that the position of the Government is that the defence of the RSK is the task number one. We have seen that a part of technical and material equipment being provided has not been adequately treated by a part of the Department at the end of last and beginning of this year.

Today, at the session, we have formed a picture which the ministers could use in the field.

As for the legal regulations, a lot has been done in the past period, a discipline was imposed in the area of tax policy, excise duties, customs duties - the things that were previously unreachable (Our inspection in Vukovar has found out that the liabilities towards the RSK in the amount 20 million Dinars have not been covered in this year – excise duties, customs fees and turnover tax). Therefore, we must know of every truck entering and exiting Krajina. In that way the position of the municipalities will be improved.

Likewise, we will not permit that everybody pays salaries as they wish (especially state organs, SDK /Public Auditing Service/, banks). That is why we have taken a decision that nobody can have higher basic salary rate from the one which has been defined, and that is how we will achieve the internal unity.

When the strategic issues of the defence of the RSK are in question - equipment, aircraft, rocket system – we will not be satisfied and we will not accept the idea that the "Jastreb J 21" remain with us. We will request the additional part of the equipment that is due to us from the SRJ, since the chances of them attacking us and not SRJ are much bigger.

A strong defence is a guarantee for peace. A strong defence will enable a counterattack. Gentlemen in Zagreb may now that we are growing stronger, it is even desirable.

Something regarding the shortage of ammunition which Mr Bjelanović mentioned:

We have to discuss that at the Federal level, in order to ensure that part of the equipment urgently. If the aggression takes place, we must have that.

When talking about mines, our position is that we have to provide support to our own production in Teslingrad and also we should manufacture more of them that we had before.

We have made an agreement with the Nikšić Iron Works /Željezara/ to give them the propane butane in exchange for shells.

Propellant – fuel and bullets are the reasons why the Serbs got killed on Ozren.

We have filled our stocks in the spring sowing (184,000 hectares of land) and we have a surplus of food. That is important if they attack us.

We have entered into a business with Montenegro regarding the fuel. We will transfer the received fuel to the Central Warehouse. We can buy additional 2,000 litres of oil. The oil should be provided to the most endangered territories.

We have started with the overhaul of the Mirkovci NIK /?Oil and Industrial Combine/. We are putting three oil-wells into working order and we will have a crude oil.

I would like to stress that we will give a part of the timber to the SVK and therefore the Army should be in the permanent contact with the Government. A part of the fuel should be provided by Yugoslavia.

In the end, Prime Minister Mikelić voiced a protest because General Čeleketić, Chief of Staff, was not present at the session. He has pointed out that it was a serious discussion and that they were obliged to be present.

This expose of Prime Minister Mikelić was accepted as a conclusion of the today's session.

The items from the yesterday's session of the Government have been discussed.

n the proposal of Minister Budić, the following

AGREEMENT

for the Coverage of the Professional Soldiers from the Republican Fund

(Attachment no. 1)

has been reached.

Item – 1

1.1 Minister Perić talked about the Decision on the amount and method of

calculation of salaries in the RSK (Attachment no. 2). The discussion was opened thereafter.

Following the request of Minister Ratković that the overtime be paid, Minister Perić has proposed the following wording to be added under Article 3 "as well as the compensation for the overtime".

Minister Perić – we cannot incorporate everything into the Decision, every single detail.

Minister Đurić – there is a difference between the overtime and the duty service. There will be big problems in the health services.

Minister Ratković – accepts the Decision but requests that this issue be resolved since some employees have received compensation for the overtime and some have not. It should be resolved.

Minister Veselinović – I am for this Decision, and if in the course of time problems arise, we will pass the amendments.

The following

DECISION

on the Amount and Method of Calculation of Salaries in the RSK

(Attachment no. 2)

has been taken.

Item – 8

8.a. Mr Lopac delivered a report about the Rule Book on Organisation, Activities and Methods of the Agency for Business Relations with the International Organisations (Attachment no. 3), after which a discussion was opened.

Minister Tanjga has proposed that the Agency be adopted urgently since it is necessary.

Minister Veselinović – /has said that/ Minister Funduk should do some more work on the Rule Book, making a remark about 5% of services (Article 15),

since he considers that to be too much. The textual part will be prepared for the next session.

The following

CONCLUSION

has been reached that the textual part be prepared for the next session of the Government.

Item – 4

1.1. Assistant Minister of Justice Radić has talked about the Proposal of the Law on

Territorial Organisation of the RSK and the Local Self-government (Attachment no. 4) and after that the discussion was opened in which the following took part:

Minister Babić – a person who was preparing this Law has not been updated with the recent events. He has made objections to Article 10, Article 3, Article 22, Article 7, Article 8, Article 13, etc. There are technical deficiencies. Article 45 is unnecessary.

After those remarks, Minister Babić has proposed that the Law be withdrawn and revised for the next session (Draft Law).

Minister Perić has added that the previous and this Law should be elaborated (there are contradictions between them).

Upon finishing the discussion, the following

CONCLUSION

has been reached that a Draft Law together with the amendments should be prepared for the next session of the Government.

1.2. Draft Law Amending the Law on the State Administration (Attachment no. 5)

will be discussed at the next session of the Government.

On the proposal of Minister Budić, the following

DECISION

on Granting Funds for the Construction of the Infrastructure for Prefabricated Facilities at the Location of Senjak

(Attachment no. 6)

and

DECISION

on granting 40,000 Dinars for the JKP /Public Utility Enterprise/

(Attachment no. 7)

have been made.

The following

DECISION

on the Appointment of the Assistant Minister of Defence of the RSK

(Attachment no. 8)

has also been made.

Number:

Knin,

SECRETARY OF THE GOVERNMENT
PRIME MINISTER

Savo Štrbac
Borislav Mikelić

LIST
OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE THEMATIC SESSION OF THE RSK GOVERNMENT HELD ON 06 JULY 1994 IN KNIN

No.	First and Last Name	Function	Signature	Telephone no.
1.	Mikelić Borislav	Prime Minister	/signed/	
2.	Tanjga Rade		/signed/	
3.	D o m a z e t o v i ć Ljubomir		/signed/	
4.	Ratko Veselinović	Minister of Finance	/signed/	62-093
5.	Perić Slobodan	Minister of Labour	/signed/	
6.	Milivoj /?/Krička	MEP /expansion unknown/	/signed/	719-034
7.	Đurić Ljubiša	Minister for Urban Planning	/signed/	719-011
8.	Milan (/illegible/	Minister of Traffic and ?Communications	/signed/	719-154
9.	Prijić Ilija	MUP /Ministry of the Interior/	/signed/	62-063
10.	Stevo Ratković	Education	/signed/	
11.	Bosnić Mile	Commerce and /illegible/	/signed/	
12.	Petrović Branko	/signed/		719-172/078
13.	Simo Šijan	Minister of Agriculture	/signed/	719-147
14.	Vojnović Milivoj	Minister of Sport	/signed/	719-236
15.	Đurić Stevan	Minister of Health	/signed/	718-068
16.	Funduk Uroš	Justice	/signed/	60-017
17.	Krajnović Neđo	Head of Financial Service	/signed/	2102
18.	Šuput Milan	Minister of Defence	/signed/	60-145
19.	Vignjević Mile		/signed/	
20.	Mirko Bjelanović	PKPo /Assistant Commander for Logistics/ of the SVK	/signed/	62-601
21.	Milović Sava	Chief of the CZ /Civilian Protection/ in the MO / Ministry of Defence/	/signed/	60-477
22.	Dobrijević Branko	Chief of the VPS /?Naval Sector/	/signed/	60-145
23.	Arula Dmitar	Head of the Section in the MO	/signed/	60-145
24.	Ćakić Siniša	Head of the Department in the MO	/signed/	60-145
25.	Milan Babić		/signed/	

ANNEX 121:

SFRY, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE, ORDER NO. 2-77, 22 APRIL 1992

Translation 03014028

/handwritten:/ /illegible/ AVL /active servicemen/

Military Secret
Confidential

TO: REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
KRAJINA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
STAFF

ORDER Number 2-77

ISSUED BY THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION OF THE

FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

DATED 22 APRIL 1992

Pursuant to items 8/m and 18 of the Order on determining responsibilities and powers of officers regarding service-related issues in military personnel service (*Official Military Gazette*, numbers 5/87 and 22/91), and in conjunction with articles 271 and 284 of the Law on Service in the Armed Forces (SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ *Official Gazette*, numbers 7/85, 20/89, 40/89 and 26/90), the following are being

DISPATCHED
to take up /positions/

A/ IN THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE MAIN STAFF

Knin Garrison

√1. - Dušan KASUM, son of Obrad, Communications Colonel, personal VES /Military Occupational Speciality/: 31840, born 19 January 1938; √

Currently by MF /peace-time establishment/: in charge of elaboration of the SSNO /Federal Secretariat for National Defence/ war plan in the Planning Department for the use and b/g /combat readiness/ of the SFRJ GŠ OS /Armed Forces Main Staff/ 1st Administration 1st Department, Colonel FČ /establishment rank/, PG /rank grouping/ 8, dated 14 February 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

√2. – Stevo ŠEVO, son of Petar, Artillery Colonel, personal VES: 31239, born 4 February 1943. √

Currently by MF: Chief of artillery in the BH RŠTO /Bosnia and Herzegovina Territorial Defence Wartime Staff/ Organ for Service Branches, Colonel FČ, PG 9 dated 2 December 1988, Sarajevo Garrison.

√3. – Miloš PUPOVAC, son of Božo, Artillery Colonel, personal VES: 31240, born 28 December 1935. √

Currently by MF: Commander of the 586th brigades group of the TO KOGB /Territorial Defence /?Belgrade Operations Group Command// in the 1st military district, Colonel FČ /establishment rank/, PG 7 dated 26 May 1988, Belgrade Garrison.

4. –Miloš KRNJETA, son of Mile, Infantry
Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
24 April 1950.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of the Security Organ of the 13th Corps Command in the 5th military district, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 11 dated 13 June 1991, Rijeka Garrison.

5. – Aleksandar VULETIĆ, son of Dragomir
Communications Colonel, personal VES: 31839,
born 6 July 1944.

Currently by MF: Administrative officer in the Operations Section of the Department for Operations and Technical Affairs – ZNGŠ /?Deputy Chief of Staff/ of the OS SFRJ for EiV /?Electronic Reconnaissance/, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 3 June 1988.

6. – Marko MIOČINOVIĆ, son of Mojan, Captain 1st Class
in the KoV /Ground Forces/ Technical Service, personal VES: 32143, born
27 July 1955.

Currently by MF: Students Company Commander at the Military and Technical Faculty of the SSNO CVTŠ /Military and Technical School Centre/ KoV JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ Technical Service, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 10 January 1992, Zagreb Garrison.

B/ IN THE NORTHERN DALMATIA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF

Knin Garrison

√7. – Milan DJILAS, son of Stevan, Artillery
Colonel, personal VES: 31280, born
13 January 1944.

Currently by MF: Chief of Operations and Training Section at the 9th Corps Command Staff of the 2nd Military District, Colonel FČ, PG 9 dated 30 July 1991.

√8. – Dragan LEKIĆ, son of Milan, Lieutenant Colonel
of the PVO /anti-aircraft defence/ artillery and rocket units, personal VES:
31339, born 14 September 1946.

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Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of the Armed Forces Archives at the Military and Historical Institute, SSNO Sector for Moral Guidance and Legal Affairs, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 6 June 1989, Belgrade Garrison.

√9. Marko ZELIĆ, son of Marija, Artillery
Major, personal VES: 31201, born 28
February 1951.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at the SSNO Headquarters Administration Security Organ, Major FČ, PG 15 dated 31 December 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

√10. Ile MILANOVIĆ, son of Todo, Quartermaster
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 32439.

Currently by MF: no appointment, having completed his education in the 41st Class of the KŠŠ /expansion unknown/ KoV assigned to the Naval District, PG 13 dated 4 May 1987, garrison not specified.

√11. - Živko RODIĆ, son of Ilija, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31101, born
8 April 1942.

Currently by MF: Commander of the KOGB 72nd /?territorial/ brigade/ of the 1st Military District, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 13 dated 14 December 1989, Belgrade Garrison.

12. Jandrija CUPAĆ, son of Djuro, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
9 December 1950.

Currently by MF: Chief of Staff (also a deputy commander) in the 585th KOGB TO brigades group command at the 1st Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 10 dated 31st December 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

13. – Gojko IVETIĆ, son of Jovan, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31101, born
8 September 1946.

Currently by MF: Chief of Staff (also a deputy commander) of the 2nd Military District 9th Corps 180th mtbr /motorised brigade/ Commander, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 11 October 1990, Benkovac Garrison.

14. Neven PERIŠIĆ, son of Budimir, Infantry
Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31101, born
6 March 1961.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 3rd mtč /motorised company/ of the 2nd Motorised Battalion of the 49th Motorised Brigade of the 4th Corps of the 2nd Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 17 dated 16 January 1989, Sarajevo Garrison.

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15. – Glišo CVIJANOVIĆ, son of Mirko, Captain 1st Class
in the PVO anti-tank and mechanised units, personal
VES: 31401, born 16 February 1947.

Currently by MF: ONP /operations and training/ Officer at the 5th VPS /?Naval Service/ VPO /Naval District/ 139th motorised brigade headquarters, Major FČ, PG 15 dated 29 April 1988, Pula Garrison.

√16. – Radenko ČOTRIĆ son of Bogdan, Infantry
Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31101, born
4 January 1960.

Currently by MF: Platoon Commander of the 2nd Recruits Battalion of the VA /?Military Academy/ KoV CVVŠ /?Post-secondary military school centre/ OS, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 16 dated 29 August 1990, Belgrade Garrison.

?17. – Milivoj PERIĆ, son of Dušan, Captain 1st Class
at the KoV Technical Service, personal VES: 32143,
born 8 March 1955.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 2nd /?plant/ of the 55th Naval and Technical Base of the 8th VPS VPO, Captain 1st Class-Major FČ, PG 16 dated 10 October 1985, Drniš Garrison.

ndwritten: 02/ 18. -Miroslav LEŽAIĆ, son of Božo, Artillery
Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31201, born
6 June 1957.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of Staff for the ONP of the 9th map /mixed artillery regiment/ of the 9th Corps of the 2nd Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 16 dated 14 June 1988, Knin Garrison.

C/ IN THE LIKA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF
Korenica Garrison

√ K 19. – Milan ŠUPUT, son of Miloš, Infantry
Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born 7 February 1949.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment of the 2nd Military District, Colonel FČ, PG 11 dated 26th December 1988, Sarajevo Garrison.

√ K 20. – Stevan DUKIĆ, son of Djuro, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
17 March 1943.

Currently by MF: Chief of Staff (also a deputy commander) of the 168th Motorised Brigade of the 42nd Corps of the 3rd Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 28 September 1987, Strumica Garrison.

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Translation 03014032

√21. – Milan BOGDANOVIĆ, son of Geca, Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31204, born
15 May 1940.

Currently by MF: Assistant Commander for Logistics (AFM RF /expansions unknown/) of the 590th mpoabr /mixed anti-tank artillery brigade/ of the 1st Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 11 dated 11 December 1991, Ćuprija Garrison.

√22. Luka EROR, son of Ilija, Quartermaster
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 32476, born
1 June 1948.

Currently by MF: Commander of the Logistics Battalion of the CVVŠ OS, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 14 dated 31 August 1990, Belgrade Garrison.

23. Nikola MIHIĆ, son of Ilija, Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31239, born
16 August 1947.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at Artillery Organ of the 2nd Military District Command Headquarters, Colonel FČ, PG 11 dated 6 May 1988, Sarajevo Garrison.

02 24. Predrag MIŠKOVIĆ, son of Nikola, Artillery
Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31201, born
11 May 1955.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer for the ONP of the 12th Corps 18th infantry mechanised brigade of the 1st Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 15 dated 31 May 1988, Novi Sad Garrison.

25. Bogdan TOJAGA, son of Stevan, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
7 January 1948.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at the Operations, Development and b/g /combat readiness/ Section of the Infantry Administration of the GŠ OS SFRJ Deputy Chief of Staff for the KoV, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 8 March 1990, Belgrade Garrison.

26. Milan ŠUŠNJAR, son of Dušan, Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31239, born
23 July 1942.

Currently by MF: Chief of the Operations Centre at the 13th Corps Command Headquarters of the 4th Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 6 December 1990, Bileća Garrison.

27. Milan ŠKORIĆ, son of Rade, Artillery

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Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31201, born 16 March 1952.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of Staff for Organisation, Mobilisation and Personnel Affairs of the 590th mpabr /mixed anti-aircraft brigade/ of the 1st Military District, Captain 1st Class-Major FČ, PG 16 dated 25 December 1990, Ćuprija Garrison.

92 28. – Djuro DRAGIČEVIĆ, son of Todor, Major of the KoV Technical Service, personal VES: 32170, born 23 September 1959.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 2nd Technical Depot of the 530th Logistics Base of the 1st Military District, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 26 December 1988, Donji Lapac Garrison.

/?/ K 29. – Mladen RAPAIĆ, son of Dane, Captain 1st Class in the anti-tank and mechanised units, personal VES: 31401, born 27 October 1955.

Currently by MF: Assistant Commander for the MV /Moral Guidance/ of the 3rd Anti-Tank Battalion of the 252nd Anti-Tank Brigade of the 37th Corps of the 1st Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 15 dated 5 November 1991, Kraljevo Garrison.

L. 30. – Petar RAŠETA, son of Stevan, Artillery Major, personal VES: 31201, born 16 May 1950.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at the 580th mabr /mixed artillery brigade/ Command Headquarters of the 2nd Military District, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 16 June 1988, Doboj Garrison.

D/ IN THE KORDUN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF: Topusko Garrison

√ 31. Čedomir BULAT, son of Pavle, Infantry Colonel, personal VES: 31180, born 15 January 1946.

Currently by MF: Chief of Operations Section of the Organ for ONP at the 2nd Military District Command Headquarters, Colonel FČ, PG 7 dated 8 February 1992, Sarajevo Garrison.

√√ 32. Gojko KRANJČEVIĆ, son of Ilija, Engineers Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31701, born 15 August 1944.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 540th Pontoon Battalion of the 13th Corps of the 2nd Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 15 April 1988, Karlovac Garrison.

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√√ 33. Zdravko KOPAČ, son of Milan, Captain
1st Class, personal VES: 31801, born
27 August 1954.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 367th Communications Regiment of the 2nd Military District, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 28 August 1990, Samobor Garrison.

√√ 34. Petar AJDINOVIĆ, son of Prokop, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31101, born
28 April 1952.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of the 13th Corps Counter Intelligence Group of the 4th Military District, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 30 September 1990, Rijeka Garrison.

√√ 35. Djuro GVOZDENOVIĆ, son of Nikola, Quartermaster
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 32439, born
1 May 1946.

Currently by MF: Assistant Commander for Logistics of the 49th mtbr of the 4th Corps of the 2nd Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 26 April 1991, Sarajevo Garrison.

SL 36. Marko RELIĆ, son of Ljuban, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
9 December 1949.

Currently by MF: Chief of Staff (also a deputy commander) of the 46th Partisan Division, 24th Corps, 1st Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 11 dated 18 July 1991, Kragujevac Garrison.

VM 37. Ljuban IVKOVIĆ, son of Milan, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
10 February 1947.

Currently by MF: Assistant Commander for the MV SVŠ /Secondary Military School/ KoV CVVŠ KoV – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for Kov, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 22 December 1986, Sarajevo Garrison.

E/ IN THE BANIJA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF
Glina Garrison

38. Milan BOGDANIĆ, son of Božo, Engineers
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31739, born
15 March 1952.

Currently by MF: Security Organ Administrative Officer at the 2nd Military District Command, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 19 August 1989, Sarajevo Garrison.

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√√ 39. Milan JEKIĆ, son of Janko, Technical Services Lieutenant Colonel of the Kov, personal VES: 32139, born 25 July 1947.

Currently by MF: Teaches Weapons Constructions-Introductory Course at the Ballistics Department of the VA KoV CVVŠ OS, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 1 July 1987, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 40. Marko VRCELJ, son of Mile, Artillery Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31239, born 10 April 1950.

Currently by MF: Teaches at the Department for Partisan Activities at the OS CVVŠ Administration, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 16 October 1989, Belgrade Garrison.

/?Petrinja/ 41. Petar GRAGBUNDŽIJA, son of Stanko, Infantry Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born 5 April 1946.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 257th Motorised Brigade, 1oth Corps, 2nd Military District, Lieutenant Colonel, PG 11 dated 13 September 1990, Petrinja Garrison.

/?Glina/ 42. Milutin MIRČETIĆ, son of Stanko, Engineers Major, personal VES: 31701, born 27 March 1947.

Currently by MF: Chief of the CAOP /Automatic Data Processing Centre/, 530th Logistics Base, 2nd Military District, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 28 February 1989, Bosanski Petrovac Garrison.

Petrinja 43. Petar DRAKULIĆ, son of Mile, Major in the Anti-Tank and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31430, born 4 July 1946.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer for the Supplies Planning for NNO /?Chief of National Defence/ at the OMJ /Armoured-Mechanised Units/ ŠC /School Centre/ of the OMJ Administration – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for KoV, Captain 1st Class-Major FČ, PG 15 dated 17 September 1986.

/illegible/ 44. Željko DAMJANIĆ, son of Pero, KoV Technical Service Lieutenant, personal VES: 32170, born 28 December 1963.

Currently by MF: Dispatched to attend post-graduate studies at the KoV CVTŠ, SSNO Technical Department, Lieutenant Colonel-Captain FČ, PG 19 dated 23 August 1988, Zagreb Garrison.

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F/ IN THE WESTERN SLAVONIA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF
Okučani Garrison

OK 45. Jovan ČUBRIĆ, son of Aleksa, Artillery
Colonel, personal VES: 31240, born 14 January 1940.

Currently by MF: On duty at the 21st Corps of the 3rd Military District, Colonel FČ, PG 10 dated 6 January 1988, Niš Garrison.

OK 46. Veljko BOSANAC, son of Djuro, Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born
24 February 1947.

Currently by MF: On duty at the KoV CVŠ, Infantry Administration – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for KoV, Major FČ, PG 12 dated 31 August 1988, Sarajevo Garrison.

√ OK 47. Rajko BOJANIĆ, son of Jovan, Infantry Major,
personal VES: 31101, born 4 February 1948.

Currently by MF: Commander of the 2nd mtb /motorised battalion/, 544th mtbr, 12th Corps, 1st Military District, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 31 March 1988, Šabac Garrison.

√ OK 48. Pero GRKINIĆ, son of Stanko, Communications
Major, personal VES: 31830, born 19 June 1944.

Currently by MF: Teaches at the Communications Department of the ŠC OMJ, OMJ Administration – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for KoV, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 13 dated 31 January 1986, Banja Luka Garrison.

OK 49. Veljko BOSNIĆ, son of Simo, Lieutenant
Colonel of the KoV Technical Service, personal VES:
32103.

Currently by MF: Chief of Technical Service at the ŠC PVO – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for RV /Air Force/ and PVO, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 10 December 1990, Rajlovac Garrison.

OK 50. Zdravko PETKOVIĆ, son of Nikola, Infantry
Major, personal VES: 31139, born 14 June
1946.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of Staff for the Belgrade ONP KOG /Operations Group Command/, 1st Military District, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 13 dated 6 September 1985, Belgrade Garrison.

OK 51. Vlado NIKOLIĆ, son of Krsto, Infantry
Captain, personal VES: 31102, born
5 June 1950.

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Currently by MF: Commander of the Border Company, 36th grb /border battalion/, 42nd Corps, 3rd Military District, Captain FČ, PG 17 dated 8 December 1988, Strumica Garrison.

OK 52. Nikola ĆUĆA, son of Dragiša, Infantry
√ Lieutenant, personal VES: 31101, born
21 December 1965.

Currently by MF: Platoon Commander in the 125th mtbr, 52nd Corps, 3rd Military District, Lieutenant Colonel-Captain FČ, PG 18 dated 1 September 1990, Peć Garrison.

√ ? OK 53. Milan BEKO, son of Lazo, Infantry Major,
personal VES: 31101, born 16 August 1955.

Currently by MF: Assigned to the 12th Corps, 1st Military District, Major FČ, PG 13 dated 15 March 1990, Novi Sad Garrison.

√ ? OK 54. Milan POZNANOVIĆ, son of Milorad, Captain 1st Class,
KoV Technical Service, personal VES: 32175, born 19
September 1957.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at the SSNO Security Administration, Major FČ, PG 12 dated 16 July 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

OK 55. Dušan SARTALIĆ, son of Milko, Major in the
√ KoV Technical Service, personal VES: 32101, born 28 May
1950.

Currently by MF: Commander of the Logistics Battalion, 80th mtbr, 24th Corps, 1st Military District, Major FČ, PG 15 dated 1 November 1985, Kragujevac Garrison.

Pakrac 56. Milenko ROMANIĆ, son of Božidar, Major in the Armoured and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31401, born 1 January 1946.

Currently by MF: Administrative Officer at the Moral Guidance Organ of the 42nd Corps Command, 3rd Military District, Major FČ, PG 15 dated 4 September 1986, Kumanovo Garrison.

√Pakrac 57. Stevo HARAMBAŠIĆ, son of Milan, Artillery
Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31201, born
21 September 1958.

Currently by MF: Assigned to the 4th mpoap /mixed anti-tank artillery regiment/, 4th Corps, 2nd Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 16 dated 26 January 1987, garrison not specified.

58. Zoran TOŠIĆ, son of Milija, Captain 1st Class,
√ KoV Technical Service, personal VES: 32157,

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born 18 May 1954.

Currently by MF: Technical Service Administrative Assistant at the 866th Logistics Base, 3rd Military District, Major FČ, PG 15 dated 16 September 1991, Skoplje Garrison.

Pakr/ac/ 59. Dragan GOLIĆ, son of Ivan, Major in the Armoured
√ and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31401,
born 20 December 1948.

Currently by MF: Commander of the Armoured Battalion, 504th mtbr, 1st Military District, Major FČ, PG 14 dated 27 December 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

/illegible/ 60. Boško LEMIĆ, son of Dušan, Major in the PVO Artillery and Rocket Units, personal VES: 31301,
born 1 February 1952.

Currently by MF: Teaches at the Technical Department of the ŠC PVO – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for RV and PVO, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 12 dated 16 November 1991, Rajlovac Garrison.

/illegible/ 61. Branko ĆUĆA, son of Ranko, Communications Lieutenant, personal VES: 31886, born 1 August 1954.

Currently by MF: Platoon Commander in the Communications Company, 398th Communications Brigade – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for EiV, 2nd Lieutenant-Captain FČ, PG 19 dated 21 October 1985, Užice Garrison.

? /illegible/62. Branko ROMANIĆ, son of Gavro, Transport Service /?Požega/ Major, personal VES: 32701, born 15 November 1948.

Currently by MF: Attending the 47th Class of the KŠŠ KoV CVVŠ OS, Captain 1st Class-Major FČ, PG 14 dated 1 November 1985, Belgrade Garrison.

P/odravska/ Slatina 63. Tihomir BABIĆ, son of Živko, Infantry Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31101, born 10 September 1956.

Currently by MF: Headquarters Administration Commander, 37th Corps, 1st Military District, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 16 dated 1 October 1987, Užice Garrison.

P. Slatina 64. Dušan RATKOVIĆ, son of Milan, Infantry Major, personal VES: 31139, born 10 October 1951.

Currently by MF: On duty at the 13th Corps, 4th Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 13 dated 31 August 1988, Bileća Garrison.

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G/ IN THE EASTERN SLAVONIA, WESTERN SREM AND BARANJA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SECTOR STAFF

Vukovar Garrison

√ 65. Bogdan SLADOJEVIĆ, son of Branko, Lieutenant Colonel, Armoured and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31439, born 12 April 1946.

Currently by MF: On duty at the ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for KoV, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 9 dated 1 June 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 66. Djuro KLJAJIĆ, son of Jovo, Lieutenant Colonel, Armoured and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31401, born 27 April 1950.

Currently by MF: Assistant Chief of Staff for the ONP, 36th mbr, 12th Corps, 1st Military District, Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 13 dated 19 September 1988, Subotica Garrison.

√ 67. Milorad DJUKANOVIĆ, son of Zdravko, Infantry Captain 1st Class, personal VES: 31101, born 18 January 1951.

Currently by MF: Attending the 19th class of the School for military, sociological and psychological studies and research, SSNO Department for Moral Guidance, PG 14 dated 19 October 1989, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 68. Miloš DMITRAŠINOVIĆ, son of Djujo, Quartermaster Major, personal VES: 32401, born 26 March 1947.

Currently by MF: Quartermaster Administrative Officer at the KOG Belgrade Logistics Organ, 1st Military District, Major-Lieutenant Colonel FČ, PG 14 dated 30 September 1990, Belgrade Garrison.

69. Radoslav BANČEVIĆ, son of Drago, Artillery /illegible/ Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31239, born 24 September 1946.

Currently by MF: Teaches tactics at the KŠŠ KoV CVVŠ OS, Colonel FČ, PG 10 dated 16 April 1990, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 70. Mileta NOVAKOVIĆ, son of Stanimir, Infantry Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31139, born 25 July 1932.

Currently by MF: At the disposal of the Organ for the TO /Territorial Defence/ Command of the 1st Military District, PG 11 dated 8 January 1991, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 71. Vitomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, son of Dobrivoje, Infantry

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Translation 03014040

Lieutenant Colonel, personal VES: 31101, born 31 January 1955.

Currently by MF: Attending the 43rd class of the KŠŠ KoV CVVŠ OS, PG 14 dated 29 December 1987, Belgrade Garrison.

√ 72. Marko KLIČKOVIĆ, son of Milan, Captain 1st Class, Armoured and Mechanised Units, personal VES: 31401, born 25 January 1958.

Currently by MF: Teaches at the Tactics Department of the ŠC OMJ, OMJ Administration – ZNGŠ OS SFRJ for KoV, Captain 1st Class FČ, PG 16 dated 14 September 1990, Banja Luka Garrison.

The above-named are obliged to contact the Republic of Srpska Krajina TO Main Staff, that is the Sector Staff in the above-mentioned garrison, as soon as they are informed of the Order.

Positions for the above-named shall be determined by the Commander of the Republic of Srpska Krajina TO Main Staff.

The above-named shall be dispatched to take up positions, in accordance with articles 271 and 284 of the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, and, if required /stay/ up to a year.

A written report regarding taking up positions by the above-named according to the Order is to be compiled and sent to the SSNO Personnel Administration and the unit, from which the above-named was dispatched.

CHIEF
Major General
Gojko KRSTIĆ

Accuracy of the copy is certified by Staff Sergeant 1st Class
Milorad KATIĆ
/signed and stamped/

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ANNEX 122:

RSK, 18TH CORPS., COMMAND NO. 7-214/1, 16 APRIL 1994

COMMAND OF THE 18th CORPS
MILITARY SECRET

Confidential no. 7-214/1 CONFIDENTIAL

16th April 1994

Pers. /?Personnel/,

inform the AVS /?Active Military Service/
about this 17th April

Submission of the decisions regarding
the manpower and the Information

To: Command of the 54th pbr /Infantry Brigade/

We have received the Information, confidential no. 5/13-85/15th April 1994 from the GŠ /General Staff/ of the SVK /Serbian Krajina Army/ of the following contents:

"At the meeting of the Collegiate Body of the commanders of the SVK held on 12th April 1994 that was attended by Colonel Medaković Stevan from the Personnel Department of the 40th KG /sic, probably KC – Personnel Centre/, certain positions regarding the solutions concerning the SVK manpower were adopted and we are informing you herewith about the most important ones:

1. The professional officers and non-commissioned officers of the Serbian nationality who

were born in the territory of the former Republic of Croatia and who have been sent to the military schools from the municipality of that Republic shall be transferred to the 40th KC..

2. The professional soldiers and the Cl /civilians/, the security organs, intelligence organs, members of the information service, medical and legal units shall be sent pursuant to Article 58 of the Law on Yugoslav Army.

3. The professional soldiers and civilians from the Novi Sad and Priština Corps and the Special Units Corps, the persons on contract and the persons whose exemption was requested by the commanders of the Armies, RV /Air Force/ and PVO Anti-aircraft Defence/ and RM /Navy/ due to the requirements of the b/g /combat readiness/ of the units in which they serve, which was approved by the Chief of the GS /Main Staff/ of the VJ.

4. All persons who have been transferred cannot request the return to the VJ, only the transfer, while the persons who have been sent may get the re-

turn. The position of the Collegiate Body is to approve the return only to the persons who were not born in Krajina and those who really have justifiable reasons (serious disease). The PU /Personnel Administration/ is responsible for the transfer into the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/, the GŠ of the SVK is responsible for the transfer from one corps into another within the 40th KC, and within the Corps it is the Corps Command, which can be achieved through a Proposal for deployment into another unit.

5. The transferred persons shall have the right for a compensation of the costs of living separately from their families or a compensation for the increased costs of accommodation, if they do not have the apartment, or other compensations pursuant to the Rules of Procedure, as of the date of the transfer from the Order.

The decisions on the number of transfers shall be made by the Personnel Department of the 40th KC and other decisions the commanders of the units.

6. Proposals for regular promotions (except for the rank of Colonel) shall be submitted by the Corps Commands directly to the Personnel Department of the 40th KC and for the Colonels and exceptional promotions through the GS of the SVK.

Authorised by the Commander
Colonel
Jovan Novaković"
/STAMP/:
MILITARY POST
9165
Confidential no. 37-153
20th April 1994
OKUČANI

The Information is being submitted to you for your information, and you brief the professional officers and non-commissioned officers, members of the VJ on it.
MV/MM
Submitted to:
51st, 54th and 98th pbr and
18th map /Mixed Artillery Regiment/
- a/a /Files/

PNS /expansion unknown/
OMPP /Organisation, mobilisation and Personnel Affairs/

Captain
Vujić Marko
stamp and signature

ANNEX 123:

MINUTES OF THE 19TH SESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RSK, 31 DECEMBER 1991

/*hand-written*/: DAZ, NG RSK 35

MINUTES

of the 19th Session of the Government of Republic of Serbian Krajina held on 31 December 1991 in the Municipal building, Room number 51

The following were present at the session: Prime Minister Dr Milan Babić, Risto Matković, Dr Vaso Ležajić, Milan Bauk, Veljko Stojisavljević, Dušan Badža, Vukašin Babić, Dušan Vještica and Milan Martić.

Having established the presence of the majority of the Government members, Dr Milan Babić proposed the following:

AGENDA

1. Information by the Prime Minister regarding the engagement of the Peace Forces of the UN;
2. Decision on the Re-engagement of the Krajina Territorial Defence into the Reserve Rorce of the Krajina Police;
3. Decision on Obligatory Wearing of the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina by the Uniformed Officials.
4. ~~Taking Decision on the territorial organisation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina~~ /crossed-out in handwriting/;
5. Decision on Placing the Signposts on the Public Roads with the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and with the Inscription reading: Republic of Serbian Krajina;
6. Decision on the Ban on the Export of Food, Livestock and other Commodities from the Territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina;
7. Enacting the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

DISCUSSION ON THE AGENDA

Item 1

Dr Milan Babić has given the exposition on this Item pointing out that he was present

at the session of the Presidency of Yugoslavia at which it was said that at the tomorrow's session the Presidency would adopt the Plan of the Cyrus Vance on the deployment of the Peace Forces. He was furnished with that concept of the engagement of the Peace Forces and it is basically the same as it was before.

According to that Plan, the military and police Forces of the UN shall be engaged and four areas have been defined which will be demilitarised and treated as the territories under the protection of the UN. The positive thing compared to the former concept is that the regional police forces could be formed and the weapons could be kept in the depots, under the control of the UN.

The Prime Minister Babić has repeated the known positions of the Government, with the explanation that such protection of the UN is uncertain for us since it will be provided for six months and for every new extension of the stay of the Peace Forces all permanent members of the Security Council should give their consent.

The Prime Minister Babić has made a comment that some of the permanent members of the Security Council could impose veto over the extension of the stay of the Peace Forces.

The answer he has received to that is that the Army guarantees the security and it will be staying by the border of Krajina. He has stressed then that the offered concept is unacceptable, and one of the reasons being that the territory which is being placed under protection is territorially split up.

He has mentioned the request to define Krajina integrally, that is, to integrate Northern and Southern Krajina and join the territory of Jasenovac and Okučani, and define the Eastern Slavonia as Eastern Krajina. He has requested to officially keep the Army in the territory of Krajina for the preservation of the subjectivity of the Yugoslav territory and Krajina as a part of Yugoslavia and also not to disband the units of the Territorial Defence.

Dr Milan Babić has stressed that he will not oppose the decisions of the Presidency in connection with that disagreement with the concept, since it would create chaos and complete destabilisation, but on behalf of the Government and the Assembly he will continue to support his concept. It has been said at the level of the Presidency of Yugoslavia that it will bear all the consequences for its decisions, but also it will give a guarantee on behalf of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. The Plan of Cyrus Vance which contains the concept of the system of the future Yugoslavia has been accepted at the level of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, since it proposes a mixture of a federation between Serbia and Montenegro, a confederation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia and an association between Croatia and Slovenia. That Plan does not define the area of Krajina.

The Prime Minister Babić has stressed that every possible effort should be made by our side in order to create conditions for security. First of all, we have been given the possibility to establish the regional police force. Secondly, we can keep as much equipment and military hardware as possible and thirdly, we have to prepare the manpower to take over that equipment and hardware. We have to aim at the deployment of the Peace Forces at the peripheral areas of Krajina and formally in the inner part of the territory, and to reduce the internal control of the police monitors of the UN to the minimum. Regardless of the fact that the UN troops are the Peace Forces, their engage-

ment is inclined towards one political solution since they define us as a special territory.

Risto Matković has said that there is a danger that, when the Peace Forces come, the Croatian side tells them to leave since it has been preparing the war operations - and what would happen then? He thinks that Croatia should be at least partially disarmed since we can easily meet he same destiny as all territories which were under the control of the UN. He has pointed out that the Government should stand by the previously taken positions.

Milan Martić has stressed that we have to find a way how to keep the military hardware and the manpower.

Risto Matković has said that, unlike Bosnian Krajina, for our Krajina it is important that we have established our police and the authorities to protect our territory.

Dr Milan Babić has stressed that we can be satisfied with the special status we have been offered by the UN since, in that way, we have been excluded from the Republic of Croatia.

The previously taken positions regarding the engagement of the Peace Forces of the UN have been unanimously supported.

Item 1) is attached to the Minutes and is considered as its constituent part.

Item 2

The Prime Minister Babić has proposed that the Decision on the Increase of the Reserve Police Strength be adopted as of today's date and that a battalion is to be formed in every municipality and a brigade in the territories under the security centres.

Nobody has asked to take part in the discussion, so the Draft Decision has been put to the vote.

The Decision on the Re-engagement of the Territorial Defence of Krajina into the Reserve Police Force of Krajina has been taken unanimously.

The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 2) and it is considered as its constituent part.

Item 3

Milan Babić has presented the exposition on this Item of the Agenda pointing out that all employees of the public enterprises should wear insignia on the uniforms, namely the coat of arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

There were no other proposals or remarks, so the Draft Decision was put to vote.

The Decision on Obligatory Wearing of the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for the Uniformed Officials has been taken unanimously.

The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 3) and it is considered as its constituent part.

Item 4

The exposition on this Item was provided by Dr Milan Babić who has pointed out that, according to the Vance Plan it has been proposed that the composition of the local police be proportional to the composition of the population before the armed conflicts. He says that some problems will arise regarding the Municipalities of Slunj, Drniš, partially Vrlika and Petrinja, therefore his proposed solution is that, Sisak specifically be administratively linked with the Municipality of Petrinja, thus increasing the percentage of the Serbian population in Petrinja. It is reckoned that the Croatian authorities will request the return of population.

Milan Martić has proposed that a decision be taken to ban the return of those inhabitants who took part in the enemy armed information /sic, probably formations/ against the Serbian people.

Dušan Badža has given the example that the representative of the Croatian Parliament /Sabor/ for the Municipality of Obrovac issued an indictment against 120 people from Obrovac.

Risto Matković says that an atmosphere should be created in the public to prosecute those persons who perpetrated the crime of participation in the enemy forces

Nobody else has asked to take part in the discussion.

The Draft Decision has thereupon been put to vote.

The Decision on the Territorial Organisation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has been taken unanimously.

The Decision is attached to the Minutes under 4) and is considered as its constituent part.

Item 5

The exposition on this Item of the Agenda was provided by Dr Milan Babić who has stressed the need to put the border posts on all the roads entering into the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

There were no other proposals and the Draft Decision has been put to vote.

The Decision on Placing the Signposts on the Public Roads with the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and with the Inscription reading Republic of Serbian Krajina has been unanimously taken.

The Decision is attached to the Minutes under 5) and it is considered as its constituent part.

Item 6

The exposition on this Item of the Agenda was provided by Risto Matković.

He has proposed that the exceptions to this Decision be authorised based on the Government's decision.

The Decision on the Ban of Export of Food, Livestock and other Commodities from the Territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has been taken unanimously.

The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 6) and it is considered as its constituent part.

Item 7

The exposition on this Item of the Agenda has been provided by Risto Matković who has stressed that this Code is in keping with the general provisions of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia. This Code has provided for the possibility to pronounce a death sentence for the aggravated forms of murder. It is in keeping with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, since it stipulates the provision that the death sentence may be exceptionally pronounced for the aggravated crime against life and limb. Risto Matković has provided the explanations of all the crimes as per the chapters pointing out that they are identical to the Criminal Code of Serbia and in keeping with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. He has enumerated some new crimes in this Code. Risto Matković has appealed that the Criminal Code be adopted pursuant to Article 87 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and that it be filed to the Assembly for its next regular session. He has also added that the Code contains the regular international standards as the comparative criminal legislature. In the Transitional and Final Provisions of this Code it is said that it will enter into force on the eight day from the date of its publishing in the "Krajina Gazette". Because it is not possible to publish it now, and since the Criminal Code is in question, it is necessary to define the minimal "*vacatio legis*", therefore he has proposed that the Code enters into force on the day of its enactment.

Nobody else has asked to take part in the discussion and the Draft Code has been put to vote.

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has been enacted unanimously.

The said Code is attached to the Minutes under 7) and it is considered as its constituent part.

Risto Matković has said that he received an official letter about the Una Railway Line and that we have to achieve an equal position as an enterprise at the Federal level, since Croatia has expressed the interests in the Una Railway Line.

With this, the Agenda has been finished and the work of the session has been finished.

Minutes taken by:

PRIME MINISTER

Borka Lalić

Dr Milan Babić

ANNEX 124:

RSK, STATE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR, PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, 3 DECEMBER 1992

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

G O V E R N M E N T

STATE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION

WITH UNPROFOR

Number: 04-05-28/92

Knin, 03 December 1992

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

The latest report of the Secretary-General of the UN Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was expected, but not in the form and with the contents as it has been presented in the mass media.

We have expected that in the Report the responsibility for the blockade of the peace operation will be shared between our side and the Croatian side - according to the criteria not known to us, though - but we have not expected that the Government of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ would openly be called "the root cause for the impossibility of UNPROFOR's further operation". We cannot accept such qualification of the situation in the protected area, let alone the explanation which Mr. Boutros-Ghali provided in his Report.

The problem of demilitarisation has not been adequately presented in the said Report, since neither causes nor consequences have been defined when this important segment of the Vance Plan is in question. On several occasions it has been pointed to the essence of the Vance Plan and the overall peace operation mentioned under Item 7 which specifies the role of the UN forces to ensure that "the areas remain demilitarised and that all inhabitants of those areas be protected from threats of armed attacks". Despite constant attacks of the Croatian armed forces on the protected area and the open threats that the question of the RSK would be resolved militarily and not politically, we have fully implemented ~~to a great extent~~ Item 15 of the Plan, that is, we have fully met the obligation under items a), b) and c), while the units mentioned under the item d) are outside the formations of our police units and they are the subject of processing of our judicial organs.

The UNPROFOR Commander, General Satish Nambiar and his Deputy Mr. Thornberry were informed in detail about this case in writing in the documents dated 4 November 1992, no. 04.5.20/92 and the document no. 04-5-22/92 dated 10 November 1992. This second letter /sic/ was also sent to the Security Council. This State Committee expresses its surprise that so far it has not received any reply on the receipt of the mentioned documents and that, instead, it has to prove again something which has been already proved and that it has to state something which has been already stated, the thing we consider completely unnecessary since it is obvious that there are also communications blockades in presenting our positions and proofs. The best example of the consequences it could have is the Report of the Secretary-General. In addition to the information in writing, General Satish Nambiar was also verbally informed in Knin on 2 November 1992 on everything and on 19 November 1992 apart from him also the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. All the stated facts have been accepted, so obviously in the course of the further processing of information it has been selected with the aim of putting further pressure on our organs of authorities as the only ones to be blamed for a stalemate in which the entire Plan was brought. Therefore, we cannot accept such qualification about the demilitarisation from the Report, since it has been given using a one-track approach.

Particularly surprising is the manner in which the problem of the return of refugees has been presented and for which again the RSK authorities have been blamed. The general public knows that the Croatian side has tried to manipulate with the refugees through so-called “peace marches”, and the Croatian Government was sternly warned about that. It is also known that the regulations of the RSK apply on this territory, which is in keeping with the Report of the Secretary-General which is enclosed to the Plan. The RSK authorities have enabled that the refugees return in a legal manner and the fact that nobody has taken this opportunity so far does not represent a problem of this Government but it is a result of the already mentioned manipulation. On 2 November 1992, our representatives, in the conversation with the Ambassador Moor /?/ of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees clearly stated that the scope of the Vance Plan in this segment has been /illegible/, and they gave a concrete proposal as to how the problem could be comprehensively resolved. Ambassador Moor accepted our reasons and promised a co-operation in the implementation but nothing else has been done since then. Therefore, it is obvious that our organs are offering solutions again but for the reasons not known to us the said solutions are not being implemented or the implementation is very slow. So, this State Committee cannot accept this segment of the qualification from the Report of the Secretary-General either.

A part of the Report which refers to the check-points mentioning that the control of 5 bridges is not permitted was also dealt with in detail in the previously mentioned documents. It is undisputable that in almost the entire territory of the RSK our forces and the UNPROFOR forces have been sepa-

rated, but it was not possible to do it at those 5 disputable locations for purely technical reasons, which have also been described in detail earlier. The most important thing is that UNPROFOR forces, in cooperation with the regular units of our regular police, really control the mentioned five bridges still. Therefore, the State Committee does not accept this qualification either, because it does not think that this problem is of an essential nature, but obviously it has a completely different background related to the pressure of the Croatian side about the problem of borders.

The State Committee clearly does not accept the qualification that the entire situation could be considerably improved using the pressures of the SR /Federal Republic/ of Yugoslavia (mentioned are persuasions by President Ćosić and Prime Minister Panić) since allegedly the RSK cannot survive without SR of Yugoslavia. We ourselves decide on our destiny and we have repeated that on the numerous occasions both in our verbal contacts and in writing. Only the legal organs of the RSK can speak in the name of the people of the RSK and nobody else, and nobody else can take decisions which are of vital importance for the destiny of this nation, either. We would like to point out in the end that it is our right, that is, it is the right of those people to /choose/ the way how it will be organised and how it will call the territory on which they live. Likewise, it is the right of those people to organise their organs of authorities since, if it was not like that, it would be a protectorate. Due to all that the State Committee expresses its regrets for the one-sided Report of the Secretary-General, so the Secretary-General will be invited formally to personally see how the peace operation is progressing in the territory of our Republic. We hope that the things will be much clearer by that time and that the UNPROFR operation will not come into question given the fact that it is in the interest of all the parties in conflict so far. We exclude here the Croatian side since their positions are very well known.

PRESIDENT
OF THE STATE COMMITTEE
FOR COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR
/signed for/ Zdravko Zečević, MA
/illegible signature/
/round stamp/:

The Republic of Serbian Krajina
Government, Knin

ANNEX 125:

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 871, 16 MARCH 1994

Reports S/1994/291/Add.1, 16 March 1994 – S/1994/300, 16 March 1994

Annex

Cost estimate of the additional costs to the United Nations relating to the proposed activities of UNPROFOR

Initial six months Sarajevo and central Bosnia Maglaj	(In thousands of United States dollars)	
1. Military personnel	69,474	9,478
2. Civilian personnel costs	35,768	4,459
3. Premises/accommodation	53,322	10 087
4. Infrastructure repairs	10,017	1,113
5. Transport operations	36,312	3,168
6. Air operations	1,937	21
7. Naval operations	–	–
8. Communications	14,640	1,740
9. Other equipment	35,798	6,845
10. Supplies and services	11,270	2,148
11. Election-related supplies and services	–	–
12. Public information programmes	227	43
13. Training programmes	39	8
14. Mine-clearing programmes	1,883	360
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	–	–
16. Air and surface freight	1,575	300
17. Integrated Management Information System	–	–
18. Support account for peace-keeping operations	602	97
19. Staff assessment	... 844	... 140
Total, lines 1–19	273,708	40,007

115. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 900 (1994) (S/1994/291/Add.1, 16 March 1994)

Addendum

1. In my report of 11 March 1994[1] to the Security Council, I indicated in paragraph 27 that the preliminary estimates of the costs to the United Nations of the proposals to increase the mandate and strength of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) would appear separately as an addendum to that document.

2. The additional responsibilities to be undertaken by UNPROFOR and the proposed increase in its strength in relation to the cease-fire and ensuring freedom of movement in and around Sarajevo and central Bosnia are set out in paragraphs 11, 14 and 15 of the main report. In addition, the additional responsibilities relating to the feasibility of extending the safe-area concept to Maglaj are contained in paragraph 22 of the report.

3. It is estimated that the cost associated with the additional responsibilities relating to the cease-fire and ensuring freedom of movement in and around Sarajevo and central Bosnia will amount to some $273.7 million for an initial six-month period. This amount includes the costs for the deployment of 150 military observers, 8,250 contingent personnel, 275 civilian police, 239 international civilian staff, 951 local staff and 659 international contractual personnel. A breakdown of the estimated costs for the the first six-month period, by main categories of expenditure, is provided for information in the annex to the present addendum.

4. It is further estimated that the cost associated with the additional responsibilities relating to extending the safe-area concept to Maglaj will amount to some $40 million for an initial six-month period. This amount provides for the deployment of 1,500 additional contingent personnel, 29 international civilian staff, 106 local staff and 73 international contractual personnel. A breakdown of the estimated costs for the first six-month period, by main categories of expenditure, is also provided for information purposes in the annex.

5. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve the proposed course of action and enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNPROFOR special account.

[1] S/1994/291 and Corr.1.

[An Annex containing cost estimates has been omitted.]

116. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993)* (S/1994/300, 16 March 1994)

* A brief note of explanation may be useful for readers regarding the terminology employed in the present report to describe the three principal groups with which UNPROFOR has had to deal in its area of operations. 'Serb' and 'Bosnian Serb' refer to members of that ethnic group in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively. 'Croatian' refers to citizens or institutions of the Republic of Croatia; 'Croat' or 'Bosnian Croat' to members of the ethnic group. 'Bosniac' is the term preferred by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to refer to citizens loyal to it, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution 871 (1993), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1994. In his letter to the President of the Security Council of 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94), the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to conduct a thorough review of the role and functioning of the Force prior to the Council's consideration of the further renewal of its mandate. The present report represents the outcome of that review, which was conducted by senior Headquarters personnel in cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr.

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Yasushi Akashi, the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, and senior civilian and military personnel of their offices in the mission area during the second half of February. In addition, the report takes into account the developments in recent weeks, which have contributed to a new environment for UNPROFOR's functioning.

II. Structure of UNPROFOR

2. UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components, with overall headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 15 March 1994, the strength of the military personnel, led by the Force Commander, General Jean Cot of France, amounted to 30,655, including 580 United Nations military observers from 34 countries. There are 679 civilian police, 1,075 international civilian staff (including 711 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 1,574 local staff. A detailed breakdown of the size and composition of the Force is provided in annex I.

3. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 871 (1993), the military structure of UNPROFOR has been reorganized under three subordinate commanders: UNPROFOR Croatia, under Major General A. Tayyeb (Jordan), headquartered in Zagreb; UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, under Lieutenant-General Michael Rose (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), headquartered in Kiseljak; and UNPROFOR former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, under Brigadier-General Tryggve Tellefsen (Norway), headquartered in Skopje. The three commanders report to the Force Commander who, together with the civilian, logistical and administrative components, acts under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

III. Analysis of the mandate

A. *Croatia*

Establishment of UNPROFOR: United Nations protected areas and 'pink zones'

4. UNPROFOR was established by the Security Council in its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 for an initial period of 12 months. The peacekeeping operation was devised as 'an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis [which] would not prejudge the outcome of such negotiations' (S/23280, annex III). UNPROFOR was deployed in three protected areas (UNPAs) within Croatia, divided into four sectors. These were areas of recent conflict in which Serbs constituted a majority or a substantial minority of the population. The concept for the operation was based on two assumptions: on the one hand, there would be a withdrawal of the forces of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) from all of Croatia and a demilitarization of the UNPAs; and, on the other hand, the existing local authorities and police would continue to function, on an interim basis, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis.

5. The specific tasks of UNPROFOR were:

(a) To verify the withdrawal of all JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there;

(b) To ensure that the UNPAs were demilitarized through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons in them were protected from fear of armed attack;

(c) To monitor the functioning of the local police to help to ensure that the latter carried out their duties without discrimination and with full respect for the human rights of the residents of the UNPAs;

(d) To facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.

6. Subsequent decisions by the Security Council have changed the political context of this mandate without changing the basic mandate itself. UNPROFOR's military and civilian personnel have in the main succeeded in keeping the peace and helped to facilitate further political negotiations under various auspices. But the interim cease-fire is not a political settlement, and UNPROFOR is held responsible by both the Croatian Government and the Serb leadership in Knin for not implementing their very different views of its mandate.

7. The first expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia was contained in resolution 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, which tasked the Force 'to monitor the reintroduction of Croatian government authority in areas controlled by Serb forces and with substantial Serb populations' (so-called 'pink zones'). These zones were areas contiguous to but lying outside the UNPAs, and under Serb control. The additional tasks assigned to UNPROFOR were:

(a) To verify the immediate withdrawal of the Croatian Army, Serb territorial defence forces (TDF) and any irregular units from the 'pink zones';

(b) To supervise the restoration of authority by the Croatian police and the re-establishment of the local police in proportion to the demographic structure of the areas prior to the conflict and to monitor the maintenance of law and order by the existing police forces, with particular regard to the well-being of minorities;

(c) To maintain custody of the heavy equipment of JNA forces;

(d) To deploy along the lines of confrontation

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and within the 'pink zones';

(e) To establish and chair a joint commission to oversee and monitor the process of the restoration of authority by the Croatian Government in the 'pink zones'.

8. The Secretary-General has reported extensively to the Council on the implementation of the above tasks (see, in particular, S/25777 of 15 May 1993 and S/26470 of 20 September 1993). The only major success achieved in relation to UNPROFOR's basic mandate in Croatia has been the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatian territory. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, however, both sides have sought to use UNPROFOR to achieve their political goals. The Serb side has taken advantage of the presence of UNPROFOR in its efforts to freeze the status quo, under UNPROFOR 'protection', while establishing a self-proclaimed 'State' of the 'Republic of Serb Krajina' in UNPROFOR's area of responsibility. The government of Croatia has in turn insisted on the reintegration of these areas into Croatia according to its internationally recognized borders and demanded that refugees and displaced persons be returned to their homes in the UNPAs. On four occasions, it has launched military incursions in pursuit of these goals, which has further intensified Serb hostility. Such actions, compounded by the lack of cooperation from the local Serb authorities, who still maintain effective military control over most of the areas occupied by them during the war of 1991, have made UNPROFOR's mandates in Croatia all but impossible to fulfil.

9. The initial success of UNPROFOR in placing the heavy weapons of the Serb TDF in storage depots under a 'double-lock' system was reversed following the 22 January 1993 offensive by the Croatian Army in Sector South and the adjacent 'pink zones'. The inability of UNPROFOR to shield the local Serb population from such an attack resulted in the Serb TDF breaking into a number of storage areas and removing their weapons, including heavy weapons, ostensibly to protect themselves. The 9 September 1993 Croatian destruction of three Serb villages in the Medak pocket has, despite the robust action taken by UNPROFOR to secure the withdrawal of Croatian forces, further increased the mistrust of the Serbs towards UNPROFOR and has led to the reaffirmation of their refusal to disarm. In turn, this refusal to disarm, as required in the United Nations peace-keeping plan, has prevented UNPROFOR from implementing other essential elements of the plan, particularly facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin in secure conditions.

10. The resultant impasse has left UNPROFOR in the invidious position of, in effect, administering a stalemate in the UNPAs, while being criticized by both sides. Their dissatisfaction, however, results from the change that has occurred in the political context of UNPROFOR's original mandate. It will be recalled that the deployment of the force was not intended as an end in itself, but as an interim measure to maintain the peace while political negotiations proceeded to achieve an overall solution to the Yugoslav crisis. However, Security Council resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993, paragraph 5, states that the Security Council 'supports the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in their efforts to help to define the future status of those territories comprising the United Nations Protected Areas, which are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia'. Following the adoption of resolution 815 (1993), which in the view of the Serbs prejudges the outcome of the political negotiations, the resistance of the local Serb authorities to any dialogue has intensified.

11. At the same time, the Croatian Government has increasingly taken actions to underline its intention to reintegrate the UNPAs and 'pink zones' into Croatia, such as the opening of the Maslenica bridge and moves to open the Zemunik airport, actions that have increased the hostility of the Serb leadership in the UNPAs. These facilities are of manifest importance to the economic revival of the Dalmatian area and the restoration of the tourist trade on which its prosperity depended. However, unilateral action to reopen these facilities carries a high risk of Serb retaliation and renewal of major conflict. In this regard, the Joint Commission set up by resolution 762 (1992) to supervise the restoration of Croatian authority in the 'pink zones' has failed to carry out its tasks since the Serbs maintain that, as the majority of the population within the zones is Serb, a political settlement between them and the Croatian Government must come first. The Joint Commission has therefore been rendered largely inoperative by Serb non-cooperation.

12. Recent bilateral negotiations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia (the joint declaration of 19 January 1994) and between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Washington Framework Agreement and Vienna negotiations of March 1994) have moved some areas of the former Yugoslavia towards political agreements. These diplomatic developments again change the political framework of UNPROFOR in Croatia, but their immediate consequence is to increase the insecurity felt by the Serb population in the UNPAs. In the weeks preceding the mandate deadline, moreover, military activity by both the Croatian and the Serb forces along previously quieter parts of the confrontation line has increased. It must be stressed that the Force can fulfil its mandate in Croatia only with a degree of consent and cooperation from both the Croatian Government and the Serbs. It does not at present enjoy this and can do little to obtain it until a change in the political environment occurs. One step that the Security Council could take would be to strengthen the protection provided to UNPROFOR in the UNPAs, in the light of the paucity of available troops, by extending close air support to Croatia as requested by the Secretary-General on 19 September 1993 (S/26468). Another would be to urge both parties to revive the Joint Commission process with regard to communications links and economic issues, without prejudice to their currently irreconcilable political positions.

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Immigration and customs

13. In order to establish stable conditions in the UNPAs, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council approved in resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992, a further expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate to include:

(a) Control of entry of civilians into the UNPAs;

(b) Immigration and customs functions on the international borders of areas in Croatia where the UNPA boundaries coincided with international frontiers.

14. UNPROFOR has been unable to implement its mandate under resolution 769 (1992) because of the refusal of the local Serb authorities to allow the setting up of checkpoints at the borders of the UNPAs. The Serbs have maintained that, as a 'sovereign State', they have the right to carry out these functions themselves. They have objected in particular to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), which imposes de facto sanctions on the UNPAs by subjecting the import, export and transshipment of goods to or through the UNPAs to explicit Croatian government approval. The economy of the UNPAs has been devastated both by the effects of war and by the restrictions on trade. This has further contributed to Serb intransigence on the issue of border control, which the local Serb authorities see as being intended to subjugate them through economic pressure.

Prevlaka peninsula and Peruca dam

15. Following an agreement on the Prevlaka peninsula, which called for the complete withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and the demilitarization of the peninsula, UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded in resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992 to include:

(a) Control of the Peruca dam;

(b) Monitoring of the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia;

(c) Monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and the removal of heavy weapons from neighbouring areas of Croatia and Montenegro.

The withdrawal of the JNA and the demilitarization of Prevlaka have been signal successes for UNPROFOR. However, the mandate for control of the Peruca dam was not fulfilled as a result of the partial destruction of the dam, followed by its capture by the Croatian Army during the 22 January 1993 offensive. The other two mandates are being satisfactorily fulfilled.

B. *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Sarajevo airport

16. As a result of the initial UNPROFOR mandate contained in resolution 743 (1992), the headquarters of the Force was established in Sarajevo, which was, at that time, seen as a neutral location unaffected by the war in Croatia. It was also hoped that UNPROFOR's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina would prove a stabilizing factor amid the increasing tensions in the country. Although resolution 743 (1992) made provision for United Nations military observers to patrol certain limited areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this was to take place following the demilitarization of the UNPAs, which did not occur. Until June 1992, the Force had no other mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17. Following the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which made it impossible for the Force to fulfil its responsibilities in Croatia from Sarajevo, the headquarters of the Force was relocated, initially to Belgrade, and subsequently to Zagreb. However, UNPROFOR personnel remained in Sarajevo to facilitate negotiations between the warring factions on a variety of issues, including arrangements for an overall cease-fire. Following an UNPROFOR-sponsored agreement for the handing over of Sarajevo airport by the Serbs in order that it could be made available for United Nations and humanitarian purposes, UNPROFOR was mandated by resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 'to create the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport'.

18. Under this mandate UNPROFOR was tasked:

(a) To ensure the immediate security of the airport and its installations;

(b) To supervise the operation of the airport and control its facilities and organization, including local civilian personnel;

(c) To facilitate the unloading of humanitarian cargo and ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel through the establishment of security corridors between the airport and the city;

(d) To verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons systems from within range of the airport and its approaches and monitor the concentration of artillery, mortar, and ground-to-ground missile systems in specified areas to be agreed upon.

19. This mandate has been and continues to be effectively fulfilled, except that the objectives described in subparagraph 18 (d) above were fully accomplished only in February 1994. Prior to that, one aircraft was shot down while approaching Sarajevo airport in August 1992 and several others sustained minor damage from small-arms fire. None the less, since the airport was opened under UNPROFOR control on 3 July 1992, more than 8,200 flights have landed in Sarajevo, carrying some 95,000 tons of humanitarian relief. Although Sarajevo airport has had to be closed temporarily for security reasons on numerous occasions, it has largely remained open and provides a vital lifeline to and from the city.

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Humanitarian convoy protection

20. In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council decided, in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992, to expand the mandate of UNPROFOR to include the following tasks:

> (a) To provide support to the efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly through the provision of convoy protection when so requested;
>
> (b) To provide protection for other humanitarian agencies with the approval of UNHCR;
>
> (c) To protect United Nations facilities, including UNHCR storage centres, if so requested;
>
> (d) To provide protection for convoys of released detainees on request by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the concurrence of the Force Commander that the request was practicable.

21. For much of this period, these have proved the dominant tasks, in terms of time and resources expended, of UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command. The problems constraining the delivery of humanitarian assistance described in document S/26470 of 20 September 1993 have increased. Convoys in central Bosnia were suspended for four weeks from 25 October 1993 following a fatal attack on a UNHCR convoy. On 18 and 29 November 1993, the three parties signed joint declarations providing *inter alia* for security, freedom of movement and access for humanitarian personnel and assistance. While some improvement in access for non-food items was evident thereafter, the deliberate targeting of vehicles and personnel continued, necessitating increased UNPROFOR protection. Access to some areas remained severely restricted by obstruction (for example, Gorazde and the Maglaj/Tesanj enclave) and the intensity of the conflict (for example, East Mostar). The Bosnian Croats continued to deny clearance for critical utilities, spare parts and supplies in the areas under their control. Finally, secondary and tertiary distribution from UNHCR warehouses to recipients, particularly in central Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been greatly reduced owing to the inability of local vehicles and drivers to cross confrontation lines. Nevertheless, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the resilience of the population and a second relatively mild winter have to date prevented large-scale malnutrition and mitigated the worst effects of the breakdown in essential services. The contribution of UNPROFOR has been vital in this regard.

22. Recent developments in Sarajevo, and the Bosniac-Croat cease-fire, have provided an opportunity to reverse the deterioration in the ability of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance effectively, in conditions of security and in accordance with humanitarian principles. More important, these developments also provide the opportunity to create conditions that reduce the need for relief assistance and open the way for rehabilitation assistance. With such conditions, it is hoped that the need for UNPROFOR protection of the humanitarian operation would be reduced, although UNPROFOR would need to augment its troop strength to undertake other duties related to cease-fires, disengagements and the control of heavy weapons.

'No-fly zone'

23. On 9 October 1992, the Security Council in resolution 781 (1992) declared a ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina and mandated UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with it through the placement of military observers on airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (including five in Serbia and one in Montenegro). Under resolution 781 (1992), UNPROFOR was tasked to ensure, through an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection, that the purposes of flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina were consistent with Security Council resolutions. The ban on air activity over Bosnia and Herzegovina was further expanded in resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993 to cover all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance flights, and medical or casualty evacuation flights of the warring parties. In resolution 816 (1993), Member States were authorized to take 'under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures' to ensure compliance with the resolution. Since 12 April 1993, at the request of the Secretary-General, aircraft of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have flown in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure such compliance. The support of NATO has proved crucial to UNPROFOR in this and in other areas mentioned in the present report.

24. Between October 1992 and March 1993, there were some 540 violations of the ban on military flights ordered in resolution 781 (1992). Since the adoption of resolution 816 (1993) on 31 March 1993, it is clear that the procedures agreed with NATO and executed under Operation Deny Flight have been almost entirely successful in stopping flights by combat aircraft in Bosnia and Herzegovina.. There have been only two verified exceptions. The first occurred in July 1993: the aircraft was not engaged as it heeded the warning to land immediately. The second resulted in the shooting-down of four combat aircraft on 28 February 1994. However, the procedures have not prevented many violations of the 'no-fly zone' by non-combat aircraft (1005 as at 14 March 1994); the overwhelming majority of these have been helicopters transporting individuals – 'flying trucks' of little military significance. Although such aircraft are routinely intercepted and warned, the nature and specific circumstances of the flights have not so far justified shooting them down.

Border monitoring

25. In order to facilitate the implementation of the various Security Council resolutions relating to the

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arms embargo on all the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the call for non-interference by outside forces in the Bosnian conflict, the Security Council decided that international monitors should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina for this purpose. The Secretary-General was requested to consider this task in resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, a request reiterated in resolution 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993.

26. In his recommendations relating to the possible performance of this task, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in order to ensure the credibility of UNPROFOR in carrying out such duties, some 10,000 additional troops, equipped with the necessary material (including communications) resources, would be required to provide for 24-hour observation and search operations covering the 123 crossing points on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina with neighbouring countries. Since Member States have not so far provided the Secretary-General with the personnel resources and the material necessary for this task, there has, to date, been no implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate on border monitoring.

27. In view of the recent increase of outside involvement in the Bosnian conflict, especially Croatian Army involvement in southern and central Bosnia and Herzegovina, serious consideration has again been given to the implementation of UNPROFOR's border control mandate. The Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mr. M. Granic, specifically requested UNPROFOR to perform this function in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 16 February 1994 (S/1994/177). While the Secretary-General remains willing for UNPROFOR to take on this responsibility, the key problem remains the lack of personnel resources and adequate material from Member States, without which the tasks requested cannot be undertaken. Any conceivable deployment of UNPROFOR could not cover more than the main routes through Tomislavgrad and Metkovic, and so would not serve the intended purpose.

Safe areas

28. Following the visit of the Security Council Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1993 and the increasing concern over the critical security and humanitarian problems faced by several towns under continuing attack by Bosnian Serb forces, the Security Council, in resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, declared the following towns and their surroundings to be safe areas: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica. Under this resolution, UNPROFOR military observers were mandated:

(a) To monitor the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from the towns to a distance where they would cease to constitute a menace;

(b) To monitor the humanitarian situation in the safe areas.

29. In order to ensure full respect for the safe areas identified in resolution 824 (1993), UNPROFOR's mandate was further extended by resolution 836 (1993) of 3 June 1993 in order to enable it:

(a) To deter attacks against the safe areas;

(b) To monitor the cease-fire in the safe areas;

(c) To promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government from the safe areas;

(d) To occupy key points on the ground;

(e) To participate in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population in the safe areas.

30. The safe-area concept has had mixed results. The presence of UNPROFOR forces has indeed deterred major attacks on these towns, reduced the level of conflict, lowered casualties and improved basic humanitarian conditions in Srebrenica and Zepa. Additional forces have also been deployed in Tuzla. Humanitarian aid has, despite frequent harassment, also been delivered. However, living conditions in the safe areas remain appalling: the areas are unviable socially and economically and suffer high levels of unemployment, overcrowding and crime, as well as the tension of an uncertain future. The Army of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also used the safe areas as locations in which its troops can rest, train and equip themselves as well as fire at Serb positions, thereby provoking Serb retaliation. If the concept is to be sustained, the term 'safe area' requires redefinition, as suggested in the Secretary-General's report of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291), which discusses the feasibility of extending the concept to three additional towns identified by the Security Council. Such redefinition would require full demilitarization by both sides on agreed conditions, assured freedom of movement, the impounding or withdrawal of heavy weapons and extensive UNPROFOR deployment.

31. The recent experience in Sarajevo may offer a pointer in this regard. Although Sarajevo was declared a safe area by the Security Council, it has been difficult until recently to negotiate local cease-fires and confidence-building measures, and the city frequently suffered heavy shelling and sniping, some of it provoked by offensive actions undertaken by forces of the Army of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following a cease-fire agreement initiated by UNPROFOR on 6 February 1994, and the issuance of the NATO Declaration of 10 February 1994, both the government forces and those of the Bosnian Serbs withdrew, or placed under UNPROFOR control, their heavy weapons in and around the city. As a result, Sarajevo has for some five weeks become much safer, and its citizens are able to enjoy peace and a greater measure of freedom of movement within their neighbourhoods. The extension of such arrangements to other cities and towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina – involving genuine demilitarization, with the surrender or withdrawal of weapons by all warring parties – could breathe new life into this concept, provided UNPROFOR is given the necessary resources. It should be recalled that the Security Council, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, had

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already called upon all parties 'to end the blockades of Sarajevo and other towns and to demilitarize them, with heavy weapons under international supervision'.

32. If the conflict continues elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issues would be more problematic. Militarily, in order for UNPROFOR to deter attacks against the safe areas, it would need to have a substantial number of troops, equipped adequately to counter the besieging forces and defend UNPROFOR positions. Without such resources, it is impossible to defend the safe areas, not least because they are totally surrounded by hostile forces. In other words, the active cooperation of the parties is indispensable to the viability of the safe areas. While UNPROFOR could work towards a concept of a gradually expanding demilitarized zone even in the absence of such cooperation, this would place it in a peace enforcement mode while failing to address the larger issue of an overall settlement to the crisis. It appears that the best that could be achieved in these circumstances would be the provision of an increased sense of security and stability in the safe areas with the presence of UNPROFOR troops, until a political solution can be found.

33. Finally, the Council may wish to note that, in the case of the Bihac safe area, the following issues have not been addressed in the original mandate relating to safe areas:

(a) The safe area mandate relates specifically to attacks from Bosnian Serb forces. Bihac is also attacked periodically by forces owing allegiance to a Bosnian Muslim leader, Mr. Fikret Abdic, who is seeking autonomy for his region, and by the 'Krajina Serbs' from the UNPAs in Croatia. It is unclear whether UNPROFOR has the mandate to deter attacks on safe areas from forces outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or internal warring forces;

(b) The use of air power in defence of the safe areas is confined to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A request by the Secretary-General of 19 September 1993 (S/26468) to extend this authority to the territory of Croatia has not so far been acted upon by the Security Council. Meanwhile, attacks on the Bihac pocket have been launched from the UNPAs in Croatia but UNPROFOR, in its protection of that safe area, does not enjoy the right to use close air support on Croatian territory in the event of such attacks.

It would be helpful if the Council could, in addressing this report, clarify the issue raised in subparagraph (a) above and fill the lacuna identified in subparagraph (b).

34. The steady accretion of mandates from the Security Council has transformed the nature of UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and highlighted certain implicit contradictions. For a long while, UNPROFOR's primary mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen as assistance in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, an objective that could be attained only with the active cooperation of the parties. The increased tasks assigned to UNPROFOR in later resolutions have inevitably strained its ability to carry out that basic mandate. The principal consequences have been the following:

(a) Several of the newer tasks have placed UNPROFOR in a position of thwarting the military objectives of one party and therefore compromising its impartiality, which remains the key to its effectiveness in fulfilling its humanitarian responsibilities;

(b) As a result of the changed perception of its impartiality, the Force has suffered increased incidents of obstruction and harassment, particularly by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat parties, in its attempts to discharge its humanitarian responsibilities;

(c) The new tasks require resources that have not been provided expeditiously by the international community. For instance, despite the authorization by the Security Council of 7,600 troops for the safe areas in its resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993, only 5,000 had arrived in the theatre as of 10 March 1994.

This combination of consequences has exposed the Force to unjustified criticism even from some of those who participated in the elaboration of the rules and procedures that govern UNPROFOR's action.

35. The question of troop resources is a crucial one. When the implementation of safe areas was first considered by the Security Council, UNPROFOR estimated (S/25939, para.5) that, in order to ensure full respect for these areas, some 34,000 troops would be required. The Security Council preferred to start implementation under a 'light option' envisaging a minimal troop reinforcement of 7,600. It soon became apparent, however, that even this minimum requirement would not be met immediately by Member States. Efforts by the Secretariat to find creative solutions to the lack of equipped troops proved unavailing. For instance, some 3,000 troops offered by the Government of Pakistan in June 1993 had still not been deployed as at mid-March 1994, because the Pakistani authorities expressed their inability to provide all the necessary equipment for their troops. Although the United Nations has no equipment of its own – and previous requests by the Secretary-General for authority to maintain a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment have not been approved by the General Assembly – the Secretariat is not in a position, at a time when troop-requirements vastly exceed offers from Member States, to reject offers of less than fully equipped troops. It has therefore had to make considerable efforts to identify and obtain equipment from other contributing countries, and to arrange conversion training for the Pakistani troops. The result is that troop deployments are inordinately delayed while attempts are made to obtain equipment, train the users and deploy them to the field.

36. In the meantime, troops are being redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UNPAs, but this threatens to reduce further the effectiveness of UNPROFOR in Croatia. It also leaves UNPROFOR without the resources needed, should a possible

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political crisis and hostilities materialize in the UNPAs. Before adopting resolutions requiring additional troops and equipment, the Council may therefore wish to take into account the severe difficulties which the United Nations already encounters in obtaining the military assets required for implementation of UNPROFOR's existing mandates.

C. *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*

Establishment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command

37. Following a request by the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to counter the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR was mandated by resolution 795 (1992) as of 11 December 1992 to establish a monitoring presence on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The mandate of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a preventive one aimed at monitoring and reporting any developments in the border areas that could undermine the stability of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory. This first 'preventive deployment' of United Nations peace-keepers has proved successful so far and serves as a valuable early-warning resource for the Security Council. It should, however, be stressed that UNPROFOR has no mandate in relation to the internal situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which could prove to be more detrimental to the stability of the country than external aggression. Although UNPROFOR stands ready to lend its good offices in appropriate circumstances, it has no mandate to intervene in the event that internal instability results in some form of civil conflict.

IV. Financial aspects

38. The cost of maintaining UNPROFOR for a period of six months, should the Security Council continue the mandate of the Force beyond 31 March 1994, based on the continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities, would be approximately $573 million. This cost is based on the current recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report (A/48/878) and does not reflect the additional expenditures proposed in document S/1994/291/Add.1. The resources needed for maintaining UNPROFOR beyond 31 March 1994 will be sought from the General Assembly at its current resumed forty-eighth session. In the event that the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR are increased by the Security Council, the Secretary-General will report, in the usual manner, to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to the General Assembly on the additional resources needed.

V. Observations

39. The role of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia has proved a complex one, involving the Force in a number of responsibilities and undertakings that were not foreseen when the Force was first established by the Council in resolution 743 (1992). In responding to the rapid evolution of events, the Security Council has adopted 54 resolutions and issued 39 presidential statements relating to the former Yugoslavia, all of which have, to a greater or lesser degree, had an impact on the functioning of the Force. While this proliferation of resolutions and mandates has complicated the role of the Force, UNPROFOR's record in these circumstances has been impressive, although much remains to be accomplished.

40. In Croatia, UNPROFOR has brought about the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatian territory and the withdrawal of Croatian forces from territories occupied by force in the attack of 9 September 1993 in the Medak pocket. UNPROFOR's presence has also been instrumental in reducing to some extent the widespread and flagrant abuse of the human rights of minority populations in the UNPAs. UNPROFOR's work in coordination with humanitarian relief organizations has provided relief to 110,000 beneficiaries in the UNPAs. UNPROFOR achieved a significant truce between the parties through a step-by-step approach at the local level, which has held since November 1993 and has resulted in a significant decrease in armed hostilities along the confrontation line in all sectors except one area of Sector South. This has enabled other humanitarian and confidence-building measures to be put in place in all four sectors, including, for the first time in over a year, family reunion meetings, meetings of local Red Cross organizations and face-to-face meetings between local officials from both sides. However, the political conjuncture of the Serb elections of December 1993 in the UNPAs, the Croatian-Serbian rapprochement of January 1994, the Croatian-Bosniac agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and tensions over renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate has resulted in a dangerously tense military situation and placed in jeopardy many of these local confidence-building measures. Moreover, UNPROFOR has been unable, for the reasons described earlier, to achieve the demilitarization of the UNPAs, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, the restoration of Croatian authority in the UNPAs and the 'pink zones', and the establishment of border controls.

41. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR has kept Sarajevo airport open, protected the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitored the interdiction of flights (including effectively ending the use of the air for combat purposes), improved conditions in Srebrenica, Zepa and Tuzla and to some extent deterred major attacks on the safe areas. It has also achieved the first cease-fire and heavy-weapons disengagement in Sarajevo that appears to contain the potential for a durable peace and brokered a similar agreement between Bosniac and Croat forces. It has not, of course, ended the war in that strife-torn country, but it has been neither mandated nor equipped to do that. While cease-fires remain fragile, UNPROFOR needs more troops to

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ensure that minor incidents do not escalate.

42. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's presence appears to have contributed to stability and has certainly raised the political price of any future external aggression against the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, it is UNPROFOR's view that the more likely sources of violence and instability are internal and thus beyond the mandate of the Force.

43. An important by-product of UNPROFOR's deployment in these three republics has been the containment of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which had for some time threatened to spread beyond its present geographical confines. The further internationalization of the war would have had calamitous consequences; it is to UNPROFOR's credit that this has not so far occurred.

44. The dilemma confronting the international community as the expiry of UNPROFOR's current mandate approaches is whether to consider that these limited successes continue to justify the United Nations enormous expenditure of resources (over US$ 1.6 billion as of 28 February 1994) and lives (as annex II indicates, UNPROFOR has incurred 924 casualties, including 79 fatalities, in its two years of existence) or whether the Force's inability to implement all the tasks assigned to it warrant an end to, or reduction of, its efforts. A third option, recognizing the inadequacies of its present mandate and the new demands as well as opportunities opened up by recent moves towards a possible peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be to redefine its mandates commensurate with the resources the international community is prepared to make available to UNPROFOR.

45. At this stage, given the prevailing uncertainties, I do not believe extensive redefinition is advisable. The two other options, however, deserve examination. As I have previously pointed out to the Council (S/25777, S/25993, S/26470), the choice in Croatia is between continuing a mission that is clearly unable to fulfil its original mandate in full or withdrawing and risking a renewed war that would probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to return to restore peace. Given such a choice, soldiering on in hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the continued deployment of UNPROFOR would serve a three-pronged strategy: (a) to use military means for humanitarian purposes, i.e. to alleviate the consequences of the ongoing conflict; (b) to seek to end the conflict itself by creating conditions favourable to diplomatic negotiations on a political settlement; and (c) to provide a capability to help the parties to implement agreements resulting from the diplomatic negotiations. Since the demilitarization of Sarajevo in February 1994, the military means of the international community are being used more directly to serve its diplomatic objectives. This offers new grounds for hope for an overall solution to this tragic conflict.

46. In this connection, I welcome the close collaboration that has developed between the United Nations and NATO with regard to the former Yugoslavia. NATO aircraft remain ready to come to UNPROFOR's assistance should close air support be required, and the threat of NATO air power was effectively used to ensure the demilitarization of Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. At the same time, it has been agreed that NATO will act, in these situations, only in agreement with UNPROFOR and in full consultation with it. It remains the responsibility of my Special Representative to weigh the political and operational consequences of such actions before requesting, or agreeing to, their initiation. This is necessitated not only by his responsibility for the security of the personnel, including unarmed civilians, under his control, but also out of regard for the integrity of the humanitarian and other mandates entrusted to UNPROFOR by the Security Council.

47. Despite the progress around Sarajevo, there is no sense of complacency in UNPROFOR. Peace has all too often proved elusive in the former Yugoslavia just when it had seemed within reach. Ultimately, progress depends upon the political will of the warring parties: UNPROFOR is willing to help to facilitate peace, but it does not have (nor does it seek) the mandate or the resources to impose peace upon those who do not desire it. Although the costs are high, the tragedy that provoked UNPROFOR's involvement remains an affront to the world's conscience: abstention is not an acceptable option for the international community at such a time. As the peace-makers continue their negotiating work, the peace-keepers must continue their efforts to ensure a breathing space for the innocent victims of the conflict and to preserve peace and stability in the wider region. There should, however, be no illusions about what UNPROFOR can achieve in the absence of a negotiated overall settlement.

48. In Croatia, despite limited success on 'step-by-step' measures, the situation is more volatile than the stalemate on the ground would suggest. The consequences of the Joint Declaration between the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in which the latter appears to accept the necessity for the two sides in Croatia to negotiate directly on the autonomy and human rights of citizens in the UNPAs, have not yet materialized. Nor is it clear what are the potential 'demonstration' effects of the Croat-Bosniac agreement to establish a federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the likely consequences of attempts to extend this agreement to include Bosnian Serbs. The sides have not yet begun face-to-face negotiations in earnest and, without a change in attitudes, the most likely scenario is the continuation of present arrangements in the UNPAs, together with ongoing mediation under the auspices of UNPROFOR and the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to bring the two parties together over economic cooperation. However, the deadlock resulting from paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), described in paragraph 14 above, continues to inhibit progress on economic issues. It remains the hope that the progressive restoration of mutual confidence between the two sides would lead to an overall settlement of the political issues, but there has been a dismaying lack of progress in this area so far. In the meantime, the Council may wish to consider

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Report S/1994/300, 16 March 1994

Annex I

Deployment of units, military observers and civilian police monitors, as of 15 March 1994

		Units	United Nations Military observers	Civilian police	Total
1. CROATIA					
(a) *Headquarters, Zagreb-Belgrade*		237[1]	29	20[1]	
(b) *United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) and 'pink zones'*					
(i) *Infantry battalions*					
Sector East	Belgium	740	14	151	
	Russian Federation	1,111			
		1,851			
Sector West	Argentina	860	20	133	
	Jordan (1)	939			
	Jordan (2)	881			
	Nepal	901			
		3,581			
Sector North	Denmark	945	54	168[2]	
	France (1)	930			
	Poland	930			
		2,805			
Sector South	Canada (1)	749	77	141[2]	
	Czech Republic	738			
	Jordan (3)	1,217			
	Kenya	934			
		3,638			
(ii) *Support units*					
Canadian Support Unit		396			
French Logistics Battalion		759			
Norwegian Movement Control Unit		94			
Netherlands Signals Battalion		412			
Slovak Engineer Battalion		591			
Swedish Headquarters Company		110			
United States Field Hospital (USMASH)		359			
Netherlands Signals Battalion		406			
		2,721			
(c) *Dubrovnik-Prevlaka*			10		
Subtotal, Croatia					14,594
2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA					
(a) *Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters*		234[3]	13		
(b) *Infantry Units*					
Sector Sarajevo	Egypt	429	138	41[4]	
	France (2)	837			
	France (4)	962			
	Ukraine	582			
Recce Squadron					
	France	126			
		2,936			
Support Units					
British Radar Unit		61			
French Headquarters Company		174			
French Medical Detachment		25			
French AOG		234			
French Radar Unit		25			
French FAC Team		12			
(c) *Infantry Battalion Groups*					
	Canada (2)	783			
	France (3)	1,244			
	Malaysia	1,487			
	Netherlands	634			

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Annex I (continued)

		Units	United Nations Military observers	Civilian police	Total
	Nordic (2)	944[5]			
	Spain	1,153			
	United Kingdom (1)	644		150	
	United Kingdom (2)	145			
		7,034			
(d) *Support Units*					
	Belgian Engineer Company	172			
	Belgian Transport Company	106			
	Danish Headquarters Company	181			
	French Support Unit (DETALAT)	276			
	French Engineer Battalion	291			
	Netherlands Transport Battalion	486			
	Netherlands Signals Unit	96			
	Norwegian Engineer Platoon	32			
	Norwegian Medical Unit	219			
	Norwegian Helicopter Unit	40			
	Portuguese Medical Team	7			
	United Kingdom, COMBRITFOR	1,792			
		3,698			
(e) *Bihac*			20		
	Subtotal, Bosnia and Herzegovina				14,433
3. AIRFIELD (NO-FLY ZONE) MONITORING					
(a) *Monitoring command and coordination centres (Zagreb/Belgrade)*			12		
(b) *Airfields*			26		
	Subtotal, airfield monitoring				38
4. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA					
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia command headquarters			16	25	
(a) *Infantry Units*					
Nordic Battalion 1		718[6]			
United States Unit		330			
Subtotal, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia					1,048
Totals		30,075	580	679	31,334

[1] Headquarters personnel included in unit figures.
[2] UNCIVPOL in 'pink zones': North 12, South 6.
[3] Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters personnel from all Bosnia and Herzegovina Command national units, *not* included in the unit figures.
[4] Includes the following UNCIVPOL:

Sarajevo/Split Airport		14
Pleso Airport		9
Sarajevo Sector headquarters		5
Mostar		3
Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters		2
Srebrenica		
permanent	2	
Sector-S	3	
Sector-N	3	
	8	

[5] Nordic Battalion 2 (NORDBATT 2)

Danish	121
Norwegian	1
Swedish	822

[6] Nordic Battalion 1 (NORDBATT 1)

Danish	4
Finnish	330
Norwegian	228
Swedish	256

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Annex II

Casualty list as of 15 March 1994

Military personnel

	Croatia				Bosnia and Herzegovina Command		Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command	Other areas	Total
	Sector East	Sector West	Sector North	Sector South	Sector Sarajevo	Other			
War casualties									
Fatal	2	3	2	5	8	14	0	0	34
Total	27	18	27	51	164	124	0	7	418
Other casualties									
Fatal	2	7	3	3	1	6	0	5	27
Total	39	38	20	23	31	54	11	54	270
Traffic casualties									
Fatal	0	2	1	5	0	7	1	2	18
Total	25	38	34	25	22	68	4	19	235
Total									
Fatal	4	12	6	13	9	27	1	7	79
Total	91	94	82	99	217	246	15	80	924

the recommendation in paragraph 12 above that authority for close air support be extended to the territory of Croatia.

49. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, recent developments, described fully in document S/1994/291, offer grounds for hope that, given the necessary additional resources, UNPROFOR can help to restore peace to a significant area of that country. In appointing a Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, I look forward to the steady normalization of life in that city and to a future in which the efforts of the United Nations can be focused on peace-building and rehabilitation rather than on war and relief. However, a series of cease-fire agreements does not constitute an overall peace. UNPROFOR will do its best to build on all such cease-fire agreements and political arrangements, provided the necessary resources are made available to it by the Member States.

50. As long as the conflict continues, UNPROFOR's role in both republics can only be that spelled out in document S/25993 of 24 June 1993, i.e. to make all possible efforts to prevent the resumption or escalation of conflict and contain the current hostilities, to provide a breathing space for continued diplomatic efforts, and to support the provision of essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the ongoing conflict. The long-term objective of the international community is to help to ensure conditions in which the citizens of the former Yugoslavia can coexist in peace and in which stability and normal economic relations can be restored to the wider region. To this end, UNPROFOR's efforts will aim not only to promote an end to hostilities but contribute to all parties taking greater responsibility for their own futures.

51. I am conscious that continuing conflict and tragedy in UNPROFOR's area of operations since its mandate was last renewed have led to considerable, but unjustified, criticism of the effectiveness of the Force. These, together with mounting threats to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and the continuing failure of Member States to honour their financial obligations to UNPROFOR in full and on time, have led me to consider seriously whether the continuation of the Force constitutes a worthwhile use of the limited peace-keeping resources of the United Nations. The diversity and scope of the problems in the former Yugoslavia require the deployment of more military forces than troop-contributing nations appear to be prepared, at this time, to make available. The encouraging developments around Sarajevo at the end of February 1994 have, however, provided reason for hope that an overall political settlement may at last be within reach. Since UNPROFOR's deployment embodies the will of the international community to help the parties to arrive at such a settlement, I believe I must recommend its prolongation. In turn, it is the responsibility of the parties to seize the opportunity provided by UNPROFOR's continuation to demonstrate by their conduct – on the ground and at the negotiating table – that they are seriously committed to pursuing the path of peace. If they are, the United Nations stands ready, as always, to help them.

52. I therefore recommend to the Security Council the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate for a further 12 months beyond 31 March 1994. This period is proposed in the interests of efficiency, although I would be prepared, should the situation on the ground improve, to recommend reducing the duration of the Force's mandate at an appropriate moment. At the same time, I call on Member States to provide UNPROFOR with the material and personnel resources necessary for it to fulfil its responsibilities.

53. I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to the outgoing Force Commander, General Jean Cot, and to the brave men

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and women of UNPROFOR for their remarkable courage and dedication in the performance of their duties. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, for their unremitting efforts to strive for peace.

117. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 23 March 1994 (S/1994/331, 23 March 1994)

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 22 March 1994 concerning the addition to the list of contributing countries for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Jean-Bernard Merimee
President of the Security Council

118. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 844 (1993), 836 (1993) and 776 (1992) (S/1994/333, 24 March 1994)

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to report on a regular basis on the implementation of that resolution as well as of resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. In paragraph 5 of resolution 836 (1993) the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), *inter alia*, to occupy some key points on the ground in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992. In its resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994, the Council welcomed the goal of 'the early reopening of Tuzla airport'. The present report is submitted in order to inform the Council of my plans to direct UNPROFOR to reopen Tuzla airport, under its exclusive authority, for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes.

II. Humanitarian needs

2. It is estimated that approximately 800,000 people live in the Tuzla region, 240,000 of them being refugees and displaced persons and another 200,000 being considered cases in need of assistance. The economy of the region has collapsed, and the unemployment rate is close to 100 per cent. Because of the fighting in central Bosnia, the region has been effectively cut off from normal commercial traffic for almost one year, which has made almost the entire population dependent on humanitarian assistance for its survival.

3. Until the recent Framework Agreement of 1 March 1994 (see S/1994/255), the continued fighting and denial of access had significantly reduced the use of the main humanitarian supply route to Tuzla from the Dalmatian coast, and the access route from Belgrade could not meet all the needs. The shortage of basic items created social tensions in the region in the second half of 1993, which resulted in a number of demonstrations by displaced persons and local inhabitants demanding food. It was in this context, as well as in the expectation that access to the region would worsen considerably during the winter months, that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested UNPROFOR in June 1993 to initiate the necessary action to make Tuzla airport available for humanitarian airlift operations, in order to supplement the existing land convoy routes. Prior to the winter months, UNHCR reiterated its request, noting that lack of access was a very serious concern in the Tuzla region.

4. More recently, however, the Tuzla municipal authorities have declared that the population has survived the winter, despite difficulties. This was due in great measure to the efforts made by UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to supply the town by road, as well as to another fortunately mild winter. There have also been significant improvements, since February 1994, in access to the region from Belgrade as a result of increased cooperation from the Bosnian Serb authorities. Road access from the coast has improved dramatically since the cease-fire agreement of 23 February 1994 between the Commanders of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council (S/1994/291, annex).

5. Although immediate humanitarian disaster has been avoided, the opening of Tuzla airport would greatly improve the situation in the region. Although access appears to be improving, UNHCR delivered only 25 per cent of the monthly food requirement in the region in February. In March, UNHCR is expecting to deliver between 35 and 40 per cent of the monthly requirement. In addition to the basic food requirement, UNHCR plans to deliver some 500 tons of spring agricultural seeds in the coming weeks in order to achieve some self-sufficiency in food supplies in the region later this year. Furthermore, rapid deliveries of some of the most urgently needed spare parts and materials for coal mines, power stations and water systems are required in the region, if the total collapse of the infrastructure is to be avoided. Until such time as normal commercial traffic is restored, which is yet to be achieved despite the recently improved conditions in central Bosnia, an airlift operation to Tuzla, in addition to access by land, would meet some of those urgent requirements in the region. Air operations in and out of Tuzla by fixed-wing aircraft would contribute to emergency medical evacuations from the area. Furthermore, an increased resupply for UNPROFOR troops by air would free scarce transport capacity for additional humanitarian deliveries to Tuzla by land. The improvement in the humanitarian and social conditions by airlift would also help to preserve the exceptionally multi-ethnic character of the region, a matter of some importance to the local authorities.

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ANNEX 126:

FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780, ANNEX VII, MEDAK INVESTIGATION, 28 DECEMBER 1994

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FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VII
MEDAK INVESTIGATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Medak Pocket Operation comprises the military operations of the Republic of Croatia (Croat), United Nations Protection Force (UN or UNPROFOR) and, to a lesser extent, the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (Serb) forces near Medak, Croatia, in September 1993.

2. Sadly, it is only a typical example of how war is, and apparently always has been, waged in the Balkans.

3. It is especially amenable to legal study for a variety of reasons. The operation was confined in both time and geography. The units involved were limited in number. UNPROFOR reported on the operation in a particularly detailed and helpful manner. UN forces anticipated law of war violations and gathered much relevant information during the operation. Lastly, it was a recent event so evidence and witnesses were still available.

II. OVERVIEW

4. The operation took place just north of the town of Medak and just outside the United Nations Protected Area designated as Sector South. Medak is about 150 kilometres south-west of Zagreb.

5. Before 9 September 1993, the Medak Pocket was a collection of small rural villages and hamlets forming a finger of Serb-controlled land jutting into Croat territory.

6. On 9 September, at about 6:00 a.m., Croat forces attacked the Pocket. An artillery, mortar and/or tank fire barrage preceded an infantry and tank advance. Croats attacked from the north-east and quickly killed or routed the few Serb defenders. Overrunning the Serb defences, the Croat forces soon captured Divoselo (Struni ̌i), Čitluk (Lički), Donje Selo, and the surrounding villages. By 10 September, the Croatian army was in charge of the area.

7. The rationale for the Croat attack is impossible to determine with certainty. Speculation includes: a rehearsal by the Croats for a larger operation, a test of their forces by the Croats, retaliation by the Croats for Serb shelling of Gospi ̌, a desire by the Croats to straighten their front, or simply a Croat desire to seize territory.

III. DESCRIPTION

8. Evidence of events during the Medak Pocket Operation emerges from various witnesses experiences. The following is an extremely summarized version of their experiences.

9. Captain "1" was in command of the Serb forces in the Divo Selo area. In the face of the Croat attack, he ordered his soldiers to withdraw. This they did along with many local civilians. Over the next days, this mixed group made its way by foot to Serb territory. During the escape, an unidentified Serb soldier escaping with the group told the Captain that Croat soldiers had spared him. Indeed, the Croats told the unidentified soldier to escape when they could easily have killed or captured him.

10. "2" was a soldier in the Serb army on 9 September. Upon the Captain's orders, he withdrew in the face of the Croat attack. During his escape to Serb territory, he saw the Croats burn houses and steal livestock. He came across a body. Someone had either badly mutilated it after death or had

tortured the victim before death. During his escape, he entered Čitluk to try to find food. There he came within 10 to 15 metres of a group of Croat soldiers. He heard instructions translated into German for some soldiers. The apparent commander said in Croatian: "Those houses are Serbian houses and you can do anything you wish."

11. "3" was a Serb soldier on the front line at the beginning of the Croat attack. He retreated with his comrades but became separated from them. He came across a female body with an eye, an ear, and all right-hand fingers cut off. "3" saw Croat soldiers setting fire to houses and stealing sheep.

12. Three other Serb soldiers all fled the Croat attack. They all report that the only Croat activity they saw was legitimate "soldier against soldier" combat.

13. "4", a resident of "A", was in the local Serb militia. He fled the Croat attack and immediately returned to his home. There he saw his elderly sister-in-law dead. A search of the scene after UNPROFOR took control of the area revealed only some clothing. She was wearing this clothing when "4" saw her dead body. During "4□s" escape to Serb territory, he saw Croat soldiers killing sheep belonging to local civilians and stealing five or six tractors owned by the local populace.

14. "5", a resident of "A", was also a member of the Serb militia. On 9 September, he was on the front line. Upon the attack he fled, returned to his home, and warned his family to flee. While he was in hiding, before he reached safety, he saw his tractor being stolen by the Croats. Croat soldiers wounded him during his escape.

15. Two persons, "6" and "7", witnessed the murder of an 83 year-old blind woman.

16. "6" was a resident of "B". He left his home at the beginning of the Croat attack. Upon leaving, he saw the victim and a younger unidentified woman outside her home, from about 200 metres away. About 20 unidentified Croat soldiers came up to the victim's house and ordered the younger woman away. Then, the soldiers gunned down the victim. After this, "6" fled to the forest with relatives, where he eventually joined a mixed group of Serb military and civilians. They walked to safety.

17. "7", a resident of "A", was hiding in the woods also near the victim□s house. From the woods, she saw 10 unidentified Croat soldiers approach the victim, who was standing alone outside her home, and simply kill her.

18. "8" was a resident of "B". During the early morning of 9 September, he tried to evacuate two wounded Serb soldiers in his private vehicle. Croat forces ambushed the vehicle, their gunfire hitting all three vehicle occupants. "8" believed the gunfire killed both of his passengers. "8" escaped and hid in bushes approximately 20 metres from the ambush site. Ten to 15 unidentified soldiers approached the vehicle, dragged the two dead Serb soldiers out, placed the bodies near a building and set the building on fire. In "8□s" original statement, he said one of his passengers was alive when taken from the vehicle by the Croats. He also said that they placed both the wounded soldier and the body of the other dead soldier in the building before setting it afire. The correction of the original statement was not placed in all versions of the various reports compiled by UN organizations.

19. "9", a resident of "A", fled the initial attack with her family. When shortly thereafter she returned to her house to get shoes, she was shot and wounded by unidentified Croat soldiers. She heard the soldier's conversation

from 300 to 500 metres away. The conversation showed that the Croats deliberately targeted her as a civilian. One soldier objected to shooting at her with, "No, it's a woman"; the other replied, "It does not matter".

20. "10" resided in "A". During the 9 September attack, she was in her home. "10's" son fled the house at the start of the attack. He took his rifle with him. No one has seen him since, and he is presumed to be dead. An unidentified Croat soldier saw her through a window then threw a grenade into her house. The subsequent explosion wounded her. The same soldier entered the house and fired into the room in which she lay. This gunfire did not hit her. Wounded but still in her house, "10" observed two Croat vehicles pull up disguised as UN vehicles (i.e. white with "UN" lettering). These vehicles carried Croat military forces. She heard instructions, translated between German and Croatian, to slaughter everything and leave nothing. She saw Croats killing her sheep and pigs. During her escape, she also saw Croats killing domestic animals, burning houses and stealing roof tiles. She eventually made her way to safety.

21. "11" lived between "B" and "A". He and his family escaped to the woods at the beginning of the attack. He fled with his rifle. From hiding, he returned to his house on 10 September. There he found all his possessions destroyed, his animals mostly dead or injured and his house burning. During the several days it took "11" to reach safety, he was shot at several times and eventually wounded. A neighbour accompanied "11" during most of the time.

22. "12", a resident of "B", also fled during the attack carrying his rifle. On 10 September, while still in the area, Croat soldiers discovered him and a friend. The Croats arrested both and ordered them to turn over their weapons. A Croat soldier then used his rifle to hit "12". "12" fled with the Croats trying unsuccessfully to shoot him. His friend apparently did not escape, not having been seen since. He spent the next several days hiding in various houses and in the forest in the area. During this time, he discovered Croats had taken the furniture and animals from his house. "12" observed the Croats stealing sheep, cows, and horses belonging to others. He was shot at by Croats twice and wounded in the leg on the second occasion.

23. "13", a resident of "A", fled the 9 September Croat attack. During his escape, he saw civilian Croats stealing cattle, including his own cows and calves.

24. "14" a resident of "A", escaped from her house on 9 September. During the several days she spent in the woods before she made her way to safety in Medak, she saw Croat soldiers burning houses and throwing grenades into houses. Other Croats fired upon her while she was walking to Medak.

25. "15" lived in "C". She entered the Pocket on 26 September to look for her sheep. While searching, she came across the body of a dead female, whose fingers were cut off.

26. Many witnesses report joining up with groups of fleeing Serb soldiers or mixed groups of fleeing Serb civilians and Serb soldiers.

27. Many male civilian residents of the area carried or fled with their rifles.

28. There are many witnesses available who, while not seeing any illegal activity by Croatian forces, can establish the general non-damaged nature of the area prior to the attack and the non-military use of most of the civilian houses.

29. Within several days of their attack, Croatian authorities showed a willingness to withdraw to their 8 September positions. Serb artillery attacks on Karlovac and a Serb missile attack on Zagreb may have prompted this willingness.

30. Negotiations took place, and the parties eventually agreed that the Croats would withdraw to their 8 September positions, and UN forces would occupy the territory vacated by the Croats. UN forces consisted of Canbat I, the Canadian battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. It was augmented by two companies of infantry from two separate French battalions. The Croat withdrawal and insertion of UN forces started on 15 September and were originally to be completed by 6:00 p.m., 16 September.

31. During the evening of 15 September, UN and Croat authorities held a meeting to iron out the implementing details of the original agreement.

32. As the UN forces began to deploy into the Pocket on 16 September, they could hear tens of explosions and see new smoke rising from Croat-controlled territory. There were no Serb forces in those areas nor had there been for many days. Such explosions and smoke had not been seen before 15 September. They also heard small arms fire from the same area. There are many witnesses to this including nearly all Canbat I personnel, UNMOs, UNCIVPOLs, UN civilian personnel, UN and Canadian Forces public affairs personnel and news reporters. All suspected that the Croats were engaged in ethnic cleansing of the Pocket before turning it over to the UN.

33. During the morning of 16 September, several more meetings took place between Croat and UN authorities. As a result, the time by which UN forces were to complete the takeover of territory evacuated by the Croats was delayed 24 hours until 17 September.

34. At noon, 16 September, Croat forces prevented Canbat I soldiers from crossing into the Pocket. This was a violation of the agreement. UN public affairs video and radio, plus Reuters news agency, videotaped this delay. Additionally, there were numerous witnesses to this delay. UN personnel felt the delay was a deliberate tactic used by the Croats to give them more time to complete their ethnic cleansing of the Pocket. UNPROFOR pressed the Croats, and after a delay of about two hours, they allowed UN forces to enter the Pocket.

35. The explosions and smoke from fresh fires continued to be evident from Croat-controlled parts of the Pocket throughout the Croat withdrawal. Again, there are many witnesses to this, including all UN personnel involved in the operation.

36. As UN forces entered the Pocket, they found every building burning or demolished. There were hundreds of such buildings in the several villages and hamlets, none of which were habitable. Special sweep teams assessed and recorded damage, searched for survivors and collected bodies. The teams included UNPROFOR medical officers, UNCIVPOLs, and soldiers.

37. On 16 September, in the Medak Pocket, "16" saw the crest of the Croat Ninth Mechanized Brigade (Ninth) on several Croat army trucks. He also saw the crest of the Croat 111th Home Defence (HD) Brigade (111th) on a Croat army truck.

38. "17" noted Croat soldiers with the shoulder flashes of the Ninth Brigade. On 16 September, he saw Croat police of the Special Police in the Medak area. He witnessed the explosions and fires that preceded the Croat withdrawal. He also saw the complete destruction throughout the Medak Pocket.

39. "18" heard the explosions and saw the fires within Croat-controlled territory on 16 September. He questioned a Croat liaison officer about these. The Croat officer replied that maybe the Croats were destroying their own homes in the area. "18" also observed that the Croat troops within the territory did not react to the explosions as they would to incoming artillery. He witnessed the total destruction and devastation throughout the area. He saw no house undemolished and took photographs of the damage.

40. Also on 16 September, "19" saw about 15 Croat Special Police at Drjlei in the Pocket. These Special Police appeared fresh, probably having recently arrived in the area.

41. During a 16 September meeting held at 10:00 a.m. an UNPROFOR officer specifically asked a Croatian officer to stop the explosions and fires in Croat-controlled territory. The Croatian officer clearly ordered to ensure his troops stopped those actions.

42. Two more representations to the same effect were made to the Croats that day. The Croats said that Croat soldiers were firing into the houses, but that Croat forces were causing the explosions by detonating mines to make the area safe.

43. On 17 September, after personally viewing the destruction in the Pocket, an UNPROFOR officer expressed his disappointment at this devastation to Croat officers. The Croats offered no explanation, but said they would again warn their troops.

44. Also on 17 September, during a dispute between UN forces and the Croatian Army on the exact proper location of their respective forces, an UNPROFOR officer met a Croatian officer in the Pocket. The Croatian officer had a map and was plainly in charge of the Croat forces. The map had been obviously and crudely altered, and it no longer represented the earlier agreed upon placement of various forces.

45. On 19 September, Croatian and UNPROFOR officers met and discussed the exact boundaries of the UN zone of responsibility in the Pocket.

46. On that same date, an UNPROFOR officer met Croatian officers. During this meeting, a Croatian officer threatened to have his Croat forces fire on UN forces, if he did not receive the cooperation he wanted.

47. On 22 September, a meeting was held to finalize the agreed upon positions of Croat and UN forces in the Medak Pocket. A Croatian officer signed a map depicting the agreed relative positions.

48. The Medak Pocket area falls within the area of responsibility of the Croat OZ Gospi˜. Croat units involved were largely from OZ Gospi˜. Some Special Police Forces from OZ Split were seen during the operation, but their role seemed to be secondary.

49. The nominal OZ Gospi˜ Commander was a particular Croatian officer. However, during the relevant prelude to the attack and the attack itself, he was not in command due to his absence on leave and to illness. The actual OZ Commander was another officer.

50. The major Croat unit involved in the attack was the Ninth Mechanized Brigade (Ninth), which is unofficially called the "Wolves". It had been designated the 6th Mechanized Brigade until about July 1993. The Ninth was directly responsible to OZ Gospi˜. Graffiti left on the walls of buildings in the Pocket by Croat forces included the "Ninth" and "Wolves".

51. The 111th also participated in the attack. Miscellaneous other Croat army units formed a minor part of the attacking forces.

52. The UN Military Information (MI) Branch (at UNPROFOR headquarters and elsewhere) compiles orders of battle (orbats) for all the protagonists in the former Yugoslavia.

53. UNPROFOR units sweep teams recovered 18 bodies in the Pocket in the immediate aftermath of the operation. Croat authorities turned over another 64 bodies they said they recovered in the Medak Pocket. These bodies were all given to the Serb authorities. Of all the bodies recovered, 59 (71 per cent) were probably those of soldiers and 23 (29 per cent) those of civilians. Among other factors complicating the determination of military status is that many civilians wear items of military clothing and many local military wear items of civilian clothing.

54. Serb authorities have identified most of the bodies. There are no reported witnesses to the deaths of any of the bodies identified.

55. Medical officers examined many of the 18 bodies recovered by UNPROFOR. The preliminary field examinations and the circumstances in which the bodies were found revealed:

(a) Some suspicious circumstances, e.g., two badly burned bodies were found in a concrete chicken coop that could have been used as a jail, spent casings found near bodies, one body tied up, etc.;

(b) Some bodies had injuries that might have occurred before death, e.g., broken legs, a broken neck, a smashed face;

(c) Some evidence of either pre-death torture or post-death mutilation, e.g., missing ears, eyes or fingers; and

(d) A perhaps higher portion of head and close range wounds than might be expected.

56. These examinations led a medical officer to place the times of death from 24 to over 96 hours before discovery of the bodies, with six having died after 14 September.

57. Serbian authorities had a doctor conduct an examination of the bodies turned over to them by the Croats and UNPROFOR. Only one full autopsy was done. UNCIVPOL describes the rest of the examinations as "cursory". After this, Serb authorities quickly turned over the bodies to relatives for burial.

58. The Serb authorities prepared a postmortem report and gave it to Major Holland. He passed it on to Dr. Robert Kirschner, an experienced pathologist with the independent group, Physicians for Human Rights. Dr. Kirschner's report states that regarding the bodies recovered by UNPROFOR, "there is insufficient evidence to document an execution style slaying". Of those bodies turned over to the Serbs by the Croats, "I could find no evidence to suggest a pattern of extra-judicial executions". His opinions regarding both groups cannot exclude some murders and admit some suspicious circumstances, but in summary the evidence is ambiguous.

59. Dr. Kirschner□s further verbal opinion was that the earlier preliminary field examinations and those conducted by a Serbian doctor are not reliable. This unreliability results from the necessarily rudimentary conditions of the field examinations, e.g., the bodies could not be washed, no x-ray equipment was available, etc. Additionally, the medical personnel involved

understandably lacked forensic experience.

60. The Croats claimed in an 11 October statement to the UN in Geneva that they did not violate the laws of war during the Medak battle. They specifically cited the cases of two elderly but apparently still feisty women killed during the attack. They said one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and another blew herself up with a grenade to avoid capture.

61. Most Canbat I personnel entering the Pocket witnessed the total destruction involved. Many buildings were still on fire on 16 September. There may be others with equal experiences. A Canbat I photographer took 1,400 photographs recording the destruction and the 18 recovered bodies. Much of this activity was video recorded by Canbat I personnel.

62. Besides the destruction of buildings, all witnesses saw that most livestock was killed and most personal property, including vehicles and farm equipment, was destroyed. They noted that haystacks were set on fire, and wells were polluted. Croatian forces had discarded hundreds of surgical gloves throughout the area.

63. Canbat I personnel think the bulk of the destruction in the Pocket was done on 16 September.

64. The Canbat I reports state that firewood and other incendiary materials were seen being brought into the area by the Croats. Unfortunately, the report does not identify the specific witnesses to this.

65. UN civilian employees and UNCIVPOLs also witnessed the same destruction. A UNCIVPOL team member made sketches of most buildings and detailed damage assessments of over 100 representative buildings. These assessments confirm the total devastation in the Pocket.

66. The Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) visited the area from 27 to 31 October and on 10 November 1993. The WCIT consisted of Major Holland and Master Corporal T. McComb, both of the Canadian Forces. The team was accompanied by Dr. Kirschner. The team took video and still photographs, interviewed some witnesses and gathered further materials and reports. The team also obtained the 1,400 photographs taken by the Canbat I photographer and arranged and conducted the videotaped assessment by Major S. Laplante (a combat engineer in the Canadian Forces serving as UNPA Sector South Engineer) and Chief Warrant Officer Bastid (an explosive ordinance disposal expert in the French Army serving with UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb) of the damage to civilian buildings.

67. The examinations of the buildings by Major Laplante and Chief Warrant Officer Bastid reveal that the buildings were either set on fire and/or demolished by charges set inside the buildings. Artillery did not cause the damage nor did tank fire, mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, nor aerial bombardment. Canbat I personnel believed that antitank mines were used to demolish those buildings not burned. However, neither of the above witnesses could be that certain of the type of explosives used.

68. Croat authorities say that the widespread destruction in the Medak Pocket was necessitated by the Serbs using the civilian homes for barracks and the storage of ammunition. What evidence there is of military use of the civilian accommodation is ambiguous or point to its military use by Croat forces. The type of garbage (Croat cigarettes, newspapers, etc.) and the direction the builders pointed the defensive positions (towards Serb controlled areas, etc.) support usage by Croat forces.

IV. ANALYSIS

69. The preceding reveals several potential broad categories of "serious violations of international humanitarian law"[1] or war crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal. These are:

(a) Murder ("willful killing"--Article 2(a), "murder"--Article 5(a), unlawful targeting of civilians causing their death being a general unlisted violation of the laws of war--Article 3);

(b) Torture ("torture or inhuman treatment"--Article 2(b), willfully causing great suffering or serious injury"--Article 2(c), "torture"--Article 5(f));

(c) Genocide by killing (Article 4(2)(a)) or by causing serious bodily . . . harm (Article 4(2)(b));

(d) Wanton destruction ("extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly"--Article 2(d), "wanton destruction of . . . villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity"--Article 3(b)); and

(e) Plunder ("plunder of . . . private property"--Article 3(e)).

70. The war crimes have been analysed in a pragmatic narrow legal fashion. The analysis will seek to decide who specifically, if anyone, can be held criminally responsible for any given crime. Dealing with a war crime, no matter how horrendous or how clear, is in this analysis a fruitless exercise if specific legal responsibility cannot be attributed.

71. Such an analysis will deal with those directly responsible "who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted" the crime (Article 7(1)). Also dealt with will be indirect (command) responsibility, as referred to in Article 7(3), of a superior "if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."

72. The analysis of direct criminal responsibility for any of the disclosed war crimes is very simple. At present, there is no evidence implicating any specific identifiable individual in the direct planning, instigation, ordering, commission, aiding or abetting of any of these crimes. Therefore, this analysis will concentrate on indirect, i.e., command responsibility.

73. Proof of command responsibility for war crimes will often be largely circumstantial. Absent capturing or obtaining written orders by the suspects or having the testimony of witnesses to the issuing of these orders, such responsibility can usually only be inferred. Inferences of such orders of a sufficiently reliable nature to satisfy a criminal tribunal can only be derived from clear and convincing patterns. Under the first head of criminal command responsibility, the patterns must be so strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect ordered the commission of the crimes. Under the second head of criminal command responsibility, the pattern must be so strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect knew of the crimes and failed to control or punish his offending subordinates or that the suspect criminally abandoned his command.

74. As mentioned, there is no evidence identifying any specific individuals with any crimes, including any of the murders. The only first-hand evidence of a murder is in the murder of the 83 year-old blind woman. However, even

here, neither of the witnesses identified the responsible individuals beyond being "Croat soldiers". In any event, there are serious discrepancies between the two witnesses. "6" describes 20 soldiers, "7" describes 10. Furthermore, "6" describes a second woman with the victim, but "7" omits this.

75. The reliability of these witnesses, particularly "6", is questionable. "6" was 200 metres away. "7" was hiding to save her life and almost certainly greatly upset. Their opportunity to reliably observe is moot.

76. There is no convincing general pattern in the deaths occurring in the Pocket. It is suspicious that UN troops found virtually no survivors. It may also be suspicious that there were more head wounds and close-range injuries than might be expected. However, the majority (71%) of the located dead were military. Although not strictly comparable, this was a higher percentage of military casualties than the global figures in WWII, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

77. Despite the importance of the presence of surgical gloves stressed in the Canbat I report and elsewhere, their presence is ambiguous. The sinister explanation is a possible one. However, surgical gloves may have simply been ordinary precautions by the Croats to deal with the legitimate dead and wounded anticipated in any attack. The photographs of Canbat I personnel show them also using surgical gloves.

78. A prosecutor cannot use the postmortem examinations of the bodies, as they are unsatisfactory from several points of view. The initial examinations in the field were of necessity cursory, done without equipment and by doctors without forensic pathology qualifications.

79. Further, the examinations done by the Serb authorities were unsatisfactory. They were extremely undetailed and were conducted in an unprofessional atmosphere, i.e., the supervising judge□s drunkenness and corruptness.

80. Thus, conclusions reached in the preceding examinations are unreliable. As earlier mentioned, an independent examination of what material remains (Dr. Kirschner□s report) also fails to disclose any convincing pattern.

81. Care must be taken in relying upon local witnesses. They tend to be unreliable due to their extremely emotional attachment to their own community□s cause and their demonization of the enemy. Witness "9" has given several versions of her experiences. While her versions are not inconsistent, they do not cover the same material, some of which it is surprising not to hear in all versions. Her testimony should be confirmed and carefully considered before presentation.

82. The irrationality of the parties to this conflict is shown by the absurd excuse given by the Croat authorities for the deaths of the two elderly women. They say one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and another used a grenade to kill herself rather than face capture.

83. Therefore, any reliable prosecution should be based on objective evidence, objective witnesses, or clear patterns. One or even two local witnesses may be insufficiently reliable to obtain a conviction.

84. Yet, even using a stringent standard, it is obvious from the many witnesses' experiences that Croatian forces fired on fleeing civilians, killing some. However, this action cannot be proved to be illegal.

85. Many civilians were fleeing in the company of retreating Serb soldiers,

armed Serb civilians or were themselves armed. Thus, the actions of many Croat soldiers were possibly lawful and, at least, ambiguous. Much of the firing was at night. They may have believed they were firing on retreating non-surrendering enemy forces, which remain lawful targets. The law of war does not impose a standard of perfection on soldiers. It accepts that unfortunately civilians near military objectives may be incidentally killed without necessarily breaching the law of war. The inherent ambiguities surrounding this aspect of the Medak Pocket Operation make building a prosecution for unlawful targeting of civilians difficult. The evidence is not sufficiently reliable or clear to obtain a conviction.

86. There is even a hint of contradictory evidence. The sparing of the Serb soldier, as related to "1" is some, albeit second hand, evidence that either there was no express policy to kill everyone, or at least any such policy was not strictly observed. Additionally, the witnesses naturally would not be aware of the possibly many times they were not fired upon by Croat forces.

87. All this being said, some dead were probably murdered. However, no individual can be proved to be directly responsible. Further, there is no strong unambiguous pattern of willful killing emerging from the evidence available to this point. Without such a pattern, it is impossible to affix criminal responsibility upon the Croat commanders.

> "Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true of all armies throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape."[2]

What is required is something "extensive and widespread". No such pattern emerges from the evidence. Many commentators have criticized the General Yamashita prosecution, which was, at least, an aggressive use of the doctrine of command responsibility. Even at that, the prosecutors of General Yamashita could point to tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of victims with 286 witnesses and 423 exhibits.

88. Unlike the deaths arising from the Medak Pocket Operation, there is a clear, obvious and overwhelming pattern of wanton destruction. Hundreds of homes were destroyed, virtually hundreds of other buildings were destroyed, most animals were killed or taken, virtually all personal property was destroyed or taken, all vehicles and farm equipment were destroyed or taken, haystacks were fired, and many wells were polluted. Devastation was total.

89. The timing of the destruction is inconsistent with any legitimate military conduct or of military necessity. The bulk of this destruction occurred on 16 September, according to the many eyewitnesses. The sounds of the explosions, the rising of the smoke from fires, and the fact many buildings were still on fire as UN personnel entered the Pocket establish this.

90. The destruction occurred well after all Serb resistance had ended. There was no Serb resistance in the areas from which the explosions were heard and the rising smoke seen. All effective Serb forces had fled the area at the time of the bulk of the destruction. The devastation was wrought in an unopposed withdrawal, not a contested advance or retreat. Even the Croat liaison officer was forced to use an excuse not involving legitimate combat activity by the opposing forces. The scattered nature of the buildings, with the brief and desultory original Serb defence, does not explain this level of destruction.

91. The widespread destruction by demolition and fire is also generally inconsistent with legitimate military operations. If buildings are contested, then demolition charges cannot usually be placed inside them. Similarly, absent incendiary weapons, of which there is no evidence, being able to set fire to buildings implies an ability to approach and control them. That is inconsistent with enemy forces being present in them.

92. Various contradictory excuses given by the Croats for the destruction suggest the lack of any legitimate excuse for such widespread destruction.

93. The reports, if confirmed, of incendiary materials being brought into the Medak Pocket by the Croats is some evidence of planning. However, this evidence is ambiguous. Obviously lumber and even timber can be used to construct defensive positions as well as be used to burn buildings.

94. The Canbat I report states that any antitank mines used in demolitions would have been centrally controlled. This indicates that their use to destroy civilian objects would have required high level approval. Such control is usual in a regular well-run military. However, there is evidence that this is not always the case with the forces involved in this conflict. Some minefields in Sector South have overlapped, indicating a lack of such central control. Additionally, all the forces display large measures of ill-discipline, lack of control, and disorganization.

95. There are at least two defences to this charge offered or available to the responsible Croat authorities. A Croat press release said that the level of destruction in the Pocket was required by the Serbs use of civilian buildings as barracks and for ammunition storage. This is clearly an inept excuse. The timing of the destruction, being after Serb resistance ended, argues against it. The extent of the destruction also argues against this excuse. If every destroyed building had contained Serb soldiers and ammunition, the Croats would never have captured the Pocket. Destruction by fire and demolition, as opposed to conventional military assault, also suggests this Croat excuse is invalid.

96. Although not yet raised by the Croats, the second possible excuse is that this destruction was a legitimate use of a "scorched earth" policy. However, pointing out that this excuse was not what the Croats themselves have claimed demolishes it. They chose to rely on the use of these buildings for military purposes by the Serbs.

97. Further, this area was not being turned over or being re-occupied by enemy forces. The UN was taking control of it to the exclusion of the Serb military.

98. Lastly, as a party to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Croatia is bound by Part IV, Section I of Protocol I. That treaty prohibits this tactic even if the Croats could otherwise claim they were entitled to lay waste to their own territory as a legitimate defensive tactic.

99. It is not practical to prosecute anyone for any torture committed during the Medak Pocket Operation. First, it is not clear anyone was tortured. In each instance of suspected torture, it is possible the body was subjected to post-death mutilation and not pre-death torture. However, mutilation of bodies is itself a conventional war crime. It is not specifically covered in Article 3, but it is perhaps within its general ambit. The determination of this question turns on whether mutilation of corpses is a "serious violation of international humanitarian law" (Article 1).

100. Second, as with the suspected murders, no specific individual can be

identified as involved in any torture or mutilation. Again, assuming torture or mutilation could be proved, the few cases do not form any convincing pattern that could then be attributed to commanders.

101. A particular Croatian officer was clearly in charge of the operation for the Croat forces. The evidence is clear and convincing that he was responsible.

102. The thoroughness of the destruction, the open nature of the methods used (the explosions could be heard and the smoke seen by all), the orders overheard by civilian survivors, the inherent control a commander must or should have, and the express concerns raised by all overwhelmingly point to his responsibility. He, by his actions and by attending at various meetings, was clearly the responsible OZ Commander.

103. Widespread use of roadblocks by all parties in the conflict, particularly near front lines, means that the responsible commanders would or should know about any large-scale movements of personnel or goods entering or leaving an area of operations. Therefore, the commanders either did know or should have known about demolition or incendiary materials entering the Pocket and plundered goods leaving.

104. Can responsibility be found above that officer? Another officer was clearly in charge of the withdrawal of the Croat forces. However, he was only sent from the Zagreb general staff on about 15 September to oversee the withdrawal. The Croats saw the withdrawal as extremely sensitive, requiring a high level of supervision. His responsibility is therefore problematic due to his limited time in the area.

105. There is no direct evidence of the commander of the Ninth□s role in the wanton destruction. However, based solely on the orbat information, a prima facie case can be made. As the commander of the major unit involved, he is responsible for the destruction inflicted in the Pocket, which must have involved his unit. Graffiti in some of the destroyed buildings implicate the Ninth.

106. The OZ Commander was replaced shortly after this battle. This, plus his reported Albanian ethnic background, suggests that the Croatian authorities are perhaps more likely to turn him over to the International Criminal Tribunal than another officer of Croat background and in more political favour.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

107. It is recommended that two Croatian officers be charged with the following war crimes, respectively:

(a) A grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, being the extensive destruction and appropriation of property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention, such destruction and appropriation not being justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly contrary to Article 2(d);

(b) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being the wanton destruction of villages or devastation not justified by military necessity contrary to Article 3(b); and

(c) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being plunder of private property contrary to Article 3(e).

The charges involve the wanton destruction and plunder which occurred during the Medak Pocket Operation. While the case against one officer is stronger than that against the other, it is believed that there is also a prima facie case against the second officer.

108. It is also recommended that no one be charged with any murder (murder, killing, unlawful targeting of civilians or genocide related deaths), torture or mutilation occurring during the operation. No one has been identified as being directly responsible for such crimes. There are some suspicious circumstances and even some probable murders. However, no convincing pattern can be proved such that a commander can be held indirectly criminally responsible using the doctrine of command responsibility.

Notes

1/ From the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (Statute) Article 1. All further references to articles are to those in the Statute, unless stated otherwise. It is interesting that virtually all these provisions are echoed in the Yugoslav constitution.

2/ "Trial of General Yamashita", 4 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 35.

ANNEX 127:

DARUVAR AGREEMENT, 18 FEBRUARY 1993

English Translation *ET B008-0131-B008-0132*

TRANSCRIPTION

AGREEMENT

1. On 18-Feb-1993 in Daruvar in the presence of UNPROFOR representatives (illegible signatures) a meeting was held between:

DŽAKULA VELJKO	ZLATKO KOS
DUŠAN EĆIMOVIĆ	ZDRAVKO SOKIĆ
MILAN VLAISAVLJEVIĆ	IVAN VOLF
MLADEN KULIĆ	VLADIMIR DELAČ
LOVRIĆ ĐORĐE	ŽELIMIR MILNAR
RADAKOVIĆ MILAN	

2. In the whole region, comprised of the former municipalities: Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Nova Gradiška, Novska and Pakrac, which is under protection of the UNPROFOR forces, the following will be ensured:

a. Complete reconstruction of the electricity and water supplies system;

b. Unrestricted traffic of personal vehicles on roads, including the Zagreb – Belgrade Highway, further negotiations will also encompass the commercial traffic;

c. Enabling of restoration of railway between Novska and Nova Gradiška;

d. Restoration of the telecommunication structure */illegible/* with the results of preliminary inspection from August 1992, with representatives from both sides);

e. Establishing the joint commission for normalisation of the life of citizens in the UNPA area, with special emphasis on reassessing and at a later stage also establishing social activities, health care, education and sport activities.

f. Unobstructed and regular meetings at the checkpoints under the supervision of the UNPROFOR;

g. Enabling return of all expelled persons;

h. Giving consent to civilians who are staying on both sides of the separation line to work on their land (at this moment, it is especially important and urgent that farmers are given guarantees for crops in the harvest season later in the year);

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i. Meetings of representatives of local authorities, for the purpose of discussing the methods of (illegible) cooperation;

j. Enabling placement of containers as specified in the agreement that was achieved;

l. Joint commissions will be formed for preparations, implementation and monitoring , as well as supervising of all points.

3. Agreement is signed by representatives:

(personal signatures)

Džakula Veljko v.r.
Dušan Ećimović v.r.
Milan Vlaisavljević v.r.
Malden Kulić v.r.
Lovrić Đorđe v.r.
Radaković Milan v.r.
Zlatko Kos v.r.
Zdravko Sokić v.r.
Ivan Volf v.r.
Vladimir Delač v.r.
Želimir Milnar v.r.

Inote re: v. r. - *unknown abbreviation – possibly for personal signature, i.e. this document is a transcription of an original that probably contains original signatures/*

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UNPROFOR REPRESENTATIVES:

(illegible signatures)

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ANNEX 128:

IGOR PALIJA, "PEACEMAKER", IDENTITET, MARCH 2008

PEACEMAKER

DARUVAR AGREEMENT WAS INITIALLY REVEALED BY TUĐMAN WHEN HE COMMENDED ŽELJKO ĐŽAKULA AND HIS ASSOCIATES BEFORE ANDREAS KHOL, SECRETARY OF THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC UNION, AS LOYAL SERBS WILLING TO COOPERATE UNLIKE THE REBLES IN KNIN.

Author: IGOR PALIJA

Slavko Degoricija, Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1991 and one of the closest associates of Franjo Tuđman at the time, published a book on the pre-war and war time events in Croatia. Everyone will perceive the book in their own way. Regardless whether we are going to be thrilled or disappointed by the book the fact remains that this book is a firsthand account of the events at the beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991. Many things are discussed in this book for the first time, matters regarding the relations between Croats and Serbs at the very beginning of the war that had been shrouded in secrecy, negotiations and attempts to stop the madness as well as the attempts to keep the madness going indefinitely. Despite this, even Degoricija sticks to a unified, we could even say, officially proclaimed, view of the Homeland war. However, he crosses the Rubicon and speaks factually, openly and correctly about certain events. In any case, what he says is different from what is written in the school books that are supposed to help raise the young people in the spirit of tolerance and understanding. Degoricija titled his book "*It was not in vain*", and this title seems important to me but for completely different reasons. It would be hard and unnecessary to speak here about everything that is written in the book. Those who wish to learn more can just read the book themselves. Why I feel this book was not in vain is that it contains a story of one man.

PERSONAL: Slavko Degoricija, a history professor and one of the founders of the independent and sovereign Republic of Croatia. At the first congress **of the** HDZ **he was elected the Chairman of the** Executive Committee **of the** HDZ, and in 1990 multi-party elections **for the** parliament he was elected as representative. He was a Deputy Minister of Interior, **Minister**

without Portfolio and Minister of Reconstruction. He was the chief negotiatior for the Republic of Croatia during negotiations with the local Serbian authorities in the Republic of Croatia.

A man hated by everyone, from sinners to saints. A controversial man and an even more controversial politician. One of the greatest Serbian dissidents in Croatia. A man Degoricija describes as sombre, and refers to him as the most constructive and the most cooperative Serbian politician coming from Krajina area. A man that Serbian authorities of then Krajina referred to as a traitor and a Croatian spy. That man is Veljko Đžakula.

There is nothing that Degoricija writes about him that is new to me. We often spoke about the war period in Krajina and what he went through in order to prevent further killings and property devastation.

Veljko, what you are trying to do is a good thing, but I am afraid that in the end you will suffer a devastating political defeat. With your stress on the peacemaking you will not be able to oppose the Serbian military and police authorities. He did not listen to me, and my dark premonitions, unfortunately, turned out to be true... Slavko Degoricja writes in his book Nije *bilo uzalud /It was not in vain/*, Zagreb, February 2008.

Veljko was one of the few who said NO to his people, when such a thing could have cost him his life. Was it courage, madness or honesty, I will leave to others to judge as I am not an objective judge. Degoricija dedicates a whole chapter to wartime events in Pakrac and peacemaking role of Veljko Đžakula. He writes about numerous meetings, some 7 to 8 of them, that he had with Đžakula since 1991, with a goal of ending the war and achieving normalisation. He also writes about the first meeting between the Serbs in Western Slavonia and Franjo Tuđman, initiated by Đžakula. The epilogue of the peacemaking attempts was the signing of *Daruvar Agreement* on 18th of February 1993, with Ivan Milas signing for the Croatian side and Veljko Džakula for the Serbian side. The Agreement envisaged the reopening of roads, return of all refugees and normal functioning of the government in Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Nova Gradiška, Novska and Pakrac Municipality. Another important thing was that this Agreement recognised the Croatian sovereignty over the area of Western Slavonia. Soon after the signing of the Agreement Džakula and his associates were removed from all political functions, never the less, they continued to implement the Agreement. After this Džakula was arrested, maltreated and imprisoned in Knin and Glina, accused of treason, he was also abducted in Belgrade and suffered several assassination attempts.

Later on Džakula was one of the most constructive and the most cooperative Serbian politicians in Krajina area, and one of the people that I preferred to negotiate with. He constantly emphasised that the conflict could only be peacefully resolved and that his peacemaking efforts would bear fruit sooner or later... Slavko Degoricja writes in his book Nije *bilo uzalud /It was not in vain/*, Zagreb, February 2008.

For one side Veljko Džakula was a rebel and a criminal and for the other side he was a traitor and a spy. This speaks enough of his altruism and peacemaking efforts during the warm, as his efforts, as a rule, were misunderstood and judged by the both of the opposing parties. Simply put, those who want to play war games dislike those who prefer peace. For them peace is boring and something they do not know how to do. Veljko Džakula was the first politician in this area during this last war who had to serve time sentenced "by his people" only because he did not wish to converse over the barrel the "other side".

VELJKO DŽAKULA, AS A FOLLOWER OF RAŠKOVIĆ, WAS AGAINST THE REBELLION IN WESTERN SLAVONIA CLAIMING THAT THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR SUCH ACTIONS IN THIS REGION... SLAVKO DEGORICJA WRITES IN HIS BOOK NIJE *BILO UZALUD /IT WAS NOT IN VAIN/*, ZAGREB, FEBRUARY 2008.

After the Operation Storm he stayed in Croatia and did not, like so many other Krajina politicians, bravely escape. He was used as a red rag in "Veliki Hrvati". He was attacked on the street, insulted and spit on. He suffered through it all stoically, not only because he knew he was not guilty but also because he was certain that he did more than most to achieve peace and normalisation of relations. This is why, if for no other reason, this book has its value. It rehabilitates the man who, at the time when heads rolled easily, and war had its own set of rules and a clear division between us and them, had the strength and the courage to think and act differently. This book gives us hope that there are people everywhere at all times that defy the stupidity of their fellow men. People striving to achieve peace, agreement, coexistence and tolerance during the time when such notions are more of an abstract noun instead of a real category. And this is why *It was not in vain*.

ON 21ST OF SEPTEMBER AT THE BREAK OF DAWN SOME 20 MEM-

BERS OF SPECIAL POLICE FORCE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF KRAJINA, MADE A SPECTACULAR ARREST OF VELJKO DŽAKULA. THEY SURROUNDED A HOUSE IN PAKRAC AND HANDCUFFED DŽAKULA, THIS TIME AS THE PRESIDENT OF PAKRAC MUNICIPALITY ASSEMBLY

After these events Džakula went to Belgrade, where he was abducted and exposed to new abuse. After that he lived in villages in the vicinity of Pakrac. His experience shows that there are people among the Serbs in the occupied part of Croatia that openly disagree with Krajina regime and truly wish for a change but are unable to oppose the military-police leadership capable of anything... Slavko Degoricja writes in his book Nije *bilo uzalud /It was not in vain/,* Zagreb, February 2008.

ANNEX 129:

RSK, DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA AND REPUBLIC SPRSKA, 24 APRIL 1993

1993, 24 April
Banja Luka
Decision on the constitution of the joint assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska

_____

Pursuant to the Declaration (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, No. 17, 1992), the Assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska as legitimate representatives of the Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, at their joint session held on 24 April 1993, have adopted the

D E C I S I O N
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA AND REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

I

The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska (hereinafter: National Assembly) is hereby constituted as the joint body of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly will meet in Banja Luka.

II

The National Assembly is being constituted on parity basis from deputies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly in the foregoing paragraph will be constituted with 82 deputies from the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and 82 deputies from the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.

III

The National Assembly will harmonize and enact the constitution, laws and other legislative provisions concerning areas pursuant to the authority granted it by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly shall harmonize legislative provisions in the fields of foreign policy, defence and security, justice, regional and population planning, the rights and status of companies and other organizations, the financial system, credit-monetary policy, customs and payments system, veterans' and disabled persons welfare, education, science, culture and the protection of cultural assets, information systems and other areas of activity pursuant to the authority granted it by the assemblies of the Republics.
(...)

Chairman of the National Assembly
Prof. Milovan Milovanović, Ph.D.

_____

Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, 28 April 1993, No. 1

ANNEX 130:

RSK, PROPOSAL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA TO THE ASSEMBLIES OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO CONCERNING UNIFICATION IN A SINGLE STATE, 18 AUGUST 1994

1994, 18 August

Proposal of the Assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina to the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro concerning unification in a single state

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

ASSEMBLY

TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MONTENEGRO

(...)

Having established that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska are state entities emerged after the secessionistic fragmentation of the SFRY through the materialization of the right to self-determination and of the principle of permanent sovereignty of the people and the nation, and that they are entitled to take decisions on their own state, the assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina have decided to send the following

P R O P O S A L

ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, THE REPUBLIC OF

MONTENEGRO, REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN

KRAJINA INTO ONE STATE

1. The assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and of the Republic of Montenegro are hereby invited to accept the Proposal on Unification into One State, and

to consider the procedure and the conditions under which unification could be effected.

2. The joint delegation of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska is entrusted with starting, as soon as possible, talks with the representatives of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro in order to prepare the declaration on unification and the draft s of other relevant documents. (...)

President of the National Assembly	President of the Assembly
Momčilo Krajišnik	Branko Vojnica
(stamp)	(stamp)
Republika Srpska Serbian Krajina	Republic of
National Assembly of the Republic	Assembly
Sarajevo	Knin

ANNEX 131:

RSK, MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA WHICH APPROVED THE DECISION ON STATE UNIFICATION WITH REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, 29 MAY 1995

1995, 29 May

Knin

Minutes of the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which approved the decision on state unification with Republika Srpska

(...)

AGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION ON STATE UNIFICATION OF THE RSK AND THE RS

Minister MILAN BABIĆ presented the chronological sequence of the work of the state commission, and the variants of the name of the future state. The common position was that it ought to be called UNITED SERBIAN REPUBLIC.

After the debate, the other members of the Assembly also unanimously agreed with the Decision.

AGREEMENT WITH THE DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFICATION

Accepted unanimously along with the statement of reason

ANNEX 132:

EXCERPT FROM THE INTERVIEW WITH THE SVK LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILE MRKŠIĆ, VOJSKA KRAJINE, 11 JUNE 1995

Excerpt from the interview with the SVK Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić on 11 June 1995 published in *Vojska Krajine* [The Army of Krajina]:

Commander of the Serb Army of Krajina Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić congratulated all fighters and senior officers of the SVK the largest Serbian historical holiday – St. Vitus' Day.

"Everything we have done in reorganizing the SVK and all we must do more to strengthen the defense and protection of the state, expresses a firm commitment for defending and commitment to defend RSK"

"I want for everyone to welcome the next St. Vitus' Day in peace, freedom and united – in the one Serbian state" said commander Mrksić at the end of congratulations to soldiers and senior officers of SVK.

ANNEX 133:

EXCERPT FROM FRANJO TUĐMAN, ZNA SE, HDZ U BORBI ZA SAMOSTALNOST HRVATSKE (IT IS KNOWN: HDZ IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF CROATIA), ZAGREB, 1993, PP. 190-195

Dr Franjo Tuđman

ZNA SE /It is known/

HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF CROATIA

Second Volume

ZAGREB, 1993

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Prepared for printing by:

Anđelko Mijatović

On the occasion of the Second General Assembly of the Croatian Democratic Union

Editor:

Ivan Bekavac, MA

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OFFICER'S VOCATION -

VOCATION THAT BEARS THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY[1]

Dear officers, ladies and gentlemen,

I said something about the vocation to everybody outside - you were probably listening - so I will not repeat it. In addition, I would like to particularly appeal to you who got your diplomas, the members of the first generation of officers, commanding officers of the Croatian Army who finished their education at the Croatian Educational Institution, Croatian Commanding Staff School to think about your vocation day and night. Really, there is no vocation which bears such responsibility as this one.

In this world, from the times immemorial to-date, there has actually been nothing new in a person's life, in the life of a nation, even in the warfare. Only the combat equipment has changed – from the spear and arrow to all that we have nowadays. However, a human being has remained the same.

Therefore, reach out for the old books – starting from the old Chinese and ancient ones, to the past century - Klauzewitz and the others and then to all those who wrote about the Second World War and about the wars thereafter.

You will learn all sorts of things from them, but do not follow blindly any of those, but use your own brains to think about everything.

If any of you has come across my book "War against the War", written almost 40 years ago, you will see what kind of things I pursued then, what kind of literature, etc.

But, let me tell you something – all that knowledge is really necessary. You should cherish your personality, cherish the fact that each of you is an individual and that you are a Croat, the member of this nation and think with the heart and soul of your nation! Do not fall under somebody else's influence of any kind! One should have the knowledge, master one's skills, but have one's own judgements.

Had we not had our own judgements, we would have neither our Croatian Army nor our independent Croatian state now.

Ladies and Gentlemen, please recall - less than four years ago who would believe that we would create our Croatian state? Not even among the ranks of the Croatian people there were not those who were involved in politics exactly because they were reading but also they were falling under somebody else's influence, they trusted other services - analytical, intelligence, etc., all of which calculated that they needed Yugoslavia, and they did not need Croatia, that Croatia could not happen. Nevertheless, we have assessed the historic period using our own judgements – that the time has come for the collapse of socialism and the collapse of multiethnic states and that in such circumstances the Croatian people, if they knew what they wanted and if they knew how to organise themselves, they could have its sovereignty and its independence.

This is the look at the big picture. But, gentlemen, this happens in all the aspects of a human life.

---

1 The speech of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr Franjo Tuđman to the officers, attendees of the High Staff School upon their graduation at the Croatian Military College in Zagreb on 30th June 1993

Therefore, you should learn, you should develop your potentials, you should know what is going on around you, but also you should perceive your personal place, the one of your unit, of your nation in such circumstances!

Therefore, I call upon you to develop your potentials, to be responsible.

You are not aware as to what extent every step is being monitored, the behaviour, knowledge of every member of the Army. That runs in the blood of every nation and in that is how people develop trust or distrust in their armed forces. With regard to that, we are obviously still faced with a very complex task.

Let me tell you briefly about our present situation.

Gentlemen, do not fall under the influence of all sorts of scribblers, dilettantes and the like who are saying that the destiny of the Croatian state is uncertain. The position of the Croatian state is stable. It is not only internationally recognised, but the most responsible factors of both the European and world politics count on it as well, they count on the fact that Croatia is situated at the very important geopolitical location, that such system was set up in Croatia which is more stable and democratic than in any other post-communist state.

If you look at the political situation in those countries in which a collapse of socialism occurred and in which multiethnic states were formed, then you can see that in the states which were created in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the former Soviet army and its currency are still in place and the former Bolsheviks and Communists and the new democratic forces still fight there, somewhere the communists even prevail, even in the countries such as Baltic Lithuania or Azerbaijan. It is still uncertain whether the communists or non-communists will gain power in Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Croatia does not have that, and you probably know why. It is because we achieved the unity of Croatian people based on one program the aim of which was to unite the sons of those who fought against each others in the last war – starting from the Home Guards-men and Ustashas to partisans and anti-fascists who fought for Croatia under different flags.

Naturally, rejecting all that is negative, all the deceptions, disillusions and crimes, but taking what was positive, what they aspired for, and that is an independent state and democracy.

Gentlemen, soldiers!

You should be aware precisely of that fact! You should respect all those constituent parts of the Croatian history and those ones who fought for the autonomous and independent state of Croatia.

We have to be aware that we could not have created the present Croatian state under such international circumstances. They would not have recognised us unless we had respected that anti-fascism, the anti-fascist segment of the Croatian people from the Second World War and unless we had incorporated it into the foundations of our Croatian state. Those thing that were being created both through the Partisan Army, ZAVNOH / Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia/ and the Constitution. Only on such foundations we could come to the independent Croatia. For this reason particularly you who are in the Army should be aware of the both.

Ergo, you should respect everything from the times immemorial – the segment that was positive in the Second World War and the segment that was for the au-

tonomous and independent state of Croatia; without that anti-fascist segment we would not have come to you here.

Please, nobody has the right to forget that. Those are the historic experiences and on that we are creating and we must create our state policy, the policy for building the army. Do not allow that all sorts of people from their narrow mindedness, who cannot understand it, do not let them deceive you and mislead you.

And one more thing – do not let that based on such radical national programs and ideas the provokers emerge among our ranks.

You should pursue the state policy and be vigilant when doing that! The incident that happened the previous night when a driver took a dozen Croatian soldiers to the enemy's territory – that is the responsibility of our services and commanders, the concrete ones, up and down the hierarchy. You should not permit such things.

Another thing, briefly:

- We are obviously faced with the task first of all how to achieve a full sovereignty, how to liberate the Croatian areas from the occupation. Our people, ordinary men, you and other units of the Croatian Army are righteously wrathful and impatient. Why do we tolerate that? Why don't we go to Knin, Baranja?

Gentlemen, the very moment when we will have to go, if we will have to go, we will go, regardless of the victims. But, until that moment comes we have to get prepared, individually, prepare all our units, all combat arms, all branches of service of the Armed Forces, the entire Army, even the population, but also be aware that at the state leadership level - and we are – we will return those areas from Knin, Baranja, Vukovar to Ilok in a peaceful manner. Why? There are two reasons:
to have as less victims as possible. In the Maslenica operation our opponents had 600, 800 dead, according to what is said, and we had one hundred dead and two hundred wounded.

So, we want to save, if possible, every Croatian life, every drop of Croatian blood. We know that no nation in its history, more or less, managed to achieve full freedom without victims.

So, we will not be deceived, and if those sacrifices are necessary, we will have to bore them as well. The second reason, apart from saving the lives, is also the international community which was not inclined to the independent Croatia, they ask us to give up the use of armed force. What if we get started today? The world would be prepared to impose sanctions against Croatia as well, in addition to many other reasons.

Thus, we have to coordinate our state interests with the international circumstances. You and every individual, the Croatian Army as a whole, must be the interpreter of such Croatian state policy which cares for the interests of Croatia as a whole and the interests of every Croatian man, Croatian area, etc. There should be no dilemmas among the ranks of the Croatian Army.

Between you and me, as I have said there, you have to be politically active to educate the Croatian and reserve soldiers and to act among the population as the citizens of Croatia. The less you, as Croatian soldiers, are present in the press, on the radio and television the better, except when it is necessary. And, of course, when you appear there it should be solely and exclusively with the aim of interpreting the Croatian state policy.

Our second task, in addition to the liberation of those areas, is to provide all-embracing help to our fellow-countrymen, Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to preserve their subsistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to defend the areas

where they live, thus defending the strategic interests of the Croatian state. Since, if we allowed, had we not provided help, had we not pursued such policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have become a part of the Greater Serbia or their Yugoslavia a long time ago if it was for the policy of the official Bosnian and Herzegovinian leadership. The Croatian policy would lost its way under those who wished such order which would ensure majority and the hegemony of the Muslims and, according to the statistics, there are 44 percent of them, while Alija Izetbegović told me personally that there were already more than half of them.

Hence, gentlemen, we have pursued such policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was realistic from the point of view of the interests of the Croatian people and the Croatian state. We did not have the illusions that that Bosnia and Herzegovina could be Croatian up to the Drina River. And, speaking among ourselves, do not impute - if the journalists are present - that and I do not know what else on me.

I am asking you, if somebody gave you such Croatian state, what kind of Croatian state it would be - up to the Drina River - in which there would be two million Serbs and two million Muslims? Would that be a Croatian state? Would it be worth getting killed for such Croatian state? And how many of us would be killed and what would happen then?

There are such would-be wise men, do you know what I mean, among our soldiers, and combatants, young men too, who advocated such ideas from the beginning, We have done everything possible for the cooperation with the Muslims. Alija Izetbegović did not want to sign the military agreement with Croatia, from the very beginning of the war. When the war was waged only against Croatia, he was saying that it was not the war and that it was not their war. Later on, when they were attacked, not event then did he want to sign the military agreement. We only managed to /sign/ the one about the cooperation and border areas. It was constantly the tendency to proclaim also Croatia as the aggressors in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

You have to be aware that what we have achieved with such policy – preserved the territories in which the Croatian people live there, in Bosnia and Herzegovina – that in that confederate plan for the resolution of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian crises the Croatian interests have been protected to such an extent that one of the deputies, and even one of the prominent, our Croatian men, said in a discussion: “Gentlemen, look! Does it even happen in the history, from the times of Tomislav and Krešimir to the present days, that the Croatian weapons and Croatian people control such a big territory as they do today? (Applause).

Therefore, despite the resistance to the creation of the independent Croatia, despite the fact that in 1991, at the end of 1991, even the most important international factors wished we were defeated, when they wanted to deprive Croatia of its leader by bombing the Presidential Palace /*Banski dvori*/ and when the consulates of foreign countries left Zagreb the same day.

Despite that, we in Croatia have won both militarily and politically, we have managed to preserve the interests of the Croatian people, the Croatian state and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We should be well aware of that historical achievement, so let us not challenge those achievements. You, as a commanding officers, be aware of that and pass that to the soldiers.

There is a possibility to bring the entire war to an end without further armed complications. A new resolution will be passed in the Security Council today. You know

that the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed the extension of the mandate for three months without any changes. While he is proposing the extension of the mandate without any changes, at the same time those European and world powers that are inclined to us - and there are not many of them - sent me an explicit and personal advice not to undertake anything and to be patient.

However, you probably know that, I have sent a request to the Secretary-General that we do not agree to the simple extension of that mandate, that we agree that the mandate be extended for one month, actually that within those three months but in the period of one month it needs to be seen whether those Serbs in Croatia, from Knin further, will agree for the normalisation of relations. We have proposed the opening of the road and the railway line between Split and Zagreb, Zagreb and Županja and Okučani, power-transmission lines and oil pipelines. We put that as a request. If within that month, the next month, Serbs agree to that then we can agree to the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia.

So, if that is not proved in the next month, then we will call it off, we will not agree to the extension of the UNPROFOR /mandate/. Of course, from the point of view of the European and world politics that consider not only Croatia but Bosnia as well and the area of the entire former Yugoslavia /sic, unfinished sentence/. But I still think that they will have to take into consideration those requests of ours, and that what has been said in the Resolution 815 will be confirmed, that the United Nations will recognise the territorial integrity of Croatia and that they call for the implementation of the Vance Plan.

I hope that the in the resolution of the Security Council – I cannot be positive but I judge that the Security Council will pass such resolution in which our requests will be accepted. It means that they will call Serbs to accept the normalisation regarding those specific matters, which is of the crucial importance for us. So, we have to be prepared that, if that does not happen, that is, if the Serbs from Knin and the others do not agree to that within that month, we will be ready to provide for the constitutional and legal system of Croatia in the entire state territory with all possible means.

That is why we have to get prepared instead of making noise. We would not like that, but if we have to do that then we will do that.

I am positive that it is clear to you what our policy is like, what our situation is like and the reasons we pursue such policy.

We have been and we still are in a very delicate position when Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned. But, please, we nevertheless have the Croatian state which is recognised, we have the Croatian state which is recognised not only by Germany which is not in a position to help us efficiently for many reasons. However, as you could see, on Monday even the American Ambassador stated that the United States of America, as the biggest world power, not only recognised the territorial integrity of Croatia, but the United States of America would, for their part, do everything in order that all the territories be returned into the composition of Croatia as soon as possible.

You have to bear in mind and to understand that when a country like China signs contracts with Croatia, the biggest we have had so far – it is the most populated country in the world, not only from the inhabitants point of view/sic/, with the population of billion and 165 million. It possesses nuclear weapons too. That is a country

that already today has a role of second world power and it will have that role in the future too. And when the power like that is ready to cooperate with Croatia, then it speaks about the stability of Croatia.

Nevertheless, within those international factors who recognise us, active are those who do not forget to tell us that we are the main culprits for the dissolution of their flavour – Yugoslavia and who would like, because of their spheres of influence, to make all sorts of arrangements and creations.

So, gentlemen, those are the circumstances under which the Croatian state and the Croatian Army are. The Croatian Army has to be prepared to ensure the implementation of that Croatian policy, that is, if we did not have the support of the Croatian Army then we would not be able to carry out that policy.

Therefore I appeal to you, gentlemen, officers, all of whom are the members of the Croatian Army, to bear in mind the entire history of the Croatian people when performing your officers and senior duties, from that you can derive the perception of what we have achieved. You have to bear in mind the overall international situation and you have to be proud of being the members of a nation that knew how to create its state with its own potentials, its judgements, its sacrifices, its wisdom, its prudence but also its resoluteness., how to create conditions for you to be the officers of your army and not of somebody else's.

So, let us continue our job in the same way as we have done so far. Have trust in yourselves, in the Croatian people, in the Croatian state.

We have created it and it has been inscribed into the world's history at one point in time when the civilisation integration occurred, the technological and national individualisation. There are larger or smaller nations than the Croatian nation who did not have that courage, who did not have a capability to put itself on a firm footing and to become a subject of the international politics.

The Croatian nation has got that awareness, those perceptions and those potentials. You are the constituent part, moreover, one armed part of those nation and you have an important task, regardless of how those circumstances will develop this year and in the future.

Congratulations once again for completing your schooling, for performing your honourable and senior duty in the interests of our Croatian homeland.

Thank you.

(Applause)

ANNEX 134:

EXCERPT FROM VJESNIK, (CROATIAN NEWSPAPER), 28 DECEMBER 1993

VJESNIK

Croatian political daily

Zagreb, Tuesday, 28 December 1993

/image/: Function for the highest military officials at the Presidential Palace

President Tuđman organised a function for the representatives of the MOD and CAF

We rely on the peaceful way, but also on the Croatian Army

The Croatian Army must not depart from the Croatian state policy, says dr. Tuđman

ZAGREB - On the occasion of Christmas and New Year's holidays, President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman hosted on Monday at the Presidential Palace a function for the highest officials of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Armed Forces.

In his speech, President Tuđman pointed out that international circumstances still do not allow for a definite incorporation of the Croatian territories under the supervision of the peacekeeping forces into the Croatian legal and economic system. "We are trying", said President Tuđman, " to achieve this by peaceful political means, in cooperation with the international community, but it is also our obligation to have the Croatian Armed forces trained so that any given moment, if need be, they are able to liberate on their own every centimetre of the Croatian territory."

Furthermore, President Tuđman said that the Croatian Army cannot and must not depart from the Croatian state policy in any way. "This must be the task of not only the Political administration, but of all the factors in all organisational units of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Armed Forces", said President Tuđman.

ANNEX 135:

EXCERPT FROM VEČERNJI LIST, (CROATIAN NEWSPAPER), 28 AUGUST 1994

Večernji list,
Sunday, 28 August 1994

Excerpt from an interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman given to the Croatian Radio Television

Patience will bring the solution

We have to hold back with our army and we even have to convince our citizens that we really must be patient so that our policy could contribute to solving the conflict without further escalation of hostilities

ZAGREB - last night, the Croatian Radio Television broadcast a 30-minute interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman, which he gave on Brijuni to the Croatian Radio Television journalist Jozo Ćurić. We selected several most interesting questions and replies from the interview with dr. Tuđman.

Croatia is entering an important period regarding a decision on the UNPROFOR mandate. In terms of this mandate, what are you currently willing to accept?

This issue is clearly not only our, Croatian problem, but the problem of the international community and the European Union, because the problem of the occupied Croatian territories is connected with the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in general, meaning it is also connected with the war crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it were not for this correlation, Croatia would be in a much more favourable position. As things are now, we will have to coordinate our policy and our decisions with the international factors, although it goes without saying that we will resolutely defend the Croatian state interests in this process. With respect to this, it is my pleasure to say that Croatia and the important international factors fully agree that maintaining the current situation is out of the question, or this situation becoming permanent, which would turn Croatia into a sort of Cyprus.

Thus, in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted approval to start solving the problem in the UNPA area. The process of peaceful solution to this problem has to commence with international assistance; however, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration of these areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with international as-

sistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other internationally recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal.

Guarantees to the Serbs

During the summer, statements could be heard in Croatia, even from some officials, that their governments supported the integral Croatia, within which, they said, a sort of partial federation would be formed, whereby the local Serbs would even get the right of self-determination; this was repeated by some Croatian politicians and so on. Can you comment on this?

Well, I am very well informed about all the opinions and proposals coming from the official circles of the European countries and worldwide. I firmly declare that I have not heard such proposals to solve the Serbian issue in Croatia from any diplomatic representatives or political leaders. No one has ever mentioned the word federation.

Therefore, the problem of occupied Croatian territories can be solved by incorporating these areas back into the Croatian constitutional system, while the Serbs in general, and as an ethnic community, would be granted all civil and ethnic rights, and autonomy to the local Serbs in the two districts - Knin and Glina - where they were in the majority before the war started. What is envisaged in our Constitutional Act. We are willing to establish a court of human rights pursuant to the Constitutional Act, consisting also of the European Union representatives.

This would make it obvious that Croatia is truly willing to guarantee to the Serbs all the rights included in the Constitution and the Constitutional Act, and that is what we offer them as a political solution. They will have to accept that.

In the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted approval to start solving the problem in the UNPA area. The process of peaceful solution to this problem has to commence with international assistance; however, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration of these areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with international assistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other internationally recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal

We have a prepared army

A statement could be heard that the Croatian Army is weak, not strong enough, and that this is the reason why Croatia insists on a peaceful solution. Is this true?

Where did you hear that? From Knin or Banja Luka? The Croatian Army they mention fought and resisted the Serbian assault when the Serbian aggressors had on their side, against Croatia, the entire Yugoslav communist army, which really was one of the strongest in Europe. This Yugoslav communist army no longer exists, while Croatia, which was at the time only starting to form its army, was able to resist the aggression and today we have our own armed forces.

Today we have our ground forces, the aviation, the navy, we have an army that is prepared, if necessary, to go to arms in order to return the occupied territories and stand at the Croatian borders.

However, due to the circumstances I spoke about, because Europe and the international community are requesting that we opt for the political solution, and, as far as our side is concerned, we will not give cause for the escalation of the situation so that it turns into a conflict. This is not a separate issue just in Croatia but, as I said, it is connected to Bosnia, and many things converge in Bosnia. Not just the direct Serbian and Muslim-Croatian conflict and because many international factors are involved, 1914 could be repeated there, when the First World War started. The clash of civilisations could break out there if the world does not contain the war.

Because of the above, the Croatian army has to hold back and we even have to convince our citizens, not just the Croatian people but all citizens of Croatia, that we must be patient so that our policy can contribute to the efforts of democratic European and international forces to resolve this conflict without further escalation of hostilities, and in order to create the preconditions for establishing a new international order on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in South-eastern Europe, to which Croatia belongs as a Mediterranean and Central European state, as well as on the territory of Balkans that is constantly in turmoil - concluded President Tuđman.

ANNEX 136:

EXCERPT FROM PREDRAG LUCIĆ (ED.), STENOGRAMI O PODJELI BOSNE (SHORTHAND NOTES ON THE DIVISION OF BOSNIA), SPLIT, SARAJEVO, 2005, BOOK II, PP 399-448

Večernji list,
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Thus, in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted approval to start solving the problem in the UNPA area. The process of peaceful solution to this problem has to commence with international assistance; however, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration of these areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with international as-

sistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other internationally recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal.

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ANNEX 137:

RSK, MILITARY POST 9138, SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION, 30 JANUARY 1995

MILITARY POST 9138

Confidential number: 32-14
MILITARY SECRET

Glina, 30 January 1995 CONFIDENATIAL

Submission of the Information To: Command: a/a /files/

The Decision of the RH to bring the question of the political resolution for the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ to a head before the expiry of the UNPROFOR mandate is considered to be a measure of pressure and it is viewed as utterly wrong and harmful.

Since the possible conflict could escalate into the war on a wider scale in the Balkans, it could be expected that the U.S.A. and particularly Europe take all necessary measures in order to prevent it. The world expresses a special interest in a potential reaction of the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/.

A Mini-Contact Group, at the head of which is the American Ambassador Peter Galbraith, will try to impose the "Z-4" Plan as a foundation for political negotiations between the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and the RSK.

The Plan has been drawn up in cooperation with the RH and at the expense of the RSK. The Plan anticipates the annulment of the Vance Plan, thus the RSK, by accepting the status of the autonomy, will lose its political and economic sovereignty as a state.

It is the opinion of the RSK that the Plan should be rejected, stating that it has not been drawn up with the consent to favour the interests of the RH. It is expected that the "Mini-Contact Group" will release the contents of the Plan for the political solution between the RH and the RSK in the course of the 30 or 31 January 1995.

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last name/ Jovo
/
signed/

/round stamp/: Military Post 9138, Glina

ANNEX 138:

RSK, DIRECTIVE FOR THE USE OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA, FEBRUARY 1995

Translation 03088950

NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE SECRET
IRON

Copy no. ____

Enclosure no. _____

D I R E C T I V E

FOR THE USE OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA

February 1995

Translation 03088951

NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE SECRET
I R O N
Copy no. _____
Enclosure no. _____

D I R E C T I V E

for the use of the Serbian Army of Krajina /in/ /?Operation/ no. 1 *STEEL*

Scale: 1:200,000 Ljubljana, Zagreb, Bjelovar, Pečuj, Osijek, Gospić, Bihać, Banja Luka, Doboj, Tuzla, Zadar, Split, Jajce, Sarajevo, Zvornik

1. THE ENEMY

1.1. Military and political situation

So far all attempts by the international community to establish peace in the former BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and resolve the crisis on the territory of the previous Yugoslavia have failed.

Through coordinated action of secret diplomacy, the sponsors of the warmongering policy of Croatia and the Muslim-Croat federation, the US, Germany and Turkey are trying to impose their model of a resolution of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reintegration of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ into Croatia.

The current military and political situation in the wider and closer environment is characterised by:

a) The concern of the international community that a unilateral dismissal of UNPROFOR by Croatia after 31 March 1995 may cause:
(1) a renewal of hostilities on the territory of the former Croatia; (2) a suspension of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties and a flare-up of the war in the former BH; (3) an involvement of the FRY in the war; (4) extension of the war into other parts of the Balkans, but also the hesitancy of the UN, EU and OSCE to sanction Croatia's decision by diplomatic, political and economic means. This concern of the international community is also encouraging Croatia's tactical manoeuvring when it comes to accepting the Z-4 plan.

b) Thorough preparations of the NATO corps' rapid reaction force to ensure and safeguard the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, Croatia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina after 31 March 1995.

Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 103 12/16/2010 2:38:37 PM

c) Threats and pressure on the RSK and RS /Republika Srpska/ from the Croatian and Muslim sponsors to accept the plans of the contact group in order to preserve the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and BH in their internationally recognised borders.

d) Russia's reduced influence on the international political and diplomatic scene and its temporary exclusion from the international community's peace process for a resolution of the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, because it is preoccupied with resolving (1) the imposed secessionism in the Muslim federal republics, (2) the unstable political and economic situation in the country, and (3) defending itself from accusations that it is violating the human and national rights of Muslims in Chechnya /as in the original/.

e) The obstruction of the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities by the Muslim army and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, which is tolerated by the international community and UNPROFOR, has brought the survival of both the agreement and UNPROFOR in the former BH into question.

f) In the clash between the forces of the NO AP ZB /National Liberation of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia/ and the 5th Corps of the so-called BH Army, the situation is characterised by low intensity fighting, anticipation and possible turnarounds with surprises to the advantage of one side or the other.

g) The imposition and internationalisation in international organisations of the supposed threat to both national and human rights of the *Šiptars* /derogatory for Albanians/ in Kosovo and Metohija, the Muslims in the Raška region and the Hungarians in Vojvodina, /and/ civil rights and the democratic processes in Serbia, through which the leading powers and architects of the break-up of the previous Yugoslavia wish to use the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the realisation of their goals and interests, and above all the preservation of Croatia and the former BH in their internationally recognised borders.

The situation in Croatia is particularly characterised by: (1) a disintegration of society and the creation of social differences, (2) an extremely complicated economic situation, (3) the dilapidated political model of the ruling party, and (4) a threat to the institution of the president of the republic Franjo TUĐMAN, and consequently also to the government and the parliament where the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ has a majority. In order to stay in power and solve the accumulated economic, social, political problems and the ever greater isolation by parts of the international community, the current administration has decided to use force in order to establish constitutional and legal order on the entire territory of the former Croatia.

1.2. The aim of the aggression:

The probable aim of the aggression would be: destroying the Serbian Army of Krajina, cutting off the territory and breaking up the constitutional order of the RSK, and creating conditions for the reintegration of the RSK territory into the constitutional and legal framework of Croatia.

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1.3. Strength, composition and grouping of forces and likely method of aggression and axes of attack:

1) Strength of forces:

The HV /Croatian Army/ comprises some 60.000 troops in peacetime, including soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, with a possible build up of forces to around 150.000.
The army is organised in 3 branches, of which the ground troops form the mainstay. It has about 450 tanks, about 150 pieces of other armoured equipment, about 1,100 artillery pieces, about 800 pieces for anti-armour combat, about 600 pieces for anti-aircraft combat, about 8 surface-to-surface rocket launchers, 2 fighter plane squadron, 2 MI-8 and MI-24 helicopter squadrons.
The navy is organised in a fleet and has 2 RT /? missile gunboats/, 2 RČ /? patrol boats/ with armed motor boats.

In the aggression against the RSK we anticipate: up to 4 operations groups comprising 3-5 brigades, 1 light assault brigade, 1 independent guards battalion, 12 HV brigades (reservists), 2 independent HV battalions, and 2-3 home guard regiments with about 35,000 troops, 150 tanks, 70-80 APCs, 2 artillery brigades and 1 surface-to-surface rocket battalion.
With the rest of the forces it would organise and carry out defensive operations with a focus on Eastern Slavonia, the area of Sisak, Karlovac, Zagreb and Ravni Kotari. For the defensive operation it would engage:

- Osijek Military District without one brigade comprising: 2nd gbr /guards brigade/, 14th HV brigade and 4th dp /home guard regiment/ grouped in the 3rd OG /operations group/;

- Sisak OG from the Zagreb Military District with the 6th HV brigade and the 2nd dp;

- Karlovac Military District, without the 143rd HV brigade, comprising the 5th HV brigade and the 1st dp;

- Zadar OG from the Split Military District comprising: 3rd HV brigade and 1st dp.

It would provide air support with about 20 fighter planes, 5 MI-24 combat helicopters, 12 MI-8 transport helicopters and a certain number of AN-2 planes.

As regards electronic surveillance and satellite reconnaissance, the HV will probably have full support from US and NATO forces and equipment.

2) Composition of forces and grouping of forces for the aggression:

- Lika Operations Group (OG) comprising: 1st, 2nd and 9th gbr, 111th, 138th, 133rd, 155th, 143rd and 128th HV brigades, Slunj dp, Gospić dp and 1st artillery brigade.

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- Sinj Operations Group comprising: 4th gbr, 84th sgb /independent guards battalion/, 113th, 142nd HV brigades.

- Papuk Operations Group comprising: 121st, 125th, 127th, HV brigades, Novska and Daruvar independent battalions and 16th artillery brigade.

- Reserve – Zagorje Operations Group, comprising: 7th gbr, 104th HV brigade and 1st HV brigade - Zagreb.

- Support: surface-to-surface rocket battalion

3) Likely method of aggression and axes of engagement:

Aggression by the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Serbian Krajina would likely be carried out in three phases: **First phase** – psychological operations; **Second phase** – defensive operations with active combat operations with a limited objective, and **Third phase** – offensive operations with a radical objective.

1st phase – Psychological operation:

This type of aggression is in progress, and is being carried out by way of psychological operations, methods and means following a "low intensity combat" strategy.
By applying psychology and propaganda, political and economic pressures and threats of war while simultaneously grouping troops on parts of the front line in the eastern, central and southern theatres, Croatia's likely aim is to exert a strong influence on the population, disorient it, create doubt in the possibility of a defence of the Krajina and dissatisfaction with its government; to disorganise and divide the state leadership; to disable an orderly and timely mobilisation of units and the operational development of the SVK /Army of Serbian Krajina/, thus creating the conditions for a peaceful reintegration of the RSK.
By achieving or not achieving its aim, through this operation, Croatia would probably create favourable conditions for the reintegration of the RSK into its borders through peaceful or violent means /as printed/.

2nd phase – Defensive operations with active combat operations with a limited objective:

In this phase of the aggression, by organising a defence along the entire line of contact and through vigorous offensive action in Western Slavonia and along the Drniš – Vrlika axis, it will probably aim to destroy parts of the 18th and 7th Corps, take control of this area in as little time as possible, capture and put it under its control, thus demonstrating its superiority and the impotence of the RSK.
Through a possible occupation of our territory, propaganda machinery, the actions of infiltrated sabotage-terrorist groups, and the adept use of destructive forces in other parts of the Krajina, it will attempt to continue the creation of conflict situations and a

rift in the state organs and the military, and thus create favourable conditions for the forced reintegration of the entire territory of the RSK into Croatia's constitutional and legal framework.
Engagement of troops: the main forces would be engaged in the defensive operation with a focus on Eastern Slavonia, and auxiliary forces comprising the Papuk OG in Western Slavonia and the Sinj OG on the Drniš – Vrlika axis. For the offensive engagement, the Sinj OG would probably cooperate with the Livno OG from the territory of Republika Srpska.
Artillery support for the Papuk OG would be provided by the 16th mabr /mixed artillery brigade/, and for the Sinj OG by the Split Military District KAG /corps artillery group/.

Air support:
The air force would be used to neutralise and destroy surface-to-surface rocket systems, anti-aircraft defence rocket systems, the Udbina airport, the KAG and armoured-mechanised formations. Focus of air support in Western Slavonia.
Duration of the operation 4-5 days.

3rd phase – Offensive operations with radical objective:

Croatia would probably resort to realisation of this phase of the aggression following a failure to achieve its goals in the second phase, and with the backing and support of the US and FRG.

Croatia's likely aim in this phase of the aggression would be: rout parts of the SVK on the Lika-Kordun part of the front line, destroy them part by part, and then, by putting the captured area under its control, cut the RSK territory to pieces and thus create favourable conditions to set up a "loyal" government in the RSK, and in this way reintegrate the Krajina into the internationally recognised Croatian borders.
The offensive operation with a radical objective and defence on the other parts of the front line would most likely be carried out in the zone of Sveti Rok, Donji Lapac, Šturlić, Mrežnica river, with a grouping of the main forces along the Ogulin – Slunj – Rakovica – Tržac axis, and the auxiliary forces on the general axes of Otočac – Plitvice Lakes (Korenica) and Gospić – Udbina.
By means of a helicopter assault in the general sector of Rakovice and the village of Podlapača, and in cooperation with the forces of the 5th Corps of the Army of the BH Muslim-Croat federation from the direction of Tržačka Raštela – Rakovica, the likely objective of the aggression in the first stage would be to take control of the Slunj – Rakovice – Babin Potok – Ljubovo – village of Ploče line, and then in the second stage, by introducing fresh troops, link up with the 5th Corps of the Army of the BH Muslim-Croat forces and come out to the upper course of the Una river.

In defensive operations it would probably focus on Eastern Slavonia, south of Zagreb and on Ravni Kotari, with the objective of preventing a breakthrough of the forces of the 11th Corps and the VJ /Army of Yugoslavia/ towards Western Slavonia and the 15th and 17th Corps towards Zadar and Šibenik.
Expect the use of chemical weapons.
Duration of the operation 10-15 days.

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4) In case of a failure by the international community to convince and force the Croatian leadership to accept an extension of the UNPROFOR mandate, expect the engagement of NATO forces to secure the withdrawal of the UN units.

For the operation to secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, NATO would probably use a multinational mobile air force from Belgium, Canada, the UK, and armoured mechanised units of the 3rd mechanised division from the US and countries whose units are on the territory under UN control.

Likely axes of engagement: Zagreb – Okučani; Karlovac – Velika Kladuša – Cazin; Ogulin – Slunj – Bihać; Gospić – Udbina; Zadar – Obrovac – Gračac, and Šibenik – (Sinj) – Knin.

In the course of the operation the use of force and protection from air space cannot be ruled out.

2. OUR FORCES

The conduct and activities of the advocates of a war option to resolve the problems caused by the break-up of the former SFRY /Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ both on the territory of the former BH and in relations between the RSK and the RH require the highest readiness of all government organs and organisations, and in particular the Serbian Army of Krajina. With this in mind, the Serbian Army of Krajina has the following task:

Group along axes and features on RSK territory with the task of preventing surprise aggression, averting the take-over of vital features on the territory by means of persistent defence, thus preventing further incursions along the axes of attack of the Croatian army, in readiness to liberate the occupied territory and capture the largest possible Croatian territory inhabited by Serbs through strong counteroffensives along /?special/ axes.

The defence and counteroffensive are to be carried out in joint action between parts of the VJ and VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/ and volunteer formations.

Operationalisation of tasks:

a) In an aggression with a limited objective:

With the forces of the SVK along the enemy's axes of attack, decisively defend axes and features, and switch to attack with the main forces along selected axes, and take control of terrain and features of particular importance to the enemy for the purpose of capturing the largest possible terrain and reclaiming earlier occupied territory.

Command post in the sector of Knin.
Forward command post in the Petrova Gora sector.

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b) In an aggression with a radical objective:

Through a maximum use of all state resources, persistent defence and active combat operations, the Serbian Army of Krajina in joint action with parts of the VRS and the VJ shall prevent the capture of territory and defend the integrity of the RSK.
Prepare and carry out active combat operations in the areas of Central Dalmatia, between the rivers Kupa and Mrežnica, and Eastern Slavonia. Focus on cutting off connections and communications between Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia.

Command post in the Petrova Gora sector.
Forward command post in the sector of Knin.

3. In case of a general attack by the RH army against the RSK, the VJ shall fulfil the obligations it has pursuant to the Vance Plan by employing units and gathering volunteers from the area of the FRY. The main reporting centre is located in Belgrade (Bubanj Potok) in the area of responsibility of the 1st Army Command, through which all contact is to be made.

The VRS shall defend the area and carry out active combat operations towards the Corridor, Cazin Krajina and in Livanjsko Polje, thus tying up parts of the HVO and the Muslim army and preventing their engagement against the RSK.

! **4. I DECIDED** in coordination with the government organs and organisations, and in joint action with the units of the RSK MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, parts of the VRS and the VJ, prevent the destruction of the SVK, and the break up and occupation of RSK territory by means of decisive defence and the use of various types of armed combat in order to preserve territorial integrity.

a) In an aggression with a limited objective:

- In case of an HV aggression against the RSK, using decisive defence along the enemy's axes of attack and active combat operations on the other axes and focusing on Eastern Slavonia, Kordun and Dalmatia, reclaim the territory lost earlier, prevent the cutting off of smaller parts of the RSK, inflict losses, stretch out his forces, and through artillery and rocket strikes against selected targets on the territory of the RH act deterringly on the RH and make it drop its aggression with a radical objective. In this way preserve the state's territorial integrity, creating the conditions for further negotiations towards the recognition of the RSK.

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b) In an aggression with a radical objective:

- Using decisive defence, from the outset do not allow deep incursions by the enemy along the axes of attack and the break up of the RSK territory, while at the same time, with the use of the VJ in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, inflict tangible losses on the enemy, crush the attack and create conditions for offensive operations.
After taking the initiative, switch to offensive operations in Eastern Slavonia, Kordun and Central Dalmatia, cut off parts of the RH territory in the area of Eastern Slavonia, Gorski Kotar and Central Dalmatia, thus linking up the SVK and RS forces, prevent communication and contact with the central part of the RH and regular supplies to Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia, and in this way obstruct the further planned use of the OS /Armed Forces of the/ RH. In the other areas carry out active defensive combat operations.
In this way create favourable conditions for the further and final resolution of the question of the Serbian people. In case of an entirely unfavourable development of the situation in the theatre, continue action and switch to appropriate forms of armed combat and resistance.

Carry out the operation in two stages:

- In the first stage – using decisive defence preserve the territorial integrity of the RSK, prevent surprises and the cutting off of parts of the territory, stretch out the enemy's forces, inflict losses and create conditions for offensive action. Duration of this stage: 15-20 days.

- In the second stage – after taking the initiative, through offensive combat operations and in joint action with the forces of the VJ and the VRS, destroy the Ustasha forces on the axes of attack in the area of Eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia, Gorski Kotar, and create conditions for further offensive action in order to establish control and prevent communication and supply of the armed forces and the RH population in the area of Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia.
Duration of this stage: 10-15 days.

Readiness for the first stage immediately, and for the second following detection of positive indicators of an HV aggression with a radical objective against the RSK.

Group the forces in an operational disposition as follows:
- Defence forces,
- Forces for active combat operations and infiltration,
- PDB /anti-sabotage combat/ forces,
- Selected target strike forces,
- Support and anti-aircraft defence forces,
- Forces for territory control, protection of features and sabotage-terrorist group combat, and forces for the defence of populated areas,
- Forces for rapid reaction and prevention of desertion.

The basic command post in the sector of Knin, and the forward command post in the Petrova Gora sector.

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5. UNIT TASKS

5.1. – 11th Corps:

In an aggression with a limited objective in the 1st stage of the operation, using decisive defence in Baranja, prevent incursions of Ustasha forces, and switch to offensive action in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, block Osijek and Vinkovci, and on the Mirkovci – Županja axis create a bridgehead on the Andrijaševci – Pritoka – Otoka territory.

In the 2nd stage of the operation, from the bridgehead created earlier, switch to offensive action with the main forces along the Privlaka – Županja axis, and with the auxiliary forces along the village of Mirkovci – Babina Greda and Nijemci – Posavski Podgajci axes, with the task of destroying the Ustasha forces along the axes of attack, cooperating with VRS forces in routing and destroying Ustasha forces in the general Orašje sector, coming out onto the Sava river and securing the Corridor from the north. In the further course of operations, rout the cut off forces in the general Spačva Forest sector, and switch to defence along the Gradište – Štitor line.

Be prepared to repel a counterattack by Ustasha forces.
Support: AF and PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/.
Command post: Vukovar.

5.2. – 18th Corps:

In all circumstances, using decisive defence, prevent an incursion of Ustasha forces into the Corps' defence zone, focusing on the Novska – Okučani, Nova Gradiška – Okučani and Pakrac – Okučani axes.
Support: VRS AF and PVO.
Command post: Okučani.

5.3. – 39th Corps:

Through a persistent defence in cooperation with the 21st and 18th Corps, in all circumstances prevent an incursion of Ustasha forces on the Glinska Poljana – Glina, village of Farkašić – Petrinja – Dvor, Sunja – Kostajnica – Dvor axes, with the following task: rout and destroy enemy forces and as far as the Dvorište – Hrastovica (grid reference 415) – Hrvatski Čantić – Dejanović - grid reference 262 – Šamarice line crush the enemy attack and create conditions for offensive action.

In the further course of operations, regroup the forces and switch to counterattack, rout the Ustasha forces along the axes of operations on the Kupa and Sava rivers and switch to defence.
Support: 2nd AG /Artillery Group of the/ GŠ /Main Staff of the/ 105th vbr /? Air Force Brigade/, VRS AF and PVO.
Command post in the Šamarica sector.

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5.4. – 21st Corps:

Through persistent defence in cooperation with the 39th and 15th Corps, in case of an aggression with a limited objective in the first stage of the operation, prevent an incursion of Ustasha forces on the Gradac – Lasinja – Vrgin Most, Karlovac – Vojnić and Generalski Sto – Slunj axes with the following task: through persistent defence, draw out and destroy the enemy forces and prevent their further incursion along the main axes.
With a part of the forces be prepared for: PDB, "persistent" and decisive defence against the forces of the 5th Corps and flank action against enemy forces holding the salient.
During the second stage of the operation, have the free forces prepared for offensive action along the Vojnić – Banjsko Selo line where they are to come out onto the Mrežnica River and switch to active defence.
Keep the focus on the Generalski Sto – Slunj – Rakovica axis.
Support: 1st and 2nd AG GP /expansion unknown/, SVK AF and PVO.
Command post in Vojnić, forward command post in Slunj.

5.5. – 15th Corps:

Using persistent defence in joint action with the 21st and 7th Corps prevent an incursion of Ustasha forces on the Ogulin – Plaški – Plitvice Lakes, Otočac – Vrhovine – Korenica, Perušić – Bunić – Udbina and Gospić – Medak – Gračac axes with the following task: through persistent defence prevent flank action and the taking of Kapela and Mt. Velebit and the town of T. /expansion unknown/ Grad, and further infiltration along selected axes, while stretching out the enemy forces and inflicting maximum losses in personnel, materiel and equipment.
Make a move on the focal point that emerges and switch to counter-attack, and destroy Ustasha forces holding the salient.
Keep a part of the forces in readiness for PDB and defence towards the 5th Corps.
Support: AG VBR /multiple rocket launcher/, SVK AF and PVO.
Command post in Korenica.

5.6. – 7th Corps:

In an aggression with a limited objective in the first stage of the operation, prevent the incursion of Ustasha forces through decisive defence along the Zadar – Benkovac – Knin, Šibenik – Drniš – Knin and the Sinj – Vrlika – Knin axes, and on Mt. Velebit, and with a part of the forces switch to active operations and reclaim territory captured earlier.
In the second stage continue with the defence, regroup troops and through offensive action on the Šibenik – Biograd na moru stretch, come out to the sea and fortify the lines reached. Furthermore, be prepared for offensive action.
Support: 105th vbr and VRS AF and PVO.
Command post: Knin.

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5.7. – AF and PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/:

In the aggression by the HV against the RSK, with all forces of the SVK AF and PVO in joint action with the VRS AF and PVO and the VJ AF and PVO, carry out PVO combat operations /? against/ important features on the territory and SVK groups, and /provide/ air support to SVK forces in the defence of important SVK axes and sectors.

(1) 45th battalion VOJIN:

Monitors the air space from the main radar positions and provides information about the enemy to users through the Main Staff and corps operations centres, in the standard way and in the automation system.
Be prepared to occupy reserve radar positions.

(2) 44th rbr /? Rocket Brigade/:

- The 1st rd /rocket battalion/ is to carry out PVO operations in the deployment area of the 39th Corps' command post, and following the HV aggression against the RSK, and once the conditions are created, carry out strikes against important features and enemy forces on the ground.

- Target the enemy's attack aviation with SS /? medium self-propelled/ z. /expansion unknown/ batteries along the most likely axes of attack and action against the Udbina airport and the Petrova Gora command post's /? surface-to-surface/ artillery and rocket unit.

(3) 105th vbr /? Air Force Brigade/:

- By means of air reconnaissance, gather information about grouping and enemy forces on roads, as well as its reserves in the /? border/ area.

- With fighter and bomber aviation provide fire support to the SVK in the defence and along the enemy's main axes of attack.
Following enemy action, and after the Udbina airport is rendered inoperative, carry out airfield manoeuvres by flying to the Petrovac, Banja Luka and Glamoč airfields.

- With combat helicopters in the corps zones carry out anti-armour combat operations along the most vulnerable axes of attack of the enemy's armoured and mechanised forces.

- With transport helicopters transfer and evacuate wounded personnel, reinforcement troops, materiel and equipment in the theatre.

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Number of sorties: - 2-4 sorties by reconnaissance and fighter-bomber aircraft
- 4-6 sorties of NH /expansion unknown/ and
- 4-6 sorties of TreHe /transport helicopters/

Command post: Udbina airport.

(4) Combat against helicopters:

In case of a helicopter assault, all forces in the air and on the ground shall fire at the target in order to break it up and destroy it.

(5) Air support:

Air fire support of the 18th Corps is provided by VRS AF and PVO, while the VJ AF and PVO provide air fire support to the 11th Corps, as per a separate plan.

5.8. – Artillery:

1) ARG /Army Rocket Group of the/ Main Staff (R-65) from the Petrova Gora sector shall neutralise personnel and weapons at the Lučko airfield with 2 rocket strikes, and then be prepared to target the Črnomerac training centre and the *4. Juli* barracks in Zagreb and the Duboki Jarak military depot near Sesvete.
Target the Logorište depot and barracks with 2 rocket strikes.
Furthermore, be prepared to provide support to the free troops under the command of the SVK Main Staff and /act/ in accordance with developments.
Command post in the Petrova Gora sector.

2) Main Staff AG VBR (*Orkan* /Hurricane/), group commander, SLR-262 mm /expansion unknown/ weapons commander.
Firing position in the general Korenica sector.

T a s k s:

- Prevents the organised introduction of enemy reserves on the following axes: Vrbovsko – Ogulin – Oštarije – Slunj and Oštarije – Plaški – Plitvička Jezera; Otočac – Vrhovine and Gospić – Medak – Gračac.
Furthermore, be prepared to strike against sectors and axes depending on developments.

3) 1st Main Staff AG comprising: 75th mabr /mixed artillery brigade/ (-2). Group commander – commander of the 75th mabr.
Firing position in the Cvitović, Slunj, Mali Vuković sector.

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T a s k s:

- Prevents a fast incursion of enemy forces along the Oštarije – Tržić –Slunj and Babina Gora – Obljajac – Zbjeg - Rakovica axes.

- Prevents the incursion of 5th Corps forces along the Tržička Raštela – Kršlja – Rakovica and Bugar – Dreznik Grad – Rakovac axes.

- Neutralise the enemy artillery in the general Oštarije sector.

- Support the counter-attack by 21st Corps forces on the Slunj – Primišlje axis.

- Be prepared to support the forces for anti-landing combat in the general Rakovica sector.

Command post in the Cvitović sector; maintain a line of observation posts on the Donje Primišlje – Primišlje line and in the Rakovica sector.

4) 2nd Main Staff AG comprising: 2nd /battalion of the/ /75th mabr. Group commander – commander of the 2nd bad /? battery of the artillery battalion/ – 130 mm.
Firing position in the Slavsko Polje, Podgorje, Pješćanica sector.

T a s k s:

- Support the defence of the forces of the 19th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ along the Donja Kupčina – Sjeničak – Vrginmost axis and the 11th pbr along the Karlovac – Tušilović – Vojnić axis.

- Support the attack of the 11th pbr along the Vukmanić– Goljak – Duga Resa and Vojnić – Velemerić axes.

- Support the defence of the 24th pbr along the Slatina – Vidoševac – Glina axis.

Furthermore, be prepared to support the forces of the 21st and 39th Corps according to a special plan.
Command post in the Vrginmost sector, and a line of observation posts along the Skokovac – Popović Brdo – Tušilović line.

5) ANTI-ARMOUR COMBAT
Focus anti-armour combat and defensive engineering work in Eastern Slavonia, Western Srem, Baranja, Western Slavonia, and in the 7th Corps area of responsibility along the Zadar – Benkovac – Knin axis.

6) Organisation of groupings and the use of artillery for support and anti-armour artillery and identification of operational focus – pursuant to the Corps Commander's decision.

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5.9. – Armoured mechanised units:

Engage armoured and mechanised units on tank-accessible axes on the focal point of the defence. Keep the armoured battalion and mechanised battalion in reserve as a manoeuvre force for active operations and combat with the VD /? airborne division/ in the corps area of responsibility, and, if needed, in the general RSK area.

Engage units at the level of tank company and mechanised company for active combat operations in the brigades' zones pursuant to the brigade commanders' decisions, and also in the general corps' area of responsibility as needed. Ensure the correct use of armoured mechanised units, and make sure to establish firm coordinated action by tanks and infantry.

5.10. – Reception and use of volunteers:

At a time of an imminent threat of war, the Serbian Army of Krajina is to be reinforced with volunteers from the territory of the FRY, RS, with Serbs from the diaspora and volunteers from other countries. The reinforcement can be carried out individually, when volunteers are deployed in establishment units in accordance with their military occupational speciality and skills, and complete units from group/crew to brigades of various types.
Volunteer units are to be put under the command of the SVK units.

The *Bubanj Potok* training centre under the command of the 1st VJ Army is designated for the preparation and dispatch of volunteers and volunteer units from the territory of the FRY.
The Erdut training centre and the *Alfa* NC /training centre/ in Bruška is designated for the reception of volunteers and volunteer units on the territory of the RSK. The command of 11th Corps (for the Erdut centre) and the command of the 7th Corps (for the *Alfa* NC) shall carry out all necessary preparations for the reception of volunteers and volunteer units, their preparation and dispatch to the Serbian Army of Krajina for combat use. Complete preparations by late February 1995.
The Main Staff of the SVK is responsible for establishing cooperation with the *Bubanj Potok* NC through the command of the 1st VJ Army and the VJ Main Staff.

Dispatch all volunteers from the territory outside the RSK to the aforementioned centres.
The SVK Main Staff shall prepare Instructions for the Reception and Use of Volunteers in the SVK by late February 1995 and send it to the corps and brigade/regiment commands.

5.11. – Defence of towns and larger populated areas:

In the defence zones of the corps and brigades immediately begin preparations of larger populated areas and towns for long-term and circular defence, and focus on defensive engineering work and the preparation of solid structures for firing action and the protection of personnel and materiel.

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Engage the entire able-bodied population, Civilian Protection units, SVK command and units in the preparation.
Focus on the preparation of towns and populated areas on the front lines and the preparation of the town of Knin, for which a command and defence units shall be established separately.

6. SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

6.1. Moral and psychological support:

Focus moral and psychological support on creating the conviction among all members of the SVK that the defence of the Serbian cause and the Serbian people in this area is a historic task, and that the unification of the entire Serbian people, which can only be achieved through the struggle of each individual, depends on its realisation.
By means of continuous and timely information point out and expose propaganda by the aggressor.
Through the mass media, by means of informative propaganda activity, secure the support of unified public opinion.

In raising morale, use the combat traditions of the Serbian people throughout history, and incorporate the Serbian Orthodox Church to develop and foster the Orthodox faith and raise the spiritual awareness of the SVK.

From the very outset take vigorous measures against everybody who jeopardises the defence system through his/her conduct by setting up summary court martials and using units for the prevention of desertion.

6.2. Intelligence support:

Focus on monitoring indicators of possible aggression, gathering intelligence information about the military and political situation in the immediate surrounding and measures, activities and steps pursued by the Croatian army regarding direct war preparations for an aggression against the RSK.

Employ the intelligence centre and sub-centres for gathering information about the intentions, grouping of troops, likely axes of use and engagement of forces and start time of the aggression.

Through reconnaissance work gather information about the disposition of units, the firing positions of the enemy artillery and rocket units, and other elements of the enemy's combat order in direct contact.

6.3. Security support:

All units in the zone shall take protective measures of combat formation elements and establish cooperation with subjects and forces of protection in the zone of operations.

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Pay particular attention to maintaining the secrecy of decisions and plans on unit use, and protect command posts and deployment sectors of artillery and rocket systems.

Through command measures thwart enemy attempts to spread rumours, cause panic, fear and other forms of propaganda and subversion.

Engage security organs primarily in uncovering and preventing intelligence, reconnaissance and sabotage activity.

Military Police units shall be used for tasks of direct security of the command post and the unit commanders on the spot and when moving, for traffic regulation and control, and the fight against infiltrated special Ustasha forces.

6.4. Engineering support:

Focus engineering support on fortification and defensive engineering work along the axes of operation of the corps main forces.
With the fortification 2nd and 3rd degree of protection is to be accomplished. For defensive engineering work, in addition to mines and other explosive devices, use the natural advantages of the land and local material to a maximum. Open passages in minefields manually and with minesweeper tanks.
On selected axes train the necessary obstacle construction group and mobile obstacle construction group up to the strength of platoon in order to prevent rapid enemy incursions.
Provide special purpose mines and explosives for operations by the aforementioned groups.
Extend existing minefields and lay down new ones according to tactical conditions and unit tasks. Set up two or three lines of anti-armour minefields along the main axes of defence.
Focus the maintenance of communications on the main roads and corps units points of convergence. Keep all pontoon and floating devices prepared at all times in order to bridge rivers and canals.
Use private and public transport companies and equipment as well as other specialised organisations for engineering support tasks in an organised and systematic fashion.

Pay full attention to camouflaging movements, units, equipment and features, and for this purpose use various camouflage methods and procedures.

6.5. PNHBOb /Anti-Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defence/

Focus PNHBOb along the axes of engagement of the SVK main forces and corps and formation of support forces, command post and sectors for PDB.
Take general measures with your own forces and equipment in the zones where combat operations are being carried out by focusing on:

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a) In defence – on chemical and biological surveillance, NB /? nuclear and biological/ reconnaissance, setting up of fortification features and adjusting natural features for protection from chemical and biological weapons, reporting about chemical and biological danger, the use of establishment equipment for protection and decontamination, a final decontamination of people and materiel, permanent water and food checks for toxic components, a physical check of accumulated war booty that indicates the presence of chemical and biological weapons, and the establishment of a service for checking and protection on contaminated surfaces and buildings.

b) In attack – on chemical and biological surveillance, the establishment of a service for checking and protection, inspection and control of contaminated soil and features, permanent maintenance of combat contact with the enemy, the use of personal and local means of protection and decontamination, and the primary decontamination of personnel, materiel and equipment at the level of company/battery and battalion.

Immediately pull out units that become contaminated with long-term poison gas (Mustard, Soman) from combat and perform complete decontamination, replace contaminated clothes with new clothes from the unit's reserve, which should be provided for in the replenishment plans.

Report on chemical and biological risk through priority links of command, joint action and cooperation with the observation and reporting service in the units' areas of responsibility.

By issuing tasks to troops for infiltration and active combat operations emphasise the tasks of chemical and biological reconnaissance and alertness in handling war booty that could be contaminated.

Give priority to support forces and the PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/ and forces for active operations and infiltration when issuing equipment for nuclear, biological and chemical defence.

The corps and independent brigade commands shall establish cooperation with the Civilian Protection municipal staffs and the municipal observation and reporting centres, and regulate issues relating to the use of chemical and biological decontamination facilities, analysis of causes /as printed, maybe: samples/ of contaminated material, food and water, and exchange of information of chemical and biological issues on a priority basis.

Use the units for nuclear, chemical and biological defence in the corps and the brigades for chemical and biological observation, reconnaissance and decontamination of the main axes of attack and defence, support forces, large armoured and mechanised groups, command posts, communications centres, PDB rooms and key roads.

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6.6. Logistics support

Organise logistics support through the logistics units and institutions of the SVK Main Staff and the corps, making use of the Republic's commodity reserves, the capacities of the RSK territory, special sources of supply, and war booty.

The corps commands are responsible for the organisation and functioning of logistics support in their areas of responsibility. In addition to establishment units, have all attached units and reinforcement units, including RSK MUP forces and volunteer units in logistics support.

The reinforcement of RSK units with materiel shall be done through corps bases relying on the 75th Main Staff PoB /Logistics Base/.

The use of materiel shall be authorised by the SVK Main Staff, and the use of the Republic's commodity reserves for the needs of the SVK shall be processed through the RSK VK /Supreme Command/.

Through the competent RSK departments ensure the expeditious import of critical strategic raw materials, fuel, ammunition, spare parts, medicines and other materiel.

Carry out logistics support in two stages.

In the first stage focus on supporting the units on the focal point of defence and supporting the forces for anti-armour combat, PVO and PDB, and in the second stage the forces for active combat operations and counterattack.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION

In the first stage of the operation the command post shall be in the sector of Knin, in operation from D-5 hours; in the second stage of the operation in the Petrova Gora sector.
PKM /? alternate command post/ in the sector of Knin.
Organise communication according to the communication plan.
Send regular reports every day by 2000 hours with the situation at 1700 hours, and interim reports as needed.

SVK SUPREME COMMANDER
/signed/

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Translation 03088969

NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE SECRET – R
***IRON*- ANNEX**
Enclosure no. _____
Copy no. _____

A N N E X

TO THE PLAN OF USE OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA

The annex amends the Plan of Use of the Serbian Army of Krajina in the event of possible use of VJ units in the area of Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem.

TASK OF THE 11TH CORPS

Scale: 1:200,000 Pečuj, Osijek, Doboj, Tuzla

The 11th Corps with OG /operations group/-2 (18th and 138th mtbr /motorised brigade/, 453rd and 1st okbr /armoured brigade/, 51st mbr /mechanised brigade/, 16th mtbr, 12th mpoad /mixed anti-tank artillery battalion/, 1st /battalion of the/ 240th PVO ssrp /medium self-propelled air defence rocket regiment/ and 155th lpbr /light infantry brigade/)

- In an aggression with a limited objective in the 1st stage of the operation, through decisive defence in Baranja, prevent incursions of Ustasha forces, and switch to offensive operations in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, block Osijek and Vinkovci, and on the Mirkovci – Županja axis create a bridgehead on the Andrijaševci – Pritoka – Otoka territory.

In the 2nd stage of the operation, from the bridgehead created earlier, switch to offensive operations with the main forces along the Privlaka – Županja axis, and with the auxiliary forces along the village of Mirkovci – Babina Greda and Jamena – Vrbanja Podgajci axes, with the task of destroying the Ustasha forces along the axes of attack, cooperating with the VRS forces in routing and destroying the Ustasha forces in the general Orašje sector, coming out onto the Sava river and securing the Corridor from the north. In the further course of operations, rout the cut off forces in the general Spačva Forest sector, and switch to defence along the Ivankovo – Babina Greda line.

Be prepared to repel a counterattack by Ustasha forces.
Support: AF and PVO and 16th mtbr.
Command post: Vukovar.

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ANNEX 139:

LETTER FROM COLONEL RADE RAŠETA, 6 JANUARY 1995

0294-4245-0294-4252-ET/Translation

T4-051-VD-04 /handwritten/
2

? ARMY OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MAIN STAFF
SECURITY DEPARTMENT
?HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL no. 191-3
0601…1995

/stamp plus handwritten/

Mr General!

Today, November 9 1994, in the composition of part of the command of the Main Staff /GŠ/of the Army of Serbian Krajina /SVK/, part of the Security Department /or Security Section; OB/ together with the Chief went to the Forward Command Post of the Main Staff /IKM GŠ/ and deployed in an empty house in Korenica, away from the deployment areas of the other organs of the command.

Of the /members of the / OB GŠ SVK the following were engaged in this assignment, in addition to the Chief: Colonel/s/ Rade RAŠETA, Nikola ŠUPUT and Lt. Col. Damjan PRLIĆ, Lt. Stanko LONČAREVIĆ, Staff Sergeant Aleksandar VOJNOVIĆ and Veljko DRČA.

The objective of engaging the OB stemmed from the plan of engagement of the command of the GŠ – the "Pauk /Spider/" activity.

On November 10 in the evening when Col. SMILJANIĆ returned from KORDUN, he called me to see him in his office and in a panicky tone informed me that in Kordun a parallel IKM was being set up, at which there were Major-General Mile NOVAKOVIĆ, Colonel (retired) Čedo BULAT as NŠ /Chief of Staff/, Mihajlo KNEŽEVIĆ as Security and Intelligence organ, Jovica STANIŠIĆ representing the Republic of Serbia and some other retired active servicemen and members of MUP.

He was particularly concerned at the arrival of STANIŠIĆ and his inclination towards, to he says, a parallel IKM in Kordun. Then he had some direct contact with STANIŠIĆ from which he concluded that he is very hot-tempered, rash, stops at nothing, and claims that the president of Serbia S. MILOŠEVIĆ stands behind everything he says.

SMILJANIĆ openly expressed his doubt that the formation of a parallel IKM in Kordun meant the taking over of the functions of the Main Staff of the Army of Serbian Krajina from the commandant together with his adjutants.

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His attitude to Lt. Col. KNEŽEVIĆ was one of resignation, saying that he had betrayed him.

He also told me, that STANIČIĆ had informed him directly that he was to transfer to Kordun for this campaign, which he had refused and said that he had to be at the main IKM of the Main Staff in Korenica.

The same evening, SMILJANIĆ, in my presence, got in touch by telephone with the commandant of the SVK General ČELEKTIĆ, briefly informed him of the state of affairs in Kordun, and arranged for the two of them definitely to meet.

SMILJANIĆ went off to this meeting, I do not know where, but on November 11 in the morning he told me that the IKM in Kordun would be subordinate to the IKM in Korenica.

On November 11 in the evening, the president of the RSK /Republic of Srpska Krajina/ M. MARTIĆ arrived in Korenica, which we learned of after the return of SMILJANIĆ, from his briefing. In this he endeavoured to give the impression that all of them in the Main Staff were surprised because he had not announced the visit.

I think that MARTIĆ came to the IKM of the Main Staff of SVK at the suggestion of SMILJANIĆ, with which he had acquainted the commandant of the SVK, purely so that MARTIĆ through his presence should indicate to the public that the main IKM was in KORENICA after all and not in Kordun.

MARTIĆ at once dressed in battledress and was quartered in a villa at Plitvice.

The next day (November 13) in the morning, at the IKM of the Main Staff of the SVK MARTIĆ set up a meeting with the leaders of Action Pauk to which Generals NOVAKOVIĆ and Jovica STANIŠIĆ had been invited and took part. According to what SMIJANIĆ said, MARTIĆ let everyone know that the IKM of the Supreme Command was in Korenica and that all activities stemmed from this command, and that all the other people taking part had to answer to it. Allegedly, NOVAKOVIĆ and STANIŠIĆ stood up for this.

However, in practice, completely different things are going on. The reports that NOVAKOVIĆ and STANIŠIĆ send daily to the IKM of the GS of VK (I am speaking of the report of the security and intelligence organ in their command – Lt. Col. KNEŽEVIĆ) are superficial, generalised and in some things confusing.

For example, they processed about 150 deserters and prisoners from the ranks of the 5th Corps, sent several recruited sources and IG (Reconnaissance Groups) that had properly carried out their assignments to the territory of C./azinska/ Krajina, but without writing a word about this, or reporting on it in any other way.

The background to this is very clear, as is the resulting state of affairs that can occur in war conditions. To make it simple, in all these games human life is worth the least, because it is obvious that the IKM at Petrova Gora does not care about the operations of our forces, which fired from the Lika war zone on the C. Krajina.

On the same day, in Željava (the barracks of the air force base of Bihać), President MARTIĆ, after a plan of his own, together with General ČELEKETIĆ, inspected the unit of the self-styled Major MEDIĆ aka /?Buca/ who with his 200 men had come from E. Slavonia from securing the facilities at Đelekovci as volunteers.

As well as the matters dealt with in our telegram, Highly Confidential. r. 1-13 of November 12 1994, relating directly to MARTIĆ, SMILJANIĆ did not allow the following exact facts to be put into the report:

I give in its entirety the matter that did not get put into the report, and that was written by Col. Nikola ŠUPUT, who was an on-the-spot eyewitness.

"Only the soldiers of MEDIĆ were drawn up to await the President of the State and the Commandant of the SVK, while the others (about 1000 soldiers) watched the "grand welcome of the President" from behind corners and from the balconies of the surrounding buildings. The other combatants catcalled at MARTIĆ and ČELEKETIĆ: "How aren't you ashamed to be inspecting thieves, black-marketeers and profiteers (meaning the MEDIĆ unit) and give them recognition. Mr President, don't you see that the men are watching you from behind the corners and from the balconies, afraid of your elite units that are providing you security (meaning MARTIĆ's men from his escort)."

This kind of reaction from many was the product of their party commitment (SDS) and the unacceptability of MARTIĆ in this setting, and they were just looking for some reason to compromise him.

Immediately after this incident, SMILJANIĆ said that I should insert into the telegram the conclusion that MARTIĆ had gained in reputation and had strengthened his political office.

To do with the truthfulness of the information that we dealt with in our telegram Highly Confidential no. 1-9 of November 12 1994, which relates to the circumstances and causes of the semi-encirclement of some of our units (mb. 103 lbr /motorised battalion, light brigade/) in the Bihać war zone.

As compared with the telegram in which this combat action was dealt with, the following is the truth:

In the liberation of V. and M. SKOČAJ (SO Bihać) units of the *mb*/103rd *lbr* and a battalion from the 18th Corps, whose commandant is Reserve Captain Zoran MIŠČEVIĆ, whom we early reported on concerned with crime, took part.

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During the incursion of the *mb* into these two villages, the standard looting of Croatian houses started, so that they unloaded from the APCs all the equipment, soldiers and even ammunition in order to be able to load the loot into them.

Captain MIŠČEVIĆ was unable to put up with all this and he ordered his soldiers to open fire on the criminals from the *mb*, as a result of which there was a general melee and a confused situation that could not be controlled. MIŠČEVIĆ personally ordered a tractor to be fired on with a *Zolj*, and ordered one combatant to fire at a stolen television.

The Turkish side very quickly sized up the situation and the commandant of the 5th Corps personally ordered and commanded, with one intervention unit, which he deployed in the rear of our forces and thus got them half encircled.

One source, an on-the-spot witness says that he had been in an APC from which the commander ordered quite literally everything thrown out, and in place of the standard issues, loaded 6 colour televisions and a barrel of 200 litres full of brandy.

While the unit in the encirclement was engaged in combat, he with his well-versed looting team picked up everything that was of any value (at this time we do not know what the booty was), loaded it all into three TAM-110s and the same evening the commandant of the 18th Corps Colonel Lazo BABIĆ arrived for the said trucks and took them off to W. Slavonia.

Of course, then, the background of MIŠČEVIĆ's arrival at the Lika war zone is clear, as that Col. BABIĆ and General ČELEKETIĆ after him are.

It is certain that this case will not be brought up any more, but if there is anything else, then we shall endeavour operationally to arrive at as detailed information as possible.

SMILJANIĆ is unwilling to order the initiation of an examination of the scene, nor will he allow the chief of OB of the 15th Corps to investigate or document the case.

The more time goes by, the clearer the picture of the formation of the IKM in Kordun becomes, even SMILJANIĆ becoming convinced of it, though much more slowly than we others.

In the meantime the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is in session in Eastern Slavonia, the Interior Minister Ilija PRIJIĆ has been dismissed and the Chief of the Office of the Government of RSK in Belgrade is PRIJIĆ's brother, and so on. This was an opportunity for me to start of a deeper conversation with SMILJANIĆ, since he had claimed that all this would not happen.

In the conversation that I had with him (November 19 and 21) I think (but I do not aver) that SMILJANIĆ was fairly candid and convincing.

For he sincerely recounted several talks with M. MARTIĆ, while he was at the IKM in Korenica, having spent several hours in company with him.

MARTIĆ told SMILJANIĆ that in the RSK there were two trends that the president of Serbia S. MILOŠEVIĆ is in direct contact with. At the head of one such trend is the president of the Government B. MIKELIĆ with his set, and at the head of the other is M. MARTIĆ, who has behind him only the army and part of the Interior Ministry.

MARTIĆ was modest and objective when he said that he and his supporters were feeling the ground slip beneath their feet and that it was just a matter of time before his discharge, and discharges inside GŠ SVK, MUP and so on.

He says that he does not understand the background of all these events. But it is clear that everything that occurs and happens in some course of its own (his election as president of the state, the appointment of MIKELIĆ as prime minister, of ĆELEKETIĆ as Commandant of the SVK and a number of other examples) must be understood as something that is both real and inevitable, and then he is not at all surprised at everything that is happening in Krajina. He concluded that Krajina and its top people would be the way that S. MILOŠEVIĆ says, believing that MILOŠEVIĆ is a Serb, that he is fighting for the Serbian cause and that he cares about the position of the Serbs in Krajina and Repulika Srpska.

On November 21 SMILJANIĆ, after his arrival from the Commandant of the SVK came in angrily and nervously, and since he could not conceal his mood, told me in confidence the following:

That General ČELEKTIĆ had told him that at the next session of the Assembly the matter of his (the general's) responsibility would be raised, because of which he is accused of:
1. Appointing Col. Dušan LONČAR as NGŠ /Chief of Main Staff/ of SVK, when all his close relatives are in Croatia;
2. That one of the brigades has a Croat for its NŠ /Chief of Staff/;
3. Because of his engagement of the SVK in combat with the Muslims, and because of the considerable number of combatants killed and wounded;
4. Because the Commandant of the SVK is not from the territory of the RSK and so on.

If the Commandant of the SVK is discharged, then several organs of the Staff Command would be discharged in consequence, which implies the chief of security as well.

SMILJANIĆ points out that he will soon leave Krajina (he would go at once if it were not for the current b/d /combat operations/), and to replace him the only possible choice would be Col. Simeon MARAVIĆ, the current assistant for KO /command and operation/.

Col. MARAVIĆ is not accepted by anyone in OB, and it is completely clear that the service would collapse.

At the end of November, twice, members of MUP and once a v/o /conscript/ from the 7th Corps on the occasion of returning from the Lika war zone, burst into the building of the Knin Municipal Assembly, firing their guns inside and around the building, harassing the auxiliary staff they found there. All this was done to scare the political representatives of the current authorities from the ranks of SDS Krajina.

When Col. SMILJANIĆ asked OB to have the cases investigated to the bottom and when notes started coming in that President M. MARTIĆ was behind these events, all of a sudden the action was halted, and nothing was made clear about the case.

Around December 1 this year, a special unit of MUP (about 300 of them) were brought to the Plitvice area to take part in combat operations in the Bihać Pocket. At Plitvice, quarters were laid on for them in the Plitvice Hotel. They were in Plitvice about 3 days and during that time they absolutely sacked the hotel, caroused every night and constantly opened fire, did not even make an attempt to get into the fighting, the commandant of the unit (a family friend of MARTIĆ, Dragan KARNA) resigned and all of them went back to Knin /? in separate groups/.

I think that on December 5-6 a session of the Supreme Defence Council was held in Vrginmost, attended by all the members of it (President of the RSK, President of the Government, Commandant of the SVK, Ministers of Interior and Defence in the government of the RSK).

For reasons unknown to us General ČELEKETIĆ left this meeting (SMILJANIĆ knows why, but doesn't want to comment on them), arrived in Plitvice about 2400 hours, where he was actually quartered, packed up his personal stuff and went off to Knin.

SMILJANIĆ too was surprised at this proceeding of ČELEKETIĆ, because he was looking for him the whole day and couldn't get information from anyone, because MARTIOĆ /as written/ was not there either. In conversation with me, SMILJANIĆ commented that something must have happened at the session of the Supreme Defence Council.

In the evening, SMILJANIĆ got hold of the chief of the Office of ČELEKTIĆ, but he didn't want to give him any information at all, except that the Commandant was well but tired and so he could not communicate with parties. This irritated SMILJANIĆ still more, and he replied that if he needed him (meaning, if the Commandant needed him), he could look for him.

In the meantime, SMILJANIĆ was in touch with MARTIĆ by phone, and immediately after that, about 2100 hours, went off to meet him in person.

He came back from MARTIĆ's about 2200 hours, visibly the worse for drink, and at once discreetly told me that ČELEKTIĆ, had gone off like a whore and that he would no longer be commandant, and that MARTIĆ had told him that he (SMILJANIĆ) would take on the duty of Commandant of the SVK. Quite overjoyed, he told me that I should

go with him to his beautifully built family house in Korenica, which I refused discreetly, and then he took Lt. Col. Damjan PRLIĆ with him, assistant chief of KOG, / command of city defence?/ and actually one of the top men who worked only on SMILJANIĆ's private matters.

Before he went, in a polite way I let him know that he would have problems with the corps commandants, since all of them were in general officers' positions and none of them was a general, and particularly because a person from OB SVK was coming in as Commandant. He replied "F..k me if I care, it is not my wish, but that of the president of the state".

On December 6-7 the affair with the arrests of Col. ŠUPUT and Lt. Col. GLEDIĆ went down, concerning which I orally informed you of the reasons of dispute, but even then SMILJANIĆ's main obsession was how to protect MARTIĆ from his responsibility, and not to help the arrested people.

On December 7 SMILJANIĆ came late from a meeting of the Commandant (the Commandant came from Knin that day about 1200 hours) and as soon as he came into my office, right from the doorway, said: "Imagine, he came back this day (meaning ČELEKETIĆ). How long are they going to fool me? For consolation, the Commandant told me to be ready to take the 39th Corps", and then he at once went up to the working map, showed the zone of responsibility of the Corps, talked about its role and purpose, more or less showing that he had already become the commandant of it.

In the meantime he talked with you, but he didn't tell me what about, only on December 9 ordered me not to report to UB GŠ VJ any more. I was surprised and taken aback, but I nevertheless replied to him that I thought this was not right, because only the UB /Internal Security/ was left to us as an escape valve to which we could resort and that wouldn't let us down. This inflamed him still more and he went on: "When has anyone from the UB come in these last four years to see where we are even and what we are doing? How many enactments have they sent us? Aco won't move a finger for my flat, doesn't support me being a general, and I know that if I returned to the FRY he would have me pensioned off," and a number of other things.

In connection with all this, I talked with Lt. Col. Stevo KRESOJEVIĆ, and we were unable to conclude anything but that SMILJANIĆ was a sick person and that his arrival in the Krajina was motivated entirely by /his wish for/ promotion to the rank of general.

After that, a couple of times, I attempted to talk with him about all these circumstances. However, even then he constantly brought up the rank of general, the flat and that he would never stop repenting that he hadn't accepted the duty of Commandant of SVK when MARTIĆ had asked him to.

Many of us from OB did not know, until we came to Korenica for this situation, that back after the arrival of UNPROFOR into this area SMILJANIĆ had arranged to have one

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such team quartered at the house of his brother-in-law Stevo OGNJENOVIĆ, and he personally made sure that Stevo did not have to go through the OB assessment process.

After the bombardment of Udbine Airfield, and when members of the UN on the territory were being exposed to fire, a group of unknown persons entered the OGNJENOVIĆ house and literally looted everything that the UNPROFOR people owned. SMILJANIĆ covered up the affair for a few days, because the same night his brother-in-law had come into his office and informed him that UNPROFOR had been robbed or would be robbed.

On December 11, when he was told by the Commandant of the SVK, that he would go with ŠUPUT and GLEDIĆ to Belgrade to see Jovica STANIŠIĆ to clear up the case about the OB arrest he told me that STANIŠIĆ had called on them to make it up and have a lunch together, that if everything was all right STANIŠIĆ would at once give him the keys to a family flat, and then promotion to the rank of general would certainly follow.

At that moment he started preparations for departure. At first he started by trying to convince ŠUPUT and GLEDIĆ that they had to go and that the case would be settled in their favour, which he managed to do. He told me personally that he would invite the Chief of the UB GŠ VJ to the meeting in order to get cover for the flat assigned to him, because he is scared that you might stand in his way.

On his return from Belgrade, he was not delighted, but still he lived in hopes of being promoted to the rank of general just before the New Year.

On December 16 a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council was held, at which, apart from the rest of the agenda, the list of colonels to be promoted to the rank of general was to be verified. The list was made up of the following colonels: Dušan SMILJANIĆ, Dušan LONČAR, chief of the GŠ SVK and Veljko BOSANAC, commandant of the 21st Corps.

On the day before the meeting of the Council was to be held (December 15) SMILJANIĆ did not conceal that all the relevant political and military factors had informed him that he would be verified for promotion to the rank of general and in the evening put on a big dinner for close friends in his family house.

On December 17, when was informed that the proposal for promotion had not gone through, he fell into a very severe psychological condition (I even thought he was going to do something to himself, and I was with him almost the whole night, until about 0200 hours). He tried to get in touch with ČELEKETIĆ and MARTIĆ on the phone, and some friendly connections, but couldn't get anyone, and this made things worse for him.

In this kind of condition, he at once decided to write a request to be returned to the VJ /Army of Yugoslavia/, which he handed to ČELEKETIĆ on December 18, which the latter agreed to the following day without a word, inviting him and me to his place and informing him that his application had been settled positively, and me that I should take on the duty of Chief of OB.

SMILJANIĆ was convinced that if he were ever to resign his duty, his successor would be Col. Simeon MARAVIĆ, which he had made him a firm promise of. This suited Simo, and he made use of this remark in his work, and quite simply harassed the operational staff with unimportant things.

On December 17 when SMILJANIĆ learned that he had not made it on the list for generals he probably informed Simo that he intended to leave Krajina and that he Simo should be ready to take on the duty, and the very next day in Knin Simo started presenting himself as the new assistant commandant for security matters, even to people outside the composition of the SVK.

Both in front of us OB people and other persons Simo constantly said that if necessary he would stay in Krajina until he was driven out, and in recent times when he and SMILJANIĆ had started calculating about the future successor of SMILJANIĆ, Simo would often say that he would certainly remain in Krajina another 6 months, and probably a full year (i.e., until the end of 1995).

However, when SMILJANIĆ told him that I was taking over the duty from him, Simo said in public that as of December 31 1994 he was leaving Krajina and submitted a written request.

In the meantime (December 19-24) the handover of duties between me and SMILJANIĆ was taking place, but the two of them were constantly in contact, and what is more, were more together than I and SMILJANIĆ were. I do not know what they were talking about or their further plans, but they certainly came down to what they were to do in the future.

Just before his departure, SMILJANIĆ contacted MARTIĆ and told me and ČELEKTIĆ that he would probably be coming back again to Krajina to be appointed chief of National Security in the RSK. I assume that he once again promised Simo some place at the top of this national security he was dreaming about, because on the very same day Simo renewed his application to leave the SVK, putting the last date as January 25 1995, which he tried to justify to me by the need to hand over his duties, which was beyond the point. Thus, up to this time, he was expecting a positive solution of this status – remaining in the SVK.

I would mention that SMILJANIĆ was seen off with dignity and that I was pleasantly surprised. Simo attempted to obtrude himself by holding a speech for the occasion, which he was politely prevented in, but I enclose it to you, because he talks about the personal connection.

SMILJANIĆ took with him an official Audi to take his things, which he asked the SVK Commandant about, and he indicated that he would be able to keep up the connection with me, about which we would come to an agreement.

My plan is to come and see you about January 15 1995 in order to familiarise you with the situation in the service, with the focus on the appointment of the already existent cadres, which I shall inform you in detail about later.

With comradely greetings,

/Stamped signature/
Colonel Rade RAŠETA
/Signed by hand/ Rade RAŠETA

/round rubber stamp/
? ARMY of SERBIAN KRAJINA
MAIN STAFF
SECURITY DEPARTMENT

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ANNEX 140:

RSK, STATE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CAUSES AND MANNER OF THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA, 11 JULY 1995

Draft translation

L0104631

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/hand-written/

Delivered to the President of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ Assembly

19 July 1997 at 1700 hours

/round stamp/

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

STATE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION ON

THE CAUSES AND MANNER OF

THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA

KNIN

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

STATE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION

ON THE CAUSES AND MANNER OF

THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA

Number: _____

Knin, 11 July 1995

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REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC

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THE RSK ASSEMBLY

REPORT

On the causes and manner of the fall of Western Slavonia

Pursuant to the Decision of the RSK Assembly no. 01-02-02-23/1-95 of 18 May 1995, the State fact-finding commission on the causes and manner of the fall of Western Slavonia was established

The following were appointed to the Commission:

1. Slobodan PERIĆ – Minister of the Interior;
2. Col. Slobodan PERIĆ – Commander of the 18th Corps;
3. Borislav BOGUNOVIĆ – vice-president of the RSK Assembly;

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4. Krste ŽARKOVIĆ – member of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/,
5. Lt. Col. Jurica ŠAJATOVIĆ – Chief of the security organ of the 18th Corps.

The task of the Commission was to establish the following:

1. How did Western Slavonia fall?
2. Why did Western Slavonia fall?
3. Who is responsible for the fall of Western Slavonia?

In order to establish the facts and provide answers to the afore-mentioned questions, the Commission requested a report from the following individuals:

1. Milan MARTIĆ – the RSK president;
2. Borislav MIKELIĆ – the prime minister of RSK;
3. Milan ČELEKETIĆ – SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ GŠ /Main Staff/;
4. Rade TANJGA – Minister of defence;
5. Dušan LONČAR – Chief of SVK GŠ;
6. Ilija PRIJIĆ – adviser to the president of the Republic;
7. Aco DRAČA – MUP, DB /State Security/;
8. Nebojša PAVKOVIĆ – deputy minister of the UP /Interior/;
9. Mihajlo KNEŽEVIĆ – GŠ – security service;
10. Ostoja DŽAMBAS – GŠ SVK – liaison;
11. Ratko DOPUĐA – the Udbine airport;
12. Lazo BABIĆ – Colonel, Commander of the 18th Corps;
13. Milan ROMIĆ – Colonel, 18th Corps NŠ /Chief of Staff/;
14. Boro STIJAK – Lt. Col., Chief of 18th Corps OB /General Security/;
15. Stevo BABAC – Lt. Col., Commander of the 54th pbr /infantry brigade/
16. Milanko BABIĆ – Lt. Col., Commander of the 98th pbr;
17. Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ – Lt. Col., Commander of the TG-1 /tactical group/;
18. Branko CRLJENICA – Major, Commander of the 18th MAP /combined artillery regiment/;
19. Milan JEKIĆ – Colonel, 18th Corps PkPo /assistant commander for logistics/;
20. Branko ZEBIĆ – Colonel, Pk /assistant to the commander/ for morale;
21. Zoran MIŠČEVIĆ, Lt. Col., Commander of the 18th BiN /extension unknown/;
22. Stevo LJILJAK – Captain, Commander of the pbr 2/98;
23. Božo KUKAVICA – commander of the Mlaka company from TG-1;
24. Drago VESELINOVIĆ – Secretary of the Okučani SUP /Secretariat of the Interior/;

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25. Stevo KRESOVIĆ – Chief of the Okučani SUP;
26. Nedeljko KOSIĆ – Chief of the Okučani DB squad;
27. Jovo PAPIĆ – officer in charge of defence preparations of the Okučani SUP;
28. Nikola BRUJIĆ – MO /non-commissioned officer/ Okučani;
29. Dragan ČANAK – Chief of the Okučani draft office;
30. Rada KOS – Chief of the Okučani CZ /civilian protection/ staff;
31. Đorđe DAMJANOVIĆ- vice-president of the RSK Assembly;
32. Aran DRAGIČEVIĆ – president of the Okučani SO /Municipal Assembly/;
33. Dušan VITEZ- president of the Western Slavonia OB;
34. Petar BABIĆ – Captain, commander of the 4/54th pbr;
35. Petar DELIBAŠIĆ;
36. Commanders of the 11th and 39th Corps.

Of those requested, the following have not submitted their reports:

1. Ilija PRIJIĆ;
2. Ostoja DŽAMBAS;
3. Milan ROMIĆ;
4. Boro STIJAK;
5. Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ;
6. Zoran MIŠČEVIĆ;
7. Stevo LJILJAK;
8. Božo KUKAVICA;
9. Stevo KRESOVIĆ;
10. Nedeljko KOSIĆ;
11. Jovo PAPIĆ;
12. Nikola BRUJIĆ;
13. Đorđe DAMJANOVIĆ;
14. Dušan VITEZ;
15. Petar DELIBAŠIĆ;
16. Commanders of the 11th and 39th Corps;
17. Aran DRAGIČEVIĆ

The Commission has compiled this report on the basis of the reports /which have been ed/ and the facts established in the field.

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The Commission has been establishing the causes leading to the fall of Western Slavonia on the Serbian side, thereby in no way wishing to diminish the crime Croatia has committed by its aggression on the RSK, i.e. on Western Slavonia.

1. How did Western Slavonia fall?

Pursuant to the Decision by the President of the Republic of 24 April 1995, the motorway was closed down for 24 hours, from 0600 hours on 24 April until 0600 hours on 25 April 1995. War tensions immediately increased and the chief of Croatian negotiating team, Mr. ŠARINIĆ stated that unless the motorway was reopened at 0600 hours on 25 May /as printed/, it was going to be opened by force. The motorway was reopened at 0600 hours on 25 April 1995, and the situation calmed down.

During 25, 26 and 27 April 1995, Western Slavonia was visited by the president MARTIĆ and commander ČELEKETIĆ. They held a number of meetings and public gatherings in which they stated that the situation around the motorway was soon going to become very complicated and that the SVK was ready to protect and defend Western Slavonia and even reclaim a part of the occupied territory. This created a false sense of security among the people, especially in the northern part of Western Slavonia, which later proved to have been an illusion.

On 28 April 1995, our citizen Tihomir BLAGOJEVIĆ was killed with a knife at the petrol station in Gradiška, near the *Slaven* motel (Croatian territory), by a Croat who had grown up with him in the same village. Following this, several citizens of Croatian nationality were killed on the night between 28 and 29 April, on the stretch of the motorway passing through our territory. It is indicative that to this day our state authorities have not established who were the perpetrators of the killings of Croatian citizens on the motorway.

Before the killing of Croatian citizens, the UNCIPOL /United Nations Civilian Police/ informed our authorities that the motorway had been closed at 2105 hours. After this announcement, six Croatian buses and several groups of cars passed on the motorway, which probably served as a Croatian provocation /in order to/ create conditions for a military attack. For that purpose, the already described killing of Croat citizens was probably to serve as a pretext for an attack. The conflict was avoided when all three sides agreed to close the motorway at 2305 hours.

Already on 29 April 1995, a meeting of all three sides was agreed through UNPROFOR /United Nations Protection Force/ and then held at around 1500 hours. UNPROFOR's request to open the motorway the same day was denied by the representative of our police and army, secretary VESELINOVIĆ and commander BABIĆ respectively. On 30 April 1995, contacts with UNPROFOR were restored. General PETERS insisted that the motorway should be opened the same day at around 1300 hours, but BABIĆ and VESELINOVIĆ opposed this again, to which the

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general warned that not opening the motorway presented a great danger for Krajina. At around 1500 hours the same day, contact was established with general KRABO /as printed/ and at 1700 hours our side agreed to opening the motorway at 0600 hours on /illegible/ May. At 1800 hours, UNPROFOR, through its information centre, announced that the motorway was going to be reopened. However, at around 2000 hours, Col. BABIĆ announced that the motorway was not going to be reopened. Following that, at around 2100 hours, the defence minister, Col. TANJGA tried to arrange with general ČELEKETIĆ for the motorway to be opened as agreed. Nevertheless, the general refused any mention of reopening the motorway, claiming that it had been agreed with president MARTIĆ that instead of reopening the motorway, more obstacles should be erected on it.

At the same time, after receiving an oral order from the MUP leadership to remove the barricades and prepare the motorway for re-opening, the police in Okučani were informed by the Command of the 18th Corps that they had received a different order and that the motorway was to remain closed.

According to reports received from the GŠ SVK, the basic problem regarding the re-opening of the motorway on 1 May 1995 was the presence of strong military establishments of HV /Croatian Army/ in the following area: Kutina and Novska; Pakrac; Lipik and Nova Gradiška; and on the following stretches of the motorway: Novska-Okučani; Pakrac-Bijela Stijena-Okučani.

Due to the presence of the HV in these areas, the GŠ SVK ordered that combat readiness be raised to a level allowing quick mobilisation and the transfer of units of the 18th Corps into the area of engagement.

Concurrently with the described events, on 28/29 April the commander of the 18th Corps ordered a total mobilisation in the territory of Western Slavonia. The mobilisation was conducted between 28 and 30 April, with 95-100% success.

According to the report by General LONČAR, NŠ /Chief of Staff/ SVK, due to this situation, the commander of the 18th Corps, Col. Lazo BABIĆ, made the decision to prevent any traffic through the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps. By contrast, Col. BABIĆ had, according to his statement, estimated that the aggression on Western Slavonia would not have happened without the closing of the motorway. Col. BABIĆ maintained that he had insisted that the motorway should be opened, but that he did not get an approval from the GŠ SVK, i.e. that the only orders received from the GŠ, were those not allowing the re-opening of the motorway. The GŠ did not change this position even after UNPROFOR had sent the order to Col. BABIĆ and forwarded it to the GŠ, which read as follows: "Colonel, are you aware of what you are doing by not allowing the re-opening of the motorway, and will you be able to bear the responsibility for the consequences?" The GŠ maintained its position not to re-open the motorway. Mr. MIKELIĆ, the prime minister, had requested Col. BABIĆ to reopen the motorway. /BABIĆ/ then referred him

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/MIKELIĆ/ to the GŠ as only they could order the re-opening. Such order was never received and the motorway remained closed.

Following that, the commander of UNPROFOR in Sector West ordered that the UN personnel be withdrawn to bases from the checkpoints and other locations where, in the event of a conflict, they could be at risk. This withdrawal was carried out between 0100 and 0300 hours of 1 May 1995.

At 2358 hours the same evening, the administration of the 3rd State security department received a dispatch from the Okučani DB Centre, informing the SDB /State Security Service/ that in the village of Dragalić a meeting had been held between the Croatian side and the Nepalese battalion, in which it had been agreed that the Croatian army and police forces would open the motorway by force at 0600 hours of 1 May 1995. This dispatch was immediately delivered to the GŠ SVK, where it was received by the officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel GVOZDENOVIĆ. After reading it, he said that the military authorities in charge were following the situation in Western Slavonia.

The dispatch was personally brought into the GŠ SVK by Đuro TESLA, an operative officer of the SDB, who demanded from the officer in charge, Lieut. Col. GVOZDENOVIĆ to put him in touch with the chief of intelligence department, Lieut. Col. KNEŽEVIĆ, due to the contents and urgency of the dispatch. The officer in charge, however, refused that, claiming that he did not know Lieut. Col. KNEŽEVIĆ, although it was later established beyond doubt that he did know him. According to the statement by General LONČAR, this dispatch arrived at the GŠ SVK in the morning of 1 May and it served as a confirmation of previously collated information regarding the aggression on Western Slavonia.

The decision by our authorities, i.e. GŠ SVK, not to open the motorway served, on the Croatian side, as the immediate cause and justification before the international community for the aggression against the RSK, i.e. Western Slavonia.

The course of the fighting

In the night between 30 April and 1 May 1995, it was observed that the HV and the Croatian MUP transferred numerous forces along the line of deployment at the following locations:

- the villages of Krička, Katolička Šagovina, Gorica, Stari Grabovac, Bročica and Drenov Bok.

The 18th Corps Command and the GŠ SVK were kept abreast of any increase in the number of Croatian forces in these locations.

On the basis of such information, the commander of the 18th Corps sent the following assistants, members of the command, to subordinate units: Col. ZEBIĆ to the command of the 98th

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pbr; Col. ROMIĆ to the command of the 54th pbr; and Col. PERIĆ to the command of the 51st pbr, in order to analyse the situation and assist in commanding. He also sent a military police company to both sides of the motorway.

At around 0530 hours of 1 May, robust Croatian army and police forces commenced the softening-up for an infantry attack, along three axes simultaneously. The softening-up began at the axes of Novska-Rajić, Novska-Jasenovac and Pakrac-Gradiška.

The Novska-Jasenovac axis

The attack along this axis commenced at around 0530 hours, by a softening-up, after which a section of the 125th HV brigade and a section of the special detachment *Lučko* of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ MUP and MUP units from the Sisak-Moslovac county carried out an infantry attack from the Bročice-Jasenovac and Drenov Bok-Jasenovac axes. TG-1, a force which listed 450 soldiers but from which in reality only about 60 were present, was defending Jasenovac. The commander of TG-1 was Lieut. Col. Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ. In the beginning of the attack, he was not in TG-1's zone of responsibility. After HV's artillery activities, the TG-1 did not offer any active resistance to the Croatian forces. Instead, they abandoned the territory of their zone of responsibility straight away and moved onto the territory of RS /Republic of Serbia/, across the Sava river, to the town of Gradina, and no longer took part in any fighting. As our forces had withdrawn without fighting, the Croats entered Jasenovac freely.

The TG-1 sustained no casualties, apart from a soldier who drowned while fording the Sava river. As for weapons, they only pulled out their side arms, and the majority of MTS /material and technical supplies/ (food, vehicles, ammunition, communications) remained in Jasenovac and fell into the hands of the Croatian army. The Croatian forces entered Jasenovac a little before 0800 hours on 1 May. We would like to point out that the commander of TG-1, Col. PAVLOVIĆ would not submit a report to this Commission. The MUP RSK and civilian population left Jasenovac together with the TG-1.

The Novska-Rajić axis

The attack on this axis commenced at around 0530 of 1 May 1995, by a softening-up, after which sections of the 125th HV Brigade, sections of the 1st and 2nd guards brigades, a detachment of an RH MUP brigade, carried out an infantry attack. Battalion-size forces were infiltrated behind the lines on our territory, through exposed gaps. These forces were brought into the Bročice-M/alo/ Polje-Rožđanik and Kričke-Kričko Brdo-the Rožđanik village lines. In such way they got behind our forces, thereby completely encircling the 2nd Battalion and the population of the Paklenice village. The third axis from which this attack was launched was the axis between the villages of

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Kričko and Rađenovci. As a result of this attack, the 4th Battalion was crushed and the command post of the 98th pbr in the Rajići village was made vulnerable. After the take-over of the Rajići village, Croatian forces continued to attack along the axis between the villages of Rajčići, Milisavci and Benkovac, and proceeded to cut off the communication between Okučani and Pakrac.

The Novska-Rajići axis belongs to the zone of responsibility of the 98th pbr. The brigade numbered 549 soldiers. Before the start of fighting, all men were mobilised. At around 0100 hours of 1 May, all units of the 98th pbr were ordered to deploy all support weapons and POB /logistical support/ at their disposal, i.e. take up the firing positions and take control of the firing data, in accordance with artillery's deployment plan.

In its assigned zone, the brigade organised active defence, with the focus on Novska-Okučani stretch of the motorway and in the secondary axis of Kričko Brdo-the Rajić village. The focus of the POB was on the motorway.

The brigade was supported by150mm tab /gun artillery battalion/ with BPo /extension unknown/, the village of Draksenić (RS /Republika Srpska/), and, as for their own support units, on their disposal they had a B-1 76mm tab, M-42 (4 artillery pieces) with BPo in the village of Jazavica and with a vMB-82 /mortar platoon/ (8 artillery pieces) in the village of Paklenica.

At 0550 hours, after the enemy's attacks in the area of Novska-Okučani, on the motorway stretch of the Krička village-the Rajčići village- the Bijela Stijena village, the commander of the 1st pb /infantry battalion/ was ordered to fire from all available weapons at the area of the village of Krička, the commanders of vMB-82 and B-1 battery were ordered to fire at the area of Novska.

At 0600 hours, the 1st pb proceeded to engage with Ustashas /derogatory for Croats/ in the area of Kričkino Brdo. As a result of a fierce attack with armoured and mechanised forces around the motorway, the defence on the motorway, organised by a unit belonging to the Okučani MUP was quickly overcome. The brigade units were defending the positions until 0930 hours, when the 2nd pb withdrew from their first position for about 200 metres onto another position on Zorkino Brdo. At 0940 hours, strong Ustasha forces cut off the Rajić-Paklenica road and the 2nd pb and vMB-82 mm in the village of Paklenica. The commander of the 98th pbr sent a group of 15 men led by Major MARJANOVIĆ, to assist the 2nd pb. This group fought the enemy until about 1400 hours when they had to withdraw with losses. In the meantime, the 1st pb withdrew towards the village of Rajić and organised defence at St. Ana-Orešac. The command of the 18th Corps was regularly kept abreast of the course of the fighting, and assistance and artillery support were requested from RS and KAG /Corps Artillery Group/. No assistance and support were sent, apart from two T-55 tanks, which arrived at the village of Rajić at 1137 hours and were each deployed on the motorway and to assist the 2nd pb respectively. On the motorway, defence of the Rajić flyover was organised with reinforcements from the Okučani MUP. The defence of the flyover took 3 hours and 15 minutes, at

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which point the Ustasha forces, with intense armoured and mechanised forces, supported by the artillery and air force, extended their attack onto the Borovac flyover. As a result of the course of such fighting, including the breakthrough of Ustasha forces on both the left and the right flank, the KM /command post/ of the 98th pbr was abandoned and defence from the Ranković hill was attempted, which failed. Soldiers, civilians and their families began withdrawing towards Okučani.

At around 2000 hours, 63 soldiers mounted a defence at Lađevac on the border with the village of Bodegraj, where at about 2030 hours, they fought two Croatian helicopters which attempted landing in the area of M/ale/ Bare.

There was no fighting during the night. Then at around 0500 hours of 2 May a withdrawal towards the village of Nova Varoš near Stara Gradiška was ordered. At about 0530 hours, in the village of Nova Varoš, the units ran into an Ustasha ambush where they engaged in fighting, and two hours later they started withdrawing in groups through the forest towards Stara Gradiška. With the collapse of the 98th pbr on 1 May, the defence of Western Slavonia was totally crushed, causing panic and chaos that resulted in the fall of Western Slavonia. In the zone of responsibility of the 98th pbr, 70 soldiers were killed in the fighting, about 50 were taken prisoners, while the others managed to cross into the territory of RS on 1 and 2 May. Only side arms were taken out, meaning that all other MTS remained in the zone of responsibility and fell into the hands of Ustashas. Artillery pieces, mortars, guns, vehicles, one T-55 tank, ammunition for all the weapons, food and all reserve brigades were left behind. Members of the MUP and civilians were withdrawing together with members of the 98th pbr.

Attack on the Nova Gradiška-Okučani axis

The Croatian forces attempted launching an attack on the zone of responsibility of the 54th pbr, from the following three axes:

1. Katolička Šagovina-Gajevi-Smrtić;
2. Trnava-Dragalić-Gorice (within communication range);
3. Pivare-Prašnik.

The 54th pbr offered resistance on all axes, except for the zone of responsibility of the 3rd pb, the forest of Prašnik, where Ustashas controlled the only communication.

The course of events

At around 0700 hours, the attack on the 3rd pb commenced, and at 0755, the Ustashas emerged onto the cemetery at Gorice, in order to attack the 3rd pb from the direction of Gorice, Pivare and Prašnik. At around 0830 hours, the Ustashas took control of the intersection at Gorice, where their advance was halted. From 0830 to 0930 hours, the defence near Donji Bogićevci was

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stabilised. At around 1300 hours, the 2nd pb was pushed back from Prosek towards Ratkovac, the Croatian air force was shelling Zabrdo and our forces repulsed a Croatian attack towards Donji Bogićevci. At 1400 hours Proseka fell, and at 1445 Ustashas came above the Ratkovac village. At around 1500 hours, 2nd pb took control of the 2nd defence line, while the command of the 54th pbr ordered the evacuation of civilian population. At around 1630 hours, Col. BABIĆ informed the command of the 18th Corps that the 98th pbr was crushed. At 1755 hours, Croatian air force attacked Donji Bogićevci , and at about 1900 hours the Croats landed four helicopters at Ribnjak and carried out an airborne assault. At 1930 hours, the road through Nova Varoš was cut off, and at 1945 hours all communications with the 1st pb were cut and the 18th Corps IKM /Forward Command Post/ was abandoned. At around 2100 hours, Col. BABIĆ ordered a withdrawal of units onto alternate positions and an evacuation of the population. He also ordered that the units from S/tara/ Gradiška should mop up N/ova/ Varoš, 51st pbr and BiN, and that Krsto ŽARKOVIĆ's group should mop up Cage. None of this was accomplished.

At about 2300 hours between 1 and 2 May, the enemy laid a siege of the wider Okučani area, along the line of the Nova Varoš village- the Medari village- the Trnava village- the Čaprinci village-the Benkovac village-the Borovac village- the Borovljani village, as well as the northern part of the zone along the line of: V/elika/ Gradina-Ivanovac- the Šeovica village-Gavrinica-the D/onji/ Čaglić village- the Kričke Donje village- the Rađenovac village- the Bijela Stijena village – the Trnakovac village.

The 54th pbr, which had been closing off the N/ova/Gradiška-Okučani axis, was in disarray, especially after the withdrawal of the 2nd pb from the Smrtić-Ratkovac position.

In the western section of Okučani, the Bodegraj village-motorway-Vrbovljanski flyover line was established. Col. PERIĆ, member of the Corps command, who had been in Okučani, established this line through utmost efforts. However, the number of soldiers on that line was dwindling. The majority of soldiers from the 54th pbr were pulling out with their families, in the direction of S/tara/ Gradiška.

At around 0130 hours, Col. PERIĆ requested the corps command to send reinforcements that had been promised. The reply he got was that the light brigade from Gradiška had crossed the Sava river and was at the Strug canal, but that it could not break through to Okučani via N/ova/ Varoš, and that instead the 51st pbr had been ordered to break through via Bijela Stijena thereby helping Okučani. However, that was not feasible. Col. PERIĆ then suggested to the commander that with the rest of the troops and five tanks he should form a spearhead group, which would break through N.Varoš and pull the units from the Strug canal towards Okučani, in order to organise circular defence. The tanks and the remaining troops would then launch a breakthrough to Benkovac, in order to link up with the 51st pbr in the area of Bijele Stijene.

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The corps commander told him that there was no need to hurry. When he /PERIĆ/ insisted on this matter again, he responded with: "Do as you know."

Col. PERIĆ formed a group for the breakthrough consisting of 50 men and five T-55 tanks, and he appointed Captain Zoran BRKIĆ its commander. He assigned him the mission of breaking through Nova Varoš, emerging onto the Strug canal and, immediately returning the tanks with the lprb /light infantry brigade/ to Okučani, to be used for a breakthrough to Benkovac. The breakthrough group set off on 2 May, at 0400 hours sharp. However, the group did not complete the mission as described. The tanks went through Nova Varoš with no infantry, while Captain BRKIĆ and the infantry broke through the Ljeskovača forest, west from the village of Nova Varoš and emerged onto the Sava river.

Having crossed the Strug canal, the tanks did not go back, but remained south of Strug. The units that had been expected to come as reinforcement did not arrived to Okučani.

At around 0500 hours on 2 May, the line of the Bodegraj village- Vrbovljan flyover also started weakening and groups of soldiers and some civilian population were gathering around the inner centre of Okučani. The commands of the 54th and the 98th pbr did not function. On the night between 1 and 2 May, at around 0300 hours, all communications were down.

Thanks to huge efforts and help from Krsto ŽARKOVIĆ, Rajko NARANDŽIĆ and Drago STUPAR, Col. PERIĆ gathered the remaining soldiers, about 80 of them, at the Dubrovnik flyover and decided to form two platoons for a decisive defence of Okučani. The soldiers were objecting to this noting that they were too few and that they were all going to die. They suggested they should attempt a new breakthrough to N.Varoš, towards the units at Strug, after which they would join the light Gradiška brigade for the defence of Okučani. Col. PERIĆ accepted this proposal and ordered a breakthrough to Nova Varoš.

In the village of Nova Varoš there had been about 2,000 people, mainly civilians and a few soldiers who had been fighting previously with Ustashas. The breakthrough was launched at 0700 hours on 2 May, and it finished by 1210 hours the same day. When at 1300 hours this group emerged onto Strug, none of our forces were there, and the only thing left was some abandoned hardware.

The corps command left S/tara/ Gradiška at around 1000 hours and moved to Gradiška south of the Sava river.

The defence plan for Okučani was not accomplished. In the afternoon hours of 2 May, Ustashas entered Okučani. The siege of the forces of the 51st pbr, 59th and 63rd detachments, 1/54th pbr and 2/98th intervention battalions continued, the circle was tightening and they were called to surrender.

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Some of the 2/98th pbr which had been cut off in the territory of the Paklenica village, surrendered in the afternoon of 1 May, and the large part of it surrendered on the morning of 3 May. About 50 soldiers, including battalion commander Lieutenant Stevan LJILJAK, pulled out across the Sava river only on 7 May 1995.

The majority of soldiers from the 1/54th pbr and a section of the BiN pulled out from the area of the Bobare village-the Rogolji village, towards Šeovica on 2 and 3 May and joined the 51st pbr.

The command post of the corps in S/tara/ Gradiška was taken by Ustashas between 2 and 3 May 1995, at around 0100 hours.

The corps commander, Col. BABIĆ, issued an order to the commander of the 51st pbr, Lieut. Col. HARAMBAŠIĆ on 2 May, at around 1500 hours, that all the forces in the northern section of the encircled zone should, on the basis of the agreement reached with the Croatian side, hand over their heavy weapons and 600 tubes of long weapons to the forces of UNPROFOR's Argentinian battalion in the course of 3 and 4 May. As this order was being carried out, SVK was attacking Croatian cities, including Zagreb, which served as a pretext for the Croatian side to violate the agreement and start taking members of the encircled units prisoners in the northern section of the zone. The capture started with fierce artillery and infantry fire on the besieged units. In the course of 4 May, the handover of units was finished, not including smaller groups that had, at their own initiative, turned to guerrilla warfare in the forests of Psunj and Papuk.

The civilian population, members of the MUP, the 98th pbr and the 54th pbr were all pulling out together on 1 and 2 May towards S/tara/ Gradiška, i.e. RS.

UNPROFOR's behaviour

The following /battalions/ were deployed in the territory of Western Slavonia (Sector West):

- A Jordanian battalion on the West axis, in the zone of the motorway;
- A Nepalese battalion on the East axis; and
- An Argentinian battalion on the North axis.

Since the incident on the motorway, until the beginning of fighting, there had been some very lively activity between the corps command and the battalion commands with the aim of identifying options for avoiding conflict. In that period, a series of meetings was held between the sector commander and the 18th corps commanders and the Okučani SUP secretary, with the aim of opening the motorway, which they did not succeed in agreeing. In the evening hours of 30 April, the sector commander, an Argentinian general, warned Col. Lazo BABIĆ with the following words: "Colonel, are you aware what you are doing by not allowing the re-opening of the motorway and will you be able to bear all the responsibility for the consequences?"

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After the meeting, at around 0100 hours the same night, the sector commander ordered that the personnel be pulled out from their checkpoints on the motorway and other locations, into their camps. This was done at around 0300 hours.

When the fighting started, the forces of the Jordanian battalion openly cooperated with the RH forces, by ceding their positions and some of their hardware. They had pulled out their personnel to the enemy side, in the direction of Novska and further. Members of the Nepalese battalion continued to behave acceptably during the aggression, but due to their inferiority, their behaviour had no impact on how the situation developed. When the heavy weapons were being removed from the *Kula* depot, members of this battalion did not offer any resistance or disrupt the removal. The members of the Argentinian battalion openly stood on the side of Ustashas. Their negative role was particularly apparent during the negotiations on the surrender and withdrawal of the 51st pbr from the encirclement. The Argentinian battalion, through their incompetence to fulfil the signed agreement and through their direct collaboration with the Ustasha command in Pakrac, directly bears some of the responsibility for the casualties among soldiers and people that remained encircled and were held in Ustasha camps and prisons in RH.

The participation of the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/ forces in the fighting in Western Slavonia

During their visits, the president of the republic and the GŠ SVK commander on several occasions stressed that at the level of western Serbian lands, a unified defence had taken hold, as reflected in the common Supreme defence council of the RS and RSK, which was supposed to serve as a further guarantee for defence.

Despite its efforts, the commission has, throughout its work, failed to come across a written confirmation of such claims, and it has not established the important fact of who was presiding such a council.

When the Ustasha aggression on Western Slavonia began, the promised assistance and involvement of VRS units in the defence failed to materialise, except for individual cases and smaller groups.

It was apparent from the "Warning to the Croatian side" issued by the Press Centre of the 1st KK /Krajina Corps/ that the 1st KK was distancing itself from the conflict and that, unless the HV was to shell cities and towns in the RS, they were going to continue to remain on the sidelines.

Such behaviour proved wrong the statements by the President of the republic and commanders from the GŠ SVK on the existence of any joint Supreme Council and joint defence plans.

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Despite such a situation, some of the VRS members acted honourably by extending assistance as much as possible.

Col. POPOVIĆ, chief of the intelligence department of the V and PVO /Army and anti-aircraft defence/ of the VRS at the KM in S/tara/ Gradiška showed up in the early morning hours of 1 May, assessed the situation, and upon our request sent two helicopter gunships for our disposal, which due to the disarray in the command of the 18th corps, were only used for reconnaissance, and not in combat.

In the afternoon hours, Gradiška sent a company of young troops across the Sava river, to assist to the command of TG-6, i.e. 1st lpbr. This company was used in the area of the Donja Varoš village.

According to our findings, this was all the military assistance received from the VRS during the fighting in Western Slavonia.

After the end of fighting in Western Slavonia on 4 May, the command of TG-6 and 1st KK had an extremely unfair attitude towards the remaining soldiers and people who had been placed temporarily in their zone of responsibility.

All that resulted in mass flight of population and soldiers in the direction of Eastern Slavonia and Serbia.

The use of air power

At 0615 hours on 1 May, General LONČAR, the SVK / Army of the Serbian Krajina/ NŠ /chief of staff/, ordered a state of readiness for the Udbine airport, for action in Western Slavonia. The Udbine airport commander, Lieut. Col. DOPUĐA, immediately ordered that helicopters, airplanes and crews be readied for combat activities. The preparations took about two hours, after which the air force was ready for action. At 0837 hours, the commander of the GŠ SVK ordered that combat readiness be raised. The order, *inter alia*, included the following: "Assume the elements of combat disposition and be ready for action according to the wartime plan."

According to the wartime plan, the V and PVO were supposed to provide air support for the 18th corps, from the a/irport/ Mahovljani. Notwithstanding this, the air force at the Udiba /as printed/ a/irport/ was on standby. As ordered by the commander of the GŠ, two helicopters were sent to Gradiška. The overflight was done between 0900 and 1000 hours. At around 1300 hours, helicopters flew over to the territory of Western Slavonia, and at around 1400 hours they attacked Ustasha forces with a direct hit. The other helicopter fired two rockets southeast of G/ornji/ Rajići, but with no effect. At around 2000 hours both helicopters were sent into base on the territory of RS. On 2 May, the helicopters only performed reconnaissance flights, and on 3 May they returned to the

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Udbine a/irport/. Airplanes did not take off from the Udbine a/irport/, as they never received such an order.

Assistance from other SVK corps

By the order of the GŠ SVK commander, the following forces were supposed to be sent to assist the defence of Western Slavonia on the same day or on the night between 1 and 2 May:

- from the 11th K /Corps/ - two infantry battalions;
- from the 7th K – one infantry battalion;
- from the 21st K – one infantry battalion;
- from the 39th K – one infantry battalion.

Of the designated units, the following forces responded

- from the 39th K – in the evening hours of 1 May, three companies (the equivalent of a battalion) arrived to the area of the Draksenić village. There they were put up and the same night one company was transferred to S/tara/ Gradiška. However, due to the disarray in the 18th corps command, this company was not used in combat, and was hence, by commander's decision, transferred to the territory of RS in the morning of 2 May;
- from the 11th K – a unit the size of an infantry battalion with about 370 soldiers arrived to the area of Klašnica where they awaited further orders. As they did not receive any orders by the afternoon hours of 3 May, they were sent back in the direction of the 11th Corps;
- from the 21st K – in the morning hours of 2 May, a platoon of snipers (16 soldiers) and one 130mm gun crew with ordnance arrived; this force was not used in combat.

Apart from these forces, Cigo's group belonging to the MUP Krajina about 40 soldiers in size, was used in the fighting in Western Slavonia. The same group took part in the fighting in the area of N/ova/ Varoš, in the attempt to open up a corridor for a pull out of soldiers and people from Okučani. The same day, this unit suffered two fatalities and a few casualties.

According to the statement by the President of the republic, the command of the 11th Corps had been ordered to launch an attack in the direction of Županja with a section of their forces. This attack was never launched.

Why did Western Slavonia fall?

Due to its geographic position, Western Slavonia must have been the part of RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ territory that was hardest to defend militarily. This fact was known to all those who in any way were part of public life in RSK. In order to conclude this, one does not need to state all the facts, but a couple: Western Slavonia only had one land connection with other Serbian lands, the bridge on the Sava river in Gradiška, on which there was a UN checkpoint; and the fact that the

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no-fly zone was still in force above the territory of former Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should also be added that in the territory of Western Slavonia in most optimal conditions only about 5,000 soldiers could have been mobilised. We note all this in order to take into account the assessment by experts from diplomatic and military circles that Western Slavonia can survive and remain an integral part of RSK only in the event of a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the territory of former Yugoslavia, or, which is much harder, by a timely dispatch of additional forces from the other parts of RSK and RS (as stipulated by the wartime plan) which would actively participate in the preparations and in the active defence of Western Slavonia.

Despite such assessments, the war games around Western Slavonia started concurrently with the economic negotiations with Croatia. These intensified after the opening of the motorway on 21 December 1994.

The implementation of the economic agreement with Croatia under pressure from the international community resulted in the opening of the motorway as an international thoroughfare. With the opening of the motorway all the problems came to light regarding the non-functioning of the rule of law in a section of the state territory. Specifically, with can state with certainty and full responsibility that RSK as a state did not function at the territory of Western Slavonia. Western Slavonia became the ground where accounts in the Krajina political arena were being settled. (For this, most credits should go to the Croatian intelligence service) /circled in pen/. The fall of Western Slavonia is nothing but a textbook example of the strategy of staging pre-planned riots and limited war skirmishes in which those who had planned the riots invariably win in the limited war skirmish. Riots and the non-functioning of the state contributed the most to the fall of Western Slavonia.

The deputies from Western Slavonia have, in the RSK assemblies in the last three years, been warning about the situation in Western Slavonia, requesting, about which there is also an assembly decision, that live military equipment should be pulled out of depots controlled by UNPROFOR, i.e. that Western Slavonia should be put in a position equal to that of other RSK corps.

The Assembly did not abide by such a decision, which allowed for an easier and faster fall of Western Slavonia.

Neither this, nor other appeals coming from Western Slavonia were complied with. In order for any actions, i.e. decisions to be complied with, they first had to be agreed by Lazo BABIĆ- the corps commander, and with VESELINOVIĆ and KRESOVIĆ – SUP officials. They had completely ignored some prominent people from Western Slavonia, and took the liberty of seizing total power and making decisions on everything. Not one of them had anything to do with this region, which was not the case with the arrival of ČELEKETIĆ as the corps commander in February 1993. In 1992 the civilian authority took hold, especially after the signing of the Vance

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plan. When ČELEKETIĆ arrived, his team led by Boro STIJAK – chief of security of the 18th corps, were tarnishing the reputation of political personalities in Western Slavonia with their misinformation and lies, characterising them as thieves, collaborators of some other states etc., mentioning their incompetence, lack of patriotism, regardless of the fact that these people had endured everything from preparatory to combat activities. Almost simultaneously, they sing ČELEKETIĆ's praises for perfecting the defence of Western Slavonia, for /making/ the corps the guarantee of peace in Western Slavonia and the like, and that the former corps commander, Col. Jovo ČUBRIĆ had not done anything, although the truth was totally different. Precisely those things ČUBRIĆ had done were real and visible, while ČELEKETIĆ's work was only about words and aggrandisement of his own personality, at the same time deceiving the public about the combat readiness of the 18th corps. The same policy continued with the arrival of BABIĆ. All those who wanted to know knew that the 18th Corps represented no security for the people and that the work of the SUP did not offer even a minimal internal stability for the area. The culmination of the weakening and destabilisation of the area happened with the order from ČELEKETIĆ to BABIĆ, to move the Corps command from Okučani to S/tara/ Gradiška. ČELEKETIĆ himself, the president of the republic and the RSK Assembly were informed by a memorandum from UB /Internal Security/ SVK, which also makes mention of the opinion of the people and their representatives, that the act of moving the corps to the banks of the Sava river also meant the abandonment of Western Slavonia. Furthermore, analysis clearly showed that in the case of an aggression by RH, the corps command would be cut off from its subordinate units, and that in that event they would be left alone, which on 1 May proved to be correct. It is also important to note that the republican authorities made no investments of relevance to the life and survival of the area, which the people interpreted as a betrayal of Western Slavonia. A new and visible investment and assistance to Western Slavonia started with the arrival of a new, MIKELIĆ's government, which boosted the morale of the population of Western Slavonia. For example, 40% of the territory of the village of Pakrac until 1994 had no electricity, teaching aids, a developed infrastructure, etc.

The opening of the motorway after a decision by both the republican and the municipal assembly, lead to the emergence of crime in the form of smuggling with the RH, as well as daily departures of people for the RH.

The total control of the motorway fell under the jurisdiction of the Okučani SUP, which showed amateurism in their work and the inefficiency of all the methods applied for their control. The RSK government rendered a decision to prevent crime on the motorway by closing down all 13 illegal exits to the motorway, both physically and with mines and explosives. The SUP did neither implement nor realise that decision.

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On 21 January 1995, the government issued a decree defining the conditions on who may come out to the motorway and under which conditions. The Okučani MUP was put in charge of this decree, however they never implemented it.

The attempt to continue the works on a section of the railway line with the aim of lowering war tensions was met with general resistance among the leadership of the municipality and the radicals, so much so that they publicly burned down the sleepers.

After the opening of the motorway, the municipal authorities started holding weekly sessions of SO /Municipal Assembly/, in which they were mostly attacking the government and blackmailing it with various requests. In almost all its sessions, the government discussed the requests by SO Okučani and for the most part accepting them, but the SO Okučani leadership was never satisfied.

By provoking and raising tensions around the motorway, railway, smuggling and other crimes, it was continuously attempted to bring down the government of B/orislav/ MIKELIĆ, regardless of consequences. The order by the president of the republic of 8 March 1995, by which he, sidestepping the constitution, prevented the legally elected minister of the interior from assuming his duties, must have served the same purpose.

Members of the army, the police and local municipal authorities through their work prevented the functioning of the rule of law in the territory of Western Slavonia. These structures, aided by Knin's highest level, prevented the RSK as a state to comply with a single international agreement that it had signed itself. In this way, they directly helped Croatia by proving a pretext for a military attack, before the eyes of the whole world, despite all the warnings. The fact is that Croatia had long before prepared a plan of the attack on Western Slavonia, that our authorities had known about that plan and that the plan itself envisaged its realisation once the Serbs could be accused before the whole world of provoking an attack. That is precisely what happened on 1 May 1995.

In Western Slavonia, the riots had been deliberately started thereby shattering the diplomatic, political and military defence of the area, which at the same time was the main reason for the fall of Western Slavonia.

The human and technical potential of the 18th Corps was not adequate, both quantitatively and qualitatively compared to the aggressor. Thus the Corps was not able to perform the task of decisive and persistent defence of the zone of responsibility, i.e. Western Slavonia.

It should particularly be taken into account that according to the requirements of the Vance plan, corps personnel were separated from heavy hardware.

Command at all levels held inaccurate estimates of the enemy, especially referring to the forces deployed in the aggression (composition, strength, ability and intentions).

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Command at the level of corps and GŠ SVK did not make accurate estimates of the first indicators of aggression, although they had some very compelling information at their disposal. They were convinced that those were about provocation from the position of power, and not about enemy's aggressive intentions.

Even at the beginning of the aggression and fighting, the 18th Corps command and the corps commander were convinced that this was a provocation intended at /illegible/ the opening of the motorway. Although the defence by the 98th pbr on the Novska-Rajić axis was crushed by 1200 hours of 1 May, the command was convinced that the corps was carrying out the defence successfully.

When in the second half of 1 May, the command-18th Corps commander were persuaded that the enemy forces were making progress, they requested reinforcements and coordinated action with the forces of VRS and units from other SVK corps.

The support and coordinated action failed to appear. The commission has not found any reliable indicators why the support and coordinated action failed to appear.

However, the Commission concluded that the support and the coordinated action were more declarative in nature, instead of being attached to the system of defence of the 18th Corps and of the RSK defence in general. Attacks on enemy's towns, as strategic support, were launched at the time when the defence of the 18th corps was totally crushed, instead of at the beginning of the aggression. Furthermore, such activities considerably exacerbated the position of units in the encirclement in the northern section of the zone.

The agreement on military cooperation and mutual assistance between VRS and SVK, and the joint Supreme Council did not came into being and it is unclear who is in charge of joint VSO /Supreme Defence Council/ in aggression circumstances.

Insufficient perseverance and tenacity of defence was caused by a late deployment of heavy hardware, as they had been held in the depots of UN forces. The hardware left the depots and was sent to the areas of deployment when the aggression had already begun.

In the beginning of the aggression, the commander of the 18th corps incorrectly organised the work of the command and combat actions by subordinate forces.

Those irregularities were reflected in the following:

- the KM had not been transferred to the centre of the zone of fighting, i.e. to Okučani;
- although the KM had remained in the peacetime location of S/tara/ Gradiška, a team for IKM should have been established;
- deploying senior officers (colonels) individually into subordinate commands as advisors was the least sensible thing to do, instead of forming a team for IKM as had been suggested to the commander;

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- the corps commander decided to appoint two reserve officers, Lieutenant Petar DELIBAŠIĆ, a.k.a. *Pjer* and Lieutenant Dobrivoje ĆETOJEVIĆ as operations officers for the conduct of combat activities.

These officers were inexperienced and insufficiently qualified. They mostly advised the corps commander on what he needed to do in certain situations, which had an adverse effect on the conduct of fighting.

- Although the SVK commander issued an explicit ban on abandoning S/tara/ Gradiška and although not envisaged in the plan of deployment for the 18th corps, already at 1000 hours of 2 May the corps commander transferred the KM across the Sava river into Gradiška.

- Already by 1200 hours on 1 May, the commander started losing control of developments on the battlefield.

Such approach in commanding the corps further damaged the combat morale among the units and lowered the defence's resilience.

The corps command had not assessed in an accurate and timely manner the threat to civilian population.

At around 1100 hours of 1 May, the corps commander ordered an evacuation of the civilian population, only to withdraw this order soon thereafter. He then ordered an evacuation again at around 1400 hours. Such an action provoked chaos, confusion and jeopardised the organisation of the evacuation. This led to increased losses and also caused the soldiers to desert their positions in order to save their families.

The level of coordination between the corps command and the CZ Staff during the evacuation was not satisfactory.

The police forces in the z/o /zone of responsibility/ of the 18th corps had not been, before and during the fighting, integrated in the defence system.

In the period before the onset of the aggression, the police did not enable the functioning of the rule of law in the territory of Western Slavonia.

In their activities within their jurisdiction, the SUP authorities did not manage to prevent either the uncontrolled flight of citizens to RH or the crime that kept climbing.

Members of the SUP did not prevent the incidents on the motorway, nor did they ensure the implementation of the international agreement that the RSK had signed as a state.

The leadership of the army and the police, instead of being preoccupied with their professional tasks, primarily defence of the country and internal stability, was largely preoccupied with politics and petty politicking.

The local political leadership of the Okučani municipality actively joined in the provocations of the conflict in the territory of Western Slavonia.

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In Western Slavonia, riots had been instigated deliberately with the intended goal of bringing down the government. In reality, they resulted in a weakened defence of Western Slavonia and its fall.

RSK had not been functioning as a state in the territory of Western Slavonia, since the day of the opening of the motorway until its fall.

By disseminating lies to the public, the media of RSK and RS significantly influenced the creation of panic and disorganisation in an already broken defence.

Persistent conflicts between the president of the republic and the president of the government directly undermined the defensive power of the SVK, the soldiers' morale and resulted in a failure of civilian authorities in Western Slavonia.

All the aforementioned activities and facts have, to a smaller or larger extent, had an impact on the weakening of the defence of Western Slavonia, and altogether they led to a total loss of Western Slavonia as an integral part of RSK.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA?

The Commission has, on the basis of this report and the reports and evidence that the aforementioned persons have submitted to the Commission, concluded that the following are most responsible for the fall of Western Slavonia:

1. President of the RSK, Milan MARTIĆ, for exceeding his authority as set by the constitution, by blocking and preventing the work of the Supreme Defence Council.

2. SVK Commander, Gen. Milan ČELEKETIĆ for the failure to organise a system of defence for Western Slavonia and deliberate violation of the international agreement signed by the RSK, and for pursuit of politics instead of defence.

3. Commander of the 18th Corps, Col. Lazo BABIĆ, for violating the international agreement signed by the RSK and bad conduct of defence of Western Slavonia.

4. Minister of defence, Col. Rade TANJGA, because the MO /Ministry of Defence/ had not compiled a defence plan for RSK.

5. Commander of the 54th pbr, Lieut. Col. Stevo BABAC and commander of the 3/54th pbr, Lieutenant GRMUŠA, for weak defence of the Prašnik-the village of N/ova/ Varoš, which enabled enemy's quick breakthrough and cutting off of the Okučani-Gradiška communication.

6. Commander of the 98th pbr, Lieut. Col. Milanko BABIĆ for weak command in the course of fighting and for a rapid collapse of the brigade, which greatly affected the success of the corps defence.

7. Commander of the TG-1, Lieut. Col. Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ, for the desertion of TG-1.

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8. President of the Okučani municipality, Mr. Aran DRAGIČEVIĆ, for the failure to comply with the decisions of state authorities.

9. Deputy to the Minister of the Interior, Nebojša PAVKOVIĆ, secretary of the Okučani SUP, Drago VESELINOVIĆ, and chief Stevan KRESOVIĆ for the failure to perform their professional duties.

STATE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES FOR AND MANNER OF
THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA
/stamped/

Knin, 11 July 1995

Members of the Commission

1. Slobodan PERIĆ
/signed/
2. Col. Slobodan PERIĆ
/signed/
3. Borislav BOGUNOVIĆ
/signed/
4. Krste ŽARKOVIĆ
/signed/
5. Lieut. Col. Jurica ŠAJATOVIĆ
/signed/

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ANNEX 141:

RSK, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION CHARGED WITH ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY ORGANISATION FOR THE FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA, 13 JULY 1995

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/stamp:/

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

MAIN STAFF OF THE SERBIAN ARMY

Confidential number: 3-430

13 July 1995

MILITARY SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Commission charged with establishing
responsibility of the military organisation
for the fall of Western Slavonia, Knin, report

To:

COMMANDER OF THE SVK

/Army of the Serbian Krajina/

MAIN STAFF

DRAFT TRANSLATION

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Order issued by the Commander of the SVK Main Staff confidential number 3-278/95 on 28 May 1995 the Commission charged with establishing responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of Western Slavonia has been formed. The commission includes: Colonel Rade VUJAKLIJA, chairman of the commission; Colonel Kosta NOVAKOVIĆ, deputy chairman of the commission; and commission members: colonels Nikola ŠUPUT, Stevo KOŽUL, Dušan KRNJAJIĆ, Boško MARIČIĆ, Ilija DOPUĐ and Nikola POZNAN.

In order to analyse the aggression against Western Slavonia and to establish responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of Western Slavonia the commission requested written and oral statements from officers who performed certain tasks in the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps in connection with the above. A report has also been requested from ONO /?Operations and Training/ of the SVK Main Staff in connection with the situation in Western Slavonia between the second half of April and the first half of May 1995.

In addition to information collated and analyses conducted in connection with responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of Western Slavonia, the commission considers it necessary that statements taken from the most responsible officers be supplemented by information which would contribute to shedding light on the facts in connection with responsibility of the military organisation.

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The commission's report is divided into three chapters dealing with the following: (1) Important characteristics of the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps; (2) Preparation and execution of Croatian Army's aggression against Western Slavonia; (3) Preparedness of the 18th Corps to defend Western Slavonia; (4) Conclusions in connection with establishing responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of western Slavonia and (5) Proposed measures that need to be taken towards the military organisation.

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I

PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSION AGAINST WESTERN SLAVONIA

1. THE MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 18TH CORPS

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Western Slavonia which lies in the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps has a horse-shoe shape and covers the area of 587 square kilometres; the length of its border is around 98 kilometres. The zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps encompasses the area of low-lying land between the Sava river and the old road between Novska and Nova Gradiška and the northern hilly part of the area extending from the old road, up to but not including the mountains of Psunj and Ravna Gora.

The southern part of the zone of responsibility of the corps is easily accessible, the zone is serviced by a motorway and a railway network; this part is densely populated and enables the Croatian Army to use special operations units and Police Department units on a massive scale; the hilly mountainous part is less accessible, the main road being the Daruvar–Pakrac-Bela Stena–Okučani road; it is less densely populated than the southern part of the area.

According to information gathered, between 23,000 and 29,000 people live in the territory of Western Slavonia; of this number around 4,773 persons could be engaged for the needs of the 18th Corps units, while the SVK should objectively have 8,379

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members. Of the required establishment needs the SVK has the following: officers - 47 percent, non-commissioned officers – 138 per cent and military conscripts – 53 per cent. On 30 April the real level of staffing in the 18th Corps units was around 95 per cent of the staffing level prevalent at the time. The issuing of weapons to the manpower under UNPROFOR control was effected in the morning of 1 May (when the aggression against Western Slavonia began).

In the low-lying part of Western Slavonia the 18th Corps had more forces (the 54th and 98th infantry brigades, the 18th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, a tank company, etc) for: anti-armour combat, erecting anti-armour barrier systems, anti-aircraft defence units for the protection of armoured mechanised units, artillery unit to support anti-armour combat and protect the crossing on the Strug canal and the Sava river. In the hilly area the main combat forces were infantry forces (the 59th and the 65th detachments of the 51st Infantry Brigade,).

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Given the lie of the land with its geographical features, passability of terrain, population density and other characteristics, the organisation of defence in the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps is very difficult and gives the attacker the opportunity to group rapid reaction forces and hardware and use strong artillery and air support.

2. PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF CROATIAN ARMY'S AGGRESSION AGAINST WESTERN SLAVONIA

The Croatian Army carried out all preparations for the aggression against Western Slavonia in good time. With the view to executing rapid operations the Croatian Army

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intelligence service collected information in due course on the following: disposition and concentration of the 18th Corps forces, the main thrust of combat operations, capabilities of forces for artillery and air support, defence engineering work, fortification and some weaknesses in the system of defence of Western Slavonia.

In the aggression against Western Slavonia the main forces (1st Guards Brigade – *Tigrovi* /Tigers/, the *Kobre* /Cobras/ anti-terrorist unit of the Republic of Croatia MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, parts of the special brigade of the Republic of Croatia MUP, the 125th Brigade of the Republic of Croatia and special units from Kutina) were active along the stretch of the Novska-Okučani motorway axis; parts of the 3rd and 5th guards brigades and the 121st Brigade of the Republic of Croatia were active on the Nova Gradiška-Okučani axis. The 127th Brigade of the Croatian Army and parts of the 2nd Guards Brigade – *Gromovi* /Thunderbolts/ - were active on the axes leading from the general area of Pakrac and Novo Selo towards Okučani. The main idea of the Croatian Army was to cut the territory of Western Slavonia across the inhospitable terrain on the Kričke-Trnovac axis and from the east from /?Mašić/ towards Benkovac Okučanski by simultaneously engaging special forces of the Republic of Croatia MUP and the 1st Guards Brigade. At that time an attack on Jasenovac began from the axis extending from Bročice village and west from Drenov Bok; a helicopter assault in the Prašnik sector then threatened crossings on M/?/ Struk and Stara Gradiška and roads leading from Gradiška towards Okučani. In the initial phase of the aggression weaker forces carried out diversionary operations from Pakrac and Lipik towards Donji Čagljić.

Axes which lay on the junctions between defenders' zones of responsibility were chosen for attack and were used to infiltrate reconnaissance and sabotage groups

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into the combat disposition of the 18th Corps; alongside this the "fifth column" was activated both from the ranks of loyal Croats and from the Serbian ranks.

The use of air force and its operations against columns of civilians, crossings across the Sava river, the Command Post of the 18th Corps and other facilities had a great impact on the morale of the Croatian Army; among members of the 18th Corps and the Serbian population the use of air force increased fear and the feeling of helplessness. The attack was preceded by longer artillery preparation and attacks were launched once defences weakened. It was characteristic that as soon as it encountered resistance the Croatian Army would halt the attack for a while. In combat operations artillery was very active, there were infiltrations of groups, attempts at envelopment and outflanking.

The Croatian Army made evident efforts to avoid losses in manpower and weapons.

Political and propaganda activities were well-prepared and consistently implemented. Assessments show that Croatia's political and propaganda activities had an impact on around 30 per cent of the Serbian population in Western Slavonia.

In addition to political and propaganda activities in the course of preparations and during aggression against Western Slavonia, the Croatian Army used various tricks very successfully. Officers and soldiers wore UN uniforms to carry out military missions and performed diversionary operations in that way. A lesson can be learnt from how the Croatian Army and police coordinated work during their overall combat activities. The application of political and propaganda activities, tricks and other measures led to the weakening of resistance of the Serbian people and made the attack and occupation of Western Slavonia proceed faster.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

During preparations for the aggression of the Republic of Croatia against Western Slavonia members of the Argentine and Danish UN battalions openly placed themselves at the service of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia in every respect and thus contributed to the quicker fall of Western Slavonia.

3. PREPAREDNESS OF THE 18TH CORPS TO DEFEND WESTERN SLAVONIA

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In conditions of any aggression the 18th Corps had the following task: through decisive defence prevent incursions by Ustasha forces into the corps zone of defence, focusing on the axes: Novska–Okučani, Nova Gradiška–Okučani and Pakrac–Okučani, destroy trapped forces and create conditions to execute an assault operation (in coordination with forces of the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/) towards ethnic Serbian areas focusing on the Lipik-Pakrac-Daruvar axis.

Supported by KAG-18 /corps artillery group/, the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence of the VRS, Command Post Stara Gradiška, Forward Command Post Okučani.

Neighbours: to the left – no neighbours; to the right: along the line between Drenov Bok village and Sunja defence operations carried out by the 26th Brigade of the 39th Corps with the following task: in coordination with forces of the 18th Corps prevent the Croatian Army's incursion along the Sunja-Kostajnica-Dvor axis and create conditions for offensive operations. Commander of Tactical Group One is responsible for convergence with the 26th Brigade of the 39th Corps.

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On the basis of the task set in this way by the SVK Main Staff the commander of the 18th Corps decided: through decisive and active defence, with the large-scale use of barrier systems, prevent incursions by the Croatian Army into the defence zone with the focus on the following axes: Novska-Okučani (98th Infantry Brigade), Nova Gradiška-Okučani (54th Infantry Brigade) and Pakrac-Okučani (51st Infantry Brigade), inflict losses on them in manpower and hardware, prevent the defence zone from being cut along the stretch of the motorway and parts of the corps forces from being cut off in the northern part of the zone, defend the territory, through active combat operations occupy key facilities improving the operational and tactical position of the corps and thus create conditions for offensive operations.

Combat formation: forces for decisive defence; for active operations; for anti-landing combat; forces to combat helicopter assault; reserve; KAG-18; forces for air support and anti-aircraft defence of the VRS and forces to control the territory…

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TASKS FOR UNITS

54th Infantry Brigade with a tank company, Commander Lieutenant Colonel Stevo BABAC, close and defend the axis leading out of Prašnik towards Novi Varoš, Goričkа-Donji Bogićevci-Nova Gradiška-Okučani and Širinci village-Trnakovac.

18th Intervention Battalion: Commander Lieutenant Colonel Zoran MIŠČEVIĆ from the Ivankovac sector; with the main forces organize defence of the Brezovo Polje-Omanovac axis. Depending on how the situation develops be ready for the execution of a counterattack along the Ivankovac-Crna Kosa axis and towards Kik. Coordinate action with the 63rd Detachment.

63rd Detachment: Commander Major DOBRIĆ, close the axis leading from Krička Zabrdska and Donja Šurlica towards Gornja Šumetnica.

59th Detachment: Commander Major Vlado GATANIĆ, close the axis leading from Novo Selo and Dragović towards Brusnik.

51st Infantry Brigade: Commander Lieutenant Colonel Stevo HARAMBAŠIĆ, close and defend the axis leading from Pakrac, Lipik, Kovačevac and Čaglić across Bela Stena towards Okučani.

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98th Infantry Brigade: Commander Lieutenant Colonel Milanko BABIĆ, close the axis leading from Krička, Novsko Brdo, Paklenica and Mokro Polje towards Gornji Rajići and further towards Okučani.

Tactical Group One: Commander Lieutenant Colonel Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ (aka Paja), close the Jasenovac-Mlaka axis, direct coordination with the 98th Infantry Brigade and the 26th Brigade of the 39th Corps.

18th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion: Commander Captain Siniša SAVKOVIĆ; assume the role of Anti-Armour Detachment-18 from the /?Pedegraji/ sector and be ready to engage in anti-armour combat on the following axes - Novska-Paklenica-Gornji Rajić, Borovci, Čaglić-Bjelanovac, Donji Bogićevci and Gornja Trenova towards Okučani.

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18th Mixed Artillery Regiment: assume the role of KAG-18 (105-mm howitzer battalion and tob /expansion unknown/ 130); Commander Major Branko CRLJENICA with the basic firing position from the general area of Rogalji and Tenokovac villages; give artillery support to the 59th and 63rd detachments of the 54th Infantry Brigade and the 51st Infantry Brigade at the request of the commanders of these units.

Tavod /expansion unknown/ -130 mm and 155-mm cannon artillery battery: from the firing position from the Draksenići sector give artillery support to the 98th Infantry Brigade and Tactical Group One as requested by the commander.

Anti-Aircraft Defence: Focus anti-aircraft defence on the Novska-Okučani, Nova Gradiška-Okučani and Pakrac-Okučani axes.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Use other units of the 18th Corps and give tasks in line with COMMAND FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATION codenamed GVOZD.

On the basis of what was outlined above, the tasks for the 18th Corps and its subordinate units were precise and commands and units of the corps should have been trained to execute them in a number of ways.

Given that the Corps Command and subordinate units were promptly briefed about the place, role and tasks that were to be executed in case of aggression against Western Slavonia, the SVK Main Staff holds them responsible for the execution of tasks according to the war plan.

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On the basis of reviewing the war plan of the 18th Corps and analysing documents on the causes of the fall of Western Slavonia, the Commission charged with establishing responsibility of the military organisation has concluded the following:

- The 18th Corps Command and its subordinate commands and units did little to prepare and increase combat readiness to a certain level, the 98th Infantry Brigade and TACTICAL GROUP ONE in particular.

- The Corps Command was not fully in control of the combat readiness of its subordinate commands and units regarding combat readiness /as printed/, because it did not inspect them nor did it take adequate measures to increase their combat readiness.

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- In the night between 30 April and 1 May the Corps Command removed crews from their weapons of support and anti-armour combat and crews from the tanks and anti-aircraft guns and sent them to the 54th and 98th infantry brigades as reinforcement, instead of deploying these crews according to their combat disposition and being prepared to use them according to the engagement plan.

- Given how the situation developed in front of the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps, the gathering and the bringing in of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia to the border of Western Slavonia, the Corps Command was slow to implement assigned tasks in line with degrees of alert; in particular it did not ensure the issuing of weapons and equipment to the manpower under UNPROFOR control and that is why the support units for anti-armour combat, anti-aircraft defence,

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engineering support and others were deployed late in the engagement sectors. This is one of the causes that contributed to the fall of Western Slavonia to the Republic of Croatia authorities.

- The Corps Commander grouped the available forces and weapons in one position along the axes leading from Nova Gradiška, Novo Selo, Pakrac and Novska towards Okučani. The average depth of defence sectors was between four and six kilometres. Battalion commanders had reserves of around one reinforced platoon (intervention platoon), while the brigades and the 18th Corps Command had no free forces in reserve or intervention forces to be deployed on threatened axes.

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- The system of communications functioned well at all levels from the start of the aggression until the command post started being moved and from then on communications were established with a great difficulty in the course of moving to subsequent command posts.

- The system of constructing obstacles, fortification of observation facilities, firing and the protection of manpower and weapons were carried out only in the basic deployment sectors; they were only partially carried out deep in the zone of responsibility of the brigade and the corps.

II

CONCLUSIONS

in connection with establishing responsibility of the military organisation

for the fall of Western Slavonia

1. The commission charged with establishing responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of Western Slavonia held a number of meetings, worked out a plan of activities in connection with gathering information to enable the assessment of the state of combat readiness of the 18th Corps and its readiness to execute assigned tasks. To that end the Commission had planned to conduct interviews with 53 officers, soldiers and civilians. Of this number it managed to obtain statements from 43 persons. It is still necessary to take statements from eight officers /illegible/ who avoided doing so and who discharge responsible duties: Colonel Slobodan PERIĆ, acting commander of the 18th Corps; Colonel Milan ROMIĆ, chief of staff of the 18th Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Dušan POPOVIĆ, chief of armoured mechanised units and acting assistant chief of staff for operations and training in the 18th Corps; Lieutanant Colonel Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ (aka Paja), commander of Tactical Group One; Lieutenant Colonel Zoran MIŠČEVIĆ, commander of the intervention battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Veroljub SMILJANIĆ, assistant chief of staff for organisation and mobilisation in the 18th Corps Command; Captain 1st Class Marko VUJIĆ, assistant commander for personnel in the 18th Corps Command; Lieutenant Colonel Jurica ŠAJATOVIĆ, assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the 18th Corps Command.

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At the same time the commission believes that statements obtained from the most responsible officers of the 18th Corps (Corps commander and his assistants, commanders of brigades and independent units) are incomplete and do not reflect the real state of events in connection with the fall of Western Slavonia and therefore they ought to be supplemented.

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2. The commission believes that the SVK Main Staff, the 18th Corps Command and its subordinate commands and units did not take adequate measures that would have prevented a surprise aggression against Western Slavonia.

Preparations for the defence of Western Slavonia by the military organisation and civilian structures were not complete and coordinated according to the goal, place and time, which is one of the reasons why they did not function at the time of the Croatian Army's aggression.

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3. The opening of the motorway provided conditions for smuggling, psychological and propaganda influence, bribery, corruption, etc, of which the Croatian Army took advantage to erode and disturb the system of defence in the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps. The military organisation and civilian structures in Western Slavonia did not take adequate measures promptly to prevent such hostile activities with the view to increasing the defence might of commands and units of the 18th Corps.

4. Incomplete evaluation of officers and soldiers (promotions, appointments to higher duties, privileges given without proper indicators and adequate results) had a negative impact on single command and thus on the firmness of defence.

5. The characteristic behaviour of officers of the corps command and the subordinate units was that they implemented laws and regulations incompletely which is one of the reasons why responsibility was diluted. This kind of conduct by officers and civilians serving in the SVK is one of the factors that caused: army conscripts to

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wilfully abandon units, smuggling, a large number of army conscripts and residents to take out Croatian certificates of citizenship, the weakening of combat readiness of units and of the system of defence. Because of such a situation in the zone of responsibility of the 18th Corps authority of officers and commands was undermined which reduced the power of successful command.

6. The commission /?is aware/ that there were untrue reports on the state of combat readiness of commands and units, the real situation, developments in the territory and defence capabilities in the zone of responsibility of the corps. This caused a situation in which the SVK Main Staff was unable to take adequate measures to prevent these actions and developments and increase the overall combat readiness to the required level.

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7. After analysing the elements of combat readiness in the 18th Corps the Commision established that little attention had been paid to the practical training and drilling of commands and units in tasks assigned to them according to the war plan, which is also one of the causes that led to the slow and disorganised issuing of weapons to the manpower under UNPROFOR control and the unplanned engagement of units and commands according to the plan of engagement and so on /as printed/.

8. The commission /?is aware/ that at the start of the aggression against Western Slavonia a large number of army conscripts and some reserve officers wilfully abandoned units in order to evacuate unprotected families and move them south of the Sava river and to participate in the defence of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/.

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After the 18th Corps commands and units were pulled south of the Sava river commanding officers and commands displayed utter incompetence in quickly adjusting to the newly-created situation and in establishing the command and control system. In such a situation some officers took for themselves the materiel and technical equipment that belong to the SVK (motor vehicles, combat equipment, personal weapons, equipment, etc) which had a very negative impact on the overall morale of commanding officers and soldiers in the 18th Corps.

9. The course of events in Western Slavonia required of the SVK Main Staff to intervene in order to provide assistance to the 18th Corps particularly to the forces in encirclement; however, no opinions were sought from the commanding officers of the SVK Main Staff. Decisions were made by the Commander and the President and stances and orders were given on the telephone (there are no written orders).

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The SVK Main Staff did very little to influence the 18th Corps Command to put up persistent defence and offer decisive defence at the Strug canal. The situation that non-fighters imposed was accepted.

10. The commission /?is aware/ that the SVK Main Staff did not have at its disposal /information on/ the state of combat readiness of the 18th Corps units and its readiness to defend Western Slavonia.

The place, role and task assigned to Tactical Group One and who was in command of it (whether it was the commander of the SVK Main Staff or the commander of the 18th Corps) still remain unclear. Commander of Tactical Group One Borivoje PAVLOVIĆ aka Paja is not welcome in the zone of responsibility of the 39th Corps and the Dubica

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Brigade and they did not want to stay with their manpower in the area of Banija and Republika Srpska /as printed/.

11. Commentaries that a large number of officers and soldiers in the 18th Corps were from Republika Srpska have become topical. Of these many evaded their duties towards the VRS by "settling down" in the 18th Corps because they were close to their homes where they went whenever they wanted, they did not have to go to war to the area of engagement of units of the 1st and 2nd Krajina corps. Time will show the significance of such assessments.

The commission established that the most responsible officers in senior and junior command positions */komandiri i komandanti/* and those discharging staff duties are not completely conversant with the organisation and formation structure, the principles of engagement, fire and combat capabilities of the units which were under their command, and in particular with the execution of combat operations in the zone of responsibility of the Corps brigades.

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III

PROPOSAL

The commission charged with establishing responsibility of the military organisation for the fall of Western Slavonia hereby recommends: that the complete documentation be forwarded to the Military Prosecutor for further processing, because we believe that there are elements for the submission of criminal reports against those responsible.

COMMISSION CHARGED WITH

ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBIILTY OF THE

MILITARY ORGANISATION FOR THE

FALL OF WESTERN SLAVONIA

1. Colonel Rade VUJAKLIJA, chairman /signed/_____

2. Colonel Kosta NOVAKOVIĆ, deputy chairman ____

3. Colonel Nikola ŠUPUT, member /signed/_____

4. Colonel Stevo KOŽUL, member_____

5. Colonel Dušan KRNJAJIĆ, member /signed/_____

6. Colonel Boško MARIČIĆ, member /signed/_____

7. Colonel Ilija DOPUĐ, member_____

8. Colonel Nikola POZNAN, member /signed/_____

DRAFT TRANSLATION

/stamp:/ REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

MAIN STAFF OF THE SERBIAN ARMY

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ANNEX 142:

WITNESS STATEMENT OF IVAN BAČIĆ

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
BROD-POSAVINA POLICE ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL POLICE

Number: 511-11-13-2 10.

Okučani, November 5th 2010

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

on the premises of PP1 OKUČANI, on 05.11.2010, from Bačić Ivan, retired police officer from Dubovac no. 39 about the events in May 1995 in the area of Okučani and Stara Gradiška; started at 08.15h.

I hereby state that before the Croatian War of Independence I lived in the place Dubovac and I was employed in the police forces in Nova Gradiška and later in Okučani. At the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence I was already retired.

Since my wife is Serbian, it was uncomfortable and unnecessary for me to flee from Okučani when the problems began in August 1990. I did, however, flee to Bosanska Gradiška for about 40 days, until the situation settled. The Serbs from Bosnia killed the officers on Bijela stijena and that is how it all started. I was retired from the police on 01.01.1990; most of the time I had been working in the traffic. During the Croatian War of Independence I lived in Dubovac, I haven't been integrated in any forces since the Serbs probably had certain reserves regarding my loyalty due to the fact that I am Croat and a retired police officer. I think it was in 1993 when Međački Džep was liberated and Drago Drača (an administrator) called me and said that I had to join the army: "I cannot protect you any longer; you have to join the army."

My unit was a communications company; we were next to the veterinarian station, in the house of Tunja, the veterinarian. There were about 20 of us, soldiers, and 5-6 officers. Drago did me a favour and did not assign me to a combat unit. Major Grkinić was my commander. I think he was Slavonian. I was entrusted with a truck, headquarters' vehicle with communications system for possible work on the terrain. I may have left the backyard with it twice, to fill up fuel and to the service in Rudi Čajavec in Banja Luka. The rest of the time we organised the IKM (improvised command post) in Čage – we made

1 PP – Police station

dugouts and shelters. Lončar Mihajlo from Okučani and mile Ostrolučan were our signalmen. Lončar is a further relative of my wife and I sometimes conversed with him and entered the communications room.

I think that it was 2 – 3 days before May First when a dispatch arrived, probably from the Banja Luka Corps, the point is – from Banja Luka, stating that an attack to Western Slavonia is underway. It was a coded dispatch and I think Lončar decoded it. He himself was surprised by the contents and said that Banja Luka is notifying us on an upcoming attack. I left the room so Lončar would not have problems due to the fact that I heard the contents of the dispatch. I suppose that Lončar then took that message to the headquarters. Grkinić had already left, another officer had replaced him, from the area of Pakrac or Čaglić, married in Okučani2.

I did not notice any particular activities the next day, related to possible withdrawal or fleeing. Personally, I did not tell anything to my family because I did not believe that an action should be undertaken. I call attention to the fact that it was not until the early evening of 01.05. that my family left Dubovac. When the fights began and it became obvious that the Croatian army was attacking, I went home by bicycle and prepared my family for departure. My wife knew how to drive tractor so she left with the children towards Bosnia. I had to go back to the headquarters, but I also saw that I needed to escape.

Early in the evening, warrant officer Đumić and I also left with my communications truck towards Stara Gradiška. Warrant officer Đumić's mother was killed in Medari that day and he had left his automatic rifle at home in Medari that morning, not even assuming that he might need it. Đumić's vehicle did not have an accumulator so I tried to persuade him to haul it so it could start and so we could go to Bosnia. Later he agreed. I went first and he followed me.

In Novi Varoš I caught up with two tanks and further continued to drive behind them. Near Strug I waited for a while for the shooting to quieten. I did not see many vehicles on the road, except for our two vehicles and the tanks I mentioned, and my father-in-law on a bicycle. I did not pay too much attention, but I did not see any damaged or abandoned vehicles along the road.

In Novi Varoš I saw Lovrenac (or Lovrenović) Ostoja who was a barber in Čage - dead. There were some other people by the tractor, alive, and I think that the tractor had a puncture. During the driving, there was constant shooting, but I think that we were not hit, not once. In Okučani I gave a lift to a military police officer, he used to live in Okučani, his father was a forester and I also gave a lift to Miro and Petra, a married couple from Ciglane.

Soon after we had crossed Sava, I decided to go back to Bogićevci where

2 transl.not. – probably meaning: married with a woman from Okučani

my son stayed. I came to the restaurant Šeik in Nova Varoš, I saw launcher's flares, I drove with my headlights off. I decided to turn and return to Bosnia because it was too dangerous to continue. Passing through Varoš and Dobovac I saw barely anyone, I only met Ilija Ribić from Poljane. He was walking down the road and he seemed drunk to me, so I offered to give him a ride towards Bosnia which he refused.

The unit called "Garavi" from the Pakrac area (maybe some 12 people, one or two women) was set up in the Malić houses, at the exit from Novi Varoš and eastwards. They had sidearms and maybe a launcher or two. They were not firing as I was passing through because the Croatian army could not be seen. They were in some sort of a commotion.

There was an anti-aircraft vehicle on the channel of Strug which the Serbs took over from the UN, they did fire towards Prašnik and Pivare. I don't know who they fired at. The Serbian tanks that were under UN's supervision in Stara Gradiška had arrived to Okučani and its environs before the noon, in order to assist in the defence. It is possible that it was those tanks I met in the course of my escapade.

I heard that Nišević Mirko from Dubovac was somewhere on Pustara with a launcher and on 02.05. he was still trying to cover the withdrawal of the refugees.

In Bosanska Gradiška we gathered near the fire department. The next day we went to Urije and tried to get in contact with the units which remained in Slavonia. The contact was established by RUPs3, but the connection was weak and we had nothing to communicate. The Command was trying to obtain some information from the units that were in Slavonia. My family stayed with Barač Nedeljko, native of Donji Varoš, director of the elementary school in Bosanska Gradiška. I assumed that it would be the case so I easily found them.

I give this statement willingly, as I had given the previous one. While giving this statement, I was not threatened nor instigated to state anything that I do not personally recall. I have no objections to the Notice, and I sign this statement personally.

Ended at 10.00 hrs

Supervisor of the official procedure	Citizen
Đuro Šarić	Bačić Ivan

3 mobile radio transmitters; mobile radio sets

ANNEX 143:

UNPROFOR, CODED CABLE, MEETING WITH BABIĆ: A PROPOSAL FOR WESTERN SLAVONIA, 10 MAY 1995

IMMEDIATE

P1/5

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 5
95N=1113

IMMEDIATE

95 MAY 11 -8 :16

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: COLBORNE-MALPAS, ICFY, ZAGREB

DATE: 11 MAY 1995

NUMBER: CZG=605

SUBJECT: Report of meeting with Babic

CODE
RESTRICTED

Please find attached for your information a report of a meeting with Babic held yesterday in Belgrade. It outlines a proposal by the "RSK Government" for West Slavonia. There are also a number of references to ICFY.

ENDALL

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Palais des Nations

95 MAY 11 -8 :24

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10-MAY-1995 22:24 07=UNPROFOR BELGRADE 38 11 609 368 P.01

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

C20-605 2/5

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

CBZ - 077
CBM - 077

PEACE FORCES

LIAISON OFFICE BELGRADE

UNPROFOR
CRYPTO FAX

CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

PAGE 01 OF 04

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, SRSG/ ZAGREB

FROM: KIRUDJA, D-SRSG/CAC TO FRY, BELGRADE

DATE: 10 May 1995

SUBJECT: Meeting with Babic: A proposal for West Slavonia.

1. At a meeting this evening with "Foreign Minister" Babic in Belgrade, he requested that the proposal outlined below be urgently communicated to SRSG Akashi. The proposal was developed after your meeting yesterday and represents the considered views of his "government" as well as those of his "President". The SRSG is further invited to Knin on 16 May, or thereafter if this date is not feasible, to receive the proposal formally. The intention today is to give the SRSG a lead time to study the concepts being proposed in a preliminary form and, should he support the idea, to submit it officially to the Croatian side as a basis for face-to-face negotiation. In the meantime and until the proposal is formally presented to the SRSG, Babic has requested that its contents be considered as UN restricted. Following is Babic's proposal almost verbatim as he presented it.

2. Mr. Kirudja, thank you for your interest and for giving me the opportunity to follow up on yesterday's meeting. Yesterday, two main subjects were discussed: the issue of the departure of Serbs from Western Slavonia and the withdrawal from the separation zone. We are all interested in the fate of the people in Western Slavonia, and we know that the majority want to leave and not

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- Page 2 of 04

remain under Croatian authority. We also know that the Croats have intensified their propaganda campaign to show to everybody that they are a "humane" occupying force of our lands. We also received information today that Serbs are being re-arrested when they are released from prison and arrive home. We would be very grateful if you could contact Mr. Akashi tonight so that this matter be investigated, and our second appeal: we did not receive confirmation that the group which was to be allowed to pass to the RS today actually passed. If you could find out about these two matters and inform us tonight about them, we would be very grateful.

3. We discussed yesterday a model to temporarily solve the issue of Western Slavonia. However, it was not finalized. For all of us, the mandate of the UN forces is undefined. SC Resolution 981 is a general resolution, and the Resolution 990 is also unclear on the engagement of UN forces in Western Slavonia. We heard what the Croatian government's (Granic) position is, and they do not want any further engagement of the UN in Western Slavonia, except to monitor the situation. We expressed our interest for the UNPAs to continue existing; that means the extension of the resolutions up to Resolution 981 (inclusive) as it reaffirms the previous resolutions, especially the Vance Plan. In addition to this, Ambassador Galbright recently confirmed to me that the Vance Plan continues to be effective. When you look at the Sectors East, North and South, the situation has not changed much in relation to the mandate, in spite of the UNPAs not being mentioned in SCR 981. We consider protection to be the essence of the UN forces' activity here.

4. I also want to say that at the next meeting of the RSK Parliament, we will discuss the mandate of the UN forces. Our interpretation of the mandate for Sectors North, East and South is well known to you. I would now like to discuss the mandate for Sector West.

5. During the signing of the agreement of 29 March 1994, Western Slavonia had not been precisely defined in relation to the separation zone, except for the part between the Sava river and the highway. The current government did

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not participate in those negotiations, and we believe that this issue should have been defined in the year following the signing of the agreement.

6. We have worked out a proposal. If the UN and ICFY are interested in preserving the separation zone, as confirmed by Resolutions 981 and 990, and in normalizing the situation, our proposal is for a separation zone to be established in Western Slavonia to cover the entire territory that was under Serb control before 1 May. We also propose the UN to take over control of the entire area, from Okucani to Pakrac, so that this entire area is treated as a separation zone under the exclusive control of the UN. This would be in accordance with the 29 March Agreement, which still exists. It would also be in accordance with Resolutions 981 and 990. That could be the basis on which the UN could proceed, and we would do the same. I know that it may probably be difficult for the Croatian side to agree to this, but that is the only way to resume the negotiation process with Croatia.

7. Our side is interested in three important problems to be resolved:

(a) The people who remained in Western Slavonia to be safe. Under the current circumstances, they could feel safe only with the constant presence of UN forces.

(b) We want free access to the concentration camp in the Jasenovac monument. There should be no Croatian police or authorities in the monument site.

(c) It is important for our future to continue talks with Croatia, but only following the implementation of these first two items. These would be followed by agreement for free access to the highway from Sector East to Sectors North and South.

8. These are our three conditions for any further talks with the Croats. These further talks could be done under the auspices of either the UN or ICFY.

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Of course, it goes without saying that a further condition is that all those who wish to leave Western Slavonia should be permitted to do so as provided in the cessation of hostilities agreement.

9. Our position is well known concerning the other Sectors. We are against the "political" parts of Resolutions 981 and 990 which prejudge the political settlement, treating Krajina as an integral part of Croatia. We will also not accept the UNCRO sign to be used in our territories. Concerning the operational part of the mandate, we agree to the UN role in the implementation of the economic agreement and its previous activities which are in accordance with the Vance Plan. This means that we accept the presence of the UN forces with their hitherto tasks, except for the role of demilitarizing Krajina under the current circumstances, as you can well imagine.

10. Both Martic and Mikelic support the ideas in the proposal which I have relayed to you, meaning the establishment of a separation zone in Western Slavonia under exclusive UN control. We could join the Croats in the talks that they want on the withdrawal from the separation zones after solving the problem of Western Slavonia. It would be good for the SRSG or his associates to meet with us on Tuesday, 16 May, or any day after that date to discuss this.

11. The venue of the meeting is unimportant. It can be anywhere. We would like you to first present this idea to Mr. Akashi, so that we could meet on 16 May, and this idea could even come from Mr. Akashi as a UN proposal. In order for a meeting to be held with the Croats, it would be good if all Serbs from Western Slavonia were released from prison and those who want to leave the territory to be allowed to do so before the meeting. That could help the meeting to be set.

12. Regarding the invitation by ICFY Co-Chairmen to visit Geneva for negotiations, you must realize that we could not accept that invitation under the circumstances. However, if we could define these above mentioned ideas with Mr. Akashi or his associates, then they could be followed up by a meeting with ICFY.

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ANNEX 144:

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MEMORANDUM ON THE VISIT TO ZAGREB AND WESTERN SLAVONIA, 23 JUNE 1995

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Strasbourg, 23 June 1995
aap24.95 (s:\pol)

AS/Pol (1995) 24

POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Croatia's request for membership of the Council of Europe

(Rapporteur: Mr van der Linden, Netherlands, EPP)

MEMORANDUM

on the visit to Zagreb and Western Slavonia (13-15 June 1995)

I. Introduction

1. The Committee, at its meeting in Paris on 1 June 1995, having considered my interim report (AS/Pol (1995) 20), asked me to visit Western Slavonia as soon as possible and to report at the next meeting.

2. Unfortunately, the Rapporteurs of the Committees seized for opinion[1] were unable to accompany me at such a short notice and I therefore carried out the visit alone from 13 to 15 June 1995 (programme attached as Annex 1).

3. I should like to express my sincere thanks to the Czech Ambassador in Zagreb, Mr Havlin, for having organised an extremely useful meeting with the Ambassadors of the Contact Group. Thanks are also due to the Croatian authorities, in particular the special guest delegation, for their assistance and support. Finally, I should also like to thank the European Community Monitoring Mission for its practical support and valuable information.

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[1] Mr Jansson (Finland, LDR) for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rightrs and Lord Dundee (United Kingdom, EDG) for the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries

II. Western Slavonia

4. Fighting broke out in Autumn 1991 between Croat forces and rebel Serb units supported by the JNA (Yugoslav National Army). Subsequently, a United Nations Protected Area (UNPA), called Sector West, was established (see attached maps, as Annex 2). Sector West was unique in that it contained both Croats and Serbs with a confrontation line running through the middle of the Sector. In addition, the municipality of Pakrac was divided in two parts ("Pakrac pocket"). The Croatian army officially did not have forces in the area, although it must be noted that its special police are indistinguisable from regular army elite units. The Serbs did keep armed units in the UNPA. The Zagreb-Lipovac motorway was controlled by Serbs.

5. An Economic Agreement which included the re-opening of the highway was reached on 2 December 1994 between Croatia and the authorities of the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina" ("RSK").

6. However, incidents concerning the use of this motorway resulted in several deaths and led to the motorway being closed again by the Serb authorities at the end of April 1995.

Operation "flash"

7. On 1 May 1995, at 05.30, the Croatian special police, supported by artillery, began an operation to reopen the motorway. With the help of regular Croatian army forces, the operation was concluded on 2 May at 2 pm with the surrender of about 600 armed Serbs.

8. On 2 and 3 May, the "RSK" forces fired a dozen rockets carrying cluster bombs in Zagreb, killing 9 people and wounding nearly 200. Other Croatian towns such as Sisak, Karlovac, Novska, Novagraoiska, Zupania and Dubrovnik were shelled. The Croatian Government showed great restraint by not taking any retaliatory action.

9. Immediately after the military operation, Croatian forces arrested around 1,400 men (the data given by respectively the Croatian authorities, ECMM, ICRC and Serb representatives differ somewhat) who were taken to different centres for screening. Most of these men were subsequently released, however without ICRC being notified despite the latter's formal request. According to the Croatian authorities, 182 men are still being detained and ICRC has been informed of their names and whereabouts.

10. Figures given by the Croat authorities as to the number of Serb fighters killed (188) differ substantially from the figures given by the Serb representatives (400 killed). The Croatian authorities have stated that 127 casualties have been identified and that the process of identifying the others is continuing. International observers were not in a position to say which figures were exact.

11. Uncertainty also exists as to the fate of the wounded Serb fighters, reportedly numbering about 1,000. It would appear from information received from the ICRC that a considerable number of wounded took refuge in Serb-held Bosnian territory and were treated in local hospitals there.

12. The Rapporteur received no reply to specific questions about the various missing persons put directly to President Tudjman and Foreign Minister Granic. It was said that these matters should be seen "in context". The question arises whether the Croatian authorities want to link giving information about missing Serbs to receiving news about Croatian persons missing since 1991.

13. Meanwhile, about 11,000 civilians (according to ICRC data) left Western Slavonia in order to seek refuge in Northern Bosnia and in Sector East. UNHCR which helped with the transport of many of these people has been criticised for having acted too soon and having in fact contributed to an - unwanted - ethnic cleansing of Western Slavonia. Mr Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, stressed that the UN agencies had been under enormous pressure from the Knin authorities, which threatened further attacks on Zagreb, to assist the Serb population in leaving the area.

14. About 2.000 Serbs are said to have remained in the area, mostly elderly people, and the Rapporteur was able to speak to number of them by visiting them in their own houses. A deep-seated mistrust vis-à-vis the Croatian authorities exists, despite the latter's assurances, and it would seem that many Serbs do want to leave the area.

15. As to the return by Serbs who fled at the beginning of the fighting, 50 formal requests have been made and the Croatian authorities have stated they intend to grant these. It remains to be seen whether these requests are incidental or the beginning of a general return. The Croatians expressed their firm intention to promote further returns.

III. Reconstruction

16. On his visit to Western Slavonia, the Rapporteur was accompanied by Dr Ivan Majdac, Croatian Minister and Coordinator for the Establishment of Civil Authority in Western Slavonia, and by Mr Goran Dodig, Head of the Office for Interethnic Relations. I was favourably impressed by their approach to the problems in the area. It is to be hoped that they will receive the necessary support at local level.

17. They stressed that all infrastructural needs were being met by the re-establishment of electricity, water, the opening of banks, shops and schools. The re-establishment of the local economy was a top priority. Many displaced persons could still not return to the area because their villages had been entirely destroyed. I was able to visit several totally destroyed Croatian villages near Pakrac. In one of them, only one man, together with his grandson, had returned to rebuild what had been his home. His wife had been killed when the village had been destroyed. It was shocking to see the degree of destruction caused in the ethnically cleansed villages: nothing had been spared, not even Churches.

18. Croatian officials, also of local authorities, emphasized that they were strongly encouraging civic tolerance in order to enable the two ethnic communities to start living together again. In several meetings with displaced persons, I was impressed by the degree of forgiveness shown by people who had suffered enormously at the hands of the Serbs and who yet were willing to live with them again. This attitude also prevailed in a camp for refugees and displaced persons I visited, and where living conditions were not easy (12 persons on 72 square meters).

19. Police authorities confirmed that there had been no acts of revenge or retaliation. The local police also employed Serbs, coming from other parts of Croatia.

20. Throughout my visit the Croatian authorities at various levels emphasized their awareness of the necessity to making the treatment of the Serb minority in Western Slavonia a show-case and an example for the possible integration of Serbs in Croatia. The hope was expressed that this example would persuade those Serbs who had not yet left to stay and also demonstrate to the Serbs living in the still occupied territories that there was a future for them in Croatia.

21. Representatives of the Serb minority, in particular Mr Dzakula and Mr Ivanovic, formerly leaders of the Serb community in Western Slavonia, strongly criticised the arrest of Serb men (see paragraph 9) who have been separated from their families and detained. Although most of them had subsequently been released, it was alleged that their belongings had been taken away. These measures were said to have convinced many Serb families of the need to seek refuge in Northern (Serb-held) Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia (Sector East).

22. The composition of the recently established "mixed committees", consisting of two Serb and three Croats, to advise local authorities on a variety of administrative measures was criticised in that the Serbs were deliberately put in a minority. I suggested to the Croatian authorities that a different composition, giving equal representation, could go some way in reassuring the Serb minority. In addition, Serbs should be included in the new Croatian administration.

23. It was also claimed that the infrastructure had only been restored in Croatian villages. Promises were not being fulfilled. In meetings with the Croatian authorities I stressed the need to assist both ethnic communities in the reconstruction on an equal basis, and was given formal assurances that this would be the case.

IV. Prospects

24. Following its victory in Western Slavonia, the morale and confidence of the Croatian armed forces are very high.

25. The Knin authorities on the other hand are in disarray by the defeat, which led to the dismissal of the relatively moderate Prime Minister Michelic and the apparent re-establishment of hardliners in control. The Croatian army has largely withdrawn from Western Slavonia, as requested by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 994, and is said only to be guarding the borders to Bosnia. On the other hand, violations of the so-called separation zones in Sectors North and South on both sides were reported to me. Moreover, Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) have moved very close to Knin.

26. The Croatian Government expressed its willingness to negotiate the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into Croatia but it was added that a Cyprus-like situation was inacceptable and that time was running out. Barring any provocation, such as attacks in Zagreb or the unification of the Croat "RSK" with the "RS" (Republic of Bosnians Serbs) no military action was envisaged at least until the end of UNCRO's mandate, which expires at the end of October 1995.

27. Though the Croatian armed forces are thought capable of retaking Sectors North and South by force in a short while, provided Pale and Belgrade do not intervene, very serious risks remain. One is the "RSK"'s possession of ballistic missiles which could cause thousands of casualties in Zagreb and other Croatian cities. Secondly, it is likely that in case of a Croatian attack, most of the 170.000 Serbs living in Sectors North and South would seek refuge in Bosnia, thus exacerbating the already extremely difficult situation there.

28. Despite the good intentions professed by the Croatian authorities, I was struck by pessimism among the international observers about a peaceful solution of the occupied territories, essentially because of Serb intransigence. It was also reported to me that President Tudjman in a recent 50-minute address to the Croatian Parliament on the anniversary of Croatia's independence did not once mention the need of reconciliation with the Serbs.

29. Although the Croatian impatience is understandable in view of the over 350,000 displaced persons, the cutting of major rail- and roadlinks (see attached map, as Annex 3), and their legal claim to the occupied territories undisputed, a new military action would carry enormous risks as well as result in much human suffering.

30. The Croatian Government does not appear to envisage a military solution to Sector East (around Vukovar) at present, given the immediate proximity to Serbia proper. The situation there has been aggravated by the arrival of some 4,500 (according to ICRC) displaced persons from Western Slavonia.There is much speculation about President Milosevic possibly having accepted the return of the other sectors to Croatia, in exchange for Sector East. It must be noted that Belgrade's reaction to the operation in Western Slavonia was remarkably moderate.

V. Future procedure

31. This report will be discussed with the Rapporteurs of the Committees seized for opinion. The latter will probably wish to pay a second visit to Croatia, in particular also to examine the situation of human rights in Croatia proper (situation of minorities, freedom of the media, etc). The Rapporteurs will discuss at what stage they want to request formal and specific commitments from the Croatian authorities on a number of outstanding issues.

32. The question of peace however remains predominant and it is clear that renewed hostilities would at very least delay the procedure. Neither the Committee, nor the Assembly could discuss an Opinion on a request for membership of a country which is actually engaged in a war. → liberation, self defence

33. In addition, transparency on the fate of the missing persons and the actual treatment of the Serb minority in Western Slavonia will give a good indication of the sincerity of the Croatian Government's claims. The Rapporteur will therefore continue to monitor developments closely. It is hoped that the "Phare" programme of the European Union, recently extended to Croatia, as well as the Council of Europe's assistance programmes can have a positive influence.

34. A next report will be presented to the Committee on 4 September 1995.

ANNEX 145:

MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FRANJO TRUĐMAN, RICHARD HOLBROOKE, GENERAL WESLEY CLARK AND PETER GALBRAITH, 18 AUGUST 1995

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Minutes
of the Meeting held on

Date:	**18 August 1995**
Place:	**Presidential Palace, /President's/ Office**
Meeting began at:	**1430 hours**
Meeting ended at:	**1600 hours**
Meeting attended by:	**Richard HOLBROOKE**
Delegation:	**General Wesley CLARK**
	His Excellency Peter GALBRAITH

Present with the President: **Dr M. GRANIĆ, G. ŠUŠAK, Dr M. ŽUŽUL**

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MINUTES

of the discussion between President of the Republic Dr Franjo TUĐMAN and an American delegation led by Mr. Richard HOLBROOKE, held at the Presidential Palace on 18 August 1995.

Began at 1430 hours.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

As I have understood the agenda, Mr. President, we will divide this meeting into roughly two parts. After the introductory part during which we will inform you about our talks in Belgrade, the Ambassador and I would like to talk to you in private, especially since Dr KRUZEL and General CLARK will be having discussions with Minister ŠUŠAK and General ČERVENKO. We will meet with Prime Minister SILAJDŽIĆ at four o'clock. We did not know that he was here, it is a co-incidence, but a very fortunate one. We will meet with SILAJDŽIĆ privately, without any publicity, I hope. SILAJDŽIĆ will probably give it publicity.

PRESIDENT:
Probably.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

Do you agree, Mr. President? First of all, thank you again for receiving us so frequently and for devoting so much time to us. We truly appreciate it. Ambassador FRASURE and Nelson DREW are at the Embassy sending some reports to Washington, so we left them there.

First of all, I would like to inform you about our meetings with President MILOŠEVIĆ. We met with him twice, yesterday the meeting lasted five hours and this morning three hours.

PRESIDENT:

You could have discussed all five continents!

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We could have, but, unfortunately, we spoke about a small part of one continent. Additionally, General CLARK met with General PERIŠIĆ this morning, perhaps he could say something about that conversation. We did not meet with anyone else in Serbia except Minister of Foreign Affairs MILUTINOVIĆ, who is new and sat with them, and that was all. The one word that I could use to describe our talks is "unconvincing". I have used this word publicly and we asked the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon to use it. I have read in the papers that our peace process is picking up pace. This is not true. We are spending a lot of time travelling around, we are using a lot of airplane fuel, but I do not know whether we are making progress or if we are stuck. I really do not know. Unconvincing. Specifically, we

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outlined our peace plan, our complete proposals exactly as we had outlined them to you.

However, we really stressed the President's firm position that we have to make progress. MILOŠEVIĆ listened carefully and did not start, as I thought he would, with a thousand-year-old history of the Serbian people. He started talking about various things and his problem number one was the triple recognition. Out of all the questions we talked about, this was by far his greatest problem. He said, I can quote his exact words… Joe, correct me if I'm quoting his words erroneously … "I cannot do that after humanitarian catastrophe of this magnitude." Did I quote him correctly? (Dr KRUZEL nods in confirmation). Humanitarian catastrophe (unintelligible). By the way, when he says "humanitarian catastrophe", let us be frank in our separate private relationship, he is also referring to the political catastrophe. We saw refugees along the road. Carl BILDT, who came there immediately after us, and met with us yesterday, told us that he had stopped and talked to some of the refugees and those he had talked to did not want to go back to Krajina. On the other hand, the others may want to go back. However, the issue of the refugee return, their right to return, or the issue of their property rights, all of this is of absolutely fundamental importance. In relation to that, I emphasized to MILOŠEVIĆ, as I had emphasized to you too, Mr. President, that the U.S. is firmly convinced that the Serbs who left Krajina, regardless of whether they left voluntarily, were expelled or fled due to combat, must have the right to return, the rights of the citizens of Croatia, and if they decide not to return, a right to compensation for their property. You told us that you had announced all this. It is very important that it be upheld.

PRESIDENT:
But, this must also apply to Croatian refugees from Serbia, from Bosnia…

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Of course. The central …

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
The same principles.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Of course, Mate. If I had to bring our objective down to two goals, if you asked me, "What the hell are you trying to achieve here?" I would put it down to two goals. I'd say, "These two goals, regardless of the order in which they take place, are equal treatment of all three ethnic communities regardless of the country in which they live and a Bosnian state in its current international borders, a sustainable state that will be recognised by its neighbours. There are other issues, but these two problems are *sine qua non*. When I talk about the right of Serbs to return, I think, naturally, of the right of all to return, including the Croats and Muslims. However, let's talk about my conversation with MILOŠEVIĆ and I would like to stress what MILOŠEVIĆ said. He was absolutely resolute in relation to the recognition of Croatia. Concerning the recognition of Bosnia, his position was exactly the same as it was four months ago. He would recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina in its international borders, but he would not recognise the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or IZETBEGOVIĆ. I told him, "I'm not asking you to recognise IZETBEGOVIĆ", and

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we argued about this. This is why I said that the discussion was unconvincing and no conclusion was reached. In connection with Eastern Slavonia, he expressed concerns about the situation there and we said that at president Clinton's request and on his instructions, we were calling upon all sides in this area to refrain from new offensive operations, which definitely includes to Eastern Slavonia, in our view. I especially stressed this because there has been a certain amount of confusion, and I understand in terms of what we object to, or rather not object to in terms of military operations. Two days ago, I talked about this with my friend, the Minister of Defence, and I would like to say very clearly about that famous red, green or orange light in relation to Eastern Slavonia, the USA absolutely firmly holds the belief that any operation in Eastern Slavonia would be really dangerous and would draw MILOŠEVIĆ into the conflict in a way in which he very clearly does not want to be drawn. He does not want to enter this war, he wants to get out of it, but Eastern Slavonia is different. He told us several times that he accepted the principle that Eastern Slavonia was a part of the Republic of Croatia, but he does not want to say it publicly because of the massive disaster he has just experienced. We spoke about negotiations on the resolution over two to five years and about all these gradual processes, but he constantly evaded the issue and we did not achieve much. We continue to affirm the importance of the Croatian problem, peace in Eastern Slavonia and elements of plan Z-4, which could still be implemented. Of course, a large part of the Z-4 plan, as pointed out by Ambassador GALBRAITH two days ago, is now the past, but the principle of the right to return, compensation, equal rights and so on … And now, to put the Croatian issue aside for a moment, Mr President, I'd like to return to where we stand now. We will meet with SILAJDŽIĆ this afternoon. SILAJDŽIĆ and IZETBEGOVIĆ have had a major political row, just as the President CLINTON and Senator DOLE, which is actually very similar, because SILAJDŽIĆ is so close to Senator DOLE. This is truly a factor that complicates the situation. I'd like to ask you first of all, if you could use your influence with SILAJDŽIĆ, tell him that the conflict between him and IZETBEGOVIĆ is only helping his opponents and that we have to cooperate. We will, naturally, tell him this, but it would be useful if this advice were to come from the people in Zagreb that he listens to. I don't know which of you is closer to SILAJDŽIĆ, but this would be really useful.

PRESIDENT:
Not closer than IZETBEGOVIĆ.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Is your personal relationship with SILAJDŽIĆ good?

PRESIDENT:
No, just …

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
A correct one.

PRESIDENT:
Yes, correct.

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:

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During the negotiations, I …

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
VALENTIĆ, the Prime Minister, he has …

PRESIDENT:
All right, we could try.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
I think this could be the message that we could send. The next question, Mr President, is what next. As I mentioned the day before yesterday, in my very long report, I wanted to stress several elements because I spoke for over 30 minutes, I would like to stress one or two key elements that may not have been mentioned then. In my introduction, I said that we would like to hold an international conference in about a month. Mate even talked about the "five plus three" formula in relation to the representation(?) (Translator's note: HOLBROOKE actually said, "as concerns the place where it would be held.") We think that this would be best. The Contact Group plus you, MILOŠEVIĆ and IZETBEGOVIĆ.

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
And the presidents of these five states. A summit meeting …

Richard HOLBROOKE:
I cannot impose a commitment on President CLINTON, but it would be either President CLINTON or State Secretary CHRISTOPHER … I don't know at what level. Let's first ensure that this is a real conference that will produce some real results. The place and level of our representatives will depend on the type of conference, but I know that you want a summit meeting with the five heads of state, including YELTSIN, CLINTON and the three of you. We completely understand this, but the prospects for this are tied to the prospects for success. I also know that both YELTSIN and CHIRAC have proposed direct summit meetings with you. We think that these meetings should be prepared well, but what is important is that we have about four weeks. I'd like to explain this … if this does not happen, if we fail to organise something, we will go down the road of withdrawing the UN from Bosnia and the entry of NATO in one form or another after UNPROFOR. According to the original plan, there would be from 75,000 to 100,000 NATO troops on the ground, 25,000 of whom would be American. This is, as you know, the plan of withdrawal, but it won't be very easy. There is also the plan of further engagement that I talked about two days ago, which involves the organisation of forces that will come after the UN and actively support the Bosnians. We would train, arm and equip them; the weapons embargo would be lifted and there would be bombing, by NATO or the USA, this is the war plan. But this is not what we want. However, if the UN starts withdrawing, this is what we'll get. And the UN will start leaving if we fail to make progress on the diplomatic level. This is why SILAJDŽIĆ worries me so much because he is causing so many problems and we need his support. I told MILOŠEVIĆ all this, by the way, in great detail, not just in 30 seconds, we spoke about this for hours. I don't have any idea if he believed what I told him. But we must not let him out of our grip. He lives in his dream world in Belgrade, as you well know. His

English is really good, he lived in New York. We spoke street slang and I hope that he understood all of it.

In connection with the conference, it has to be preceded by practical progress on the ground. We will try to achieve this. I don't know if we can achieve it until I meet with IZETBEGOVIĆ and SILAJDŽIĆ. At this moment, we are faced with the following basic problems: first, Croatia. He is prepared to recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina in a limited way, but as I said earlier, he will not recognise Croatia right now. Perhaps later, perhaps we could sign a secret agreement, I don't know, because I have not changed our position. I first wanted to talk with you, and my colleagues and I want to talk with our colleagues in Washington. However, of all the problems we discussed, he was the most uncompromising in his position that he would not recognise Croatia in any form at this time although he already has liaison personnel and although he knows that he will have to do it one day, he won't do it now. We all know why. It is because you have just won the greatest victory and he has experienced the greatest defeat since 1389. He considers himself to be (unclear) the Serbian people, he is really … this is a horrifying event. The second issue that we discussed with MILOŠEVIĆ, apart from his problem in relation to recognition, and the most difficult question for us was, "who speaks on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs". We spoke a lot about MLADIĆ and KARADŽIĆ and all these other people and do you know what he told us about KARADŽIĆ? He said and I quote, "The man is a damned crazy maniac." You know, I have never met KARADŽIĆ and whether he … But in connection with Srebrenica and Žepa, he told us, I don't know if this is true, Mr President, but we are just informing you now, he said that he had tried to prevent it, he considered it shameful. When we told him that war crimes had been committed in Srebrenica, he actually agreed and said, "I know." By the way there is no question about it, we have just spoken with American Embassy officials who talked with refugees and …

PRESIDENT:

And what about MLADIĆ and KARADŽIĆ? And the relationship between KARADŽIĆ and MLADIĆ and PERIŠIĆ?

GENERAL CLARK:

I could say something about this.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

We will come to PERIŠIĆ in a minute. He … This is very unclear. I asked him who MLADIĆ was subordinated to, who gave him orders. He answered, I don't know if this is true or not, "I sometimes influence him in limited matters, but other times I cannot influence him." In Srebrenica … he claims that he had nothing to do with it and tried to stop it. However, it happened and I'm not freeing him of responsibility. What I wanted to stress in our discussion about Bosnian Serbs was not history, although history is extremely important and we will talk about this later, but I wanted to stress the fact that we cannot find a solution to the problem in this area if there is no one who can talk on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. And all this game, this … pardon my expression … "crap" because no one talks and so on, is still plaguing us. This is approximately how it went, Mr President. We are going back to Belgrade on Tuesday … on Sunday, today is Friday. We are leaving for Sarajevo tomorrow, we'll meet with SILAJDŽIĆ today, with IZETBEGOVIĆ tomorrow, and then with MILOŠEVIĆ

again on Sunday. If we cannot make progress, we feel we are not making progress, by the end of this … so to say … the second round in which I met twice with you, I'll meet with him twice and three times with the Bosnian government, but every time separately, SILAJDŽIĆ, ŠAĆIRBEJ, IZETBEGOVIĆ … then we'll go back to Washington and tell the President that we have not achieved anything, and the President will have to decide, in consultation with CHIRAC, MAJOR and KOHL, how to proceed. It is very probable that we will then be on the road to a NATO presence on the ground in Bosnia after the UN withdraws. Consequently, in our opinion, we have three or four weeks … This is actually everything that I have to say at this time. I'd be glad to hear your reaction or comments and then I will ask General CLARK to say something about his meeting with General PERIŠIĆ.

PRESIDENT:
I would be very interested to hear something about the conversation with …

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Would you like the General to say something first? Les, go ahead.

General CLARK:
I think that two main things came out at this meeting, Mr President. First is the fact that you are faced with very determined and very grim military circles in Yugoslavia. They put up a map on the wall so that I could see it showing the breakthrough by of the Croatian forces in Bosnia. They showed the advances around Dubrovnik, around Glamoč and the concentration of Croatian forces around Eastern Slavonia. Although they did not issue any threats at any point, they let me know very clearly … they said, "If Croatia were to invade Eastern Slavonia, the Serbs there will fight and there is no way fighting could be limited to the area around the Danube." They also said, "This is why we are massing our forces in order to protect our territory." Therefore, I got a very…

PRESIDENT:
Eastern Slavonia is …

General CLARK:
I was given a very clear message, and from a general who is probably not authorised to say which point could be critical. Nevertheless, it was a very clear message.
I didn't get that message (unclear).

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Perhaps KRUZEL could say something about our talks with MILOŠEVIĆ. Do you have any additional … Can you remember anything else?

General CLARK:
I'd like to say something about MLADIĆ. You asked me to talk to PERIŠIĆ there. That's what I did.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
It was your idea and we did it because it was a good idea.

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General CLARK:
Well, I told him, he told me the military views that I have just relayed to you, I described our plan, what will happen when NATO arrives on the ground, NATO air attacks … He agreed with me in that the balance of power has decisively changed to the detriment of the Bosnian Serbs, there was no question of it, and they can see it. I then said that we had to have peace, we had to achieve peace now, we had little time, and he agreed with this. I also said what Ambassador HOLBROOKE had asked in his report, I asked who or what controlled Bosnian Serbs or could talk on their behalf. He said, he did not answer me, but said, "Perhaps KARADŽIĆ, perhaps … who knows." I said, "Some people say that you control MLADIĆ. Is this true?" Naturally, he denied it. I said, "But he respects you, he is your army comrade," while he said, "No, he's the head of his own army." That's where we ended …

PRESIDENT:
And who is supplying the Serbs?

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
MLADIĆ controls him, he doesn't control MLADIĆ.

PRESIDENT:
But PERIŠIĆ is supplying …

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
Mr President, PERIŠIĆ was the commander of Mostar when we captured it and MLADIĆ was his superior officer. PERIŠIĆ was then promoted after losing Mostar and Tasovčići and all this; he was then promoted and taken back to Belgrade. This is the complex, MLADIĆ was his superior officer for 15 years …

General CLARK:
After this, I had a feeling that we could not control MLADIĆ via PERIŠIĆ. If this is so, PERIŠIĆ denied it at any rate.

PRESIDENT:
All right, I agree, there is this personal reason … But with regard to supplies and so on, Serbia and PERIŠIĆ are doing it.

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
MILOŠEVIĆ practically controls …

PRESIDENT:
Not entirely … But without Serbia, without the supplies from the Yugoslav Army, MLADIĆ could not be waging this war.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
This is obvious.

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
It is absolutely so.

General CLARK:

The issue is whether he is really willing to be the channel and a certain force … General PERIŠIĆ … But he did not indicate it. Perhaps he will at some future meeting. I told him that I would perhaps be talking to him again if we come to Belgrade again, on Sunday.

PRESIDENT:

Didn't you meet with MLADIĆ?

GENERAL CLARK:

No.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

Joe, could you perhaps reconstruct the conversation a little more broadly than I did, especially yesterday in connection with Eastern Slavonia? For the President. I have a feeling that there may have been some other nuances in addition to what I stated and I think this was the most important part of the conversation.

Dr KRUZEL:

Mr President, I think that President MILOŠEVIĆ agrees to the issue that is the most important for you, i.e. that Eastern Slavonia is Croatian. He is faced with a political problem and I think that we have to find a way of accepting what he has agreed to, the fact that this is Croatia, his expression of agreement that this problem will be resolved in the future. However, this should be an agreement that will be politically acceptable to President MILOŠEVIĆ in a certain way and which will at the same time enable us to find a solution in Bosnia. This is why we will need your help to find a way to explain that this will be completed in two, three years, sometime in the future. However, this must not complicate our immediate task, which is finding a solution in Bosnia.

PRESIDENT:

All right. I have already said that the main problem for MILOŠEVIĆ is a solution in Bosnia and this is connected with … I see.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

We would be interested … I know that my colleagues must soon be leaving to attend this other meeting, but before that, we would be interested in your possible reactions to our report about where we stand right now, especially in connection with what you have just mentioned when you replied to Dr KRUZEL … the problem that Bosnia is now the focus. Do you think that if we concentrated on Bosnia now and met with IZETBEGOVIĆ and MILOŠEVIĆ in turn, that we could achieve something? Or do you think that MILOŠEVIĆ will continue to go round in circles until we topple into an abyss?

PRESIDENT:

I think that MILOŠEVIĆ is interested in finding a solution for political and economic reasons, but this solution has to be such that the Serbian part of Bosnia

would have the right to this support, this confederal leaning on Serbia, and he would accept this.

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
And a referendum.

Richard HOLBROOKE:
What referendum are you talking about?

Dr Mate GRANIĆ:
The referendum on separation in a few years …

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Aha, on secession after a certain number of years. I understand.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
Mr President, the essence of their question is whether we will agree to them talking to IZETBEGOVIĆ and MILOŠEVIĆ without Eastern Slavonia being a topic, that it be frozen as a topic. This is their question.

PRESIDENT:
No, no.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
They should be told clearly.

PRESIDENT:
I said it. My position is based on MILOŠEVIĆ saying that he recognises that Eastern Slavonia and Baranja …

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
But he won't say it publicly.

PRESIDENT:
This cannot happen as long as he does't say it and this is what I said last time. This mustn't happen because MILOŠEVIĆ, despite the fact that he has a fairly good sense that he cannot go any further, still has a Byzantine approach thinking that because he won't recognise /it/, he might be able to get it in the future.

So, there can be no agreement to lift or suspend sanctions until he recognises Croatia.

The proof, he told us in Geneva two years ago that if he could get rid of HADŽIĆ, MARTIĆ would be his man and we would have the solution to the Serbian problem within Croatian borders.

However, MARTIĆ came as his man, and things got considerably worse. So, this means from his side. Then, instead of NOVAKOVIĆ, he appointed General MRKŠIĆ, also from the Yugoslav Army. This General MRKŠIĆ was even more radical than before. Therefore, he cannot be completely believed.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

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Mr President, this has been very useful … Maybe we could now split up into two groups because I know that Minister ŠUŠAK and Joe would like to talk, as would General CLARK and your general, and then we could talk for a few minutes. And then we have to go and meet with SILAJDŽIĆ. Do you agree?

PRESIDENT:

All right. Is MILOŠEVIĆ prepared, but we can talk about it later, to discuss problems in a wider context apart from with you, with some European … he has relied on France and England to a large extent and he signalled that he would like to talk directly.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

What do you think about this, Joe?

Dr KRUZEL:

To talk with you directly, Mr President?

PRESIDENT:

That too.

Richard HOLBROOKE:

I would … Primarily, when he is with us, he tells us that he would like the US to be the negotiator, but maybe he will say something completely different to Carl BILDT, I don't know. He told us that he wanted us to be the negotiators since we are the only world superpower. Whatever the case, we are here to do everything we can. Secondly, in connection with a meeting between MILOŠEVIĆ and you, I can tell you which game MILOŠEVIĆ is playing. He wants to meet with you in private, he wants a private meeting with IZETBEGOVIĆ and he wants to divide the Federation. There is no doubt about this, I would do it in his place and I would like to stress as much as possible that in my opinion, you should not meet with him in private, nor should IZETBEGOVIĆ. This must be a part of a process that will lead to a meeting between the three of you. This is my position. Would you like to add anything, Joe? … If he were to meet with you in private, whether in private or in secret, it will become public and the world will have an impression that the two of you are dividing Bosnia. This would lead to a crisis in Sarajevo, it would split the Federation, and as you know, we keep repeating that the USA will never agree to an involuntary agreement, a division. The two of us sat in this room many times and you tried to convince us, I know that you tried to convince the Ambassador as well, that you will never divide Bosnia with Belgrade. We have taken these assurances very seriously. And if Bosnia were divided between Zagreb and Belgrade, America would no longer support Croatia in western institutions. We would not do it. I cannot speak for the next president of the USA, but CLINTON will be president for at least a year and a half, and I think in the next five and a half years. He will be elected again and this would not be acceptable to us. Your secret meeting with MILOŠEVIĆ, which he would make public, would have been planned for this purpose. Would you like to add anything, Joe?

Dr KRUZEL:

I agree with Ambassador HOLBROOKE in connection with two things: first, that President CLINTON will be elected again and second, it is not only the USA, but the whole western community that would not easily forgive you for this.

PRESIDENT:
This is perfectly clear.

Dr KRUZEL:
However, Mr President, the meetings with you and your assistants have completely convinced us that the dimensions of the solution for Bosnia, which we presented to you, were acceptable to you. Naturally, you will consider the details. But Eastern Slavonia remains a big problem. I know that you said that you would prefer a peaceful solution to this problem. Would you promise to try this at least for a certain time? To attempt to find a peaceful solution?

PRESIDENT:
Yes, for several months, but not years.

PRESIDENT:
This was historical, the Serbs have never had, as I have already said, any borders between Croatia and Serbia, except the Danube, the natural border if it exists at all, and it does, even from a military tactical point of view, this border exists.
Therefore, I am for it, we can see for example, until the UNCRO mandate expires, or I don't know what, for all attempts for a peaceful solution, but if there is no peaceful solution, we still have a hundred thousand expelled persons and the mood of the Croatian people is such that we cannot leave this to some kind of speculation …

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
Unless there is recognition.

PRESIDENT:
If there is a political solution, yes. I am for, as I said, the return of a democratically elected government and the presence of the international community, either the European observers or the United Nations, to oversee the implementation of human and ethnic rights.
However, gentlemen, let us go back to an issue that constantly comes up regarding a supposed agreement between MILOŠEVIĆ and me, the agreement that never took place, and about whether this is acceptable to the USA. Yugoslavia itself had been in a state of crisis since it was created in 1918 before the Second World War when bourgeois politicians headed Yugoslavia, I have had more experience than the ones of today and even more democratic experience. Then there was the so-called Croatian-Serbian agreement under the auspices of England and France and with the agreement of America. And then, please keep in mind, in order to save Yugoslavia, this Croatian-Serbian agreement was made to create the Croatian *Banovina* comprising Herceg-Bosna and Bosnian Posavina, while there were supposed to be talks about either autonomy or division concerning the remaining part. This was the situation when the Yugoslav monarchy disappeared in 1941.
Gentlemen, you are also probably acquainted with a NATO and European Union map from 1990 and 1993 …

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General CLARK:
I don't remember that I (unclear) any NATO /?map/ like this …

PRESIDENT:
NATO or the European Union … This is the division between the eastern, Russian … whatever Russia was like … and the West.

General CLARK:
This is certainly not an official NATO document …

PRESIDENT:
Not as an official document, but as a strategic consideration, a concept …

General CLARK:
Mr President, I can tell you that NATO does not have any strategic concept of this kind. I'd like to say that I have seen all these documents, but this one is not there.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:
This has been used so that we can be accused of supposedly negotiating with MILOŠEVIĆ. This is not our … (unclear, several voices).

PRESIDENT:
This is a map from Brussels. And to be …

Richard HOLBROOKE:
Could I please check if I understand this map? I didn't want to talk about it, but the question has been raised. I'd like this to be clear to me. You are saying that the map published by London newspapers does not correspond to your vision of Bosnia and that you described what this map looked like to Paddy ASHDOWN, but that this is not something that you personally support.

PRESIDENT:
Of course. However, I support Henry Kissinger's view. He said: "If we could not save Yugoslavia, we cannot save Bosnia and Herzegovina."

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Mr President, since we have now cleared up the matter of the map, so we can say that this was not your map, but that you were drawing someone else's map… The other day you said, at lunch…

PRESIDENT:
I did not describe that map etc.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
No, obviously, since we understand your explanation now, we will say that you told us that this map, which appeared in a London newspaper, was not your idea but someone else's idea and that you were explaining it. But you also said, I'm not

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interested in Henry Kissinger in that sense… You know, Henry Kissinger had a lot of crazy ideas in his time…

PRESIDENT:
But they were pretty logical…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
He is not stupid, but he is not speaking on our behalf here. I would like to make it very clear, you made it very clear in our conversation today that you and MILOŠEVIĆ would not divide Bosnia. This is extremely important. However, you also just quoted Kissinger and said that he said "They could not preserve Yugoslavia, and they can't preserve Bosnia either", and you agreed with that. These two statements don't seem congruent to me. We must be able to tell President CLINTON, very clearly, that you share the American view in which the future of this region includes Bosnia as a separate nation. I would like to make sure that I have not missed something.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:
As a separate state.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
…Union, federation, we understand. You know what I mean, a single country in the UN, within its present borders. Let's leave aside the matter we discussed, union, federation, republic… We do not want a division of Bosnia or its disintegration…

PRESIDENT:
Dear Mr HOLBROOKE, I did not mention the agreement of '39 offhand. The communists wanted to resolve that problem, to alleviate it by pronouncing the Muslims a separate nation, but they did not alleviate it, they made it more difficult. And please, you cannot have peace in Bosnia today if you do not recognise the Serbs' right to form ties with Serbia, and equally so, the Croats' right to form ties with Croatia. There is no practical or theoretical possibility to achieve peace, we have to be clear about that. That is the only possible way to create the prerequisites for a new stable international order in the former Yugoslavia.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Mr President, in my long, too long, presentation the day before yesterday I emphasised many important points. Some of them also represent changes in US policy. One of the things I've said in my presentation was that the US accepts the fact that the Bosnian Serbs should have a separate and parallel relationship with Serbia. This is the change in the US position. This was initially the position held by Alain JUPPE. We agree to include this in the future. Therefore, let us agree to agree with this.

PRESIDENT:
I agree.

Dr MATE GRANIĆ:
Plus a referendum…

PRESIDENT:
In two, three, five years… Possibility…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
A referendum, of course, but the matter of secession and separatism leads to another matter, and that is how to implement it. When Czechoslovakia voted to be divided in two, the US and the rest of the world did not say a word. Why? Because this was a fair vote in peacetime. Even in Ethiopia, the international community led by the US and UN agreed with the referendum for Eritrea after a specific number of years, and Eritrea is now a member of the UN. That is a separate matter.

PRESIDENT:
Let me add to this, gentlemen, what I have said, this historical and strategic review of the matter. It is absolutely certain that from the Churchill-Stalin agreement on the fifty-fifty division of the interest spheres in the former Yugoslavia, it was not just a whim on part of those two, but that their staffs and the analyses of the possible solution to the problem stood behind them.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Mr President, I wonder, considering the time, whether the Ambassador and I could have a few minutes with you. Besides, I would really like Dr KRUZEL to talk to Minister ŠUŠAK because the day before yesterday I took up the Minister's time for talking to Joe. And they wanted to talk. And your Chief of Staff is also waiting for us, and SILAJDŽIĆ is waiting for us too. We see each other often and we will come back again. Do you agree?

PRESIDENT:
I agree, but just one more sentence. Without perceiving this historical depth, this division which practically led to such a terrible war, for which Western Europe bears great responsibility. For if Western Europe had not allowed this aggression of the Yugoslav communist army and Serbia, we would not have the situation we have today.

Therefore, without perceiving all the essentials of the problem, we cannot come out of the war and provide for the future. Therefore, by offering semi-solutions we will not fulfil the requirements of the time.

PETER GALBRAITH:
Allow me to say something, too, Mr President. We understand this aspect and since President CLINTON came to office, we have displayed great sympathy in that respect, regarding the importance of emphasising the territorial integrity and independence of Croatia. You have seen this both in our policy and in the manner it has developed since the BUSH administration which, to be honest, was reluctant to recognise Croatia, and did not agree with its present borders. Thanks to us the UN recognised you in early '93, you saw what I did in accordance with President CLINTON's instructions, and I affirmed this very publicly. However, the prerequisite for that was the territorial integrity of Croatia and also of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A little while ago you asked if the so-called agreement, which never existed, would be acceptable for the US or not. The answer is very clear: it could never be acceptable for

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the US. We simply could not participate in a division of Bosnia under any circumstance. Secretary HOLBROOKE was speaking for the present government. I can only speak from my own perspective based on 14 years of working with Congress, whereby I mean that any such plan would cause a very strong reaction in Congress and it would be a disaster.

PRESIDENT:
I pointed out yesterday, so if you accept what they said, that the Serbian part has the right to rely on Serbia, then there are no differences actually, as long as there is no hidden idea behind it that Croatia could thereby be returned into a Yugoslav framework.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
No, of course not.

Dr MATE GRANIĆ:
(Indistinct) … views, there are no great differences, but we fear… (voices mix).

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Mate, this administration never had any absurd ideas about the renewal of Yugoslavia. What Ambassador GALBRAITH wanted to say is exactly…

PRESIDENT:
Mr EAGLEBURGER was not alone in his efforts to…

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:
That was the former administration.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
That's exactly what I wanted to say. I'm so glad you mentioned EAGLEBURGER. The former administration had this absurd idea… BAKER's speech in Belgrade, EAGLEBURGER, SCOWCROFT… That's in the past.

PRESIDENT:
And Ambassador ZIMMERMANN.
(Part of the delegation leaves).

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
We actually discussed some of these issues, but I would like to discuss them on a more personal level. First of all, Eastern Slavonia and MILOŠEVIĆ. A little while ago you said that nothing would be happening in Eastern Slavonia in the next few months, but that after the expiration of UNCRO's mandate, you might take certain actions.

PRESIDENT:
If there is no progress in the negotiations.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I understand. I would like to be very honest, because our administration has been giving you different signals about military activity in the past months. In November we asked you not to attack, and you did not. In March I flew over here and we agreed, and then you and GORE announced it in Copenhagen, and you did not attack. But then the war started again. And when the war started again, and when you went into Western Slavonia, both Ambassador GALBRAITH and I realised the strategic importance of that operation and the pressure it imposed on the Serbs, so in Washington we adamantly maintained that we should show understanding for the military operation, although we pointed out the right of the Croatian people.

PRESIDENT:

And if the Serbs had observed the agreement at the time, I would not have gone ahead. But they degraded not only the Croatian government, but also the Croatian people, and they killed my men out there. Therefore, I was not the one who allowed or chose aggression for no reason. One day they open the oil pipeline, the next they close the highway, etc.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr President, I want to be absolutely honest with you, speaking not only as a US official, but also as a person who cares about this matter, as an individual, as a man who considers himself a friend of Croatia, and I certainly consider myself a friend… (indistinct) … and Ambassador (indistinct) … that you did much to make a peaceful solution possible, and that you had justification for your military operation in Western Slavonia. And I always defended it in Washington. You will remember that the two of us met in London right after that, we met in private, and then we went to the US Embassy and met with GORE. It was a very dramatic exchange. Some wanted GORE to tell you to withdraw from Western Slavonia, and we said "absolutely not", you must stay there, you closed the back door, it is your country. Then we discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje. And there we again said "go ahead". As you know, we were publicly saying we were concerned, but, privately, you knew what we wanted. And you improved the situation again, you strengthened the Federation etc. Then the issue of Knin appeared and of Sector North and South. At that point we were in a very… Peter was involved in talks with BABIĆ about the Z-4 plan, there was much confusion… You went ahead. It was a triumph from a political and military point of view, and he used the situation again, he helped again. The only problem are the refugees.

If you could bring back those people, if you could hold a speech and say that the war is over, to return… Most of them will not return… But tell them to return, emphasise it, at least mention that they should return…

PRESIDENT:

I would be very content if about 10% of them returned…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

All right, tell them to return, give them compensation, but if we leave aside the human issue for a minute, I will never forget it, but let's leave it aside for now, you again helped the situation. I would like to be make myself clear, since I told you how I feel, secretly and in my heart, which is that you did great things to help peace. I do not feel the same about Sector East, Eastern Slavonia. I am firmly convinced that this

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would be a different situation because it is on the Serbian border, and the President has authorised me to tell you that we would like to ask you to consider symbolically withdrawing part of your units from the edge of the region under UN protection. You are building up your forces there and artillery fire is constantly being exchanged, on some days this fire is more intense, between the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and you. MILOŠEVIĆ is also building up his forces. MILOŠEVIĆ told me to tell you that he would also like to ask you to consider withdrawing some units in a visible way. You just have to withdraw them ten miles, 15 miles, just a symbolic gesture. If there is a crisis, you can have them back there in an hour. But do something so people would understand that you are prepared to negotiate peacefully about Eastern Slavonia. And don't forget, Mr President, we made a public statement… And I told MILOŠEVIĆ who knows how many times, Eastern Slavonia is part of Croatia. We will never change our position. On behalf of President Clinton, I ask you, since I have talked to MILOŠEVIĆ about it, withdraw a part of your units, publicly, in the next few days. Let the world see that you are contributing to the President's peace initiative, which our delegation is representing. Do this, please.

PRESIDENT:
All right, I agree. I am really for a peaceful solution.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
I know you are.

PRESIDENT:
You know, 200 of my men have been killed and 1,400 have been wounded, and if I can effect a peaceful solution, fine. Although the entire Croatian public opinion and the army, they are all ready to move to…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Of course. You know, if you attack in Sector East, and MILOŠEVIĆ stays out of the conflict, you will win. However, we think he will not be able to stay out.

PRESIDENT:
I know.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
Thank you. Secondly, I don't think we have to repeat our earlier conversation. I also wanted to bring up the matter of the secret meeting with MILOŠEVIĆ, but we have already resolved that. MILOŠEVIĆ told me something really interesting. I am new in this region, I've been coming here only three or four years now, and you have, of course, lived the history of your country. And you are truly the father of modern Croatia. You will be a great figure in history if everything turns out the way I think it will. I was watching MILOŠEVIĆ, and at one point, this morning… We were talking about Bosnia almost all the time… He was fuming, criticising the developments in Krajina, saying he could never recognise you under these circumstances, maybe later… And then he suddenly said, "You know, after all, everything in this region boils down to the Croats and Serbs, we must reach an agreement with the Croats some day, we must, we must resolve that, because that is the history of this region, and the

history of this region is the difficult relation between the Croats and Serbs." He was very agitated when he said all that.

PRESIDENT:
Don't you think that a meeting in the next few days would be…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
It would split up the Federation. Until the Bosnian matter is resolved… What I heard, while he was talking… He talked about KARADŽIĆ most of the time, that "damn crazy maniac", and he really does hate him, he's not acting. But, you know, it's like a squabble between two communists, between Djilas and Tito. And Stalin and Kaganovich before them. He said more than once that Bosnia was the main problem, but then, in the end, he said "It boils down to Croats and Serbs". I think we should freeze the situation in Croatia such as it is now. You have regained 90% of the territory you lost, 26% of your territory was under enemy occupation before, and now… How much is it now?

PRESIDENT:
4.6% of the land area. If we take the sea into account, the percentage is 2.8.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
I can openly call you a liberator of your country. First a creator and then a liberator. You've won back 98% of the territory, if you count the water, and since you have the most beautiful coastline in Europe, let's count the water too. You now have a chance to consolidate, to show that you want to contribute to peace, by freezing the situation in Slavonia, by this public withdrawal of some units… I have asked you to do this, and you said you would do it… By focusing on the Federation and helping us arrive at a solution in Bosnia, and then we will resolve Slavonia. The US President told us to tell you, and to tell MILOŠEVIĆ and IZETBEGOVIĆ, that we have just a few weeks. We would like to convene this big international conference. Of all the leaders in this region you are the one we have met with most often, you've mostly met with CLINTON, GORE, CHRISTOPHER, with me. I have spent the greatest amount of time in these rooms. We are ready to cooperate with you so Croatia would become part of the West. If you move against Eastern Slavonia, not just now, all this will be ruined for us.

PRESIDENT:
You don't have to waste your time with that. But let us achieve in this time…

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
But Mr President, we will not make progress in the next few weeks. Next month I would like to focus on Bosnia. I cannot make progress in Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia at the same time. And MILOŠEVIĆ might show that he is ready to make progress in Bosnia, but not where Slavonia is concerned. And a secret meeting between you and him, now, is just an attempt to break up the Federation. If you help us by offering us support in the course of one month, this is very difficult for you, but you are the winner… In today's triangle between Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo, you are at the top of the triangle, not MILOŠEVIĆ. And this annoys him indeed. But you are the winner. Don't overdo it, freeze the situation, please, consolidate, cooperate

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with Ambassador GALBRAITH regarding public statements on peace, restraint and return or compensation for the Krajina refugees. And let's deal with Bosnia, let's deal with the Bosnian Serbs, let's deal with recognition, and we will see what we will achieve. Give us a little room, diplomatic (indistinct). By the way, you will notice that I did not mention restraint in Livanjsko Polje, I did not mention restraint in Western Bosnia, where the Federation units are active. It has a different dimension. We want restraint everywhere. But I draw a very, very strong line regarding Eastern Slavonia. Because what is happening in Bosnia must be linked to the negotiations in Bosnia. It's a very delicate matter. But here we are, Mr President, and I am grateful that you made time for me. I don't think I will be able to convince MILOŠEVIĆ to recognise Croatia now. However, on the other hand, taking a long-term view, Croatia is the one he will actually recognise, not Bosnia. But for the short term we must focus on Sarajevo. So I ask you for some negotiating flexibility. This implies that the more you offer us now, the more flexibility, restraint and leadership you show now internationally, the faster Croatia will become part of Western Europe. And this is where you belong.

PRESIDENT:

As you said, all the steps I have taken contribute to the resolving of that problem in that way.

PETER GALBRAITH:

Mr President, in that context, perhaps in the next few days, as Secretary HOLBROOKE suggested, perhaps in the next few days this symbolic withdrawal could be carried out, and some sort of statement could be issued about wanting to…

PRESIDENT:

I have a press conference today at 1800 hours, and I will…

PETER GALBRAITH:

I think that would be a good idea.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That would be great. You say this today, don't refer to my visit, just give the statement. But let's send a message to MILOŠEVIĆ, let's say, privately, that this is a reaction… That would be great.

PETER GALBRAITH:

As for Eastern Slavonia… As Secretary HOLBROOKE said, nothing can be done in the next month, no steps that could resolve the problem. I know this because, as you know, I am obviously in contact with the so-called Krajina Serbs regarding that. Perhaps some small steps could be taken that would show some sort of progress. For instance, some displaced persons could be returned, and some other steps could also be taken, even in the context of some protected villages or something. Actually, I don't know, I'm just thinking aloud about some small steps that would show that the wall is cracking there.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Exactly.

PETER GALBRAITH:
In order to help you to an extent… This, of course, cannot be conditioned on anything, but I think we could achieve it as part of the efforts to tear down this wall.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
I would like to make something clear, particularly because you mentioned EAGLEBURGER. The US government will never, ever accept any changes of Croatian borders. They are your borders. We will support you. However, just now… Because you have won in this war, you have won the war in Croatia, except in Eastern Slavonia, and this you can do later, and you are winning in Bosnia and I hope you will go on winning until we achieve peace… Let's suspend Eastern Slavonia, let's deal with what Peter has mentioned, and let's not make it condition of any specific later deadlines. Thank you so much for your comments today. They have given me great encouragement, and we will stay in close contact. When is your press conference?

PRESIDENT:
At six.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:
We will be with SILAJDŽIĆ. And we'll be watching television. Thank you for your time, Mr President.

PRESIDENT:
Thank you for your efforts.

(Ended at 1600 hours.)

ANNEX 146:
RSK, MINUTES OF THE RSK ASSEMBLY, 8 FEBRUARY 1995

1995, 8 February

Knin

Speeches by Milan Martić, Borislav Mikelić and Milan Babić at the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which discussed the process of negotiation with the Republic of Croatia and Plan Z-4

_____

(...)

The first and the only item on the agenda:

THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WITH CROATIA
IN THE LIGHT OF THE CROATIAN DEMAND FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF
THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE POLITICAL&SECURITY
CONDITIONS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

(...)

MILAN MARTIĆ (RSK president):

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the assembly,

Just as many times so far, and that will also frequently be the case in the future, the Serbian people and the Republic of Serbian Krajina are finding themselves in the position, against their will and wish, to say a determined "no" to the international mediators and to their attempts to force us to accept an international peace plan which does not meet even a minimum of our national and human rights and interests. As you know quite well, the Republic of Serbian Krajina did not even consider the plan of the Z-4 group29

(...)

The possible estimate of certain international subjects and of Croatia according to which the threat of cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate is an ideal situation for deceiving the scared Serbs is just a mistaken estimate and nothing else. The Serbs are not scared by the possible departure of the peacekeeping force and they cannot be tricked.

(...)

As for accepting the concept of so-called peaceful reintegration of Krajina into Croatia, can we accept that? Can we defame all the victims of this war? Can we agree to our own death? Life in Croatia would be worse than any death. Life in Croatia - would that be any life?

[...]

BORISLAV MIKELIĆ ((RSK prime minister)

[...] To put it simply, the peacekeeping force arrived in this area which was proclaimed a protected zone until a solution is found between the two warring sides. We have not yet come up with a solution or initiated talks about possible political solutions with which we can also disagree, but we can start talking. Therefore, to say the least, the decision of the Z-4 group, which was also involved in the cease-fire agreement and economic negotiations, is provocative for our side, for the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Their decision to deliver this officially to us prompted consultations of our leadership at all levels; thus, the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina officially informed them that we cannot even consider such a document before the definition of the position of the United Nations and the Security Council, that is, before their decision whether or not UNPROFOR, the peacekeeping force, will remain in the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and whether Krajina will remain a protected zone [...]

MILAN BABIĆ (foreign minister in the RSK government)

[...] As regards Republika Srpska, I had the opportunity to visit Pale [seat of the Serbian para-state in Bosnia&Herzegovina] with the state delegation, and they promised us that the plans which have been agreed will be realized if we are militarily threatened. As regards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I did not get any guarantees of that kind - maybe some other people in the state leadership have some information - other than the promise that we shall get I don't know how many tons of food and ammunition.

What other intervention is possible? In our public appearances we even tried, gently, in this period of crisis set off by UNPROFOR, to draw attention to our situation, and to prompt a greater response of the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The refusal of the president of Serbia [Slobodan Milošević] to accept the Z-4 plan of the mini-contact group was a great encouragement for everyone. However, I would also like to see a real relation and not just a political possibility. [...]

ANNEX 147:
MILITARY FRONTIER PROVINCE BETWEEN THE HABSBURG AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES, CA. 1600-1800, (VOJNA KRAJINA)

Video clip: General Ratko Mladic speaking to media in Knin – 30 July 1995

General Ratko Mladic, the legendary commander of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska army, an old acquaintance and one of the Serb legends. So this is an opportunity to use the presence of General Mladic to address you and to ask him questions concerning the current situation which is of great importance to the Serb people, critical. So I now give the floor to General Mladic and will not be taking up any more of your time. So, Mr. General, please go ahead.

"Thank you very much. If I could I would like to take this opportunity to use the media in order to address the people, to greet the people of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. We are here together. I've always been here even if I left and was away for a while. I never left here.

"Maybe for starters Mr. General how do you perceive the situation as a whole in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina?

"Currently, I would say that the situation is quite complicated due to the extensive aggression being conducted by the Croatian armed forces against the Republika Srpska and the goal of their operations is to cut off the Republic of Srpska Krajina and that with the use of their weapons and their mediators and pressure by the international community to enforce a solution in the area by means of force. But I hope that with the help of good organisation and the functioning of all segments of the Serb people in both the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina the outcome will be resolved successfully. And I think the Croats made a crucial mistake in this war which is going to cost them gravely.

"Do the Serbs have enough strength to withstand the Muslims and the Croats?

"The Serb people have enough forces and sufficient strength and had countries from the German and Islamic bloc not provided support, unfortunately along with the support of some others, they would have lost this war long ago. Every prolongation of this war is catastrophic, first of all for those who instigated it, and by this I mean the Croatian armed formations.

"Mr. General, from a strategic point of view, in my humble opinion, I think the Croat forces are very stretched across the territory now and towards the defence lines of our Serb defense forces. To what extent with respect to our strategy can this be of use for a successful strategic strike to retake and liberate our territories?

"I won't address this question. You pose a good question taking into consideration the fact that you express typical journalist curiosity. I wouldn't answer your question with any particularly high degree of precision. Time will show and time will answer your question.

"Mr. General, what is the current situation in the Grahovo and Glamoc battlefields?

"The Croatian Army formations have attacked and have entered Grahovo and partially into Glamoc. But I do hope that we will retake these and other occupied territories of the Republic of Srpska very soon.

"Amongst other issues we are interested in the situation in Grahovo and Glamoc in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Krajina Corps. Numerous rumours are being spread by the public, even by some public information agencies in the Serb territories that there is insufficient defence coordination between the Republic of Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska there are even rumours and attempts to bring unrest among the population. There are talks of some sort of selling out or surrender of our liberated lands for a "greater gain"?

"First of all, I wouldn't want to comment calculated propaganda of a base intensity. As far as I'm concerned the Serb population is a unified one – in the same from Kupa and Korana and all the way to Timok and South Morava. I feel that the Serb people in those territories, as should all other peoples on the planet, have the same interests, the same state and remaining structures of such a state. And I believe that with regard to that, what is going on in every part of those territories, needless to say, as with every individual on the planet that Serbs should be allowed to demonstrate an interest in at least the same degree as any other modern state demonstrates for its citizens living within their state or in foreign territory.

"Surprised you by his presence but this doesn't mean that they have asked me many questions up to now and they know what I think [inaudible].

"You posed a good question. This isn't the first time the Ustasha formations attacked our lives.

"That was a good question. This isn't the first time the Ustasha formations attacked our lives. However, I believe the time has come that our people as a whole need to realize and which many have come to realize during this war and which I had indicated. I believe terrible mistakes have been made by individuals who claimed the war with the Croats was over once and for all or that it would be over within 7 days and then in the lines of separation, numerous check-points were being opened, customs zones, and in some places there were even soccer games being held. As you can see, these proved to be costly decisions resulting in the loss of lives, numerous refugees and burnt villages, but I hope our people have understood this and that they have enough strength, and that they will muster enough strength so that this aggression by Croatia which has been present with its armed forces during the whole time of this war in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina be avenged and so that we send them back to where they belong.

"I just want to send my regards to the people, that they remain resolute in defending their century-old historical hearth and graves and that they don't give in to any form of provocation or any form of propaganda because it is only with the means of our forces

Yugoslavia: A Country Study



Source: Based on information from United Kingdom, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, *Yugoslavia, 2: History, Peoples, and Administration,* London, 1944, 20.

Figure 2. Military Frontier Province Between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, ca. 1600–1800

that we are creating our State. A state can be made with its own children and so many of our wonderful children have given their lives for both the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republika Srpska which should motivate the rest of us who are still alive and on our feet to apply additional efforts and that we remain focused on the finale of this war.

Until the final victory.

That's right. Thank you.

ANNEX 148:
RSK ASSEMBLY, SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE FIRST EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE RSK, KNIN, 8 FEBRUARY 1996

A SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES

of the first extraordinary session of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ Assembly,

held in Knin on 8 February 1995, starting at 12:40 p.m.

A total of 75 deputies responded to the first call.

The extraordinary session was convened at the written request of 30 deputies with only one item on its agenda.

1. Negotiation process with the Republic of Croatia in the light of the request for termination of the UNPROFOR mandate submitted on the part of Croatia, and the political and security related situation in the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Further to the decision voted for by 39 deputies, the session was declared closed for public. The following deputies participated in the discussion on whether or not to allow broadcasting of the session: Milan Kresojević, Ranko Vujić, Radovan Maljković, Stanko Vujanović, Drago Kovačević, Đuro Podunavac. /handwritten: and S. /?Krnić/

The RSK President Milan Martić gave the introductory speech concerning the item on the agenda. In his lengthy speech he said that with their plan, known as "Z-4", the international community denied the right of the Serbian people in the RSK to live in one state. He pointed out that the "Z-4" plan is unacceptable to the RSK, however, further talks should be accepted on an equal foot.

He addressed in particular the functioning of the RSK government, expressing his disagreement regarding the issue of the place of residence of some of the ministers who live outside Knin. In his speech he also accentuated the position of conscript in view of their low salaries.

After Mr Martić, the next to take the floor was Prime Minister Mr Borislav Mikelić who dwelt in detail on the course of the negotiation process conducted with the Republic of Croatia. On behalf of the Government he made the following proposals to the Assembly:

- in addition to the letter already sent to Butros Ghali, the unified RSK leadership should request UNPROFOR to maintain its mandate in the territory of the RSK, and to see that the RSK remain under protection;

- secondly, that the Assembly give its support to the decision of the RSK leadership not to accept any kind of document on a political solution as long as the issue of UNPROFOR mandate is not addressed, in other words until the Security Council issues a decision on the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR;

- thirdly, the Government proposes to the Assembly to postpone all further activities regarding the economic aspects of the negotiations until the United Nations and the Security Council declare themselves about this problem;

Minister of Defence, Mr Rade Tanjga, made a proposal to the Assembly to pass a decision to proclaim the imminent threat of war and render invalid the decision of the RSK President in 1992, no. 03-4-18/2.

The following deputies participated in the discussion on the subject: Drago Kovačević, Milan Kresojević, Lazar Macura, Milorad Višić, Bramko Perić, Marko Atlagić, Miroslav Grozdanić, and others /handwritten: /?S. Krnić/

After the discussion, the Assembly accepted the proposals of the Government and unanimously adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Assembly has accepted the Government's proposal regarding the continuance of negotiations with the Republic of Croatia on economic issues, and it has decided to cancel and postpone the talks with the Republic of Croatia on economic issues, including political issues, until Croatia withdrew its request to cancel the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces, or until the Security Council issued a decision on the extension of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces in the protected zones withinin the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

2. The Assembly has accepted the Government's proposal and decided to proclaim the state of imminent war threat throughout the territory of the RSK, thus rendering invalid the Decision of the President of the Republic no. 03-3-20-/1-53 and Order no. 03-418/2/92.

The session ended at 9 p.m..

NOTE:

The integral minutes of the session are filed at the Assembly Registry, and all leadres of the deputies clubs received a copy..

RECORDING CLERK: MINUTES COMPOSED BY:

Neda Dondur /stamp/ Mirjana Rodić

ANNEX 149:
EXCERPTS FROM MLADIĆ'S DIARY, PP. 201, 203, 206, 239-240

0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation

* I will see the High Commissioner and insist that these convoys pass! I hope he will understand me.

* I cannot give a date…

* Goražde: I will resolve the rotation of 60 men after the convoy passes.-

Bgd, 29 June 1995

2110 hours –

MEETING

with President MILOŠEVIĆ, BULATOVIĆ, PERIŠIĆ and MRKŠIĆ-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

SM:

- Now you have stopped the H/M /Croatian-Muslim/ offensive, we helped you, but we are at our last gasp –

- RS /Republika Srpska/ is ensured, we must seal it and place emphasis on the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ and defend it.

- I said last year that you would cause most damage to the RSK, which is what happened.-

* We must abandon the war rhetoric – from there it was recorded with SM's consent.-

* Do you care about RS? Yes!

* PLAN:

A. – BH will be a union of the "H-M" Federation and "Republika Srpska". It makes RS official.

B. – Both entities, the "HM Federation" and "RS", have a balanced and equal treatment.-

C. – Both entities, RS and the Federation, have the right to enter into a confederation with the neighbouring states.-

D. – In the event that

DRAFT TRANSLATION

…a reorientation occurs in one entity, this has no effect on the other entity.

* The 49:51 parameter of the KG /Contact Group/ remains the basis which can be altered based on negotiations –

* Movement will be carried out in the end when the final political solution is achieved.-

* We must install RS and then defend the RSK.-

* What would you give them, I ask him:

SM: - I would give Vogošća and Ilijaš. They need a link with Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla… /?We/ would enlarge on account of Fikret, I would not touch the enclaves, they are islands which will run out.

* You are rampant – you just keep screaming that you are a divine nation…

* SM: I, LILIĆ and BULATOVIĆ will bring the negotiations to an end and proclaim *fait accompli*.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

* Come on, if you can, if we need your position regarding the negotiations – let it be away from the spotlight.-

* Sanctions will be lifted by resolving Bosnia.-

* It is my conviction that not more than half of Bosnia belongs to us, if we get more, we are digging graves for our grandchildren.-

* I don't want our grandchildren to die in order to take what belongs to others… Let us defend what is ours.

* My request is:

"If I achieve what I dictated, if I fix something, they lift the sanctions against us and I say 'I believe that MLADIĆ will accept – if not, then I will keep quiet about it…

DRAFT TRANSLATION

* Don't tell me you will help, and not do it, it's better if you say "I won't", and I'll do it alone.-

* /?FRASER/ is the top US man for negotiations – he resolved Estonia, South Africa, negotiated with CASTRO, and he ardently hates Germans. – The US wants to help us, they see us and Greeks as a barrier against Germany.-

* I beg you in the name of God, it is our crucial interest – don't think that I am not for the Serbian people – that I am a traitor and if you think that, I will give you a pistol, kill me.-

* PERIŠIĆ, Ratko has a terrible influence on you.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Belgrade

Friday

30 June 1995

MEETING

with President MILOŠEVIĆ at the GŠ VJ /Yugoslav Army General Staff/

DRAFT TRANSLATION

* President MILOŠEVIĆ

- I called FA /Fikret ABDIĆ/ to tell us what is new in the Bihać Pocket, that is a very important point for us, we must do something so he can take Cazin, and then it will be easier later!

*FA:

- That we should insist that the Banija Corps take up positions on the line on the left, it is more dangerous –

- We should go in more systematically and make raids because the men who would come over to us cannot due to frontal fighting.-

- We have enough, even too many men for assault operations.

- The greatest danger is of morale falling.

- Our best unit is the 3rd Brigade, men are 10 km from their homes, and they haven't been doing anything for seven months.

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- We need 1,500 men for 15 days…

- They (5th K /Corps/) are mobilising 60-year-old women, leaving Bužim, probably withdrawing civilian population to form a human shield around Bihać.-

- Irfan LJUBIJANKIĆ says in the report that at least 20 of 48 assemblymen must be dismissed, and that not a single MZ /local commune/ president supports them.-

- We just had a meeting of 2,000 people in Ljubljana. They are pressuring our people in Germany.-

* We should start a bigger offensive and call on men to join us.

- Smuggling has been reduced, we must bring in police from outside and it will disappear.-

- Legija and BOŽOVIĆ ~~is~~ had contact with NANIĆ through a Motorola.-

- We could take Cazin in two weeks if we had 1,500 men.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

* JS /expansion unknown/: which forces can General MRKŠIĆ engage:

- What about the police from Banja Luka

- Who will provide the men –

- There is no oil there.-

- The 5th K knows precisely about our attack –

- The whole operation cannot be finished so quickly, everything must be well planned.-

- Neither oil nor men came.-

- The Muslim offensive toward Sarajevo will continue.-

- We must make a decision to act quickly.-

- We have been supplying 100,000 men for six months, there is poor organisation in RS, they plundered us.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

SM:

- I think it is important to resolve the 5th K as soon as possible, and then later to try cutting off near Livno.

- Nothing should be added of Krupa, because that can be taken as a provocation for the MZ /?international community/ and they might use air force against FA too.

- General MRKŠIĆ is here and as soon as

he left we made a decision to subordinate the "PAUK" /Spider/ Command to him.

- Let RS give something to General MRKŠIĆ if it can.-

- Jovica should resolve logistics problems, and let RS resolve this problem of holding up convoys.-

* JS: My men should be fully considered when an operation is planned.

- I don't trust Mile NOVAKOVIĆ, at least in terms of professionalism…

- Corps Commanders haven't provided help for six months and I must ~~se~~ ask that they be considered.-

- They told my men the first day that they were a paramilitary.-

- PEĆANAC must be taken out with 400 men, let them rest for seven days and give to General MRKŠIĆ.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

FA:

- 15 months ago we talked about coming to Cazin in 15 days.-

- * We must have units which will hold the line.-

FA:

- I have 9,400 under arms, and around 1,200-1,300 wounded.-

- We should not attack Bihać and we should not try to drive them from the right bank of the Una – that would be counterproductive because the MZ would accuse me that I am responsible for the fall of Bihać.-

SM:

- We should not conduct operations that are counterproductive for FA.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

JS:

- I can find 120 perfect men who would come there in seven days. They would be from the eastern sector. – That is support.

JS: They should not be engaged (we gave 80 from Erdut, we gave 80 from Đeletovci…

JS – Proposal:

- Let MLADIĆ arrange it with the 1st and 2nd KK and find men to replace the 400 of PEĆANAC's men and give them to MRKŠIĆ.

- That we form a battalion of volunteers and engaged them in ten days. – That General PERIŠIĆ equips them.-

- There are 58, from Kragujevac, Niš, Ljubiškovo

* MRKŠIĆ:

- Let us pay this corps. Four million came, but I don't know where four is. JS: Everyone knows where they are, the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ is holding it. (KOZIĆ and MRGUD) – They want to pay the MUP – it must go through the SDK /Public Auditing Service/.-

- Mobilisation – 2,400 from Serbia.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

General MLADIĆ

Request:

1. – 7.62 mm ammunition = 20,000,000
2. – 7.9 mm " = 5,000,000
3. – 12.7 mm rounds = 4,000,000
4. – Rounds for PKT /7.62 mm machine-gun/ = 3,500,000
5. – Shell for ZIS /76 mm field gun/ = 10,000
6. – " for T-34 tank = 6,000
7. – " for T-55 tank = 5,000
8. – " M-84 t. /tank/ = 3,000

9. – Shell for 105 mm howitzer = 6,000

10. - 122 mm = 4,000 –

11. – Shell for 130 mm gun = 2,500

12. – Shell for 152 mm howitzer = 2,000

13. – Shell for 155 mm howitzer = 3,500

14. – Shell for 60 mm MB /mortar/ = 7,000

15. - 82 mm MB = 10,000

16. 120 mm MB = 10,000

17. Fuel air bomb = 50

18. *Zolja* – rocket = 6,000

19. Rocket – *Kub* = 4,000 tons

20. Fuel

21. Food upon request

22. – Equipment upon request.-

23. – 12.7 mm sniper rifles = 50

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Han Pijesak

Saturday, 1 June 1995

MEETING

with Mrs MILENTIJEVIĆ

Mrs MILENTIJEVIĆ

- There are positive developments in the US.-

Knin, 30 July 1995

1600 – 1700 hours

MEETING

with the Main Staff of the Serbian Krajina Army.-

* Further operations arranged and coordinated

Mrkonjić Grad

31 July 1995

MEETING

with representatives of municipal governments of Glamoč, Mrkonjić Grad, Šipovo, Jajce, Ključ, Srbobran, Kupres.-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Mrkonjić Grad

31 July 1995

1430 hours –

MEETING

with General SMITH.-

1. * I informed him about the offensive of the OS /Armed Forces/ of Croatia against RS.-

2. * In response to the question as to what he can do to stop the H /Croatian/ offensive – he just rambles.

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SMITH:

* The justification for the attack on Udbine airfield is that it has a concept of a safe area.-

* The M used the charter to ask Croatia for help and Article 51 of the charter makes it possible for one side to ask the other for help.-

* Žepa – (Meeting on 5 August 1995)

* Sarajevo –

* Offering assistance for provision of care for refugees from Glamoč and Grahovo (meeting tomorrow at 1200 hours at Balkana).-

DRAFT TRANSLATION

Drvar, 1 August 1995

1800 hours – 2 August 1995

JOINT

Session of the Supreme Defence Council of RS and the RSK –

Present: KARADŽIĆ, KRAJIŠNIK, PLAVŠIĆ, KOZIĆ, T. KOVAČ, NINKOVIĆ, KIJAC, ŽUPLJANIN, SUBOTIĆ, KRNJAJIĆ, TOMANIĆ, TOLIMIR, G. MILOVANOVIĆ, MARTIĆ, BABIĆ, MILOJEVIĆ, PEJIĆ, MRKŠIĆ, ŠUPUT, MLADIĆ …

Agenda:

1. – Reviewing the newly developed situation

2. – Further coordination of operations

3. – Supplying the troops with everything needed to continue fighting the war.-

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ANNEX 150:
CONCLUSIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTIVE FORCE IN THE OCCUPIED PARTS OF CROATIA, KNIN, 30 MARCH 1995

1995, 30 March

Knin

Conclusions of the Government of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" regarding the negotiations on the amendment of the mandate of the United Nations Protective Force in the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia

In accordance with its constitutional powers, the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, at its extraordinary session held on 30 March 1995, has considered the draft of the UN Security Council Resolution suggested to the Security Council by the Contact Group, and adopted the following positions:
(...)

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina estimates that there is no reason to terminate the current mandate of the United Nations Protective Force laid down by the UN Security Council in Resolution No. 743 of 21 February 1992, and expects the UN Security Council to extend the current mandate of the protective force.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina considers that the newly proposed UN operation (UNCRO) can contribute to the stabilization of peace if it is determined as the continuation and extension of the UN peacekeeping operation as established by Resolution 743 of the UN Security Council, i.e., in line with the principles and basic terms of the current protective force mandate in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and zones under UN protection.

The proposal according to which the UN operation, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the proposed draft of the Resolution, ought to be "a provisional arrangement for the creation of conditions leading to an agreed solution which will be in accordance with the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia" is absolutely unacceptable if it refers to the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The Republic of Serbian Krajina, the sovereign state of the Serbian people and of all its citizens, is not part of any Croatian state, and it will not accept any UN arrangement which would bring it into such a position against its will.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina considers the engagement of UN peacekeeping forces in its territory unacceptable if their name implies prejudiced political solutions to the disadvantage of the Serbian people and the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina cannot permit the blockade of the borders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina by any armed forces which would be contrary to the principles of the current mandate of the UN protective force.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has decided to inform the UN Security Council about its foregoing conclusions. (...)

Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script

HR- HMDCDR, 4, 06-5-340/95

ANNEX 151:
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 7 AUGUST 1995

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/666
7 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you, and through you to the members of the Security Council, information about the latest developments in Croatia and about United Nations activities before and since the recent outbreak of hostilities there. It covers events up to midnight New York time on 6 August.

Following the Croatian Army's takeover of Sector West in May 1995, tensions have remained high in the area of operations of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO). Croatian Army mobilization, troop movements and live-firing exercises increased throughout June and July. In the meantime, the local Serb authorities failed to extend the necessary cooperation to UNCRO to permit it to implement the mandate granted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995.

On 19 July, the "Krajina Serb" army ("ARSK") and the forces loyal to Mr. Fikret Abdic launched offensives against the Bosnian Army V Corps in the Bihac pocket. The attacks were supported by Bosnian Serb shell fire along the southern confrontation line and were alleged to be in response to earlier military actions by the Bosnian Army. The following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia warned the Security Council that "the displacement of the population of Bihac ... would be considered a serious threat to the security and stability of Croatia ... [and] Croatia may be compelled to undertake necessary measures to secure its status and territory".

In an effort to stabilize the deteriorating military situation, the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) finally succeeded in arranging a meeting between the military leaders of the Croatian Army and "ARSK". The local Serb authorities subsequently cancelled the military meeting after they had accepted an invitation by the United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, to participate in a preliminary round of political talks at Geneva in early August.

The pace of events gathered momentum after 22 July, when the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Split Declaration, which committed the Croatian Government to assist the Bosnian forces militarily in the Bihac pocket. The Croatian Government maintained the position, already conveyed by

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its Foreign Minister to the Security Council, that the fall of the Bihac pocket would threaten its national security interests.

On 28 July, the combined forces of the Croatian Army (HV) and Croat Defence Council (HVO) succeeded in capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina, severing the Krajina Serbs' main supply road from Banja Luka to Knin. In response, the Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs declared states of war against the Croats and mobilized their respective armies.

Within Croatia, the Croatian Army continued a major build-up of troops around Sectors North and South. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, meanwhile, convened a session of their joint Supreme Defence Council on 1 August at Drvar in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The meeting resulted in an appeal to all Serbs, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to assist in the defence of Serb territory.

Meanwhile, on 29 July, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, had met with President Tudjman to forestall what appeared to be an imminent military confrontation. President Tudjman expressed his Government's willingness to participate in political and military talks with Knin, but stressed that progress on the ground must necessarily follow. If such progress was not achieved in a matter of days, Croatia would take whatever measures it deemed necessary to redress the situation. Specifically the President insisted on the reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline within 24 hours, rapid agreement on the opening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and immediate progress on political re-integration of the Serbs on the basis of Croatia's Constitution and Law on Minorities. President Tudjman did, however, agree to send representatives to Geneva for the meeting sponsored by the International Conference on 3 August.

My Special Representative held emergency talks on 30 July with the local Serb authorities in Knin. He secured a six-point commitment that their forces would withdraw fully from the Bihac pocket and desist from further cross-border interference (see annex I). However, the Croatian Government considered these commitments insufficient. In a written reply, President Tudjman rejected the agreement, on the grounds that it did not meet the terms he had presented to my Special Representative (see annex II). The Croatian Government did, however, reaffirm its readiness to participate in the talks at Geneva.

On 3 August, at Geneva, Mr. Stoltenberg duly chaired the meeting of the representatives of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs. The former took the position that the Croatian Serb leadership must immediately accept reintegration under the Croatian Constitution and Laws. The Croatian Serb delegation proceeded from the starting-point that there should be a cessation of hostilities, following which other issues could be discussed. After a series of bilateral meetings, the Co-Chairman presented to the two delegations a list of seven points covering, inter alia, the reopening of the oil pipeline, the reopening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and negotiations on a final settlement on the basis of the "Zagreb-4" plan. The Croatian Serb delegation was inclined to accept the paper as a useful basis for progress, subject to clearance by its political leadership, but the Croatian Government delegation's view was that the paper did not address its fundamental concern for the Krajina Serbs to be reintegrated under the Croatian Constitution and Laws.

/...

Following the Croatian Government's rejection of the paper prepared at Geneva, I telephoned President Tudjman on the evening of 3 August and urged the utmost restraint. At the same time, I instructed Mr. Stoltenberg to proceed to Zagreb the next morning and to continue to work closely with Mr. Akashi in trying to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Despite these United Nations efforts and similar efforts by various Member States, at 0500 hours on 4 August the Croatian Army launched a major offensive against the Krajina region (Sectors North and South). I immediately issued a statement expressing my regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, and urging the parties to respect international humanitarian law and the human rights of the affected population.

At the start of the Croatian offensive, a significant number of United Nations observation posts were overrun by the Croatian Army, and some came under indirect and direct fire. UNPF reported to me that on two occasions United Nations troops and Serb prisoners were used as human shields by Croatian Army units as they conducted their attacks. These incidents have been vigorously protested by the United Nations and the troop-contributing Governments concerned.

On the first day of the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative met with Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, the Head of the Croatian Commission for Relations with UNCRO, to seek assurances for the safety of all United Nations personnel. The Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier, took similar action with the Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, General Cervenko. I regret to have to report that, these efforts notwithstanding, the United Nations has suffered a total of 18 casualties, all of which have also been protested. Three of these casualties (a Danish soldier and two Czech soldiers) were fatal and two other soldiers are in serious condition. I should like to take this occasion to convey to the Government and people of the Czech Republic and Denmark my condolences at their loss.

On 5 and 6 August, my Special Representative held a number of meetings with Mr. Sarinic to discuss temporary arrangements that would allow the United Nations, together with other international organizations, to cope with the major humanitarian difficulties caused by the Croatian offensive and to monitor the human rights situation on the ground. These discussions resulted in a nine-point agreement that was signed on 6 August (see annex III).

On 6 August in Geneva, the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference's Steering Committee, Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, along with the Foreign Minister of Spain, representing the Presidency of the European Union (EU), and the External Relations Commissioner of EU, met the Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, to discuss the political consequences of the Croatian offensive. The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference and the representatives of EU strongly condemned the shelling of civilians and the attacks on United Nations personnel and expressed great concern at the humanitarian crisis which was unfolding. Foreign Minister Granic, who expressed confidence that the Croatian military operation would be completed within 24 hours, indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United

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Nations troops had been attacked and gave assurances about access for humanitarian organizations to civilians displaced by the fighting.

In the meantime, the Force Commander's representatives have been in contact with the military authorities of the Croatian Army and "ARSK". They have discussed the medical evacuation of United Nations personnel, and the need to alleviate the consequences of the military operations for the civilian population. A refugee crisis of major proportions has already started. Tensions remain high and the possibility of continuing hostilities cannot be ruled out.

I should be grateful if you would bring the above information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

/...

Annex I

Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF), and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by Mr. Martic and in which Mr. Babic and General Mrksic participated, and in the light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) leadership reiterated their commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:

1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the ARSK in the area known as the Bihac pocket.

2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire (shell, mortar, tank, etc.) into the Bihac pocket from territory that they control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any offensive action against that territory.

3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area bordering the Bihac pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either direction by any forces.

4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksic, is prepared to have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as 31 July 1995 at 1400 hours.

5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry out cross-border activities, RSK reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with UNPF regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border-crossing points under the mandate of UNPF.

6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Bihac pocket, based on the principle of assessed need, and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

30 July 1995
Knin

/...

Annex II

Letter dated 30 July 1995 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

In response to your fax which I received today, at 2130 hours, together with the enclosed proposals from the Knin rebels, I would like to state the following:

1. It is surprising that in your letter you never mention UNCRO - the United Nations peace forces which were under this name given the mandate to act in Croatia by a Security Council resolution and, in contrast, you do mention the Knin leadership and RSK.

2. It is unacceptable for us to have UNCRO troops deployed only on the border towards the Bihac pocket. Our request was and remains that UNCRO forces undertake the monitoring of internationally recognized borders between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but at the same time also between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, that is SRY, which is particularly significant because in these last few days new formations and equipment of the Yugoslav army have been transferred across the Danube.

3. In regard to what was stated under point 2 there can be no question of deploying United Nations border-crossing monitors only in the region of Dinara.

4. Serb rebel leaders again want to outwit United Nations Representatives and UNCRO for their own benefit. That is apparent from their proposal to allow humanitarian aid for Bihac under the condition that it is at the same time delivered to them.

5. Such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration and do not contain a response to any of the conditions which I put forward in discussions with you on Saturday, 29 July 1995, when I expressly indicated that negotiations on a peaceful reintegration with Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas can commence under the following conditions:

(a) That Croatian authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić, who has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the Hague or with anyone else representing him;

(b) That negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the occupied areas is operational in a period of 24 hours;

(c) That direct discussions commence immediately concerning the opening of all communication lines through the occupied areas, and in particular the railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin;

(d) That discussions are simultaneously undertaken concerning the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the

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occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning the rights of the Serb ethnic community.

6. Only on the basis of this can we reach a peaceful solution and with this aim I propose discussion between military and civilian representatives of Croatian authorities and the rebel Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas.

The President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudjman

(Original signed - sealed)

/...

Annex III

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF)-United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) on temporary measures in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South"

We the undersigned,

Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter referred to as the Areas),

Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of civilians and of their human rights,

Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,

Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,

Agree to the following:

1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.

2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) where appropriate, will monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.

3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and ICRC, to assist and coordinate such departures in conformity with recognized international standards.

4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by

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the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.

5. That United Nations military observers and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.

6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect military fire as long as the hostilities continue.

7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present, and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for appropriate action.

8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.

9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.

(Signed) Hrvoje SARINIC
Republic of Croatia

(Signed) Yasushi AKASHI
United Nations Peace Forces

Zagreb
6 August 1995

ANNEX 152:
RSK, COMMAND OF THE 39TH CORPS., ORDER: PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY ORGANISATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF NEGATIVE OCCURRENCES WHICH ARE ONE OF THE CAUSES OF DEFEAT AND LOSSES OF THE RSK TERRITORY, 1 JUNE 1995

Translation

COMMAND OF THE 39TH CORPS
SP /Strictly Confidential/ no. 71-182
1 June 1995

/handwritten:/
SP /illegible number/

Problems in the military organisation
and the elimination of negative occurrences
which are one of the causes of defeat and
losses of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ territory – O r d e r

We hereby forward to you the Command of the GŠ SVK /General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina/:
Our young state of the RSK is being created to reflect the wishes of all its citizens, as a guarantee of their free life.

Regrettably, despite the efforts made, many functions of the state have not come into being. We have witnessed disunity of leadership, poor functioning of the legal system, existence of smuggling operations and quick amassing of wealth by individuals. These instances have adversely affected the development of the Serbian Army of Krajina /SVK/ and especially the functioning of the command system. The weaknesses in the military organisation have had a demoralising effect on both members of the Army and the citizens of our state.

Miljevački Plato, Maslenica, Divoselo and Western Slavonia have been lost so far because of the flaws in the state and the SVK.

To put an end to these flaws and prevent further risks to the people and state, an entire chain of actions has been undertaken with a view to enabling the state and its organs, including the SVK, to jointly act on strengthening the defence.

The SVK General Staff has intensified its efforts on building up the military organisation. The first professional formations and special units are being established. We are on the way to creating in a very short period of time an Army that will be the pride of our people and Serbs throughout the world.

We can prevent and punish every Ustasha attack provided we rid ourselves of indiscipline, smuggling, disobedience and departures from the combat lines in the course of combat operations.

In connection with the above, and with a view to removing all major faults and indiscipline in the SVK, I hereby

O R D E R

1. Cease all smuggling activities with our enemies because we have lost people and territory due to smuggling. Open fire at places where smuggled goods are

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Translation

exchanged and at the enemy, using weapons determined by the Corp's commander.

2. Prevent escaping and random leaving the positions and spreading panic among the soldiers and civilians. Adhere to the rules of combat when performing combat b/d operations.
I hereby authorise the use of weapons for the purpose of preventing indiscipline in combat.

3. Corps' commanders are hereby authorised to prevent any destructive conduct by individuals or groups in the area aimed at weakening the defence and spreading panic among the people.

4. Issue the soldiers with ammunition and severely punish and register all acts of wilfulness and celebratory shooting. Further, transfer all those who do not respect discipline according to a special plan.

5. Corps' commands in their areas shall devise civilian protection measures, assign municipal organs and local communes to organise evacuation and accommodation and food supplies for the population (women, children and the elderly) from the potential areas of operations.

6. Through their conduct in and out of combat situations, officers and non-commissioned officers must set an example to the soldiers and be responsible for the implementation of this Order. Apply this Order against the individuals who deviate from these positions.

7. Familiarise the RSK Serbian Army with this Order along with the analysis of the situation in the corps and brigades, which points to the specific problems in the units and zones of responsibility.

The Order shall enter into force at 1200 hours on 2 June 1995 to sanction any subsequent violations on the part of individuals, but not the hitherto committed ones.

Soldiers and the officers of the RSK, we are entering the concluding phase of accomplishing of our national aims and we must not allow any further losses of people or territory. The RSK is more important than the interests and rights of individuals and that is why I am aware of my responsibility and the measures I am taking.

Trusting the Serbian soldier and his bravery, I put myself at the service of my people.

C O M M A N D E R
Lieutenant General
Mile MRKŠIĆ

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Translation

This exact copy is certified by:
Head of ONO /Operations and Training/
Colonel
Milan RADMANOVIĆ

/handwritten:
3 June 1995/

/stamp:/
Military Post
0142
Strictly Confidential no. 691-1
Date_____
Petrinja

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ANNEX 153:
RSK, STATE INFORMATION AGENCY, STATEMENT OF RATKO MLADIĆ, KNIN, 30 JULY 1995

1995, 30 July

Knin
Communication of the RSK State Information Agency Iskra on the visit of Ratko Mladić,
CRS commander, to Knin and on his statement concerning the assault on Knin

_____

(...)
Knin, 30 July (Iskra) -The Commander of the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,
Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić, today stated in Knin that Serbian forces would quickly regain
Grahovo and Glamoč, and other occupied territories.
Stressing that Croatian aggression is aimed at cutting of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), in which effort the Croats are supported by their political brokers, General Mladić said that the Croats had made, with this move, the decisive mistake in this war, a mistake which will cost
them dearly.
Referring to the situation in the so-called Bihać pocket, he said that the Muslims would continue to provoke until they were defeated as in Srebrenica and Žepa, and those provocations would have stopped a long time ago, he added, but for their helpers in our own ranks.
"The time has come for our people to grasp fully the fact that the war is not over yet, a fact which was clear to some people a long time ago. Let me give our people the following message: be determined in the defence of your homes and don't fall for any propaganda", said General Mladić, adding that he hoped the people would find the strength to repel this Croatian aggression as well.
"We must put in extra effort and hold out until the end of this war", concluded the
commander of the RS Army. (...)

ANNEX 154:
GENERAL RATKO MLADIĆ SPEAKING TO THE MEDIA IN KNIN, 30 JULY 1995

Video clip: General Ratko Mladic speaking to media in Knin – 30 July 1995

General Ratko Mladic, the legendary commander of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska army, an old acquaintance and one of the Serb legends. So this is an opportunity to use the presence of General Mladic to address you and to ask him questions concerning the current situation which is of great importance to the Serb people, critical. So I now give the floor to General Mladic and will not be taking up any more of your time. So, Mr. General, please go ahead.

"Thank you very much. If I could I would like to take this opportunity to use the media in order to address the people, to greet the people of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. We are here together. I've always been here even if I left and was away for a while. I never left here.

"Maybe for starters Mr. General how do you perceive the situation as a whole in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina?

"Currently, I would say that the situation is quite complicated due to the extensive aggression being conducted by the Croatian armed forces against the Republika Srpska and the goal of their operations is to cut off the Republic of Srpska Krajina and that with the use of their weapons and their mediators and pressure by the international community to enforce a solution in the area by means of force. But I hope that with the help of good organisation and the functioning of all segments of the Serb people in both the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina the outcome will be resolved successfully. And I think the Croats made a crucial mistake in this war which is going to cost them gravely.

"Do the Serbs have enough strength to withstand the Muslims and the Croats?

"The Serb people have enough forces and sufficient strength and had countries from the German and Islamic bloc not provided support, unfortunately along with the support of some others, they would have lost this war long ago. Every prolongation of this war is catastrophic, first of all for those who instigated it, and by this I mean the Croatian armed formations.

"Mr. General, from a strategic point of view, in my humble opinion, I think the Croat forces are very stretched across the territory now and towards the defence lines of our Serb defense forces. To what extent with respect to our strategy can this be of use for a successful strategic strike to retake and liberate our territories?

"I won't address this question. You pose a good question taking into consideration the fact that you express typical journalist curiosity. I wouldn't answer your question with any particularly high degree of precision. Time will show and time will answer your question.

"Mr. General, what is the current situation in the Grahovo and Glamoc battlefields?

"The Croatian Army formations have attacked and have entered Grahovo and partially into Glamoc. But I do hope that we will retake these and other occupied territories of the Republic of Srpska very soon.

"Amongst other issues we are interested in the situation in Grahovo and Glamoc in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Krajina Corps. Numerous rumours are being spread by the public, even by some public information agencies in the Serb territories that there is insufficient defence coordination between the Republic of Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska there are even rumours and attempts to bring unrest among the population. There are talks of some sort of selling out or surrender of our liberated lands for a "greater gain"?

"First of all, I wouldn't want to comment calculated propaganda of a base intensity. As far as I'm concerned the Serb population is a unified one – in the same from Kupa and Korana and all the way to Timok and South Morava. I feel that the Serb people in those territories, as should all other peoples on the planet, have the same interests, the same state and remaining structures of such a state. And I believe that with regard to that, what is going on in every part of those territories, needless to say, as with every individual on the planet that Serbs should be allowed to demonstrate an interest in at least the same degree as any other modern state demonstrates for its citizens living within their state or in foreign territory.

"Surprised you by his presence but this doesn't mean that they have asked me many questions up to now and they know what I think [inaudible].

"You posed a good question. This isn't the first time the Ustasha formations attacked our lives.

"That was a good question. This isn't the first time the Ustasha formations attacked our lives. However, I believe the time has come that our people as a whole need to realize and which many have come to realize during this war and which I had indicated. I believe terrible mistakes have been made by individuals who claimed the war with the Croats was over once and for all or that it would be over within 7 days and then in the lines of separation, numerous check-points were being opened, customs zones, and in some places there were even soccer games being held. As you can see, these proved to be costly decisions resulting in the loss of lives, numerous refugees and burnt villages, but I hope our people have understood this and that they have enough strength, and that they will muster enough strength so that this aggression by Croatia which has been present with its armed forces during the whole time of this war in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina be avenged and so that we send them back to where they belong.

"I just want to send my regards to the people, that they remain resolute in defending their century-old historical hearth and graves and that they don't give in to any form of provocation or any form of propaganda because it is only with the means of our forces

that we are creating our State. A state can be made with its own children and so many of our wonderful children have given their lives for both the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republika Srpska which should motivate the rest of us who are still alive and on our feet to apply additional efforts and that we remain focused on the finale of this war.

Until the final victory.

That's right. Thank you.

ANNEX 155:
DECLARATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT, JOINT DEFENSE AGAINST SERB AGGRESSION AND REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION CONGRUENT WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
SPLIT, 22 JULY 1995

The delegation of the Republic of Croatia, led by the President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman, the delegation of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina led by the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and by the President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Krešimir Zubak, after their talks in Split on July 22nd 1995, adopted a

DECLARATION

on the implementation of the Washington Agreement, joint defense against Serb aggression and reaching a political solution congruent with the efforts of the international community

Confirming their strong commitment and political will to strengthen the cooperation and alliance of the Croatian and Bosniac nations in these fateful moments for the survival of both nations, faced with the increasing violence in the occupied territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the uncertainty of the peace process and the inefficacy of the international community ;

Having established that the occupying of and the attacks on the UN "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the joint operations by Bosnian and Croatian Serbs against the UN "safe area" in Bihać, the armed provocations in other areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the refusal of all peace plans by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, are part of a unified and joint strategy of continuing aggression and attempt to maintain occupation of territories in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aim to create a "Great Serbia", under the leadership and with the full responsibility of the political and army leadership of the "FRY" (Serbia and Montenegro) ;

Having established that the continued aggression and violent attempts to keep control of the occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as the inadequate results of the peace process, command the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to fully examine the situation in the region from the standpoint of safeguarding the national survival of the Croatian and Bosniac people and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ;

Expressing their irrevocable support to the implementation of the Washington Agreement on the establishment of the Federation, as well as its confederal linking to the Republic of Croatia ;

Convinced that such a strong, internationally established, territorially viable, economically developed and democratically organized Federation is an irreplaceable governmental and political framework, the historical interest and the safest form of security and realization of equal national, political and other interests of the Croatian and Bosniac nations ;

Convinced also that on the basis of the realization of such a Federation of the Croatian and Bosniac nations and with the assistance of the international community, a solution to the crisis can be reached and the ground laid for a new, balanced regional order as a guarantee of peace, stability, security and development ;

Calling on the Croatian Serbs to reexamine their current militant policy and to accept the peaceful reintegration in the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan ;

Calling on the "FRY" (Serbia and Montenegro) to give up aggression with the aim of creating a "Great Serbia", to stop giving military assistance to the extremists in Knin and in Pale and to agree to the mutual recognition of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within their internationally recognized borders ;

Confirming their readiness to actively contribute to the efforts towards an urgent revival of the peace process on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group Plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia ;

Underlying in particular that any prolongation of the existing ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the non-application of the UNCRO mandate in Croatia will lead to the decision to call off the prolongation of their mandate in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;

Supporting the decision to send Rapid Reaction Forces and jointly establishing that all questions concerning their arrival, mandate and deployment must be organized by way of a special agreement in accordance with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ;

Underlying the common viewpoint that any decision on lifting the arms embargo must be applied simultaneously to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Croatia ;

Convinced that the "FRY" (Serbia and Montenegro) carries a special responsibility for the continuation of the crisis and judging that it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the United Nations Security Council sanctions system ;

Refusing ideas about renewing or creating any kind of new "Yugoslav" state community, considering them to be parallel and spare variations of Great-Serbian hegemony, and supporting normalization in the region on the basis on sovereignty, independence and integrity ;

Confirming their interest in the urgent implementation of the aforementioned principles of the Declaration, agreement has been reached on :

1. Widening and strengthening of the defense cooperation on the basis of the Agreement on friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina of July 21st 1992.

In this respect, the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have called upon the Republic of Croatia to extend urgent military and other assistance in the defense against aggression, especially in the area of Bihać, which the Republic of Croatia has accepted.

Agreement has also been reached on the continuation of cooperation and constant coordination of defense activities between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Agreement has been reached as well on the cooperation between the main headquarters of the Croatian Army and the joint headquarters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council for the sake of coordination of defense activities in the areas of command, logistics, military-industrial production, communication systems, information and analytical needs and other areas.

2. Creation of a political-legal expert group with the duty to urgently analyze and submit proposals for the integration of the functions of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities.

3. Addressing an invitation for a meeting of the group of 22 member states of the "Friends of the Federation" on the highest level, in view of urgent donations and assistance in the face of the humanitarian and refugee catastrophe and to examine long-term joint reconstruction and development strategies.

4. Maintaining regular and constant political consultations aiming at the realization of the principles and agreements of this Declaration, as well as the preparation of legal, political and other foundations for the establishment of confederal ties with the republic of Croatia.

Dr. Franjo Tuđman
President of the Republic of Croatia

Alija Izetbegović
President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Krešimir Zubak
President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Haris Silajdžić
Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

ANNEX 156:
RSK, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE RSK AND LEADERS OF THE DEPUTIES' GROUPS, 19 JUNE 1995

/handwritten: a/a /files//

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

/

handwritten: 123/
No: 020/4-2-623-2/95.
Knin, 19 June 1995

NOTE

On 30 May 1995 the President of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ had a working meeting with leaders of the RSK Assembly deputies' clubs, the topic of which was – appointment of the PM /Prime Minister/ designate.

The minutes of the meeting are attached.

ADVISOR TO STATE OFFICIAL
Dušan Pralica, professor

/signed/

/handwritten: HMDCDR /expansion unknown/ OFFICE OF THE RSK PRESIDENT Nut. /expansion unknown/ 1/
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
No: 120/4-2-623/95
Knin, 19 June 1995

MINUTES
of the meeting held by the President of the RSK
with leaders of the deputies' groups

PRESENT: Ranko Bakić, Ranko Vujić, Marko Dobrijević, Drago Kovačević, Milorad Višić and Đorđe Bjegović.

Beginning of the meeting: 12:15 hours

Date: 30 May 1995

The President made a remark that, given the gravity of the situation, Babić should have attended.

VIŠIĆ: It's time to start resolving problems jointly rather than individually.

PRESIDENT MARTIĆ: Is it possible to temporarily freeze activities of the parties and go for a patriotic bloc?

Dobrijević made a remark about political activities of the trade unions.

BAKIĆ, defends the existence and activities of the parties.

„Political pluralism is essential because it keeps democracy alive. The West also insists on that."

PRESIDENT MARTIĆ: That is what I recommend, my viewpoint. Anyway, it is you who decide.

There is no cooperation between me and the trade unions, no contact. They act as an institution and I have no intention of interfering. As for the unification, what I find of utmost importance now is to buy some time in order to consolidate our defence, and only then go for a formal unification. If Karadžić could send couple of thousands soldiers, we could unite tomorrow. Once we establish a professional army, the military goals ahead of us are as follows:

- ultimate crushing of the 5th Corps
- liberation of Mt. Dinara
- resolving of *Balijas'* /derogatory term for Muslims/ pockets
- rectification of eastern borders
- liberation of Western Slavonia

All we have at present is armed population. Their parade was staged just to intimidate us Serbs, and especially us in the RSK. I visited President Milošević. What he offers is a peaceful way, a peaceful solution to the problems. He has

no intention of going to war because of us, however, he offers assistance in terms of logistics, professional personnel and financial support to the professional units. He promised to see that deserters are gathered and sent over here. Also, he will not stand in the way of volunteers coming from Serbia. I told him that the people have lost trust in all of us and that it is you who will eventually be the guilty one.

So, he will help us, but he will not go in war or unification. As for the situation in Eastern Slavonia, he and Hadžić are the guilty parties. It is my opinion that in the transitional period it is crucial to establish a wartime government of national rescue, but the PM designate should live in Knin. An extensive cooperation of the most responsible high officials of the RSK is imperative. A meeting will be held tomorrow with the leaders of the RS /Republika Srpska/ in Bijeljina. We will go there.

KOVAČEVIĆ: I have a feeling that things will change for the better. The parties are not to be blamed for the situation. We need a consensus as regards the appointment of the PM designate. There are some practical reasons why it is impossible to freeze activities of the parties. Some parties, such as the SPS /Socialist Party of Serbia/, the SRS /Serbian Radical Party/ and the SDS / Serbian Democratic Party/, have their headquarters outside the RSK.

I am satisfied with yesterday's work. There is no need to sign off anyone. I would be careful about Slavonia. I find encouraging the logistic support from the SRO /expansion unknown/. A small step forward is already felt within the units. The collective state of depression is over. It is important that children do not leave the RSK after the end of the school year. Whatever you, the most responsible officials, agree upon with regard to the unification of the RS and the RSK, you will be supported. However, problems arise where they should not arise – radio and television, and also the Decree that was rejected by the RSK Assembly. As for the PM designate, I think it should be Milan Babić. We plan to have a word with him.

VUJIĆ: The political strategy of the RSK was shaped without meeting essential conditions. I am glad I did not participate in the government. The government was led poorly. It was based on two concepts that tended to neglect the reality. Trust is slowly being lost. The initiative for unification brings hope. The RS has many problems. Together we will be stronger. There has been no logistic support so far. They have been playing around the bush, offering no standpoint. I refuse to believe that this is a general policy of Serbia – a policy accepted by the Serbian people. I was pleasantly surprised by Bakić in the Assembly (voting against Mikelić). We in the eastern part of the RSK are in the worst situation. Mikelić still holds the position of the Government's PM.

We must speed up the process of establishing a new government because this is the only way to stop Mikelić and his backroom deals. Without its eastern part the RSK is not a whole. Under what conditions does Babić accept the role of the PM designate? The one that we accept and appoint here will be the one, and he will have all our support. Will Drago please tell us how extensive is their mandate to nominate Babić as the PM designate?

KOVAČEVIĆ: We think that the PM designate should be appointed by consensus. The presumption (condition) of Babić's nomination is the functioning of the defence.

PRESIDENT MARTIĆ: It is important to me that the problem of the PM designate be taken care of as soon as possible. We must prevent secession. The people there, and especially here, are not for it. President Milošević has slackened. He is giving in. Maybe that's why the PM designate from the eastern area cannot be one of the radicals. I've been considering Višić. But, I'll go along with Milan as the PM designate. It would be good if we include few radicals from the eastern area in the government.

DOBRIJEVIĆ: We will reach an agreement about the government. This situation is not good for anybody. Whoever will be appointed president of the government, he will not be successful without our support, neither him nor the RSK as a whole. If institutions will not function we've done nothing. It is imperative that we regain the trust of people as soon as possible and now is the right moment. We should not create problems in the state policy. The Croats keep quarrelling, but it does not reflect on the running of the state.

To freeze the parties might be counterproductive. If we act responsibly the parties should not represent an obstacle.

What we should do is strengthen up the army. We hold all the keys in our hands. No one is allowed to act to our own detriment. Problems must be resolved right here.

As for your problem with the interview, Mr President, the problem with the Television, you should have called and we would have solved it.

We have to strengthen up the state. You won't have any problems with us. We will pursue that concept.

BJEGOVIĆ: Personally, I think that the state institutions have failed to start

functioning. We have to put labels on things – who does what. A chaos and lack of tolerance are all around us. The Serbia – RS – RSK relations need to be clarified as soon as possible. Our problem of defence cannot be resolved without 20,000 professional soldiers and officers. The formation of a professional army is going to take a while. We need 5,000 families to move in the abandoned areas. The programme of revival of the economy will not succeed without the support of Serbia. In commercial terms, we are unable to survive the blockade.

If that is not going to work, we'll have to join Europe all by ourselves; we have an exit via the Danube. Why don't we establish information system network with the RS right away?

We must talk to Milošević.

Unification – yes. How?

We are through with the coupons. (Coupons instead of banknotes in the RS).

Why isn't the RS with us in the same payment system?

PM designate?

The Krajina SDS should give the PM designate, because they won the elections.

The East is our problem and our failure, too. There was no Law on territorial organisation. There are just a few people there who would dare to stick their neck out and get to grips with the secession under such circumstances. Dalmatia and Lika have usurped all high positions. In Knin you have nothing but quarrels. Let the SDS produce a PM designate. We must be aware of the fact that we can hardly move forward without the RS and the SRJ /Socialist Republic of Serbia/. The leading figures must work together. Without an army all of this means nothing. We could have at least installed special units in the camps by now.

We must help the President of the state, the President of the Assembly, the President of the Government, the VRSK /Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina/ Commander.

To be just obedient to Serbia is no solution, either.

We know what we do not want. But, how can we achieve what we want? Serbia will recognize us when we become strong.

KOVAČEVIĆ: Territorial organisation is essential.

BAKIĆ: The situation is alarming. Krajina is dissolving. Secession is under way. The situation in the eastern part of the RSK is hard to resolve. The people in Banija are scared too.

There are three issues that we need to address right away:

- consolidation of power
- establishment of government as soon as possible (but why, if we are to unite soon?)
- unification will restore people's trust

PM designate?

Babić is the best solution. Will the relations with Martić be good? I fear divisions. I am to blame for Mikelić. I took hard the separation, the divisions.

Let us not have any illusions that we will soon have a professional army. Consolidation of government is also an aspect of defence. Party leaders should be better used in the talks, Mr President.

VIŠIĆ: We are waking up. The reality has forced us to wake up. We should assume more responsibility rather than shift it to others. The regime in Belgrade is shaking. It was unable to evade the responsibility.

To build up a state from the top is an illusion. We must build it up from the bottom. People are fleeing RSK. We should at least stop people from leaving.

And what has led to all that?

- fleeing is in our nature;
- we can't expect Serbia to help us move people to Banija while Kosovo is empty;
- we should not seek wisdom in Serbia at any cost;
- the role of media in the SRJ – they are bombarding us - the healthy forces of the RSK;
- RS – taking hostages;
- negative selection of personnel;
- Mikelić is our rude awakening;
- reliance on the people from Krajina;

Milan Babić is the best solution; however, what we need is redistribution within the Government. We must agree on each man, member of the Government. President Martić should talk openly with Milošević. Secession was encouraged by forming the cadre with the people from Knin. What we need is the most honourable and capable people rather than strictly party people. In order to nominate Babić it is necessary to amend the part of the Constitution referring to the powers of the President. We should not insist on leadership. In that sense particular responsibility rests on the Krajina SDS.

DOBRIJEVIĆ: Leadership was created artificially. That was done by some other people. I am not in favour of shutting the door for Serbia. We are aware of what Milošević meant when he spoke his mind. It is the help of the official Serbian policy that we should win over. I am against conflicts. What we need is political stabilisation.

VIŠIĆ: The President is the one who should go to Serbia instead of what we have now – that every citizen has his Daddy over there.

PRESIDENT MARTIĆ: I've revealed to you all dilemmas up there. The moves in the eastern part of the RSK are made by Serbia and they are aimed at hindering the unification of the RS and the RSK.

As for Western Slavonia, I am the most responsible for it. But, who is to blame? It's a clash of two concepts. Mine and Mikelić's concept, and he was dragging us to Croatia. As for me and my concept, there is no life for us with the Croats in Croatia.

It was agreed with the delegation of the Krajina SDS that Babić would come the same day for a conversation with the President.

At 15:00 hours the President talked with Babić over the phone and the latter announced his visit at 16:00 hours. They were waiting for him until 18:00 hours but he never showed up.

ADVISOR TO THE OFFICIALS:

Dušan Pralica, professor

/ signed/

ANNEX 157:
RSK, SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL, PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE WAR THROUGHOUT THE RSK, 30 JULY 1995

1995, 30 July

Knin

From the decision of the Supreme Defence Council of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" on the proclamation of the state of war

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Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council

STATE OF WAR PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE RSK

Knin, 30 July. At its meeting held on Friday evening the RSK Supreme Defence Council has decided, considering the latest developments after the occupation of Grahovo and possible Croatian aggression against the RSK, to proclaim the state of war throughout the RSK in accordance with Article 102 of the Constitution.

[...]

The government has heard and accepted the information of the minister of defence Milan Šuput on the steps taken with regard to the defence of the borders and civil defence activities. RSK President Milan Martić visited yesterday the area of the shelled village of Strumica, some twenty kilometres north of Knin towards Grahovo together with the SVK commander Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić, and stated on RSK Radio&TV that the Krajina defence lines in the area were stabilized.

"We cannot believe that Croatia could decide to carry out an insane venture such as the attack on Knin", said he, but added that the possibility was not to be excluded.

According to his words, the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, with whom he spoke yesterday on the phone, assured him that Serbia could no longer be indifferent.

Speaking about the alliance with Republika Srpska, President Martić said that the RSK and the RS would act jointly, and that the presidents of the two states and the their military commanders were in continuous contact.

"We have the strength to recoup what the Croatian army has seized", stressed Martić, and urged citizens to be disciplined and comply with the instructions of the authorities.

ANNEX 158:
CROATIAN INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION, SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SVK, 30 JULY 1995

1995, 30 July

Knin

From the decision of the Supreme Defence Council of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" on the proclamation of the state of war

_____

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"We have the strength to recoup what the Croatian army has seized", stressed Martić, and urged citizens to be disciplined and comply with the instructions of the authorities.

ANNEX 159:
RSK, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTOR, REGULAR DAILY REPORT, 31 JULY 1995

1995, 31 July

Knin

Report of the Military and Civil Aff airs Sector of the RSK Ministry of Defence concerning mobilization and bringing of the units to full wartime complement, and spontaneous evacuation of the population aft er the news that Croatian forces had broken through the defence lines at Strmica

_____

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Military and Civil Aff airs Sector

Official secret

Strictly confidential

No. 403-201/95
Knin, 31 July 1995

Regular daily report

1. Mobilization and wartime complement

During general public mobilization focus was placed on achieving full strength in SVK war units with conscripts and materiel. Mobilization is carried with the assistance of the military police and the conscripts are immediately transferred to war units. Since there are no conscripts without specifi c assignments, the conscripts transferred to war units are those who most frequently abandon the units. Between 17 July and today 2,850 conscripts were transferred from compulsory work order status to war units. By order of the Ministry of Defence 51 employees of the Ministry were transferred to SVK war units.

In the Knin area 30 motor vehicles are being requisitioned for the requirements of the SVK General Staff . Also in the Knin area, 4 pack horses were requisitioned for the requirements of the 7th Rear Base. Nine doctors have

returned from specialization in the SRJ, and will be assigned to war units and to the *Sveti Sava* Hospital in Knin.

317

In the Lika area mobilization is completed, and motor vehicles, tractors etc. are being requisitioned as required by war units. Both are proceeding smoothly. In the Plaški area 6 tractors have been mobilized for the howitzer battalion. Six nurses were mobilized for the medical unit of the Plaški brigade. Six trucks were requisitioned at Plaški for the 103rd light infantry brigade.

Kordun

Eight trucks were requisitioned for SVK requirements.

Banija

Seventeen volunteers, persons declared unfit for military service, applied to SVK units.

Second recruitment and peacetime complement

The following persons were recruited for military service:

- Northern Dalmatia	38 conscripts
- Lika	61 "
- Kordun	23 "
- Banija	68 "
Total	90 "

Civil defence

Civil defence units, staff s and wardens are updating plans for protection, rescue, evacuation, relief and shelter. During aggression on Grahovo civil defence staff s in Northern Dalmatia and Lika provided relief to 220 refugees.

Civil defence wardens were particularly involved in preventing movements of the population caused by rumours.

Last night someone in Strmica spread the rumour that the ustashi had broken through defence lines and were entering Strmica, causing panic and uncontrolled movement. Panic was dealt with and the population remained in their homes aft er the timely intervention of the head of the municipal civil defence staff in Knin and civil defence wardens.

4. Defence preparations

Activities focused on continued downsizing of the number of persons temporarily employed in government bodies through compulsory work orders. Th us, the persons under compulsory work orders in the ministries include the ministers, their assistants and one driver per ministry. Other administrative personnel are persons not eligible for military service (women and persons unfit for combat duty).

Compulsory work order units are being formed at brigade level in order to prepare the territory for combat operations. So far four such units, 30-50 person strong, have been established in the Knin area.

5. Surveillance and reporting service

The service monitors the situation on the front, on land and in the air space, and is on alert status in order to inform the population about imminent danger and respond to orders by competent officials.

Copy to:

- Ministry records
- Ministry of defence
- SVK General staff, general Sekulić

ASSISTANT MINISTER

Colonel Duško Babić

ANNEX 160:
SVK, GENERAL STAFF, DAILY REPORT, 3 AUGUST 1995

1995, 3 August
Knin

Daily report of the Security Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security Directorate of the VJ General Staff concerning the request of the General Staff to have the SVK air force bombard Split because of the attack on Drvar, the spreading of rumours about the HV attack on the RSK, the situation in SVK units, the situation in the Grahovo-Glamoč theatre, and prevailing public opinion that the SVK could not defend itself, and that it would be better for the people to move out than to become encircled and perish.

SVK GENERAL STAFF
Security Department
Str. conf. no. 37-616
3 August 1995

Daily report to:
SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF THE VJ GENERAL STAFF
Att. General Aleksandar Dimitrijević

During the day our units have kept their positions, with the engagement of the air force and artillery, and there has been no major shift of the front line from Mandići – Dubrave - Mount Brežine - Koščica hill - Ograci hill - Javorov Vrh - Veliki Mračaj- Mali Mračaj - Javorova Glava - Samar, - Igla - Bezdan - Grgić - Suvi Vrh - Dinara- Razvale -Unište – the large cave right.

During the day the chief of the SVK General Staff visited the forward command post of the VRS General Staff in order to arrange cooperation and further offensive action at Grahovo - Livanjsko Polje. Specific tasks were agreed, but we do not know when they will be accomplished because the impression is that in the western part the RS has hardly any forces capable of offensive action. The VRS is concealing this fact. At the meeting of the chief of the SVK General Staff at the forward command post of the VRS General Staff the SVK was requested to carry out air raids on Split as a reprisal for the shelling if Drvar.
During the meeting the SVK was also blamed for the fall of Grahovo and Glamoč.

1. Foreign factor
The analysis of information obtained from different sources on HV aggression on the SVK warrants the following conclusions.
The Croatian Intelligence Service or Western intelligence services (certainly

within the scope of their global policy towards Krajina) have been spreading, several times a day and from different sources, misinformation about the unconditional HV aggression on the RSK.
As established, more than 80% of misinformation has been spread through UNPROFOR, in most cases through liaison officers or friends, always taking into account that such misinformation should reach the highest levels (brigade and corps commanders, and senior officers in the SVK General Staff). False and misinforming written material was given to persons believed that they would pass it on to such officers.
The second category of sources used by foreign intelligence services to launch misinformation were telephone communications between intelligence agencies and the republican state security officers abroad.
The third channel used by the Croatian Intelligence Service were radio communications intercepted and recorded by the radio tapping service.
The fourth group of misinformation - or half-truths - includes data obtained from sources sent by different services to the Republic of Croatia or the 5th Corps, not qualified for proper appraisal of what they saw or heard.
Finally, intelligence services in the units do not function at all, and our units do not have any tactical depth information about hostile forces and do not monitor the situation.
The foregoing considerations obviously show how realistic and timely are the decisions made from the highest down to the lowest echelon.
Yesterday (2 August) the European Community RC and teams in the RSK were ordered by the UN High Command in Zagreb to establish the following:
- Air raids on Mount Dinara and facilities in the Grahovo area: did the planes take off from the Udbina airstrip or from Mahovljani near Banja Luka? If from Udbina, are the planes and pilots from the air force of Republika Srpska?
- Number of SVK troops killed and wounded? On which sites and where are they taken care of? Can the ICRC visit them and talk to them?
- Artillery and rocket positions? Did the VRS take part in artillery support?
- Response of the military and state leadership to the negotiations in Geneva? What is the response of the citizens?

2. Situation in the units
After the proclamation of the state of war, alcohol abuse among the troops is on the rise, resulting in ever more frequent injuries, killings, verbal and physical quarrels, obstruction of commands and serious disruption of combat readiness.
After the decision of the SVK High Command to launch an offensive at Grahovo - Livanjsko Polje, parts of the Special Unit Corps, MUP units and part of the special "Captain Dragan's" (Dragan Vasiljković) unit were committed to the operation. In our assessment, the units did not accomplish the mission; the authority of certain persons had to be saved and, accordingly, the units were withdrawn from action.

The fact is that the 2nd brigade under the command of "colonel" MILOŠ CVJETIČANIN did not accomplish the mission except some minor operations of no significance for further action. MUP units which were included into the Special Unit Corps after the "Vidovdan [St. Vitus] parade" not only failed to accomplish their mission but even abandoned their positions. They were returned to their positions but refused to remain within the Special Unit Corps. "Captain Dragan", supposed to be responsible for deep reconnaissance of enemy deployment, reconnoitred instead the positions of our forces.
What is only true is that military police units at all levels, including the military police battalion, are fighting properly, with no hesitation or fear, and have not abandoned a single position.

In connection with the current situation the commander has made the following moves:
On 2 August he recalled "general" Stupar from the Grahovo theatre, formed a strategic reserve out of the uncommitted forces of the Special Unit Corps and attached units in Kordun.
During the day the 2nd brigade was pulled out of combat and redeployed to Bruvno (municipality of Gračac) to be in readiness for "special action" in all directions.
During the day "captain Dragan" left the SVK, disgruntled because he had requested to be appointed commander of the 92dn motorized brigade of the 7th Corps and promised that he would bring it to full combat readiness within a month. When the SVK commander disagreed, Dragan demonstratively left Krajina.
Let me note that "captain Dragan" was 'nominated' commander of the 92nd brigade by the Republican State Security Service of Serbia (MILAN KNEŽEVIĆ, aka "Nedo") because they persistently tried to present the current commander of the 92nd motorized brigade, lieutenant colonel JANKO ĐURICA, as incapable of commanding the unit.
This has become a fairly complex internal problem with, so far, an uncertain outcome.
If our internal political and the external environments are added, the case is more than serious.
As reliably verified there is other than lip service no practical cooperation with the VRS.
Untruths and lies are paid with human lives.
As offensive operations against the 5th Corps have come to a standstill, illicit trade is flourishing and threatens to assume uncontrollable dimensions.

The security system at all levels is geared to the same function as the leadership and command system. However, in spite of all problems, the counterintelligence service is functioning and unity within the service is still at a high level.
An attempt to disrupt the system was made in the Special Unit Corps and

in the 15th Corps. Lieutenant colonel PETAR BORIĆ has totally identified himself with "general" STEVO ŠEVO, who has no tolerance for the security service. Together they oft en exert pressure on specific security departments and brigades. However, the counterintelligence service has remained functional thanks exclusively to the sound, professional and responsible efforts of the 15th Corps security department (captain POTKONJAK and lieutenant LONČAR), with whom I am in continuous contact.

Ref.; your information str. conf. no. 33-226 of 26 July 1995.
The sum of 37,000 DEM is mentioned on page three (3), paragraph four. Additionally we received the information that the sum involved was 190,000 DEM, which he received subsequently.

3. Situation in the territory
On 3 August 1995 the impression was gained, in contact with citizens, of elements of panic, although still controlled. Citizens are mainly accusing the authorities, i.e., the political leaders of the SVK, and believe that the situation is due to their carelessness and negligence. They hope that we have not been betrayed and believe, as the last resort, that the SRJ will help.
Furthermore, citizens think that we are not able to defend ourselves and that, if no substantial help is provided by the SRJ, it is better for the people to move elsewhere rather than to be encircled and perish.
According to reliable information received during the day, RSK prime minister M. Babić told the ministers to pack up and be ready for moving to Donji Lapac. He asked Nikola Štrbac, secretary of the government, whether he was sure that those in Knin would defend Knin in the event of an attack. Štrbac replied that he (Babić) should know the answer having spent some time there. Babić did not continue the conversation on the subject.

ASSISTANT COMMANDER
for security affairs
Colonel Rade Rašeta

(stamp)
text illegible

ANNEX 161:
MILAN MARTIĆ SPEAKING IN RAVNI KOTARI, 2 AUGUST 1995

VIDEO CLIP: TV Knin - Milan Martic govori - Ravni Kotari – 2 kolovoz 1995

MILAN MARTIĆ : «...Sigurno među živima ne bi bilo ni mene, naravno ni vas nikoga i mi nemamo nekog velikog izbora, jednostavno smo osuđeni da moramo pobijediti. Zato sve, kad su u pitanju bilo koji interes države, na prvom mjestu svakako mora biti odbrana i sa svoje strane, kao predsjednika, u tom imam podršku i Parlamenta i Vlade, da svi prioriteti upravo budu na strani vojske i odbrane. Hrvatska će najvjerovatnije izvršiti novu agresiju na RSK. Pokušali smo da to sporazumno i pregovorima prolongiramo i da do toga ne dođe. Međutim, njihovo opredjeljenje upravo jeste da dobiju podršku za ratnu opciju kako bi stabilizovali se na unutrašnjem planu, a vi znate koliko ima nestabilnosti kod njih. Ali ukoliko mi, što se ja nadam iskreno da će tako biti, sačekamo "domaćinski" i porazimo ih, onda je naše priznanje veoma blizu. RSK je tada najveća realnost, realnost da nas se prizna i u svijetu pa i ta Hrvatska koja bi bila poražena, morat će da nam pruži ruku i da kaže, postoji RSK.»

VIDEO CLIP: TV Knin showing Milan Martic speaking – Ravni Kotari – 2 Aug 1995

„…I surely wouldn't be amongst the living nor would any of you, nor do we have much of a choice, we are simply destined to win. For this reason, when any State interest is at stake, the sole priority should surely be defense and on my behalf, as the President, I have the support of the Parliament and the Government in that the priorities should be the army and defense. Croatia will most likely conduct new aggression towards the RSK. We attempted to delay this by agreements and negotiations in order for it to be avoided. However, their position is precisely to gain support for a military solution in order to stabilize themselves within, and you know how much instability they are suffering. But if we succeed, and I sincerely hope this will be the case, and we wait “as a host” and defeat them, then our recognition will be truly imminent. The RSK would then become the utmost reality, it would be realistic that we be recognized worldwide and that Croatia be defeated, they would be forced to shake our hands and say, the RSK exists.”

ANNEX 162:
EXCERPT FROM ICTY, PROSECUTOR V. SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ (IT-02-54-T), BABIC TESTIMONY, THURSDAY, 21 NOVEMBER 2002

EXTRACT

International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54-T)
Babic Testimony
Thursday, 21 November 2002

Page 13256
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don't think we need to put it all to the witness. It's tabs 98, 99, 100, and 101 of Exhibit 352. They all deal with General Celeketic, his promotion and his release.
Q. But I would like to put to you tab 102, and it's 102 of that same exhibit, 352. And that is actually a document by Dusan Zoric, the military post 1740 -- 90, Belgrade, from 21st December, 1994, regarding the promotion of Colonel Milan Celeketic to the rank of Major General. Can you tell us who this person Dusan Zoric is, what position did he have?
A. He was head of the personnel department of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, or was the acting head.
Q. Yes. Thank you.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have to go into private session, and I'm dealing now with paragraph 293 and the following two in the proofing summary.
[Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]
THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
Q. Witness, did you have a conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the Z-4 plan in August 1995?
A. Yes, a telephone conversation.
Q. At that time, had you discussed the Z-4 plan with Mr. Galbraith?
A. Yes, with Ambassador Peter Galbraith, on several occasions, several times before that.
Q. And immediately before you had this telephone conversation, what was the option given to you by Mr. Galbraith?

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A. He offered that we should accept and adopt the Z-4 plan and the disengagement of the armed forces of Krajina in the Bihac pocket. He said that we should accept a new mandate for the UN peacekeepers, which was known as the UNCRO mandate, United Nations Croatia, and that communications and roads be opened in Croatia.

Q. At that time, were you the president of the RSK?

A. I was the Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Martic was the president, in fact.

Q. Why did you not simply accept it?

A. I accepted in my capacity as Prime Minister, but I informed Ambassador Galbraith that this could not be put into practice without the will and acquiescence of President Milosevic.

Q. How -- and did you then -- you said you had a telephone conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the 3rd of August, 1995. How did you reach him? Did anyone help you?

A. Yes. Jovica Stanisic did, from Jovica Stanisic's cabinet or offices.

Q. Did you go to his office, and where was it?

A. I did go to see Stanisic in his office, which was located in the building of the Federal Internal Affairs Ministry.

Q. Who was present? Who else was present when you saw him?

A. Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza was there, and so was the head of the counter-intelligence service of State Security of Serbia, a man whose name I don't remember, but he resembled Frenki.

Q. Is that the same man you mentioned earlier on to have seen in

ANNEX 163:
CENTRE FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, EXCERPTS OF INTERCEPTS BETWEEN MILAN MARTIĆ AND ILIJA PRIJIĆ, NOS. 65 (3 AUGUST 1995, 08:50), 66 (3 AUGUST 1995, 12:23), 67 (3 AUGUST 1995, 14:42)

English Translation *ET 0112-2616-0112-2690*

Centre for Electronic Surveillance **Top Secret**

the Ustashas are listening, I think he will react with some instructions.
RK: All right, is he going to obstruct our efforts to create joint bodies?
MM: No…
RK: He wants to put the blame on us.
MM: Yes, yes!
RK: OK Mile, I'll see you tomorrow evening and we can discuss it.
MM: All right.
RK: Take care of everyone.
MM: You too Rašo, take care of your /people/.
RK: The two of us have to be present in connection with that body, but if it goes slowly…
MM: We can do it as a leadership, it does not have to be a body.
RK: Yes, I'll explain when I see you.
MM: All right.
RK: Good.
MM: We'll discuss everything tomorrow.
RK: All right.
MM: OK Rašo, stay well.

65. No audio recording
03-Aug-95 08:50
The following is a transcript of a conversation between Milan MARTIĆ (MM) and Ilija PRIJIĆ (IP) from Geneva:

MM: Where are you?
IP: We are here.
MM: When did you get there, last night, right?
IP: Yes, last night.
MM: How was it?
IP: The trip was OK.
MM: How is your accommodation, is it OK?
IP: Yes.
MM: Right…
IP: Everything's OK.
MM: PAVIČEVIĆ, he is the man.
IP: Did you speak with Milan?
MM: Not this morning, but yesterday, yes. He went up yesterday.
IP: And he spoke to the person we mentioned.
MM: I know, but last night he did not call. I was expecting his call. He is calling me at 10:00. But don't /give him/ a penny, I know roughly what this guy is looking for.
IP: I know, it's exactly what he said, this person, that's why he is here.
MM: That's him. We won't even consider what TUDJMAN has said in public.
IP: Of course.
MM: Railway, oil pipeline, this and that.
IP: Yes, yes.
MM: You know the concept, first the withdrawal from here upwards, and then we can talk.
IP: Or else around Drvar and others, we could do that.

MM: No, it will not do, they have been around Drvar from afar, but we have pressed them firmly here. They have a lot of casualtics and there is unrest everywhere, their people don't want to go on these infantry incursions, they are afraid because so far they have lost, they have had many losses.
IP: All right.
MM: Yesterday KARINA /as printed/ came to see me, and he said, they are doing well, the guys are holding on well.
IP: All right.
MM: It is getting better and better here. They drank heavily and yesterday they went around pounding houses here and also civilian villages, and that is where you can make a warning. Hey can pound civilian villages, but then we'll do something. The other thing is a lie, we did not pound anything and it is clean.
IP: .....
MM: Take advantage of it at the press conference, and say that it is their way of raising tensions.

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I see that CNN and BBC have quoted them, they say that we pounded Karlovac, Gospić and the rest, so they could get support for an offensive.
IP: Yes, yes.
MM: Please, it must be said.
IP: What is their situation in the area?
MM: The same, they are building up to the left, to the right, but it is their theory that we are attacking them. which is nonsense. They are staging some detonations by themselves, really we are not pounding them at all. They are staging some detonations and this should be settled at the conference, OK?
IP: OK.
MM: Keep it that way. And after that, at what time?
IP: At 10:00.
MM: Oh, at 10, are you coming back this evening or tomorrow?
IP: I don't know it depends….. some say tonight, others say tomorrow.
MM: Listen, have somebody telephone Radio Knin at 60-410.
IP: OK.
MM: And let them know what is happening.
IP: We are unable to get any lines there, this is the other one.
MM: All right I see, if not we'll send a message from our office here, that's it, just hang in there.
IP: All right.
MM: All right Ićo, take care.
IP: Bye.

66. No audio recording
03-Aug-95 12:23
The following is a transcript of a conversation between Milan MARTIĆ (MM) and Ilija PRIJIĆ (IP):

IP: We are having a break at the moment, so I called.
MM: How is it going?
IP: We have not had any concrete talks yet with the other side……. We had a joint meeting at 10:00….. STOLTENBERG said it was essential that we have established and prepared our negotiating activities.
MM: Yes!
IP: And nothing else in particular…. was discussed.
MM: Yes, yes!
IP: After that he held a talk with the Croatians……. requests, after which we were granted 10 minutes with the group. We presented our statement saying we were for a peaceful resolution of the dispute.
MM: Excellent!
IP: First of all, we have to resolve the issue, cease hostilities, cease-fire agreement.
MM: Yes!
IP: Now there is another break, and they will talk with the Croatians again. They are discussing it among themselves.
MM: All right, yes.
IP: Therefore, STOLTENBERG and Ejde Arensi DELAPREL /as printed/…… we must continue with the talks.
MM: With STOLTENBERG, especially regarding a cease-fire.
IP: All right.
MM: Don't forget that, it is very important.

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IP: He received information, I don't know what you have on it, from TANJUG /news agency/. that BABIĆ and GALBRAJT /as printed/ talked……and what they agreed on.
MM: Nothing, I've not heard from Milan yet. It's what I told you earlier, that the meeting was held up in our MIP /foreign affairs ministry/. It was more of a private visit by GALBRAJT /as printed/. Milan has not phoned me yet.
IP: Tanjug have published it apparently.
MM: Let them, that's why I told him, don't go, and they wanted him to go to the American Embassy, so I said not the American Embassy, but our MIP here, and it should be a private visit.

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IP: STOLTENBERG himself had stressed that AKAŠI and GALBRAJT /as printed/ should take part in the talks.
MM: Not quite, but that's OK, actually GALBRAJT is alone as far as I know, but I am waiting to hear from Milan any moment now.
IP: Yes, OK.
MM: Don't forget to talk to STOLTENBERG regarding the flow of goods.
IP: I won't.
MM: And the other thing, stick to our stand, we are for a peaceful resolution, we are for a peaceful solution to the problem. Ask for the withdrawal of troops, both to the left, the right and so on.
IP: All right!
MM: You can even schedule additional meetings. That is not a problem at all.
IP: What's the situation like?
MM: Everything's OK, everything is under control. We have withstood infantry attacks and we still managed to inflict losses. The ones up there raising tensions are inventing things, and you must protest, they are inventing /the story/ that we are attacking them, which is nonsense.
IP: Was there an ultimatum, in their newspapers I think, as if they have mobilised 100,000 men, or they were going to.
MM: They have already done it, they mobilised over 100,000 men and it was announced here last night by GANS /as printed/ and KRISTOFER /as printed/, and this GANES /as printed/ guy from UNPROFOR, and yes they've done it, don't let that confuse you. Our men are deployed on positions both in the depth and along the front ends, and we're ready if it comes to that.
IP: The talks you have had when we were going up?
MM: Right!
IP: Were they fruitful?
MM: I know, but it will get better I think.
IP: All right.
MM: I think that in Serbia and Yugoslavia they will start mobilising today, and they are coming in here all the way.
IP: All right.
MM: This is being intercepted, perhaps I shouldn't have said it, but it's all right, hang in there, we are doing well militarily and there are not any problems.
IP: All right.
MM: Listen can we get some of that for radio, or is Pero going to convey from our talk that…..
IP: We are going to discuss it and release a statement to the radio. A reporter should be there in the studio, close to our offices.
MM: They could go to Mara if you gave them a call. Mara can connect directly through 83. She can /go/ up there directly.
IP: Yes.
MM: It wouldn't be bad if Ilija could call /or broadcast?/ up there through the direct one. He should say that we have been received here as an equal partner, and you should say it. I am telling you that everything here is OK, militarily and otherwise. There are no problems, but you should push it.
IP: ……. to start at, not later.
MM: OK, just go on. In the second broadcast, Pero will summarise a statement for the radio, while you guys call in and go on the air.
IP: OK!
MM: Somewhere around 16:00, perhaps you should go straight to the radio.

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IP: All right!
MM: Maybe 15 or 20 minutes before, or even earlier.
IP: Will do……..
MM: All right Ićo, give my regards to everyone and hang in there.
IP: I am leaving tomorrow morning.
MM: Say hello to everyone there, to Lazar, Milivoj, Mile and hang in there. There are no problems here.
IP: I'll talk to you later.
MM: Stay well.

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67. No audio recording
03-Aug-95 14:42
The following is a transcript of a conversation between Milan MARTIĆ (MM) and Ilija PRIJIĆ (IP).

MM: Hi, Ićo, are you done yet?
IP: No, it's still going on. we have a big problem regarding the outcome of the situation, it is not favourable for us, I'll lay it out to you and you can…
MM: Yes, yes.
IP: It says: On the basis of today's agreement, the Croatian government's delegation and the Serb representatives of the authorities in Knin, it was decided to cease all hostilities and military operations on Friday at noon. The following was decided on the basis of the agreement:
1. That the oil pipeline opens on Monday, 07-Aug-95, in accordance with the agreement of 09-Dec-94.

MM: That's it?
IP: That's it unless technical reasons prevented it. A meeting on the pipeline for Petrinja would be held in Pleso on August 8th.
MM: That is also out of question.
IP: Number 2: the meeting would be held on Friday at (VENZEI?) /as printed/ on August 9th in Knin, to set the modes opening and controlling the railway from Zagreb to Split via Knin.
MM: God forbid.
IP: Third: to move toward including the political issue of Serb Krajina. basing the talks on the Z4 Plan.
MM: Neither that.
IP: The first meeting would be held in Pleso on August 10th and the second in Knin. on August 17th.
MM: First of all, you should demand that the meetings be held outside Croatia and Krajina. Let it be Geneva.
IP: All right.
MM: We agree that the negotiations take place on an equal footing.
IP: ……. And four, to have enabled unrestricted flow of humanitarian aid toward Bihać.
MM: That is OK.
IP: Four, that the border crossing, that is, inspections of the crossings in Bihać /be performed/ by the international peacekeepers, that is OK. Five, to have achieved full implementation of the agreement regarding the mandate, the deployment of forces along borders.
MM: The internationally recognised borders?
IP: Here it does not say, on internationally recognised borders. but in Resolution 981. And number seven, that the military leaders of Krajina and Croatia meet on Saturday August 5th under the auspices of General ŽANVIJE /as printed/, in order to set the terms of the cease-fire.
MM: That can be done, but on the line.
IP: OK now, what we are contemplating one thing here, but of course we don't know how things are. That depends on the situation, we are thinking as far as the pipeline is concerned that at some point we would have to accept that part.
MM: All right.

IP: As for the railway, we agree that we are allowed to formulate our own request.
MM: No, first the unconditional withdrawal of troops.
IP: Of course, I will say it, the part which you have said toward the end. As for the pipeline, we can try solving it.
MM: Yes.
IP: Secondly, regarding the railway, we are going to say that it cannot go through Knin.
MM: Neither through Pleso nor Knin!
IP: Number three, regarding political talks, we hold the view that the talks can be political but without the Z4 Plan.
MM: Without the Plan, political talks without preconditions.
IP: Yes, and also we agree with the opening of a process of political talks.
MM: That's it, nothing more.

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Centre for Electronic Surveillance Top Secret

IP: They proposed August 10th as the date.
MM: Not August 10th.
IP: We are binding ourselves after the withdrawal of Croatian forces.
MM: The date will be set eventually, after the withdrawal, to respect the cease-fire agreement.
IP: Should we say during the month of August?
MM: Yes, yes.
IP: It gives us a lot more time, good, and the other things, from Bihać, that's not a problem.
MM: Yes, did you make the call to Radio Knin?
IP: We don't need to make any, I don't know how it will end.
MM: He is expecting you to call, listen I'll go out for a second, you stick to what we have agreed, without further deviation, do not accept the thing about the railway.
IP: …… talking.
MM: All right, but you conditioning the withdrawal to the line of separation means we are pushing for demobilisation. Ask for demobilisation, that is, for /withdrawal to/ the line of separation, the previously established line of separation.
IP: (Repeatedly shouting) Yes, yes, yes.
MM: Ask for that, and after that the remaining talks including political, without conditioning of Z4, ask for it to be outside Croatia and Krajina, again, ask for Geneva to be the location of the talks.
IP: All right.
MM: Geneva, to be the location of the political talks.
IP: All right.
MM: Don't let them double-cross you, because they want to narrow it down, in the military sense, that we persevere, don't hold back in there please. we are doing well. We are in a much better position now, it is them who have a situation.
IP: I have the comments by DE LA PREL /as printed/ and others, JARENS /as printed/ as well.
MM: Good, they want to induce the psychosis, we are almost done, if they had been able to do something they would have done it. The ones up there are attempting, and suffering losses everywhere.
IP: OK.
MM: The situation is good, there are no problems at all. Make sure you say, forces on equal footing, make sure you are not treated like the local authority but as the Croat side and the Serb side. If they /say/, Croatia, then RSK, if they /say/ Croatia and Serbia.
Fight for such equality, therefore. No way are we going to be blackmailed into talks, no ultimatums, we are asking for a peaceful resolution, making it ours /as printed/. Don't let them trick you with STOLTENBERG and internationally recognised borders and UNCRO mandates, because as soon as you recognise the UNCRO mandate you will have recognised everything.
IP: That is point 5.
MM: Yes, yes.
IP: Normally, they are deployed over there, but we cannot accept Z4.
MM: …. political talks after the month of August, we can do it immediately after the Croatian forces' withdrawal to the line of separation, meaning demobilisation, lowering tensions, we can immediately begin the political talks.
IP: OK.

MM: That's it, and then we'll decide if the shit gets lesser, then we'll begin and do not let them blackmail you. No Pleso, and no internal problems, but Geneva. That's it, all right. Ićo.

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ANNEX 164:
DUŠAN VIRO, "SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ: THE ANATOMY OF CRIME", PROFIL, ZAGREB, 2007, PP. 370-378

Dušan Viro

SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ
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Ćosić: Yes, yes, by all means. We will be in touch and you don't give up. Thank you very much.

Martić: Cheers, Ćosić, bye.

03 August 1995 08:50 AM

The conversation between Milan Martić and the Minister of the Interior of the so-called Krajina, Ilija Prijić who is calling him from Geneva. Martić is trying to find out about the progress of the negotiations with the Croatian side and he is convincing his collocutor that the Croatian Army, which is at the border of the so-called Krajina, is almost in a state of disarray.

Martić: Where are you?

Prijić: Here we are!

Martić: When did you arrive? Last night, didn't you.

Prijić: Yes, last night.

Martić: How was the journey?

Prijić: Well, good, the journey was good.

Martić: Is it good, the place where you are accommodated there?

Prijić: Yes.

Martić: Aha, aha.

Prijić: Everything is okay…

Martić: Hey, this Pavičević is a hell of a fellow.

Prijić: Have you talked with Milan[1]?

Martić: Not this morning, but yesterday I did. He went up there yesterday.

Prijić: He has also talked with the one we talked about.

Martić: I know, but he did not call last night. I was expecting him to call. He will call me now, around 10 o'clock. But don't give a penny for that, I know roughly what that one is requesting.

Prijić: I know, I know, he said exactly that, that one, that's why he is here.

Martić: Well he, what Tuđman publicly said about what he requested, we wouldn't even think of it.

Prijić: Naturally.

Martić: Railway line, oil pipeline, this and that.

Prijić: Yes, yes.

Martić: You know what the concept is - withdrawal from here, from up there and then we can talk.

Prijić: But otherwise, there around Drvar and the reset, that we can.

Martić: Nothing, look, nothing. It is only, they were doing something around Drvar but from a distance, but here we have rushed them properly. Let me tell you, they have a lot of casualties, riots are everywhere, their men don't want to go to those infantry breakthroughs, they are

1 He is referring to Milan Martić

frightened because they have been losing so far, they have a lot of loses.

Prijić: Good.

Martić: Karina also visited me yesterday. And he says that they have been holding out very well, the guys have been holding out excellently.

Prijić: Good.

Martić: Eh, it's getting better and better in here. They have had a few drinks, they have had quite a lot of drinks. Then they were rumbling around the houses here the whole day yesterday and also around those civilian villages and that is what you can threaten with. They can pound, pound at the civilian villages, but then we will do something. Anyway, that one, it is a lie, we were not pounding at anything and that one is clear.

Prijić: …

Martić: You should use that at the press conference there to say that it was the way how to mount tensions. I have seen that the CNN and the BBC repeated that. They say that we were pounding at Karlovac, Gospić and the rest in order to get the approval for an attack.

Prijić: Yes, yes.

Martić: Well, this should be said there, please.

Prijić: What is their situation like, over there, in the region?

Martić: The same, they have been amassing on the left and on the right, it is their theory that we are attacking them, but it does not matter. They themselves have been causing some explosions, but we do not pound at all, really. They themselves have been causing some explosions and that should be resolved at the Conference, you know.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: So, you should stand by it. Well then, when do you have it, at what time?

Prijić: At 10 o'clock.

Martić: At 10 o'clock; will you, are you returning tonight or tomorrow?

Prijić: I do not know whether tonight or tomorrow, it depends on… somebody says tonight, somebody tomorrow.

Martić: Look, it would be good that someone calls *Radio Knin* later, someone should call here, 60-410.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: Yes, and you should say how...

Prijić: We cannot get through the lines over there, this is the other one.

Martić: Aha, all right, if not, then we will convey something from here, from the Cabinet. Then good, you just continue to hold out as you should.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: Well Ićo, cheers.

Prijić: Bye.

03 August 1995 12:23 PM

The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić, in which Prijić informs Martić about the details of the talks. On that occasion they also comment the news about the mobilisation of 100,000 people on the Croatian side and Martić is convinced that "the mobilisation will start in Serbia and Yugoslavia today and they will absolutely come in here," Martić presumes that their conversation is being wiretapped…

Prijić: Well, we have a break, so I wanted to get in touch.

Martić: How is it going?

Prijić: We have had no concrete talks with the other side so far…we had a joint meeting at 10 o'clock…Stoltenberg[2] said that the main thing was to establish and prepare for the negotiating activities.

Martić: Yes, yes.

Prijić: And we have not…… talked about anything else, in particular

Martić: Yes, yes!

Prijić: Thereafter, he had talks for about 15 to 30 minutes with the Croats…requests, after that we had /talks/ lasting 10 minutes with that group. We communicated our statement that we were for the resolution of conflicts in a peaceful way.

Martić: Excellent!

Prijić: First of all, we have to resolve the issue of cessation of hostilities, the agreement on a ceasefire.

Martić: Yes, yes!

Prijić: And after that we are now having a break again. They will talk again with the Croats. They have been conferring among themselves.

Martić: Oh, I see.

Prijić: Meaning Stoltenberg and Arens and De la Presle[3]…we should continue with the talks.

Martić: With Stoltenberg particularly regarding the ceasefire.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: Do not forget that, it is very important.

Prijić: He has got the information, through *Tanjug* – I don't know what you have in that regard - that Babić and Galbraith[4] talked….and what they have agreed over there.

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2 Thorvald Stoltengerg, a Norwegian politician, at that time he was a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for the former Yugoslavia and one of the participants in the Geneva talks.

3 This probably refers to the participants in the negotiations Gert Arens and Bernard de La Presle. It says „Arensi Delaprel" in the original.

4 Peter Galbraith, U.S.A. Ambassador in Zagreb from June 1993 until January 1998. In the original transcripts, Galbraith is always referred to as „Galbrajt"

Martić: Nothing, Milan has not got in touch with me. I have told you that the meeting was held in our "MIP" /Ministry of the Foreign Affairs/[5] up there. It was more of a Galbraith's private visit. But Milan has not called me yet.

Prijić: It seems that *Tanjug* released it.

Martić: Well, let them, let them, that is why I said – Do not go; they wanted him to go to the American Embassy, then I said – Do not go to the American Embassy but to our "MIP", here, and it should be a private visit.

Prijić: Stoltenberg has mentioned here that Akashi[6] takes part in the negotiation process, he and Galbraith.

Martić: Well, no, um, all right, all right, actually it is only Galbraith as far as I know, but I am waiting for Milan to call me any minute now.

Prijić: Yes, yes!

Martić: And you should not forget to see with Stoltenberg about this flow of goods.

Prijić: No, I won't, I won't.

Martić: And this, stand by that position – we are for the peaceful resolution, we are for the resolution of the problem in a peaceful way. Request a withdrawal of the forces, on the left and on the right and so.

Prijić: All right!

Martić: Actually, you can schedule new meetings, you can do all that, there are no problems.

Prijić: What is the situation like?

Martić: Everything is OK, everything is under control. We have resisted the infantry attacks again and everything, and we have inflicted loses on them. They do not have, they are building up tensions up there, they are fabricating, you should lodge a protest regarding that, they are fabricating that we are attacking them, which has nothing to do with anything.

Prijić: Was there some ultimatum of theirs, in the newspapers or what, I don't know where, as if they have mobilized 100,000 men or that they will do that?

Martić: They have already done that, they have mobilized over 100,000 men and Ganes[7] and Kristofer[8] announced that last night here and this Ganes from UNPROFOR, I do not know, they have done that, I don't know. But you should not be perplexed by that. All our men have occupied the positions, both in depth and in the forward lines of defence, and we are waiting for them, if it comes to that.

Prijić: Regarding those talks you held when we were going up there.

Martić: Eh, eh.

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5 He is referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Krajina.

6 Yasushi Akashi, UN diplomat and the special envoy of the Secretary-General of the UN for the Peace Operations.

7 UN Spokespearson

8 He is referring to Waren Christofer, American Secretary of State (1993 – 1997)

Prijić: Have they produced some results?

Martić: Well, I know, I know, it will be, it will be better, I think.

Prijić: Good.

Martić: I think that those ones will start with a mobilisation in Serbia and Yugoslavia today and that they are absolutely coming in here.

Prijić: Good!

Martić: Yes, well, I don't know, all this is being wiretapped, maybe I shouldn't have said this to you, but, um, it's okay. You should hold out, we are good, we are firm like soldiers and there are no problems.

Prijić: Good!

Martić: Listen, can you /*say*/ something for the Radio or Pero will convey something from our conversation, that they have informed that …

Prijić: Well, here it is – we will talk about it later, and we will give a statement for the radio, some of the journalists should come over there, to the studio, there to our offices.

Martić: Good, they can come in here, to the Mara's /*office*/, when you call. Mara can put you directly through to that one up there, through this 83. She can /*do that*/ directly up there…

Prijić: Yes!

Martić: It will not be bad, Ilija, to call on that direct line up there, to say basically that we have been accepted as an equal party. Everything is OK here, I am telling you, things stand good with us militarily and there are no problems, but you should stress…

Prijić: …in the beginning, so that it will not….further on.

Martić: All right, all right, you just continue. Regarding this other call, Pero will prepare brief information and broadcast it on the Radio and then you will call directly into the Radio /program/.

Prijić: Good!

Martić: Sometime around 4 o'clock then, maybe you can get into the Radio /program/ directly.

Prijić: Yes, we will…

Martić: It's a deal Ićo, my greetings to all those men there and you hold out.

Prijić: I am leaving from here tomorrow morning.

Martić: Greetings to all who are there - Lazar, Milivoj and Mile - give my regards and you hold out. There are no problems here, whatsoever.

Prijić: Talk to you.

Martić: Okay, all the best.

03 August 1995 14:16 PM

The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić.

Martić: What's new up there?

Prijić: Look, the mobilisation is to the full and it is a wait-and-see

situation.

Martić: Aha, aha, all right, you should be ready to go over there, if necessary.

Prijić: I think that everything is completely ready.

Martić: Eh, that's good, that's good, and here we are holding well, no cracks whatsoever. Wherever they tried to advance, they got it in the neck.

Prijić: Good, good,

Martić: Um, that meeting which I planned to /?*organise*/, I cannot do that now. When the commander judges that he can call the corps commanders as well, then we will /*organise*/ it here where I am.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: You will be in touch with Tošo, are you there with Tošo now?

Prijić: Yes, yes, I spoke with him when they came.

Martić: He is over there, at the Joco's somewhere, you should meet with him and discuss with him thoroughly, but tell him that the meeting will be dependant on the Commander's opportunity to gather corps commanders, they are now in the field and they are not available. Eh, then you will come from up there, you and the secretaries. So, hold out up there, be ready and if need be - on Zagreb, fuck it.

Prijić: No problem.

Martić: That's right, Ićo. Bye, sport, push on, cheers.

03 August 1995 14:42 PM

The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić who is telling him not very optimistic news about the outcome of the talks with the Croatian side so far. However, Mile Martić, not even suspecting what is going to happen the next morning, is still taking a firm stand.

Martić: Oh, hello Ićo, have you finished?

Prijić: No, we haven't, it is still going on, we have a very difficult problem in front of us regarding the outcome of this situation. It is not favourable for us, I will tell you and you…

Martić: Yes, yes.

Prijić: The following has been said: that based on the Agreement, the today's one, the delegations of the Croatian Government and the Serbian representative of the authorities from Knin have decided that all the hostilities and military operations should cease at 12 o'clock on Friday. It means that pursuant to this Agreement the following has been decided: 1. that in accordance with the Agreement of 19 December 1994, the oil pipeline will be opened on Monday, 07 August 1995.

Martić: Nothing else?

Prijić: Nothing else, only – unless the technical reasons prove to the contrary. The meeting regarding the oil pipeline for Petrinja would be held at Pleso on 08 August.

Martić: That is also out of the question!

Prijić: Under 2: the meeting will be organised in (VENZEI?!)[9]on Friday, 09 August in Knin in order to define the modalities and methods as how to open and control the railway line between Zagreb and Split via Knin.

Martić: God forbid!

Prijić: Thirdly: there is a tendency of including the political issue of the Serbian Krajina in the talks that will start based on the Z-4 Plan.

Martić: That, neither!

Prijić: The first meeting will be held at Pleso on 10 August and the second in Knin on 17 August.

Martić: First of all, you should request that all those meetings be held outside Krajina and outside Croatia. Let them be held in Geneva!

Prijić: All right.

Martić: That we agree that the talks be held on an equal footing.

Prijić: …and the forth, that the normal flow of humanitarian aid be ensured for Bihać.

Martić: All right, that is okay.

Prijić: The forth: that the border crossing, that is, that the international forces check the border crossing towards Bihać - it is okay. The fifth: that the full implementation is ensured, that means the implementation of the agreement on the mandate, on the deployment of the forces on the borders.

Martić: On the internationally-recognised borders?

Prijić: It does not say here – on the internationally-recognised borders, but it is written in the Resolution 981, it is that part, and the seventh: in order to define the segments of this political agreement, that is, in order to specifically define them regarding the ceasefire, the meeting will be held between the military leadership of Krajina and Croatia under the auspices of General Janvier[10] on Friday and Saturday.

Martić: I agree with that, but on the line.

Prijić: Well now, this is what we think here, but of course we don't know what the situation is like. It will depend on the situation. But we opine that, as for the oil pipeline, we have to accept that in one segment.

Martić: All right.

Prijić: As for the railway line, we have agreed that we should formulate our request.

Martić: No, first and foremost – the unconditional withdrawal of forces.

Prijić: Of course, just let me say – that part as you said it now, in the

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9 It is not clear which place is in question.

10 General Bernanrd Janvier, the then Commander of UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia. In the original it says „generala Žanvijea".

end. As for the oil pipeline, we can be resolving that.

Martić: Yes.

Prijić: Secondly, as for the railway line, let us not put it that way, but that we will be able…not in Knin, but outside, to…

Martić: It can be neither Pleso nor Knin.

Prijić: Then, under number three, as for the political negotiations, we are of the opinion that the political negotiations can take place, but without the Z-4 Plan.

Martić: Without the plan, political talks, but without conditioning.

Prijić: Yes, we agree that the process of political talks starts.

Martić: That's right, without, and nothing else.

Prijić: About this, they have proposed the date – 10 August.

Martić: Not 10 August.

Prijić: We will make it conditional - after the withdrawal of the Croatian forces.

Martić: That date will be additionally fixed after the withdrawal, in order to adhere to the Agreement on the ceasefire.

Prijić: Shall we put – during the month of August.

Martić: Yes, yes.

Prijić: It gives us much more time, all right, those other issues as well, starting from Bihać and other things, no problem about that.

Martić: Yes, yes, have you called *Radio Knin*?

Prijić: We do not make, I do not know how it will end.

Martić: He expects you to call. Listen, I will go out, I am going in the field and you stick to what we have agreed, there is no retreat. In any case do not accept that regarding the railway line and I will…

Prijić: …talks.

Martić: Eh, well, all right. But to condition it by the withdrawal of the forces to the line of separation, meaning that we want a demobilisation. You should request a demobilisation of the forces, that is, to the line of separation, to the previously determined line of separation.

Prijić: (keeps yelling) Yes, yes, yes!

Martić: You should request that and then all the negotiations and political /?talks/, without conditioning it by the Z-4, you should request the political /?talks/ there, it should be outside Croatia and outside Krajina. Request again that Geneva be the place to hold negotiations.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: For the political talks it should be Geneva.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: Do not let them trick you, because they also want to bring that down, we should insist on the military plan, don't you get scared, our position is good. We are now in a better position and they are now in a situation…

Prijić: Here, the comments of De la Presle[11] and the others, yes, and

11 In the original transcript „De la Prel"

also of Arens[12].

Martić: …Well, all right, they want to give you the feeling that we are almost ruined. They would certainly do something, only if they could. They have been trying up there but they suffer loses everywhere.

Prijić: All right.

Martić: The situation is good, there are no problems. Listen, you need to say there – as equal forces, and see to it that you are not treated as the local authorities but – the Croatian and the Serbian side, the Serbian side. If there is the Croatian /side/, then /there is/ - the RSK and if they are the Croatian /side/ then - the Serbian side. So, you should fight for the equality to be applied. And, no chance that we, *bre* /*Serbian colloquialism*/, agree to the negotiations under blackmail, without ultimatum, we go for the option to request the resolution in a peaceful manner, all that should be our…Do not allow them to foist Stoltenberg upon you and the internationally recognised borders and the mandate of UNCRO, because as soon as you accept the UNCRO mandate, you have accepted everything.

Prijić: And that's the end.

Martić: Yes, yes.

Prijić: Normally, they have been deployed there, but we should not accept the Z-4.

Martić: No chance, no chance. The Vance[13] Plan is out of the question, and so is the Z-4.

Prijić: …political talks, as we….the political negotiations after the month of August, actually immediately after the Croatian forces withdraw to the line of separation. It means that there should be a demobilisation and they should reduce war tensions, then we can start immediately with the political negotiations. Good.

Martić: That's it, and then we will decide, if they reduce the crap, then we will start, and they shouldn't blackmail us. Pleso is out of the question, it shouldn't be an internal problem, but Geneva. Well, that's it, good, Ićo.

04 August 1995 07:20 AM

The report of Milan Martić to an unknown individual only two hours after the "Oluja" /Storm/ started in which the embittered Martić sends a message to Slobodan Milošević.

Martić: They have been pounding at Knin since 05:00 AM incessantly. Look, they have been pounding at Knin for one or two hours. They have been pounding at Knin, but they have been pounding everywhere. Look, I and /unintelligible word/ are here. They are pounding at everything!

12 He refers to Gert Arens, in the text „Jarens".

13 In the original it says „in Vens Plan"

No, they have not broken through anywhere so far. They have launched now an infantry attack up there, toward Kušica, that is, towards Slunj, but they are pounding at all this, they are pounding at the towns, bombarding, for instance Knin continuously. The Udbina airport also, they are pounding at everything, fuck it, Petrovac. With what can they reach Petrovac, yes, yes, yes! That's it! They will, they will, as soon as we refused yesterday, it was already their intention, they have planned that. They have received the support from the Germans, Americans and that's it. They've got the assurances, they've got the assurances from Serbia that it wouldn't get involved. Last night they repeated it and they quoted him[14] that he condemned Karadžić and me and so. Call him and inform him, so that he is glad, tell him that. Bye now!

04 August 1995 14:10 PM

The conversation between Milan Martić and an unknown collocutor, presumably a journalist, Mile Martić continues to delude the public…

Martić: …the shelling of all towns and civilian facilities has started, including also Knin. It has not stopped until now. Look, practically there has been no break until now, not even for 2 minutes. As for our lines, I can say and praise our fighters who are holding out courageously and the officers who are doing their job extremely well. Our lines have not been broken anywhere so far, but the Croats…

14 Obviously he refers to Slobodan Milošević

ANNEX 165:
RSK, OPERATIONS REPORT, 26 AUGUST 1995

English Translation *ET 0632-2923-0632-2941*

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a signature and contours of a round stamp/

/handwritten: 24/

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REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
SERBIAN ARMY MAIN STAFF
Strictly conf. No. 30-1/33
26th August 1995

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

UNREVISED

Operations report on
the aggression against the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/
and the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ activities
in the period from 4th August to 10th August 1995

TO THE CHIEF OF MAIN STAFF
OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY

1. Situation within the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/, conditions and characteristics of the situation preceding the aggression

The aggression by the Croatian Army against the RSK covering the territories of Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia happened under conditions which were utterly unfavourable for the Army of the Serbian Krajina. After the fall of the Western Slavonija and the dissolution of the 18th Corps, the development of the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ took a major turn. In June, there was a day-and-night work on reorganising the existing military organisation and establishing new units out of military conscripts who were being brought from the territory of the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/. At the so-called St. Vitus' Day Parade, there were exhibited potential possibilities of the new military organisation. Strengthening of the

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established organisation and making it capable of carrying out combat activities required a minimum time period of 2 to 3 months (the reorganisation of the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ which had already started was planned to conclude until the beginning of October, at the latest).

The situation in the RSK surroundings and the situation within the state required that SVK hurriedly and without the necessary time /as printed/ undertakes tasks for which it objectively had not been prepared. The crisis at the Livanje-Grahovo route and at the Dinara Mountains required sending special units for the purpose of the defence of Grahovo and providing security at the Dinara Mountings. That forced the SVK Main Staff to form special units, to supply them and to command them.

The Operation *Mač-95* /Sword-95/ on the territory of Western Bosnia started on 19th July 1995 and could have been carried out successfully only if our units had been prepared to carry out, at the same time, an attack operation of the operative level in the area of Western Bosnia and a defence operation of a strategic character on the borders with the Republic of Croatia.

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After 10 days, the Operation Sword was stopped because of the attack on Grahovo and the endangerment of Knin from the direction of the Dinara Mountains. The moves carried out were those /the SVK/ was forced to make in order to stabilise the front towards Knin after the fall of Grahovo. Because of that, a new operation for the liberation of Grahovo was undertaken. The Guards Brigade from KSJ /Special Unit Corps/ was transferred to the area of *Crvena zemlja* /Red Land/. The two-day combat operations did not better the situation considerably, apart from halting the advancement of the Croatian Army towards Knin via Strmica and towards Lička Kaldrma via the village of Resanovci.

The operative position of the SVK was characterised by a many-month crisis of their neighbour to the right (2nd Krajina Corps) who were defending several routes of operative and strategic importance in an area of responsibility which was too wide (2nd Krajina Corps were defending the Livanje-Grahovo route and the Livanje-Glamoč route and were closing the routes leading from the Bihać pocket via Ripča and Krupe towards Petrovac and Drvar.)

The weaknesses of the 2nd Krajina Corps were forcing the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ to keep creating temporary units for the defence of the Livanje-Grahovo route and for the participation in the operations which were carried out against the forces of the 5th Muslim Corps. Thanks to the powerlessness and unpreparedness of the 2nd Krajina Corps, the Dinara Mountains problem was created, as a basis for the aggression into the area of Knin and Dalmatia.

The initiation of the operations against the 5th Muslim Corps without the necessary readiness particularly damaged the SVK, which was always, as if according to some rule, being pushed into the fighting for the territories of Western Bosnia.

The aggression was expected, and the Main Staff directed the main focus of their work on preparing the units to defend their positions, regions and areas resolutely for 5 to 7 days, believing that that would be enough for the international factors and, if necessary, even the Yugoslav Army, to react. Certain conditions were established for such a use of the SVK units (ammunition had been secured, small reserves had been established, fortification and obstacles had been created, the population had been prevented from moving out, etc.)

UNREVISED

It was expected that the authority organs would start performing their functions in the area of defence, but, unfortunately, the new Government did not manage to start functioning independently, so the aggression started at the moment when the government had not yet organised its activities. It practically dissolved on the day before /as printed/ the aggression. The authority was represented only by the President of the RSK, who was attached to the SVK Main Staff and who had no contacts with the Government and its organs.

Before the aggression by the Croatian Army, the commanding situation in the 7th Corps was in a chaotic state. The commander had requested to be relieved of duty, the chief of staff was not carrying out his duties at all (he was commanding the tactical group in the Dinara Mountains), the chief of artillery was commanding the *Vijuga* Tactical Group along the Livanje-Grahovo route…

The command was in a situation when it could not prepare or implement anything on its own. The Main Staff did not have personnel capabilities to repair the situation at

this Corps command. Literally two days before the attack by the Croatian Army, General Slobodan KOVAČEVIĆ arrived and positioned himself as the commander of the 7th Corps. Objectively speaking, he could not really change anything, but that was still better than if the Colonel Veso KOZOMARA had stayed as the Corps commander.

The SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ Main Staff evaluated the situation in the 5th Corps as regards the commanding and the overall combat readiness as unsatisfactory. The Corps Command could not complete all their tasks. The 1st Light Brigade, the 4th Light Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Brigade were in dire need of new commanders. The Main Staff and the commands of all the corps and brigades were noticeably lacking key commanding officers.

For years, the state and its organs' attitude towards defence, and in that way towards the SVK, was inadequate.

The materiel and financial plan for the army was not approved. The events in the country influenced the drop in morale within the SVK. The motivation for defence was constantly decreasing.

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The Army was the subject of all kinds of manipulations in the political settling of scores. A certain dose of distrust towards the SVK, especially within the active military service, was persistently being pointed out. At the same time, the police was seen as the army, and the paramilitary options were not hidden.

For many political players, the fight against President MARTIĆ entailed a fight against the SVK. The army and its role were equated with individuals or with certain institutions. The disunited attitude towards the SVK long weighed down on the consciousness of its members. For a long time, the Ministry of Defence accused the army of all kinds of things, in that way deepening the gulf of dissatisfaction in relation to the army.

The SVK was asked to publicly keep quiet with regard to everything that was happening on the political scene, both within the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ and among the RSK, the RS /Republika Srpska/ and the SRJ /Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia/. In that way the SVK Main Staff and unit commands were brought into a position of being utterly passive with regard to all the developments in the RSK, although those developments had a thoroughly negative effect on the country's defence readiness.

The Assembly, the Government and the Military Defence Council did not consider any of the key issues of the SVK's development and combat readiness. It is paradoxical but nevertheless true that the RSK had no defence plan, and without one it was not possible to know who was supposed to do what in case an immediate threat of war or a state of war were proclaimed. Had there been a RSK defence plan, it would not have been possible for individuals to decide regarding the evacuation of the population.

It is certain that a defence plan could not have been accepted if it had contained a plan for an evacuation of the population on the first day of an aggression. It was important for someone that the defence plan be not adopted because that excluded the possibility of the SKV Main Staff and the SVK influencing its content.

2. The beginning of the aggression and the course of combat activities

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At 1400 hours on 3rd August 1995, the Main Staff learned that the aggression would commence at 0500 hours on 4th August. All the commanders and unit commanders were informed about the aggression's commencement time.

The aggression commenced at 0500 hours on 4th August 1995 with the artillery firing at Knin, Benkovac, Vojnić, Vrgin Most, Petrinja, and one hour later at Korenica and all other settlements. The infantry and OMJ /armoured mechanised unit/ attack started at around 0600 hours, first along the Sunja-Kostajnica axis, then the Sisak-Petrinja axis and the Generalski sto-Perjasica one, followed by the aggression in the direction of Plaščanski and the attacks on the Velebit Mountains. At around 0730 hours, the Ustaša army was noticed moving over The Dinara Mountains towards Crvena zemlja and Knin, followed by the attacks on the area of the 75th Motorised Brigade (the area of Drniš), 2nd Infantry Brigade, 3rd Infantry Brigade and 92nd Motorised Brigade.

The work of the commands and the situation in most units was good during the first 10-12 hours of the combat activities. Many Croatian Army units' attacks were repelled, and smaller-scale tactical successes in the direction of Perjasica and Petrinja did not change the situation much.
Later on, during the afternoon, HV /Croatian Army/ units managed to wedge themselves in the Velebit Mountains at the junction between 4th Light Brigade and 9th Motorised Brigade and to endanger the route which led through Sveti rok and Lovinac to the wider area of Gračac.

At the same time, the enemy was successful in the attack via Prezid towards the Plitvica Lakes.

The Ustasha breakthrough over the Dinara Mountains during the afternoon of 4th August represented the greatest threat for the collective activities of the 7th Corps. The MUP special unit leaving its positions on the Dinara Mountains (around 1100 hours) offered the Ustasha forces a possibility for a swift breakthrough over the Dinara Mountains towards Crvena zemlja. In that way the defence in the rest of the Dinara Mountains and the defence of the 1st Light Brigade in the wider area of Vrlika were compromised. The appearance of Ustashas in the area of Knin endangered the rear of the 75th Motorised Brigade and the defence of the Drniš axis.

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While the SVK Main Staff organs were preparing measures for the stabilisation of the situation, the meeting of the Military Defence Council took place in the night between 4th and 5th August.

At the council meeting, the topic of the discussion was the military and political situation in the RSK as affected by the Croatian army's aggression. It was concluded that the artillery attacks against the towns and settlements caused great disturbance among the citizens. It was obvious that the citizens were unprepared and unready to endure the artillery fire in an organised way. Not one service functioned in the area of Dalmatia. Nobody extracted or took care of the wounded and the injured. In Knin, at the request of the SVK Main Staff, the extraction of the wounded and the injured and their transportation to the hospital was carried out by UNPROFOR. In the area of Dalmatia municipalities, the citizens on their own, individually or in smaller or larger groups, left villages and towns and moved towards Lička Kaldrma and Srb. The most

critical situation which was expected to develop into chaos was in the area of Dalmatia. The Military Council established that the uncontrolled evacuation of the population had an impact on military conscripts leaving their units in increasingly large numbers under the excuse that they had to save their families that nobody took care of. In order to preserve the compactness of units and protect the non-combat population, and basing it on the real situation in the field, the Military Council made the decision that part of the population, the sick, children and women (mothers with small children and old women) be evacuated in an organised manner into the area of Srb and Donji Lapac. The decision pertained only to the municipalities in Dalmatia. The Military Council did not even consider the evacuation from the areas of Lika, Kordun and Banija.
The President of the Republic signed the memo regulating only the evacuation from four municipalities in the area of Dalmatia. The evacuation had a temporary character and an evacuation into the areas of RS and SRJ did not even enter the consideration.

At the moment the above-mentioned decision was made, the evacuation from the areas of Dalmatia was under way. It had started with the fall of Grahovo and could not be stopped although measures had been taken to prevent it. Women with children were returned from the RS and movement towards the SRJ was not allowed. Constant artillery fire at the settlements and towns was unexpected and the citizens were unprepared as to how to protect themselves and how to act under such conditions.

The course of events in the RSK during the following days (5th, 6th, 7th and 8th August) showed that the decision on the evacuation of population from the Dalmatia municipalities did not influence the ultimate result of the Croatian aggression. It is more than obvious that the evacuation would have taken place even if there had been no decision for it to be carried out. Whatever the actions by the authorities and the command organs, the evacuation could not have been stopped. That is, unfortunately, the reality which can not ignored. (The evacuation was not ordered in Lika, and it happened anyway. In Kordun, everything that could be done in order for the evacuation not to take place was done, and the results are well known. In Banija, there started an evacuation which could not be stopped, and which was justified by some supposed orders with which the SVK Main Staff and the President of the Republic had nothing to do. It is important to acknowledge the real situation: that the evacuation would have taken place even without any orders).

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Unable to do anything else, the SVK Main Staff insisted, in its order, that the units protect the evacuation and that they do not allow the enemy to target the columns of people retreating from the area. At 2000 hours, the SVK Commander chaired a meeting with the 7th Corps command and the corps brigade's commanders. The commander of the 1st Light Brigade (Vrlika) did not come to this meeting.

Proposals by the brigade commanders were acknowledged and each brigade received orders on what to do. For example, the commander of the 92nd Motorised Brigade was given the task of sending one battalion in the direction of Obrovac-Gračac, for the purpose of organising the defence behind the lines and preventing the wider area of Gračac from being captured. Other brigades were given the task to keep most of their forces in contact with the enemy, and to use smaller part of the forces to create conditions for reception and defence deep behind the lines.

The commander of the 75th Motorised Brigade was given the task to carry out manoeuvres with one battalion and to take hold of Bulina strana by the morning of 5th August for the purpose of the defence of Knin.

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The commanders of the 75th motorised brigade, 3rd Infantry Brigade and 92nd Motorised Brigade were in favour of not evacuating the population; they were in favour of fighting to the end, in those places where the units are already deployed.

An order was sent from the SVK Main Staff to all units in accordance with the newly developed situation.
The SVK commander sent a group of commanding officers together with the Chief of Staff to the 15th Corps command in order to assist and to relay messages to the corps command.

On 5th August, the SVK RV /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/ units operated successfully. Special mention goes to the activities of the rocket units against military targets in Sisak, Sunja and airborne targets. Apart from causing great losses to their manpower, three airplanes were shot down, and the Ustasha aviation was prevented from carrying out activities deep within the RSK area.

After 2200 hours, the commander of the 39th Corps reported that the Croatian units took control of Dubica and that they were carrying out attacks against Kostajnica and in the vally of the River Una. The commander of the SVK sent orders to the KSJ commander to head immediately to Banija with an armoured brigade and with the task to secure the Vojnić-Topusko-Dvor communication. The order was coded and sent at 2330 hours.

It was ordered that the SVK Main Staff be relocated from Knin to the IKM /Forward Command Post/ in the area of Srb (a group of commanding officers had been sent to Srb during the day in order to arrange the reception and the communications). The relocation started some time after midnight on 5th August 1995.
The commander, some commanding officers and the President of the Republic stayed in Knin, the village of Pađani and Otrić, and followed the work of the 7th Corps units and the evacuation of the population.

In the morning of 5th August, the 5th Muslim Corps attacked Željavo and Ličko Petrovo Selo. The intention was obviously that Lika be separated from Kordun and that the Croatian and Muslim armies join in the wider area of Plitvice and Rakovica.

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On 5th August, the 7 Corps units mingled with the refugee columns and practically stopped fighting the enemy. The 1st Light Brigade ceased existing as early as the evening of 4th August. This unit did not carry any combat activities at all (apart from the artillery activity). Its members mingled with the civilian population and that was the end for this unit.

The 2nd Infantry Brigade pulled out relatively quickly as well. The 75th Motorised Brigade units were carrying out combat activities south of Knin, but the brigade did not carry out the task of organising the defence at Bulina strana. This brigade also ceased existing as a combat unit after the withdrawal from Knin.

The 3rd Infantry Brigade units acted in a similar manner as the 75th Motorised Brigade and passed Srb in the direction of Martin Brod mingling with the population in the afternoon of 5th August.

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The 92nd Motorised Brigade units left the region of Benkovac in the morning of 5th August.

The 4th Light Brigade remained carrying combat activities the longest, but without communications and coordinated action with their neighbours.

On 5th August, the 15th Corps units were carrying out defence and were protecting the retreat of the population. The building at which the command was working was hit during the day. With the 5th Corps and the Croatian units meeting in the area of Rakovica and Plitvice, the 15th Corps units, not including the 70th Infantry Brigade, were separated from the 21st Corps and continued with the retreat towards Spasovo and Donji Lapac.

On 6th August, the SVK was separated into two groups, the southern group and the northern one. The southern group consisted of the 7th and 15the Corps (without the 70th Infantry Brigade), and the northern group consisted of the 21st Corps, 39th Corps and the 70th Infantry Brigade.

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The southern group mingled with the population and was withdrawing along the routes Srb-Martin brod-Petrovac and Donji Lapac-Spasovo-Petrovac.

The northern group carried out combat activities in Banija and Kordun on 6th, 7th and 8th August. On 6th August, the SVK Chief of Main Staff was sent to the area of the northern group, and on 7th and 8th the SVK Commander personally commanded the combat activities of the northern group from the area of Dvor.

Three times, the blockade of the 21st Corps was relieved and then the 21st Corps was surrounded again. With the fall of Glina, all forces directed their activities towards withdrawing via Žirovac and Dvor.

In the area of Žirovac, the Ustasha and Balija forces cut off the line of withdrawal for the 21st Corps and the population withdrawing towards Dvor. The attempts of relieving the blockade using the 2nd Krajina Corps forces were unsuccessful.

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The radio and TV broadcast information regarding the surrender of the encircled 21st Corps forces, but it contained more disinformation than real facts.

The 7th, 15th and 39th Corps and the KSJ /Special Units Corps/ forces retreated to the territory of Republika Srpska.

The totality of the SVK RV and PVO forces were relocated to Banja Luka and resubordinated to the VRS Air Force and PVO Command.

Most of the conscripts and commanding officers wilfully abandoned their units upon the withdrawal to the RS territory and joined the refugees moving towards the SRJ.

All wartime equipment and materiel were collected in Petrovac, Prijedor and Omarska and were handed over to the VRS. It is estimated that the SVK took with them more than 80% of all MTS /materiel and equipment/ and ammunition as they withdrew.

3. Commanding organisation and
   the work of the SVK Main Staff

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The operation plan stipulated that upon the commencement of an aggression, the activities of the 21st Corps, the 39th Corps, the KSJ /Special Units Corps/ and the *Pauk* operative groups were to be combined by Major General Mile NOVAKOVIĆ. The purpose of the above-mentioned commanding organisation was to achieve better unity in the deployment of forces, but also a greater independence in carrying out combat activities using the northern or the southern group.
It was thought that there was possibility for the RSK to be divided in half at the Lika-Kordun junction, which would make the commanding considerably more complicated. In the conditions of a possible severance of the commanding communications, the commanding organisation thus ordered would make the commanding of the combat activities easier.

The operation plan envisaged that a defensive operation be carried out in the western part of the RSK, and an offensive one in the eastern part.

When the aggression started, the SVK Main Staff was in a building with all the elements of a command post developed. Having established that the aggression was carried out against all the parts of the RSK in the west, the Main Staff ordered the 11th Corps command to do as outlined in the plan of engagement (to undertake offensive combat activities).

The weakest part of the defence plan was the lack of unbound forces, at the level of the SVK Main Staff as well at the corps levels. The reserves which existed were the size of a platoon or company. The exception was the armoured brigade from the KSJ /Special Units Corps/ at the level of the SVK Main Staff.

The expected aggression dictated that the combat activities be commanded from the IKM /forward command post/. /Because of/ the immediate threat of aggression, and in order to keep the authority organs, it was decided that the SVK Main Staff should wait for the aggression in Knin, and should command from Knin as long as possible.

Commanding the defensive operations was conducted from the Operations Centre. The communications with all the corps functioned well up until the moment of leaving Knin and /?while/ Ćelavci and Promine were held. Until the proclamation of the decision on evacuation, the SVK Main Staff and the commands of the subordinate units had the situation under control. The decision to evacuate the population presented the SVK Main Staff and all the commands with a *fait accompli*. The Main Staff introduced changes into the organisation of the commanding which corresponded to the newly developed situation.

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The Chief of Staff and a group of commanding officers were sent to the 15th Corps command where the situation was deemed critical. The commander and a group of commanding officers staid near Knin intending to directly influence the activities of the 7th Corps from the area of Padani and the village of Otrić. The remaining part of the SVK Main Staff relocated to the area of Srb, intending to create conditions so that the operations could be commanded from that area. Before leaving Knin, the SVK Main Staff issued tasks to the subordinate units for the following 24 hours, and an armoured brigade from the KSJ was ordered to march to Banija during the night.

Work on the IKM /forward command post/ was characterized by the interruption of all connections with Corps Commands (due to the fall of Ćelavac and Promina). Based on direct contacts with Corps and Brigades Commanders, on 05. 08. the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ Main Staff regulated the tasks of the 7th and 15th K /? Corps/ and monitored operations in Kordun and Banija. On 06. 08. the Chief of Staff was sent to the IKM Dvor /sic/.

The SVK Commander met with the Main Staff Commander, General MLADIĆ, in Oštrelj. In the morning on 07. 08 the Commander goes to the IKM and directly commands /and controls/ the combat activities of the northern group. The remaining part of the GŠ SVK /the Main Staff of Army of the Serbian Krajina/ stays in Oštrelj, gathering intelligence from the 7th and 15th K /? Corps/ units which happened to be in the territory of Republika Srpska. After 12:00 hours on 06. 08. the SVK Main Staff gets deployed to the region of Prijedor, where it stays until 10. 08. Further work of the SVK Main Staff is organized in such way that the Commander with the most responsible senior officers stays in Banja Luka, and that the other part of GŠ SVK is transferred to Belgrade.

The Main Staff works in groups, which was the only possible way. There was the lack of coordination and joint analysis of bigger problems. Besides harsh conditions, the core members of Staff met several times and jointly estimated the situation and suggested solutions to the Commander.

Lack of equipment within the GŠ SVK (and units' Commands), of adequate means for command and communication, significantly limited the efficiency of commanding bodies during combat activities. Communications were possible only through the repeaters in Ćelavac, Promina and Plješevica. The annihilation or seizure of these repeaters practically meant the interruption of all communications between the GŠ SVK and Corps Commands (apart from radio-communications which could not function due to jamming) .
The Main Staff of Army of the Serbian Krajina did not have an established and equipped main or forward command post. Practically, it could not be commanded from anywhere outside the building where the Army of the Serbian Krajina Main Staff was located.

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4. Decisive factors and occurrences for the utilisation of Army of the Serbian Krajina and the outcome the Croatian aggression.

4.1. Estimate and course of combat activities

It was foresighted by the plan of defence that the SVK units in the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina would carry out combat activities for 6 to 8 days. It was estimated that this would be possible on condition of establishing encirclement and carrying a persistent defence /It was estimated that this would be possible if an encirclement was an option and if the area was persistently defended/. The evacuation of population was not foresighted because that would have meant the collapse of Republic of Serbian Krajina. It was pointed out at the necessity of evacuation of part of the sick, elderly people and children before the beginning of aggression, onto certain locations of Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.
The Supreme Defence Council has never responded to this proposal.
It was estimated that within 6 to 8 days a reaction by international factors or even probable VRS or VJ /Yugoslav Army/ intervention would have occurred. (There were opinions that it was groundless to count on a reaction of any of the mentioned factors in the first 6-8 days of aggression).

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In the first 15 – 20 hours of aggression combat activities were carried out as expected. The enemy achieved minor tactical successes in the axis of Generalski sto – Perjasica and Sisak – Petrinja.
The biggest danger were successes achieved by the Ustashas on the Velebit Mountain (they took Mali Alan) and on the Dinara Mountain (an empty area remained, which the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ unit deserted without combats).

During the day, the MUP unit deserted the Dinara Mountain (it was arbitrarily done and without a fight with the Ustashas), similar was done by the 1st Light Brigade, which deserted Vrlika and its area of responsibility without combat. Besides this, during the day, smaller parts of some units refused to carry out assigned tasks (parts of the 9th Brigade, 103rd Infantry Brigade, Tactical Group 3).

The following night between 4th and 5th of August offered an opportunity for an intervention in the axes where weakness and failures happened /occurred/.
Most units, including all Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence units, handled it very well. The fact that in the first 24 hours the SVK had 170 dead, 457 wounded and 136 wounded, speaks about the persistence of defence.
Heavy losses have been inflicted upon the enemy. According to the estimate provided by our units, the Ustashas had around 1.000 killed and approximately the same number of wounded.
The Main Staff and units' Commands made significant efforts to keep the units in the combat with the Ustashas, but that turned out to be impossible. No unit was issued an order to withdraw.
During the first day of combat activities all reserves from brigades and Corps were utilized. It was shown that a successful defence was not possible without strong reserves.
The 7th Corps practically collapsed after 24 hours of combat activities. One could not count on its organized utilisation. In all units arbitrary abandonment of positions and units occurred as well as a refusal of a further participation in combat activities.
The police units which defended the Dinara Mountain deserted their positions and left unprotected area which led to the general area of Knin from the Dinara Mountain through Crvena zemlja.
In July, the Main Staff regulated, by its order, that the police units were subordinated to Corps Commands of SVK during the war. Minister of Interior of RSK did not agree with this, so the SVK Commander abrogated it by his order on 31. 07. 95 (Pursuant Article 17, Law on Defence of RSK, the police are to be subordinated to SVK in the war, but /only/ upon the order issued by the Minister of Interior).
The police were not present anywhere during the evacuation of population.

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4. 2. Balance of forces

About the balance of forces for the day when the Croatian Army carried out the aggression on the western part of RSK is possible to judge only /if it is/ based on facts about the real number of engaged troops on the day of aggression. There is data about the real numerical strength of SVK in the western part of RSK, daily updated from May to August 1995. Total average numerical strength for 7th, 15th, 21st and 39th

Corps and Special Units Corps in May, June and July was about 36 000 soldiers and senior officers.

During every day, averagely absent were: a) about 4000 on sick leave and medical treatment b) about 3000 absent without leave c) about 2000 absent with leave (without troops that were not in the shift which carried out a duty).

On the day of aggression, "expenditure" of 9000 people, on the aforementioned bases, decreased the Army of the Serbian Krajina numerical strength to only 27000 soldiers and senior officers.'

Since the fall of Grahovo (29. 07. 95) people have been deserting the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina every day.

(By exercising control over /on/ the bridge over the River Korana in Slunj, on the 1st and 2nd of August, it was found that there were about 400 conscripts among 700 individuals who tried to cross the River Korana towards Vojnić).

Since Grahovo fell, until the beginning of aggression of the Croatian Army on the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina, about 2000 conscripts have deserted war units, in various ways.

That is the numerical strength of soldiers and senior officers of Army of the Serbian Krajina in the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina on the day of aggression (04. 08) which came down to approximately 25000. The intelligence we have suggests that there were at least 120 000 troops directed at the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina (between 100 000 and 105 000 soldiers of the Croatian Army and 15 to 20 000 of the Muslim army). The balance /the ratio/ varied of at least from 4:1 to 4.8:1. Similar balance was in the artillery and in aviation too.

The balance of tanks was somewhat more favourable and it was 2:1, to the advantage of the Croatian Army.

In the analysis of the balance of forces it is necessary to take into account age structure and strength of quality senior officers.

Average age of battery company in the Army of the Serbian Krajina was 47, and in the Croatian Army it surely did not go above 35. Regarding the matter of senior officers, the differences are much more drastic. In the units of Army of the Serbian Krajina there were almost no active military officers on duties of platoon, company-battery and battalion commanders. These duties were performed by military officers without basic professional knowledge /training/ (there were only 10% of commanders who had finished School for Reserve Officers and who carried out the duties of basic

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units' commanders. As for the rest of commanders, 30% of them took courses and 70% of them were without any professional /advanced/ training).

The quality of platoon and section commanders was low. This category of military officers is unequal to command over sections and platoons in wartime. (Not even one commander was made lance corporal during compulsory military service after 1992).

Courses that were organized in units lasted from 3 to 10 days at the most, and they could not significantly contribute to a quality level of training of the biggest category of military officers in Army of the Serbian Krajina.

4. 3. Psychological and propaganda activities

The consequences of Croatian psychological and propaganda activities, that have been going on for years, towards Republic of Serbian Krajina, are shown to be totally pernicious. Trough all the media and by spreading rumours, the Croatian propaganda was persistently spreading fear amongst the population, the fear of the Ustasha revenge and persecution of the Serbs, without mercy. Threats, delusions, notorious lies remained unanswered for years, so in conscience of most of the people a mood /a will/ was formed for leaving their homes as soon as possible and going to live in Serbia. As a result of that, citizens arbitrary undertook several measures which had a negative influence on the Republic of Serbian Krajina defence. The most characteristical are large-scale occurrences of veiled /hidden/ sending of conscripts to Serbia and abroad.

In the space of fours year, about 28 000 conscripts have left Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had to have catastrophic consequences for the Republic of Serbian Krajina defence.

Croatian psychological and propaganda activities directly influenced people's attitude towards defence. Avoiding the duties in war units was a significant "characteristic" of a number of conscripts. The vast majority of reserve army officers who had completed Schools for Reserve Officers avoided /to carry out/ the duties of platoon and basic unit commanders (There were 677 reserve military officers in Banija only, but out of that number not even 5% was on basic commanding duties /performed basic command duties/. All of them asked to be deployed to, so-called, compulsory work service).

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The propaganda was constantly encouraging distrust in active military officers, spreading accusations that active military officers would betray, that they were Yugo-officers and that they had already betrayed the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/, et cetera. Unfortunately, such accusations were not prevented and the aggression started with many /people/ leaving their units and spreading lies about the betrayal of active military officers, instead of fighting.

The Croatian propaganda was constantly spreading the news about great support that Croatia had in the world, about a low rating that the Serbs had in world, about the incapacity of SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ to give a military assistance to Republic of Serbian Krajina, etc.

Psychological and propaganda counter-activities of Republic of Serbian Krajina were weak and with no effect, both amongst the citizens of Republic of Serbian Krajina, members of Army of the Serbian Krajina and the Croats and their soldiers and senior officers.

With the beginning of the aggression, Croatia started with the real psychological and propaganda war against Republic of Serbian Krajina and its Army. Information that had been carefully planned in advance, were sent to world. All means and methods were fired at the citizens and Army of the Serbian Krajina. The most lethal ones were rumours and flyers thrown from planes and brought by agents. The unreadiness of the Serb Radio and TV Knin was quickly used, which had extremely negative consequences.

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4. 4. The morale of combatants and people

Non-existence of belief in a possibility of a successful combat in case of a Croatian aggression is characteristical for the morale of combatants and people. The foundation for this belief is in an uninterrupted growth of Croatian military power and the support given by international factors, primarily by Germany and the USA. At the same time, combatants and people were aware of the fact that possibilities of defence were getting smaller with each day, in comparison to Croatia. After the fall of the Western Slavonia, one did not believe in support of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, nor was it expected. According to many combatants, it had a crucial influence on flagging morale and desertion of individuals and whole units.

Several factors from everyday life and practice objectively influenced the low morale level. Some more important ones are being pointed out:
a) Combatants have been in trenches since 1991. Being on duty day and night, during the summer and winter, made combatants overtired, surfeited and unready to accept such situation which promised no prospects that it would be successfully solved.

b) The families of combatants have been unprovided-for. Fifteen to thirty Dinars wages, which combatants were irregularly getting, were not solving any of life issues. The families were being left without sources of incomes, and /even/ if they had some property they could not have sold it anywhere.

c) Combatants were not clear about the aim of combats they carried out and which they should have carried out.
They could not understand what the authorities of Republic of Serbian Krajina wanted and which option they advocated for, and what the real political advocacy of SRJ/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ and RS /Republika Srpska/ was.

d) The standard of combatants and standard welfare were on an unacceptable level. The majority of combatants were either without or in worn-out clothes and footwear. Nutrition was occasionally bad (one meal at the time would be abolished /? cancelled/).

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e) Privileges of certain individuals regarding defence obligations had the most fatal influence on the morale /were fatal for the morale/. Mainly poor people were in trenches. Intellectuals, rich and well-off businessmen, people form authority establishment and state-level institutions, in various ways avoided obligations of service in war units. The most fitted ones /for military service/ were deployed to compulsory work service which could have been carried out by older people, disabled people and persons exempted from military service.
Sons of intellectuals would find their way to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and with that their obligations towards the Army of the Serbian Krajina and the defence of Republic of Serbian Krajina would end.

f) There were large-scale crime and black market carried out semi-illegally, which enabled for certain individuals to get rich. Certain areas in Republic of Serbian

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Krajina had a special treatment when it comes to black market. These are the areas that border with the territory of western Bosnia and the Knin area. Various rumours were spread amongst combatants regarding the black market and the rumours had it that prominent individuals in power, from state institutions and the Army participated in black-marketing and hampered its prevention.

g) Disunity in the authority and state was lived as a betrayal planned in advance (scuffling amongst the political parties, disputes at the Assembly of Republic of Serbian Krajina, relations between the police and Army of the Serbian Krajina, etc).

h) The tendencies of organising things in paramilitary way /? tendencies of the paramilitary establishment/ were manifested through attempts to belittle Army of the Serbian Krajina, and to present the Army as an unnecessary organisation. Attacks on active military officers had extremely negative consequences on the morale.

It can be seen from the fact that one part of combatants believed in what would be told about the officers, and the other part lived those attacks as an assault on Army of the Serbian Krajina and defence, which was tolerated in Republic of Serbian Krajina.

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4. 5. Decision on evacuation

Evacuation of the population is /the/ crucial /act/ for the outcome of resistance to the Croatian aggression. The conditions in which the aggression on Republic of Serbian Krajina was done made room only for carrying out a complete evacuation. Partial evacuation could have been carried out only prior to the beginning of the combat activities, i.e. the aggression.

In the practice, some sort of evacuation from Republic of Serbian Krajina has been going on for years, and especially after the fall of Grahovo and after Knin was endangered from the axis of the Dinara Mountain (from 1992 until august 1995, 28 000 conscripts have moved out from the territory of Republic of Serbian Krajina). In the situation when people did not believe if the possibility of self-defence, without the help of the VRS and the Yugoslav Army, no-one could have stopped the evacuation during the aggression.

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When the decision that the sick, children and elderly people were to be evacuated, the evacuation itself was already going on.

Everyone was evacuated (healthy people and the sick, the youth and the old, those were able to fight and those who were not). The purpose of the decision on evacuation was to influence /to control/ the evacuation (/the purpose was to/ separate those who could have fought, hence they were to be kept, from those for whom was better not to be in combat zones, then to direct the evacuated ones to certain areas and to prevent uncontrolled motions of the population).

The evacuation proved to be the collapse of the Army, and it was /especially/ confirmed during the night between the 4th and 5th of August when the evacuation took place from the area of Dalmatia, but also other evacuations, which later occurred on the other parts of Republic of Serbian Krajina, proved the same.

It turned out that it was groundless to treat both people and army as separate entities. That is the same /thing/. Army and people are the same, and they do not exist separately, especially when army is without professional compositions.

The aggression carried out by the Croatian army on the Western Slavonia showed that one could not command over an evacuation and evacuation did not depend on orders. In this aggression, the evacuation started just few hours after the aggression began. The evacuation could not be prevented and stopped with any authorities' or commanding measures. After the fall of the Western Slavonia, there were many accusations at the expense of the authority (the President of Republic) because the evacuation was not ordered earlier.

During the aggression on the western part of Republic of Serbian Krajina, the evacuation was ordered from four municipalities and that was lived as a treason and petty politics.

The evacuation, as it happened, would have occurred anyway, even if the order of its execution had not been issued (Evacuation occurred without issuing an order for it in Lika and Banija, and in Kordun it took place upon the order issued by the Crisis Staff, but only while the evacuation was already in process). From Strmica and the Dinara Mounatain villages, evacuation spontaneously began the same day when Grahovo and /Illegible/ fell. It is important to note that the evacuation could not have been prevented with the issued order or with any other orders.

4. 6. Other facts

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The activities of the 5th Muslim Corps and the changeover of 2.br NO /? 2nd Brigade of National Defence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia/ from "Pauk" /"Spider"/ to the side of DUKAVIĆ's army had a significant influence on the outcome of combat activities in Kordun, Banija and Lika.
The KSJ / Special Units Corps/ Command did not carry out the order according to which and armoured brigade should have been sent to the area of responsibility of Banija Corps (the region of Glina), and by failing to do so, it was late for the intervention of hampering endangerment the communication Topusko-Glina-Dvor.

The work of Banija Corps during the first day of operations was good, but with the beginning of the evacuation, the Corps units sopped carrying out their tasks.

14.

Some number of officers and non-commissioned officers showed inability to carry out the responsibilities of their posts. It was a noticeable paralyses due to the fear and cowardice at the time of receiving the assignments. Some of the commanders from the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ Main Staff did not come to the Main Staff not even 7-8 hours after the beginning of the aggression. Some individuals were incapable of doing anything. A fairly large number of commanders left the Main Staff and their units, without having requested the approval. Among them there are even those who had no problems with regard to taking care of their families. The above mentioned commanders are also expressing main criticism against those who had remained to do their job.

The organs of the Government and the authorities did not function, and this was disastrous to the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ and the population.

The expectations of many that help would arrive from the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ and the RS /Republika Srpska/ were failed. The feeling of being abandoned was present with the majority of the Army of the Serbian Krajina members and the population.

Conduct of the majority of conscripts, upon withdrawal to the territory of the RS /Republika Srpska/ was particularly irresponsible and cowardly. Almost no one wanted to fight. Most of them were in a hurry to leave Krajina behind as far as possible. There were many cases of throwing away the arms, leaving behind the vehicles, equipment and other devices.

Command stopped to function, because everyone were doing what they wanted. Even the Corps Commanders were "in a hurry" for Belgrade making it possible for the conscripts to go with the lines of refugees.

4.7. Overview of the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ losses during the period from 04.08. to 08.08.1995

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According to the information collected so far the Army of the Serbian Krajina, from 04.08. to 08.09.1995 had total 763 soldiers and a commander /as written/ pulled out of combat. Out of that 170 were killed, 457 were wounded and 136 are gone missing.
The Lika Corps units suffered the worst losses: 445 (65 killed, 280 wounded and 100 gone missing). The losses of the 7th Corps (Dalmatian) amount to 166 pulled out of combat (53 killed, 90 wounded, 23 gone missing). In the 39th Corps there were 144 pulled out of combat (44 killed, 87 injured and 13 missing). In the KSJ /Special Units Corps/ (the information relates to Guards Brigade only) 7 killed, 45 wounded and 17 missing were registered. 69 pulled out of combat in total.
In the 75th PoB / logistics base/ there were 4 killed solders.
The 75th mtbr /Motorized Brigade/ (of the 7th Corps) had the highest number of killed: 40, while the 31st pbr /Infantry Brigade/ (of the 39th Corps) and the 18th Infantry Brigade (of the 15th Corps) had majority of wounded: 45 and 42, respectively.

By the time when this report was written no data was obtained about the losses of 5 regiments-brigades and a significant number of independent units in the rank of a company-battery and battalion-division. Therefore the information on the killed, wounded or missing can not be considered as final.

15

4.8 Work of the Army of the Serbian Krajina Main Staff Logistics, before, during and after the aggression of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ on the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/

A/ Basic activities of the logistic organs before the aggression of the Republic of Croatia on the Republic of Serbian Krajina

During this period the Main Staff Logistics were engaged in:

1. Preparation of manpower and materiel resources fro the realization of the operation "MAČ-95" /"Sword-95"/. In the course of the preparations we established appropriate teams for supply and maintenance of the TMS /materiel and technical equipment/ and we carried out replenishment of the units by MS /materiel supplies/ up to the pertaining supply levels.

We started with his activity on 10.07.1995, and we stopped it on 27.07.95, due to the very complicated situation in the Livno-Grahovo axes.

2. Relocation of MS /materiel supplies/, especially ammunition and MES /mines and explosives/ store "Golubić". The activities were carried out in three directions:

- establishing a field store in Tiškovac /tunnels/;
- establishing a mobile ammunition store on the /railway/ wagons and
- relocation of a part of ammunition from Golubić to the store Čerkezovac in the Banija area;

The fall of Grahovo on 28.07.1995 and the Ustasha attack on the communication Strmica-Golubić-Knin, slowed down the activities on relocation of the store.

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3. Planning the attack operation "Vagan-95"; bringing the units from Kordun-Lika axis /manpower and technical equipment/ with the aim of redeployment for carrying out the above said operation.

4. We were especially engaged in the work on providing p/g /fuel/ that, after an extended time period and a series of known political problems in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, has crossed the border only on 03.08.1995. Because of that some of the cisterns failed to arrive to the destination before the aggression, /the communications have been already cut/, and this caused additional problems regarding the resupply with technical equipment.

During the period before the aggression through the 03.08.1995 inclusive, all the units of the Army of the Serbian Krajina were, on average, supplied with three ammunition b/k / combat sets/, at the Corps Level, and with fuel on average from 0,7 to 1 p/r /tank-full/ for a b/v /combat vehicle/, and with 0,5 to 1 p/r /tank-full/ for a n/v /non-combat vehicle/.
They were supplied with food for 20 days of war, at the Corps level.

95 to 100 percent of technical combat equipment was in good condition and in the KSJ /Special Units Corps/ 100 percent was in good condition, while 65 - 80 percent of the non-combat technical equipment was in good condition.

B/ Activities of the logistics organs from the beginning of the aggression on the entire Republic of Serbian Krajina /on 04.08.1995

1. After six hours of b/d /combat operations/ the requests of the units for the resupply with large caliber ammunition started coming in, especially from the 7th and 21st Corps.

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16.

2. At about 16:00 hrs of the same day, a part of the Main Staff Logistics manpower was sent to help out in the Main Staff 75th PoB /Logistics base/, namely to its stores: Kosovo, Stara Straža and Golubić, while in the section of the 75th PoB /logistics base/ - store Čerkezovac, in the Banija area, from 01.08.1995 there were the Main Staff of the Serbian Krajina Army NTSl /Chief of Technical Services/ and the 75th Main Staff Logistics base NŠ /Chief of Staff/ helping out.

3. Due to incessant activity of the enemy artillery and rocket system, from the "Senjak" barracks in Knin, where at the very beginning of the attack three trucks had been destroyed and a driver was killed, it was not possible to carry out any relocation of quartermaster or any other materiel supplies.

4. On 04.08.1995, at 18:30 Hrs, all the Corps Commands and "Pauk" /spider/ were ordered to send all available transport resources to the store in Golubić, with the purpose of evacuation of ammunition. However, due to the congestion of the roads and the general chaos on the Knin-Srb and Gračac-Sučević-Srb roads, the transport vehicles failed to arrive to the Golubić store.

At that time we started the evacuation of fuel from the stores "Kosovo" and "Stara Straža". At these locations no fuel was left behind except for the kerosene at "Stara Straža" in the amount of approximately 200 t.

At the same time /at about 18:00 Hrs/ the VVS /Military Supreme Court/ was in session, where the decision on evacuation of the population from the threatened municipalities /Knin, Drniš, Benkovac, Vrlika and Obrovac/ to the direction of Srb and Lapac, had been brought, and on continuation of resupply of the units with necessary materiel equipment.

04.08.1995, at 20:00 Hrs, at the briefing with the Commander of the Main Staff of the Serbian Krajina Army, Commanders of the 7th Corps brigades, did not present their requests for additional resupply with MS /materiel supplies/, except for fuel.

However after the decision of the Commander to shorten the front line and that the units must come closer to Knin, it was decided that with the available fuel and transport resources the units can carry out the assigned tasks.

On the first day of combat operations the 75th PoB /logistics base/ section Čerkezovac carried out the resupply of the units with ammunition and fuel according to their requests.

In the late evening at about 22:00 Hrs, when combatants started uncontrolled withdrawal with technical equipment, mingled with population, the functioning of the PoOb /logistics support/ practically stopped, except for the store at "Stara Straža", that was still issueing fuel at the requests of the 7th Corps units , until the morning of the 05.08.1995.

The organs of the Main Staff Logistics have left the PKM /Rear Command Post/-Knin at 01:30 of the 05.08.1995, while the PKPo /Assistant Commander for Logistics/ left at 02:30 hrs.

5. On 05.08.1995, in the morning, the organs of the Mains Staff Logistics had found themselves in Srb, where they established the PKM /Rear Command Post/ and made an overview of the PoOb /logistics support/ system functioning. Then it was ordered to evacuate 14 railway wagons loaded with ammunition from the tunnel on the axis Stara Straža-Padane and to relocate them to Otrić-Malovan region, in order to take them to the Republika Srpska territory. However the train personnel and the security left the wagons during the night, but even had they been at their work posts in the morning, it would not have been possible to do anything constructive, since Malovan had already been under the enemy fire.

17.

In order to initiate destruction of ammunition in the tunnels near Stara Straža, the amour train was pushed, in order to incite an explosion due to the inertia and crash with the wagons loaded with ammunition. This operation failed, because the train turned over before the entry into the tunnel.

It was ordered to blow up the mined ammunition store "Golubić", and for that all preparations had been carried out previously. But due to disruption of communications, it was not possible to forward the order to the Store Commander.

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According to our current knowledge, he tried to activate the ignition system, but an enemy IDG /reconnaissance and sabotage group/ prevented him. By the time of writing this report we have received no information about him and his driver /on whether they were killed or detained?/.

That day the section of the 75th PoB - Čerkezovac kept issuing ammunition according to the units' requests /39th Corps, "Pauk" command, 21st Command and the VRS /Republika Srpska Army/ Novi Grad Brigade, until the late evening.

At the same time, from this section evacuation of MS /materiel supplies /ammunition, fuel, basic resources, quartermaster materiel supplies, engineering and rocket resources etc./ was carried out as planned. This activity was taking place in the course of the following day and night, even though the region of the store had been under the total enemy siege by the Ustashas and Muslims.

C/ Activities of the Main Staff Logistics organs on the 06, 07, and 08.08.1995

On 06.08. the work on additional evacuation of MS /material supplies/ from the section of the 75th PoB /logistics base/ - Čerkezovac was being carried out. The functioning of the PoOb /logistics support/ in the units of the 21st Corps, that was fighting under siege, was carried out in difficult conditions, while in other units the main activities were focused on evacuation of equipment and other materiel supplies, and also on preparations for the handover thereof to the Republika Srpska Army and to the Republika Srpska MUP /Ministry of the Interior/.

On 07.08.1995, in the early morning /at about 01:30 hrs/ evacuation of material supplies from Čerkezovac and mining of its vital objects was finished.
At the same time at Petrovac point and at other points the hand-over of materiel supplies was carried out between the units of the Republika Srpska Army and the SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/. Those activities were continued during the day of 08.08.1995.

On the basis of the personal insight of the Logistics organs, as well and of written reports of the Brigade Commanders, and oral statements of the Corps Logistics organs, it is apparent that the following quantities were withdrawn and handed over to the Republika Srpska Army and Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior:

- infantry weapons about 90 percent,
- artillery weapons about 80 percent, including artillery system "Orkan" with rockets,
- combat vehicles about 75 percent / 15th and 39th Corps and KSJ /Special Units Corps/ 89 - 90 percent,
- non-combat vehicles 65 to 70 percent,
- resources of the RV /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defense/ 95 to 199 percent,
- ammunition and MES /mines and explosives/, 70 percent in total, while from the Čerkezovac store it was above 95 percent, and
- fuel /except for kerosene/ - 100 %.

18.

Most of materiel supplies of the 21st Corps, which was under siege for the longest time period, was left behind and destroyed. However according to the statements of

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the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ and PKPo /Aassistant Commander for Logistics/ of this Corps, about 60 percent of combat hardware was withdrawn.

Except for the material supplies about 30 wooden boxes of various documentation and all cash financial assets were evacuated.

We stress that the material supplies of the Army of the Serbian Krajina were handed over to the Army of the Republika Srpska, to the Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior and to the Republika Serbia Ministry of the Interior, at 15 to 20 points.

The Main Staff Logistics organ officially requested from these subjects data on the quantities of the material supplies handed over - seized, however we did not receive it so far, and it is not sure whether we will receive it in future.

Financial assets were evacuated and handed over to the VJ /Yugoslav Army/ as follows:

- 493,740.00 Dinars,
- 58,208.00 US$,
- 125,601.00 DM,
- 100.00 Canadian Dollars and
- 50,00 Austrian Shillings.

According to some information, safety vault of the Republic of Serbian Krajina NB /National Bank/ holding 1,750,000.00 Dinars in cash deposited there for the needs of the Army of the Serbian Krajina KSJ /Special Units Corps/ had not been carried out. We emphasize this because of the military cash, since the evacuation of the NB safety vault and the SDK cash was supposed to have been carried out by other Republic of Serbian Krajina state organs.

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The SVK debts to towards the suppliers of goods and services, by 31st July 1995 inclusive, amount to 12 millions Dinars. However, because of the invoices for material liabilities that did not come in and the unpaid plan and salaries to PBL /professional serviceman/ and conscripts, by the beginning of aggression these obligations are not final.

D/ CONCLUSION

We estimate that the Army of the Serbian Krajina Main Staff Logistics organs, in the preparatory period /before the aggression/, during the combat and after the combat, though in particularly difficult circumstances, understaffed, with modest RMR /strategic war reserves/, and without any moral or materiel support from the Republic of Serbian Krajina Government organs for an extended period, had carried out their basic function - they had provided logistic support for successful combat operations and evacuation of population, the army and material resources.

The speed of events /quick military fall of the Republic of Serbian Krajina/ made it impossible for the Logistics organs to perform an organized evacuation of a part of relocated strategic war reserves according to the plan.

CONCLUSIONS

The realistic expectations were that the Army of the Serbian Krajina units would be able to resist the Croatian Army for no longer than 10 days. This did not happen due to the evacuation of the population, and some weaknesses in the Army of the Serbian Krajina, that had deeper roots and it was not easy to overcome them (poor morale, dissatisfaction with the situation in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, expectations that someone else would come to the Republic of Serbian Krajina to defend the population etc.).

19.

The Main Staff was doing everything to their abilities and knowledge in order to prepare the Army of the Serbian Krajina for defense. In this it did not find any understanding or support. The Army was always used as a means of this or that politics. Such attitude towards the Army of the Serbian Krajina did not stop even after the aggression had started.

The Army of the Serbian Krajina was and still is considered a part of the VJ /Yugoslav Army/. It was doing everything it could, but it has remained isolated. We think that the Main Staff of the Yugoslav Army should have supported development of the Army of the Serbian Krajina in a more courageous and determined way. The greatest mistake had been done in relation to the staffing questions. All personnel from the Republic of Serbian Krajina territory should have been assigned to serve in the Army of the Serbian Krajina. Regrettably, the most capable ones were retained, and the same was the case with the most necessary ones (lower-ranking officers). This was wrong and it had disastrous consequences to the growth of the Army of the Serbian Krajina and to preparations for combat operations.

No Army in the world manned to 20 percent of the AVS /active military strength/, Would be able to count on success in combat operations.

Misunderstanding is particularly distinct even after the disaster that the Army of the Serbian Krajina had found itself in. In the Republika Srpska the soldiers and the officers of the Army of the Serbian Krajina were practically disarmed. In the Federal Republic of Serbia all of us are looked upon as the sole culprits who did not want to defend the population and the Krajina. Moves have been made without making any assessment of the events and occurrences, and the assessments of those who either never came to the RSK or had stayed for a few days, and afterwards wrote books about what they had seen and concluded, were accepted.

The attitude towards the Army of the Serbian Krajina members is such that those who create it and support it can not be proud of this.

All of those who had honestly served in the Army of the Serbian Krajina would be happy if criminal proceedings were initiated against them, because for them this would be the only way to be heard and to talk about those who are quick to blame their own mistakes and omissions on others.

The situation in which the Army of the Serbian Krajina had found itself on the day of the aggression, objectively did not facilitate a different outcome. In case the evacuation of population had not taken place, the combat operations would have lasted 6 to 8 days, however the final outcome would have been the same: the loss of

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the entire territory of the western part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina with great losses in manpower and material resources. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would not have got involved in war for the sake of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and the Republika Srpska Army was unable to provide any kind of assistance.

Commander
Lieutenant General
Mile MRKŠIĆ
/signed/

/stamp reading/:
Republic of Serbian Krajina
The Serbian Army Main Staff

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ANNEX 166:
RSK, ORDER OF LIEUTENANT MILE MRKŠIĆ, 29 JULY 1995

0418-0483-EDT/Draft translation

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA C O P Y

MAIN STAFF OF THE SERBIAN ARMY

Strictly confidential number 4-3244

29 July 1995

Moving away of families of professional serviceman
and the population from the territory of the
RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/

DRAFT TRANSLATION

On the basis of the latest deteriorated military and security situation in the RSK and the occurrence of panic among individuals:

1. I prohibit the moving away of members of families of professional serviceman from the territory of the RSK.

2. Take any measures in order to explain the situation in order to prevent the moving away of the population from the territory of the RSK /as printed/.

C O M M A N D E R

Lieutenant General
Mile MRKŠIĆ

Authenticity of the copy certified by:
/illegible/
Lieutenant
Vladimir /?PEKEČ/
/signed and stamped/

ANNEX 167:
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, 2 AUGUST 1995

English Translation *ET 0609-3003-0609-3007*

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OPERATIVE GROUP NORTH/4th HV Guard Bde
CLASS: SP 81/95-01/04
REF. NR. 1114-01-05-95-13
S. Luka, 2nd of August 1995

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: I N T E L L I G E N C E R E P O R T

Due to the consequences of the breakthrough of the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps forces in the area of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, the highest state leaders of the Serb Para-states on the occupied areas of RH and RBiH have intensified the mutual cooperation in order to get the specific military results that should restore the undermined morale and stop the panic among the civilians.

The "state of war" has been declared on the area of both Para-states with a goal to arm all men fit for military service and to organise the defence of the "serbhood" in all institutions and organisations.

Accordingly, the regrouping of the forces has been carried out which should be the answer to the regrouping of our forces and our progress.

The Corps Special Forces with the primary task to carry out the decisive defence of Knin and RSK were accordingly transferred from Slunja to the area of Crvena zemlja and Strmica.

101st Sabotage Squad belonging to the 7th Krajina Corps is also located at that direction as well as a Tactical Group /TG/ which is equivalent to a stronger battalion belonging to the 7th Krajina Corps.

Artillery support is provided by the Special Unit Corps 71st Special Bde and Corps artillery fire support group.

Although they took all precautions on our left side, we have the information that there was an outburst of panic in that area which was confirmed by a VRSK officer tapped through the communications; he said literally: "the situation in Knin is the same as in Berlin in 1945.".

3rd Infantry Bde from Bosanski Petrovac and the other forces from Bosansko Grahovo are located in the area in front of us, with the following reinforcements:
-two infantry battalions and one artillery company belonging to 16th Motorised Bde of the 1st Krajina Corps, Banja Luka.
-two police brigades of the 1st Light Infantry Bde belonging to the 1st Krajina Corps/Velika župa – 16 km north-west from Banja Luka.
-one company belonging to the 21st Kordun Corps of "SVK" /Serb Army of Krajina/
-one company has already been sent from the 39th and 15th Corps.

These forces are to close the area in direction of Drvar. It is also necessary for you to get familiar with the equipment present in the 2nd Krajina Corps and other relevant information that can influence further war activities in this area.

The enemy disposes of the following Corps artillery equipment:

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-T-130 mm 6 pcs - ammunition problematic for this calibre
-H-155 mm 4 pcs - also problem with ammunition
-H-122 D-30 8 pcs - ammunition available
-H-105 mm 10 pcs - located within the brigades and there is no problem with ammunition of this calibre.
-OGANJ 128 mm 1 pcs - this calibre rockets represent a big problem

It is necessary to mention that they get the biggest equipment supplies from the 1st Krajina Corps:
-ORKAN 262 mm
-VOLKHOVS
-AIRPLANES
-HELICOPTERS

2nd Krajina Corps disposes of an armoured motorised battalion consisting of the following:
-TANK M-84 5 PCS
-TANK T-55 12 PCS
They also have two more tanks T-34 in the 11th Infantry Bde from Bosanska Krupa, among their armoured vehicles

The help in armoured vehicles has been mainly arriving until now from the 7th Krajina Corps which has been sending the best tanks and crews to the Grahovo battlefield.

The central base for the repair of the equipment and vehicles is located in Banja Luka and the 2nd Krajina Corps has the maintenance company consisting of 120 men in Bosanski Petrovac.

Surgical dispensary and the main logistics warehouses are also located in Bosanski Petrovac.

The saving of fuel and all calibres of ammunition has been noticed for some time.

The forces of the 1st Serb Bde belonging to the Drina Corps as well as the smaller forces (as Tičevo company that left its positions this morning after our combat activities) have been brought to the right side of our AOR (in front of TG-1).

We have noticed that the enemy front line is not defined; the enemy is so far sending there the smaller groups with a goal to check our present positions.
The enemy is also intensifying the use of the airplanes of all types for the reconnaissance and in-depth activities in our territory in order to parry our superior artillery and possibly endanger it as well as the command posts.

CONCLUSION:

Gen-Lt. COS of RS Army Manojlo MILOVANOVIĆ, the person responsible for the consolidation of forces, linking up and joint activities with the 7th Krajina Corps has arrived to this part of the battlefield.
According the statements of the detained enemy soldiers and officers and the information from the enemy media, it is obvious that they have been beaten at this part of the battlefield and that they are trying to restore the morale of the visibly shaken RS Army through the false information on our big losses.

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Since the enemy has not tried to counterattack at any part of our AOR until now, our estimation is that their primary task at all directions will be the stopping of our attacks and infiltration of the sabotage groups that will try to destroy or take over our main or forward positions.

IK/IK

SEND TO:
-all units
TG-1
-Operations and Training
-archive

Intelligence-Security Deputy /illegible/
Major
Romeo ROŽIĆ
/signed and stamped/

We certify this copy to be identical to the original document.
In Zagreb, 25th of April 2007
Certified by:
/signed and stamped/

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ANNEX 168:

RSK, SECURITY DEPARTMENT, DAILY REPORT, 3 AUGUST 1995

Draft translation

GENERAL STAFF OF THE KRAJINA SERB ARMY
Security Department
Strictly confidential No. 37-616
03 August 1995

Daily report.-

TO THE SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY GENERAL STAFF

- FAO General A. Dimitrijević

In the course of the day the units maintained the occupied positions with the engagement of the air force and artillery. There was no significant shift of the front line ranging from left the village Mandići – Dubrave – mount Brežina, height position Koščica – height position Ogreci – Javorov vrh – Veliki I mali Mračaj – Javorova glava – Samar – Igla – Bezdan – Grgić – Suvi vrh – Dinara – Razvale – hamlet Unište and the great cave right.
In the course of the day the Chief of the Krajina Serb Army General Staff established contact with the forward command post of the Serb Republic Army General Staff in regard of the joint operations and planning of further offensive operations along the Grahovo-Livno axis. Concrete tasks have been agreed, yet we do not know when these tasks will be realized, since we have the impression that in the western part of the Serb Republic there are nearly no units capable of offensive operations, which the Serb Republic Army attempts to conceal.
At the meeting of the Chief of the Krajina Serb Army General Staff held today at the forward command post of the Serb Republic Army General Staff the Krajina Serb Army was urged to bomb with aircrafts the town of Split as an act of retaliation for the artillery attack on Drvar.
At the meeting the Krajina Serb Army was also blamed for the fall of Grahovo and Glamoč.

Draft translation

1. – Foreign factor

On the basis of the analysis of information generating from various sources concerning the aggression of the Croatian Army against the Republic of the Serb Krajina from the North we came to the following conclusions:

The Croatian Reporting Agency or the Security and Information Agency of the western countries, certainly acting on behalf of the global politics of *(handwritten)* R. Haverlakea towards the Krajina placed misinformation from various sources several times on a daily basis concerning the unconditional aggression of the Croatian Army against the Republic of the Serb Krajina.

It has been established that more than 80% of misinformation was placed through the UNPROFOR, mostly by mediation of the liaison officers of various friendly liaisons, yet in the first and second case taking care that the misinformation reaches the highest levels (brigade commander, corps commander up to the most highly ranked officers in the Krajina Serb Army General Staff Command). They would make available written information to persons for whom they would have assessed that they would present it to the aforementioned bodies, also with a false and misinforming text.

The second category of source that the security and information agencies used to place misinformation were the connections of information services and the State Security Agency Department abroad and by means of telephone communications.

The third category of placing misinformation constituted the Croatian Reporting Agency (HIS) through radio communication detecting and registering by RPC monitoring.

The fourth group of misinformation – or semi-true information – is the information acquired from sources that were assigned to the Republic of Croatia and the 5th Corps by tasks of various agencies, which however were not competent to make expert assessments and evaluations of what they saw or heard.

And finally it has to be mentioned that nowhere the troop information agency is in function and that in front of the forward end of our units in tactical depths no information about the enemy forces is either traced or available.

The aforesaid clearly indicates the realistic and timely character of the decisions made from the highest to the lowest levels.

Yesterday (02 August) the Red Cross and EC teams in the Republic of the Serb Krajina were tasked by the UN Command in Zagreb with the following:

- to establish the airborne operations in the Dinara area and ground positions in the direction of Grahovo: whether the aircrafts were taking off from the airport in Udbina or from the airport in Mahovljani near Banja Luka. If they were taking off from Udbina, were the aircrafts and pilots from the Airforce of the Serb Republic?
- To establish the number of killed and wounded members of the Krajina Serb Army. In which localities and sites where the bodies disposed and the wounded taken care of? Is the International Red Cross in the position to see the wounded and talk to them?

- To establish the positions of artillery and rocket engagement and whether the Serb Republic Army participated in the artillery support.
- To establish the reactions of the state and military leadership to the Geneva talks. How do the common citizens react?

2. Situation within the units

When the state of war was proclaimed it could be noticed that the soldiers occupying the positions were excessively consuming alcohol, with the consequence of more frequent wounding, killing, verbal and physical confrontations, incitement of obstructions of the command in a drunken state and serious disruption of the combat readiness.

It is a fact that by making the decision of the Krajina Serb Army Supreme Command concerning the implementation of an active operation at the Grahovo-Livno axis parts of the Special Units Corps, units of the Ministry of the Interior and one part of "Captain Dragan's" special unit were engaged. According to our assessment, these units did not fulfill the tasks they had been assigned, which generated a certain state of rescue of some persons' powers, along with the withdrawal of all units from the combat.

It is true that the 2nd Guards Brigade under the command of "Colonel" MILOŠ CVJETIČANIN did not complete the tasks it had been assigned. Some minimal tasks were fulfilled that were of minor significance for the further activities. The units of the Ministry of the Interior, which were incorporated in the Special Units Corps during the "Vidovdan parade" did not only fail to complete their tasks, the members even abandoned the positions. They were reassigned to their positions, but they refuse to fight as part of the Krajina Serb Army. "Captain Dragan" was tasked with tactical in-depth reconnaissance of the enemy formation, but instead he was reconnoitering the positions of our forces.

Only the Military Police units at all Command levels, including the Military Police battalions, are fighting properly, resolutely and fearlessly, not having abandoned any of their positions.

In regard of the emerged situation the Commander makes the following moves:

On 02 August he withdrew "General" Stupar from the Grahovo battlefield, formed at Kordun a strategic reserve constituted of the available forces of the Special Units Corps and the attached parts under the command of MILORAD STUPAR.

In the course of the day the 2nd Guards Brigade was pulled back from the combat and sent back to the area of the village Bruvno (Municipal Assembly Gračac) and was in the state of readiness for "special operations" at all axes.

In the course of the day "Captain Dragan" abandons the Krajina Serb Army because he was unsatisfied as his request to become the commander of the 92nd Motorized Brigade of the 7th Corps was turned down, although he promised its full combat readiness within a month. When the Krajina Serb Army Commander disagreed of hi proposal, he ostentatiously left the Krajina. It is to be noticed that the State Security Agency Department of the Republic of Serbia (KNEŽEVIĆ MILAN aka "Medo") wanted "Captain Dragan" at the position of the commander of the 92nd Motorized Brigade because they insistently tried to present the current commander of the 92nd Motorized Brigade Colonel JANKO ĐURICA as being incapable of commanding the unit.

The internal situation has become very complex and the outcome is yet uncertain. Considering in this context our internal political and international position, the situation is more than serious.

Reliable and verified sources confirmed that except for the declarative cooperation there is no practical cooperation with the Serb Republic Army. Untruths and lied are paid with human lives.

The suspension of further offensive activities towards the 5th Corps and flourishing illegal arms trade will once again generate uncontrollable dimensions.

The security system is functional at all command levels, including the control and command level. However, the counter-intelligence system, is operational and the unity within the service is still at high level, regardless of the problems. The only attempt of system disruption was observed in the Special Units Corps and in the 15th Corps. Lieutenant Colonel PETAR BORIĆ completely identified with "General" ŠEVO STEVO, who cannot abide the security service. Frequently the two of them jointly imposed pressure upon individual security bodies from the Security Department and in some brigades. However, due to the reliable and professional work of the security organs from the 15th Corps Security Department (Captain POTKONJAK and Lieutenant LONČAR), with whom I am communicating personally and their determination to perform their tasks properly, the counter-intelligence system could remain functional.

Reference: our information st.pov.br. *(strictly confidential number)*: 33-226 dated 26 July 1995.
On page 3 (3) paragraph 4, the sum of 37,000 DM is indicated. Subsequently we received the information that the actual sum was 190,000 DM, that he was given afterwards.

3. Situation in the territory:

On 03 August 1995 I was in contact with the citizens and I had the impression that there are certain elements of panic, yet still under control. The citizens mostly blame the government, that is the state leadership of the Republic of the Serb Krajina. They believe that their neglect and irresponsibility caused the consequences we are faced with now. They hope that we have not been betrayed and abandoned and that as the last possibility the FRY will help.
Furthermore, the citizens believe that we are not able to defend ourselves and that, should there be no significant help by the FRY it would be better for the people to resettle to other areas rather than stay here to face encirclement and death.

According to reliable information, in the course of the day Milan Babić, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Serb Krajina, told his ministers to pack and be prepared to redislocate to Donji Lapac. He asked the government secretary Nikola Štrbac whether he was sure that the people of Knin would defend Knin if the town was attacked. Štrbac replied that he (Babić) should give him the answer to that question, considering the time he spent in the town. BABIĆ did not put up this issue for further discussion.

Draft translation

RMR/MT

ASSISTANT COMMANDER
for security affairs
Colonel
Rade Rašeta
(signature illegible)
(Text of the stamp illegible)

ANNEX 169:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES – UNCRO ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS "SECTOR NORTH" AND "SECTOR SOUTH", 6 AUGUST 1995

00955579

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES-UNCRO
ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"SECTOR NORTH" AND "SECTOR SOUTH"

We the undersigned,

Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter referred to as the Areas),

Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of civilians and of their human rights,

Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,

Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,

Agree to the following:

1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.

2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that UNCRO, together with UNHCR and ICRC where appropriate, will monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.

3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to assist and coordinate such departures in conformity with recognized international standards.

00955580

4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.

5. That UNMOs and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.

6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect military fire as long as the hostilities continue.

7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present, and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for appropriate action.

8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.

9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.

Hrvoje Sarinic
Republic of Croatia

Yasushi Akashi
United Nations
Peace Forces

Zagreb
6 August 1995

ANNEX 170:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DIRECTIVE OP. NO. 12-4/95, 26 JUNE 1995

English Translation *ET 0609-8347-0609-83*

/coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA	DEFENC
MINISTRYOF DEFENCE	STATE SECRE
HV /CROATIAN ARMY/ MAIN STAFF	"OLUJA /STORM/ -
RP/12-4/94	Copy no.
Zagreb, 26 June 1995	

DIRECTIVE

Op. /operation/ number 12-4/95

Maps 1:100,000: Zadar, Gračac, Drvar, Glamoč, Biograd, Šibenik, Split, Sinj

UNREVISED

The current military and political situation in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, with UNCRO's ongoing mandate, does not guarantee a peaceful reintegratic of the occupied territories with the Republic of Croatia's constitutional and legal order.

Starting from the Republic of Croatia's sovereignty and independence, and tl Croatian people's and other people's rights in Croatia, to freedom and to independently decide about their future within the borders of an internationally recognised state, the Leadership of the Republic of Croatia has decided to implemen force in order to liberate the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia. All the commands and units of the HV are required to respect and obey all the decisions of the state Leadership as well as the orders of the Supreme Commander, especially in view of ensuring the Republic of Croatia's integrity and full sovereignty over its whole territory.

Therefore, the HV's fundamental task at this point is to rapidly establish the highest level of combat readiness and intensify all preparations related to building combat morale, including impeccable training of the commands and units, efficient commanding and logistical support for launching of offensive combat operations,

crushing the enemy's main forces and liberating the Republic of Croatia territories temporarily occupied in the enemy's aggression.

1. Enemy

Despite the steps being taken by the international community to put an end to the Greater-Serbian aggression and find a peaceful solution to the problems created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbo-Chetnik authorities are not accepting a peaceful option and have not given up on uniting "RS" /Republika Srpska/, "RSK" /Republic of the Serbian Krajina/ and the "Federation of Serbian Lands" (Greater Serbia).

Following the Zagreb agreement and the demarcation of forces, the enemy strengthened its defence in the temporarily occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, entrenching heavily along the c/r /demarcation line/ and in the depth, creating conditions for decisive defence of the temporarily occupied, Republic of Croatia territories, while entrenching the demarcation line as the border of the, so-called, RSK.

UNREVISED

Following the attack operations in Western Slavonia and Mt. Dinara, the enemy did not accept the Republic of Croatia and the world community's initiative to start implementing the second phase of the Agreement (resolving financial issues), which points to the fact that the enemy is trying to postpone matters only to consolidate its defence, and that the enemy will defend its "state" regardless of the cost.

In the ZP Split /Military District/ area of responsibility, in occupied zones of the Republic of Croatia, the following forces of the 7th KK /Krajina Corps/ are putting up defence: Obrovac 94th lbr /Light Brigade/, Benkovac 92nd mtbr /Motorised Brigade/, Benkovac 93rd pbr /Infantry Brigade/, Đevrske 2nd pbr, Knin 75th mtbr, and Vrlika 1st lbr, with two artillery regiments, two PZO /anti-aircraft defence/ light artillery regiments, an engineers battalion, and other subordinated units.

The numerical strength of the brigades along the line of demarcation, following the Ceasefire Agreement, ranges between 700 and 1100 men. A portion of

the troops is busy entrenching in the depth. Roughly one-third of the enemy force was mobilised following the HV operations in Western Slavonia and has been on the highest level of combat readiness.

Deployment of forces:

- 94th lbr (circa 700 men) on the demarcation line, from Tulove Grede to Karin;
- 92nd mtbr (cca. 110 men) on the demarcation, line from Karin to Nadin;
- 93rd pbr (cca. 1000 men) on the demarcation line from Nadin to Prović;
- 2nd pbr (cca. 900 men) on the demarcation line form Prović to the Krka area;
- 75th mtbr (cca. 1100 men) on the demarcation line from the Krka area to Lisina;
- 1st lbr (cca. 700 men) on the demarcation line form Lisina to Vještić Gora.

The enemy positioned main combat hardware as follows:

- The enemy put its light artillery and ammunition up to 10 km behind the line, as follows: in the Benkovac barracks, village of Popovići, Baković Gaj, village of Bilišane, village of Varivode, Manojlovac, village of Tepljuh, and the village of Kijevo.
- The enemy's long-range artillery and armour is located in two large areas, around Ervenik - Žegar and Knin – Golubić.

UNREVISED

The enemy has hidden a portion of its artillery and armour from UNCRO along the demarcation line and in the depth of the line of defence, next to the firing positions, and has set up a large number of armour-piercing groups and obstacle laying groups immediately behind the demarcation line.

The enemy is entrenching extensively in the depth, along the line of Miškovici – Zelengrad – Katuša – Um – Kondovača – Varivode – Kistanje – Promina – Tepljuh – Lemeš - Baturine – Ječević – V. Glavica (Mt. Dinara), which it plans to take using its first echelon reserve.

Likely axes of artillery and armour interventions from the depth are as follows:

- From Knin to Đevrske, through Kistanje, to Petrovo Polje and Moseć, and to Vrlica;

- From Žegari to Obrovac and Jasenice, and through Benkovac to Smilčić, Zemunik, and Biograd;
- From Ervenik to Kistanje and Radučić.

One can expect an intervention by a brigade-strength unit, from the direction of B. Grahovo, and by another brigade, from Gračac.

The enemy defence will be supported by LBZ /light combat aircraft/ and H /?helicopters/ for POB /anti-armour combat/ as well as rocket systems of great destructive power.

In the event of an unfavourable development of combat activity, we can expect large-scale use of BOt /chemical agents/ of the "CS" type, and selective use of Iperit and Sarin.

The enemy has serious problems replenishing manpower levels in units, especially the armoured units, and lacks fuel and other logistic requirements, salaries etc., which indicates relatively low and falling levels of morale. The enemy is mobilising the Serbian refugees who had fled to the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ from the RSK.

UNREVISED

2. NGSHV /CROATIAN ARMY MAIN STAFF CHIEF'S/ DECISION

I have decided to redeploy and mobilise additional manpower in the ZP /Military district/ of Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić, and Split, to immediately launch intensive preparations raising both combat and mobilisation readiness to the highest level, ensuring sudden, simultaneous and energetic attack operations in harmony with given Directives.

The forces of ZP Osijek and the Southern battlefield should redeploy and mobilise required troops, supporting HRM /Croatian Navy/ and HRZ /Croatian Air-force/, organising a persistent and decisive defence, creating conditions to initiate offensive operations in the territory of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja with the objective of liberating the entire occupied territory and reaching the Republic of Croatia's internationally recognised borders.

Troops should be on readiness for executing operations on 15 Jul 1995, by which time all the necessary preparations should have been undertaken.

Until the beginning of the operation, the troops in the brigades/regiments should be mobilised for training and military manoeuvres and rotated every 45 – 90 days in accordance with the brigades/regiments' resources.

Croatian Army Main Staff ZpM /Command Post/ in Zagreb
Croatian Army Main Staff IZpM-2 /Forward Command Post 2/ in Ogulin

3. Tasks of ZP Split

ZP Split /military district/ is to prepare and launch an attack operation in the area to the right of the RBiH border and the left of the ZP Gospić boundary, with the following task: using the KoV /Land Forces/ in coordination with the MUP /Ministry of Internal Affairs/ forces, taking M. Alan and dominant spots on Mt. Velebit, and linking up forces to prevent an enemy intervention from the direction of Gračac; taking the whole area of the village of Muškovci, thereby creating conditions for introducing the main forces along the axis of, village of Muškovci – village of Otrić, with swift and concentrated attacks by the Guards brigades along the axes of Dinara – Strmica – Knin, and Velebit – village of Ostrić; launching HD /?helicopter assaults/ in synchronised operations with the MUP, air-force, artillery and rockets, on Knin and Benkovac, crushing the enemy along the given axes, and taking Knin. In the second phase of the operation, you should begin liberating all of the occupied areas of Dalmatia.

Prevent an enemy intervention from the direction of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ by deploying sufficiently strong forces, including the ID /reconnaissance and sabotage/ forces, cutting off communications, while deploying strong infantry and PO /anti-armour/ forces to secure the main forces from the direction of Benkovac and Kaštel Žegarski.

In order to execute the operations, ZP Split shall receive reinforcement from:

- 145th br from ZP Zagreb
- 7th gbr HV /Croatian Army Guards Brigade/
- 9th gbr Second Battalion from ZP Gospić
- 203 mm H /howitzer/ battery (5 weapons) from ZP Zagreb
- MUP forces

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Available forces of ZP Split should be deployed in line with the special Plan of the ZP Split Commander, revised and authorised by the Croatian Army Main Staff Chief.

ZpM /Command Post/ of ZP Split /Military District/ in Split
IZpM /Forward Command Post/ -1 of ZP Split in the village of Unešić
IZpM-2 of ZP Split in Zadar
LZpM /?logistics command post/ of ZP Split in Split

4. Neighbours:
Right: HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ forces are engaging the enemy on the current frontline.
Left: ZP Gospić is carrying out an attack operation with the objective of linking up with ABiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina Army/ 5th K /corps/.

5. HRM /Croatian Navy/ Support:
HRM is to support ZP Split with: 3 DJČ /expansion unknown/, 1 DMB, 1 PB, 1 RB or TB, and the required number of auxiliary vessels.

UNREVISED

6. Air Support:
Air support to the operation shall be provided by HRZ PZO /Croatian air-force and anti-aircraft defence/, in line with a special Plan of the Croatian Army Main Staff.

7. Artillery and Rocket Support:
Artillery and rocket support shall be provided by the 14th and 20th trd /artillery and rocket battalions/ and an additional 203 mm battery.
The support should focus on neutralising GŠ VRS /Republika Srpska Army Main Staff/ and the 7th Corps Command Post in Knin, the brigades' command posts, concentrations of enemy manpower, armour, and artillery in the area of Knin and Benkovac, including ammunition and fuel depots., while supporting the main forces in attack and preventing an enemy counter-attack from the direction of Knin, Kaštel Žegarski and Benkovac.

8. Anti-armour Combat:

You are to engage in counter-armour battle utilizing the anti-armour resources of the brigades – regiments including contemporary rocket systems, 11th potrd /anti-tank artillery rocket battalion/, and a Howitzer for anti-armour combat in combination with obstructing mines and explosives.

The focus of anti-armour combat should be along the axes toward Kistanje and Knin from Benkovac and Kaštel Žegarski, which task should be given to the main force of 11th potrd.

9. PZO /Anti-aircraft Defence/

You are to constantly monitor the airspace by relying on the PIPIN system and by listening to the wave of information of the COb /information centres/ of Split, Šibenik and Zadar.

Surveillance of the airspace should be supported by additional surveillance posts throughout the area of responsibility.

Anti-aircraft defence should be provided by your own forces, focusing on protecting guards brigades, artillery and rocket groups, ammunition and equipment depots, command posts, bridges linking northern and southern Croatia, as well as the towns of Split, Šibenik and Zadar. Therefore, you are to group forces adequately, especially the 204th trbr PZP /anti-aircraft defence artillery-rocket brigade/.

Anti-aircraft defence in the operation shall also be provided by the HRM and PZO with 2 MIG-21 airplanes on readiness at Split ZL /Airport/.

Anti-aircraft defence of weapons should be executed only primarily, to carry out special tasks. In exceptional cases, you are to use 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm PZS /anti-aircraft machineguns/ in counter-infantry battle.

While implementing anti-aircraft defence measures, you should focus on timely alerting units and using a scarce formation.

10. Electronic Operations

Electronic operations should focus on disrupting radio communication along the main forces' axes of attack. This should be done by utilizing the resources of the 4th and 7th gbr.

UNREVISED

11. Engineering Support

Engineering support should be carried out by the brigades – regiments' engineer units as well as the 40th Engineer Battalion, and by created groups for road maintenance and removal of obstacles.

The engineering support should focus on overcoming obstacles made of mines and explosives, clearing roads, and building fortifications along the reached axes of attack and along the Republic of Croatia – Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina border.

12. Reconnaissance and Sabotage Operations

You should plan and coordinate reconnaissance and sabotage operations with a plan of artillery and rocket attacks and HRZ and PZO operations.

13. PNHBOs /Anti-nuclear, chemical and biological support/

The focus of PNHBOs should be on protecting manpower and their capacity for self-assistance and self-decontamination.

14. Political and Psychological Support

You should carry out detailed moral, combat, psychological, security and other preparations with all HV commands and units, in order to guarantee a high level of combat morale, resolve and readiness to carry out all tasks in an extremely conscientious and responsible manner.

At all costs, you are to prevent any of the enemy's psychological warfare and propaganda operations in HV units.

You are to ensure that all HV units are always implementing international laws of war, regarding treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories, which task should be given to the VP /military police/ as well as the MUP.

15. Security and Information Support

You are to implement all measures, steps and actions related to the preparation, planning and organisation of the operation, including mobilisation measures, as well as the introduction, regrouping and development of the forces carrying out the operation. This should be done in greatest secrecy.

UNREVISED

You are to prepare and carry out the operation under the secret name, OLUJA-4, which should be mentioned in all the files and documents concerning the operation.

16. Intelligence Support

Intelligence support should concentrate on collecting and analysing all the information about possible changes of the enemy formation, especially the forces in the depth of the formation, command posts, artillery positions for support and anti-tank battle, concentrations of manpower, artillery and armour in the redeployment areas, including the resources hidden from UNCRO, and any other changes indicating the enemy's likely focus of defence, main axes of resistance, and introduction of fresh forces, currently not present in the 7th Corps' area of responsibility.

The Electronic Operations Centre (SED) of the ZP Split Intelligence Administration is to collect, analyse and distribute intelligence for the requirements of the ZP Split.

On the basis of the newly collected information about changes on the enemy's side, you are to update the plan of operations, particularly the plans for the use of artillery and HRZ, as well as the other plans, all of which are to be submitted to the GSHV.

UNREVISED

17. Logistical Support

For logistical support, the ZP Split shall rely directly on 300th SLoB /central logistics base/ deployed in a wide area around Zagreb and on 310th Brigade 2nd Battalion of RP /expansion unknown/ Zadar, KBC /Clinical Hospital Centre/ Split, and the OB /?security departments of/ Zadar and Šibenik.

In preparing the operation, all units are to be supplied with allocated resources. UBS /lethal assets/ and fuel should be distributed along the supply routes.

The resources should be ready for use in worst possible conditions.

Use the resources approved for the purpose of carrying out the operation, as follows:

a) Ammunition
- Small arms ……..… 6 b/k /combat sets/
- Artillery for support……..6 combat sets
- Artillery for anti-aircraft defence……..4 combats sets
- Armour……..4 combat sets
- Anti-aircraft defence……4 combat sets
- HRZ /Navy/……. In line with a separate plan

b) MES /mines and explosives/
- POM /anti-tank mine/……4000 pieces
- PPM /anti-personnel mine/……6000 pieces
- Explosive……200 tons

c) Fuel
- for combat motor vehicles……3 p/r/ /tankfuls/
- non-combat motor vehicles……..5 tankfuls

UNREVISED

Supplies should be sent in a combined manner, as follows:

a) By land, along the route, Zagreb – Senj – Zadar – Šibenik – Split – Sinj
b) By land and sea, along the route, Zagreb – Rijeka – Zadar – Šibenik – Split
c) By air, along the route, Zagreb – Split

The ZP /Military District/ Command is in charge of regulating and monitoring traffic, using the VP /Military Police/, in cooperation with the MUP.

Ensure that the Military District reserve has the means required for the movement of troops along the frontline.

Use your own forces to provide preventive medical care and carry out evacuations of wounded HV members. Requests for helicopters for air evacuation should be made to the GSHV /Croatian Army Main Staff/.

18. Commanding and Communications

GSHV Command Post in Zagreb
GSHV Forward Command Post-2 in Ogulin
Communications – as stated in a special plan of communications, alongside the directive.

Send your reports to the GSHV, as follows:

- reports on readiness for attack, at 01:00, on "D"
- regular daily reports, every six hours, with the situation at 06:00, 12:00, 18:00 and 24:00.

MO/MO /expansion unknown/

GSHV Chief
Staff General
Janko BOBETKO
/a signature/

UNREVISED

Attachments:

1. Map of the planned engagement of forces in the operation
2. Order for Communications
3. Instruction on cooperation of the HRZ and PZO units with the KoV and HRM units in the execution of attack operations
4. List of documents to be created for the attack operation

The Oluja-4 Directive was done in two identical copies, each consisting of eight (8) pages.

- The original of the Directive is to be kept in the Department for RP /?radio interception/ of the GSHV OpU /?Intelligence Administration/.
- The copy has been delivered by hand to the commander of ZP Split, Major General Ante GOTOVINA

ANNEX 171:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ORDER TO ATTACK, 2 AUGUST 1995

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
HV /CROATIAN ARMY/
MAIN STAFF
SPLIT ZP /MILITARY DISTRICT/

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

KOZJAK-95

Class: SP 8/95-01/01
Number: 1080-01-95-75/2
Split, 2 August 1995

Attachment number 4
Copy number ____

ORDER TO ATTACK

ATTACHMENT FOR THE ARTILLERY

Map 1 : 100,000
Sections: Zadar, Biograd, Drvar, Šibenik, Split, Glamoč,
Jajce, Sinj, Gospić and Gračac

Artillery support and anti-armour combat for the units of the Split ZP and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ deployed as follows: Demirovac trig. point 1765 to the right and Oglavinaovac – Velebit to the left shall be provided by TRS /Artillery Rocket System/-1, TRS-2, TS /Artillery Group/-3, TS-4 and TS-5 - for artillery support, and the POOd /Anti-armour Detachment/ - for anti-armour combat.

1. *Grouping of the artillery*

a) Attach:
- Two T-12 100 mm guns from the 11th Potrd /Anti-tank Artillery Rocket Battalion/ to the Šibenik OG /Operations Group/;
- Three 122mm D-30 howitzers from the 112th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ to the Zadar TS-5 OG.

b) Form:
- in the OG North: TRS-1, TRS-2-2, TS-3;
- in the Šibenik OG: TS-4;
- in the Zadar OG: TS-5.

Composed of:
TRS-1: four 130 mm guns, three 122mm BM 21 SVLRs /self-propelled multiple rocket launcher/, two 203 mm howitzers and two 152 mm NORA howitzers from the 10th HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ TRP /Artillery Rocket Regiment/.

TRS-2: two 130 mm guns from the 10th HVO TRP, two 152 mm D-20 howitzers and one 122 mm BM 21SVLR from the 5th HV /Croatian Army/ gbr /Guards Brigade/.

TRS-3: four 130 mm guns from the 14th td /Artillery Battalion/, three 155 mm howitzers and two 203 mm howitzers from the 20th hd /howitzer battalion/.

Form a TS-4 in the Šibenik OG composed of the following:

TS-4: five 130 mm guns from the 14th td and two 203 mm howitzers from the 20th hd.

Form a TS-5 in the Zadar OG composed of the following:

TS-5: five 130 mm guns from the 14th td, two 203 mm howitzers from the 20th hd and three 122 mm D-30 howitzers from the HV 112th pbr.

2. *Combat disposition*

TRS-1: its firing position shall be in the southeastern area of Glamočko Polje. The observation post /shall be/ in the Matrak area, trig. point 1463.
- establish the command post in the village of Vrba;
- the commander of the OG North Forward Command Post shall issue an order designating the commander of the TRS –1.

TRS-2: - establish the command post in the village of Ćoslije.
- the firing position of the 130 mm guns /shall be/ in the area of Jurišića Pod.
- the sector of expected operation for the 122 mm BM 21 SVLR shall be in the area of the village of Ćoslije.
- the main observation post shall be in the area of Matrak, trig. point 1463, and the auxiliary one in the area of Gradina, trig. point 1352.
- the commander of the 5th gbr units, Senior Lieutenant ALAJICA, shall be the commander of the TRS-2.

TS-3: establish the command post in the area of the village of Luka.
- the firing position of the130 mm guns shall be in the village of Donje Peulje;
- the firing position of the 155 mm howitzers shall be in the area of the village of Luka – the hamlet of Dimitrovići;
- the firing position of the 203 mm howitzers shall be in the area of the village of Luka – the hamlet of Dimitrovići;
- establish an observation post in the area of trig. point 1324 Razvala;
- the deputy commander of the 14th td, Captain Goran MAMIĆ, shall be the commander of the TS-3;
- the commander of the TS-3 shall form a TS-3 command from parts of the command of the 14th td which will include: a reconnaissance squad, a communications squad, a logistics squad and two to three operations officers.

TS-4: establish the command post in the area of the village of Pokrovnik;
- the firing position of the 130 mm guns shall be in the the village of Ključ;
- the firing position of the 203 mm howitzers shall be in the village of Ključ;
- establish an observation post in the area of Crni Vrh, trig. point 720.
- the commander of the 20th td, Captain Bruno MILIN, shall be the commander of the TS-4;

- the TS-4 commander shall form a command out of the command of the 20th td which will include: a reconnaissance squad, a logistics section, a communications squad and two to three operations officers.

TS-5: establish a command post in the village of Gornji Debeljak;
- the firing position of three 130 mm artillery pieces shall be in the area of Gvozdanka;
- the firing position of the 122 mm D-30 howitzers shall be in the area of Vučje Polje;
- the firing position of the 130 mm guns shall be in the village of Gornji Debeljak;
- the firing position of the 203 mm howitzers shall be in the area of Čičhan;
- establish the main observation post in Skradelovac and the auxilliary one in the area of Vrčevo trig. point 230;
- the commander of the 2nd Company14th Artillery Battalion, Senior Lieutenant Ante KARDUN, shall be the commander of the TS-5.
- the TS-5 commander shall form a command which shall be fortified with a communications squad from the 1st Company14th Artillery Battalion and one to two operations officers from sections of the TS-5.

3. *TRS tasks*

Engage in intensive artillery shelling to rout, neutralise and destroy the enemy's combat disposition at the tactical and operational level.
Focus the shelling on our forces' main axis of attack: Bosansko Grahovo - Crvena Zemlja – Knin, and on the secondary axes: Glamoč - the villge of Pribelja – Veliki Vitorog trig. point 1906, Glamoč - Mliništa, Svilaja – Kozjak, the village of Miljevci – the village of Siverić, M. Golić – Prezid – Gračac and Islam Latinski – Debelo Brdo.

Prevent the enemy from bringing in new forces from the directions of: Knin – Crvena Zemlja, Drvar – Bosnansko Grahovo, Mliništa – Glamoč, Gračac – Obrovac and Bruška – Benkovac.

Neutralise the artillery positions of enemy batteries and destroy the enemy's communications centres and command post. During the attack, secure the flanks with units from the 1st echelon.

Shell the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gračac.

The 4th POB /anti armour battalion/:

Organise anti-armour combat for the POOd in the Zadar OG according to the already prepared combat documents for offensive operations.

5. *Communications:*

Communications up to TRS level shall be organised by using your own forces and according to the plan of the Military District Chief of Communications.

6. *Requests:*

- Carry out 3rd level defensive engineering work for the main firing positions and 1st level /fortification/ for the subsequent ones. Having completed the task, carry out 3rd level fortification for the firing positions reached.

- Logistics: two combat sets of ammunition to be delivered to firing positions on D-1 /?day one/.

7. Artillery chiefs in operations groups shall prepare, at their own levels, all the necessary documents for carrying out offensive operations.

CHIEF OF THE ARTILLERY
Split ZP
Brigadier
Marko RAJČIĆ
/stamped/

This is to certify that this copy is identical to the original.
Zagreb, 19 September 2003

Certified by:
/a signature/

/stamp:/ REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, /illegible number/, ZAGREB,
MAIN STAFF OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA ARMED FORCES, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

ANNEX 172:

MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS HELD AT THE DEFENCE MINISTRY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, 2 AUGUST 1995

0356-7926-0356-7931-ET/Translation

2 August 1995

* 1000 hours: Meeting in the MORH /Republic of Croatia Defence Ministry/ War Room

/handwritten: L.M. /expansion unknown/ /4/
/handwritten: 14 May 2004/

1. Minister Gojko ŠUŠAK
2. General Zvonimir ČERVENKO
3. Major General M. CRNJAC
4. Major General I. BASARAC
5. Brigadier Ilija MARIČIĆ
6. Brigadier Marjan BIŠKIĆ
7. Colonel Ante GUGIĆ
8. Colonel Ljubo ČESIĆ – ROJS
9. Staff Brigadier Mato OBRADOVIĆ
10. Staff Brigadier Mirko NORAC
11. Major General Pavle MILJAVAC
12. Major General Mladen MARKAČ
13. Colonel General Imra AGOTIĆ
14. Major General Luka ĐANKO
15. Colonel General Petar STIPETIĆ
16. Brigadier D. ŠLOPAR
17. Brigadier Markica REBIĆ
18. Brigadier MIHIĆ
19. Major General Ivan TOLJ
20. Rear Admiral Davor DOMAZET
21. Major General Marijan MAREKOVIĆ
22. Brigadier Mate OSTOVIĆ
23. Major General Vinko VRBANAC
24. Major General Vladimir ZAGOREC
25. Major General Ante GOTOVINA

* Minister: - Major General Ante GOTOVINA to report first

* Colonel General Petar STIPETIĆ:

- Presentation of the main ideas in carrying out the operation, in second part to proceed with realisation of tasks with ZP /Military District/ commanders:
  * Idea:
- In spite of efforts for peaceful reintegration the results are poor. After the latest successes of the HV /Croatian Army/ and HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ conditions for reaching a resolution by military operation have been created. Final talks with rebel Serbs will be held on 3 August 1995 in Geneva.

1. In Sector East – Osijek ZP to organise a strong defence with two defence zones,:
   - The first along the Našice - Đakovo – Vrpolje road. The 3rd and 5th GBR /Guards Brigade/ to be grouped in the intervening space to reinforce the

first defence line, to intervene in case there is a surprise breakthrough or if conditions allow, to /?go/ along the Bobotski Kanal or via Komletinci towards Vukovar.
- In the second defence zone are the 136th Dp /Home Guard Regiment/, the 132nd Dp and the 105th Br. /Brigade/.
- In the other areas we are moving into the attack mode in order to reach the state border.
- The operation would last five to ten days after which the main body of troops would be transferred to the eastern RH /Republic of Croatia/.
- Action must be energetic, resolute and speedy and would be launched simultaneously in all directions.
- Main directions:

2. Zagreb ZP in two main directions, Banovina cut off in the direction of the village of Gora (between Glina and Petrinja) toward Topusko and the direction Sunja – Kostajnica.
3. Bjelovar ZP – from Jasenovac to behind the lines.
   - With smaller forces Zagreb ZP will carry out smaller diversionary attacks and shall attack the line along the Kupa.
4. Karlovac ZP toward Slunj – the Rakovica area, and the other part from the village of Siće toward Perjasica and further on toward Slunj. Then by crossing /?Korana/ Korana and the Kupa, cut off forces in Turanj, Kamensko, Slunjska Brda, roll back the artillery, etc.
5. Gospić ZP with the forces of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ SJP /Special Police Unit/ to act in the following directions:
   - Velebit vantage ground for attack over Mali Alan toward Gračac and takes over the Gračac - Medak road and joins the other forces.
6. Split ZP to act in the direction of Otočac and thus to cut off Knin and the entire Knin hinterland.
   - The main direction of the Gospić ZP is the 9th Gbr's attack toward the Ljubovo and Bunić passes and so manage to place Udbina ZB /air base/ under artillery fire.
   - If there is any holdup, this will automatically have an effect on the situation on the other axes.
   - The forces have the full support of the HRZ /Croatian Air Force/ and PZO /anti-aircraft defence/.

* Major General Vinko VRBANAC:

- The idea is to have the GSHV /Croatian Army Main Staff/ IZMs /Forward Command Posts (two) and the ZP IZMs carry out the operation.
- ZP commanders are in direct communication with the NGSHV /Chief of the Croatian Army Main Staff/.
- Split ZP IZM is in Zadar (the village of Sajkovići)
- Gospić ZP IZM is in the village of /blank/
- Karlovac ZP IZM is in Sveti Petar
- Zagreb ZP IZM is in Sisak
- Bjelovar ZP IZM is in Okučani
- Osijek ZP IZM is in Gradiška
- GSHV IZM is in Ogulin and Đakovo

- The JB /Public Security/ IZM is in Cavtat
- SJP – General MARKAČ - IZM in Seline
  - IZM in Galići

* Rear Admiral Davor DOMAZETA:

- Overall potential:
  - a maximum of 30,000 men
  - 300 tanks
  - 450 artillery rockets of 100-155 mm
  - 199 armoured personnel carriers
- Enemy deployment is such that the opposing side is forced to counter attack in the Grahovo theatre.
- Operational reserve is exhausted.
- M-55 tanks are predominant.
- Tank crew shortage.
- Fuel shortage (destruction of central fuel storage planned).
- Destruction of the radio-relay nodal communications centre on Petrova Gora planned.

* Minister G. ŠUŠAK:

- 52,000 men mobilised in the RH (total: 170,000).
- Meeting held with the BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army and HVO and the movement is in the direction of Donji Vakuf and Kulen Vakuf. HVO is moving toward Banja Luka (action commencing on 3 August 1995).
- Military police must be more energetic in its actions and must prevent all offences.
- ZP commanders must be the ones to pass on to the other commanders the prohibition of any kind of uncontrolled conduct (torching, looting, etc.).
- We must prevent having to take the heroes of the Homeland War to court.
- PD /ideological and political/ workers must carry out their task of appropriately briefing HV members.
- The West has given a partial blessing, but nothing must happen to UNPROFOR.

* Major General Ante GOTOVINA:

- Enemy forces have taken up firing positions and there are around 10,000 men on the first line.
- The 7th Corps has carried out additional mobilisation (they have one military police battalion).
- The 2nd Krajina Corps has around 16,000 men.
- Populated areas are included in the defence system.
- They have around 20 aircraft in Udbina ZB.
- They have chemical agents and the assumption is that they will use them.
- Poor morale and command system disrupted due to distrust of commanders.
- Significant logistics problems.

- HV main attack forces:
  1. Dinara – Knin

2. - in the direction of Grahovo from Otočac
- in two phases of an overall four day duration
- Split ZP IZM is in the village of Stojkovići
- OG /Operations Group/ North IZM in Sinj, under the command of Colonel KOTROMANOVIĆ
- Šibenik OG IZM in Šibenik, under the command of Colonel VUKIĆ
- Zadar–Rovanjska OG IZM, under the command of Colonel FUZUL

* Staff Brigadier General Mirko NORAC:

- Main axis of attack is Ljubovo – Ličke Jasenice and then toward Udbina and Donji Lapac.
- Adjacent forces to the right are the RH MUP SJP.
- No firing on Chetniks if they capture a UN member.
- The GSHV assisted by HRZ will deal with Udbina ZB.
- In case of mist, request possible change in schedule for commencement of artillery preparatory fire.

* Major-General Mladen MARKAČ:

- SJP strength is that of one infantry brigade.
- Firm contact established with Staff Brigadier Mr NORAC.
- He has a shortage of PZO systems.
- Chetniks in Medak received reinforcements of eight tanks and seven armoured personnel carriers.

* Brigadier D. ŠLOPAR

- The GSHV has stocks of 3,940 shells of 120 mm calibre.

* Major-General Miljenko CRNJAC:

- the 99th Br. is to be redeployed to Modruš on Kapela:
  - the brigade does not have a communications system.
  - 120 mm artillery battery is not capable of carrying out task.
- 110th Br.
- 104th Br. – will be introduced on 2/3 August 1995.
- 18th Artillery Battalion
- 14th Home Guard Regiment
- 143rd Br.

- There is to be no activity in the Karlovac zone in the first instance unless Karlovac suffers strong attacks, meaning we will have to attack to suppress the Chetnik artillery.
- Requested that Karlovac SJP return to Karlovac.

* Major-General Ivan BASARAC:

- The 1st Battalion of the 149th Brigade /1/149 Br./ is in reserve.

- The *R* /expansion unknown/ Brigades do not have communications equipment.
- Another four to five brigades or regiments could still be mobilised.

* Major-General Luka ĐANKO:

- Suggests the 121st Br. be placed as a reserve with the GSHV (adopted).
- Proposes mobilisation of the 1st Battalion of the 24th Dom. puk. /Home Guard Regiment/

* Colonel General Imra AGOTIĆ:

- Two MiG-21s and two MI-24s /Hind assault helicopters/ in Split
- Four MiG-21s are in Pula and they attack Čelavac
- 12 MiG-21s are in Pleso and two have been allocated to Bunić
- Two MI-24s in Požega
- Of the eight MI-8s /transport helicopters/ in working order, four are in Split and four in Lučko (HVO has one more and one the BH Army)
- There are few high-impact aerial bombs, that is for 40 sorties.
- With regard to anti-tank missiles and small bombs and rockets the situation is satisfactory.
- Transfer S-300 rockets from Kerestinec to Kanjiža.

* Brigadier ŠLOPAR:

- Solid supplies of: 7.60x39, 7.62x51, 12.7x107, 14.5, 125 mm for M-84 tanks, 122 mm howitzer M-30, 130 mm field gun, 155 mm howitzer, 60 mm M93 rockets, 128-mm rockets RAK-12 /multiple rocket launcher/.

<u>* 1730 hours: Meeting in Minister's office:</u>

- Minister ŠUŠAK,
- Minister JARNJAK,
- MUP Assistant Minister J. MORIĆ

* Minister ŠUŠAK:

- Agreement on two issues:
  1. On the KPPs /checkpoints/ in the combat operations zones
  2. On possible refugees

* Minister JARNJAK:

- It cannot use the same model as operation *Flash* as more places will be occupied.
- The Military Police follow the front line and the civilian police enter populated areas.
- Shutting down of catering establishments within a 50 km range from a place - ordered by Government (?).
- Introduction of curfew (Karlovac, Sisak, Gospić, Zadar, Šibenik).

- Possibility throughout the entire Police Administration area (including Sinj, Imotski, Vrgorac).
- The Karlovac – Senj motorway to be closed, traffic from Rijeka to be detoured.
- Government to adopt a decision that all those on vacation remain in their places of vacation.
- Close down the Karlovac – Josipdol motorway for all (except military) traffic.
- Adriatic highway:
    - traffic over the Maslenica bridge
    - road through Pag to be left open or detour to Rijeka.
- The military police must announce passage of military convoys in advance in order for that part of the road to be closed to civilian traffic during that time.
- Shut down all directions toward Sisak.

* Minister ŠUŠAK:

- On the refugees from the Eastern Slavonija region.

* Minister JARNJAK:

- Women and children in one group, and men to reception centres in the zones of each of the six police administrations.
- This is where interviews and selection are to take place.
- All MUP reserve units are mobilised on 3 / 4 August 1995 and they enter the liberated regions and take over power.
- The Police Administration will be in Knin and Glina.
- The Staff will be in the MUP and LACKOVIĆ will be in the Information Staff.

* 1815 hours: NUVP /Chief of the Military Police Administration/ Collegium in Vlaška

- Till now there has been a discrepancy between the orders decided and the working meetings held and the way in which these orders have been executed in the field.
- Not energetic enough in approach.
- Be rational in use of forces and equipment.

1. Ogulin GSHV IZM
    - Colonel KOZIĆ – Team leader
    - Lieutenant LONČAR
    - Senior Lieutenant Ilija STOJIĆ
    - Senior Lieutenant Grgo MARKOVIĆ
    - Sergeant HORVATIN

2. Zagreb – Sisak ZP IZM
    - Major CVITANOVIĆ
    - Junior Lieutenant MAGDIĆ
    - Lieutenant Tihomir ZEBEC
    - Lieutenant Željko BARTOLEC

3. Split – the village of Sojkovići ZP IZM

- Major JURIĆ
- Senior Lieutenant MADUNA
- Senior Lieutenant GLAVAN
- Lieutenant CICVARIĆ

ANNEX 173:

WITNESS STATEMENT OF MARKO RAJČIĆ

Translation

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Surname: **Rajčić**

Name: **Marko** Father's name:

Nickname/Alias: Gender: Male

Date of birth: Place of Birth:

Ethnic origin: Religion:

Language(s) spoken: Croatian

Language(s) used during the interview: Croatian

Current occupation: Retired

Former occupation: HV/Croatian Army/ Staff Brigadier

Dates of interview: 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 February 2009

Interview conducted by:
Gregory W. Kehoe, Luka Mišetić, Michael Stanton, Sean Cronin, Goran Žugić, Vlado Galić (7 February 2009)
Michael Stanton, Sean Cronin, Goran Žugić, Vlado Galić (9 February 2009)
Michael Stanton, Sean Cronin, Goran Žugić (11 February 2009)
Gregory W. Kehoe, Michael Stanton, Sean Cronin, Goran Žugić (12 February 2009)
Gregory W. Kehoe, Michael Stanton, Sean Cronin, Goran Žugić (13 February 2009)
Interpreters: Luka Mišetić and Goran Žugić

Names of persons who were present during the interview: Same as above

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Signature:_____

Translation

WITNESS STATEMENT

1. In the period from 1 April 1993 until 17 June 1996, I was the Chief of Artillery in the Split Military District and was in charge of planning, coordinating, and controlling the use of artillery during Operation Storm. I retired from the Croatian Army with the rank of Staff Brigadier as of 14 March 2003.

2. Following the completion of Operation Ljeto /Summer/ the HV was in a position to engage artillery assets upon Knin from this second position on the front line. In fact, one of my initial tasks following Operation Summer was to plan new artillery positions for the artillery group known as TS-3, focusing on protecting the flanks against the Bosnian Serb Army while Knin was at the same time within range of the artillery assets from the area of Grahovo.

3. The HV did not engage any of these TS-3 artillery assets upon Knin between 29 July 1995 and 04 August 1995 despite the fact that it had these capabilities.

4. The use of artillery upon military objectives within Knin by the HV was only done in conjunction with an offensive military operation to support the advancing infantry units.

5. In the evening hours of 31 July 1995 I received an order by General Gotovina to prepare plans for the use of artillery for the next phase of the military operation in accordance with the Commander's Decision. I prepared the Plan for engagement on a map, the attachment for artillery with a tabular-textual part of the Operational order for attack, as well as the selection of firing targets.

6. On 1 August 1995 I attended a planning meeting for the next phase of Operation Storm, known as Kozjak, in Split, Croatia. Among those who attended the meeting were representatives of the Split Military District, OG /Operational Group/ North, OG Šibenik, OG Sinj, OG Zadar and the battalions contained therein. A full list of those who attended the meeting is entailed in the attached document from 31 July 1995 that orders officers of the SPLIT MD to attend the meeting. (See Attachment 1: MORH-1-508).

7. The commanders present were informed of the upcoming operation and the Commander's Intent regarding the implementation of the operation based on the directive by the Chief of the HV Main Staff /NGSHV/. The tasks of the Split MD were understood to be the reincorporation of the land and the people of the occupied territory within the constitutional authority of the Republic of Croatia.

8. Due to the political circumstances at the time, it was ordered that the military operation must be completed within a maximum of four days.

/signed/

9. I recall that at this meeting, General Gotovina emphasized that the goal was to obtain a military victory, that the operation was aimed only against enemy soldiers and nothing else, and that the UNPROFOR facilities in the Split MD AOR must not be put in danger even though some of them were located in the vicinity of ARSK positions and facilities. He also warned that we must instruct our subordinates that enemy prisoners of war and civilians receive proper treatment and protection.

10. Specific to the use of artillery during the military operation, General Gotovina stressed that there was a lack of ammunition. Therefore, the use of artillery needed to be as precise as possible and we could only target the military objectives that provided the highest military advantages.

11. Additionally, with respect to the use of artillery during the military operation, artillery was the asset with the most fire capability and if it was well-managed it enabled an expedient achievement of tactical and operational supremacy.

12. The plan was that we would simultaneously attack the military objectives at the enemy defense's front line, in the tactical and operational depth. Synchronization of fire and the element of surprise were important elements. One of the goals was to create a shock effect on the system of command and control and the communication centers of the ARSK. The idea was also to defeat the ARSK's will to fight, to disorient and disrupt the leadership, which would result in a domino effect where ultimately the defense lines would break and the ARSK would capitulate.

13. In order to attack the enemy, our forces needed to create an opportunity to approach the enemy line of defense with minimal casualties. This was accomplished with a forceful artillery preparation. During the artillery preparation, our infantry forces created passage ways through the minefields and removed enemy obstacles.

14. Despite the limited ammunition, and in order to generate the strongest effect, the first strike had to be the most powerful, simultaneous and coordinated, firing on targets on the enemy front line of defense and in depth on targets such as the commands and communications.

15. From our source lists of potential military objectives in Knin, we identified the Main ARSK HQ, the communications center next to the ARSK HQ, and the HQ of the 7th Krajina Corps of the ARSK located in the Northern Barracks as the main and highest pay off targets that would achieve this goal.

16. Because these objectives were critical to the success of the entire operation, it was determined that they needed to be hit with all available assets that were capable of being directed at and hitting these military objectives. For Knin, the artillery assets available that could be effectively directed and hit the high pay off targets

were T-130s and 122 MBRLs. It was decided that the MBRLs were going to fire at the very beginning in the early morning.

17. The instructions were clear, as they had always been in the operations I had participated in with General Gotovina, the civilians were not to be targeted under any circumstances. We were to minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.

18. Following this meeting, I began to fulfill my task of preparing the artillery engagement plan for this operation.

19. My usual and standard practice prior to preparing the necessary supporting documents for a military operation was to review the source lists of potential military objectives, taking into consideration the available amount of ammunition. I would make the final selection of military objectives by taking into account the military necessity as opposed to possible collateral damage and civilian casualties.

20. I would also like to add that with respect to the source lists, certain military objectives do not appear on them due to the fact that it was determined that the collateral damage would be too high. One specific example of a military objective not appearing on a source list was the fuel station near the Atlagic Bridge over the Krka River in Knin. Engaging on this military objective with artillery posed a genuine danger that could result in contaminating the river which was a source of drinking water for the area.

21. Moreover with respect to the source list, I would like to add that just because a structure appeared on a source list did not mean that the structure was truly a military objective that would be fired upon. It is common military practice to identify some structures on a source list as a reference point in case there is a need for artillery support during a battle. For example, a church may be one of the highest structures in a town. Therefore, it can provide a valuable visual reference point for artillery support. The mere appearance of a structure such as this upon a source list does not mean that it was targeted as a military objective. Further, certain structures might be civilian objects for which it is estimated that they have a reasonably high chance of becoming a military objective during the battle if the enemy military forces begin using it. Also, a church tower might be used at a particular moment as a military observation post, for example, or if the object was used as a facility for combatant accommodation and in that case it would be considered a military target.

22. I have been advised by the Gotovina defense that an issue has arisen during the trial of the target named "hospital" appearing on a source list of potential targets. (See Attachment ____, 65ter 6119). At no time was the hospital in Knin targeted by the HV. In fact, the x, y, z coordinates of the hospital were never during the war in any plans or lists of targets. With respect to these particular coordinates, they represent a field near the crossroads outside of the Northern Barracks from

which we anticipated that the ARSK may attempt to withdraw military equipment or otherwise use the area to its advantage. Considering the military logic that the Croatian Forces may ultimately need to employ artillery assets upon this location to suppress movement and neutralize activities from the Northern Barracks, we identified it as a military objective. The term "hospital" was used because the hospital was the first dominant facility in the vicinity of this location.

23. The target 'hospital', as well as certain other targets, started to appear on the lists of potential targets in 1993, when the HV started using unmanned aerial drones of domestic production. These drones were used for reconnaissance but also for making corrections of artillery fire. Due to the fact that various smaller facilities were not visible enough from the altitude the unmanned aerial drone was flying at, the targets were then named after visible and dominant facilities in their vicinity.

24. I would also like to add that many of the military objectives in cities such as Knin were structures such as barracks and HQs that had been in existence for decades. With the assistance of the intelligence departments we were able to constantly review and update our source lists.

25. Prior to Operation Storm the Split MD had organized and established 22 artillery observation posts from the Velebit to the Dinara Mountains in addition to numerous infantry observation posts. From these observation posts the ARSK was constantly monitored and information was updated on the movements and positions of the enemy forces. Any change in the ARSK positions would be noted and updated in a Diary of Reconnaissance and then relayed to the commands.

26. These numerous Observation Posts were, in addition to the work of the intelligence services of both the Croatian military and civilian structures, also involved in gathering information that could be used in determining military objectives. As soon as information was received, it was immediately used to update source lists and working artillery maps.

27. Generally speaking, special consideration would be given to the choice of weapon for firing at certain targets. Weapons were taken into consideration based on range and weapons were chosen for which it was determined that they would cause the least collateral damage while still achieving the desired military advantage.

28. Also with respect to situations in which artillery was used against military objectives within urban areas, the choice of time of day that the weapon would be fired was an important consideration that went into the planning and the choice of weapon, type of fire and amount of ammunition, to attempt to minimize collateral damage to civilians. For example, in my experience using artillery assets in the early morning hours provides for the opportunity to employ a larger number of

projectiles with different artillery pieces while civilians are less likely to be outside of their homes. With respect to Operation Storm the artillery preparation fire was always conducted very early in the morning, 0500 hrs or as shortly thereafter as possible, to minimize the risk of collateral damage to the civilian population.

29. In conjunction with the assigned task, artillery units would receive a textual tabular segment of the attachment for artillery and the list of targets for the specific operation for the x, y, z coordinates of planned military objectives.

30. Prior to Operation Storm, we considered and discussed the protection of the civilian population throughout the area that would be affected by the military operation. I believe we did the best we could under the circumstances to protect the civilian population and at no time was the civilian population a target of our artillery assets.

31. I would also like to add that in any military conflict, it is the responsibility of both sides to protect the civilian population. The RSK leadership and the ARSK knew that if negotiations failed to solve the situation they would ultimately be forced to solve the political problem by military means, and that such a military solution would result in the HV employing the use of artillery assets. For example, I have been shown an ARSK Intelligence Report from February 1995 that reveals the RSK leadership and the ARSK knew this. (See Attachment ____). Despite this fact, and despite the fact that following Operation Ljeto /Summer/, the HV controlled the high ground along the Dinara Mountains overlooking Knin, there was never any attempt by the RSK to remove their command posts, logistics support, and communications centers from Knin. This also applied to the other towns in the occupied area. To the contrary, we were constantly advised from declarations from the RSK leadership and the ARSK leadership that they intended to resist and defend Knin to the last man.

32. Following the said meeting, General Gotovina and his Staff Officers began the process of drafting the Kozjak-95 Order number 1080-01-95-75/2 and its various Attachments.

33. Within Section 7 of this order, General Gotovina established in OG North TRS-1, TRS-2 and TS-3, in OG Šibenik TS-4 and established in OG Zadar TS-5. I have been shown a map by the Gotovina defense, D-971, that shows the various positions of these artillery groups. I agree that the positions identified on this map accurately reflect the dispositions, axes of attack and ranges of those groups on 4-5 August, 1995. (See Attachment _____) with a note that a part of TRS-5 was operationally subordinated to the MUP Special Forces so it is possible that their axis of attack was redirected.

34. The decision to group the artillery of the Split MD ('Corps level artillery') into 5 groups was based on several factors. The primary factor was that the

confrontation line was too long for the available amount of artillery assets. The main axis of attack (Dinara – Knin) was determined and several auxiliary axes of attack as well as the need to secure the right flank (Drvar – Grahovo) and tie up ARS /Bosnian Serb Army/ forces on the axis Mliniša – Glamoč.

35. The available assets of the Corps artillery of the Split MD were insufficient to cover all needs of the operation. For this reason the artillery was modulated and grouped into artillery and rocket groups whose purpose was twofold. This means that they were providing artillery support for the infantry brigades and Home Guard regiments as well as conducting tasks of firing at military objectives at an operational and strategic level.

36. When firing at military objectives within the disposition of the enemy brigades in defense, the Operative Groups were responsible for directing artillery fire according to their Plans and lists of targets.

37. When firing at strategic targets and targets in operational depth, which include the targets in Knin, directing artillery fire was the authority of the Chief of Artillery of the Split MD.

38. The complexity of the task is best visible on the example of TS-3 which had to provide parallel fire support for 3 axes: prevent an ARS /Bosnian Serb Army/ counterattack from Drvar, support to OG NORTH in the attack on the axis Dinara – Knin and support to OG SINJ in the attack towards the Cetina valley. All of this was done with only 4 available long range guns (T-130s).

39. This combined model of managing Corps level artillery is visible through the use of TS-4 where OG SIBENIK HQ was controlling tactical firing, and the SPLIT MD was controlling operational and strategic firing. Thus, fire requests for TS-4 could be made from two directions, SPLIT MD for deep operational and strategic targets, and OG SIBENIK for close tactical targets. This resource sharing ensured that the SPLIT MD was always in full control of firing upon in depth targets especially in the situation where TS-3 and TS-4 were simultaneously firing in operational depth, such as the fire on targets in Knin.

40. The SPLIT MD also maintained constant oversight over the use of the Corps level artillery during tactical targeting. If needed, we could react promptly and if necessary stop every potential irrational action or fire.

41. Artillery preparation was not fully carried out as planned because of enemy artillery fire on the TS-4 positions. After neutralizing enemy artillery, the TS-4 continued firing at the highest pay off targets according to plan.

42. Most of the activities by the TS-3 and TS-4 were related to carrying out tactical tasks of support for the infantry brigades and Home Guard regiments.

43. As mentioned previously in this statement, the HV had been preparing lists of military objectives in those towns for several years and was constantly receiving intelligence data which they used to update the lists of military objectives.

44. I personally drafted the Order to Attack – Attachment for Artillery, dated 01 and 02 August 1995, D-970, in accordance with Section 7 of the Order by General Gotovina (Operational Order for attack 'Kozjak').

45. As can be seen in Section 3 of this Order to Attack – Attachment for Artillery, following Section 7 of the Operational order, I also planned fire on the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gračac. I relayed this order with the exact same language as stated in Section 7 of the operational order, because there was no need for clarification. It was clear to me, and to all the commanders of the subordinate units that this meant to fire at the selected military objectives in these towns and in accordance with the existing plans and source lists of military objectives.

46. A tabular-textual part existed alongside this Order to Attack – Attachment for Artillery, which the Operative Groups and artillery groups TS/TRS 1-5 received.

47. In addition to the tabular-textual part which I prepared, the artillery groups had a list of targets with x, y, z coordinates for these military objectives. The lists of military objectives were re-checked again prior to the operation to ensure the accuracy of the x, y, z coordinates.

48. Among the military objectives selected in Knin was Milan Martić, the President of the RSK and Commander in Chief of the ARSK. Mr. Martić had been one of the highest priority targets of electronic surveillance by the HV and Croatian civilian intelligence in the years of the occupation. Information regarding the location of Mr. Martić, including his residence, was constantly updated. A determination was made that should we have information regarding Mr. Martić's residence, engaging the military objective would provide the advantage of putting pressure on him by showing both the effectiveness of the HV and Croatian artillery. Further, even if we could not kill Mr. Martić with the artillery strike, we wanted to put pressure on him personally and influence his decision-making process, thus forcing a capitulation as fast as possible.

49. In the majority of the areas of the operation, the situation had been static prior to Storm so it was merely a matter of updating existing plans and updating source lists of military objectives, which was continuously done.

50. The planning for the liberation of certain areas of responsibility, such as for OG ZADAR, OG ŠIBENIK and OG SINJ started years before in the form of various training exercises and war games. After such training within the commands, plans were prepared for offensive operations for each of the mentioned operative groups. Thus the planning for an offensive operation for that segment of the

battlefield started earlier and afterwards the plans were merely updated. As discussed above, during that period approximately 750 artillery personnel went through various trainings courses. All units and commands knew very well what their roles would be in any action to liberate their area of responsibility. They had a long time for preparation because the confrontation line at that part of the battlefield did not change after the arrival of the UN. Plans were updated according to changes in enemy combat structure and positions which had been updated on a daily basis.

51. OG NORTH and OG SINJ started achieving goals set out in operation STORM with operation LJETO-95 /Summer-95/. GSHV STORM-4 Directive for the SPLIT MD defined the main attack axes in operation STORM for MD SPLIT as the direction Strmica-Knin. In order to be in position to fulfill this task, the town of Grahovo had to be taken. As a result of this change in position and the resulting changes in the positions of the enemy forces, these OGs required more substantial changes to their existing plans to execute Operation Kojzak.

52. Through different forms of training, various scenarios and plans for the implementation of offensive operations on the Split MD level and the level of individual units within the composition of the Split MD were also trained. Special attention was put on training artillery personnel. Aside from Staff trainings, plans were also made for offensive operations based on orders by the Chief of the HV Main Staff.

53. Also, during 1994, Staff training was conducted at the Split MD level under the code name 'Promina-94'. The same year, a tactical live-fire exercise was conducted under the code name 'Bandira-94' the focus of which was to show the level of training of all branches and units of the Split MD. One or two Staff trainings were conducted in 1995 as well.

54. Also, in May of 1995, an order was issued to create plans for an offensive operation for liberating the occupied territories, and I think it was on the basis of an order by the Chief of the HV Main Staff, General Janko Bobetko.

55. Alongside the aforementioned Staff trainings and military exercises, special training was conducted for soldiers, non-commissioned officers and artillery officers. Among others, training was conducted in February 1995 for the Chief of Artillery, Commanders and Deputy Commanders of the Home Guard units' artillery battalions. Aside from the above mentioned, a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers were according to plans sent to specialist training to the Croatian Military College. All these activities regarding education and training were conducted according to a plan by the Split MD Commander. .

56. It is visible from the above mentioned that the Split MD two years prior to Storm continuously conducted preparations within their capabilities in preparing the commands, and individual units, and especially the artillery, to conduct the tasks

of liberating the occupied territories. Staff trainings, military exercises, orders, artillery documents, etc. prove that this was a process and not simply the implementation of one 'ad hoc' operation.

57. On 3 August 1995 I was in Zadar for a meeting with General Gotovina and General Markač to discuss providing part of the artillery assets of the TRS-5 and subordinating them to the Special Police along their axis of attack. At this meeting General Gotovina gave me an order to extract part of the artillery assets of TRS-5 that were in the area of Maslenica. Thus the artillery support for Operation Kozjak in the area of OG ZADAR was weakened. The result was that part of the units in offensive actions on the axis of attack Muškovci - Kaštel Žegarski were without TRS-5 artillery support.

58. In addition to attending this meeting in Zadar, I spent 3 August 1995 visiting with the Chiefs of Artillery at the various Operational Groups, and the Command of each artillery group to coordinate and harmonize planned artillery targets for the operation, and to check whether everyone understood their tasks and that they had a reliable communications system and other details.

59. On 3 August 1995 upon my return to Sajković I visited the TS-3 and the 7th Guards Brigade command. I had a short meeting there with the Chiefs of Artillery of the 7th and 4th Guards Brigade with the purpose of coordinating artillery support on the main axis of attack. Afterwards I returned to Rujani where I continued preparing the working map and followed up on the preparations for transporting the 122mm MBRL from TRS-1 to Rovanjska for the needs of the MUP Special Forces. During the night, the transfer of the Split MD FCP from Rujani to Sajkovići was conducted.

60. During Operation Storm, persons directing and correcting artillery fire were commanders of artillery groups at the artillery observation points. This was the reason why our observation posts were under constant enemy artillery fire. For example, on 4 August 1995 the ARSK hit with its artillery the artillery observation point for the artillery units' Commanders of the 4th GB, 7th GB and TS-3.

61. I have been informed by the Gotovina defense that some witnesses have informed the Chamber that they believed gaps of time in the use of artillery on military objectives in Knin indicated to them that the purpose of using artillery was to harass the civilian population into fleeing the area. This is false. The use of artillery during Operation Storm was always tied to a military objective and was never intended to harass civilians in the area of the battle. Alongside their tasks of firing at military objectives in Knin, the T-130s were providing artillery support for units on a tactical level, and that was the reason for the gaps in their activity on Knin. This means that in the time they were not firing on Knin they were engaged in firing on targets on the attack axes of the brigades of OG NORTH, OG SINJ and OG ŠIBENIK.

62. As outlined previously, we were faced with significant limitations with respect to the amount of available ammunition and artillery assets. The artillery groups had to simultaneously provide support on all three levels: strategic and operative (targets in Knin and in operative depth of the enemy's defense), as well as the tactical level (targets within the composition of the enemy brigades and combat groups).

63. The vast majority of the artillery fire during Operation Storm was concentrated on the enemy defense lines, enemy artillery firing positions and the area of deployment of reinforcements. In other words, the artillery was closely related to the support of infantry and dictated by the dynamics of the battle. Following the artillery preparation, the further use of artillery upon military objectives in Knin was to provide support for offensive actions. The goal of this activity was to achieve the artillery task of neutralization and suppression of movement by the enemy, because with the ammunition available this was the only use of artillery possible.

64. During Operation Storm, the HV did not use, nor did they have, cluster munitions. Furthermore, the HV did not use proximity-sensor fuses; rather they used only contact ignition fuses.

65. I have also been shown P-1276 by the Gotovina Defense, which is entitled Report on Discharged Ammunition 4-5 August 1995 for the 4th Brigade Artillery. The "TF" referenced in this report does not mean "time fuse." The full Croatian term is "trenutna-fugasna" and does not imply a type of fuse but rather a type of shell. This means that the fuse is instantaneous and the explosion detonates on contact. It is the most standard type of ammunition.

66. After obtaining control of Knin, part of the ARSK forces mixed together with the civilian population began withdrawing in the direction of Srb, and the other part in the direction of Strmica – Lička Kaldrma – Resanovci. On 7 August 1995 our units entered Strmica. On that day we received information of this withdrawal and their location. I looked at General Gotovina, and he ordered that not a single artillery piece can be fired at that column.

67. One of the key elements of the quick breach of the enemy's front line and a rapid liberation of Knin was the efficient and appropriate use of artillery. This goal was achieved with minimal civilian casualties and minimal collateral damage to civilian structures.

68. I was assigned by the Croatian Government on 10 July 2008 to assist them in the selection of documents which relate to the time frame of Operation Storm specifically dating from 02 August to 09 August 1995. I do not know precisely what the sources were of these documents, however from certain details I concluded that it they were obtained through searching for documents in the MORH /Ministry of Defense of the RH/ Archives, as well as through interviews

conducted by military and civilian police with participants of certain events, as well as gathering personal notes of direct participants.

69. Given that I didn't have the statements the direct participants of specific events gave to the police at my disposal, it was my task to select and mark the documents that were time related to the period of the operation from this gathered documentation. The completing and binding of these documents was conducted by members of the Military Police.

70. In July of 2008 I worked for only 7 working days because there was very little documentation available. We had a break until 01 October 2008 after which I was called back to continue with my work.

71. The request for preparing related documentation was presented to me as the need to have a paper trail regarding my being engaged to select the documentation, in the form of a reconstruction of events from the time of Operation Storm, based on documentation which was placed at my disposal. I was told that this work was being carried out upon request by the Government Office for Cooperation with the ICTY. The purpose of the reconstruction was to put the selected documents in context regarding the role and tasks of artillery of the Military District and the Guards Brigades (4th and 7th GB).

72. The work on the reconstruction was a continuous process because new information kept coming on the basis of which updates needed to be made. This work cannot be considered finished even today because the Military Police is still gathering information and conducting interviews. After receiving new documentation, the last version of the reconstruction I made so far needs to be updated again.

73. It was only after the first part of my reconstruction was sent to the Prosecution of the ICTY that I realized that my materials were being sent to the Prosecution as well, which I felt was unnecessary because I think that my work methodology was not adjusted to the needs of the court. I was working for an employer – the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

74. My reconstructions cannot be viewed as expert analyses because they lack many elements in order for this to be possible. Had there been a request for an expert analysis, then I would have approached my work with a completely different methodology and wouldn't restrict myself to the restricted selection of documents that were made available to me.

Translation

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the International Laws of War Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the Tribunal.

Signed: */signed/*

Dated: */handwritten: 13 February 2009/*

I, Notary Public, **Jagoda Makelja-Šuljić,** from Split, Šimićeva 2, do hereby confirm that:
Marko Rajčić, Dubravice, Prispo 47, who's identity was established by virtue of ID card no.100003584, issued by the Šibenik-Knin Police Administration signed the document in my presence.

The signature on the document is authentic.

The notaries certification fee according to the Tariff No. 11 para 4 of the Notary Fees Law has been charged in the amount of 10,00 HRK. The duty stamps have been applied and annulled on the copy that remains for the records
The notaries remuneration has been charged in the amount of 30,00 HRK pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulations of the Temporary Notary Tariff. The amount of 5,00 HRK has been charged according to Article 37, VAT has been charged in the amount of 7,70 HRK.

NUMBER: OV-1996/09
At Split, 13 February, 2009

NOTARY PUBLIC
Jagoda Makelja-Šuljić
/signed/

(Text on the seal:)
Republic of Croatia
Split
Jagoda Makelja-Šuljić
Notary Public

Annex 1

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REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
HV */Croatian Army/* MAIN STAFF
SPLIT ZP */Military District/* COMMAND
OG */Operative Group/* NORTH

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Class: 080-09/95-01/06
Reg. no.: 1080-01-95-85
31 July 1995

SUBJECT: Information.-

On 01 August 1995, beginning at 08.00 hours in the ZZP */Military District Command/* - Split – Lora a working meeting is going to take place and the following persons are obligated to attend:

OG ZADAR:
- Rajko Rakić, Brigadier
- Antun Jeričević, Brigadier
- Mladen Fuzul, Colonel
- Ivica Arbanas, Major
- Danijel Telesmanić, Major
- Josip Čerina, Major
- Ivan Ivković, Major
- Dragan Brkljača, Major
- Željko Dilber, Major
- Boris Skorić, Major
- Sreten Bego, Captain
- Sreten Kolovrat, Captain

OG ŠIBENIK:
- Danijel Kotlar, Colonel
- Ivan Bačić, Major
- Željko Nakić, Captain
- Stanko Mikačić, Major
- Milan Perin, Captain

OG SINJ:
- Ante Kotromanović, Colonel
- Mirko Klarić, Colonel
- Ivan Jenjić, Senior Lieutenant
- Ante Kotromanović, Chief of artillery

MM/MA

Deliver to:
- IZM */Forward Command Post/* Zadar
- Archives

COMMANDER
Colonel General
ANTE GOTOVINA
/signed and stamped/

Text of the seal: SPLIT, MILITARY POST 1080, 4

172 REBUS SYSTEM 172		
Received:		Date: **31 July 1995**
Sent:	X	Time: **16. 35 hours**
Register no. */illegible/*	Operator's signature: */signed/*	

It is verified that this transcript – copy is
identical to the original document.
Zagreb, 11 July 2006
Certified by: */signed and stamped/*

Text of the seal:
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ZAGREB, 59

Annex 2

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TABLE OF IDENTIFIED TARGETS

Date: _____ P.P. /expansion unknown/ Region: 1. Karli
2. Ključ
3. Pakovo Selo

Target Number	Target Description	Target Coordinates			Unit Tasked
		X	Y	Z	
KV /expansion unknown/ 110	Church in Knin	77185	96170	220	SVLR /self-propelled multiple rocket launcher/ 122 T-130
KV 150	Ko?ovo warehouse	68?00	97400	245	SVLR 122 T-130
KV 210	Army barracks /located/ at the entrance	76500	96280	220	SVLR 122 T-130
KV 250	"Slavko Rodić" army barracks	78880	96560	250	T-130 1st Platoon
KV 310	Bridge /located/ at the entrance	77?50	95800	220	SVLR 122 T-130
KV 350	"Senjak" army barracks	78220	96650	225	T-130
KV 410	Railroad station	77540	96360	225	T-130
KV 450	Western warehouse	77630	95250	225	SVLR 122 T-130
KV 510	The crossroads	76130	96260	230	T-130
KV 550	Old garage	80800	94200	360	T-130 1st Platoon
KV 610	Apartment building complex	783??	96520	240	T-130
KV 650	Padane warehouse	81860	91060	415	T-130 1st Platoon
KV 710	Hospital	79300	97140	230	T-130 1st Platoon
KV 750	Screw and bolt factory	77960	96890	230	T-130
KV 810	Western bridge	78060	95530	230	T-130

OTP/JOVI

P01271/65ter 6119

Annex 3

COMMAND OF THE 7th CORPS
STATE SECRET NO. 37-7
13 February 1995

NATIONAL DEFENSE
STATE SECRET
"GVOZD"
Encl. No.: 7
Copy No.: 3

ORDER FOR THE AIR DEFENSE Operational No. 1

Section: 1:100 000 Zadar, Gračac, Drvar, Biograd n/m, Šibenik, Split and Sinj

1. In the corps defense area approx. 24 sorties of combat aircrafts may be expected, namely 2-4 sorties of reconnaissance aircrafts in 20 sorties of light combat airplanes, approx. 6-8 sorties of combat helicopters and approx. 15 sorties of transport helicopters. Aside from combat aircrafts and helicopters, redesigned farming and sport aircrafts may also be expected.

2. The aircrafts have their base in the following airports: Split 6 MIG-21, Krk 4-6 MIG-21, Pula 4-6 MIG-21 and 4 MIG-29, Hvar and Sinj farming and sport aircrafts type UTVA-7 and AN-2.

The focus of the operation is to be expected on the following axes:

> Split – Sinj - Vrlika / Knin – Šibenik – Drniš – Knin – Zadar – Benkovac – Knin and Karlobag – Obrovac – Knin.

with the attack directed on the positions on artillery units for support and anti-armor combat, on the armored mechanized units, Knin town and the structures in the town such as the General Staff of the Serb Army of the Krajina, the TVIK factory, the military barracks etc., the power plant Obrovac and Manojlovac, and the storage sites in Golubić and Padene.

The most powerful activities of the ustasha air forces can be expected at the beginning of the "decisive" attack on the RSK.

Reconnaissance will be aimed at the detection of the completely precise locations of our forces. The attack will presumably be carried out in pairs of 2-4 aircrafts in diving and low-flying by using rocket weapons, AV and TMV(?).
It is expected that the task force aircrafts of the NATO will be providing security to the ustasha air force units and that electronic warfare will be extremely intensive.
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles aimed at collecting information and provocation of the air defense system, as well as jamming is to be expected.

2. The 7th Light Artillery Rocket Regiment without the Air Defense Light Self-Propelled Artillery Battery 20/3 mm BOV-3 *(APC)* and Air Defense Light Self-Propelled Rocket Battery S-4M will organize and carry out the air defense of the town Knin throughout the combat activities.

3. The Air Defense Light Self-Propelled Artillery Battery 20/3 mm BOV-3 without 1 section will be allocated to the 1 Corps Artillery Group-7. The battery commander will report to the commander of the I Corps Artillery Group-7 in the southern barracks, who will assign him the tasks.
- the Air Defense Light Self-Propelled Artillery Battery S-1M without 1 section will be allocated to the 7th Armored Battalion. The battery commander will report to the commander of the 7th Armored Battalion in the area of the village Očestovo, who will assign him the tasks.
- 1 section 20/3 BOV-3 and S-1M will be allocated to the MRL "ORKAN" Platoon. The section commander will report to the commander of the MRL "ORKAN" platoon in the Northern Barracks, who will assign him the tasks.
- the other corps units will organize and provide air defense to their own forces and means.
- Along with the Air Defense Artillery Rocket Units, the air defense of the 7th Corps, as part of the RSK air defense, will be organized and executed by the 105th Air Brigade upon the request of the Corps commander.

4. Information about the situation in the air space will be provided by the 7th Military Intelligence Center, the 45th Battalion of Military Monitoring and Guidance and the 71st Military Intelligence Center in the Territorial Defense according to the monthly work plan.
Follow the best audible intelligence waves.

5. Air protection measures
Undertake any air protection measures, in particular the camouflage and fortification measures, in all Corps units.
The infantry weapons are to be used for firing at helicopters and low-flying aircrafts and farming aircrafts.
Provide as much false positions as possible.

6. For the purpose of electronic protection the wire communications of command and control intelligence and reporting have to be secured. Planned and alternate work, along with the work from reserve positions, has to be provided with radar means. The radar means should be used as less as possible, while the visual surveillance and combat duty service should be intensified.

7. Expenditure of ammunition and rockets for the Air Defense Artillery Rocket Units according to the defense order.

8. The announcements of the flights of own air forces shall be made according to the existing instructions and through the chain of command.

9. The commander of the 7th Air Defense Light Artillery Rocket Regiment will be in charge of the Air Defense Artillery Rocket Units. The commanders of the basic units will be in charge of the other units.
The planning of the operations of the own air forces will be announced 30 minutes before the take-off.

The air corridors of the own air forces:

- Udbina Otrić - Obrovac
- Udbina Otrić Benkovac

- Udbina – Otrić – Knin – Drniš
- Udbina – Otrić – Knin – Vrlika

The Command Post of the 7th Air Defense Light Artillery Rocket Regiment is in Bušina straža.

10. The reports on the activities of the Air Defense Artillery Rocket Units and on the tactics of the enemy air forces shall be delivered until 19.00 hrs for the situation as of 18.00 hrs; special reports as required.

CHIEF OF STAFF
COLONEL
ŽIVKO ŠAPONJA
(signature)

(Text on the seal:)
Military Post Office 9031
Knin

Annex 4

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DEPLOYMENT OF HV / HVO OPERATIONAL ARTILLERY GROUPS IN OPERATION "KOZJAK" 04 AUG 95



(Sources: ERN 0342-2548, 0279-8578, 0070-7832, 0617-6363)

D-971

12/16/2010 2:54:12 PM

ANNEX 174:

OPERATION STORM

ANNEX 175:

EXCERPT FROM THE SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, MILAN MARTIĆ, GIVEN AT THE BRIEFING ON THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE SVK, 10 FEBRUARY 1995

MILITARY SECRET

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM THE SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, MILAN MARTIĆ, GIVEN AT THE BRIEFING ON THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE SVK

Date: 10-Feb-95

The President of the Republic joined the briefing just after 09:00hrs. Before leaving the briefing, the President excused himself to the participating commanding officers, saying that due to his other obligations, which could not be postponed, he was unable to follow this extremely important activity /event/ through to the end.

In the speech given to the commanding officers, the President has clearly and unequivocally pointed out to the characteristics of the existing situation in the country and to the seriousness of the forthcoming Ustasha aggression.

Particular emphasis in the expose was placed on the role and the tasks of the SVK and its preparations to be ready to face the aggression, while stressing the importance of the combat morale and the relationship between the army and the people. Bearing in mind the importance of the questions, assessments and stands of the President of the State, the Main Staff decided to submit an excerpt of the President's speech to the Corps' Commands and to the Commanders with the most responsiblility. The excerpt is attached to the Conclusions and the SVK Combat Readiness Tasks.

*

The fate of the Serb People and our state is in the hands of the SVK. The responsibility of the Command Staff is great. Without the good system of command, there will not be an efficient and an organised Army. Without the good system of command, the SVK is unquestionably doomed to failure.

The people – the SVK: All hope of the people lie in the SVK.

The establishment of the army is a /an ongoing/ process. Army, which has poor equipment and training, can do well if a good command system exists. The system of command solves the problems. The people in Krajina today have their Army, the Serb Army, with their own Command personnel.

I am against badmouthing the SVK and its officers.

Our objective is to strengthen the faith of the people in its officers.

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There's a belief: the JNA deserted us in 1991. Is the Army (referring to the SVK officers) going to flee again, should the war brake out again? All those who haven't deserted us in 1991 are still here, and they for sure won't desert us now, that is the answer of your Commander, Gen ČELEKETIĆ.

SVK is a non-party /army/, the people's /army/, it is equally the army of all who live in the RSK and of all the parties, but it is apolitical. The army guards and fights for the interest of the people to be free on their own soil. It is not interested in the political parties' doings in their struggle for the power. The SVK must be a stable factor, above the /political/ parties, the structure of the state and its defence power.

It is expected from the SVK to constantly ensure the people that the RSK territory is safe. If the SVK is not well organised, strong and firm, all else fails in our country. There can't be any legal system, any social politics. A precondition to have it all is the defence. The defence is the priority number one for our present and our future. That must be it.

There is an inconsistency in the defence.

Everything is fine theoretically /when public statements are given/, but practice shows the opposite. It is expected that the Parliament be better informed and to show more influence on the solving of the problems of the defence. All representatives support the idea that the army and the defence system in general must be reinforced /strengthened/. The competent government state organs must meet their part of the obligations to the defence. The Parliament does not support the attempts of shifting the responsibility onto the others. The stand that those who are authorised must ensure the existential minimum to each of the troops /?as printed/. The negative in the relationship towards the SVK and the defence will be overcome. The irresponsibility has been and is destroying the healthy tissue of our defence of the SVK /?as printed/. There are also attempts of spreading a disconcert into the army, which caused the fall of the combat morale and the appearance of a spirit of defeatism.

It is human to doubt the good intentions, which had negative results, and it must be understood. It shouldn't have come to that.

The fact that the state property is being used for purposes other than the defence, primarily for the acquisition of individual wealth, says a lot about being inert and avoiding the defence obligations. The example of the use of the forests /timber/ more than proves this claim. The "Drvo" /"Timber"/ project of the planned cutting down of trees could have provided for the SVK and the defence. However, that did not happen,

and certain individuals and many profiteers have relentlessly appropriated the all-peoples property. More voices must be raised in the Parliament against such a policy. An aggression of the Croatian Army is anticipated in 1995. We must be ready to face the aggression. That will be a crucial battle, not just for the RSK, but for all the Serb people.

The existence and the work of the military intelligence organs and the state security service must provide the information on the start of the aggression at least 10 to 15 days prior it happening. We are certain that the aggression will take place but it is difficult to predict its beginning, which will take place in the period between April and July 1995.

The war between the RH and the RSK must end in victory of one and the defeat of the other side. Until that happens, the war will not and can not end.

The RSK is doing its best to acquire a peaceful solution to the problems with the RH, through our diplomatic channels. This option has little chance of success because all the arguments are on the side of the Serbs (the historical, the legal, the factual ones).

The Serbs are a nation-building people and can only remain as such /as printed/.

We will not and we must not come out of this war, which we are leading now and which we will continue to lead, as the defeated side, to be treated as an ethnic community and a national minority. At the end of the war, our status must be as it has been: that of a nation-building people. We've accepted the negotiations with the Croatian side, with the International Community as mediators, but little can be expected to come out of the mentioned negotiations. However, the negotiations are useful to us because they enable us to gain more time to prepare for the defence from the Croatian aggression. We must be ready for the final duel with Croatia.

Tudjman's political moves are not drawn without calculations. All he did, he did with the approval of Germany. Statements given by Kol (sic) and Kinkel (sic), whereby Tudjman is called on to withdraw the decision on having the UNPROFOR leave /Croatia/ are just masking the calculated objectives of exerting the pressure on the Serbs and the Security Council to influence the FRY to recognise the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina within their AVNOJ /Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia/ borders. Behind the pressure exerted on Serbia and the FRY is the intention of getting the FRY renounce their obligations from the Vance-Owen plan and to isolate the people of the RSK and leave them with no help. As Croatia and Germany assessed, that should bring about the defeat of the Krajina Serbs.

The political situation is also controlled by the inter-party rivalry in Croatia, in the struggle for the power. All parties have a unified stand on the question of the RSK. The armed option as the solution to the problem is a part of each commander's program and in the opposition /as printed/. What the Serbs can expect of any Croatian politics, are the attempts to implement the plan of Ante Starčević (1/3 Serbs to be expelled; 1/3 Serbs to be forced to take on the Catholicism; 1/3 Serbs to be killed). Regardless of which party comes into power, they won't give up the plan of Ante Starčević. In the Croatian Assembly, a full consensus was reached on the politics towards the question of the RSK, which shouldn't be much of a surprise. Those against Tudjman's politics (Istrian forum and others) are not inspired by the justice to /do the right thing with respect to/ the RSK, but rather by achieving their particular political interests.

In Croatia itself there is an ever- increasing apprehension caused by the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR. Even Tudjman himself can not hide that apprehension. The possibility of Tudjman pompously withdrawing his request for the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR, should the International Community requested it, is not to be excluded. Of course, that could happen should certain concessions, which would go against the interests of the RSK and the FRY, be made. Croatia will not and must not engage in the war against all Serbs, and that option is realistic, should the UNPROFOR leave. Should there be an aggression of Croatia on the RSK, we must be ready to lead the war without the direct assistance of the VJ or the VRS for a short or a long period of time. That is why we have to be fully prepared. That is also important because it lightens the position of Croatia /works in their favour/ against the RSK.

Should the situation call for it, the whole of the Serb nation would defend Krajina. We are brothers and the help we give each other when it comes to fighting for our survival, will be at the level requested by the times we live in.

The RSK is guaranteed assistance in food, ammunition and manpower. The provision of assistance will be so as not to openly engage the FRY in the war.

Independently of the assistance and the engagement of the FRY and the RS, we have to be fully prepared to counter the Croatian aggression. We must independently lead the war for a period of time. Our readiness must be at the level where we could dissuade Croatia from the aggression or, should the aggression take place, be able to, in the most damaging case scenario for us, repel it even without assistance.

Our motif for repelling the aggression is based on the fact that we are defending our homes, families, protecting ourselves from the genocide, that we are on our own soil,

that the Croats can not and do not want to live with the Serbs as the people who are their equal. Apart from the above mentioned, the Serb people form the RSK have nowhere else to go to since they have no spare fatherland. All which constitutes the basis of our defence, should be the basis of the activity of and the relationship towards the SVK. Now is the time for initiating all the forces we have at our disposal and directing them towards the strengthening of the defence.

The Corps' Commands should be the carriers of the initiative for the joint engagement of the government, the citizens, the army, in the tasks of the defence in the zones of responsibility. It is necessary to call the Presidents of the Municipalities and other organs of government, organs of the Ministry of Interior and arrange the joint actions in the preparation for the defence from the Ustasha aggression. Organise the fortification and arrange the terrain for the defence, push for the labour actions of the young and the citizens. Prepare each settlement for the persistent defence. Provide for the protection of the properties of importance. Request from the Municipalities to supply the fuel, material for the construction of bunkers and other fire-system features. The engineering, that is, the civil engineering mechanisation must be fully applied in the tasks of the fortification of the terrain.

The positions, which the SVK deserted as per the Zagreb agreement, are to be arranged and prepared for the taking up and the decisive defence. Apply all the acquired experience for that.

Apply all the intelligence on the combat activities of the 5th Corps and the Croatian Army, particularly on the deployment of the Croatian Army units in the Livanj-Grahovo axis. Ahead of us are persistent and long-lasting combat activities. We must face the start of the aggression with an organised defence and the fire system, which provides a sure basis for the breaking down of the attacks and the survival and the protection from the killer artillery fire. The setting up of the obstructions and the fortification must be full and in line with the idea /?plan/ of the defence and the fire system. The regions of the defence of the lower units must enable each troop and /each/ section to resist from at least three defence lines.

At each of the lines, each troop must have a /?shoulder/ high shelter, reserve positions for all the ordnance, fortified observation positions, etc. Construct the connection trenches between the lines of the defence, where the terrain does not provide for the inconspicuous movement of troops and the means of the fire.

It is not realistic to expect a successful defence if it is to be launched only from one line, however well it might be arranged. Corps, ready for combat, must have a reserve

however small it might be. The reserve enables the swift reactions to the sudden changes in the situation.

The system of command must not make and repeat the mistakes from 1993. Maslenica, Medački pocket, Divoselo must not be repeated. The loss of the mentioned features was a result of the one-line defence and even without any activities /as printed/. Do not accept the engagement in the combat activities only where the Ustasha's are attacking. Besides engaging in the defence of our territory, which is under an attack, we must launch attacks where the enemy's weakest link is, where they do not expect our counter-offensive. Get ready to attack. Use the reserve to launch attacks and use the forces, which arrive subsequently (the volunteers and others), for the decisive strikes. Do not launch attacks where the Ustasha manpower outnumbers ours. Attack them at their weakest points.

Our combat activities must not be reduced to only regaining the territory lost to the Croatian Army. That would be a Utopia /as printed/ and wouldn't positively contribute to the end result of the war. Stop the Croatian Army where they are attacking by launching the defence, and launch the attacks where the Ustashas are the weakest.

There will be activities in the whole of the area of Croatia. We have the initiative in the attacks. We chose the place, the time, the manner of the attack. No one can stop us to fire at Zagreb, Osijek, Vinkovci, Zadar, Karlovac, Split….Have the plan of activities and prepare for the full and certain implementation. Croatia can be split and with that, we could finish with it for good. Splitting and cutting through the parts of Croatia in a number of places would defeat the Ustashas and they would never recover from it.

Search for the way of linking with the part of the RSK in East Slavonia, West Srem and Baranja. That would be the greatest score. Should we win, Croatia would be finished. No one would be able to stand by them anymore. At least, not officially. That would be our shortest way of gaining an international recognition and the uniting with the unified Serbian state.

We must win the battle with Croatia. We must not lose this battle. We have no rights to lose it either. A battle, whereby the last atom of energy is applied, is called for. Mobilise all that are healthy and fit, eliminate all which is negative, prevent defeatism. We must raise the combat morale to an enviable level. The Army is commanded by the Supreme Commander. Attempts of the profiteers to remove commanders from functions have been prevented. The system of command as a whole

must turn to the problems of the preparations for the defence of the units and the commands of the SVK. It is expected, from the Army and its Command, to always raise to the task at hand. The crucial battles must not be lost. And our Army will be faced with a crucial battle. I was personally not very pleased to see how little was being done on the /preparations for the /defence and to see the relaxed attitude and the lack of readiness to do everything that can be and must be done for the defence. I was also thinking about the possibility of introducing a military administration. However, the results can also be achieved by relying on the representatives and the parliament. We are fighting to put an end to the practice of "everyone pulling in their own direction". There exist intentions and moves that don't mean well to the SVK. The Army must not and will not be anyone's doormat. I will do everything I am allowed to by the Constitution and the Laws, to save this people. I am counting on the readiness and the high combat readiness of the Army. The Army must act so that it protects the interests of the people. It is clear that we can not lead and win the war without the economy, and we all must look after it and help provide the personnel for the economy, without which there would be no industry. The state must open the doors of the economy to the women and all those who are fit for work but not for combat. It is illogical that we meet young and healthy men in and nearby the kitchens, in the factories, while old people and many with damaged health, are /deployed/ at positions.

Pensioners, disabled, women and others who can not carry a gun, must take over all those duties performed by the young who can carry a gun and join the war.

We are on the way to have the legal system start solving the problems within its jurisdiction. The Military Judicature has been formed, but is not working. The Civilian Judicature practically does not perform its function. All that was "gathered" in an illegal manner by those who are not performing their duties, will be confiscated. And used for the needs of the SVK. Trucks, vehicles, cigarettes, goods… will be taken away from them. The goods are to be handed over to the SVK, and the surplus will be handed over to the financial police. Such work has the aim of saving the state of the RSK. The crime and the smuggling and those who are protecting it are damaging the combat morale of the troops and the commanding officers at the first lines. An honest man does not except any protection provided by the smugglers and the criminals. If the smuggled goods are returned to the smugglers in the courts of law, than the honesty and the intentions of the courts must be doubted.

This is a crucial moment for the whole of the Serb people. The battle, which we are leading, we must not lose. Great responsibility lies on the command. I expect from you a maximum in the carrying out of the tasks, which lie ahead for the SVK. As the President of the State, I stand by you and strive for the provision of the minimum that is necessary for the Army. It can be expected that the material sources and the conditions important for the life and the work of the SVK will improve, the wages raised and stabilised. The Army must not be the beggars in the RSK. I say this bravely and decisively and I emphasise it. We have to show to the people that we are highly disciplined and organised. What the Army is doing must be transparent and obviously point to the fact that it is fighting for this people. The most urgent task is that of the fortification of the positions. The importance of the Presidents of the Municipalities and the governments and their role in the defence of the zones of responsibilities of the units has to be acknowledged. Let every citizen, from the pupil to the President of the Municipality, give his contribution to the defence in their place of residence. It is assumed, and certain facts point to it too, that the aggression might take place around the 31st March 1995. We must be on standby, at full combat readiness, for the aggression we discover is about to be launched in five days or less. We must not be taken aback. Each day and hour until the aggression takes place must be used for the preparation, particularly for the preparation of the plan of the strengthening of the combat morale and the arrangement of the positions. Reinforce the propaganda, through which the Army, and its connection with the people, should be more advocated. Beside the "The Freedom Front" /'Front Slobode"/ program, promote the round-table talks in which our troops and officers should take part. Send cameramen into the trenches more often. Use the psychological preparations to affect the strengthening of the will and the morale of the troops and the people. It is my wish that I find a much better state of affairs on my inspection of our Corps' than the one I found there recently.

ANNEX 176:

MARKO VRCELJ, "THE WAR FOR SERBIAN KRAJINA: 1991-1995", BELGRADE, 2002

Marko VRCELJ

THE WAR FOR SERBIAN KRAJINA

1991 - 1995

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

The evening before the general attack of the Ustashas and the Muslims on Krajina, General LONČAR stated that there is a 90% chance that the Ustashas would attack Krajina in the morning. The exact date and hour of the attack has been known from before, but no one would communicate it to us.

What were the preparations in which we have engaged to face up to the aggression?

The President of the country has always talked about the defense being the priority task, but he would make these preparations for defense harder in his daily work and everywhere else he could. Although he has been the Supreme Commander of the Army, he has had more trust in police. All the groups that had been established in 1991, while he was the Minister of Interior, have still been in existence after four years; throughout the war they have been a true nightmare for every little town in Krajina. Their terrorizing of their own people and "powerlessness" of the organs of authority to take the power away from them, have created in an ordinary citizen a resistance both towards the leaders and the members of these groups. Whereas all the capable people have had to do their share in the Army, the members of these groups would be smuggling goods and were dealing in other, most frequently illegal, affairs. President knew all this, but he didn't take any action. Some of the leaders of these groups and groups alone would steal vehicles from UNPROFOR and then they would show up for talks at the "cabinet" of the President in those same vehicles with hurried paint job and removed registration plates. Throughout his mandate, he visited only a small number of units to listen and to witness himself the problems the troops were having at the spot. I don't know whether he knew, but he ought to have known that not a gram of meat has been prepared for his troops in the casern in Knin in three months; these were the troops to whom he was a Supreme Commander, but there simply was no meat no be found anywhere. Throughout that time, however, everybody around him competed who will better serve themselves with the state money in the taverns. He pulled in General ČELEKETIĆ, the Commander of the smallest Corps, to reward him for unfinished job with the mobilization to the Corps when the hitherto President has proclaimed the state of war. He knew that ČELEKETIĆ wasn't from Krajina and that he had no ties to Krajina; he has only been tied to the Banja Luka area, because his family lived in Banja Luka. Along with the

report on the army from the GŠ /Main Staff/ he ought to have gotten the information from the other sources. He is the most responsible person for the fall of Krajina. Why didn't he, after the fall of Western Slavonija, submit resignation when he has already lost a part of the country? What were the actual acts portraying his responsible behavior? Why didn't he file criminal complaints against those responsible for the fall of Western Slavonija through the Public Prosecutor?

The Prime Minister is responsible before the God and the people for the fall of Krajina. He has been appointed the Prime Minister elect by the President. He has had to bring home all decisions ordered to him by the President and the Assembly. How many days has he spent in Knin and how many days in Belgrade? Has his post location been assigned to Knin or to Belgrade? He has been responsible for the implementation of the policies in all spheres of life in Krajina. He was picking his Ministers alone, was issuing tasks to them and was controlling their execution. I don't know whether him or the President have administered the State Security though; most probably it was the Prime Minister. The manner of work of his ministers is best illustrated by the fact that Krajina has been abandoned by several thousands military-able men which, in return, directly jeopardized the further survival of the country as in whole. The negotiations have been made by him and his Government. The results of his negotiations can be best felt here in exile. How many Ministers has there been in Knin during the general attack to Krajina? The majority of them, long before the attack, have sought shelter for their families in Serbia or in /Republika/ Srpska. What exactly have his Ministers been engaged with except for trashing the state supplies in the taverns? What results have they achieved during their mandate? Who among the Ministers has been held accountable for failing to fulfill their obligations and to whom? Where are all his Ministers now, what do they do presently and how do they live? Do they see their people suffering and do they suffer the same? Has it been an honest desire of the Prime Minister for Krajina to survive or not?

The President of the Assembly has been selected to lead the Assembly, to schedule its sessions and to represent it. How many times have you discussed defense in the Assembly, Mr. President? What conclusions have you reached? Who did you task to implement your decisions? How many of your deputies have there been in the Assembly who have never previously been assigned to any military unit? In which unit, Mr. President, have you had your wartime assignment and when was the last time you have been to that unit? Why didn't you adopt the Law on Military Courts?

Why didn't you consider the situation in Dinara? Why did you, Mr. President, promise to the soldiers of Benkovac, to the families of the killed soldiers and to the military veterans that the relationship towards the troops will be one of the points of discussion of the Assembly without you ever making it one? Why did you, Mr. President, dismiss from duty all the managing directors in Benkovac bringing your yes-men? Why did you chase away the Corps Commander Boro POZNANOVIĆ when he refused to protect your brother from being sent to Grahovo? Why did you install your brother-in-law Živko ŠAPONJA as a Corps' Chief of Staff only to send him away to Banija? Do you know, Mr. President, how much evil you have inflicted on certain some from your vicinity and from the whole of Krajina? Do you sleep at all, Mr. President? Do you find yourself chased by the shadows of the killed and the miserable whose misery you have caused?

The Minister of Justice has simultaneously been the Head of University in Knin. He was struggling for all those studying to be liberated from duties in the units, even if they didn't pass a single exam during the academic year. He spent the money that has belonged to the Army to buy about 15 computers for the University, whereas the Army had to work like it was a 100 years ago. He would often leave the Army without any means to survive, without the food, without the fuel, without spare parts, without medicine… He has given over almost 90% of the apartments in Knin that were built by the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ to the MUP /Ministry of Interior/ together with the President and the Minister of Interior. Commander of the Knin Corps godfathered the project. Instead to be given back to the Army, military apartments that have been occupied by others, have been left to the occupiers only so he can remain the Minister and so he doesn't have to quarrel with anyone. He was concerned with his own comfort as well as that of the people who surrounded him. He didn't even ask about the comfort of the troops because he hasn't been really interested. Where is all that fuel that headed up from Serbia to Krajina and never arrived? How could you, Mr. Minister of Defense, leave the Army without the fuel? Several times, in my capacity of the Logistics officer, I had had to borrow flour to bake bread for the soldiers at the frontlines. The Minister knew that, he just didn't care. How many brigade headquarters have you visited, Mr. Minister? What have you been told in those headquarters? Where are the uniforms that you have promised? Where are all those things you have promised when you became a Minister? Where was your location when Western Slavonija was falling? Why

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their spirit. Nevertheless, cruel reality was such that it did not allow for a moment of rest. The tasks before the troops were large and the leeway to carry out those tasks has been modest. One couldn't have gone to three simultaneous frontlines; it has not possible to sign truce with anyone.

The attack of Ustashas from Grahovo has directly menaced Knin and the entire Dalmatia; the Muslims' attack has menaced Banija, Kordun and Lika. The Ustashas were getting ready for the final conflict. The embargo to import weapons did not count for them. They have supplied sufficient amounts of weapons, ammunition and foreign instructors, primarily Americans, and, with the assistance of satellites and peacekeeping troops, they have provided for their initial steps towards the success. Those were the reasons why the negotiations that the Croats led have served only to camouflage their preparation for the final conflict.

The Ustashas carried out the mobilization of all military resources, have deployed large resources and were hoping for success with assistance from the international community.

I have spent the last month in immediate vicinity of the Commander. He has given clear orders to the artillery; I have carried out those orders through the commanders.

On the last day, just before the general attack to Krajina, helicopter transported the artillery observation station to the top of Dinara and started administering fire on Ustashas in Livanjsko Polje. That afternoon, MRKŠIĆ and MARTIĆ climbed up to Dinara to survey the situation. There has been a column of Ustashas' vehicles moving on the road from Livno to Grahovo at that moment. They opened fire and hit the bus. They were happy to have scored. If there were only more similar scores in the preceding period, if only visible targets or those under surveillance of the infiltrated groups were scored, the results in the battlefront would surely have been different.

GENERAL ATTACK TO KRAJINA

On the 4 August, at exactly 0500 hrs, I was woken up by the explosions made by the shells that started landing on Knin. I got up, dressed quickly and opened the front door of my studio cramped by mothers with children. I led them to my studio. This hasn't been the first time the shells were landing in my immediate vicinity. I

weren't there any criminal proceedings instituted against you? The President of the country didn't allow it, that's why. Where was the Civilian Protection, Mr. Minister? Why didn't you do anything to establish it so it can function during the war? Why was nothing functioning in your defense? Why, Mr. Minister, didn't you step down from your duties once you understood all your tasks and realized you weren't up to them? How can you look the others in the eye? Is your conscience clear? Do you find yourself haunted by those dead whose death you too have caused?

The Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of the Serb Krajina, General MRKŠIĆ has been given a "hot potato." After years-long practice of demeaning the Army, they brought MRKŠIĆ as a savior. Highly professional, as he has always been, after having studied the situation, he has tried everything to stop the Ustashas' aggression. However, he arrived too late. After all the belittling of the troops and degradation of the military summons going on, he has arrived as God given to take the responsibility on himself.

During his first address to the GŠ commanding officers he has given very serious tasks; unfortunately, there has been no time to carry out those tasks. Ustashas realized they shouldn't give too much time to MRKŠIĆ to recreate the army, because they knew just how much ČELEKETIĆ has put it back. They have already had skirmish with MRKŠIĆ in Vukovar and they still remembered how that ended. They didn't want to get Vukovared again. That is why they sped up their preparations.

MRKŠIĆ couldn't have changed everything overnight. The reforms, that he has envisaged, could have been implemented only a year after. He has suggested the establishment of deep defense of Krajina, and abandonment of the current one line defense. He knew should that thin, spider-like line of defense break, the whole direction where it has been assigned would fall as well, because there weren't any reserve forces to halt Ustashas. Formation of the units in the depth which would consist of young soldiers, would provide for the mobility of the forces and would allow for the successful defense.

They promised to return the runaways from Krajina thus strengthening the defense. The defense has had to survive for at least 15 days in order to organize assistance from Yugoslavia; one would guess that the World would also take certain steps.

He started with the establishment of the Special Units Corps and with the St. Vidus Parade. This beginning has given optimism to the soldiers not to give up in

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went through the same thing on daily basis for a long time in Glina. Unlike the people from Benkovac, the people from Knin, unfortunately, haven't been experiencing "shelling" before. This is why this has been felt like such a catastrophe for them.

Barely a month prior to that, I asked to try out a artillery simulator and imitate the shelling of Knin to prepare the people of Knin for what was awaiting. Unfortunately, I couldn't find that machine anywhere, although there have been several in Knin and Benkovac before the war. Besides, I thought that the people of Knin would get scared off a little and that then they would respond better to mobilization. It is possible that they could have saved Dinara in Dinara and not in Knin. The general rehearsal failed though.

Now we were supposed to face up the reality. The reality was as cruel as it could be. Knin was shelled with all pieces and from all directions and from all weapons that could have reached it. These were primarily 130 mm artillery pieces and larger, and multiple rocket launchers used to shoot at our radars. NATO *Avaxes* were flying above Krajina disturbing the work of our radars and communications. The Ustashas radio stations were calling for surrender at the same radio frequencies used to broadcast the Krajina radio stations.

All these events would have surely been simulated several times before in Ustashas' cabinets, but were now, unfortunately for us, materializing in reality under the watchful eye of the conductors and learned instructors.

The artillery cannonade has started throughout Krajina. Everything has been planned out to a single smallest detail: each projectile and each artillery fire. Several days prior to this event, observers and projectile leaders have been infiltrated.

The most important targets in Knin were building of the General Staff, residence of the President, casern "Severna Kasarna," casern "Senjak" and the main crossroad in Knin.

I was listening to the intensity of the fire. I went out in front of my apartment building to see where the shells were landing. Half an hour later I bid farewell to my "tenants" and headed up towards the building of the GŠ. Lieutenant-Colonel BABIĆ, who was working in the Ministry of Defense, has stayed in my studio from where he would, at least for a certain period time, lead the Civilian Protection. Lieutenant-Colonel Dragić STOJANOVIĆ, the Commander of the Logistics base and the

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"Severna Kasarna" casern, has also stayed behind. Those 2,000 meters were a long way, you know. They were neither a lot nor nothing.

I jumped over the fence in the casern and entered the building where I worked up until four months ago. My holster has been broken and I had given it to be sewn up, so I came to reclaim it. The shells were landing in the casern, however one needed to be particularly lucky for them "to fall on your head." I asked the people who were present there if there were any volunteers to take me to the GŠ. Nobody wanted. They didn't have courage or they didn't want to gamble with their life. A guy from the military police said that he would give me a ride. We sat in "Golf" and went to uncertainty. The shells were still falling, but somewhat rarer. We arrived to the crossroads at Dešlići. The shelling has been much heavier around the GŠ. I stopped the driver and told him to go back to the casern because I wanted to continue on foot. Why would both of us get killed? If one should get killed, let it be me. I reached the GŠ moving from one tree to another for shelter.

I entered the building and, boy, was there a lot for me to see there! Two shells landed in the parking area between the buildings, exploded and destroyed the entire car park of the GŠ. It must have been that one good artillery operator has stuck them precisely at that location. I entered Operations center where there were GŠ Commander and his deputy with several other commanding officers.

I asked about the situation and took over the Operations center.

The reports from Banija were saying that the Ustashas headed up in all directions, but unsuccessfully. The reports from Kordun said that the biggest pressure is through Primišlje towards Slunj. The hardest situation was in Lika. They headed up through Saborsko towards Plitvička Jezera, through Vrhovine towards Korenica and through Velebit towards Gračac. Lika natives were enduring, they were not giving up. There was a danger that they might breakthrough Velebit towards tunnel Prevoj through Velebit cut off Dalmatia. In Dalmatia, the biggest pressure was in Kistanje, in Vrlike from Sinj and in Dinara towards Knin.

I asked around about the other commanding officers from the GŠ, since they were not present. There were just a few of us. Some didn't report throughout the day although their sleeping quarters have been situated in the Retirement Home which was located some 400 meters away. They succumbed to fear. Inability of the commanding officers to react in hard situations had had to be revealed before, not there and then when those who were supposed to help others required helping

themselves. Good part of them wasn't prepared for the war neither physically or psychologically. Why didn't they model themselves on UNPROFOR officers who would run ten and more kilometers on daily basis just to keep their physical condition? I had to keep up my physical condition when I got transferred to the GŠ. I was walking every day for at least eight to ten kilometers, and during the week I would run at least five times from Severna Kasarna to Krčići and back, which makes up for ten kilometers in total. The kids thought I was a UNPROFOR soldier and they cursed at me along the way until I "explained" to them in Serbian who I was.

Good part of the commanding officers and the civilians did not show up at all at the GŠ. They were concerned how to save themselves and their nearest and dearest; the obligations that they have taken on themselves have been left for others. They had it all nice while it was peaceful and now, when the time has come to repay through work that which they enjoyed, they had fled head over heels. They too are telling stories here in Yugoslavia how they were brave and how they have taken part in the war. My opinion that no one who hasn't spend the time in the brigade during the war shouldn't be in the GŠ, was not taken into consideration. It has been proven now that my thinking has been appropriate, but it is too late.

All forces have been deployed. The elements of Special Units Corps were located in Dinara and in Slunj. "Orkan" has been in Kordun. I dictated the following tasks to the Commander in direct connection with him: first shoot at the targets towards Sunj, then at those in direction of Nebojan, and everything in Banija where the situation was the hardest.

The Muslims were attacking from Bihać pocket through Ličko Petrovo Selo towards Korenica, and those from Cazin Krajina were attacking towards Žirovac in order to cut off the main roads in Krajina.

Except for Velebit, where they took the pass Mali Alan from where they headed up towards Gračac, there were no larger breakthroughs of the Ustashas until the evening. They had minor success in direction of Vrhovina towards Plitvička Jezera, through Primišlje towards Slunj, from Jasenovac towards Kostajnica, and in Dinara at the Crvena Zemlja.

In the afternoon, the President issued an order to pull-out the citizens from the endangered areas who have been suffering under incessant artillery towards the areas located in the depth of the territory. The Civilian Protection was supposed to complete that task, but due to their lack of organization, some soldiers have left their

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units and have gone home to save their families. The President did not count on that happening.

That afternoon, Colonel BOJANIĆ from the RV PVO /Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense/, has committed suicide in his office because he couldn't stand all this. The majority of the commanding officers' staff in the GŠ was incapable of doing their job though. Some of them have been worried because of their families and some, fearing for their own lives, were unable to do anything else. The majority of them who have been in the GŠ shelter in the basement just gazed at one spot, without moving and without regards to the jobs they were supposed to complete. Small number of us tried to influence the events. I was used to working with shells landing all around me. It is not that I don't fear for my own life, but I have learned the following truth in the war: death doesn't come to you if it's not time. During the day, I went through the entire Knin twice, once to see what the situation was like in Severna Kasarna, and the other time to take some of my personal belongings from my studio. The relocation of the GŠ to the forward command post in Srb has been ordered. I also had to leave, so I went to my studio to take everything I needed. I didn't know we won't return to Knin. I left there my five notebooks full of wartime notes. If I had known, I would surely not leave Knin. Who could have gotten a possession of those notes? This story of mine would surely be corroborated better with the details about the events and their participants. As it is, I had to summon memories, and I surely must have forgotten something. Besides the notebooks, I left behind some books that I nowhere went without. I am sure some Ustasha will be very glad to get a copy of "Gorski Vijenac."

In the evening, MRKŠIĆ summoned brigade commanders from Dalmatia. They arrived and have been ordered to shorten the frontline by pressing on to Debelo Brdo and the slopes towards Knin, so that the Vrlika brigade could pull out towards Polača and that Drniš brigade could pull out towards Promin. PARAVINJA, Obrovac brigade commander, has asked for assistance to secure the tunnel Prezid. UZELAC promised him one company from Benkovac. I laughed at him knowing that no person from Benkovac would go to Prezid, but would, just like the others, head up to save their families.

In the afternoon, when the "Orkan" commander briefed me to have completed the tasks he has received, I ordered him to get ready to fire at the military targets in

EXILE

I went back to look for my mother around noon, but they have already left in direction of Banja Luka. I spent the whole day in Srb. I haven't had any special duties. The GŠ was practically out of function. The communications with the Corps headquarters were no longer in function, except for the ones that the Commander had with them. Everyone was on the go. The entire people of Krajina have risen up and headed up to the unknown, probably towards Serbia. The Ustashas entered Kostajnica and have cut-off the road for the pull-out. To pull-out from Banija, one would have to use the road towards Šamarica and Glina—Dvor Na Uni. The road Glina—Dvor was too small to accept all the people of Kordun and people of Banija. The Muslims were trying to cut off this road near Žirovac. The tank operators from the Special Units Corps and "Orkan" were pulling out in direction of Dvor.

Sometimes in the afternoon that day, the President of the Assembly of the RSK, Rajko LEŽAJIĆ, and the President of the Executive Committee of the Benkovac municipality arrived. I asked them how they were feeling and whether they were happy with their work now. They weren't really glad to hear me ask that.

Čedo JOKIĆ, former Public Prosecutor from Knin, arrived in the late afternoon. He has been all broken. He was looking in amazement at the situation in which we have found ourselves. He hasn't found it clear why everything was happening like this, why everything has had to come to this. He has known for many criminal reports that have been filed, many of which he has had evidence for, but he didn't dare raise the indictments. He has always been prevented by the "political factors." That is exactly why we are all here where you find us, Čedo! If we have only had courage to eradicate evil and appoint the right people to right places, the majority of refugees wouldn't be refugees or they would return. But, as it were, to return to anarchy, where one can kill you or maltreat you at anytime, anywhere, who would want that? He hasn't brought any food with him, he hasn't had any time. I had given him my last two tins that I have always had with me for those "God forbid" situations as our parents would say; I gave them to him because he deserved. He asked me about my family. I told him that I saw my mother this morning in Srb and that she was somewhere on the road. Whatever happens to the others will happen to her as well.

Zagreb and Dugo Selo and that the firing was to start at 0700 hrs the following morning.

We packed up the entire contents of files, we gave them over and started getting ready for evacuation. When it was ordered for the files to be brought out, the women who were working as typists started carrying those boxes, whereas many officers just looked around them and yawned. I went down to the basement, chased them out so they don't distract them and I made some of them do at least some work that day.

The evacuation of the GŠ has started at eight o'clock in the evening. I stayed with Commander and MARTIĆ. Several our vehicles from the Command were the last ones to reach Pađeni around two o'clock in the morning where we have stayed for about one hour. Boba JOKIĆ, who was working in the Personnel service in the GŠ and her three-year-old twins were pulling out with that column as well.

We headed up towards Srb at around three o'clock in the morning. The road was congested with military vehicles, civilian vehicles, tractors, rotary hoes and horse-drawn vehicles. Everybody took whatever they could hastily, they poured the last liter of fuel they had and they started moving. The Commander was going a little bit ahead of us. Looking at the column of people leaving their homes to go to the unknown, knowing that the "Orkan" Commander has gotten a task to fire at Zagreb, I had to reach the Commander to tell him to tell the guy not to fire at Zagreb. If he was to fire any shells at Zagreb, the Ustashas would lift up their own air-force and would mutilate these innocent people. This is the reason why I hurried up to find the Commander before six o'clock so that we can prevent catastrophe in waiting.

I arrived to Srb. I was looking for "Gimnazija" high school because that was supposed to serve as a location of the GŠ command post. I found it. Instead of the Commander and the GŠ, the premises were occupied by the refugees. I found my mother, sister-in-law, nephew Andrej and my aunt Zorka. I was surprised to see them and I asked them how their journey was. They pointed at the truck and my neighbor Momčilo who has given them a ride to there. I haven't had the time to ask them all the details. They told me that my brother Jovan stayed behind and that my nephew Aco left with another cousin.

I found the Commander and told him about my fears in relation to using "Orkan." He called the Commander of Kordun Corps where "Orkan" was located and told him that "Orkan" should not fire at Zagreb under any circumstances.

Several of us went back to Otrić before the nightfall to see what was the situation like and who was protecting the pull out of the population. General BJELANOVIĆ made a remark that I had to find the train captain who would pull out the train loaded with ammunition from Stara Straža. I told him that it would be difficult getting down to Stara Straža. Everyone has already pulled out and where was I supposed to find a train captain? We arrived to the crossroads Otrić. Not a living soul around. Here and there, we would meet a miserable soul trying to pull out from Dalmatia on a tractor or a rotary hoe. No trace of any army. No one was protecting the column of miserable souls. Ustashas knew that very well and they were letting them go further on, the farther the better. They have been waiting for this for several hundreds of years. I couldn't believe their wishes were coming true now. We went back to Srb before the nightfall. I couldn't drive. I resumed on foot. What is ten kilometers for me?! Maybe I would get to meet my brother or my nephew. I would ask for them my acquaintances or my neighbors, should I meet any on the way. I met many acquaintances. They just shrugged their shoulders. They couldn't believe this was happening to us, to them. How come and on whose orders were they leaving everything that they have had to go to the unknown? I met my nephew Aco. He was driving a tractor of one of our cousins. They couldn't start the rotary hoe that they had in their yard and didn't have any fuel. "Fićo" was without fuel in the garage. Everybody was on the road, some were further up, some were closer. They would meet each other along the way, I would hope. Before the midnight I arrived to the house where there remained several commanding officers from the GŠ. Dragan PUPOVAC and Žarko SAKIĆ arrived around midnight. They were looking for BJELANOVIĆ. They requested the fuel cistern to fill up several tanks and other vehicles that have gotten empty to go towards Otrić for a transfer to Republika Srpska. However, there was no fuel and the cistern couldn't breakthrough from Martin Brod towards Srb. Everything was congested. The people formed two to three rows in a column and one couldn't return in the opposite direction. The speed of the column was determined by horse-drawn vehicles and sometimes by rotary hoe; we moved at several hundreds of meters up to a several kilometers an hour. One would arrive to a destination faster walking than with any vehicle.

We were woken up early in the morning. We were getting ready to move. Where to now? How to face up your own people in all this fear and shame? Did it really all have to happen like this? If it did have, why wasn't it announced earlier?

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Why did so many victims fall? So many wounded, dismembered, maimed for the rest of their lives.

Instead to move on, we were stuck waiting. What else was there to wait for? We were tied to a beaten up dingy old bus like in a "Ko To Tamo Peva" movie. I saw my brother sometimes before noon. He was wearing some track suit and was barefoot. He was driving "Fićo" of a cousin of ours. He hasn't had any of his personal belongings with him in "Fićo." He said that he had planned on staying, but when he saw that everyone was leaving, he left too. Pešo JOKIĆ asked him to drive his "Fićo" and here he was. I asked him if he has had anything to eat. He said that he wasn't hungry, that he only wished he had cigarettes. I asked my colleagues for cigarettes and have succeeded to collect close to two full packs for him. That would last him until he gets to Republika Srpska and once there, he would manage somehow. I pulled out my wallet, divided all the money into two and gave him the other half to have for the trip. One never knows when one might need the money; it's never a bad idea to have some stashed.

We finally started moving. The bus was hardly crawling on its wheels, it would then speed up for a several hundreds of meters, and then it would halt. No way that it could continue. I got off and resumed on foot. I met my acquaintances from Benkovac and Knin. Everyone was afraid, lost. They were gazing into the empty space. They couldn't look back. I guess they were afraid to. They were afraid to look back knowing what they have left behind, afraid they would turn around and go back. Instead, they were gazing in front of them and were going into the unknown. What was waiting for them there? Many of them never stepped foot outside their village or the nearest little town, and look at them now, making this large trip to the unknown. Where will all this end and where will they finally find their peace? Luckily, the weather was nice. It wasn't raining, but there was scorching heat during the day. Small children, coronary patients and pregnant women suffered the hardest. How many of them would leave their bones in this unsorted column? The children were given birth along the way. What would stand in the column for the "place of birth" in their birth certificates? Maybe "somewhere on the road between Martin Brod and Srb" or "in the tractor wagon between Petrovac and Ključ."

How would the cousins bury their dead? Where would they find the coffin now? They would have to bury them because the heat was unbearable, the bodies were decomposing quickly. They would have to do it at the first cemetery they

reached, without the priest, without the funeral service. How would they mark the grave of the deceased? Who would make the cross for them? They would manage. They will remember to tie two sticks together making the cross marking the location of burial. How would they visit the deceased for seven days-, month-, half a year- and one year-commemoration? They won't visit him for a seven day, one month, half a year or one year commemoration, and maybe they won't visit them ever again. The only thing that stays behind /the deceased/ is the picture of the deceased one carved in their minds and this sad, endless crawling column.

The column of the homeless, martyrs and refugees was crawling slowly but surely. Moving further away from their homes but also from danger coming from Ustasha again in desire to annihilate them, to destroy them and to camouflage every trace of their existence. You succeeded to chase us away, but you didn't succeed in destroying us, went through the head of each martyr from the column.

Somewhere half way between Srb and Martin Brod, in one of the buses transporting the homeless, I met my brother again. I asked him what has happened to "Fićo" and he has told me that Pešo simply chased him out the car and left, leaving him to mercy of self-management. I asked him where his shoes were. He said that he lost one along the way and that he threw the other one away. His foot, which was hurt, looked bad. He couldn't walk anymore and he had to stand on it for long periods of time. How will he manage to Belgrade? He is hungry and tired. It is the third day that he hasn't had anything to eat. I haven't had any more tins on me, so I went to the nearby garden. I found carrots. I started digging them out and washing them. I took several carrots to my brother to eat. He was looking at me strangely, but he was still eating them. I knew he never liked them. But hunger makes you eat many things you never ate before. Some people were carrying shoes from a house. I asked the guys who were carrying several pair of sneakers to give me pair for my brother. Surprisingly enough, they gave me one. I brought them to my brother. They were two, three sizes bigger than his normal size, but he can manage until Belgrade. It is better that he wears them than to go barefoot.

The news flew through the column that the Muslims were breaking through towards Donji Lapac and that there is a possibility that they will cut off the road leading to Srpska through Martin Brod. Myself and several GŠ officers went to pull out the tanks from the column. We sent them to break through to the crossroads from which they can control the road from Donji Lapac thus preventing the cutting off of

the column. We succeeded breaking through to the crossroads where we installe tanks in couple of hours. The road from the crossroads is hairpin-bent towards M Brod. There is where I found the battery of "Ognjevi." I went for coup kilometers with them. They went on their way and I waited for the GŠ bus. I too shortcut to Martin Brod. Crossing through the forest reminded me of my old da mountaineering in Slovenija. However, I was no longer on a weekend trip, but burdened with the automatic rifle and a bag. I was sweating from every pore o body. I was alone and all kinds of thoughts were coming to my head. It would been nice to come here in the summer, wander in the hills, climb down to the v of beautiful Una, and then climb up again competing against oneself. I entered M Brod in the late afternoon. I had my lunch in the tavern, I had a drink and then to wait for a bus. I waited for the bus until two o'clock in the morning. I have only a tee-shirt and I froze, unused to such low nightly temperatures.

We headed up to Oštrelj through Drvar. There were no people from Kraji Oštrelj, so we went back to Petrovac. Since there was no one in Petrovac returned to Oštrelj again. This is where the command of the decomposing Se Krajina Corps of the decomposing Krajina Army has been located. The soldiers to save their families, left to mercy of the enemy. Evacuation and accommodati the refugees has not been sorted out, and they had to do it themselves so as to their nearest and dearest. Who remained to fight? What would one such batt for? The maps have already been drawn, they just needed to be tidied up. tidying up cost the entire Serb population of Krajina an exile, and it will cost an a large part of the Serbs from the former /sic/ Bosnia and Herzegovina. establishment of the ethnic states in the premises of the former SFRY will co people a lot, and Serbs the most. They have been made to exile and they are being made.

The Serbs have lost again at the green table that which they had milit After the collapse at the green table there came a military collapse. This was prob one of the biggest defeats of the Serbs after the First World War.

Never before had the Serb army dissolved so easily as it had dissolved i SVK. It has "dissolved" exclusively because of the fact that it didn't have support of the "political factor" and because the people who decided on its fate lulled themselves with stories, and didn't care for realities. The ones who were b chased away from Krajina fought for the facts as they tried to create the army.

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concept of territorial troops has long ago become obsolete; however our hotheaded soldiers didn't realize that. The army has had to be independent from its environment. VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ tried to carry that out twice, and he has been chased away from Krajina twice. It's late for everything now. It's too late for any lessons, but it isn't too late for those who led the army to this stage of final collapse to feel sorry for what they have done.

What was the decisive factor why all this happened? In which key moment the army and the troops went on the go? Was there any purpose in fighting? What would the casualties be? Would we be able to resist fighting the Ustashas and for how long? This should still have had to be solved differently. Is this the worse case scenario?

We stayed in Oštrelj for a couple of hours. I have gotten warm in the bus because I put on a vest. I even caught some sleep while the bus was driving. We were waiting for the news and they were not coming, only speculations. We knew that Dalmatia and Lika were moving out, but we were unsure about what was happening in Banija and Kordun. We heard that Banija was moving out, while Kordun was encircled. Is that true? What will happen with all those people? That area suffered the most in the Second World War. Will they have to suffer again? We headed up towards Prijedor in the late afternoon.

We went down towards Drvar where we saw the column moving from Martin Brod towards Petrovac. We joined the column and followed it on the road towards Petrovac. The road was wider, the column was stretched, so one was able to pass through faster. Before Petrovac: trucks, tractors and their wagons, rotary hoes and horse-drawn carriages besides the road. People were moving off the road. They were resting and preparing for further advance.

We headed up from Petrovac towards Ključ. We heard airplanes and thought that those were the NATO airplanes who were controlling the skies above Bosnia. However, those airplanes wouldn't flight so high up.

We climbed up to the high ground from where we saw a terrible scene. Air force that we have just heard has fired at the column. They fired and shot them. That was Ustashas air-force. They probably thought these guys were transporting missiles or something like that. My eye of an officer did not miss to notice that the anti-aircraft launchers "Kub" have been located in the direct vicinity of the location that

Ustashas shot. Truth to be told, they weren't positioned for firing, because the airplanes would have acted like that /as written/.

The truck that was transporting the food was on fire. Several vehicles before and after us got hit. There were probably dead and wounded. We arrived to the scene in some 15 minutes. The truck was still on fire, and the tins were exploding one after the other from the great temperature. The column moved on. I remembered Branko Ćopić's poem "At the road to Petrovac." For us, Serbs, the history was repeating and who knows how many times it was to repeat itself again.

The column split into two parts at the crossroads in the village Velagićevo. One part headed up to Prijedor and the other to Ključ and Mrkonjićgrad. They would merge into one column again somewhere near Banjaluka where they would continue towards Serbia. We went towards Prijedor and got there before the nightfall. The "dissolved" SVK would have their temporary GŠin Prijedor. We have been put in hotel. I spent the first time in bed after the bed in my studio in Knin. Who sleeps there now? I regret it, because I made it so nice there in my studio. Everything was sparkling and the shades provided me with a peaceful and comfortable sleep during these summer days. Everything has changed. I haven't slept for three nights already. I haven't taken a shower for four days and I have passed 40 kilometers walking with the column of refugees. If it only should happen that one such column gets organized somewhere in Serbia to go back where it came from! One should hope that moment will come. We have to live for that moment, although it might never arrive. That evening I heard happy news, if it could be called happy news at all: "Orkan" succeeded in pulling out from Kordun. Several months after that I met the commander of "Orkan" and he has explained to me how he was pulling out the tools and the rockets. The Ustashas did not use their air-force to survey the road through which they were pulling out so they couldn't have noticed them at all. They also avoided cutting-off the road by the Muslims. They passed through prior to Muslims cutting-off the column, so they safely arrived to Novi Grad, and it was all easy after that. The entire tools and rockets were given over to the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/. In all this unluckiness we have still been dealt some luck. The crew of "Orkan" has proven in this final act, the pulling out, that they were up to the responsibility bestowed upon them. How much force and assets must have Ustashas invest to track them down! How disappointed they must have been when they didn't find them among surrounded and captured people of Kordun! However, I am still

charged about some rockets that Ustashas captured and I didn't even know they ever existed.

I had contacted Zorica for the first time. I knew that she was lost too and that she was waiting for my call. I finished it quickly: I am alive and am somewhere on the road leading to Serbia, I don't know when I will see you again. I made a call to my sister Marija. I couldn't have contacted anyone up until now, although I did spent a lot of time thinking about contacting people. There was no possibility for me to make any contacts up until now. They told me my closest ones have arrived to Belgrade and that I had nothing to worry about.

I took a bath and then I slept like a baby. I learned how to relax and to regain willingness to live even during the hardest of hardships. During this war, this was my second hard period. The first one has passed but the scars have remained. There remained a memory of all the dead soldiers who still remind me that all this ought to be recorded.

EXODUS

How much sadness is there in every horse-drawn carriage, on every rotary hoe, tractor, truck, car, bus? Who could collect all that sadness in one place? That's why it isn't all collected in one place. It would have stretched from Martin Brod up to Banja Luka and further up to Serbia. If the sadness was to get lined up on the road it would reach from Knin to Bijeljina. That road, which is called a corridor, carries its damnation on its back. It carries all the Serbs of Krajina towards Serbia. It used to be used as a road that linked people, but now it is a road of miserable people going towards the unknown or nonexistent future. Hungry, miserable people, who hoped to have stayed in Krajina, are moving towards a living of the rest of the world, towards working as they used to, cultivating their poor land that has been snatched away from them for years.

The entire world is looking at this desperation, at this poverty, at their own ugly face and their own shame, and they are saying nothing because they are at a loss for words. There are no words that they could speak up without self-accusation. This is the very world that has guaranteed safety to these poor people crawling on the road of uncertainty. They used to guarantee to them the solution to the problems between Serbs and Croats in Croatia. That which is happening now, they will forget quickly.

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There is no world's press to record this shame of the world. There is no European press, although this is happening in Europe, the home of the modern civilization. Is this a beginning of the end of this whole civilization or only one nation? There is no Serb press. The exodus of the Serbs is not discussed. Ethnic cleansing, which has been taken as a synonym to blame the Serbs, is not discussed. Who is guilty for this exodus, for this greatest example of ethnic cleansing after the Second World War. Are the Germans repaying for the persecutions from the whole of Europe of those Germans who supported Hitler? Are the Germans playing their revenge on Serbs for the second time in this century? Where are you, Europe? Đura Jakšić was ever too right about you in his poems. You didn't deserve better. Will you dare come to our homes persecuting us from them like you used to until now?

After we got up, we went to the casern in Prijedor. We had our breakfast there and then we went to Mrakovica. We stayed in Mrakovica until lunch. We didn't do anything, we were just a burden to ourselves and to the VRS. We went back to Prijedor for lunch. All the stupidities we have done: just driving around aimlessly here and there. At around 1700 hrs I am called to go to Novi Grad. The GŠ Commander was there and I was supposed to check in with him. On the road to Novi Grad, we have arrived to the village Svodna in which Ustasha air-force fired and shot at the vehicles and the assets parked there for the take over by the VRS. They shot at one truck with ammunition and set it on fire. The infantry weapons ammunition exploded. The bullets were flying all over the place, and the road was closed. One couldn't even approach the vehicle. I am sure that it lasted like that for a couple of hours. I took a map and found a roundabout road, twice longer than a regular one. It would have taken me an hour on that road. I took the roundabout road. That was a macadam road, full of potholes. Our tire broke in the middle of the road. The driver didn't have a crane, so we lifted up a car with a long piece of wood and we put rocks under it for support. We succeeded to change the tire. We arrived to Novi Grad in the sunset. The Commander has just left. I found a reserve Captain Nikola KUKOLJ of Kordun, who pulled out a battery of artillery pieces 130 mm and installed it in such a manner that it could still be used against raging Ustashas. The Ustashas would try to force over Una to cross over to Republika Srpska if we didn't oppose them. That is most probably why the Captain called me. I found several commanding officers from the Main Staff. They were working on reception of miserable people breaking through from Banija towards Novi Grad. The Muslims have cut the road at Žirovac,

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and all the VRS units and elements of the 24 pbr /infantry brigade/ from Glina, led by Colonel Milan BEK, started with a breakthrough and pulled out more than 2,000 refugees. They were the last of Krajina people who pulled out from the encirclement. Those who didn't pull out up until now, have stayed back on the mercy of Ustashas and Muslims. I learned from BEK that a commander of artillery battalion Zoran ČUČILOVIĆ and his driver KARAICA have been seriously wounded on a second day and that they have been transferred to the hospital in Prijedor. I remembered them both. I knew them well while I was in Glina. I learned that Mile LJILJAK, who was a reserve member of police, has been killed during conflict with Ustashas. Mile has been wounded during the breakthrough, but he has taken up the arms immediately after getting rehabilitated. I met him for the last time in July, in Slunj, some fifteen days prior to the events, when they came to assist people of Kordun in the direction that leads to Slunj from Primišlje.

A woman in Novi Grad told me about the events from Žirovac. She has been at the exact location where the Muslims have cut off the column. They came out from the forest and intercepted the column that was on their way to Dvor. They started killing the unarmed people with their rifles, their guns, and they cut throats to some, like savage animals. It has been a slaughterhouse in the real. A Muslim caught her and put a knife under her throat. She looked at him and recognized him as one of her students from High school in Karlovac. He recognized her too. He paused a little. He couldn't cut her throat right away. She used that moment, snatched herself away from her arms, and escaped. He remained there for a bit, shocked. She stayed alive. She is in Novi Grad. She will continue towards Serbia. Her two brothers and their families are there. Their families are in Serbia, and they are with their people /as written/. She doesn't know anything about them. Are they still alive? Who would know in all this mess? She has to wait for her brothers. They didn't pass through here, maybe they will.

I went back to Prijedor. The GŠ was located in the premises of a shop at the exit of a town leading towards Novi Grad. We talked about our experiences. I checked in with the Commander who told me to remain close to him if I am needed to finish anything else. What else could be finished, since those who pulled through from Banija and Kordun are already in Srpska? Is the breakthrough of surrounded people still possible? What unit to engage when there are none left? Everyone abandoned the assets and were looking for their families. There remained nothing

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from the Serb Army of Krajina. A large portion of the people of Kordun and the elements of Kordun Corps, led by Čedo BULAT, remained surrounded.

On the fifth day since the beginning of Ustasha and Muslim aggression on Krajina, 9 August, LONČAR called a meeting. He was preaching about immorality of those who have escaped! I was listening to him, disbelieving. Should he be preaching to us who were there and who didn't have any intention of going back before our people?

I have had nothing to do, and I couldn't resist knowing what's happening around Novi Grad. I asked around in the GŠ whether someone will go in that direction, but they told me that they had no business there. I decided to go to Novi Grad hitchhiking. I went on the road and started hitchhiking, but no one would stop. I was waiting for more than half an hour. Military "Puch" arrived. I waved it down. A familiar face in the vehicle. I couldn't immediately remember where I knew him from. He was a tank man, a Chief of the OMJ /armored-mechanized unit/ in First Krajina Corps. He has been collecting data on tanks and was searching for crews. I introduced myself. He was watching me ironically. I remembered that he was actually Colonel MATIĆ! At the time while I was Postojna, he was in Pivka. I asked him about it, but he feigned he couldn't recall. He has spoken a great many ugly words at Krajina people's expense. He never even dreamt that that which has happened to Krajina people will happen to Banja Luka people too. We arrived to Novi. I thanked him for the lift. I headed up towards the bridge. At that very moment Ustashas commenced fire at Novi Grad. Judging by the sounds of shelling, the direction of falling and the strength of detonations, they were either coming from artillery pieces 130 mm or howitzers 155 mm. Ustashas have had both. I took shelter behind a building. The shelling stopped and I reached the bridge. I found Colonel KOVAČEVIĆ of the Technical service organ there. They have left him there a couple of days ago and have completely forgotten about him. The shelling commenced again around the bridge. I told him to take shelter as I did. I went to hotel with KOVAČEVIĆ. The hotel was well preserved. Some windows were broken because of the shelling, but it wasn't much damaged as in whole. I found General NOVAKOVIĆ, former GŠ commander, there. BEKO soon arrived. PREČANICA was taking him in "Puch," the same one in which, in my capacity of a brigade commander, I used to ride. They were taking lunch to the VRS unit. They asked us if we were hungry and if we wanted to have lunch. We accepted because

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one such offer shouldn't be refused during the war. Who knows when one will eat again? That's why one cannot ever refuse food that is offered to him. I said to a man at the reception: "What kind of a hotel is this where they don't serve wine for lunch?" "Who said we don't serve wine," he said and brought two bottles of wine at the table. I opened the bottles. We poured the wine and, after having tasty beans, we cheered for health and for having survived the war. We had wine and talked a little about the previous, unpleasant events for us. I asked BEKO if PREČANICA could give me a ride to Brezičani, from where I would manage on my own. It was starting to rain. I halted a vehicle in Brezičani rather quickly and I was given a ride back to Prijedor.

I was amazed at my comportment. As if I was searching for a bullet during these past several days, but couldn't find it anywhere. I was bothered by this situation. So much effort, knowledge and will that has been put in, and everything gone now /as written/. Krajina that I have fought for, that I have lived for, has been gone. I denied myself many things during this war to stay in Krajina, but it burst up, like a soap balloon. "This is all still good, considering the idiots who were leading us," I kept on saying to myself many times and who knows how many times I will repeat the same thing until the rest of my life.

Since everything was over for Krajina, we haven't had anything to do in Prijedor. We were getting ready to return to Belgrade. I have had to give over my rifle and my hand grenades in the casern in Prijedor. How can I just give them over, when we have been hanging out for four years? Wherever I went, they went with me. I kept them and nourished them like they were the most precious thing in the world. I had full trust in them and many of my enemies were afraid of them. How can I make myself break free for them and whom can I leave them to? Don't they have enough rifles here in Srpska that they needed mine? Why couldn't I take them along with me? I will give them over to the unit of my deployment. Nevertheless, it has been ordered that no weapons, except for the side arms, can be brought to Yugoslavia. There shall be no questions about it; I had to leave my rifle. The other won't cherish it as much as I cherished it. Instead of rifle on my shoulder, I put a receipt on return of property in my wallet, so I am not maltreated on the border crossing.

The column was still passing through Prijedor. How large is it, and where does it begin? It resembles a long snake. It moved forward slowly, as if it was 300 years old and as if it was about to die, but was still resisting, slowly moving ahead. We joined the long column full of bitterness and sadness. Rotary hoe or two along

the road. Its engine stopped. It got too heated up and can serve nothing else but at the garbage dump. Those to whom it served until now climbed up to a bus or a truck and were moving on. They don't dare look back. This is the sixth day they were on the road. They are exhausted, tired, hungry, thirsty… There is no one to help them. Red Cross checkpoint here and there along the road. They are distributing bread and milk for the babies. How did they survive these five, six days and how will they survive at least as much as that until they reach their destination?

The column got smaller. The cisterns with fuel of the Government of, now former, Krajina, were waiting along the road. They were assisting as much as they could. They also needed several days to compose themselves and to take measures to help people. Who can help this poor people anymore? They can only sooth their pain and suffering a little bit. The bustle got somewhat bigger before Banja Luka. We went forward up to Klašinac, and then, as a part of the column, step by step, we continued with the speed of horse-drawn carriage or rotary hoe. I often left the column and continued on foot. I met many of my acquaintances but now those from Glina. They still called me "our commander." Everyone was carrying their own burden. They often told me that they were wrong about me, but what's that worth now? Even to me though? One has to move on, brothers. Everyone was saying if at least they could reach Serbia. They didn't know, wretched souls, that there was bitterness and misery there too. Let them think they would be better off there. They would be better off because they won't be waiting every night for someone to come and slit their throats like Ustashas used to.

We were traveling for a whole day now, we weren't even close to the border crossing. We reached Rača later that afternoon. They were not letting us through there, so we had to go back to Pavlovića Ćuprija. The column was slowly moving towards Serbia, but the bitterness and misery were yet to come. The poorest of people were arriving. They crossed Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banija up to Pavlovića Ćuprija on Drina in the horse-drawn carriages. I was looking at those impoverished people who have never been in this area. I was looking at the horses slowly drawing one leg after the other. They were walking for eight days now. Should their owners let them eat grass for a little, they would be quick to put them back to work. They were afraid to be late and maybe not admitted to Serbia. A 70-year-old man was asking a policeman at the checkpoint to let him through, not to stop him. He was complaining that he wouldn't know what to do if his horse would stop and wouldn't

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want to continue: if he was to halt a little, maybe he couldn't go on anymore. When he cross the checkpoint and when he enters Serbia, he would let him eat for two days and only then will he resume with his trip because he won't be in a hurry anymore. "Where to, old man?" policeman asked him. "Where all the rest are going," old man said. "My old lady and myself have no one left, sonny. We didn't want to stay in Krajina. We came to our Serbia, to die in peace," old man continued. The policeman didn't halt him, he let him pass through without stopping him.

"WELCOME" TO SERBIA

Our bus was stopped on the border crossing in Pavlovića Ćuprija for several hours. The policemen were looking for some permits. What were they afraid of now? Is it that they were afraid of a handful of us, or maybe they wished to show off their power? They could have kept their power for someone who was interested. Worse than them made us go through thick and thin, and we survived, we will survive this as well.

Finally, in the evening, we were let through to Serbia. But, lo and behold, another surprise. They bus got halted only at some couple of hundreds of meters from the checkpoints, and we have been asked to take out all our things. We did as ordered. The policemen then asked us to give over our pistols. We were surprised by this and we didn't obey. They called the military police to persuade us, but to no avail. All persuasions were to no avail. "How can I give you my pistol that I bought 20 years ago and for which I have all the permits? I am no criminal. Show me the order to seize weapons and I will give you my pistol, otherwise you will have to take it by force from me," I said to a policeman. Military police arrived. They were checking the validity of the weapons' warrants through the command in charge and were searching all personal belongings. They didn't find anything suspicious and they let us continue. They didn't take our weapons. We arrived to Belgrade around midnight.

On departure, they told us to report to Topčider on 31 August.

I called Zorica, I told her I was in Belgrade and that I will come to Smederevo in about two hours.

Colonel MARIČIĆ, who was a commander of Military District Smederevo, called his driver who came to Belgrade to pick us up. MARIČIĆ was wounded on his

leg somewhere around Prijedor. He was moving in a vehicle to Prijedor, and a drunken reserve army man shot him in the leg by accident. He fired through his foot. The injury has been checked and dressed by a general practitioner, but not by a specialist. We arrived to Smederevo. We drank coffee that Zorica made. She has quickly organized for MARIČIĆ to be examined by dr. Goran KULJANIN, orthopedist. Goran went to the hospital and sorted things out immediately. He cleansed the wound. Nothing has been broken, MARIČIĆ can go on.

I stayed with Zorica. I was exhausted of all events from the last days and I had no willingness to do anything. Zorica understood ever so perfectly. She let me relax for a couple of days, and then we would talk about everything. I decided to move to Smederevo. I told my son, who was still in Slovenia, not to come back for another month. I guessed the situation with the officers would be sorted out in that time, and we would be appointed to new posts. The only thing I needed was Zorica's support.

We were walking on the banks of Dunav and Smederevo fortress, but the images of the refugees of Krajina just wouldn't leave my head. All my cousins have been made refugees from Krajina. Many of her cousins were in exile too: the entire families VESELINOVIĆ, DRAGIČEVIĆ and ŠVONJO of Obrovac and Gračac.

I went to Belgrade to sort out my problems with the apartment in which we lived, because the owner has been in exile. Dobrica, my former driver and friend, hurried me.

In the meantime, Zorica presented her MA thesis at the VMA /Military Medical Academy/. I met her entire family there except for her father. Her father was disabled, he could hardly walk and couldn't come to the presentation. I sat between Marija and Ljubinka, Zorica's daughters from her previous marriages, my daughters now.

The last day, when I left Belgrade to go to Smederevo, I told my sisters about them. I wrote a letter to my son so he knew what was happening and also for him to know that when he gets back from Slovenia, his new life would be in Smederevo.

ANNEX 177:

SVK, INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, 4 AUGUST 1995

Serbian document on the shelling of Knin, 4 August 1995
SVK General Staff
Intelligence Department
Str. conf. No. 2/31/3110-1
4 August 1995

Intelligence report

The attack of the Croatian Army on the RSK started on 4 August 1995 at 05.00 with the shelling of the towns of Knin, Drniš, Benkovac, Karin, Obrovac, Gračac, Korenica, the Udbina airstrip, Vojnić, Vrginmost and Petrinja. The artillery preparation lasted until 05.30, followed by engagement of individual weapons of 130, 152 and 152 mm calibre and multiple rocket launchers.

The ustaše infantry attack started at about 06.00 from Sunja towards Kostajnica, with the engagement of tanks, but units of the 39th Corps successfully repelled the attack. Another infantry attack was mounted from the village of Brlog (Otočac) - Drenov Klanac - village of Glavace, but it was also successfully beaten back. Knin was shelled from Livanjsko Polje and from several directions, and by the time of this report the town has been hit by 200 to 300 projectiles of different types and calibres.

The target of the first strike was the building of the General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina, which sustained considerable damage and the almost complete loss of the motor pool. Subsequently the fire was focused on the '1300 Corporals' barracks, the TVIK plant, the railway junction and housing below the Knin fortress [area of the residence of the "RSK president" Mile Martić - author's note] and other targets.

At 10.00, as this report is being written, hostile forces continue to attack Knin alternately with guns and multiple rocket launchers, shell the Udbina airstrip continuously, and occasionally open fi re on other settlements in the RSK.

By monitoring the radio links of the Croatian Army and their mobile telephones we have been able to

establish that the ustaše are sustaining considerable losses at Dubrovnik, Biograd-na-Moru, Gospić, Otočac, Sisak ad Sunja. You will be duly informed of all the latest information.

Head of Department

Lieutenant Colonel Mihajlo Knežević

Copy to:

7th, 11th, 21st, 39th Corps, Special Unit Corps

General Staff of the Yugoslav Army - Second Directorate

General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia

and Herzegovina - Intelligence Directorate

Command of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina

ANNEX 178:

MILITARY TARGETS IN THE VICINITY OF BENKOVAC, GRAČAC AND OBROVAC



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BENKOVAC
JAGODA Target List on Google Earth / No Overlay

1D00-1139

D01460

1D00-1138

12/16/2010 2:55:26 PM


MAP OF CITY BENKOVAC
SCALE: 1:10 000
ID25-0145
"B. MACURA" BARRACKS
TOTAL AREA: 237 549 m2
POLICE STATION
FCP OF THE 7th CORPS «ARSK»
NUN's CONVENT
"JNA" CENTRE
HOTEL
POST OFFICE
FIREMAN'S HALL - DEFENSE OFFICE, CENTER FOR ALERT AND ELECTRONIC ACTIVITIES
(the map dates from a period when the center had not yet been built)
COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF THE 3rd IBR "ARSK"
COMMAND OF THE 3rd IBR «ARSK»
BENKOVAC
Gračići
Rakinje
Kosovo
Bukovica
Palovine
Vinarija
Gradina
Kukalji
Ćulići

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OBROVAC (wider area)
JAGODA Target List on Google Earth / No Overlay



1D00-1141

D01460

1D00-1138


MAP OF CITY OF OBROVAC
SCALE: 1:15 000
ID25-0204
"GLINICA" FACTORY
FCP OF THE 4th LBR
POLICE STATION
BRIDGE
HOTEL – QUARTERS OF THE SPECIAL POLICE
AIR DEFENSE POSITIONS
OBROVAC
GRACAC
MAIN
MAIN
MAIN

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GRACAC (wider area)
JAGODA Target List on Google Earth / No Overlay

1D00-1143

D01460

1D00-1138

ANNEX 179:

DEATH CERTIFICATE OF DUŠAN KOROLIJA

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

STATE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE

ŠIBENIK KNIN COUNTY / w a t e r - mark: DM RH/

REGISTRY OFFICE KNIN

free of charge pursuant to

to Article 6 Item 1 of the Administrative Fees Act.

DEATH CERTIFICATE

On 27 April 2009, the entry of the fact of death was performed into the death registry for the area of Kistanje for the year 2009 under ordinal number 27:

Personal identification number (OIB): 48865168991

Date, month, year and hour of death: ***12 (twelfth) April 2009 at 18:30 a.m.***

Place of death: ***Ivoševci***

Name: ***DUŠAN***

Surname: ***KOROLIJA***

Sex: ***male***

Date, month and year of birth: ***20 (***twentieth***) January 1949***

Place of birth: ***Ivoševci***

Nationality: ***Serbian***

Citizenship: ***Croatian***

Name and surname of spouse and surname before marriage: ***Marija Korolija Vukša***

Parents' names and surnames: Father: deceased ***Đuro Korolija***
Mother: ***Ružica***

Notes and subsequent entries:

L. S. /Stamp: REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
ŠIBENIK KNIN COUNTY
STATE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE
ŠIBENIK

Numerical designation:
Registrar:

CLASS: 223-04/10-03/970 /handwritten signature/

REG.NO: 2182-07-02-10-1

Vedrana Požar

In Knin, 10 November 2010

Narodne novine d.d. Zagreb - (48) 040293

Order code: UT-IV-205
Form No. 10

ANNEX 180:

APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN IDENTITY CARD FOR NIKOLA KRESOJEVIĆ, 30 JANUARY 2008

FORM 2

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF IDENTITY CARD

1.	Citizen Identification number	0404961340709
2	Surname	KRESOJEVIĆ
3.	Given name	NIKOLA
4	Surname and given name(s) of parents	KRESOJEVIĆ DUŠAN AND ZORA nee ŽGELA
5.	Day, month and year of birth	04 April 1961
6.	Place and country of birth	D. Furjan 14, Croatia
7.	Place of residence and address	D. Furjan 59

In
Slunj,10 January 2008

/handwritten -illegible KD Slunj 2250
Illegible 13403714/98

signature-Nikola Kresojević
(signature of the applicant)

PD SLUNJ	
POLICE DEPARTMENT / POLICE STATION	
/photography of the applicant/	/*dactylogram* / ----------
Surname:	KRESOJEVIĆ
Name:	NIKOLA
Identification number:	0404961340709
Serial number of the Identification card	103141341
Mark of the Identification Card	HR
Date of birth	04 April 1961
Sex	Male
Citizenship	Croatian
Permanent Residence	DONJI FURJAN
Address	DONJI FURJAN 59
Issue date	10 January 2008
Valid until	10 January 2018
Identification by insight into	ID Card 13403714 /98

Identity Card form

ANNEX 181:

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN IDENTITY CARD FOR MARIJANA POZNANOVIĆ, 30 APRIL 2008

FORM 2

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF IDENTITY CARD

1.	Citizen Identification number	0401978375027
2	Surname	POZNANOVIĆ
3.	Given name	MARIJANA
4	Surname and given name(s) of parents	BRANKO
5.	Day, month and year of birth	04 January 1978
6.	Place and country of birth	Sisak, Croatia
7.	Place of residence and address	Četvrtkovac 72b

In
Sisak,30 April 2008

signature-Poznanović Marijana
(signature of the applicant)

1943 Form 4

SISAK-MOSLAVINA PD	
POLICE DEPARTMENT / POLICE STATION	
/photography of the applicant/	/*dactylogram* / ---------- *papillary line* crosscut
Surname:	POZNANOVIĆ
Name:	MARIJANA
Identification number:	0401978375027
Serial number of the Identification card	103278081
Mark of the Identification Card	HR
Date of birth	04 January 1978
Sex	Female
Citizenship	Croatian
Permanent Residence	ČETVRTKOVAC 72b
Address	ČETVRTKOVAC 72b
Issue date	30 April 2008

Valid until	30 April 2018
Identification by insight into	ID Card 10033259 /illegible/

Identity Card form

ANNEX 182:

RSK, MILITARY POST 9138, EXTRAORDINARY EVENT, 16 OCTOBER 1993

07/2-958
16.10.93.

v.p. (military post) 9138
Glina
o.b.
Conf. nr. 15-1-31
Date: 16.10.1993

Extraordinary event, delivered by -

Command of 39th corps -

On 16.10.1993, at undetermined time between 00.30 and 01.00 hours in Glina, in Ciril and Metodije street, in front of "Bolji život" tavern, Rajšić Mirko, born in 1943, with permanent residence in Vinogradska bb, Glina, member of *ODTO* (territorial defense) Glina, was killed.

He was killed in a traffic accident while driving his bicycle.

The scene of the accident was investigated by Glina traffic police and investigative judge Milošić.

In the vicinity of the traffic accident personal vehicle Zastava 101, number plates VN 44-06 was found, the vehicle was damaged on the right front side, the damage occurred when the vehicle skidded off the roadway into a ditch and hit the ground; the vehicle was driven by Slijepčević Ilija from Hajtica 37.

The inspection at the accident scene did not provide any evidence that Slijepčević had caused this serious accident with his car, although he does acknowledge hitting the front wheel of a bicycle with his right front wheel, which, according to his statement, had already been lying down on the road.

bn. -

Chief o. b, Ljiljak
Djuro
k i k

RECEIVED	16-10 (day&month)	15,50 (hour & minute)	illegible (signature)
(secret code)	452 Cable nr.	(illegible)	
PROCESSED	xx -10 (day&month)	15,55 (hour & minute)	illegible (signature)
SUBMITTED	(day&month)	(hour & minute)	(signature)

MILITARY POST 9138
Confident. nr: 43-6
Glina, 20.05.1994

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Further to the request from the family of deceased RAJŠIĆ MIRKO, on the basis of Article 98(3) of the Act on Basic Rights of Disabled Veterans and Fallen Soldiers' Families ("Official Gazette of SFRJ" nr 31/85, 44/89, 87/89 and 20/90), and duly implemented procedure, issues the following

CERTIFICATE:

This is to confirm that RAJŠIĆ MIRKO; son of STOJAN, born in 1948, residing in Glina, Vinogradska bb, married, father of two, was killed on 16.10.1993 as a member of the Squad I of 24th pbr. Glina.

He was killed in a traffic accident at the time he was not on duty in his unit.

In the procedure leading to the issuance of this Certificate the statement given by the commanding officer of the Squad I was used.

This Certificate has been issued for the purpose of obtaining rights to which families of the fallen are entitled and cannot be used for other purposes.

VOJNA POŠTA 9138 GLINA

KOMANDANT :
potpukovnik
Jovo Mamula

COMMANDING OFFICER
Lieutenant-colonel
Jovo Mamula
illegible, signed
(Military Post 9138 GLINA) stamp

ANNEX 183:

RSK, POLICE DEPARTMENT, LETTER CONFIRMING THE DEATH OF BRANKO BAJIĆ, 22 FEBRUARY 1995

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
SECRETARIAT OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS VOJNIĆ
POLICE DEPARTMENT

No: 08-03/1-1-12-282/2-95
Vojnić, 22 February 1995

MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS 9104

PETROVA GORA

Liaison: Your letter no.: 41/2 of 16 February 1995

In regard with your letter referring to the above mentioned number and date, we inform you that on 18 October 1994 around 18.50 hrs in the place Široka Rijeka, near the house owned by Vergaš Mile, there was an accident in which a driver in an agricultural vehicle, Bajić Branko, son of Vasa, born on 21 February 1955 in Vojnić, with the residence in Široka Rijeka No. 32, suffered severe physical injuries. He died after a short time in the hospital "St. Georgia" in Vojnić, due to injuries.

The accident was caused as follows:

The driver in an agricultural vehicle, registration mark "IMT 539", reg. no. VOJNIĆ 934, operated by Vučetić Milan, son of Dušan, born on 14 June 1956 in Široka Rijeka, living in Široka Rijeka no. 35, SO (Serbian Region) Vojnić, was driving down the motorway, without using the lights from the direction of Maljevac to Krstinje. At the time of arriving in front of the house owned by Vergaš Mile in Široka Rijeka no. 1, in a sharp right curve he crossed to the middle of the road and hit the front left part of the wheel into the agricultural vehicle, mark "IMT 539" with no registration plate, operated by Bajić Branko, who was coming from the opposite direction, also without using the lights. Due to the crash both agricultural vehicles rotated around its axis and Bajić Branko dropped out of the vehicle and hit his head against the asphalt, since his vehicle had no cabin. He had injuries in the front part of his head.

Regarding this car accident the workers of the (SUP) Secretariat of Interior Vojnić filed a criminal complaint to OJT Glina against Vučetić Milan.

M A Y O R
Nikola Vuletić
/handwritten signature illegible/

/written by hand: "282")
MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS
9104
No. 41/2
16 February 1995
PETROVA GORA

03/1-1-12

21 February 1995
/stamp illegible containing the following:/
08-03/1-12-282/1-95

Secretariat of Interior VOJNIĆ

Records from on-site inspection,
r e q u e s t e d –

This Military Postal Address was approached by Bajić Dragica, the widow of the remained Bajić Vaso Branko, requesting the entitlement to one-time financial assistance.

Since Branko died in the agricultural vehicle accident and the request was not accompanied with all the relevant data which could describe whether the the deceased person was guilty in charge or not, which would affect the acknowledgment of the entitlement.

The crash in which the late Branko died took place in Široka Rijeka on 18 October 1994.

We kindly ask you that, in case you have made an inspection or you have any information about this crash, provide us with the relevant data in order to bring the final decision about this request.

Delivered to:

- Secretariat of Interior Vojnić
- ad acta

COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel
Veljko Bosanac
/handwritten signature illegible/

round stamp with the following text:
MILITARY POSTAL OFFICE
Petrova Gora

/written by hand:/
a/a 22.47
23 February 1995

ANNEX 184:

RSK, REGIONAL CENTRE VRGINMOST, OPERATIONAL REPORT, 27 AUGUST 1993

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REGIONAL CENTRE VRGINMOST

On 27 August 1993

Republic Centre
K n i n

Subject: Operational Report

1. At the Kordun part of the fight it is peaceful
2. In Zagorje, the municipality of Krnjak, there was a severe accident of the car Golf with our registry plate and the vehicle of the United Nations. In the accident three persons died as follows: Bolić Željko from Donji Bidački Skrad, Kosjer Dragan and Blagojević Marko from Krnjak. The accident occurred today around twelve. The police authorities are still performing an on-site inspection.
4. In the municipalities of Krnjak and Slunj the traffic is difficult.
5. The supply of electricity and drinking water in city water supply line is difficult.
6. OSSCZ (General Service of Serbian Civil Protection): Vrginmost, Vojnić, Krnjak and Slunj – are working according to the plan.

OFFICER IN CHARGE

Pavlović Milan
voarrbl

submitted at 18.30 hrs
Republic of Serbia krzip +?+

I have nothing more and should there be something, we will inform you accordingly

ok ok +?

Bye bye my colleague

ANNEX 185:

RSK, COMMAND OF THE 7TH OPERATIONAL GROUP, REPORT ABOUT LOSSES, 20 APRIL 1992

C O M M A N D of 7th Operational Group (OG) MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential number 11-48-1 STRICTLY ONFIDENTIAL
20 April 1992

Report about losses,
to be delivered - TO THE COMMAND OF 10th CORPUS

In the attachment of this file, we hereby provide you with the report about losses for 7th Operational Group, in accordance with the standard forms.
Herewith we provide you with the difference, losses after 10 March 1992 respectfully, as well as for individuals for which we had no information about, but have collected in the meanwhile.

Enclosure: Filled in forms.

AUTHORISED BY THE COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel
Miloš Malidžan

/handwritten signature illegible/

/stamp 11 May 1992/ round stamp with the following text: Command of 7th Operational Group

MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS
No. 5431

No. 11/22 –
BIHAĆ

Page no. 2.

LIST OF LOSSES BY NAMES
COMMAND Glina starting with 199_ year S-2

No.	Deed and Profession	Last name, father's name and name	Date, month and year of birth	Place of birth	Address of residence,
1	**military officer**	**Banda Branko Živko**			

Date of admittance to Yugoslav National Army	Circumstances of killing, injuries or missing (date and hour)	Nationality	Unit	Remarks
	Died on 29 March 1992 due to falling down the stairs, being drunk	**Serbian**		

ANNEX 186:

RSK, COMMAND OF THE 7TH CORPS., INFORMATION FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS, 28 APRIL 1993

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
C O M M A N D of 7th CORPUS
Strictly confidential number 30-3056
28 April 1993

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY ONFIDENTIAL

ENCRIPTED

Information for subordinate units
To be delivered-

TO THE COMMANDS: 75th motorised brigade, 92nd motorised brigade, Operating Group-1, Tactic Group-4, 1st Light Brigade, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 4th Light Brigade, 7th Mixed Artillery Battalion, 7th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion

1. Yesterday in the area of responsibility of the North Dalmatian Corpus the attacks were continued at the positions of the Ustasha army and the villages along the front line.
The Ustasha opened the fiercest artillery and tank fire along the villages of Smilčić and Biljane Donje.
From the direction of Gaćeleza the mortar fire was opened to our positions in the region of Zelene Glavice.
The forces of Serbian army returned the fire to the enemy.
The NATO aircraft conducted a flight over the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
At 14.15 there was an explosion over Knin, caused by a sound wave.

In the responsibility area of Lički corpus, the Ustasha opened the fire few times over the region Ostrvica and M. Alan with the mortars.

In the region of Banijski corpus the sporadic mortar and artillery fire was opened in the region of Kruška-Čorkovača, but our forces did not turn the fire.

2. Outstanding event:

On 26 April 1993 around 13.00 hrs there was an accident in the village Struga in the responsibility zone of 39th Corpus. The accident occurred when the truck driver of UNPROFOR bumped into the bicycle driven by the member of 33rd infantry brigade Dobrić Dragan on his way from Unčana to Dvor. Dobrić Dragan died caused by severe injuries. The investigation is still in progress.

Assistant Commander
First Class Captain
Slavko Ožegović

/handwritten signature illegible/

/round stamp with the text:

Republic of Serbian Krajina

stamp with the following text
RECEIVED 28 April 93 at 17.15.
Cezar,, Telegraph no. 119, no. of group 300
At 18.20, 29-4 at 11.00

ANNEX 187:

RSK, BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT, ON-SITE INVESTIGATION RECORD, 7 JULY 1993

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT

Reference number Kri /criminal investigation/ 50/93

To: PUBLIC SECURITY STATION

BENKOVAC

Please find enclosed, for further use, two copies of the On-site Investigation Record dated 7th July 1993, with the above-mentioned reference number, which has been made by the Investigating Judge of this Court.

It is to be noted that a copy of the Record, which refers to the death of Paravinja Olga, wife of Milan, from Smoković, presently in Podlug, has not been submitted to the competent Prosecutor's Office.

Benkovac, 14th July 1993

Investigating Judge
Milica Dražić
/illegible signature/

/added in handwriting/
/illegible/ 15th July 1993
/illegible signature/

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT

Reference number Kri /criminal investigation/ 50/93

ON-SITE INVESTIGATION RECORD

Made on 7th July 1993 by the Investigating Judge of the Benkovac Municipal Court at the house of Ante Zelić, from Popovići, in Podlug in which house the family of Paravinja Milan from Smoković presently resides, on the occasion of the death of Paravinja Olga from Smoković.

PRESENT ARE THE FOLLOWING:

On behalf of the Court:

1. Investigating Judge: Milica Dražić
2. Recording Clerk: Marija Žarković

/mirror image of the stamp in Cyrillic/:
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT

On behalf of the Benkovac SJB /Public Security Station/:

Inspector: Đuro Babić
Forensic Technician: Gromiko Višić

Started at11:30 hrs.

The on-site investigation was also attended by the Dr Libuša Pantović, expert physician, who is otherwise the employee of the 92nd Brigade of RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ Army, Benkovac.

On 7th July 1993 the Duty Service of the Benkovac SJB informed this Court about the death of Paravinja Olga in Podgrađe, that is, in Podlug, therefore the on-site investigation team in the aforesaid composition went immediately to the scene in order to carry out the on-site investigation.

The scene has not been secured by the members of the Benkovac SJB.

Upon the arrival at the scene it has been established through the relatives that the person in question was Paravinja Olga, the wife of Milan, from Smoković, born in 1954 with the residence in Podlug.

The body has been found in the house mentioned above, on the upper floor of the house, in the bedroom that is 6 x 4 m in size.

On the southern part of the wall there is one window that is 120 x 120 cm in size, which is 1 m above the floor level, while by the western wall, to the right of the window, there is a bed in the size of 2 m x 1.50 m, on which bed the body of a woman has been found.

Further on along the western wall, from that bed in the northern direction, located are two wardrobes in the total length of 3.80 m and 1.50 m in height and across from the wardrobes there is a second bed that is 2 x 0.80 m in size.

By the mentioned bed, on the northern part of the wall and across from the above-mentioned window, located is the entrance door of the room in the size of 2 x 0.80 m.

As it has been stated, the body has been found on the bed, laid on the back, and the length of the body is 1.72 m.

It is to be added to the aforesaid that the expert physician who was present conducted the external examination of the body, which physician has stated that Paravinja Olga died of natural causes, also stating that the *livores mortis* were visible on the body, the *rigor mortis* was present, and the death occurred some five to six hours prior to the conducted examination.

Also, the physician who conducted the external examination of the body will, to that effect, prepare a separate death report which he will subsequently submit to the Benkovac Public Security Station.

For the reasons stated above, that is, since the death of natural causes is in question, no further investigative measures were taken, while the forensic technician has made the sketch of the scene and took photographs and the inspector who was present conducted the interviews with the relatives who were present in relation to the aforesaid, of which interviews he will make the official authority records.

Recording Clerk:
Marija Žarković
/illegible signature/

/stamp in Cyrillic/
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN
KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT

Investigating Judge:
Milica Dražić
/illegible signature/

/added in handwriting/:
/illegible/ 15th July 1993

/illegible signature/

/Over the first half of the 2nd page and the entire 3rd page of the original document there is a mirror image copy, probably of some pages of the same document./

ANNEX 188:

RSK, COMMISSION FOR THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, TRANSFER OF CORPSES, 13 JULY 1993

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA

G O V E R N M E N T

Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners

No: 06-5-725/93

Knin, 13 July 1993

President of the Government

Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Justice and Public Administration

Ministry of Interior

Headquarters of Serbian Army Krajina

- K N I N –

Subject: Transfer of corpses

At the meeting of the Commission for the exchange of prisoners of the (RSK) Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republic of Croatia held in Otočac on 12 July 1993 it was agreed to transfer corpses in both directions.

First transfer was agreed for 16 July 1993 and was scheduled to be held in Otočac.

Our side will take over the following corpses:

1. Milosavljević Nenad, born in 1961in Belgrade
2. Milanko Dušan, born in 1966 in Karin
3. Sinobad Draško, born in 1968 in Knin
4. Vujić Sava, born in 1965 in Čoka
5. Vitaz Petar, born in 1950 in Brgud
6. Ljubičić-Mijić Boško, born in 1952 in Obrovac
7. Pešelj Obrad, born in 1950 in Bilišane – Obrovac
8. Paravinja Milan, born in 1946 in Smoković
9. Bađa Živko, born in 1956 in Bilišane

10. Novković Stevka, born in 1905 in Islam Grčki

11. Gagić Marta, born in 1915 in Islam Grčki

12. Prostran Petar, born in 1958 in Smoković

13. Popović Dragija, born in 1939 in Mokro polje (died of natural causes in Zadar, his family lives in Knin).

At the same time we will provide the Croatian side with the 6 corpses buried in Benkovac (group „Podgradina“) and 5 corpses buried in Glibodolski križ in Lika and one corpse found in Umce.

At the principle of reprocity both sides will place corpses into galvanized boxes and the galvanized boxes into the wooden boxes.

After the transfer of the firsts group of corpses, it will be continued with the transfer of the corpses selected by groups.

Since there are 10 corpses of soldiers in the first group, ie. policemen, the commission suggests to GŠSVK to prepare the protocol of their funeral.

President of the Commission

Savo Štrbac

/signature illegible/

ANNEX 189:

RSK, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE SUICIDE OF GORAN PANIĆ, 18 JULY 1995

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
POLICE AUTHORITY VOJNIĆ
PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITY (SJB) SLUNJ

Nr. 08-03/1-2-1299/95
Slunj, 18.07.1995

DISTRICT ATTORNEY
VOJNIĆ

Reference: Panić Goran, suicide
Report

On 18.07.1995, around 02.00 hours, in the convenience store "RID", Grabovac bb, xx Slunj, owned by Bjelobrk Mile from Plitvice, Panić Goran, son of Ratko, born on 07.06.1972 in Sisak, Republic of Croatia, residing in Belgrade, Jovana Avakumovića nr. 1, employee of Police Authority Belgrade, committed suicide.

He committed suicide with his service handgun "CZ" M-99, cal. 9 mm, long barrel, serial number 23534, by putting it against his right temple and firing one round, all under heavy influence of alcohol; the bullet entered through the right temporal bone and exited on the left side of the skull, causing instant death.

The scene was investigated by officers from Police Station Slunj, who also interviewed witnesses; the protocol and official notes thereof have been delivered to you, as per enclosures 1 – 4.

The body of Panić Goran, as well as his personal effects, was released to Pavković Stevo, commander of the Serbian Ministry of Interior police troop whose member Panić Goran was, and the handgun with which the suicide was committed, bullet case and bullet jacket were seized by the officers of SJB Slunj.

Enclosures: x 7

CHIEF
Vujaklija Veljko

ANNEX 190:

RSK, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ORDER OF THE REPUBLICAN CIVILIAN PROTECTION STAFF, 15 JULY 1995

/stamp:/
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
LIKA ADMINISTRATION – KORENICA
DONJI LAPAC DEPARTMENT
Number: 02/2-157/1-95
15 July 1995

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA /RSK/
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LIKA ADMINISTRATION
KORENICA
REGIONAL CIVILIAN PROTECTION /CZ/ STAFF
Number: strictly confidential 03-21/2-95
Korenica, 15 July 1995

To municipal CZ staffs
Gračac, Donji Lapac, Vrhovine and
Plaški

The activities of the BH Army 5th Corps and the HV /Croatian Army/ point to the possibility of intensification and escalation of combat operations. In view of this and with the goal of taking adequate measures to protect and rescue the population and material goods, by order strictly confidential no. 01-65/95 of 14 July 1995, the RSK Republican Civilian Protection Staff

ORDERS:

1. Activate regional and municipal civilian protection staffs and establish continuous duty rosters.

2. Take measures through civilian protection commissioners to involve the population, and in case of need, sound prompt danger alerts so that people can hide in shelters and other structures.

3. Prepare adequately the leaders of activities in the evacuation and movement of the population.

4. Carry out appropriate preparations for the mobilisation of forces and resources in order also to take other protection and rescue measures.

5. In the conduct of these activities, establish continuous cooperation with the commands of the Serbian Army of the Krajina in your area of responsibility.

6. Send reports to this staff daily by 1900 hours with the situation as at 1800 hours, and interim reports as necessary.

Chief of the RG SCZ /CZ Regional Staff/
Mirko POZNANOVIĆ

/incoming stamp:/

RECEIVED:			15 July	1110 hours	/signed/
			(day and month)	(hour and minute)	(s i g n a t u r e)
ARGON	411			31	
(code name)	(telegram no.)	(group no.)	(urgency)	(processing method)	(no. of communications station)
PROCESSED:			15 July	1113	
					(s i g n a t u r e)
/illegible/			15 July	1115	/signed/

ANNEX 191:

RSK, CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ORDER CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EVACUATION AND RELIEF PLANS, 29 JULY 1995

1995, 29 July
Knin
Order of the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence staffs concerning the implementation of evacuation and relief plans

_____
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. nov. 01-78/95
Knin, 29 June 1995

DEFENCE
OFFICIAL SECRET

REGIONAL CIVIL
DEFENCE STAFFS
To whom it may concern

Pursuant to the Decision on the proclamation of a state of war, and in accordance with the latest situation, the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters hereby issues the following

O R D E R

1. Regional Civil Defence Staffs need to be activated immediately, a continuous tour of duty established and, as required, some staff members kept continuously available on call.
2. Municipal civil defence staffs shall be ordered to:
- organize a continuous tour of duty and staff member activity with respect to evacuation and relief;
- update relief and evacuation plans, including the putting of persons responsible for specific assignments on standby;
- put organized civil defence units on standby;
- through civil defence wardens animate citizens to prepare relief facilities and implement other measures and procedures for personal and collective protection;
- determine the potential of enterprises considering integration into the implementation of protection and rescue measures.
3. Monitor the situation through SVK commands and take the necessary steps.
4. Monitor the activities of municipal civil defence staffs, and offer professional and other assistance in developing appropriate solutions.
5. Daily report all measures and activities, and possible problems, to this Headquarters as of 30 July 1995 at 13.00 hours.

Copy to:
1. Regional civil defence staff s in Northern Dalmatia, by messenger
2. Lika, Kordun, Banija, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, by fax
3. Records, here

(stamp)
RSK
Republican Civil Defence Headquarters
Knin

HQ Head
Duško Babić

Memo to
1. Ministry of defence
2. Chief of the SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister

ANNEX 192:

RSK, LIKA REGIONAL CIVILIAN PROTECTION HEADQUARTERS, ORDER OF MIRKO POZNANOVIĆ, 30 JULY 1995

/page 01329698 is blank except for: footnote 39/

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA /RSK/
LIKA REGIONAL CIVILIAN PROTECTION /CZ/ HEADQUARTERS
KORENICA
Confidential number: 03-179/1-95
Korenica, 30 July 1995

/stamp:/
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
/illegible/
PLAŠKI DEPARTMENT
Number 03/2-206/95
30 July 1995

/handwritten:/ PLAŠKI MUNICIPAL CZ HEADQUARTERS

In accordance with the decision to declare a state of war and the order of the RSK republican Civilian Protection Staff, confidential number 01-78/95, dated 29 July 1995,

I hereby ORDER

that the following measures be implemented.

1. Continue to maintain uninterrupted duty at municipal CZ headquarters and increase the state of alert at settlement CZ headquarters, introducing permanent duty if need be.
2. Set staff members to work in accordance with the measures, and especially the following:
   - shelter, evacuation and welfare.
   - updating existing plans according to the measures set out and putting those assigned to carry out tasks on a state of readiness.
   - update the civilian protection unit lists.
   - with medical institutions and SVK /Army of the Serbian Krajina/ commands, assess the need to bring in PMP /recruitment, mobilisation and personnel/ units to increase the duty in healthcare institutions.
   - establish to what extent companies could be involved in implementing measures to protect, rescue, relocate and evacuate the population.
3. Maintain constant contact with SVK commands in order to follow the situation on the ground.
4. Involve civilian protection officials in the work.
5. Send regular reports on measures implemented, activities and potential problems every day with the situation at 1200 hours, and interim reports when so required.

Chief
Regional Civilian Protection Headquarters
Mirko POZNANOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

ANNEX 193:

RSK, DRNIŠ DEPTARTMENT MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DIRECTORATE ON MEASURES FOR THE PREPARATION OF EVACUATION, 31 JULY 1995

1995, 31 July
Drniš
Report of the Drniš Dept. of the Ministry of Defence to the Northern Dalmatia Directorate on measures for the preparation of evacuation

Republic of Serbian Krajina
Municipality of Drniš
Ministry of defence
Drniš Dept.
No. str. conf. 01-10/95
Drniš, 31 July 1995

Ministry of defence
"Northern Dalmatia" Directorate
K N I N

Re: Report on steps taken with regard to the new situation

In line with the new situation, the Municipal Civil Defence Staff (MCDS) has taken the following steps:

- Continuous duty of the MCDS has been introduced for the civil defence staff members and employees of the Ministry of Defence Dept.

- The wardens of all local communities in the territory of the municipality of Drniš were visited except the warden in the local community of Baljci, with whom we are in continuous contact.

We are planning to visit Baljci on 1 August 2009. We informed the wardens about the new situation, and about the measures and steps they were supposed to take. Particular focus was placed on shelters and evacuation related preparations. The wardens completed their assignments and reports from all local communities arrived at the MCDS during the day. Lists of persons envisaged for evacuation were updated, and fuel issued in November 1994 and vehicles were checked. Apart from problems in the town of Drniš, where two vehicles (one tractor and one truck) were found to be malfunctioning, throughout the municipality there were no problems either with vehicles or with fuel. The unserviceable vehicles will be replaced as soon as possible in agreement with the manager of *DP Drništrans*.

- Branka Ćakić, member of the MCDS, shall organize as soon as possible a first aid course, this being one of our top priorities.

You will be duly and timely informed about all changes.

Respectfully yours,

(*stamp*)
RSK
Municipal Civil Defence Staff
Drniš

Head of the Municipal Civil
Defence staff
Ana Mirković

ANNEX 194:

RSK, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER SIGNED BY MINISTER TOŠO PAIĆ, 31 JULY 1995

/page 01329712 is blank except for: footnote 41/

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA /RSK/
MUP /Ministry of the Interior/
MINISTER'S OFFICE
NUMBER: 08/1-1-6314/95
KNIN: 31 July 1995

/handwritten:/ Rastović
Pavković
files

/stamp:/ REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
KNIN

Received: 1 August 1995			
Org. unit	Number	Enclosure	Value
08 / 3	1 - 63	14 / 1 - 95	

- ENCODED - 00 -

SUP /Secretariats of the Interior/ in the RSK - To all

Personally to the Secretaries /stamp:/

/illegible/	31 July	18:30
/illegible/	31 July	20:30
/illegible/	/illegible/	11:28

Due to the declaration of a state of war in the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the uncertain future political situation, and drawing on the experience of Western Slavonia

I ORDER

All Secretariats of the Interior are to prepare, within their organisational units, for the rapid evacuation of the following archives and day-to-day documentation:

1. Administrative affairs

- registers of births and citizenship (previously /? paired/)
- weapons registers
- vehicle file
- card files (personal identification cards, passports, criminal records)
- printed (payable) forms (vehicle and driver's licences, ID cards, gun licences)
- and all other vehicle documentation

2. Personnel affairs

- employees' personal files
- records of dead and wounded

3. Financial affairs

- pay sheets
- interim statements of accounts and annual financial statements
- cashier's statements
- material and financial bookkeeping records
- available funds

4. General affairs

- incoming and other stamps
- SP /expansion unknown/ - files
- other files

5. Defence preparations

- all existing records

6. Operative affairs

- KU /expansion unknown/ - registers
- copies of criminal and special reports
- register of misdemeanour reports with copies of requests to instigate proceedings
- other operative records
- dispatches
- forensic records, reports and films

7. Police duty service and matters

- events logbook
- compulsory instructions and operations
- record of detainees
- roadblock plans
- sector dossier
- register of official business
- service structure

8. Communications

- entire KT /short-wave radio/ and KZ /cryptographic protection/ communications centre
- special documents and other documentation

The SUP Secretary is responsible for carrying out this task and he alone shall assess the need to evacuate the SUP and the organisational units.

Minister
Tošo PAIĆ

Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 443 12/16/2010 2:55:37 PM

ANNEX 195:

RSK, SERB ARMY GENERAL STAFF, ORDER ON THE RELOCATION OF THE GŠ SVK, 1 AUGUST 1995

Translation

REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA
SERB ARMY GENERAL STAFF
STR. CONF. No. 3 – 477
01 August 1995

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No. ___3___
/signed and stamped/

374/2
/handwritten and signed/ OPO */Operative processing/*

Relocation of the GŠ SVK */General Staff of the Army of Serb Krajina/*,
Order, delivered .-

/handwritten/ PKPO */Assistant Commander for Logistics/*
06322876

The situation and activities of the HV */Croatian Army/* have led us to the conclusion that there is a possibility of the beginning of an aggression on one of our battlefields. The beginning of an aggression brings into question the possibility and efficiency of command and control of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army from Knin. For the needs of a timely preparation for relocation and the planned relocation of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army to the area of the war location, I hereby

ORDER

1. Commanding officers of departments, sections and organs of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army shall within their authority carry out preparation of means and documentation for relocation. In the course of the preparation, sort and pack the documentation according to that which is going to be taken to the new location and that which is to be destroyed. The destroying is to follow after the decision on the relocation of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army. Alongside the before mentioned, designate which means for work are going to be taken to the new location and conduct packing of the same.

2. For the task of preparing the archive of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army for relocation and the relocation of the same, I am designating a committee of the following members:

1) Captain 1st Class Vukojević Dušan, Committee President, √
2) Ensign 1st Class Žarković Vojislav, member, √
3) Staff Corporal Meanđija Đorđe, member. √

The responsibility of the Committee is to conduct inspection, sorting and packing of the archive and to monitor that the same is loaded, transported and sent for safekeeping to the area of the war location of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army.

HQ Administration Commander shall designate a vehicle for the transport of the archival material.

3. Commanding officers of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army are obligated to sort and pack documentation within their authority and personal equipment.

4. For the needs of transporting personnel and means of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army to the area of the war location, logistics of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army shall secure three buses and five cargo vehicles and place them at the disposal of the HQ Administration Commander. The NSbSl */Chief of the Traffic and Transport Service/* shall deliver the information on the needed vehicles from the list and the request for mobilization to the organ of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army for Organization and Mobilization.

5. The organ of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army for replenishment and mobilization shall deliver a request to the authorized MO */Defense Ministry/* Administration for the mobilization of vehicles needed for the relocation of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army. The mobilized vehicles may remain with the provider of the vehicles at a one hour readiness.

6. HQ Administration of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army is tasked with:

- establishing an exact register according to type, tonnage, capacity and reg. plate no. from the SVK fund and list,
- make a list of drivers,
- inspect and register all cargos that are being transported to the area of the war location of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army,
- determine the necessary number of manpower for loading and unloading the transported means and
- when the decision is brought to relocate the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army, to carry out the loading and transfer of all means of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army to the area of the war location.

7. Within the committee for the destruction of documentation designated for destruction, I also designate a Committee composed of the following members:

1) Major Gužvica Milan, President of the Committee,
2) Captain 1st Class Perić Gordan, member,
3) Ensign 1st Class Lalić Mirko, member.

8. Conduct reconnaissance of the area of the war location of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army. The reconnaissance team shall be composed of the following:

- Colonel Gačić Žarko,
- Colonel Radičanin Đuro,
- Lt Colonel Keča Đorđe, √
- Colonel Poznan Nikola,
- Ensign 1st Class Ilijašević Uroš.

Reconnaissance shall be carried out on 02 August 1995. √
In the course of the reconnaissance determine the exact deployment of organs at the KM */Command Post/* and resolve all technical matters regarding the relocation and work of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army.

9. Assistant Commander for Logistics shall issue an order to regulate the relocation of the PKM */Rear Command Post/*.

/handwritten notation on the left side next to no.9 – OPO/

10. All preparations for the relocation are to be carried out immediately. Readiness for all tasks and obligations regarding the relocation of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army on 03 August 1995 until 20.00 hours, when the organs' commanding officers shall report on the readiness status.

ŽG/33

CHIEF OF STAFF
Major General
/illegible/ Lončar
/signed and stamped/

Produced in 10 copies and delivered to:
- OOP and O */abb. unknown/*
- PNŠ */Assistant Chief of Staff/* for branches
- PKPO */Asst. Commander for Logistics/*
- PK */Asst. Commander/* for RV */Air force/* and PVO */Anti Aircraft Defense/*
- PKM */Rear Command Post/* and Intelligence
- NB */Chief of Security/*
- PNŠ */Asst Chief of Staff/* for Intelligence
- Organ for Organization and Mobilization
- Personnel
- HQ Administration

/handwritten notation/
Document received on 02 August 1995 at 14.00 hours.
Colonel DOPUĐ ILIJA */illegible/*

ANNEX 196:

RSK, CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ORDER ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PREPARATION FOR THE EVACUATION OF ASSETS, ARCHIVES, AND RECORDS, 2 AUGUST 1995

1995, 2 August
Order of the RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence staff s to proceed immediately to the implementation of evacuation plans

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. str. conf. 01-92/95
Knin, 2 August 1995

DEFENCE
OFFICIAL SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ENCODED
To
REGIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE STAFFS
To Whom It May Concern

Preparation for the evacuation
of material, cultural and other
assets

Order **IMMEDIATELY**, through municipal civil defence staffs, bodies and organizations, enterprises and other juridical persons, the implementation of preparations for the evacuation of

- material assets,
- archives, civil registers, records and confidential papers,
- movable cultural assets,
- money, securities and respective records.

In preparing evacuation the responsible entities are required to

- prepare lists - reviews of material assets in terms of type and quantity, and prepare such assets for evacuation;
- determine the sites - facilities for their storage on the new location (in cooperation with Ministry of Defence directorates and departments);
- provide vehicles for transport (if short of requirements, try to obtain vehicles through Ministry of Defence bodies);
- form (un)loading teams;
- form commissions responsible for implementation.

As a rule, the evacuation of material assets should not be carried out simultaneously with the evacuation of specific categories of the population (if ordered in time), exception being made for articles, means and equipment used for relief purposes.
The course of preparations must be reported daily to this Headquarters starting from 4 August 1995 by 20.00 hours.

HQ Head
Duško Babić

(stamp)
RS
Republican Civil
Defence Headquarters

Copy to:
1. “Northern Dalmatia” regional civil defence staff, by messenger
2. Regional civil defence staff s “Lika”, “Kordun”, “Banija” and “Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem”, encoded
3. Records

Memo to:
1. Minister of defence
2. Chief of SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister

ANNEX 197:

RSK, CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, REQUEST ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL DEFENCE PLANS, EVACUATION AND RELIEF, 2 AUGUST 1995

1995, 2 August
Knin

The RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters requests from the regional staffs reports on the implementation of civil defence plans, evacuation and relief

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. conf. 01-82/95
Knin, 2 August 1995

DEFENCE
OFFICIAL SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

To
REGIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE
STAFFS

To Whom It May Concern

Pursuant to order conf. no. 01-78/95 of 29 July 1995, IMMEDIATELY, and not later than 3 August 1995 by 19.00 hours, forward r e p o r t s as follows:

1. Shelters (plan update, preparation of facilities, animation of the population).
2. Evacuation (plan update, material support, preparation of persons in charge, formation of committees/teams for reception, distribution etc.).
3. Relief (accommodation facilities; provision of equipment and material, food, personal and general hygiene agents).
4. Preparation and organization of protection and rescue steps (individually; steps taken and organized activities including possible integration of enterprises into protection and rescue operations).
5. Presence of hazardous materials and protection steps taken.
6. Activated protection and rescue forces, and forces on alert.
7. Problems: functioning, material supply.

Copy to:
1. "Northern Dalmatia" regional civil defence staff, by messenger
2. "Lika", "Kordun", "Banija", and "Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem", by fax
3. Records

Memo to:
1. Minister of defence
2. Chief of SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister

(stamp)
RS
Republican Civil
Defence Headquarters

HQ Head
Duško Babić

ANNEX 198:

RSK, SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL, DECISION ON EVACUATION, 4 AUGUST 1995

Translation 03054497

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL
Knin, 4 August 1995
1645 hours
No. 2-3113-1/95

Due to the newly developed situation caused by the open general aggression of the Republic of Croatia against the Republic of Serbian Krajina and after the initial successes in defending the country, a large part of the territory of Northern Dalmatia and part of Lika have become threatened, and we have therefore

D E C I D E D

1. To begin the planned evacuation of all inhabitants unfit for combat from the following municipalities: Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Gračac.

2. The evacuation shall be carried out in a planned manner according to the existing planed directions toward Knin and then through Otrić toward Srb and Lapac.

3. For the evacuation, seek the help of the UNPROFOR Command of the Sector Jug (South) headquartered in Knin.

Knin, 4 August 1995

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
Milan MARTIĆ
/signed/

/Stamp: Republic of Serbian Krajina, Main Staff of the Army /

Stamped with the official seal at the Main Staff of the Army of Serbian Krajina at 1720 hours on 4 August 1995 and issued with the above number
/handwritten: 20 September 2000, signed/

ANNEX 199:

RSK, MILITARY POST 9139, INFORMATION TO UNITS, 8 JANUARY 1995

/*handwritten*:/ DAS /*expansion unknown*/, SACP /*expansion unknown*/, 26th PBR /Infantry Brigade/, NUI S. /*expansion unknown*/

MILITARY POST 9139
KOSTAJNICA
Confidential number 1841-2
8 January 1995

Information to units 2/4 pb /2nd Company, 4th Infantry Battalion/

1. MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA:

Characteristics:
- The RH /Republic of Croatia/ with Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ in power has not given up the military option in addressing the issue of the reintegration of the RSK /Republic o Serbian Krajina/ into the RH.
- It plays a double game before the international community and its forums, with an intention to present itself as a democratic country willing to find a peaceful solution to the reintegration of the RSK and the question of the Serbs in RH in general. Meanwhile, before the public at home, via the mass media, and through the statements of certain extremist leaders, it continues with wartime tensions with an aim to cover up its own incompetence.
– Through the structures of international organisations, they managed to have some resolutions adopted which work to their advantage.
– Through the countries in Europe and on other continents that support them, and also the large numbers of emigrants abroad, they have managed to ensure solid financial support. They are receiving equipment with modern combat technology, and ensuring positive propaganda through influential international agencies.
– With great humility and by concluding military treaties and offering parts of their territory, they are trying to curry favour with NATO, in order to gain protection in their efforts to achieve their goals concerning the RSK.
– Through continuous grouping and re-grouping, and by participating in operations in the territory of the RSK on Dinara and on the territory of the RS /Republika Srpska/, as well as through constant declarations of a "general alert" for places along the border with the RSK, they are demonstrating that only in this way can they keep up wartime tensions and "patriotism" among the Croatian people, and thereby also maintain those in power;
- signing an agreement with the RSK, whose second "economic" phase is about to start right now (opening roads etc.), is no guarantee that the RH will not intervene against the RSK and it can stop it whenever it wishes.
– The RH is the primary initiator, instigator, and implementer of the campaign to destroy the Serbian people in the RSK and beyond, and this is its sole and primary goal.
– Alija Izetbegović's Muslims and the Croats in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ have the same goal and they are trying to achieve it through mutual cooperation, arming, a loose confederation, daily fighting against the RSK and the RS.

– Through the support of major Muslim countries and the U.S., Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ is managing to maintain the wartime tension that is based on lies (Jihad), and so is Franjo Tuđman.
– The occupation of Velika Kladuša by Fikret Abdić's NO ZB /National Defence of Western Bosnia/ members, and the ongoing fighting among the Muslims indicate that peace will not be achieved anytime soon in these parts.
– The imposition of Contact Group plans in BiH and the pressure on the Serbs to accept them, and the visits of numerous peace envoys have not and will not give the desired results, regardless of the signed truce.
– The daily flights of NATO aircraft over the RSK territory to control the airspace over BIH, and firing at targets in the RSK clearly demonstrate that NATO is on the side of the enemies of the Serbian people, and that it places itself in a position equal to that of the UN forces.
– Most UNPROFOR members favour the Croatian and Muslim side, while their chiefs of GS /?general staffs/ are working out withdrawal plans in the case of danger, or figuring out how to make them more effective than they are now.
– The signed agreement on ceasefire in BiH affects the Muslims rather than the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ which, together with the HV /Croatian Army/, is attacking and taking RS territory, thus also sending a warning to the RSK.

2. Situation in the RSK

– The RSK still does not fully function as an organised state with all the institutions that a state should have.
– The elected representatives of political government in their respective institutions are not rising to the tasks and times in which they are working (a state of war), as there are inter-party duels both within and outside parliament, primarily in the media, which confuses the average citizen or soldier.
– The economy and economic potential of the RSK, partly owing to factors beyond its control, and partly owing to human factors, have not been sufficiently encouraged to give their proper contribution to the development of the RSK.
– The RSK leadership wants to address all problems with neighbours through negotiations and peaceful means in the spirit of preserving and ensuring the survival of the Serbian people in these parts, and in a state that they desire.
– Having monitored the situation immediately surrounding them, the grouping of forces along the whole border with the RSK, the mobilisation throughout Croatia, the daily provocations and threats, and the conduct and actions of Muslim forces and attacks on parts of the RSK, the RSK leadership had to take the decision to conduct a general mobilisation of the RSK army. The aim of the mobilisation was to prevent being taken by surprise in any way, and to deter the Ustashas from attempts at aggression, and this has succeeded.
– The current situation still demands that most of the men be retained in the units, while a certain number have started to return to the economic activities. Experience so far has shown that the defence of the Serbian people of the RSK and RS cannot be conducted separately, it has to be done jointly.
– The legal documents which regulate issues of the RSK, which has celebrated its third anniversary of the formation and preservation of its territory.

3. The state of morale in the RSK units

– Some members of the SVK /Supreme Command Staff/ are still not aware that Serbian cause is being defended throughout the territory of the RSK and beyond, that is in the places where the Serbian people are most threatened.
– Thinking that the RSK and the Serbian people will be defended just on one's own doorstep and that someone else will defend the territory is a hugely erroneous, and both the commands and the political leadership of the country must abolish that concept.
– It must be clear to every soldier that we do not have any other soldiers or any other territory, and this is precisely why we must endure and be persistent in defending the people and the territory.
– Experience has shown that the morale, level of training, and firmness in defence are far greater among units that have carried out combat activities than among those that are static in holding the lines.
– The overall situation in the RSK, the poverty, the non-functioning of production, the general impoverishment of soldiers and their families, the length of the war, and many other system issues in the state are having a great impact on the weakening of morale among the soldiers. All structures have to make efforts to eliminate these weaknesses.
– The morale of troops is being largely affected by the slow pace at which status matters are addressed, by uncertainty, and by the impossibility of getting full logistical support, especially in quartermaster supplies, financial support, and fuel supplies, which is nothing but a reflection of the economic situation in the state which some individuals often fail to understand and instead blame their commands for the crisis.
– The inconsistent criteria in admitting back the trained officers from the RSK have a negative effect on the officers who have stayed with their units the whole time.
– The large number of deserters in some of the units has had a very negative effect on the execution of combat tasks, and this problem has to be addressed at all levels in the future.
– Regardless of the above-mentioned shortcomings – some of them for reasons beyond control and some of subjective nature – we assess that the troops are aware of the situation they are in and that they will complete their tasks of defending the Serbian people and the RSK.

4. Failures and shortcomings in conducting previous and current combat activities

In the course of previous and current combat activities in which our units have been participating, shortcomings and failures have been observed, and that impedes the performance of tasks assigned by the superior command. Here are some of the shortcomings and failures:
– On the Lika section of the front some of the 39th Corps units refused to engage in the attack because their officer informed them that they were to be engaged just in order to hold the line.
– In the sector of Glinica village some soldiers tried to steal (various technical devices, machines, machine parts, etc.), but were stopped by a military police unit. There were also some attempts of rape, and an investigation and proceedings are still in progress.

– Defence lines are being willfully abandoned, and that puts in jeopardy the performance of tasks assigned to the Command of the 39th Corps and its subordinate units.
– Units are rotated without authorisation and without notifying the Command of the 39th Corps (some of the scouts from the 26th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ and 31st pbr, and the independent pč /infantry company/ from the 31st pbr).
Within the units there have been many other shortcomings and failures which could largely affect the performance of a unit's combat task and have negative consequences, but which could be avoided and prevented with additional efforts made by the responsible officers.
More intensive work should be done with the troops in order to improve command and control at all levels.

5. Examples of responsibility and dedication of the SVK members and the 26th pbr.
On 28 December 1994 members of the 5th pč from Živaja proposed to the 26th pbr Commander to commend, pay special tribute, promote to a higher rank, give a financial reward, or grant exemplary service leave to the Commander of the 5th pč Lieutenant Branko Pralić for selfless dedication, self-sacrifice, initiative and courage shown.
This proposal was signed by 34 soldiers of the 5th pč. As rationale to support this proposal, the men stated that with such a commander any task can and must be accomplished. There is no greater recognition for an officer than when his soldiers and subordinates elevate him to a throne of honour for the virtues and courage he has demonstrated.
On 27 December 1994, Đuro Đuro Kosjer, a specialist in general medicine (Lieutenant Colonel by rank) wrote to the Chief of the SnSl /Medical Service/ at the 39th Corps Command that he would stay at the front from 26 December 1994 to 25 January 1995 because it was no problem for him, unlike the physicians at the Petrinja Health Centre who are refuse to cooperate with the SnSl of the 39th Corps Command and the Commander of the 31st pbr, and some have even rejected mobilisation call-up and participation in war units. In his letter to the N /Chief/ of the SnSl of the 26th pbr, Dr Đuro Kosjer expressed his gratitude to Dr Kordić and the major of the SnSl, Svetozar Ljuština from the 26th pbr, for their help and understanding.
This is another example of selflessness and dedication to the call demonstrated by professional members of the SVK.

6. At a tavern in the village of Crkveni Bok at around 08:00 PM on 4 January 1995, following a verbal fight (argument) between 2nd Lieutenant Milenko Vučenović, the commander of the 5/3 pb /5th Company, 3rd Battalion/, and Private Petar Čikota, regarding the latter's failure to report to his post in the unit, 2nd Lieutenant Milenko Vučenović killed Petar Čikota in the tavern yard.
Right upon receipt of the information on the VRDg /unusual incident/, a team from the 26th pbr Command and Kostajnica SJB /Public Security Station/ went out to conduct an on-site investigation.
Petar Čikota's body was transferred to the mortuary of Kostajnica Health Centre, and Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Vucenovic was taken into custody at the Kostajnica SJB for investigative proceedings, and then to the remand prison in Glina. More detailed circumstances of the VRDg will be available when the investigative proceedings are complete.

7. On 7 January 1995, Sergeant Milan Zorić wounded himself. He was disassembling an explosive device when he activated detonator number 8 and, as a result, his left hand was injured. He was taken to hospital in Banja Luka, where he underwent surgery and his left hand had to be amputated. He is still in hospital. The Command of the 26th pbr organised a visit to the wounded officer together with his relatives.

8. During the Christmas holidays a number of accidents took place in the 39th Corps zone of responsibility, which could have been prevented if greater and better efforts had been made by all parties in command and control.
In Dvor na Uni, in the midst of general good atmosphere and high spirits to welcome Christmas, a grenade was thrown, seriously injuring two people and lightly injuring one.
Shortly before 09:00 PM on 7 January 1995, in Petrinja at the checkpoint known as *Japan* held by the 3/31 /3rd Battalion of the 31st/ pbr, after a gambling and drinking session, v/o /conscript/ Ljuban Graorac shot dead Miroslav Zgonjanin with an AP /automatic rifle/.
In the sector of Glinice at 11:30 AM on 7 January 1995, v/o Slavko Rušić, a member of the 24th pbr, was killed by enemy fire. He suffered an entry-and-exit wound through the lungs.
It can be clearly seen that some of these incidents could have been prevented, and that they were caused by negligence, irresponsible behaviour, lack of discipline, and excessive consumption of alcohol. Out of several casualties, only one was caused by direct contact with the enemy. These tragedies should serve as a final warning to all responsible parties in command and control, that they must invest far more efforts in their work with the troops.
The lack of initiative in the work of people in positions of responsibility and their inadequate attitude toward working with the troops in the field and within units is slowly taking a bloody toll, and this works to the advantage of our enemies.

9. In the course of 9 January 1995 we received another two reports from the 39th Corps Command, which we are forwarding in full:

The state of morale in the 39th Corps units

Generally, the state of morale in the units of the 39th Corps meets the demands of current combat and defence activities. In the interests of fostering understanding of the need to strengthen and develop the Serbian army as one of the requirements for the survival of the Serbs in our centuries-old areas, we will highlight some negative factors in certain units which have the most direct impact on weakening combat morale:
– Too frequent, uncontrolled and excessive consumption of alcohol among a certain number of v/o in the units.
– A lack of professional staff for working with troops in lower-level units and failure to respect the principles of subordination (unity of command).
– A whole range of vague statements or lethargy of the actual state institutions, from the RSK Assembly downwards, to round off a tangled web of legal instruments and actions needed for the proper functioning of the rule of law and, subsequently, the military organisation of the SV /Serbian Army/.
– Frequent incidents of theft and profiteering, which the present military and civilian judicial organs are unable to sanction, and criminality which is becoming a general occurrence, and that, in the view of experts, is more dangerous for a people than a plague.

These negative factors exist in almost all units all the time, and have a direct impact on the escalation of a number of problems which, among other things, lead to the weakening of morale among the men.

The checkpoints/intact or semi-destroyed houses on the forward defence line and in contact with the enemy, where sometimes 10 or more /illegible/ are staying, have cast a pall over many a mother in Banija.
Due to the cold, a false sense of security if there are more of us, partial or excessive intoxication, and the incompetence of many people in lower-level units to command and take decisions on people's fates; the soldiers are crowded together in large groups without proper guarding and combat security, and are thus easy prey for the enemy who behaves like a wounded beast.
This is particularly obvious in the units that are in contact with forces of the 5th Corps of the Muslim army, whose soldiers are to a large extent intoxicated with the spread of Islam and openly state that they are on Allah's path, that this is the only true path, and that they do not care if they die as long as they take at least three Serbs with them.
In some of our units in contact with the 5th Corps of the Muslim army, signs, countersigns and passwords are not registered at all in the order of the day to the units, and in some cases are not even conveyed at all or are the subject of tasteless jokes made by arrogant individuals.
In some units, thefts committed in the course of combat operations have escalated to the extreme limits of ethics and morality in the negative sense, so that drastic measures had to be taken by the highest level of command.
For example, 20 members of the smc /expansion unknown/ from the 31st pbr who were deployed in action to assist forces of the AP ZB /Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia/ in the general sector of Velika Kladuša were more involved in gathering "war booty" than in combat activities.
In the disciplinary proceedings for the 20 of them, the Commander of the 39th Corps imposed disciplinary prison sentences as follows: one officer – 180 days; seven v/o – 180 days each; three v/o – 120 days each; two v/o – 60 days each. They are already serving their prison sentences in Gradiška.
The Commander of the 31st pbr imposed the disciplinary measure of detention for seven v/o for 20-30 days.
The uncontrolled /several words illegible/ while going to or returning from the Krajina front costs /illegible/ and casts a shadow on the SV of the RSK as a dull-witted organisation with an incompetent commanding /illegible/.
All these occurrences directly or indirectly result in too relaxed behaviour of the troops, and that ends up in fatal and needless casualties.
When contacts are made with the men in the units, the more intellectual among them raise burning, vital questions to which unfortunately, without approval from higher levels of command and the authorities, we are unable to clearly respond. Here are just the more important questions:
– Why are the military courts still not working, or why are the civilian courts not handling military matters but following decrees on the state of war, as it is abundantly clear that civilian justice does not meet the demands of the times and needs of the military organisation?

– Why do not all officers in the RSK have the same status and income while the war is going on? Three categories of officers are in command (active-service officers from the VJ /Yugoslav Army/, reserve officers, and contract officers), and there is a great deal of animosity among them, which affects the morale in general.
/several words illegible/ that it would be useful if Serbia and Montenegro /illegible/ measures to coerce all people of Krajina to return to Krajina. This particularly refers to Serbia. There is a fear that if Milošević gives away Krajina to Croatia, the Serbs in the Balkans will suffer the same fate as the North American Indians over the next 50 years.
– Why is it that at the Mošćenica border crossing a classic /illegible/ has not been set up yet, /illegible/ just a checkpoint?
– Why does the RSK Government not address the issue of the use of the Vojnić–Petrinja railway line and the issue of securing it, as was the case after the Second World War?

Major problems which are directly affecting the state of morale in units are also being created by the inability to reach an agreement in the negotiations with the Muslim Army 5th Corps over the exchange of prisoners of war and the handover of bodies. During December 1994, in fighting with the Muslim army 5th Corps, two soldiers from the 24th pbr were killed and four went missing; from the 31st pbr two were killed and one was taken prisoner; one soldier from the 39th IDO /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Detachment/ was killed.

Despite the aforementioned problems, we assess that the large majority of members of the SV of the RSK and citizens of Banija are exclusivists when it comes to the option of the so-called reintegration of Krajina into Croatia. Anyone who plays that card is certainly risking a civil war among the Serbs. Some soldiers in the units feel that coexistence with the Croats is possible and that they can repay that by recognizing and accepting the RSK as a sovereign state and homeland. Any other option is viewed as:
Continuance of the genocidal policy which has been pursued against the Serbs in these parts for over 200 years; driving the Serbs into an exodus from our centuries-old areas and extinguishing Serbdom entirely; the Vatican is seen as the greatest enemy of the Serbs, and the Croats are merely the dirty executors of the monstrous plans of their Jesuitical order.
This encourages the conscience of our soldiers and citizens, and also their determination to endure in the battle for the freedom and independence of the RSK, and the integration of Krajina into the body of Serbdom in the Balkans, even though a certain section of waverers and defectors are expressing doubt in the SVK and everyone else, and see an utter betrayal of the Serbs and Serbian interests.

Failures and shortcomings observed in 39th Corps units

On the basis of reports /about the incidents/ that happened over the New Year and Christmas holidays alone, we must present a tragic and shocking fact:
Two people were killed, and two were luckily only lightly wounded.
To make the tragedy even greater, the cause of these terrible incidents was alcohol.
– A member of our unit opened fire on an UNPROFOR vehicle. Within our units we had previously pointed out the disastrous consequences of drinking alcohol, but evidently it was not taken seriously. These incidents do, however, confirm this fact. Accordingly, in order to

prevent unfortunate incidents in the future, and especially during Serbian New Year, take the following measures:
– In all units, from the level of section commanders upwards, monitor the state of v/o with regard to alcohol consumption. Prevent drunkenness within the units and do not allow v/o to handle firearms whilst drunk.
– Make sure that the transfer of duties is conducted in accordance with the rules of service in the SO /?OS – Armed Forces/ of the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/.
– Forbid any movement of civilians in places or zones where they are not allowed.
– Forbid any abandonment of combat positions while on duty.
Otherwise, any v/o who does not abide by this should be reported to the Military Police.
– Strictly forbid alcohol from being brought into barracks, to units' positions, and during rotation of units at positions on the front. We have received a report from the *Pauk* Command that renewed black marketeering with Muslims has been observed, even with members of the 5th Corps. Inform all soldiers that anyone caught will have all his possessions confiscated, and some will even pay with their lives for such improper actions.
The border between the RSK and Western Bosnia is being guarded by members of TG-2 /Tactical Group 2/ and TG-7, in addition to our own units. Warn all members of your units and take all necessary measures to prevent black marketeering and drinking.
The entire composition of your units is to be briefed on this report, including those at the positions and those on leave, absent, or on sick leave.

10. The first issue of the *Informativni Glasnik*, the 26th pbr newsletter, has been published, dated 7 January 1995. We plan to publish the next issue by 7 February 1995. In order to improve the quality and number of contributions from the front lines, we again take this opportunity to call on the relevant parties to work with us on this, and also to enable soldiers to collaborate with the newsletter's editorial team.

Go through this report with all commands of battalions/artillery battalions, commanders of companies, platoons and sections, and use extracts from it to brief the soldiers and highlight lessons to be learned.

GM/BM

ASSISTANT COMMANDER
Major
Milan Grnović/
/signed and stamped/

TO:
– all units

ANNEX 200:

SAVO ŠRBAC SPEAKING FROM A TV STUDIO IN BANJA LUKA, 7 AUGUST 1995

VIDEO CLIP: 7th August 1995

Savo Strbac explaining from a TV studio in Banja Luka to the Serb population why the decision had been taken to take the civilians out of the so-called Krajina

Mr. Strbac.

The Croats never intended to live with the Serbs in the former Croatia.

This was now best seen in the latest examples of their aggression in Western Slavonia and now in Dalmatia, Lika, Banija and Kordun. All of us who were in a position to speak to international officials constantly kept warning them of this fact and spoke of it, that the Croats didn't want to live with us and that we cannot allow ourselves to live with them so that the genocide committed against us in the past would not be repeated. /inaudible/ and I use the term we "cannot not allow ourselves" because it has a stronger meaning than "we do not wish to live with them", we do not and cannot of course live with them and because of this it was necessary first and foremost that we preserve our biological potential, our people. We could have died off. The civilian population could have been killed. Our civilians and women could have been killed. We need our biological potential for something that is hopefully yet to come.

. . .

On the day of the most recent aggression against Krajina my association Veritas wrote a letter to Boutros-Ghali in which we alerted him with regards to this, a never before seen massacre which would be launched against the Serb population which is why it was decided in the end to begin the exodus in order to protect the people."

ANNEX 201:

APPEAL TO CROATIAN CITIZENS OF SERB NATIONALITY FROM PRESIDENT FRANJO TUĐMAN, ZAGREB, 4 AUGUST 1995

To Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality from the occupied areas of Knin, Gračac, Lapac, Korenica, Slunj, Glina, Dvor and Petrinja,

Whereas all past attempts, including yesterday's negotiations in Geneva, between the Croatian authorities and the international communities concerning the peaceful reintegration of the occupied Croatian areas have failed;

Whereas the instigators of the rebellion in Croatia, Martić and others, instead of responding to the call for peaceful reintegration, continue to wage war against the Croatian State and, together with the leaders of the rebellion in Bosnia, Karadžić and others, devise new plans for the joint conquest of the Bihać safe area, which Croatia cannot tolerate;
Whereas the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs not only prevent the return of refugees but also continue to persecute the non-Serbian population;

Whereas the Serbian extremists, from the very beginnings of the rebellion to this very day, appeal for help to the remnants of Italian fascism, offering a division of Croatian territory between Italian and Serbian imperialism;

Whereas unrestrained paramilitary Serbian units still engage in terrorist attacks on the civil population from Slavonia to Dalmatia, shell Croatian regions and the towns of Otočac, Gospić and Karlovac, and even while conducting in Geneva political talks about peaceful reintegration continue to shell Dubrovnik causing new casualties;

And whereas all the attempts of the Croatian State and of the international community to restore in a peaceful way the seized parts of Croatian territory under Croatian sovereignty have been rejected and thwarted, the Croatian State is forced to take military-police steps for the reintegration of these occupied areas into its constitutional and legal system.

We are forced to such a decision in order to put an end, after four years of futile negotiations, to the outmanoeuvring of the Croatian and international public, and in order to ensure the start of displaced person return to their homes.

Therefore, on behalf of the democratic government of Croatia:

***I call upon all members of the Serbian paramilitary units**, whether mobilized into such units of their own free will or by force, to hand in their weapons to the Croatian authorities with the guarantee that they will be granted amnesty pursuant to Croatian laws.*

***I urge the initiators of the rebellion** to grasp the futility of their enterprise and its detrimental effect on the Serbian community in Croatia if they should persist in their rebellion, to surrender to Croatian authorities and accept pardon or a fair trial for their offences.*

***I call upon Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality who have not taken active part in the rebellion** to remain at home and, without any fear for their life and their property, wait for the arrival of Croatian authorities, with the guarantee that they will be granted all civil rights and the possibility of holding elections for local self-government, in accordance with the Croatian Constution and the Constitutional Law. and in the presence of international observers.*

***I urge the representatives of Serbia and Montenegro (and their Yugoslavia)** to stop providing support to the extremists in the occupied Croatian areas, manifested also during yesterday's negotiations in Geneva, at which the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires was also present, when the Croatian Serbs refused to accept the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas. That would have been the first step towards the overall solution of Croatian-Serbian relations throughout the area of interest of the two neighbouring peoples and towards the normalization of relations based on mutual recognition.*

***We are determined** to put an end to the suffering and uncertainty of Croatian displaced persons from the occupied areas, and to guarantee to the Croatian Serbs human and ethnic rights in the constitutional and legal order of democratic Croatia.*

The President of the Republic of Croatia

Dr Franjo Tuđman

Zagreb, 4 August 1995

Original, typewritten, Latin script
HDA-1741, National minorities, file 902/17.

ANNEX 202:

AGREEMENT ON THE SURRENDER OF THE 21ST CORPS., GLINA, 8 AUGUST 1995

/handwritten and encircled: 41/
Attachment 4-154

AGREEMENT
ON THE SURRENDER OF THE 21ST CORPS

Pursuant to the agreement on cease-fire and surrender of the weapons and military equipment by the Serb rebels and the conclusions of the meeting of the military delegations held on 8 August 1995 in the headquarters of UNCRO in Glina, General Zvonimr ČERVENKO, Chief of the Main Staff of the Croatian Army, and General Janvier, Commander of UNCRO /United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation/, have reached the following

AGREEMENT
on the surrender of the 21st Kordun Corps as follows:

1. Surrender of weapons, ammunition, combat and non-combat m/v /motor vehicles/ and other military equipment

1.1. 21. On 9 August 1995, between 07:00 AM and 02:00 PM, the Kordun Corps shall surrender all its weapons and ammunition, combat and non-combat m/v and other military equipment to the Croatian Army.

1. 2. Short personal weapons shall be exempt from Item 1.1. of this Agreement, in particular:
- 100 pieces for persons in the police;
- short personal weapons belonging to officers and non-commissioned officers whose number shall be agreed by the representatives of a military commission.

1.3. The surrender of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment shall be carried out at the following two locations:

- Location no. 1 – the Brijuni Motel
- Location no. 2 – Topusko

1.4. Prior to the commencement of the surrender, a military commission shall determine the type of equipment to be taken over at specific locations and the time dynamics and manner of the surrender, taking into account that the majority of the weapons and equipment is to be surrendered at location number 1.

1.5. Within the framework of the surrender of weapons of the 21st Kordun Corps, other persons in possession of weapons (police, hunters and civilians) shall surrender all their weapons.

1.6. Representatives of UNCRO shall be present at the surrender of weapons in order to secure the area and protect persons carrying out the handover, and both parties shall mutually guarantee safety and protection of such persons.

2. Personnel evacuation has been agreed as follows:

2.1. The movement route is Topusko – Glina – Sisak – Lipovac – the Lipovac motorway and - Glina – Žirovac – Dvor na Uni.

2.2. The Croatian authorities shall ensure unhindered and safe passage along the stated routes.

2.3. Fuel, food, medical help, etc. shall be provided for those voluntarily departing from the Republic of Croatia, with UNCRO, the EM /European Mission/ and the international humanitarian organizations assisting.

2.4. The trucks belonging to the military program, which are to be used for the transportation of people, must be left at the border of the Republic of Croatia.

SERBIAN SIDE REPRESENTATIVES:	*CROATIAN ARMY REPRESENTATIVES:*
1. Commander of the 21st Kordun Corps Colonel Čedo Bulat	*1. Colonel General Petar Stipetić*
/signed/	*/signed/*
2. Tošo Pajić	*2. Brigadier Vlado Hodalj*
/signed/	*/signed/*
3. Commander of the 11th Brigade of the 21st Kordun Corps Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Kovačić	*3. Lieutenant Miroslav Vidović*
/signed/	*/signed/*

WITNESSED BY

COMMANDER OF UNCRO SECTOR NORTH
Colonel Mokrents

/signed/

Glina, 8 August 1995

ANNEX 203:

LETTER FROM COLONEL PETTIS TO BRIGADIER PLEŠTINA, 8 AUGUST 1995

/*handwritten and encircled*: 158./

/coat-of-arms/
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

Class: sp 018-04/95-151/02
File no: 512-01-04/95-73

Zagreb, 8 August 1995

Dear Sir,

Please find attached the translation and the original of the letter by Colonel Pettis from UNCRO /United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation/ regarding the conduct of the members of the 5th Corps of the ABiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in the village of Ostojić, situated two kilometres from the border with BiH.

OFFICE OF THE MORH
/Ministry of Defence of the
Republic of Croatia/ for the UN
/United Nations/ and the EZ
/European Community/
/signed and stamped/
Brigadier Budimir Pleština
Head of the Office

UNCRO
ZAGREB HEADQUARTERS

No. 1000-2 (MA)
8 August 1995 (02:47 PM)

To: Brigadier Pleština

SUBJECT: Activities in Ostojići on 7 August 1994 /as printed/ at 07:40 PM

At 07:40 PM on 7 August 1995, we received information from one of our observation posts in Sector North that members of the BiH 5th Corps were setting on fire civilian houses in the town of Ostojići (WL 8600). In addition, the UN personnel heard shooting from sidearms and screams.

We hereby appeal to you to request from the BiH 5th Corps to stop this flagrant violation of the international laws committed in the Croatian territory against the innocent civilians. The operations of the Bosnian troops are breaching the confidence that your Government has been trying to build amongst the population of the Serbs in Croatia.

Colonel Pettis

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ATTACHMENT 2.

A - List of Persons for Whom Exists Documentation that they are Members of Military Formation

No..	No.. CHC	SURNAME	NAME	NAME OCA	DATE OF BIRTH	STATUS
1	16	GRBA	ĐORĐE (ĐURO)	NIKOLA	18.11.1939	**Went missing/found in u dijelovima vojne uniform** Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090074) • Autopsy report - Petrinja, Cemetery Sv. Nikole, NN 11
2	36	LONČAR	NEBOJŠA	DUŠAN	19.11.1974	**Went missing/found in military uniform** Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090639/01) • Autopsy report - Petrinja, Cemetery Sv. Nikole, NN 162
3	57	BEKIĆ	MILOŠ	STOJAN	27.12.1972	Went missing/found in military uniform Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-091038-01) • Autopsy report - Petrinja, Cemetery Sv. Nikole, NN 164
4	76	VORKAPIĆ	STEVAN	MARKO	01.11.1972	Went missing/found in military uniform Source: • family statement in the request for searc (no. ICRC: HRZ-090618-01)

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ATTACHMENT 2.

B - List of Persons for Whom Military Status is Stated in the Request for Search (on Basis of the Statement of the Families)

No..	No.. CHC	SURNAME	NAME	NAME OCA	DATE OF BIRTH	STATUS	
1	19	MILOŠEVIĆ	PETAR	MILE	14.10.1935	**Went missing as a member of military unit 21 KK (VP 9107 Source: • Death report, ICRC**	
2	20	MILJUŠEVIĆ	DRAGIĆ	MILAN	02.05.1967	**Soldier, went missing Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090175**	
3	24	TEPAVAC	MILE	RADOJICA	20.04.1945	**Soldier of so called RSK army Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090362/01**	
4	34	IVANOVIĆ	DRAGAN	RADE	23.06.1953	**Soldier of so called RSK army Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090208/01**	
5	37	MARTINOVIĆ	ĐURO	ILIJA	05.01.1953	**Soldier, went missing Sources: • medical documentation of Military medical academy of JNA, Beograd**	***ID***
6	59	CREVAR	MILE	ĐURO	17.01.1943	**Soldier, driver of ambulance car of 19. brigade 21. corpus of so called RSK army Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090713/01**	***N***
7	65	KROŠNJAR	DMITAR	DRAGAN	12.2.1949	**Soldier, went missing Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090206/01**	***N***
8	67	MADŽARAC	DRAGAN	PETAR	11.11.1952	**Went missing in military uniform Sources: • family statement in the request for search (no. ICRC: HRZ-090311**	***ID***

ANNEX 206:

DISCREPANCY REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFERING, ATTACHMENT 3

ATTACHMENT 3.

Persons for Whom Mistakes or Disparities in the Description of the Circumstances of the Suffering were Established

civilians

	According to CHC report				According to documentation of Directorate for detained and missing persons		
No.	**No. CHC**	**Surname**	**Name**	**Circumstances**	**Surname**	**Name**	**Circumstances**
1	51	LJILJAK	MILE	Went missing at Rujevca 6.8.1995.	LJILJAK	MILOŠ	According to request for search (no. ICRC HRZ-091040-01 from March 2003.) Person with wife enterd Baranja as a refugee. Since then, there's no information about this person. Note : Still on the list of missing persons.
2	70	MIRILOVIĆ	NIKOLA	Went with the refugee column down the road Glina - Dvor. Last time seen near Dvor	MIRILOVIĆ	NIKOLA	According to request for search (no. ICRC HRZ-090401 from March 2002.) Person went missing 7.8.1995. on highway Zagreb - Beograd, in Spačva forest. Note : Still on the list of missing persons.

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ATTACHMENT 1A.

List of Persons with Incorrect Personal Data (OPERATION "STORM")

According to CHC report						According to documentation of Directorate for detained and missing persons			
No.	No. CHC	Surname	Name	Father's name	Date of birth	Surname	Name	Father's name	Date of birth
1	7	KRANJČEVIĆ	DRAGICA	MILE	**1937**	KRANJČEVIĆ	DRAGICA	MILE	**.1933**
2	12	PETROVIĆ	MILIĆ	**RANKO**	1931	PETROVIĆ	MILIĆ	**MILAN**	30.03.1931
3	16	GRBA	**ĐURO**	NIKOLA	**1938**	GRBA	**ĐORĐE**	NIKOLA	**18.11.1939**
4	19	MILOŠEVIĆ	**PERO**	MILE	**1936.**	MILOŠEVIĆ	**PETAR**	MILE	**14.10.1935**
5	20	MILJUŠEVIĆ	**DRAGAN**	MILAN		MILJUŠEVIĆ	**DRAGIĆ**	MILAN	**02.05.1967**
6	23	SIKIRICA	**LJUBAN**	SIMO	**1960**	SIKIRICA	**LJUBOMIR**	SIMO	**01.01.1965**
7	26	TOMIĆ	MILOŠ	**SIMO**	**1956**	TOMIĆ	MILOŠ	**SIMEON**	**20.01.1957**
8	33	HRSTIĆ	ANA		**1911**	HRSTIĆ	ANA	**SIMO**	**20.01.1912**
9	35	KRIVOKUĆA	DARKO	NIKOLA	**1965**	KRIVOKUĆA	DARKO	NIKOLA	**24.06.1966**
10	36	LONČAR	NEBOJŠA		**74.G**	LONČAR	NEBOJŠA	**DUŠAN**	**19.11.1974**
11	39	RADOVIĆ	**MIŠO**	STEVAN	**1957**	RADOVIĆ	**MILOŠ**	STEVAN	**23.06.1955**
12	42	NOŽINIĆ	OSTOJA (VOJIN)		**1947**	NOŽINIĆ	OSTOJA	**VASO**	**05.05.1948**
13	51	LJILJAK	**MILE**	RADE	**65.G**	LJILJAK	**MILOŠ**	RADE	**.1933**
14	52	MAĐARAC	ĆIRO	OSTOJA	**1946**	MADŽARAC	ĆIRO	OSTOJA	**.1947**
15	61	JANJIĆ	LJUBICA	STANKO	**1924**	JANJIĆ	LJUBICA	STANKO	**22.02.1922**
16	63	KOMADINA	STEVAN	NIKOLA	**1930**	KOMADINA	STEVAN	NIKOLA	**02.08.1931**
17	65	KROŠNJAR	DMITAR		**1958**	KROŠNJAR	DMITAR	**DRAGAN**	**12.2.1949**
18	66	**KUKOLJ**	MILENKO		1938	**KUKULJ**	MILENKO	**RADE**	**09.03.1936**
19	67	MAĐARAC	DRAGAN	PERO	**1954**	MADŽARAC	DRAGAN	PETAR	**11.11.1952**
20	69	MILIĆ	ĐURĐA	PERO	**1971**	MILIĆ	ĐURĐICA	PETAR	**13.05.1969**
21	70	MIRILOVIĆ	NIKOLA		**1929.**	MIRILOVIĆ	NIKOLA	**RADE**	**22.02.1926**
22	76	VORKAPIĆ	STEVO	MARKO	**22 G.**	VORKAPIĆ	STEVAN	MARKO	**01.11.1972**

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ATTACHMENT 1B.

List of Persons with Incomplete Personal Data (OPERATION"STORM")

B - List of persons s incomplete personal data (8)

According to CHC report						According to documentation of Directorate for detained and missing persons			
No.	No. CHC	Surname	Name	Father's name	Date of birth	Surname	Name	Father's name	Date of birth
1	8	KRANJČEVIĆ	ĐURĐA		35.G	KRANJČEVIĆ	ĐURĐA	JOVO	01.05.1961
2	21	MLAĐAN	FILIP		1909	MLAĐAN	FILIP	DRAGIĆ	14.1.1909
3	22	MLAĐAN	MILKA		1912	MLAĐAN	MILKA	MILIĆ	10.3.1912
4	34	IVANOVIĆ	DRAGAN	RADE	40.G	IVANOVIĆ	DRAGAN	RADE	23.06.1953
5	50	KRNJAJIĆ	PERO		1938	KRNJAJIĆ	PERO	JOVAN	.1938
6	56	BATALO	MILOŠ		1933	BATALO	MILOŠ	MIRKO	.1933
7	62	KLJAJIĆ	BOGDANKA		1952	KLJAJIĆ	BOGDANKA	JOVO	15.11.1952
8	68	MILIĆ	LJUBICA		1952	MILIĆ	LJUBICA	ĐURAĐ	20.02.1952

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ANNEX 209:

UN, CODED CABLE, MEETING WITH MR ŠARINIĆ, 9 SEPTEMBER 1995

CZN-1623
CZC-1326
SSN-2465

R0106924

UNPF - HQ

Page 1 of 3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 95 SEP -9 16:04

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB Y. Akashi

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1634

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr Sarinic

1. In a meeting I had with Mr Sarinic this morning, several issues were discussed, including the new UNCRO mandate, the issue of the Serb DPs in Sector South HQ and Croatia's views on the American peace initiative.

2. On the agreement reached in Geneva yesterday, Mr Sarinic noted that while the Croatians believed progress had been made on the Bosnian issue, they were disappointed with the results on the Sector East problem. As a result, Croatia would insist on a package deal for both BH and Croatia and would not allow Sector East to be dealt with in isolation as "Milosevic wants". However, if Croatia could reach an agreement on Sector East with either the Sector East Serbs or Milosevic directly, and before an overall solution to the BH conflict, that would be acceptable. The absolute deadline for a solution to Sector East was the end of the UNCRO mandate.

3. I informed Sarinic that at yesterday's meeting between the HV and ARSK Generals in Sector East, considerable progress had been achieved: by 10 September, the zone of separation should be cleared and UNCRO OPs restored. UNCRO was continuing its efforts to diffuse tension in SE in a swift and efficient manner. We were, furthermore, defining in detail our future presence in the area: it would comprise the two battalions presently in the sector and the addition of two Danish companies in the southern portion of the sector.

4. Sarinic made no comment on our intention to add the Danish companies, apart from the expected remark regarding Croatia's dissatisfaction with RUSBAT. He was keen, however, to know whether we had begun our helicopter and river patrols on the Danube and pushed for information on the status of the implementation of this part of our proposed new

Internal distribution: SRSG, FC, CoM UNCRO, DFC, ASG/M&C, COS, DOA, HAAU, SE/UNHCR, PLA.

95 SEP -9 16:23

R0106925

1623 2/3

mandate. I told him that the details on the manner in which we intended to implement our mandate, within the framework of the previous report of the Secretary-General, were yet to be put before the Council. The aerial and river patrols were, therefore, dependent on the acceptance of the Secretary-General's forthcoming report.

5. Sarinic then informed me that the Kutina Chemical factory had once again been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs last night. He also claimed that Zupanje had been shelled. The Croatians were currently investigating the matter and would "then take steps to protect our area". He said that "Croatia can not accept it anymore and if it continues we will be obliged to reply". I have told Sarinic that UNCRO will investigate the matter - it is possible that the Croatians are building a case for an offensive to create a buffer zone in the area between themselves and the Bosnian Serbs, if deemed necessary. These kinds of allegations will need to be responded to quickly and effectively if tensions arising from them are to be diffused.

6. On the issue of human rights, Sarinic was disturbed at what he believed was our focus on negative rather than positive actions by the HV. He made particular mention of our press and information reports on mass graves as having had "an effect on the international community". He insisted that these reports were untrue and should be retracted. He also insisted that the Croatians, particularly General Cermak, had provided UNCRO will all the necessary details to refute such claims. I assured Sarinic that we would ensure that all our reports were factual and refrain from making any sweeping judgements in our press releases. However, while I did not in any way associate the continued burning and looting in Sectors North and South with the Government, in some cases Croatian army and police had been seen in the vicinity of such incidents. I asked that UNCRO be given access to burial sites and records of those buried in these sites. Sarinic made no comment one way or another on this issue, except to correct my pronunciation of a cemetery to which we had been denied access .

7. With regard to the DPs in our Sector South HQ, Sarinic said that he had discussed the issue with the Croatian Justice Department in view of its legal and political dimensions. The Justice Department had agreed to reduce the list of those accused of war crimes from the current total to 35. The conditions for this agreement were as follows: the 35 accused could be identified by UNCRO in the HQ and handed over to the Croatians. Otherwise, the Croatians must be permitted to enter the HQ and identify them, in the presence of UNCRO, with necessary documentation (photos, "sheet of accusation" etc). Croatia would then start its investigative procedure and allow UNCRO "information" on the procedures. The UN must, in turn, not insist on "sticky conditions". Once the 35 were handed over to Croatian police, evacuation of the remaining DPs in the HQ could begin - Croatia would be willing to provide protection for their evacuation. In order to break the impasse on this issue, I have agreed to proceed in the manner recommended by Sarinic, and to inform UNCRO accordingly. He will inform General Cermak of the agreed procedure.

R0106926

1623

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8. Sarinic then turned to the issue of the 105 detainees from Western Slavonia which I had raised with him previously. He said that he had asked the Justice Department for clarification on their lack of access to defence lawyers and had been informed that under Croatian law, there is no need for the government to provide defence council to those accused of crimes whose punishment is less than ten years. The detainees themselves had also signed papers saying that they did not require defence lawyers - UNCRO was free to check up on this. When I suggested that in the prevailing atmosphere it could be in Croatia's interest to provide defence counsel despite their law, one of his assistants stated that "If they don't want lawyers, we can not force them to have them." Sarinic then noted that of 73 accused from Western Slavonia only "21 were condemned". He said that these figures were in themselves an argument for the fair justice system in Croatia.

9. Finally, Sarinic raised the issue of UNPF/UNCRO vacating premises at Pleso. He said that he was been pressurized by Croatian Airlines and the Army for a return of at least some of the space we were currently occupying at the airport. He suggested that Croatian Airlines and UNPF "cohabitate" in the hangar currently at our disposal, and that we pursue this issue with some urgency due to its delicate nature. I have asked that he provide us with written details on his proposals in order that we be able to follow up on the issue. He has promised to do so.

ANNEX 210:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ORDER ON THE WORK OF THE MILITARY POLICE, COOPERATION BETWEEN AND JOINT WORK OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICE, AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE MILITARY POLICE TOWARDS DETAINED MEMBERS OF PARA-MILITARY AND PARA-POLICE FORMATIONS, 3 AUGUST 1995WORK OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICE, AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE MILITARY POLICE TOWARDS DETAINED MEMBERS OF PARA-MILITARY AND PARA-POLICE FORMATIONS, 3 AUGUST 1995

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/illegible/
Forwarded in
code and by courier /

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/coat of arms/

- by courier -
- in code -

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION

Class: *SP /strictly confidential/ 80-01/95-158*
No: *512-19/01-95-/handwritten: 474/*
In Zagreb, *3 August 1995*

- *66th VP /Military Police/ Battalion - Zagreb*
- *67th VP Battalion - Zagreb*
- *68th VP Battalion - Osijek*
- *69th VP Company - Bjelovar*
- *70th VP Company - Karlovac*
- *71st VP Battalion - Rijeka*
- *72nd VP Battalion - Split*
- *73rd VP Battalion - Split*
- *74th VP Company - Zagreb*
- *NSVP /?Military Police Training Centre/ - Zagreb*

to the commander/s/ in person

- *UVP /Military Police Administration/*

Departments and Sections

Subject: ***O r d e r*** ***on the work of the military police, cooperation between and joint work of the civilian and military police, and obligations of the military police towards detained members of para-military and para-police formations***

On 3 August 1995, a working meeting was held with representatives of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ at which the tactics and method of conduct of the military police and civilian police at the start of offensive operations and in newly liberated areas of the RH were discussed.

In keeping with the conclusions, and in order to ensure that they are implemented on all levels of command of units of the VP /Military Police/ of the OS /Armed Forces/ of the RH, I hereby

ORDER

1. Immediately on all levels of command in VP units, and consistently with the zones of responsibility of the RH OS VP, establish contacts with the chiefs of PU /police administrations/ and commanders of PP /police stations/ in the zones of responsibility of the VP units and agree on joint work on the tasks issued in the order of the VP Administration chief Kl. /class/ SP/strictly confidential/-80-01/95-158, No. 512-19/01-95-466 dated 2 August 1995, focusing in particular on carrying out the following tasks:

   1.1. Establish strict checkpoints in front of the present dispositions of HV units once the combat operations have started.

   1.2. Follow the advance of the RH OS in the depth of the liberated territory with joint patrols and ensure law and order, traffic for the needs of the HV, and the isolation and evacuation of civilians for their security.

   1.3. In populated places, by means of joint patrols ensure law and order and everything else as listed in point 1.2. The RH MUP will take over the security of vital buildings in liberated towns, while the military police will provide the required assistance.

   1.4. At bigger intersections in liberated areas, establish joint checkpoints in order to regulate traffic and provide security for HV and civilian columns and so on.

   1.5. Anti-terrorist VP units reinforced by dog guides and General VP staff shall be used to "mop up" (search) the terrain and buildings and destroy remaining fortified enemy groups.

   1.6. Set up VP platoons in RH MUP PU centres in liberated areas, and military police sub-stations the strength of a squad to a platoon in larger urban areas for as long as the HV stays in them.

   1.7. On the lines attained and once HV units have switched to defence, independently establish strict checkpoints.

   1.8. All documentation found, both military and other, including personal documents, shall be handed over to SIS /Security and Information Service/ officers.

2. A military police unit shall conduct itself in the following manner towards detained members of para-military and para-police formations and civilians fit for military service:

   - it shall take them over from HV units or members of the HV and issue a certificate that it has taken them over with the belongings and in the state as recorded on the spot,
   - it shall escort them to the Reception Centre, which is in the jurisdiction of the RH MUP, hand the detained persons and belongings found on them to the commander of the Reception Centre, and take a certificate certifying that it has handed them

over with all their belongings, after which the patrol shall return to its regular tasks,
- the crime military police acts together with the crime police in processing the detained persons,
- the commanders of VP units do not have any other obligations towards detained persons, nor do they keep them in the VP units or in RZ /prisoner of war/ camps,
- at the request of the chief of the PU, the commander of a VP unit can assign one military police patrol to be located close to the Reception Centre and to intervene against HV members in the event they try to threaten the security of RH MUP staff guarding the detainees or the security of the detainees,
- the first and last names of the detainees handed over to the Reception Centre shall be brought up to date regularly and kept in the records of the RH OS VP.

3. Women, children and the elderly from liberated areas shall be handed over by members of the military police to the nearest PP in the liberated area of the RH or to the PP in the free territory of the RH, with a record being made of the persons handed over and signed by the person taking them over in the RH MUP PP.

4. VP unit commanders shall brief all levels of command in VP units and all members of the military police on this order during the night and ensure that it is implemented.

5. Ensure that members of the military police are rigorous in performing all military police tasks and require the same from colleagues from the RH MUP.

For: ***C H I E F***
Major General
/signed: Marjan BIŠKIĆ/
Mate LAUŠIĆ

Sent to:
- The RH Minister of Defence
  Mr. Gojko ŠUŠAK (for his attention)
- The Chief of the HV GS /Main Staff/
  General of the Army Zvonimir ČERVENKO (for his attention)
- Assistant Minister of Security
  Brigadier Markica REBIĆ (for his attention)
- The Chief of the Political Administration of the
  MORH /Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia/
  Major General Ivan TOLJ
- Commanders of ZP /Military Districts/ (all)
- Assistant Minister of UP /Internal Affairs/
  Mr. Joško MORIĆ

MB/TH

/stamp:/ This is to certify that this copy - extract
is identical to the original.
Zagreb, 15 September 2003
Certified by:
/a signature and illegible stamp/

ANNEX 211:

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINUTES FROM THE 257TH CLOSED SESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA, 4 AUGUST 1995

/the official crest of the Republic of Croatia/

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

No. 67/1995 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MINUTES
from the 257th closed session of the Government of the Republic of Croatia,
held on 04 August 1995

Present at the session:

Prime Minister of the Government: N. Valentić

Deputy Prime Ministers of the Government:
Dr I. Kostović; Dr M. Granić, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Dr J. Radić, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reconstruction and Development;

Ministers:
G. Šušak, Minister of Defense; I. Jarnjak, Minister of the Interior; N. Vidošević, Minister of Economy; I. Mudrinić, Minister of Maritime Affairs, Traffic and Communications; Dr A. Hebrang, Minister of Health; I. Gaži, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; and M. Matulović-Dropulić, Minister of Regional Planning, Construction and Housing.

Ministers in the Government:
Z. Mateša, MA, Dr I. Majdak, Dr J. Njavro, Dr A. Rebić and M. Petrović

Standing-in for the secretary of the Government: A. Gabrijel

Absent:
MSc. B. Škegro, and B. Mišetić, Deputy Prime Ministers of the Government; B. Prka, Minister of Finance; Z. Vitez, Minister of Culture; Lj. Vokić, Minister of Education and Sports; M. Šeparović, Minister of Justice; D. Mlakar, Minister of Administration, J. Škara, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; MSc N. Bulić, Minister of Tourism; Dr B. Jeren, Minister of Science and Technology; I. Penić, Minister of Privatization and Property Administration; MSc Č. Pavlović, Minister in the Government; and J. Premužić, secretary of the Government.

Also in attendance:
Dr P. Jurković, Governor of the Croatian National Bank; M. Jukić, Deputy Finance Minister; M. Mileta, Deputy Justice Minister; Dr Z. Kovač, Deputy Minister of Science and Technology; E. Rajić, Deputy Minister of Privatization and Property Administration; V. Babić, Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; D. Jelačić-Bužinski, Assistant Minister of Culture; Dr R. Vouk, Assistant Minister of Education and Sports; S. Kolesar, Assistant Minister of Tourism; M. Martinec, Assistant Minister of Administration; Z. Rogić, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Croatia; M. Baletić, Head of the Public Relations Office; M. Prus, Head of the Legislation Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia; T. Vidošević, advisor to the

Prime-Minister of the Government of the Republic of Croatia; N. Mamić, advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Secretary of Commerce Coordination; and S. Hojski, advisor in the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

Beginning at 16:00 hrs

Presiding: Nikica Valentić, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia

The following agenda was adopted:

Agenda

1. Information from the competent ministries on the current military-political situation

2. Assignments of the ministries tasked with implementing decisions of the Government of the Republic of Croatia concerning the introduction of civilian authorities in the liberated areas

3. Assignments of the Commissioners of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the liberated areas

*****

1. Information from the competent ministries on the current military-political situation

In the introduction, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia, N. Valentić, pointed out the necessity of the military-police operation undertaken by the Croatian armed forces with the aim of liberating the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia, and also remarked that the Republic of Croatia did everything to resolve the said crisis via negotiations, but there was no response from the other side.

Defense Minister, Gojko Šušak, informed the Government that the military-police operations have been successfully carried out at all breakthrough spots.

Minister of the Interior, I. Jarnjak, informed the Government that the regular police have assumed responsibility for ensuring public peace and order and for protecting citizens and property in the liberated areas.

I. Jarnjak also pointed out that the civilian protection units were preparing to carry out tasks of sanitation of the liberated terrain.

Minister of the Interior pointed out that due to military operations, the road to Maslenica was closed down and thus the entire traffic in that part of Croatia has been redirected to the Island of Pag, which has caused major gridlocks which will be removed during the day.

Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mate Granić, informed the Government of diplomatic activities of our state with regard to the said operation and about the response that the operation elicited in the world.

Minister of Health, Dr A. Hebrang, informed the Government that until 15:00 hrs 24 Croatian soldiers died and 228 were wounded.

2. Assignments of the ministries tasked with implementing decisions of the Government of the Republic of Croatia concerning introduction of civil authorities in the liberated areas

Following the account by N. Valentić, the Government has assigned all the ministries to do everything they functionally can to introduce the civilian authorities into the liberated areas.

The Ministry of Justice was assigned to establish judicial authorities in these areas immediately.

The Ministry of Administration was assigned to organize self-government and administration organs in the liberated areas and the Commissioners of the Government shall, in that sense, take over the affairs as soon as possible. In line with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and with the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, authority shall be performed in accordance with the democratic principles and with care for the protection of national rights.

The Government has ordered the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to immediately put into function all the institutions from its jurisdiction as to enable implementation of all social rights of the citizens in the recently liberated areas.

The ministries of economy, agriculture and forestry and of tourism shall be bound to ensure that the production in the industry and energy sectors and in the agriculture, as well as the activities in tourism are brought to the optimum and go in accordance with the new circumstances.

The Government also pointed out that it shall continuously monitor the development of the situation and shall undertake all the required measures as necessary for the functioning of the state authority.

3. Assignments of the Commissioners of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the liberated areas

Assistant Minister of Administration, M. Martinec, informed the Government that executive and representative bodies of local self-government had been previously elected for certain areas liberated in the military -police action by the Croatian forces, which have until now functioned outside of their areas and are now preparing to return.

In some municipalities where elections have not been held, the Government appointed its commissioners, who shall start performing their jobs as soon as possible.

With regard to the above stated, following the discussion with the participation of Dr J. Radić, Dr I. Majdak and N. Valentić, the Government concluded that the issue of future work

of the Commissioners of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the liberated municipalities shall be considered at one of the upcoming Government sessions.

The session ended at 16:30 hrs.

ACTING SECRETARY: PRIME MINISTER:

Andreja Gabrijel Nikica Valentić

RECORDED!

MINUTES

from the 256th closed session of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, held at 2 St. Mark's Square.

BEGINNING: 16:00 hrs
CHAIRED BY: Nikica Valentić, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia

PRIME MINISTER:

Just a couple of seconds so this agreement is recorded, so that the television can record it, and then we can issue an announcement, because it is important that these announcements are measured and in accordance with the overall strategy we have. I think this introductory part can be recorded and afterwards I will ask the press to leave the session.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hereby announce that the 256th closed session of the Government of the Republic of Croatia is open. You have the Agenda in the attachment, and I propose that we accept this Agenda as it encompasses the entirety of the issues and under these items we shall bring decisions appropriate to the situation which the country currently finds itself in. I would like to ask the members of the press at this point, if anybody needs a couple of more seconds to record something to do so, and to understand the reasons for us holding a closed session of the Government.

All right, ladies and gentlemen, before the competent ministers briefly provide information in connection with the 1st item, I would like to ask that the entire Government session does not last for longer than 30 to 45 minutes, as there is no need. These are only the most necessary information and most necessary decisions. The Government will practically hold sessions all the time, and if need be we shall have a Government session every day, naturally if the same is required. Mostly all ministers and deputy prime ministers are returning from vacation tomorrow, and I didn't want to call them down today, mainly because if we had done this yesterday, this could have immediately arisen certain suspicions due to 5 or 6 ministers still being on vacation, and today for certain reasons and security even though everyone has reported and many are already on their way and they all absolutely wanted be already on this session of the Government today. So, all members of the Government will be in Zagreb already tomorrow.

In the introductory part, before the ministers of defense, of the interior and of foreign affairs truly give the briefest information, as the Prime Minister I am obligated to point out the significance and historic responsibility of all of us participating in the implementation of Croatian authority for what has been happening in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, what is in fact deciding on the fate of the Croatian state and the entire Croatian corps. You know more or less everything from the information, you are aware of all the motives, all the reasons, in this type of closed session. I feel that it must be said that truly everything was done to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner through negotiations, and unfortunately, there wasn't even a theoretical possibility to resolve the crisis through negotiations. As time went by, the Serbs were becoming more reserved, they were growingly linking with Bosnian Serbs, with Yugoslavia, and unfortunately the war and this possibility was in store for us all. And I feel that we can have a clear conscience, all of us who more or less decided in bringing or advising in the process of

bringing decisions, because this decision was necessary. For this reason I would like to ask everyone to act at the level of responsibility before us, naturally within the competency of your ministries to also organize services, that you are all on-call for 24 hours a day to be able to comply with any request we may have, any of our information.

At this point, I would first like to ask the Defense Minister to briefly inform us of the situation on the battlefields, at least what can be said at this moment, and afterwards the Minister of the Interior and briefly the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the international aspects. Please, Mr. Šušak, proceed.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

Mr. Prime Minister, on the basis of an order by the Supreme Commander, this morning at 05:00 hrs we headed in the region from Bosanska Dubica around the former sectors south and north all the way to Bosansko Grahovo. We are conducting activities on approx. 40 directions, advancements have been made on all 40 directions, in some areas bigger in some smaller. They were significantly bigger in the south and in the Lika region then in the north. Altogether we could.../as printed/ staff still conclude that what has been implemented in the first day that it was already carried out in the overall situation, which does not mean that there were equal advancements made on every front line. The biggest advancements were made toward Knin, from the Dinara Mountain toward Peruča Lake and I believe that this will be closed off completely by this evening. From the south also toward Vrlika, and Minister Mudrinić's settlement is liberated, we are within reach of Drniš. From the west, special units of the Ministry of the Interior /MUP/ and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Guards Brigade have made an advance which is employed the entire day and they are moving on toward the Lika region, and Lički Osik is in encirclement, I believe that it is already in the hand. And according to all estimates, the River Korana is crossed; all units have crossed the river and are moving forward, along the river. We are having problems at Petrinja; we engaged the air force there, which is interesting, this time. Mr. Prime Minister, we had 18 sorties so far, we have not lost a single airplane and the activities were successful. We destroyed Čelavac; this is their main information center, this morning at 06:00 hrs. Now we have shelled this is Petrinja also, these resistance points that exist there. Regarding casualties on our side, so far according to the registers, there are 18 dead, around 40 wounded but we haven't managed to gather all of the information yet.

PRIME MINISTER:

And the Ministry of Health?

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

This is a very low number according to estimates Mr. Prime Minister, yesterday out of nowhere up in the Grahovo region we had a misfortune and we lost 10 men, therefore I would, and you were also present at the President's briefing, I think that we can say with pleasure that day 1 of 4 days planned for the operation, ended successfully. The first lines of defense have been breached mainly in all places. So, that is it.

PRIME MINISTER:

Thank you. Minister Jarnjak?

IVAN JARNJAK:

Mr. Prime Minister, alongside participating in this combat segment what the Defense Minister was talking about, in agreement with the very Ministry of Defense, we have prepared 3.500 policemen in regular blue uniforms from the northwestern and northern part of Croatia, the part which is not directly participating in the war and 500 of them have already been sent to Zadar, Gospić and Šibenik, because as the army enters the area, the Military Police follows which secures the line, and immediately after the regular police enters the area and takes over all those tasks that the regular police is obligated to conduct according to the Constitution and the Law, and those are maintaining public peace and order, protection of life and property. In this respect, all police stations, substations and */illegible/* will be...and these police administrations in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs, or rather pursuant to the Law, Constitutional Law on minorities, have been established. The only thing we do not have at this point is the chiefs of police administrations for these two administrations who have to be appointed by the Government on the basis of a proposal by the Assemblies of those districts. However, we will do this in the manner that we will propose, the ministry will send a proposal for the Government to have officers in charge at the same time until elections are held there, to appoint two men who will act as chiefs of those police administrations, and orders have been placed for sign boards for every police station and those two administrations and substations as well. This is extremely important and they will be finished by this evening, and starting from tomorrow, every settlement that is liberated and is the headquarters of the same, sign boars will be placed from there onward. Regular police is introduced and the regular police start functioning and doing its part of the job.

The other part of the job is completed. Civilian protection is being prepared to conduct sanitation of the terrain, the part that is liberated. Therefore, this part will also absolutely be carried out and thirdly, we put into preparation around 2.500 firemen from northern Croatia who would in case of any major fires at the Adriatic, and we can expect that the same could be caused either by artillery, inflammable bullets or something other, so that we can transfer a part of the firemen form that part of Croatia to this southern part of the Adriatic including fire trucks.

Currently, we are experiencing a problem on Pag which we have anticipated and it is being resolved; because the road toward Maslenica is blocked for army use and all traffic has been redirected to Pag. There is a column of vehicles approx. 4 kilometers long on Pag at this moment. One larger column is moving toward Pag, but we are hoping that there are 4 projects */tr. remark: probably ferries/* running. We considered employing a fifth. The fifth is just a hindrance because nothing is gained by this. Therefore, 4 are running. I would only ask that they operate 24 hours a day. Sometime between 12:00 and 14:00 hours we will resolve the problem of traffic entirely. Traffic is also regulated in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, the Karlovac road is blocked, and passage through Karlovac and the passage toward Senj, so there is no traffic there aside from local and military. I believe that we have in this manner secured a sizeable flow so that everything can be, and this traffic, civilian, is redirected to the old Karlovac road. The drivers have shown tremendous understanding, and this organization of traffic is respected, and also I can say at this point what we received from the street that the people are very motivated and positive regarding the upholding of this action and I believe that for now things are going as they should. Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER:

Thank you. Minister Granić.

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DR. MATE GRANIĆ:

Mr. Prime Minister, the Split Declaration is beyond a doubt the strongest fore move following the Washington Agreement and it has created conditions for th Glamoč operation and it was carried out de facto without, not only any more serious i consequences but also, I would say, with the support of USA and Germany. There wa of a presidential statement in the Security Council and even that was not accepted. H will not be the case with respect to this operation. The optimum foreign politica existed some 7 days ago when there was a fierce attack on Bihać there. Now we are l trouble with this Stoltenberg's proposal in Geneva and the Serbs' acceptance of this p the agreements between Galbraith and Babić, even though naturally all of us know tl all mock agreements, that afterwards and that they are under coercion and under sugg from these Stoltenberg and these international negotiators and they are practically mo this matter in these first days. Today Janvier threatened that he is going to seek NAT in the event the military forces become jeopardized as well, and Beek threatened ever court in the event the civilian population is jeopardized.

However, regarding the rest of the international community it is my opinio from one statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain requesting wit that the overall responses are moderate. For this purpose of clarifying our position, w to the Security Council, to the Contact Group and the European Union. Last night tl of the Republic wrote letters to President Clinton and President Kohl as first notificati the Office Šarinić received Ambassadors of Great Britain and the Russian Federat time, at 17:00 hrs the diplomatic corps is going to be received, and we are in contact b with all foreign leading ministers of foreign affairs, from Kinkel, Solana, Kovač, Tal who, some of who have shown strong support. I would say Šačirbej, and Taler an well. Kinkel expressed understanding. Regarding the media, the information staff wh established will commence work now at 18:00 hrs. It is working intensively, how center will also be formed which will commence work at 18:00 hours and w everything possible to cover the foreign media, because Zagreb is now practically t all media activity. This is the primary news on Sky and CNN; hence from this morn of our people have given some ten or so interviews to all leading TV stations. We are this will end, that tonight an attempt will be made of a presidential statement in t Council, but we believe that if everything proceeds as Mr. Šušak said, approx. 4 da we will be able to avoid any kind of, let's say any kind of sanctions surely, and if s presidential statement is going to be, I think it won't be of importance.

PRIME MINISTER:

Thank you, now I would like to ask only if any of the ministers has somethir to say regarding this matter to do so, because it's a matter of minutes. Under the 2nd now only read the assignments which I will coordinate, and the 3rd item is impor assigned Ministry of Administration regarding the functioning in this segment of authority. Minister Šušak again, proceed.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

There is something, Mr. Prime Minister, which is going to be in the news this to cause panic, and allegedly the Supreme Staff of the Yugoslav Army held a sessi brought a decision to attack Osijek. It finished around 15:30 today. This news c

reported to Martić in Knin, and Mr. Prime Minister we have in sector, so-called Sector East, we have placed such forces that they cannot carry out a breach on any line. The only thing that could happen is that Osijek could be shelled. In this event, we will conduct ourselves as we must.

PRIME MINISTER:
Thank you. Minister Mudrinić?

IVICA MUDRINIĆ:
Just so I don't forget to tell Minister Granić, Mate, the NATO cannot fly inside over Croatia without our approval. This is the agreement and contract with them, not even over occupied areas and...

PRIME MINISTER:
Gentlemen ministers, all of this, this is only a short information, international coordination here, I am here 24 hours a day on line, so, certain ministers, don't be troubled about this, the information is important, this is an important information for Osijek so that there is no panic, although we must not exclude any option and we are not excluding this possibility. And what needs not be said here gentlemen, is that this is real war. We won't say this aloud but you must be aware that this is a real war, 200.000 people are involved on both sides, so 250.000 people is involved in the war, this is in world circumstances and the history of war, this is a full-size war, therefore, I am asking you to be aware of the situation and the decisive moments we are in. So, let us not get into the smallest details. Thank you.
Minister Hebrang, do you wish to comment on this information that you gave me? Please.

DR. ANDRIJA HEBRANG:
Just briefly Mr. Prime Minister, the information received at 15:00 hours, which in fact means at 13:00 hours from the field, we are counting two hours latency from extraction of the wounded to the processing in the hospitals, all centers have received a total of 228 wounded, one third is seriously wounded, and 24 dead until this moment. Information from Split is delayed due to poor connections with Livno and our war hospitals in that area. The highest number was evident in Sisak and Gospić with 90 each; this is considered as significantly below military effect, below the expected casualties for the accomplished military effect.

PRIME MINISTER:
Thank you, since this is all still unofficial information, this data on casualties, clearly, it will simply be filtered through the staffs and the part that is appropriate with respect to the situation will be published. I am concluding item 1, now item 2 gentlemen. Given that every ministry is in constant contact with me, I will just remind the ministries of their obligations, with respect to the overall and the propaganda and other situation we will provide more information in the announcement but I will try to assign some additional tasks to you. Ministry of Construction, preparations for duty service for clearing up potential ruins in the course of shelling and bombing particularly in Slavonia, put special attention to that now, because it is very important that there are dredges there and all of the machinery on stand-by in case of bombing. Naturally, the utility services and everything else. Economy, maintenance, current levels of production to the extent possible under these circumstances, security with respect to the largest potential and dangerous productions from Kutina, Pliva, Oki, you all know this well, so once again, with all these preventive measures of ours, check and give me the information during the day and evening on

this situation and preparations of course, for if God permit starting production in the liberated areas. Administration, we will under item 3, assignments.

/interjection, inaudible/

Yes, administration will under item 3 receive assignments; however, it is very important that in the following couple of days an entire outline is drafted of the organization of civilian authority. We are having problems from the implementation of the Constitutional Law, the elections not being held, the issue of jurisdiction, so we must from Knin to Glina, from the districts according to the Constitution to the Registry Offices organize in a couple of days all forms of government. But this will be discussed under item 3. I am simply cautioning here, traffic and connections have one of the possibly biggest tasks, not to repeat myself here minister, from the roads, railways, PTT /post and telecommunications/, you know well what your obligations are, you are in contact with the Ministry of Defense, with the Ministry of the Interior /MUP/ and I think that things are going to work here. Ministry of Tourism, look, this is a very delicate situation with the tourism, we are aware of the psychosis that has been created, so we must not present some unrealistic information, in order not to destroy every kind of credibility, but you need to inform me on an hourly basis on the passage of tourists, transportation and everything so that we do not create additional panic and that these people that are leaving are escorted in the most proper manner. Therefore, this is very important so please, I also told your minister to call urgently and to urgently return to Zagreb. The Ministry of Justice and Minister Šeparović and Deputy Minister Mileta are in contact with me, increased security measures in prisons, completely this segment regarding the realization of the work of the courts. Also, establishment of courts according to your outline in the liberated settlements, we must carry out everything as soon as possible, you also must prepare in the next couple of days, all the personnel and everything in the liberated areas. Agriculture also, establish in the economy an agriculture system, see what can be prepared and how. It is very important that the autumn harvest already seriously starts in these areas for political and economic reasons. Health and education, I think that the conclusions are clear. Health is already implemented; education is conducting preparations for the following school year in all liberated areas, special preparations for Knin and Glina in accordance with the Constitutional Law. Therefore, we must for political and other reasons present these programs to the world with exceptional nuance and sophistication so start with the preparation of the program immediately. Analyze the Constitutional Law, study it, consult with the other ministries, there will be bilingualism here and other sensitive matters, which may irritate certain local people, but this is something we must do on account of the overall policy. And labor and social welfare also make preparations for the normal functioning of all institutions from social services to pension rights and other. The rest of the ministries, it is obvious that Finance has a specific burden and task now, we will meet again tomorrow and discuss the payment of all salaries and pensions and everything else in these complicated circumstances and the governor and the deputy are here, we are not changing our policy, we are not rescinding the program, but we will use some type of bridging and in this respect I ask that we maintain constant contact so that we can make use of the following couple of days.

Another thing we can say in this respect, keep all cash and don't send, we agreed on this, if we could ask you that. This was the agreement and the position in principle, and now in these times it is very important.

So, these were briefly the tasks, naturally the largest burdens are on the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Affairs, their tasks are coordinated directly by the President and I am informed of everything that is going on there. So, to avoid getting into a discussion I ask you to view these tasks in principle, and we will state in the announcement

what is important for us to create an additional psychosis of pressure that the Government is already preparing the implementation of civilian authority and this would in fact be the most important reason aside from information you may receive first hand to present to the public that we are already preparing all forms of civilian authority.

Does anybody else have something important to add under this item? I think there is no need.

Thank you. Item 3 is extremely..

/interjection, inaudible/

Ok, minister, unfortunately we will also have to send pupils there too. If God permit, we will worry about this in a month how to open a school there. This will be the more pleasant part of the worrying. Gentlemen, item 3 is an extremely sensitive issue because we are having substantial constitutional legal issues on account of the implementation of the law. For formal and factual reasons, it was not possible to implement the law, the world is going to split hairs and I ask of you, the minister is already on the way, he is returning tonight.

Therefore, for now just briefly information from the deputy minister of administration on the problems you are faced with. We have already ordered for all the formal legal outlines to be drafted within a day or two, and all official papers that are necessary, and I will hold consultations again with the competent ministries and people from counties to towns to observe if there are some government commissioners who we have appointed four years ago and who need to be replaced, because the situation is changing. The thirteen people that were appointed will be cautiously and carefully analyzed in the usual manner to discover whether to leave them in their positions or appoint people who can best meet these demands in the situation today. I do not wish to mention names today because this is an issue for a separate government session, but merely in principle.

Mrs. Martinec.

MIRA MARTINEC:

Thank you. So, we have a two-fold situation in the occupied areas. One is the areas where elections were held and organs of civilian authority exist only they cannot operate where they were elected but are relocated, and they operate in the liberated area and the other situation is the areas where it was not possible to hold the elections, so government commissioners were appointed. The Ministry of Administration has accurate and detailed information on one and the other. Therefore, names of people appointed to representative bodies of units of local self-government and the commissioners. We have accurate information and are practically in daily contact with the same. When these areas are liberated the stated bodies will merely go the area they were appointed to, so either representative bodies or government commissioners. The Ministry of Administration is monitoring current event. Regarding the establishment of local self-government, there will be no problems there, and also there will be no problems with respect to the establishment of state authority, which means establishment of registry offices, county offices, and county branch offices. We already have a completely clear outline on the principle of our work in the area of western Slavonia as well. In connection with areas which have already been liberated or will be liberated, preparations are already underway as the Minister of the Interior had already said for the sign boards for the police; this sort of thing is already being prepared for administrative bodies as well and practically as soon as any area is liberated we immediately arrive there. Regarding official documents, we have also prepared corresponding official documents precisely for the area which is encompassed here in the Constitutional Law on

Human Rights, so, the Glina region and the Knin region and this is something that will need to be discussed by the Government and appropriate solutions found.

PRIME MINISTER:

Okay, thank you. I think this is enough for today, because you will have all this information tomorrow. Government sessions will be held according to needs and at that time we will bring formal decisions regarding commissioners and organs of civilian authority in the areas. We will probably know by tonight the dynamics in which individual areas are going to be liberated and then we can make adjustments. This is a very important point because we must open it formally. We must indicate the actions for the establishment of civilian authority in the announcement.

Item 4, does anyone…My apologies, Deputy Prime Minister Radić, please.

DR. JURE RADIĆ:

I propose that as soon as we can, today but it won't be today, tomorrow probably to hold a meeting with the commissioners of all those areas, to prepare them, given the experience from western Slavonia. The case is, and minister Majdak can say something about this, that many of them are not very well informed of current events, even though they are the right people and everything. So, I propose to convene them together here in Zagreb tomorrow. Then we can see best who of them is okay and who isn't and this experience from the liberated area is very important, so that this man who is the commissioner can be the one who goes there immediately, and not to have a commissioner from Zagreb to go to Glina. Probably, this is a random example. When we selected the commissioners, we very often made the selections knowing that they would never return there, but if there is any possibility we should have people who will go to the field and organize accordingly.

PRIME MINISTER:

Deputy Prime Minister, we must be aware. So, the most important thing is to liberate them, and today, tomorrow or the following day, we can concentrate on this issue. This part, this is an operative part which we as the Government, as the more immediate cabinet can do later.

DR. JURE RADIĆ:

I remember when we did it in western Slavonia.

IVAN MAJDAK:

Forgive me, I believe that we already have certain experiences that this should not be ignored. As much as this first issue is important, the second is also, and we have had problems and we still have problems. It cannot happen. Here, I have a problem now that we have already appointed the third chief in the Pakrac municipality and already the next day he went on vacation to the seaside and we have no one to rely on. You have no idea how weak our local community is. Secondly, since we are on the issue, this is a matter of six counties now. The counties need to be involved more seriously in this matter and come to an agreement on who has operative jurisdiction over that area.

IVAN JARNJAK:

This will be resolved on an operative basis separately, and you take account that the commissioners…

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PRIME MINISTER:

Minister Majdak, don't get upset. Look, we will call the county heads, we will call them, we have to analyze today and tomorrow as to whom of these people we are going to keep. There is no point in calling people who are not going to stay. Therefore, let us leave this for the day after tomorrow. The point today was to get informed of the issues, for the Ministry of Administration to make preparations, there is an enormous task before them. You are not aware what it takes, and then if God permit, I know what the problems are. We will have lists of people who will stay until the end of the week. We will appoint the commissioners at the Government session. The county chiefs must send in their proposals. These commissioners will have to cooperate with the county chiefs and they must give their opinion on these people. In any case, people who will be there are going to be people who live there and who will spend time on this, and that part, we will decide on that part tomorrow between the more immediate cabinet in a short meeting, because this is something that the Government does not need to decide on.

Gentlemen, I propose that we close this session of the Government because we all have enormous tasks before us, particularly the competent ministers, I would like to ask Baletić to contact me regarding the announcement.

Session finished at 16:30 hours.

ET- English translation

COMMISSIONERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

No	Municipality	Commissioner	Address	Telephone no.
01	MEČEČANI UTOLICA KUKURUZARI	MIRKO ANTOLIĆ TIHOMIR BABIĆ	ZAGREB, 26 C. ŽUŽORIĆ STREET	533-050 6119-078 428-591
02	NADVODE	MILE VULIĆ	ZADAR, 1 NARODNI TRG	023-311-154
03	T. KORENICA UDBINA	IVICA KUKURUZOVIĆ	21A GUNDULIĆEVA STREET	275-023
04	DVOR GVOZDANSKO	ANTUN VUKOREP	SISAK, 40 K. TOMISLAVA STREET	044-47-078
05	BOROVO	/	72/5 VUKOVAR AVENUE	537-692
06	G. KLASNIĆ	MARKO SREMIĆ	SISAK, 5 K. TOMISLAVA STREET	044-40-252
07	KNIN, ORLIĆ, KISTANJE, ERVENIK, CIVLJANE, D. LAPAC	PETAR PAŠIĆ	ŠIBENIK, 1 BISKUPA FOSCA STREET	022-38-363
08	GRAĆAC	IVAN PRPIĆ	4 DOMOBRANSKA STREET	177-812
09	VRGINMOST VOJNIĆ	MIRKO PUTRIĆ	9 LASTOVSKA STREET	517-287
10	PLAŠKI	IVAN KOLIĆ	OGULIN, 11 B. FRANKOPANA STREET	047-522-612
11	OBROVAC	KARLO BRKIĆ	ZADAR, KALJSKA STREET	022-314-676
12	KRUŠEVO	IVAN VRKIĆ	ZADAR, MURAJ	022-314-067
13	KRNJAK	IVAN BENIĆ	KARLOVAC	047-221-015
14	VRHOVINE	DRAŽEN BOBINAC	OTOČAC	053-771-048
15	OKUČANI	DRAŽEN JAPUNĐIĆ	NOVA GRADIŠKA	055-669-779
16	BOROVO	ŽELJKO FEKETE	VINKOVCI	
17	IVANKOVO	LUKA IVEZIĆ	VINKOVCI	032-761-520
18	TORDINCI	JOSIP KEL	VINKOVCI	032-313-604
19	SKAKAVAC	IVAN PERKOVIĆ		047-223-262

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OCCUPIED MUNICIPALITIES

1. SISAK-MOSLAVINA COUNTY

GLINA DISTRICT:

Municipalities from the area of Glina District in which the elections were held:

1) Divuša- Chief of Municipality Antun Vukorep, Sisak, Kralja Tomislava 40, Tel.: 044/47-078 (Fax 044/47-078)

   (There was 86.51% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality Dvor).

2) Glina – Chief of Municipality Marko Sremić, Sisak, Kralja Tomislava 5, Tel.: 044/40-252, 40-128, 40-611 (Fax 044/40-128)

   (There was 60.66% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality Glina).

3) Lasinja – Chief of Municipality Mirko Jušinski, Zagreb, Lastovska 9, _____

4) Topusko – Chief of Municipality Milan Abramović, Zagreb, Lastovska 9, _____

5) Donji Kukuruzari – Chief of Municipality Stevo Jurić, his deputy is Tihomir Babić, company "Zrin", Zagreb, Tel.: 428-591

6) Hrvatska Kostajnica - Chief of Municipality Mirko Antonić, Zagreb, Lastovska 9, Tel.: 01/533-050 (Fax 01/517-668)

7) Hrvatska Dubica - Chief of Municipality Davor Ciprić _____

Municipalities from the area of the Glina District for which the Croatian Government has appointed commissioners:

1.) Gvozdansko – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Antun Vukorep, Chief of the Municipality Divuša, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Tel. 044/47-078, Sisak, Kralja Tomislava 40

2.) Dvor – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Antun Vukorep, Chief of the Municipality Divuša, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Tel. 044/47-078, Sisak, Kralja Tomislava 40

   (There was 86.51% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality Dvor).

3.) Gornji Klasnić – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Marko Sremić, Chief of the Municipality Glina, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 *(official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Tel. 044/40-252

4.) Vojnić – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Mirko Putrić, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 04th August 1992 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 49/92), Zagreb, Lastovska 9, Tel. 01/517-287, (Fax 519-717)

(There was 89.44% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality Vojnić).

5.) Vrginmost – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Mirko Putrić, appointed according to the decision as of 28th May 1992 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 23/92)

(There was 70.66% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Vrginmost).

6.) Mečenčani – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Mirko Antonić, Chief of the Municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Zagreb, Cvjete Zuzorić 25, Tel. 533-050, 6119-078

7.) Utolica – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Mirko Antonić, Chief of the Municipality of Hrvatska Kostajnica, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93)

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In the area of this county the following municipalities have been occupied and do not represent a part of the Glina District:

1.) Petrinja – Mayor Josip Dolenec, Sisak, A. I S. Radića 30, Tel. 044/24-036 (Fax 044/24-356)

(There was 44.90% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Petrinja and 35.1% in the area of the town of Petrinja).

2.) Jabukovac – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Josip Dolenec, Mayor of Petrinja, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 27th May 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93)

(There was 90.2% of Serb population in the area of the current municipality of Jabukovac).

2. ZADAR-KNIN COUNTY

KNIN DISTRICT:

Municipalities from the area of Knin District in which the elections were held:

1.) Jasenice – Chief of Municipality Mile Vulić, Zadar, Narodni trg 1, Tel. 023/311-154, Fax

(There was 65.52% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Obrovac).

2.) Kruševo – Chief of Municipality Ivan Vrkić, Zadar, Tel.: 023/314-551

3.) Obrovac – Chief of Municipality Mile-Karlo Brkić, Zadar, Tel.: 023/314-551

4.) Smilčić – Chief of Municipality Zoran Tomić, Biograd n/m, Tel.: 023/314-423

5.) Polača – Chief of Municipality Radoslav Bobanović, Biograd n/m, Tel. 023/314-423

6.) Benkovac – Chief of Municipality Miljenko Marinović, Biograd n/m, Tel. 023/314-423

(There was 56.88% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Benkovac).

7.) Lisičić – Chief of Municipality Vinko Pajić, Biograd n/m

8.) Lišane Ostovičke – Chief of Municipality Ivan Lupur, Biograd n/m

9.) Stankovci – Chief of Municipality Jakov Deur, Tel.: 023/380-141

10.) Lovinac – Chief of Municipality Ivan Prpić, Zagreb, Domobranska 4, Tel. 01/177-812

11.) Smoljanac – Chief of Municipality Ivica Kukuruzović, Zagreb, Gundulićeva 21a/4, Tel. 01/275-023

12.) Kijevo – Chief of Municipality Željko Maloča, Split, Tel.: 021/885-105

Municipalities from the area of the Knin District for which the Croatian Government has appointed commissioners:

1.) Knin Town – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Šibenik, Ul. Biskupa Fosca 1, Tel.: 022/38-363

(There was 88.20% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Knin).

2.) Kistanje – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić

3.) Ervenik - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić

4.) Orlić - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić

5.) Civljane - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić

6.) Donji Lapac - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Petar Pašić

(There was 97.52% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Donji Lapac).

7.) Gračac – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Ivan Prpić, Chief of the Municipality Lovinac, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Zagreb, Domobranska 4, Tel. 177-812

(There was 80.23% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Gračac).

8.) Udbina – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Ivan Kukuruzović, Chief of the Municipality Smoljanac, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Zagreb, Gundulićeva 2/a, Tel. 275-023

9.) T. Korenica - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Ivan Kukuruzović, Chief of the Municipality Smoljanac, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Zagreb, Gundulićeva 2/a, Tel. 275-023

(There was 75.35% of Serb population in the area of the former municipality of Titova Korenica).

10.) Nadvode – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Mile Vulić, Chief of the Municipality Jasenice, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Zadar, Narodni trg 1, Tel. 023/311-154

3. KARLOVAC COUNTY

Municipalities in the area of this county in which the elections were held:

1.) Town of Slunj – Mayor Vladimir Katić, Karlovac, Tel.: 047/221-250, defense 047/661-567

(There was 29.22% of Serb and 2.68% of Muslim population in the area of the former municipality of Slunj, while in the town of Slunj there was 30.1% of Serb population).

2.) Rakovica – Chief of Municipality Franjo Franjković, Karlovac, Tel.: 047/225-317

(There was 27.7% of Serb and 1.4% of Muslim population in the area of the municipality of Rakovica).

3.) Cetingrad – Chief of Municipality Matija Stepić, Karlovac, Tel.: 047/225-302

(There was 26.0% of Serb and 8.9% of Muslim population in the area of the municipality of Cetingrad).

4.) Saborsko – Chief of Municipality Luka Hodak, Ogulin, B. Frankopana 13, Tel. 053/525-428

(There was 43.8% of Serb population in the area of the municipality of Saborsko).

Municipalities from the area of the County for which the Croatian Government has appointed commissioners:

1.) Plaški – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Ivan Kolić, Mayor of the town Ogulin, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Ogulin, Tel.: 047/522-612

(There was 34.76% of Serb population in the area of the previous municipality of Ogulin, while in the area of the municipality of Plaški there was 94.4% of Serb population).

2.) Krnjak - Commissioner of the Croatian Government Ivan Benić, Mayor of the town Karlovac, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Karlovac, Tel.: 047/221-015

(There was 26.73% of Serb population in the area of the previous municipality of Karlovac, while in the area of the municipality of Krnjak there was 96.4% of Serb population).

4. LIKA-SENJ COUNTY

Municipalities from the area of the County for which the Croatian Government has appointed commissioners:

1.) Vrhovine – Commissioner of the Croatian Government Dražen Bobinac, Mayor of the town Otočac, appointed according to the decision of the Government as of 17th June 1993 (*official gazette* "Narodne novine" No. 61/93), Tel. 053/771-048, Otočac

(There was 31.13% of Serb population in the area of the previous municipality of Otočac, while in the area of the municipality of Vrhovine there was 93.0% of Serb population).

5. SPLIT-DALMACIJA COUNTY

Municipalities in the area of the County in which the elections were held:

1.) Vrlika – Chief of Municipality Dušan Turudić, Sinj, Tel.: 021/821-081

(There was 4.63% of Serb population in the area of the previous municipality of Sinj, while in the area of the municipality of Vrlika there was 33.4% of Serb population).

6. ŠIBENIK COUNTY

Municipalities in the area of the county in which the elections were held:

1.) Town of Drniš – Mayor Ante Matić, Unešić, Tel.: 059/80-925, Retired Persons' Center "Zenta", Tel.: 058/364-222

(There was 20.58% of Serb population in the area of the previous municipality of Drniš, while in the town of Drniš there was 26.4% of Serb population).

2.) Oklaj – Chief of Municipality Željko Đapo, Zagreb, Tel.: 229-099

(There was 13.1% of Serb population in the area of the municipality of Oklaj).

3.) Ružić – main office in Split, Chief of Municipality Ivan Perković, Tel.: 058/512-110

(There was 22.6% of Serb population in the area of the municipality of Ružić).

ANNEX 212:

SPLIT – DALMATIA POLICE ADMINISTRATION, SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT ABOUT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE SACRAL FACILITIES OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE LIBERATED TERRITORY, 22 AUGUST 1995

10th POLICE STATION
NUMBER: 511-12-74103-32/95
SINJ, 22 AUGUST 1995

"CODED – VH"
"POVRATAK" /Return/
OA /Operative Action/
- TOP SECRET -

SPLIT – DALMATIA PU /Police Administration/
- To the "POVRATAK" OA STAFF
S P L I T

/stamp/: **THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**
511-12 – MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Received on: 22 August 1995	
Classification no.:	Org. unit
	01
File number:	/illegible/

SUBJECT: SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT ABOUT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE SACRAL FACILITIES OF THE S.P.C. /Serbian Orthodox Church/ IN THE LIBERATED TERRITORY

WITH REGARD TO YOUR CABLE REQUEST NO.: 511-12-01-VT-127/139-95, DATED 21 AUGUST 1995, WE CAN INFORM YOU THAT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE SACRAL FACILITIES, THAT IS, THE MEASURES OF PROTECTION OF THE SAID FACILITIES, IS THE FOLLOWING:
1. IN THE PLACE OF JEŽEVIĆ, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF "SV. SPASA" /"Ascension Day"/ HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE MINED AND COMPLETELY DAMAGED DURING 1992 AND 1993.
2. IN THE PLACE OF MAOVICE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF "SV. JURE" /"St. George"/ - CHURCH BELLS WERE TAKEN FROM THE SAID CHURCH AND THE INTERIOR OF THE CHURCH HAS BEEN DEMOLISHED.
3. IN MALJKOVO, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF "SV. JOSIP" /"St. Joseph"/ HAS BEEN DAMAGED, IT WAS HIT WITH TWO ARTILLERY MISSILES AND THEN SET ON FIRE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1991.
4. IN VRLIKA, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH "GOSPA OD ROŽARIJA" /"Madonna of the Rosary"/ HAS BEEN DEVASTATED.
5. IN THE PLACE OF ZASIOK, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF "SV. IVAN" /"St. John"/ HAS BEEN SET ON FIRE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1991.
6. IN THE PLACE OF DRAGOVIĆ, THE S.P.C. MONASTERY HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED AND IT IS BEING GUARDED BY THE POLICE.
7. IN VRLIKA, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF "SV. NIKOLA" /"St. Nicholas"/ IS BEING GUARDED BY THE POLICE. IT HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED.
8. IN THE PLACE OF MAOVICE, THE ORTHODOX CHAPEL OF "SV. NEDJELJA" /"Holy Sunday"/, WHICH IS A PART OF THE CEMETERY, HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED. IT HAS REGULARLY BEEN COVERED BY THE POLICE PATROL.
9. IN THE PLACE OF OTIŠIĆ, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF "SV. ARHANĐEO" /"St. Archangel"/ HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED. THE SAID CHURCH IS BEING GUARDED BY THE POLICE MEMBERS.

COMMANDER:
MARKO BILOBRK

ANNEX 213:

SPLIT – DALMATIA POLICE ADMINISTRATION, SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE VRLIKA BRANCH POLICE STATION AND OTHERS, 5 AUGUST 1995

THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
SPLIT – DALMATIA PU /Police Administration/

CODED "VH"
OA /Operative Action/
"POVRATAK" /Return/
"Top Secret"

Number: 511-12-01-VT-127/23-95
Split, 05 August 1995

To: MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
OPERATIONS STAFF OF THE OA "POVRATAK"
ZAGREB

SUBJECT: Submission of the Report on the Establishment of the Vrlika PI /Branch Police Station/ and others

We herewith inform you that as of 16:00 PM on 05 August 1995, the Vrlika PI has been established as a constituent part of the 10th Sinj PP /Police Station/, as well as the Otišić and Koljani sub-branches and also that the entire territory of this PU, which was temporarily occupied until now, is now under control.

One military policeman was slightly wounded during the action, while one of the members of this PU fell sick.

CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION

/signed for/ **Ivo Cipci**
/illegible signature/

/round stamp/: The Republic of Croatia
Ministry of the Interior
Split – Dalmatia Police Administration
Split

ANNEX 214:

UN, CODED CABLE FROM AKASHI TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, 7 AUGUST 1995

CODE RESTRICTED

CZN=1342
CZG=1090
CZB= 41

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

95 AUG -7 19:17

SSN= 2043

Page 1 Of 3

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z-1355

DATE: 07 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: TRIP TO KNIN

1. Accompanied by the Chief of Mission of UNCRO, by the Deputy Force Commander, and also by a representative of the UNHCR, the U.N. Centre for Human Rights, and several journalists, I travelled to Knin today to examine the current situation first-hand. Upon arrival, I toured the city and visited the hospital. I then went to our Sector South Headquarters, where I met the new Croatian army commander for the Knin region, General Cermak. Afterwards, I toured the HQ compound and talked with several of the 799 persons from Knin who have sought refuge there, and met privately with two of their representatives.

2. My overall impression of the town of Knin is that it suffered considerable damage from artillery fire, which was evident in the streets, where I observed many shops with broken windows, cars damaged and off the road, artillery shell holes in the road, etc.. However, the damage to the town's structures, while noticeable, was less than I anticipated. Large numbers of homes and buildings were left untouched by the fighting. Utilities were still off, but General Cermak told me that he expected water and electricity to be restored today, and phones tomorrow. There was a significant HV presence in the town, but the soldiers did not appear overly unruly, although several were drinking beer or spirits around noon time. Cermak also told me that very soon, perhaps as early as tomorrow, regular HV units would be removed, and only military and civilian police would remain, together with the nascent civilian administration. There were a few people, mostly elderly, observed in the towns, otherwise it appeared empty of civilians. Several of the shops still had cheap household goods and clothes on their shelves, even though their windows were broken.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; COM UNCRO; DFC; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC; ICFY, LO Belgrade

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3. The hospital was not crowded with either patients or staff, most but not all of the former having already been transported to the UNCRO compound in Knin. Those remaining patients appeared to be mostly elderly, and not hospitalized due to war wounds. Some of the hospital's staff remained; one doctor of Serb background with whom I spoke stated his desire to continue living and working in Knin, as it was his birthplace and that of his parents (this statement was however made in the presence of local Croatian military authorities and the press). The hospital was large and in generally good condition, having been hit by only one artillery round. A lack of water and medicines was the biggest problem the hospital apparently faced; both problems were in the process of being addressed.

4. My meeting with General Cermak went very well. He pledged to respect fully the agreement signed by Mr. Sarinic and myself yesterday, copies of which I shared, in English and Serbo-Croat. He reiterated on several occasions that his forces would comply not only with the agreement, but also with international standards for human rights, as well as the laws of war. He professed a strong desire for all those people still in Knin, for the most part the 799 in the UNCRO camp, to remain living there, and not to leave their homes. He claimed that the mass exodus of Serbs from the Krajina to Bosnia was the product of political propaganda by the Krajina Serb leadership that was designed to make the population mistrustful of the Croatian army. Cermak assured me that the population had nothing at all to fear form his forces, and asked that I assist in conveying this message to the people. When I thanked him for his assurances for the rights and safety of all those who wished to stay, but then asked that safe passage be provided for those who make an informed decision to leave, Cermak stated that all such people would be allowed to leave freely and without hindrance. He returned to his point about the preferability of people remaining in Knin, with full rights under the laws of Croatia, and stated that all those in the UNCRO camp could begin returning to their homes to examine the state of their abodes, and the property in it, either to move back in, or to return to the UNCRO camp. I raised the issue of freedom of movement for UNCRO troops, and for our UNMOs and human rights teams, and Cermak again assured me that there would be no problem with these matters, contingent upon the security situation in a given area. He also said there would be no problems with humanitarian aid convoys gaining access to Knin.

5. One issue that may present a problem is Cermak's insistence that the military-age men in the UNCRO compound be interviewed by Croatian authorities. While I recognize that the government of Croatia has a legitimate interest in seeking to determine if any of those men were involved in war crimes, you will recall that this same issue caused us great difficulties in the case of Western Slavonia. In subsequent talks with the refugees in the camp, it was clear that the prospect of the men being interviewed was cause of great concern to them. However, I received strong assurances from Cermak that the interviews would be done in Knin, not far away, that the interviewers would be civilian not military police, that the families would be able to visit those being interviewed every day, and that the U.N. could have free and unfettered access to these people at any time. If Cermak fulfils his promises, I believe that the process will be transparent and along acceptable international standards. In cooperation with ICRC, UNHCR and the Centre for Human Rights, we will keep a very close eye on this matter in order to deter any potential lapses or abuses. Even in these circumstances, however, we will face an image problem, not

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only in the eyes of the media, but more importantly in the eyes of the families of those detained in the course of the interviews. Great effort will be made at the local level in Knin to address this problem. I believe that given the resources at our disposal in Knin, and the additional human rights monitoring personnel to be deployed there, we will be able to satisfactorily overcome this problem. However, we are likely to face a similar one of much greater proportions with the thousands of Serb refugees and military personnel now apparently trapped in Sector North.

6. In talks with the refugees in the camps and with their two designated representatives, several common concerns repeatedly emerged in addition to the one on interviews. The most striking aspect of my conversations, however, was the fact that all of those with whom I spoke uniformly expressed a desire to leave Croatia (with the exception of the doctor mentioned above). Perhaps the refugees' greatest preoccupation was, would they be able to freely leave Croatia for the FRY, or alternatively Bosnia, and if so when, and would the U.N. help them with their departure. The refugees also sought assurances that they would not be expelled from the UNCRO compound, pending a more permanent resolution of their predicament. They also wanted to know whether they would be able to take mobile property with them when they departed, and whether they would be compensated for fixed property left behind. The representatives of the refugees also asked about the status of other Serbs in the Krajina, particularly large groups of civilians, and asked as well for an accounting for the prisoners taken in the fight for Knin. All these issues are being examined by the appropriate UNCRO personnel and/or U.N. agency and/or ICRC.

7. My trip to Knin was generally a sad experience, bearing witness to the results of the parties' failure to compromise, and to the tragic results of their military engagement on the civilian population and on a community's way of life. However, with only 799 people identified remaining in the area, Knin is no longer amongst our greatest worries or priorities. When time permits, together with colleagues from other organizations, we will examine ways in which we can encourage all those who may wish to return in safety and dignity to their former homes in the Knin area. For now though, our attention must be focused on the looming crisis in Sector North, the volatile situation in Sector East, and the unclear but increasingly difficult situation in western Bosnia, namely Banja Luka and Bihac.

8. As a final note, the most encouraging moment of my trip today came toward the end of the day, when one of the two refugee representatives said at the conclusion of our meeting: "Mr. Akashi, I just wish the leadership of the Krajinas would have listened to your advice and counsel, and not left us in this predicament. Now, we can be more responsible to international calls and international advice, and deal with problems more efficiently so that the conflict will not continue." There is some glimmer of hope in those words to suggest that the people may be tiring sufficiently of their suffering to exact a different type of policy from any new leadership that may emerge from this crisis. While we are still a long way from that point, we will do our best to develop such attitudes amongst the population and their leaders.

9. Regards.

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ANNEX 215:

LETTER FROM MINISTER MATE GRANIĆ TO GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER KLAUS KINKEL, 25 AUGUST 1995

News

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MINISTER GRANIĆ'S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM KINKEL

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- MINISTER GRANIĆ'S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM KINKEL

ZAGREB, 25 August (HINA – *Croatian News Agency*) – We received a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia today which we are conveying in its entirety:
''In response to the letter sent to the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mate Granić on Thursday by the German Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel, and in which he emphasized concern over the alleged systematic violations of the rights of Croatian Serbs and damage to their property, Minister Granić responded that he received the letter with understanding, but that he is also surprised because it is apparent that Minister Kinkel's reactions are based on reports which are exaggerated or even deliberately tendentious.
Dr. Granić reminded Minister Kinkel that the UN information and political office in Zagreb stated that they had exaggerated in their reports even during the liberation of Western Slavonia in order to 'prevent the Croats in advance from committing crimes', and for politically recognizable but however morally unacceptable reasons certain international observers continued with this type of practice after the latest joint operation carried out by the Croatian military and police, wrote Dr. Granić.
Minister Granić emphasized in his letter how he does not wish to dissuade his German colleague regarding individual incidents which in most cases were committed by vengeful or reckless individuals and most often those whose own property in many settlements has been entirely destroyed. Dr. Granić also noed that these individual incidents, taking into account the size of the area, are in reality small in number, and added that regardless of some past negative experiences regarding the objectivity of their reporting, representatives of the UN, EU and humanitarian organizations will keep having full freedom of movement in the liberated area. 'Revenge, therefore, is neither a mass occurrence nor is it part of the spirit and tradition of the Croatian people, and no one can claim that this is a type of systematic policy', said Minister Granić.
Dr. Granić reminded once more that the 'President of the Republic, Dr. Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian Government have taken all possible steps to prevent the emigration of Serbs from those areas', however, unfortunately it has become clear today, and the same has been confirmed by intelligence data, that this is was deliberate, prevocational and preplanned and prepared evacuation directed by the extremist leaders of the rebellion. 'Why isn't that in the reports of these concerned observers!', asked Minister Granić.
'Croatia most certainly wishes and has interest in preserving the remaining property in these areas, because it is also part of the wealth of the Republic of Croatia, regardless of the ethnic or other kind of origin of the owner of the property', emphasized Minister Granić and added that the ministers put in charge of this, alongside other things, are visiting the field daily precisely for this reason.
When taking about the return of those Croatian Serbs who left to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia /FRY/, that is Serbia or Monte Negro, or parts of Bosnia, continued Minister Granić, the Croatian Government is taking all possible measures to 'organize the return well which will take a certain amount of time and the cooperation of international humanitarian organizations, but also the willingness of the authorities in Belgrade', which are currently forcibly mobilizing a significant part of the newly arrived people and are sending them to the army of the Bosnian Serbs, and Croatia cannot be held responsible for these kinds of injustices and consequences.
Croatia has no intention of negotiating the return of Croatian Serbs with people like Martić, Babić and others who have earlier refused any kind of negotiations for a peaceful solution, and all those who

wish to return to Croatia have individual right to return as Croatian citizens, noted Minister Granić in his response to the letter from German Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel once again emphasizing that the Croatian Government is willing to negotiate with the local Serbs on the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Western Sirmium and Baranja.

Dr. Granić particularly emphasized that, while certain incidents are being raised to the level of general policy, there is hardly any mention of the everyday organized and violent banishing of Croats and Bosnians from Vojvodina, Serbia and the part of Bosnia under Serb control.

With respect to the supporters of Fikret Abdić who is located in the vicinity of Vojnić, continued the Croatian Minister, the Croatian Government has taken measures to enable them to stay in Croatia until conditions are created for their safe return or their departure to another country which the majority of them are still insisting on. Minister Granić reminded that Mr. Schwarz-Schilling has been informed of this personally as well.

'I assure you that in these extremely complex times Croatia is doing everything it can to ensure strict control of the situation and to get the legal system start functioning entirely and as soon as possible in the newly liberated areas, to relieve the humanitarian issues, and to begin with the restoration and development', said at the end of the letter''.

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