INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN

(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE

Volume 4 of 6

(Annexes 215 – 278)

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Annex 215

Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile on the audience granted by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, 7 January 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Departamento América del Sur

REF: Audiencia concedida por el señor Ministro al Embajador de Bolivia.

MEMORANDUM

1.- El día de ayer, a las 9:30 horas, el señor Ministro recibió en audiencia al Embajador de Bolivia, señor Adalberto Violand Alcazar. La entrevista se prolongó por espacio de 45 minutos, aproximadamente.

2.- El señor Canciller señaló al Embajador que tenía interés en conversar con él para ver la forma en que conviene continuar la negociación.

3.- El Embajador Violand respondió manifestando que no tenía instrucciones específicas al respecto, sino que solamente la de continuar negociando sin demora.

4.- El señor Ministro señaló que podría continuar se conversando, como se ha hecho hasta ahora y como lo hacía con el ex Embajador Gutiérrez. Manifestó que es preciso conversar hasta llegar a un punto de acuerdo que constituya parte de la negociación. Aludió enseguida al Mensaje de Navidad del Presidente Banzer, haciendo presente que no creía que la forma adecuada de negociar fuera mediante Mensajes aparecidos en la prensa y señalando que estimaba necesario que las conversaciones se desarrollaran en forma privada, para evitar las presiones de la opinión pública de ambos países y mundial.

5.- El diplomático boliviano se refirió entonces al Mensaje aludido -haciendo presente que lo hacía "off the record"- explicando que éste había obedecido principalmente a razones de política interna boliviana y que el propio Presidente Banzer estaba preocupado por la forma como podía haberse tomado este procedimiento en Chile. A continuación, solicitóaa señor Ministro que le diera a conocer el planteamiento chileno actual respecto a las negociaciones.

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OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
South America Department

REF: Audience granted by the
Minister to the Bolivian Ambassador.

MEMORANDUM

1. Yesterday at 9:30 a.m., the Minister received the Bolivian Ambassador, Mr. Adalberto Violand Alcazar. The audience lasted approximately 45 minutes.

2. The Foreign Minister informed the Ambassador that he was interested in discussing with him the manner in which to continue the negotiations.

3. Ambassador Violand answered that he had no specific instructions on this matter, but only to continue negotiating without delay.

4. The Minister said that he could continue talking, as he has done to date and as he did with former Ambassador Gutiérrez. He said that it is necessary to talk until a point of agreement that constitutes part of the negotiation is reached. He then mentioned President Banzer's Christmas Message, and stated that he did not think that the right way to negotiate was with Messages that appear in the press. He believed that it was necessary for discussions to be held in private, to avoid the pressure of public opinion in both countries and around the world.

5. The Bolivian diplomat then discussed the Message alluded to (pointing that he was doing so "off the record"), explaining that the primary reason for the message was Bolivian internal politics and that President Banzer himself was concerned how this might been taken in Chile. He then asked the Minister to let him know about Chile's current proposal with respect to the negotiations.

6.- El señor Canciller manifestó que nuestro país mantiene integramente lo ofrecido por medio del documento de 19 de diciembre de 1975 y, volviendo a aludir al Mensaje del Mandatario boliviano, indicó que lo delicado de estas declaraciones públicas radica en que se adoptan posiciones muy difíciles de modificar.

En seguida, señaló que para Chile el canje es indispensable, haciendo referencia a un canje territorial que hubo entre nuestro país y Bolivia en 1907 y que se efectuó sin problemas. Destacó que existía entonces un precedente, que podría recordarse para evitar suspicacias en la opinión pública boliviana.

Agregó el señor Ministro que para facilitar la idea del canje, estimaba que Chile podría señalar la zona a la que aspiraría, haciendo hincapié en que esto disiparía muchas suspicacias.

7.- El Embajador Violand señaló enseguida que entendía que la mentención de la proposición chilena incluía los acuerdos adoptados posteriormente, respecto a las llamadas "aristas" de la negociación.

8.- Luego de un camb o de ideas en relación a cada una de estas "aristas", el señor Ministro insistió en que se mantenía el documento de diciembre de 1975 en todas sus partes y que las "aristas" sólo se interpretan. Señaló que ahora podrían ponerse esas interpretaciones en el papel, tal como se convino con el Canciller Adriázola en Nueva York. En esa oportunidad, ambos Ministros concordaron en la necesidad de intercambiar documentos en que se estableciera la interpretación de cada país daba a dichas "aristas", para luego llegar a un acuerdo final.

9.- El Embajador indicó que podría partirse ahora de ese intercambio. Luego se refirió a la idea del enclave esbozada por el Canciller Adriázola, manifestando que en principio quedaría superada.

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6. The Foreign Minister said that our country fully maintains the offer it made in the document of 19 December 1975, and going back to the Bolivian President's Message, he said that what makes these public statements so delicate is that they take positions that are very difficult to modify.

Then, he said that for Chile the exchange is indispensable, making reference to the exchange of territory between our country and Bolivia that took place in 1907 and that occurred without any problems. He highlighted that there was therefore a precedent that could be used as a reminder to prevent suspicion among the Bolivian people.

The Minister added that in order to facilitate the idea of the exchange, he thought that Chile could point out the area to which it aspired, emphasizing that this would dissipate much suspicion.

7. Ambassador Violand then said that he understood that the maintenance of the Chilean proposal included the agreements subsequently adopted with respect to the so-called "differences" in the negotiations.

8. After an exchange of ideas about each of these "differences", the Minister insisted on maintaining all parts of the document of December 1975 and on simply interpreting the "differences". He said that these interpretations could now be put on paper, as agreed with Foreign Minister Adriázola in New York. At that time, both Ministers agreed on the need to exchange documents establishing each country's interpretation of these "differences", so that a final agreement could then be reached.

9. The Ambassador indicated that they could start now with that interchange. Then he mentioned the idea of the enclave sketched by Foreign Minister Adriázola, stating that in principle it would be overcome.

10.- El señor Canciller señaló que era difícil que la idea de un enclave de 30 km2 fuera aceptada en Bolivia. A continuación, respondiendo a la consulta que le formulara el Embajador respecto al estado de la situación con Perú, señaló que la fórmula presentada por ese país estaba descartada, agregando que podría procurarse obtener la aceptación peruana, mediante la fórmula de cambio de la zona mineral de Tacora por otra. Este planteamiento, agregó, le daría un "escape" a Perú frente a la opinión pública interna, pues aparecería ganando una zona rica y también beneficiaría su imagen internacional, pues aparecería contribuyendo a la solución de la situación boliviana. Agregó que, en todo caso, este planteamiento debía ser hecho por Bolivia a Perú.

11.- El Embajador Violand manifestó que la impresión que se recoge es que, sin embargo, Perú no quiere perder su frontera con Chile.

12.- El señor Ministro señaló que, de acuerdo a nuestras informaciones, la propuesta peruana se hizo sin considerar a la Comisión Consultiva ni a los representantes peruanos en las conversaciones bilaterales, quienes habrían estado de acuerdo en buscar una solución. De tal modo, indicó, en Perú debe existir una corriente contraria al actual planteamiento formulado por ese país y quienes opinaran así podrían recomendar la fórmula de cambio anteriormente aludida. Agregó que ésta podría ser planteada por Bolivia a Perú, manifestando que la contestación chilena a la consulta que procedería por parte parte peruana sería afirmativa.

13.- El Embajador manifestó su satisfacción por el hecho de que se continuaba negocáándo, señalando que podría partirse desde lo acordado en Nueva York por los Cancilleres Carvajal y Adriázola e iniciarse una negociación peruano-boliviana por separado, proponiendo la fórmula de cambio de la zona de Tacora por otra.

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10. The Minister said that it was difficult for the idea of a 30 km2 enclave to be accepted in Bolivia. Then, responding to the question that the Ambassador asked him about the status of the situation with Peru, he said that the formula presented by Peru had been rejected, adding that an attempt could be made to obtain Peruvian acceptance, by the formula of exchanging the mineral zone of Tacora for another zone. This proposal, he added, would give Peru an "escape" when faced with internal public opinion, because it would appear to be gaining a rich zone and would also benefit its international image, because it would appear to be contributing to the solution of the Bolivian situation. He added that in any event, this proposal should be made by Bolivia to Peru.

11. Ambassador Violand said that his impression, nevertheless, is that Peru does not want to lose its border with Chile.

12. The Minister said that according to our information, the Peruvian proposal was made without considering the Advisory Commission or the Peruvian representatives in the bilateral discussions, who would have agreed to seek a solution. Therefore, he said, in Peru there must be an opposing current to the current proposal formulated by that country and those who took that view could recommend the formula of exchange alluded to earlier. He added that this could be proposed by Bolivia to Peru, and that the Chilean answer to the consultation that would proceed from the Peruvians would be affirmative.

13. The Ambassador stated his satisfaction with the fact that negotiations were continuing, and that they could start from what had been agreed in New York by Foreign Ministers Carvajal and Adriázola, and initiate separate negotiations between Peru and Bolivia, proposing the formula of exchanging the zone of Tacora for another one.

14.- El señor Ministro señaló que cada país podría traer un proyecto de interpretación de las "aristas", cotejar ambos y luego incorporar uno común como documento adicional a las bases de la negociación. Agregó que si Bolivia no tenía a mano los antecedentes sobre el canje bilateral efectuado en 1907, nuestra Cancillería podría proporcionárselos al Embajador, lo que quedó acordado.

15.- El Embajador manifestó que transmitiría con urgencia a su Gobierno lo expuesto por el señor Ministro. De este modo concluyó la audiencia, a la que asistió el Tercer Secretario Roberto Ibarra, funcionario de DIRELAS, quien tomó las notas precedentes.

SANTIAGO, 7 de enero de 1977

V° B°

PABLO VALDES
Director DIREL

14. The Minister said that each country could bring a draft interpretation of the "differences", exchange them and then incorporate a joint draft as an additional document to the bases for the negotiations. He added that if Bolivia did not have the information about the bilateral exchange in 1907, our Foreign Ministry could provide it to the Ambassador, which was agreed.

15. The Ambassador said that he could urgently inform his Government of what the Minister had said. Thus ended the audience, attended by the Third Secretary Roberto Ibarra, a DIRELAS official, who took the foregoing notes.

Santiago, 7 January 1977

[Signed]

PABLO VALDES

Director DIREL

Annex 216

Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile on the conversation held with the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile and his Minister Counsellor, 27 January 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

Diplan

del embajador don Julio Philippi.

Conversación tenida con el señor Embajador de Bolivia y su Ministro Consejero el día 27 de enero de 1977, entre 11,30 y 12,15 horas.

27.1.77

El Embajador pidió visitarme.

Después de las frases de cortesía de rigor, se entró al tena preguntando el Embajador cómo veía yo la situación.

Manifesté no tener seguramente toda la información disponible pues he estado ausente de Santiago, pero que podía expresarle mi opinión personal en el sentido de que el Perú había querido bloquear la solución chileno-boliviana. Tanto el Embajador como el Ministro Consejero expresaron que se habían recordado a menudo de la explicación que yo les había dado tiempo atrás en cuanto a que el artículo 1º del Protocolo confiere un verdadero derecho a veto y que así era, como lo habían demostrado los hechos.

Siguieron algunas reflexiones sobre el alcance de la expresión "previo acuerdo". Expliqué el sentido de "asentimiento". El Ministro Consejero expresó que Perú parecía darle el alcance de que el acuerdo previo debía recaer sobre una posible solución a la mediterraneidad boliviana, interpretación que rechacé como errónea. Mencionó el Embajador la posibilidad de que estas discrepancias fueran aclaradas por algún Tribunal Internacional. Hice presente que el Tratado designaba árbitro al Presidente de U. S. A. Observó el Embajador que, según sus informaciones, el Presidente de U. S. A. no había aceptado el cargo. Manifesté que seguramente no se le había requerido en la época del Tratado para que lo hiciera, cosa que es frecuente en tales casos y que sólo al surgir un conflicto se pide la aceptación del cargo.

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Conversation held with the Ambassador of Bolivia and his Minister Counselor on 27 January 1977, from 11:30 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.

The Ambassador asked to visit me.

After exchanging the customary courtesies, we began our discussion, with the Ambassador asking me how I viewed the situation.

I said that certainly did not have all the available information because I have been absent from Santiago, but I could give him my personal opinion that Peru had wanted to block the Chilean-Bolivian solution. Both the Ambassador and the Minister Counselor said that they had often recalled the explanation that I had given them awhile back as to the fact that article 1 of the Protocol confers a real veto right and that the facts have demonstrated that this is true.

There was then a discussion of the scope of the term "prior agreement". I explained the meaning of "consent". The Minister Counselor said that Peru appeared to interpret it such that prior agreement had to be given to a possible solution to Bolivia's landlocked situation, but I rejected this interpretation as erroneous. The Ambassador mentioned the possibility that these discrepancies had been clarified by an International Tribunal. I pointed out that the Treaty appointed the President of the United States as arbitrator. The Ambassador noted that he had been informed that the President of the United States had not accepted that position. I said that surely he had not been asked to do so at the time of the Treaty, as that is frequent in such cases and people are only asked to accept the position once a dispute arises.

Expresé como improbable que se excusara el árbitro, llegado el caso, pues el Tratado de 1929 era fruto de los buenos oficios del Gobierno de U. S. A.

Durante la conversación sobre el alcance del artículo primero del Protocolo de 1929 el Consejo de la Embajada preguntó si no podría el Perú hacer valer la cláusula "rebus sic stantibus". La pregunta fué confusa, no logré que se aclarara y contesté que tal cláusula es absolutamente inadmisible en Tratados que fijan fronteras, principio de Derecho Internacional confirmado por la Convención de Viena sobre Derecho de los Tratados.

Pregunté al Embajador cuales eran las condiciones que Perú había señalado a Bolivia al enviar un Embajador a La Paz los mismos días en que Marchand hacía el planteamiento al Gobierno chileno, Hubo manifiesto titubeo en la actitud de ambos visitantes para expresar, al final, que no tenían información y que entendían haberse limitado el Embajador peruano a recordar las materias cuya solución se encuentra pendiente entre ambos países.

Hice presente que el Ministro de la Puente, en entrevista de prensa reproducida por "El Mercurio", había indicado haberse planteado a Bolivia algo relacionado con el Titicaca y con el regadío de Tacna. Expuse mi pensamiento acerca del interés que Perú necesariamente ha de tener en lo relativo a sus aguas y canales para dicho regadío, expuso brevemente lo que yo sé sobre el delicado asunto de las tomas en el rio Mauri y cómo nos había interesado el problema debido a algunas observaciones oidas en el curso de las conversaciones con los diplomáticos peruanos.

A pesar de mi insistencia no fué posible obtener mayor información, salvo el reconocimiento por parte del Embajador de que el problema de regadío de Tacna era muy importante para el Perú, y que existía una cuestión entre La Paz y Lima sobre las

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I said that it was unlikely that the arbitrator would recuse himself, if the case should arise, because the Treaty of 1929 was the result of the good offices of the U.S. Government.

During the conversation on the scope of the first article of the Protocol of 1929 the Council of the Embassy asked whether Peru could not enforce the "rebus sic stantibus" clause. The question was confused; I did not manage to make it clear, and answered that a clause of that nature is absolutely inadmissible in Treaties that establish boundaries, a principle of International Law that was confirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

I asked the Ambassador what were the conditions that Peru had indicated to Bolivia when it sent an Ambassador to La Paz on the same day as when Marchand was making the proposal to the Chilean Government. There was clear hesitation on the part of both visitors, who ended up stating that they had no information and understood that the Peruvian Ambassador had done nothing more than point out the matters that still needed to be resolved between the two countries.

I pointed out that Minister de la Puente, in an interview with the press published in "El Mercurio", had said that something related to Lake Titicaca and to the irrigation of Tacna had been proposed to Bolivia. I expressed my thinking about the interest that Peru necessarily has in matters related to its waters and channels for that irrigation; I briefly explained what I know about the delicate issue of the irrigation channels in the River Mauri and how we had been interested in the problem because of certain comments heard during the course of the discussions with the Peruvian diplomats.

Despite my insistence, I was not able to get more information, except for the recognition by the Ambassador that the problem of irrigation in Tacna was very important to Peru and that there was an issue between La Paz and Lima regarding the

aguas del Mauri.

La conversación derivó hacia la sorpresa producida por el planteamiento peruano. Coincidimos en que fué del todo anómala la forma de actuar de Lima. El Embajador expresó que ellos no esperaban un planteamiento así, pues si bien suponían que la Comisión asesora del Gobierno de Lima señalaría ciertas condiciones, no imaginaron que fueran las aparecidas en el planteamiento que por último hicieron.

Expresé que la misma sorpresa habíamos tenido nosotros pues, por las informaciones recibidas y lo expuesto porel Embajador Marchand al término de la segunda rueda de conversaciones, esperábamos una respuesta en el fondo favorable, pero sujeta a "acondicionamientos" enumerados por el propio Marchand en aquella oportunidad. Señalé en general cuales eran. En relación a la idea peruana de un desarrollo económico tripartito en la zona, el Embajador Violand creyó ver en germen la idea de un gobierno compartido por los tres países en el Puerto de Arica. Le hice presente que tal idea no había sido formulada, pues ante sondeos iniciales y privados de Marchand, se le dijo categóricamente que jamás Chile aceptaría limitar su soberanía en Arica.

Volví sobre los asuntos pendientes entre Perú y Bolivia para destacar que había sido lógico pensar en una respuesta básicamente favorable de parte del Perú sujeta a condiciones, ya que incluso existían las posibilidades, objetivamente convenientes, para ese país, de que mas adelante Bolivia canjeara la zona de Tacora por una faja costera al norte de la línea de la Concordia, a más de regularse lo concerniente a los derechos de agua de los canales de regadío de Tacna.

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waters of the River Mauri.

The conversation then turned to the surprise caused by the Peruvian proposal. We agreed that the way Lima was acting was completely anomalous. The Ambassador said that they were not expecting a proposal like that, because although they assumed that the Commission advising the Peruvian Government would indicate certain conditions, they never imagined that they would be the ones in the proposal that they ultimately made.

I said that we had had the same surprise because from the information received and what Ambassador Marchand said at the end of the second round of discussions, we were ultimately expecting a favourable answer, but subject to "conditions" enumerated by Marchand himself on that occasion. I indicated in general what they were. With regard to the Peruvian idea of tripartite economic development in the zone, Ambassador Violand believed that he saw the seeds of the idea of a government shared by the three countries in the Port of Arica. I pointed out that such idea had not been formulated, because in view of the initial private opinion polls by Marchand, he was told categorically that Chile would never agree to limit its sovereignty in Arica.

I returned to the matters pending between Peru and Bolivia and noted that it would have been logical to expect a basically favourable response from Peru, subject to conditions, because there were objectively attractive possibilities for that country to later have Bolivia exchange the area of Tacora for a strip on the coast to the north of the Concordia Line, in addition to regulating the issues concerning the rights to the water in the irrigation channels in Tacna.

Manifestó el Embajador que ellos también habían esperado una respuesta favorable, bajo condiciones negociables, pero no el bloqueo que resultó al final. También habían tenido la impresión de que el informe de la Comisión Consultiva peruana sería favorable. Pregunté si tenían alguna información acerca de si había habido informe y, en caso afirmativo, de su contenido. La respuesta fué negativa, pero agregando el Embajador que quizás la Comisión habría hecho conocer sus puntos de vista al Gobierno de Lima.

En un momento dado de la conversación el Embajador calificó la respuesta peruana como"muy elaborada". Ante una expresión escéptica mia se rectificó para agregar "o muy improvisada". Compartí esta última apreciación indicando que el planteamiento podría explicarse como la irrupción de un veto por parte de los elementos castrenses aplicado a una fórmula positiva en el fondo, elaborada por juristas y diplomáticos. Así se explicaría que acepte Perú la cesión de casi todo el territorio, pero ponga a Bolivia un cerrojo en el extremo poniente, y, al mismo tiempo, haga planteamientos a Chile que necesariamente tenían que ser desestimados.

No objetó el Embajador esta hipótesis.

Hacia el final de la conversación el Embajador se manifestó muy pesimista sobre la situación y me preguntó qué pensaba yo que debería hacerse. Expresé que, personalmente, pensaba en la necesidad de tratar de obtener que el Perú modifique su veto, tarea en la cual correspondía a Bolivia la principal parte, pues ellos tenían problemas cuya solución interesaba al Perú (como la línea del Tacora, los problemas de agua y otros y, en cambio, Chile no tenía el menor problema pendiente con el Perú que pudiere entrar de alguna manera en negociación.

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The Ambassador said that they too had expected a favourable response, under negotiable conditions, but not the blocking that ultimately resulted. They had also had the impression that the report by the Peruvian Advisory Commission would be favourable. I asked whether they had any information about whether that report existed, and if so, what its contents were. The answer was negative, but the Ambassador added that perhaps the Commission had informed the Peruvian Government of its points of view.

At a certain point in the conversation, the Ambassador described the Peruvian response as "very elaborate". When I reacted skeptically, he corrected himself and added |or very improvised". I agreed with the latter evaluation, indicating that the proposal could be explained as a veto by the military elements applied to an essentially positive formula drawn up by lawyers and diplomats. That would explain why Peru would agree to the cession of almost all the territory, but would bolt Bolivia in on the far western end, and at the same time make proposals to Chile that would necessarily have to be rejected.

The Ambassador did not object to this hypothesis.

Toward the end of the conversation, the Ambassador said that he was very pessimistic about the situation and asked me what I thought should be done. I said that personally, I thought that we needed to try to get Peru to modify its veto, a task in which Bolivia would have to play the principal role, since they had problems whose solution was in Peru's interest (such as the line of the Tacora, the water problems, etc.) and on the other hand, Chile did not have the slightest problem outstanding with Peru that could in any way enter in to the negotiation.

Preguntó el Embajador qué pensaba yo sobre el Mensaje de Navidad del Presidente Banzer. Contesté que comprendía su punto de vista pero que no lo entendía, pues no se ve para Bolivia ventaja alguna en que Chile renuncia a los territorios en canje si ello no altera el veto del Perú. Agregué que por lo demás, una renuncia al canje de territorios por parte de Chile me parecía imposible, siendo ese canje la base de toda la negociación. Pregunté si en el caso hipotético de que se negociare sobre ese punto, tenía Bolivia alguna información de parte de Lima en el sentido de que modificarían su veto al dejarse de mano el canje. Contestó el Embajador que ninguna y el Ministro Consejero acotó que la cesión de territorio por parte de Bolivia era asunto exclusivo de su país y no tenía, por tanto, ninguna relación con la actitud del Perú.

Fué, pues, obvia la conclusión de que nada se adelantaba frente al Perú con modificar en ese aspecto la línea básica de la negociación chileno-boliviana.

Ante una observación del Embajador - hecha con cierta expresión de fstidio - en el sentido de que la cuestión estaba "empantanada", expresé que no se debían perder los ánimos, pues el transcurso de los días muchas veces cambia las cosas y debíamos esforzarnos en encontrar los medios para modificar la posición del Perú.

Toda la conversación se desarrolló en un clima muy cordial y franco.

J. Philippi

The Ambassador asked what I thought about President Banzer's Christmas Message. I answered that I comprehended his point of view but did not understand him, because there is no advantage whatsoever for Bolivia to have Chile renounce the territories in exchange if that does not alter Peru's veto. I added that moreover, it seemed impossible to me that Chile would renounce the exchange of territory, since such exchange is the basis for the entire negotiation. I asked whether, in the hypothetical case that this point was negotiated, Bolivia had any information from Lima that Lima would modify its veto if the territorial exchange was put aside. The Ambassador answered that Bolivia had no such information and the Minister Counselor added that the cession of territory by Bolivia was an issue exclusive to his country and thus had nothing to do with Peru's position.

Thus, the conclusion was obvious that it would be worthless in front of Peru to modify the basic line of the negotiations between Chile and Bolivia .

In response to a comment by the Ambassador—made with a certain expression of annoyance—that the matter was "stuck", I said that we should not get discouraged, because things often change with the passage of time, and we should strive to finding the way to change Peru's position.

The entire conversation took place in a very cordial and candid atmosphere.

[Signed]
J. Philippi

Annex 217

Letter from the President of Chile to the President of Bolivia, 8 February 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

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SANTIAGO, 8 de Febrero de 1977.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE:

Al celebrarse hoy 8 de febrero, el segundo aniversario de nuestro encuentro en Charaña, he querido enviar un sincero saludo al hermano pueblo boliviano y de manera muy especial a Vuestra Excelencia.

El recuerdo de un acontecimiento tan importante para la historia de nuestras relaciones, debe ser motivo de meditación, para que a la luz de lo ocurrido, podamos analizar los resultados obtenidos y procurar afianzar los logros alcanzados en bien del sagrado deber de servir a nuestros pueblos.

Sin lugar a dudas que el diálogo franco, propio de soldados, que imperó en nuestro encuentro, se ha traducido en hechos concretos, que nos permiten mirar confiados el futuro.

Un largo período sin relaciones nos había mantenido distanciados, en circunstancias que motivos de todo orden hacían imperiosa la intensificación de nuestros lazos de amistad y cooperación. Quiso Dios que las circunstancias nos permitieran dar un paso tan significativo, haciendo recaer sobre nuestras personas una responsabilidad de tanta trascendencia como es la de buscar por el camino del diálogo un real entendimiento entre ambas Naciones.

Consecuentes con lo establecido en la Declaración Conjunta que se emitió en la reunión de Charaña, hemos mantenido un permanente contacto político, económico, cultural, social, científico y tecnológico, del que podemos esperar alcanzar metas mayores, a través del trabajo de la Comisión Mixta Chileno-Boliviana. Las condiciones ya están dadas, el camino se ha abierto y sus resultados en corto plazo podrán apreciarse.

AL EXCELENTISIMO SEÑOR
GENERAL DON HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA
LA PAZ.

Santiago, 8 February 1977.

President:

In celebrating today, 8 February, the second anniversary of our meeting in Charaña, I have wanted to send a sincere greeting to the Bolivian sister nation and especially to Your Excellency.

The memory of an event as important to the history of our relations must be a motive for reflection, so that in the light of what has happened, we can analyse the results obtained and seek to secure the achievements reached for the sake of sacred duty of serving our people.

Without a doubt, the frank dialogue, characteristic of soldiers, that prevailed during our meeting has been translated into concrete facts that permit us to see the future with confidence.

A long period without diplomatic relations had kept us at a distance, in circumstances in which the intensification of our ties of friendship and cooperation were made necessary for all kinds of reasons. God willed that the circumstances permitted us to make a significant step, having laid on our persons such a transcendental responsibility as is to search for a real understanding between both Nations through the course of dialogue.

Consistent with the terms of the Joint Declaration issued in the Charaña meeting, we have maintained permanent political, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technologic contact, from which we can aspire to reach higher goals, through the works of the Chilean-Bolivian Mixed Commission. The conditions are given, the way has been opened and the results, in the short term, will be appreciated.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
GENERAL HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA
LA PAZ.

Confío en que esta Comisión será un excelente medio para hacer cada día más fructíferas nuestras relaciones, razón por la cual he impartido instrucciones precisas con el fin de que se aceleren los estudios y podamos en bien de nuestra integración recuperar el tiempo, que circunstancias tan especiales nos hicieron perder.

Inspirados en el más profundo espíritu americanista, iniciamos negociaciones tendientes a satisfacer la aspiración de Bolivia de tener una costa soberana sin solución de continuidad con el actual territorio boliviano.

Mi Gobierno, interpretando el sentir mayoritario de la ciudadanía chilena que ama la paz y la colaboración amistosa, ha mantenido y mantiene un espíritu fraternal desde el inicio de esta negociación. Las múltiples demostraciones de buena voluntad y de sinceridad que los más vastos sectores ciudadanos de Chile han demostrado públicamente, son un testimonio irrefutable, que a mí como Gobernante me compromete y me emociona, pués significa que al asumir la responsabilidad de dar este paso, no me he equivocado sino por el contrario he interpretado fielmente su sentir.

Un problema tan delicado y sensible como el que hemos abordado, necesitaba de resolución y de entereza ya que, tal como lo conversamos en Charaña, sabíamos que no sería fácil el camino que deberíamos recorrer.

Vuestra Excelencia conoce la dedicación que he dado a este importante asunto y el empeño que he puesto por que se avance lo más rápidamente posible en la solución de los problemas que se han ido generando, después de haber llegado a un acuerdo en los términos generales de la negociación.

Muchos interesados en hacer fracasar esta negociación, han puesto todo su empeño, en tratar de demostrar que no tiene destino y que se habría generado con propósitos mezquinos.

I trust that this Commission will be an excellent means to make our relations increasingly fruitful, and for that reason I have issued precise instructions aimed at accelerating the studies, so we can, for the benefit of our integration, make up for lost time that very special circumstances made us lose.

Inspired in the most profound americanist spirit, we initiated negotiations aimed at satisfying the aspiration of Bolivia to have a sovereign coast without interruption in continuity with the current Bolivian territory.

My Government, interpreting the feeling of the majority of the Chilean population, who love peace and friendly cooperation, has maintained and maintains a fraternal spirit from the beginning of this negotiation. The multiple demonstrations of goodwill and sincerity that the largest Chilean citizen sectors have publicly demonstrated, are an irrefutable testimony, that commits and moves me as a Ruler, since it signifies that I was not mistaken in assuming the responsibility to take this step, but to the contrary, I have faithfully interpreted their feeling.

Such a delicate and sensitive problem as the one we have addressed needed resolution and endurance since, as we discussed at Charaña, we knew that the road we would have to follow would not be easy.

Your Excellency knows the dedication I have devoted to this important matter and the effort I have employed to advance it as quickly as possible to a solution of the problems that have been arising, after having reached an agreement on the general terms of the negotiation.

Many people interested in the failure of this negotiation have made efforts to try to demonstrate that it has no aim and that it was brought on for petty purposes.

Frente a estas dificultades, estimo conveniente redoblar nuestro empeño y nuestra buena voluntad, para avanzar desde el actual estado en que se encuentra la negociación y llegar a la meta que nos hemos propuesto.

Vuestra Excelencia, puede tener la confianza más absoluta que mi Gobierno mantendrá su decisión de obtener un buen éxito.

Un amplio campo de mutuos intereses se presentan por delante y me asiste la convicción de que con renovada fé en el destino de nuestros pueblos, lograremos cimentar un futuro seguro para nuestros hijos, basado en el respeto y el profundo y realista sentido americanista que guía nuestros actos.

Reciba Vuestra Excelencia, el testimonio de mi sincero afecto,

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
General de Ejército
Presidente de la República de Chile

In face of these difficulties, I deem convenient to redouble our efforts and our goodwill, to move forward from the current state of the negotiations and reach the goal we have set.

Your Excellency may have the most absolute confidence that my Government will keep its decision to obtain a good success.

A wide field of mutual interests lay ahead and I am assisted by the conviction that with renewed faith in the destiny of our peoples we will build the foundations of a safe future for our children, based on the respect and the profound and realistic americanist sentiment that guides our actions.

Your Excellency, receive the testimony of my sincere affection.

[Signed]
AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
Army General
President of the Republic of Chile

Annex 218

Letter from the President of Bolivia to the President of Chile,
8 February 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

Presidencia de la República de Bolivia

La Paz, 8 de febrero de 1977

Señor Presidente:

Como Presidente de los Bolivianos, a cuyo leal servicio están orientados todos mis esfuerzos, he recibido con profunda satisfacción el significativo mensaje que Vuestra Excelencia se dignó enviarme, al cumplirse el segundo aniversario de nuestro encuentro en Charaña.

En nombre de mi pueblo y en el mío propio agradezco tan cordial saludo, y lo retribuyo con idéntico afecto.

Es oportuno destacar, Señor Presidente, que la histórica entrevista que recordamos estuvo convocada por el convencimiento de que el destino solidario de nuestros pueblos demandaba una actitud resuelta de sus gobernantes, que

Al Excelentísimo Señor
Gral. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Presidente de la República de Chile
Santiago.-

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA

La Paz, 8 February 1977

Mr. President:

As President of the Bolivians, to whose service all my efforts are directed, with profound satisfaction I have received the meaningful message that Your Excellency deigned to send me, upon the second anniversary of our meeting in Charaña.

In my name and the name of my people I express gratitude for your cordial greeting and return it with identical affection.

It is convenient to note, Mr. President, that the historical meeting that we recalled was convened because of the conviction that the common destiny of our peoples demanded a resolute attitude of their leaders, that

To His Excellency Mr.
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago.-

hiciera posible mirar hacia el futuro con la confianza que brinda el diálogo franco y directo, en procura de los entendimientos alta_ mente realizadores que reclama la convivencia armoniosa de na_ ciones vecinas dispuestas hacia la mas fraterna colaboración.

La entrevista de Charaña fue el paso inicial para bus_ car fórmulas de solución a los asuntos vitales que confrontan Bolivia y Chile, especialmente en lo relativo a la mediterraneidad que afecta a mi Patria, y así lo declaramos solemne y categórica_ mente ante la conciencia internacional.

Tan elevada responsabilidad que asumimos en Chara_ ña requiere, como Vuestra Excelencia lo señala, del lenguaje cla_ ro y sincero que promueve las grandes realizaciones.

Como soldados que han resuelto servir con total entre_ ga a los sagrados intereses de sus naciones, nos mantuvimos fieles a esa práctica que enaltece.

Por ello, con ese mismo lenguaje y sin apartarnos del sentir de mi pueblo, he expuesto siempre ante Vuestra Excelencia, las aspiraciones e inquietudes de los bolivianos, en torno a las ne_ gociaciones, particularmente, luego de las últimas instancias, que introdujeron nuevos factores en el cuadro general de las referidas gestiones diplomáticas, que estamos dispuestos a culminar exitosa_ mente.

would make it it possible to see the future with the confidence brought on by a frank and direct dialogue, in search of highly productive understandings called for by the harmonious coexistence of neighbouring nations willing for the most fraternal cooperation.

The Charaña meeting was the first step to seek formulas for the solution of vital matters confronting Bolivia and Chile, especially regarding the landlocked situation that affects my Homeland, and that is what we solemnly and categorically declared before international awareness.

The great responsibility we assumed at Charaña requires, as Your Excellency pointed out, a clear and sincere language that promotes great achievements.

As soldiers who have resolved to serve with total devotion the sacred interests of their nations, we remained faithful to that exalting practice.

Therefore, in this same language and without deviating from my country's feeling, I have always set out before Your Excellency, the Bolivians' aspirations and concerns, surrounding the negotiations, especially, after the last instances that introduced new factors in the general framework of said diplomatic efforts, which we are willing to conclude with success.

Las expresiones de Vuestra Excelencia, que ratifican la voluntad de avanzar en dichas negociaciones encaminadas a superar el encierro geográfico de Bolivia, mediante una salida libre y plenamente soberana al Océano Pacífico, desde el actual estado en que se encuentra este trascendental proceso diplomático, constituyen, sin duda, el poderoso aliento para fortalecer nuestro empeño destinado al logro de la meta más ansiada por todos los bolivianos.

Hago honor a vuestra palabra, Señor Presidente, que refleja la firme decisión de vuestro Gobierno de propiciar los entendimientos más justos y constructivos dentro del más elevado espíritu americanista.

Estoy seguro, además, que en el camino que nos falta por recorrer, la causa marítima de Bolivia continuará contando con el respaldo y la comprensión de los pueblos hermanos, comprometidos con la obra de hacer una realidad tangible la solidaridad de la gran patria latinoamericana.

Las perspectivas de colaboración entre nuestros países son de vastas proyecciones. Hemos creado el instrumento apropiado para hacerlas realidad a través de la Comisión Mixta Boliviano-Chilena, en cuyo marco se realizarán los estudios y se propondrán

Your Excellency's expressions ratifying the will to advance in said negotiations aimed at overcoming Bolivia's geographical confinement, through a free and fully sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, from the current state of this transcendental diplomatic process, constitute, without a doubt, a powerful encouragement to strengthen our effort intended to reach the most desired goal of all Bolivians.

I honour your word, Mr. President, which reflects your Government's firm decision to promote the most just and constructive understandings in the most elevated americanist spirit.

I am also certain that in the road we still have to travel, Bolivia's maritime cause will continue to count on the support and the understanding of sister nations, committed to the deed of making the solidarity of the great Latin American nation into a tangible reality.

The perspectives of cooperation between our countries have wide projections. We have created the appropriate instrument to realize them through the Bolivian-Chilean Mixed Commission, structure under which the studies will be carried out and

Presidencia de la República de Bolivia

las acciones más eficaces con el fin de establecer un intercambio del que se deriven beneficios equitativamente compartidos.

Aprecio en su justa dimensión, Señor Presidente, vuestro invalorable aporte personal en esta obra de acercamiento entre nuestras naciones.

Hace dos años, al referirme a la trascendencia de nuestra entrevista en Charaña, sostuve que era un día llamado a perdurar en la historia.

Lo dije interpretando los sentimientos más arraigados de mi pueblo, que aspira, como Vuestra Excelencia lo sabe, a forjar su progreso en un clima de paz, justicia y plena colaboración con las hermanas naciones de América.

Reciba, Señor Presidente y amigo, las expresiones de mi afecto personal.

Gral. Banzer

GRAL. DIV. HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
Presidente de la República

the most effective actions will be proposed in order to establish an exchange from which to derive equitably shared benefits.

Mr. President, I appreciate on their own measure your invaluable personal contribution in this rapprochement between our nations.

Two years ago, when referring to the transcendence of our meeting at Charaña, I maintained that it was a day called to last throughout history.

I said it interpreting the most deeply rooted feelings of my people, who aspire, as Your Excellency knows, to build their future in a climate of peace, justice and full cooperation with the sister nations of America.

Receive, Mr. President and friend, the expression of my personal affection.

[Signed]
DIVISION GENERAL HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
President of the Republic

Annex 219

Letter from the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 187/40, 14 April 1977 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

21

RESERVADO

E. LA PAZ (DIRELAS) RES. Nº 187/40

OBJ: Remite informativo correspondiente al mes de marzo de 1977.

REF: RR.EE. (DIREL) CIRC. RES. Nº 44 de 9-9-75.-

25 ABR 1977

LA PAZ, 14 de abril de 1977

79

DEL: EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN LA PAZ

AL : SEÑOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (DIRELAS)

Como anexo al presente oficio remito a US. un resumen informativo correspondiente al mes de marzo último, en el cual se han considerado materias concernientes a las relaciones bilaterales, política interna y exterior de este país.

Dios guarde a US.,

EMBAJADA DE CHILE
La Paz - Bolivia

Rigoberto Díaz
Embajador

DISTRIBUCION:

1.- RR.EE. (DIRELAS) c/anexo
2.- RR.EE. (OF. PARTES) c/anexo
3.- E. LA PAZ, archivo.-
4.- RR.EE. (DIPLAN) INFO.- c/anexo

CON ANEXO

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EMBASSY OF CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

CONFIDENTIAL
E. LA PAZ (DIRELAS) RES. No 187/40

SUBJECT: Sending news correspoding to the month of March 1977
REF: MFA (DIREL) CIRC. RES. No 44 of 9-9-75.-

LA PAZ, 14 April 1977
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR OF CHILE IN LA PAZ
TO: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIRELAS)

Enclosed with this official letter is a briefing for March, which covers matters relating to bilateral negotiations, domestic and foreign policy of this country.

God bless you.
[Signed]
Rigoberto Díaz
Ambassador
[Seal: Embassy of Chile. La Paz - Bolivia]

[…]

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

1.- RELACIONES BILATERALES

Respecto del desarrollo de las relaciones chileno-bolivianas en el mes de marzo último, se pudo advertir un escepticismo cada vez más marcado en las autoridades y en la opinión pública sobre el resultado de la negociación marítima y una posición más rígida hacia nuestro país.

1.- Día del Mar.- Con fecha 23 de marzo culminó la celebración de la denominada Semana del Mar, período en el cual se efectuaron diversas ceremonias cívicas y patrióticas para conmemorar la acción bélica en que perdió la vida el héroe boliviano Eduardo Avaroa en el año 1879.

El día señalado, el Presidente Banzer pronunció un discurso dedicado a las aspiraciones bolivianas para el acceso al Océano Pacífico. El Primer Mandatario reafirmó que para su país el retorno al mar era una "necesidad vital" y no una actitud emocional. Más adelante hizo una reseña de la acción internacional de Bolivia y del apoyo obtenido a su posición, aludiéndose a la propuesta del 24 de diciembre de 1976 para que tanto nuestro país como el Perú modificasen sus puntos de vista dentro de un ideal de colaboración.

El mensaje del Presidente fué acogido con una cierta indiferencia por la opinión pública, habiéndose advertido un marcado escepticismo y desilusión ante el curso de las negociaciones.

El marco que se imprimió a la celebración de la "Semana del Mar" fué de sobriedad, habiéndose mantenido como día laboral el miércoles 23. El tono de las publicaciones sobre la cuestión marítima podría calificarse como mesurado. Debe también destacarse que en una entrevista de prensa concedida por el Presidente Banzer, en la víspera del "Día del Mar", dejó en claro que desligaba su futuro político del resultado de las negociaciones.

2.- Postergación de la reunión de la Comisión Mixta (Cable 114)

Con fecha 10 de marzo el Canciller Adriázola manifestó al suscrito que se estimaba preferible postergar sine die la reunión de la Comisión Mixta, pués su celebración podría originar ataques al Gobierno y producirse un deterioro de la imagen de Chile. Estos temores se originaban ante la falta de progresos en la consideración del tema marítimo.

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I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

With respect to the progress of the Chilean-Bolivian relations last March, we noted that the authorities and public opinion were increasingly skeptical about the outcome of the maritime negotiation and showed a tougher stance towards our country.

1. Day of the Sea. March 23 marked the end of the so-called Week of the Sea, where several civic and patriotic ceremonies were conducted to commemorate the battle in which Bolivian hero Eduardo Avaroa lost his life in 1879.

   On that date, President Banzer gave a speech addressing the Bolivian aspirations to gain access to the Pacific Ocean. The President reasserted that the return to the sea was a "vital need" of Bolivia and not just an emotional quest. He also went over Bolivia's international actions and the support obtained for its position, thus making reference to the proposal of 24 December 1976 so that both Bolivia and Peru modify their point of view for the sake of cooperation.

   The message of the President was received With a certain indifference by public opinion, which was clearly skeptical and disappointed at the progress of the negotiations.

   The "Week of the Sea" celebrations were distinguished by their sobriety–Wednesday 23 was not declared a holiday. The tone of the publications on the maritime issue may be described as moderate. It is also worth mentioning that President Banzer made it very clear during a press interview on the eve of the "Day of the Sea" that his political career would not depend on the outcome of the negotiations.

2. Adjournment of the Meeting of the Mixed Commission (Cable 114)

   On 10 March, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adriázola stated it was preferable to adjourn the meeting of the Mixed Commission indefinitely and thus prevent any possible attack on the Government as well as the deterioration of the reputation of Chile. These fears originated in the lack of progress in the consideration of the maritime issue.

ERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

3.- Situación del FF.CC. Arica-La Paz (RES. Nº 21)

Con fecha 8 de marzo la Cancillería boliviana hizo entrega de un Memorandum relativo a la actual situación de la Sección Chilena del Ferrocarril Arica-La Paz, en el cual se hace un análisis de la deficiencia que presenta esta vía de comunicación y se solicita se adopten las medidas conducentes a eliminar los obstáculos al comercio exterior boliviano a través del puerto de Arica.

4.- Campaña de Prensa

Al margen de las publicaciones hechas con motivo del "Día del Mar", la prensa boliviana ha mantenido, salvo "Los Tiempos" de Cochabamba, un cierto silencio en torno a la cuestión marítima, en contraposición con las estridencias del año 1976 y de comienzos del presente. Según informaciones recogidas de buena fuente, habría un entendimiento entre el Gobierno y los órganos de prensa para evitar momentáneamente un debate sobre la negociación, a la espera de indicaciones respecto de sus posibilidades de éxito o fracaso.

Debe mencionarse la publicación hecha el 23 de marzo, de un nuevo informe del Instituto Boliviano de Estudios Geopolíticos en el cual se analizan, entre otros temas, las perspectivas de la negociación marítima, la posibilidad de un conflicto bélico en el Pacífico y la posición que debería asumir Bolivia, así como otros aspectos de los problemas que enfrenta bolivia en el campo internacional.

II.- POLITICA INTERNA

1.- Movimientos subversivos

En el mes de marzo se tuvo conocimiento del desarrollo de algunas actividades subversivas, particularmente en la ciudad de Cochabamba, las que no revistieron mayor trascendencia y fueron controladas por las autoridades. El Ministro del Interior General Juan Pereda Asbún, emitió un comunicado en el cual desvirtuó las especies alarmistas que circularon y afirmó que sólo se había detectado agitación en algunos sectores mineros y universitarios (Of. Res. 167/36). El Ministro dió a conocer la detención de doce miembros del MIR en las ciudades de La Paz, Cochabamba y Oruro, difundiéndose la nómina de las personas detenidas por actividades políticas. Cabe agregar que el dirigente del Partido Obrero Revolucionario Guillermo Lora, buscó asilo en la Embajada de Venezuela.

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3. Situation of the Arica-La Paz railway line (RES. No 21)

On 8 March, the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs furnished a Memorandum related to the current situation of the Chilean Section of the Arica-La Paz Railway Line which analyzed its deficiencies and requested the implementation of measures to eliminate the hindrances affecting Bolivian foreign trade through the Port of Arica.

4. Press campaign

Apart from the publications made on occasion of the celebration of the "Day of the Sea," the Bolivian press—with the exception of "Los Tiempos" of Cochabamba—has remained rather silent on the maritime issue, which is in stark contrast with the stridency of 1976 and the beginning of the present year. According to reliable sources, the Government and the press have seemingly reached an agreement to momentarily avoid a debate on the negotiation, while an indication on their possible success or failure is pending.

Worthy of note is the publication on 23 March of a new report drafted by the Bolivian Institute of Geopolitical Studies, which, among other matters, addresses the perspectives for the maritime negotiation, the possibility of a military conflict on the Pacific and the position that Bolivia should take in that regard, as well as other problems facing Bolivia in the international arena.

[…]

2.- Situación de Derechos Humanos (Of. Res. N° 145/31)

A su regreso de Ginebra, después de asistir a los recientes debates sobre Derechos Humanos, el Subsecretario del Interior Dr. Juan Gamarra, celebró una conferencia de prensa en la que se refirió a las garantías con que cuentan los ciudadanos bolivianos, agregando que eran infundados los cargos que se hacían sobre supuestas violaciones de sus derechos. En respaldo de sus afirmaciones el señor Gamarra citó lo expresado hace algún tiempo atrás por el Secretario de la Conferencia Episcopal. El Prelado aludido replicó a través del diario "Presencia" en una declaración en la que expresó su disconformidad con los métodos de detención por motivos políticos y por los malos tratos que se han comprobado en algunos casos para con los presos.

3.- Declaraciones del Presidente Banzer a la prensa. (Of. Res. 137/29)

En la víspera de "El Día del Mar" (23.3.77) el Presidente Banzer formuló al matutino "El Diario" importantes declaraciones en las cuales desvincula su futuro político de la suerte de las negociaciones sobre la cuestión marítima. Cabe recordar que el diario "Presencia" publicó el 25 de septiembre de 1975, un titular a lo ancho de su primera página en el cual señaló que el Primer Mandatario en una entrevista concedida a la periodista chilena Malú Sierra había afirmado: "Me iré del Gobierno si no se logra la salida al mar".

El General Banzer esta vez señaló que había sido mal interpretado y que las responsabilidades que le corresponden como Presidente no están circunscritas a la solución del problema marítimo.

En sus declaraciones a la prensa, el Presidente agregó que los sindicatos podrían ser "institucionalizados" con anterioridad a los partidos políticos.

Se ha interpretado la alusión del Presidente al reinicio de la actividad sindical como una etapa del esquema para reinicio de la actividad política en el país con alguna antelación a la fecha tentativa que se ha fijado para el año 1980.

4.- Creación del Consejo Nacional de Fronteras. (Of.Ord.135/53)

Mediante Decreto Supremo, de fecha 11 de marzo, fué creado el Consejo Nacional de Fronteras, organismo de carácter consultivo y de coordinación intersectorial dependiente del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Se señala que este Consejo tendrá por misión delinear la política general de fronteras, en concordancia con los objetivos de desarrollo y seguridad nacional del país.

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Annex 220

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia, No 22, 15 April 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
- * -
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Departamento América del Sur

RESERVADO Arch RL
RR.EE. (DIRELAS) RES. Nº 22 /

OBJ: Remite Memorandum audiencia del Sr. Ministro de RR.EE. al Sr. Embajador de Bolivia.

REF: No hay.-

(468)

SANTIAGO, 15 de abril de 1977.-

DEL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

AL SEÑOR EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN LA PAZ

Adjunto remito a US., para su debi-
./. do conocimiento, copia del Memorandum de la audiencia que concediera el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores al Señor Embajador de Bolivia en Chile, el día 1º de abril pasado.

Dios guarde a US.,

POR ORDEN DEL SUBSECRETARIO,

LUIS EUGENIO CADIZ B.
Consejero
Director de Relaciones Internacionales
Subrogante

Distribución:
1.- Embachile La Paz. c/anexo
2.- RR.EE. (DIRELAS)
3.- RR.EE. (OF. PARTES), Archivo

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

* * *

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

South America Department

CONFIDENTIAL [Signatures]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIRELAS) RES. NO. 22

Subject: Memorandum of meeting granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of Bolivia.

Ref: - None

468

Santiago, 15 April 1977.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To: Ambassador of Chile in La Paz

For your information, I enclose herewith a copy of the Memorandum of the meeting granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of Bolivia in Chile on last 1 April.

Sincerely,

BY ORDER OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
[Signature]
LUIS EUGENIO CADIZ B.
Counsellor
Acting Director of International Affairs

Distribution:
1. Embassy of Chile in La Paz with annex.
2. Foreign Affairs (DIRELAS)
3. Foreign Affairs (OF. PARTES), Archive

DESCLASIFICADO

LSC/ft

MEMORANDUM RESERVADO Nº 82

DE : DIRECTOR

A : DIGEN, INFO SUBSEC, DINGAB, DIPLAB.

I.- A las 17.00 horas de hoy el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores recibió en audiencia al Embajador de Bolivia señor Adalberto Violand. El Embajador boliviano concurrió acompañado por los Consejeros de esa Embajada señores Alfredo Valdés Lomé y Agustín Saavedra. Asistió a esta audiencia el Director General Comandante Jaime Lavín y el funcionario de DIRELAS, Leonel Searle C., quien tomó y redactó las presentes notas.

II.- El Embajador Violand manifestó que al regresar de La Paz, solicitaba esta audiencia por instrucciones de su Gobierno, señalando que se había hecho un análisis de la situación de las negociaciones entre nuestros dos países, a partir del intercambio de cartas con ocasión del aniversario del encuentro de Charaña, y ver en qué forma se continuarán dichas negociaciones. Más aún, señaló el Embajador, considerando la visita reciente del General Arbulú creía conveniente conocer en qué situación se encuentra Chile, cómo ve nuestro país la negociación y cómo piensan tratar la situación peruana, de manera de seguir el tema.

III.- El Ministro hizo presente que la visita que ha efectuado el General peruano fue para tratar

LSC/ft

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM No. 82

From: DIREL

To: DIGEN, INFO SUBSEC, MINGAB, DIPLAN.

I. At 5:00 pm today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received the Ambassador of Bolivia, Mr. Adalberto Violand, for a meeting. The Bolivian Ambassador was accompanied by Embassy Counsellors Alfredo Valdés Loma and Agustín Saavedra. Also present at the meeting were the General Director Commander Jaime Levín and DIRELAS officer, Leonel Searle C., who took and wrote these notes.

II. Ambassador Violand stated that upon his return from La Paz he requested this meeting in accordance with his Government's instructions. He pointed out that the status of negotiations between our two countries had been analyzed on the basis of the correspondence exchanged in connection with the Charaña meeting anniversary, to analyze how negotiations will continue from now on. Furthermore, the Ambassador pointed out that, given the recent visit of General Arbulú, he believed it is convenient to learn what Chile's current situation is, how our country sees the negotiation and how they plan to deal with the Peruvian situation, in order to continue with the matter.

III. The Minister explained that the purpose of the Peruvian General's visit was to

protocolado

temas exclusivamente profesionales y que no se trató nada de la situación boliviana.

IV.- Seguidamente el Embajador de Bolivia insistió: "¿ Cómo visualizan el futuro de las negociaciones y cómo van a continuar las conversaciones con el Perú ?" A Bolivia le preocupa el estancamiento de la negociación y por lo tanto desea conocer los pasos que dará el Gobierno chileno.

V.- El señor Ministro intervino indicando que el Presidente Banzer ha señalado en su Mensaje de Navidad que no habrá compensación territorial y que esto preocupa a Chile. La proposición de Chile -agregó- no ha sido producto de la improvisación, cada estipulación contenida tiene mucho significado, y por consiguiente el trueque de territorios es básico. Y esto preocupa más que lo que pueda decir Perú. Cualquiera sea la solución que haya con el Perú, Chile no estaría de acuerdo si ella implica una proposición boliviana de no canje. Esta condición chilena surge de un sentir nacional que se recogió y se recoge en todas las esferas de la opinión pública, de tal manera que es una enmienda fundamental. Sería inaceptable otro término de negociación, señaló el Ministro. Esto quedó conversado y aclarado con su antecesor el Embajador Gutierrez. Es un canje de territorios que está de acuerdo con el valor que tienen para cada país. Ese es el obstáculo principal, agregó el Ministro.

VI.- El Embajador Violand señaló que la proposición del Presidente Banzer no constituye un retroceso, y que la respuesta peruana ha creado una nueva situación que da origen a que Chile pueda reiniciar las conversaciones con ese país. Señaló que en el frente interno a Banzer le resulta difícil seguir negociando. Cuando se produjo la respuesta peruana, indicó que el Presidente Banzer trató de recabar el apoyo para el canje con un giro

discuss professional issues only and the matter of the Bolivian situation was not addressed

IV. Subsequently, the Ambassador of Bolivia insisted: "How do you visualize the future of negotiations and how will conversations with Peru continue?" Bolivia is concerned about the stagnation in the negotiation and, therefore, is interested in learning the next steps to be taken by the Chilean Government.

V. The Minister indicated that President Banzer pointed out in his Christmas Message that there will be no territorial compensation and this is of concern to Chile. He added that Chile's proposal has not been the result of improvisation – each stipulation is full of meaning, and that is why the exchange of territories is essential. This causes much more concern than what Peru may say. Irrespective of the solution reached with Peru, Chile would not agree to it if such solution implies a Bolivian proposal of no exchange. This Chilean condition derives from a national feeling that was and is expressed in all the spheres of public opinion, so it is a fundamental provision. Any other term of negotiation would be unacceptable, the Minister said. This was discussed and made clear with your predecessor, Ambassador Gutierrez. It is an exchange of territories that is consistent with the value they have for each country. That is the main obstacle, according to the Minister.

VI. Ambassador Violand pointed out that President Banzer's proposal is not a step backwards, and the Peruvian answer has created a new situation that makes it possible for Chile to resume conversations with said country. He added that in the domestic front Banzer finds it difficult to continue negotiating. When Peru answered, President Banzer tried to gather support for the exchange

que realizó por el país. Hay que tener presente que se está negociando con la necesidad de apoyo de un tercero. Esto no se ha dado, de forma que se configura una nueva situación. Se les enfrenta el problema de presentar al pueblo una solución al estancamiento que a muchos les hace ver el asunto con cierto pesimismo.

Cualquier resultado de ensayo de solución ante Perú significa que Bolivia y Chile antes deberán ponerse de acuerdo, argumentó el Embajador, y que ésta sería la respuesta peruana.

Existe la decisión de Bolivia y de Chile de seguir avanzando, es una posición compartida señaló, "y que creo de Chile muy sincera", y cualquier otra solución dentro de la propuesta se necesita la aprobación de Perú por lo que expresó el Embajador que hay que buscar otra solución en que no tenga que intervenir Perú.

VII.- El Ministro indicó la posibilidad de hacer un planteamiento de tal manera que para Perú sea atractivo este canje nuestro y señaló la posibilidad de ofrecer un canje el Tacora al Perú a cambio de un terreno más extenso de playa que se le daría a Bolivia.

Intervino el Embajador para señalar que se ha hablado del Tacora y Laguna Blanca, pero insistió en que Perú diría, "pónganse antes de acuerdo con Chile". El Ministro expresó que podrían haber posibilidades, de acuerdo a sondeos que haga Bolivia. El Embajador insistió en que esto sería otra negociación sujeta a un entendimiento primero con Chile.

VIII.- El Ministro le señaló al Embajador que él siente que Bolivia ha tomado esta negociación como "el todo o nada". Así por ejemplo en las primeras conversaciones se hablaba que, sin perjuicio de atender a la solución de este problema, de acceso al Pacífico, se avanzara en otros asuntos en forma paralela como incrementar la

during a tour around the country. It should be taken into account that this negotiation needs the support of a third party. Since such support has not been obtained, a new situation arises. They face the problem of having to offer the people a solution to the stagnation that makes many people feel quite pessimistic about the matter.

Any trial solution offered to Peru must be first agreed upon by Bolivia and Chile, the Ambassador claimed, and this would be the Peruvian response.

Bolivia and Chile are determined to move forward; it is a shared decision, the Ambassador said, "and a very honest decision by Chile, I believe". Any other solution within the proposal needs Peru's approval, and that is why the Ambassador claimed that another solution should be found in which Peru's intervention is not required.

VII. The Minister indicated the possibility of making a proposal in such a way that Peru will find our exchange appealing. We may offer Tacora to Peru in exchange for a larger piece of beach that would be given to Bolivia.

The Ambassador mentioned that Tacora and Laguna Blanca have been part of the discussions, but insisted that Peru would say "first, reach an agreement with Chile". The Minister stated that there are some possibilities, in accordance with the surveys to be carried out by Bolivia. The Ambassador insisted that this would be a different negotiation subject to a prior understanding with Chile.

VIII. The Minister told the Ambassador that he feels Bolivia has taken this negotiation as an "all or nothing" question. For example, in the first discussions, it was said that, without prejudice to addressing the solution to this problem, the access to the Pacific, we should simultaneously move forward in other issues such as increasing

ayuda al tránsito de Bolivia hacia el Pacífico y alentar las posibilidades en cuanto a su comercio y otros aspectos de interés. Esto ayuda, dijo el Ministro, a crear la impresión que estamos avanzando, da optimismo a la opinión pública, estomejora las relaciones humanas entre quienes tienen que relacionarse, por ejemplo una mejora en las carreteras, da una sensación muy positiva y que facilita las negociaciones de Gobierno a Gobierno.

El Embajador indicó que efectivamente se ha intensificado el comercio y que hay proyectos que están marchando, pero que se trata de resolver la mediterraneidad de Bolivia que es lo fundamental de la negociación. Bolivia necesita desarrollar su potencial y es una realidad la necesidad de abrirse al enclaustramiento en que se encuentra.

El Embajador manifestó su comprensión por la posición del canje que sostiene Chile pero señaló que Bolivia arriesga su futuro interno por una situación hipotética, ya que pese a que cree que existe decidida voluntad de Chile, este se tropieza con el Tratado de 1929.

IX.- Hoy, señaló el Ministro, si acaso se presentan las aristas, sumadas al hecho de que Bolivia dice que no haya canje, estamos en una difícil situación de seguir presentando a Perú un frente común. Y agregó el Ministro ¿Por qué esperar la solución principal sin seguir avanzando en forma paralela?. El Embajador intervino señalando que la Reunión de la Comixta es una postergación momentánea. Continuó el Ministro diciéndole que los ataques de la prensa boliviana a Chile son por mala información. Por ejemplo en los ataques por la acumulación de mercaderías en el puerto de Arica (especialmente trigo), debido a malas condiciones del ferrocarril, se olvidan que FF.CC. bolivianos tiene una deuda de más de tres millones de dólares con nuestra empresa de FF.CC., en circunstancias que nuestra empresa, como otras de ca-

the assistance for the transit of Bolivia towards the Pacific and promote the possibilities of commerce and other activities of interest. According to the Minister, this helps to create the impression that we are making progress and brings optimism to the public opinion. This improves the human relationships among those who need such relationships; for example, improving roads gives a very positive feeling and facilitates negotiations between Governments.

The Ambassador explained that trade has indeed intensified and there are projects under way, but the fundamental purpose of the negotiation is to solve Bolivia's landlocked situation. Bolivia needs to develop its potential and to that end it has to be free of the confinement in which it finds itself.

The Ambassador stated that he understands Chile's position about the exchange but he noted that Bolivia risks its internal future for a hypothetical situation because, although it believes in Chile's strong willingness, this stumbles on the 1929 Treaty.

IX. Today, the Minister added, if any differences come to light, combined with the fact that Bolivia is opposed to the exchange, we are in a difficult situation to continue presenting Peru with a common front. The Minister also asked: "Why wait for the main solution and not move forward on other issues simultaneously?" The Ambassador interrupted to explain that the postponement of the meeting of the Mixed Commission is momentary. The Minister continued and explained that the attacks by the Bolivian press to Chile are the result of inaccurate information. For example, when they attack Chile for the accumulation of goods in the port of Arica (especially wheat) due to the poor conditions of the railways, they forget that Bolivian Railways owe more than three million dollars to our railway company. Given that our company is, as many other state-owned corporations,

rácter público, tiene orden de autofinanciarse, entonces esta deuda hace que FF.CC. no funcione bien. Así, agregó, hay otros puntos de este tipo que se pueden solucionar y crear en la opinión pública una conciencia de que hay intención de eliminar trabas. Esto no significa soslayar el problema de fondo sino que se trata de un avance paralelo.

El Embajador manifestó que esta deuda de FF.CC. no ha caído en saco roto y existe un acuerdo de reconciliar cuentas. Hay una proposición al señor Ministro de Transportes, General Vargas, de comprar locomotoras y Bolivia cuenta con líneas de crédito con Japón de tal manera que solicite al Ministro considerar la posibilidad venta de los vagonas con el Ministro General Vargas.

El Ministro le planteó la posibilidad de estudiar tentativamente un acuerdo semejante al que tuvimos con Bolivia el 5 de diciembre de 1975 en que se rehiciera un acuerdo sobre las mismas bases aclarando las aristas y borrándolas en forma mutuamente conveniente y aceptable e incluyendo en este proyecto de solución propposiciones que sean atractivas al Perú. Que tenga este país la zona del Lacora y Bolivia, una zona mayor de playa. La Comisión Consultiva del Perú era partidaria de dar el sí al planteamiento que se les presentaba y después de la respuesta peruana se disolvió la citada Comisión. Podemos volver a presentar acuerdo. Perú puede aportar una imágen de contribución. Habría que buscar una aproximación. Es necesario limar aristas, teniendo como base el acuerdo de diciembre de 1975. Perú quiere que nosotros estemos de acuerdo antes que ellos se pronuncien.

Esto significa dar forma a lo convenido, señaló el Embajador, transformándose esto en una cosa tripartita. Tendría que ser una aproximación de Chile a Perú, sería una presentación simultánea que haría Chile.

obliged to be self-financed, this debt causes the railway service to function badly. Thus, he added, there are other issues of this kind which can be solved to make the public opinion aware that there is an intention to eliminate any friction. This does not imply disregarding the core issue, but making simultaneous progress in other aspects.

The Ambassador stated that this debt of Bolivian Railways has not fallen on deaf ears and there is an agreement to reconcile accounts. An offer has been made to the Minister of Transport, General Vargas, to purchase locomotives, and Bolivia has lines of credit with Japan. Therefore, the Minister is requested to consider the possibility of selling train cars together with the Minister General Vargas.

X. The Minister offered him the possibility to start tentatively analyzing a similar agreement to the one we entered into with Bolivia on 5 December 1975, to redraft an agreement on the same bases, clarifying our differences and smoothing them over in a way that is mutually convenient and acceptable, and including in this solution project proposals which may be appealing to Peru. To give said country the Tacora area and Bolivia a larger beach area. Peru's Advisory Committee was in favour of accepting the proposal, and after the Peruvian answer, the abovementioned committee was dissolved. We can submit the agreement again. Peru can show cooperation. We should attempt to achieve a rapprochement. We need to reconcile our differences using the December 1975 agreement as a basis. Peru wants us to agree before they announce their decision.

This means giving shape to the agreement, said the Ambassador, and converting the matter into a three-party issue. Chile should approach Peru, it would be a simultaneous presentation by Chile.

XI.- El Ministro le manifestó que estudie Bolivia esta proposición de manera de seguir avanzando. Insistió enfáticamente en la idea del canje y quizá, señaló, sería conveniente determinar el territorio, indicar cual sería el lugar, localizarlo, con el objeto de evitar suspicacias de quienes pueden pensar que Chile puede estar pretendiendo algo insospechado. El Embajador dijo que esto le parece adjetivo frente a la presentación al Perú.

A continuación intervino el Consejero Saavedra para sugerir que el Presidente Pinochet podría dar un paso de avance señalando una proposición por medio de un mensaje público, lo que él llamó hacer una "diplomacia pública".

El Ministro le hizo notar que todos los avances que se han logrado en la negociación han sido en base a conversaciones reservadas, de tal manera que en esto no habría cambio. Al Embajador le preocupa que, en Bolivia, Banzer manifestó una posición a través de un mensaje y esperan en ese país algo semejante con respecto al nuestro. El Ministro le recordó que el Presidente Pinochet habló de canje con anterioridad a que Banzer se refiriera a él.

Resumiendo un poco lo ya dicho el Embajador se refirió a la proposición de concretar el avance hecho para reiterar ante el Perú una proposición en términos concretos, buscando un incentivo para ese país. A lo que agregó el Ministro que esta proposición debiera ser formal y pública de tal manera que le resultaría difícil a ese país rechazarla, siendo aceptable para la opinión pública y la imagen internacional del Perú. Chile podría hacer un sondeo presentando con elocuencia como algo positivo para Perú, para lo que sería indispensable saber que se mantendría el acuerdo general previo entre Chile y Bolivia recalcando nuevamente que el Canje es con ición sine qua non. El Embajador Boliviano señaló que la aproximación al Perú deberá ser previa al acuer

XI. The Minister asked Bolivia to analyze the proposal so that the process can continue to progress. He insisted vehemently on the exchange and perhaps, he added, it would be convenient to determine the territory, indicate the place and locate it, in order to avoid the distrust of anyone who may think Chile may be trying to go something unsuspected. The Ambassador said he finds this question accessory to the presentation to Peru.

Subsequently, Counsellor Saavedra suggested President Pinochet could take a step forward if he makes a proposal through a public message, something he calls "public diplomacy".

The Minister brought attention to the fact that every progress made so far in the negotiations has been on the basis of confidential discussions and this should not change. The Ambassador is worried because, in Bolivia, Banzer expressed their position through a message and they expect a similar act from us. The Minister reminded that President Pinochet had already talked about the exchange before Banzer did.

Summarizing a bit what he had already stated, the Ambassador referred to the possibility of crystallizing the progress made so far in order to submit again a specific proposal to Peru which can act as an incentive for said country. The Minister added that the proposal should be formal and public so that Peru finds it difficult to reject it, it being acceptable for the public opinion and Peru's image before the world. Chile could conduct a poll, presenting the proposal as something clearly positive for Peru, for which purpose it would be crucial to be sure that the previous general agreement between Chile and Bolivia will be maintained, emphasizing again that the exchange is a condition sine qua non. The Bolivian Ambassador pointed out that the approach to Peru should be prior to the agreement

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
DIRECCION DE FRONTERAS
Y LIMITES DEL ESTADO
Asesoría Jurídica

RESERVADO
RES. Nº 166
ANT. OF. Ord. Nº 1351/43 de
23 de Marzo de 1977
MAT. Creación del Consejo
Nacional de Fronteras

do por que de otra manera las negociaciones estarían terminadas.

El Ministro señaló que comprende que el Perú tiene problemas ante su opinión pública, destacando que el Presidente anterior había hecho declaraciones en el sentido de que no permitiría que Bolivia estuviera en territorios que antes fueron peruanos.

XII.- El Ministro, finalmente propuso esta forma de trabajo; seguir este tipo de reuniones de diálogo, y le instó a que madure esto que se ha conversado y que continúen más adelante.

El Embajador le señaló que comprende que la solución no salga en una hora de entrevista y que por lo tanto espera seguir conversando en esta forma el tema y junto con agradecer al Ministro esta audiencia, le manifestó su preocupación de estar en una carrera contra el tiempo. Perú recientemente ha señalado de que abrirá las compuertas a las corrientes políticas, y entonces comienzan a entrar en juego una serie de factores que alejarían una posibilidad de entendimiento.

XIII.- Ha pasado más de una hora y con el acuerdo de solicitar una audiencia después de los días de semana santa, se despidió el Embajador y funcionarios de la Embajada que lo acompañaban, agradeciendo nuevamente el Ministro su acogida.

SANTIAGO, 1º de abril de 1977

Ve so
JPG/sam.

Distribución:

PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Director de Relaciones
Internacionales

since, otherwise, negotiations would break down.

The Minister said he understands Peru has problems with the public opinion of its own country because the former President declared that he would not allow Bolivia to step into territories which belonged to Peru in the past.

XII. Finally, the Minister suggested continuing to hold these kinds of dialogue meetings and invited the parties to think on what has been discussed today and to continue discussing in the future.

The Ambassador said he understands that a solution cannot be found in a one-hour meeting and, therefore, expects to continue discussing the matter. He thanked the Minister for this meeting and expressed his concern for being in what he believes is a race against time. Peru has recently claimed they will open the doors to political currents; this way, new factors come into play which may spoil the possibility of reaching an understanding.

XIII. After more than one hour, and on the agreement that a new meeting will be requested at the end of the Holy Week, the Ambassador and the Embassy officers who accompany him bade farewell to the Minister and thanked him once again for receiving them.

Santiago, 1 April 1977.

[Illegible seals]

[Signature]

Approved by

PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Director of International Affairs

Annex 221

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia, No 24, 21 April 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Palacio de La Moneda

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
- * -

RESERVADO
RR.EE.(DIRELAB) A-5 24
OBJ: Remite memorandum de audiencia del Ministro de RR.EE. al Embajador de Bolivia.

SANTIAGO, 21 de abril de 1977

DE: MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
A : SEÑOR EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN LA PAZ

Adjunto al presente oficio, me es grato remitir a US., para su debido conocimiento copia del Memorandum sobre la audiencia concedida por el señor Ministro al Embajador de ese país acreditado en Santiago, señor Adalberto Violand, efectuada el 20 de abril en curso.

Dios guarde a US.
POR ORDEN DEL SUBSECRETARIO

PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Ministro Consejero
Director de Relaciones
Internacionales

mvh

DISTRIBUCION:
1.- E. en La Paz c/a.
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3.- RR.EE. (DIRELAB) archivo.

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

RR.EE.(DIRELAS) RES 24
Subject: Sending memorandum of audience
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
with the Ambassador of Bolivia

SANTIAGO, 21 April 1977

FROM: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO: AMBASSADOR OF CHILE IN LA PAZ

Attached to this letter it pleases me to send to you for your information a copy of the Memorandum on the audience granted by the Minister to the Ambassador of this country in Santiago, Mr. Adalberto Violand, on 20 April of this year.

Sincerely yours,
BY ORDER OF THE UNDERSECRETARY

[Signed]
PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Minister Counselor
Director of International Relations

Distribution:
1. Embassy of Chile in La Pas whith annex
2. Foreign Affairs (Of. Partes)
3. Foreign Affairs (DIRELAS), Archives

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Departamento América del Sur

MEMORANDUN RES. No 116/

DE : DIREL

A : DIGEN, INFO DIPLAN, SUBSEC, MINGAB

NAT: Audiencia concedida por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile al Embajador de Bolivia en Santiago.

A las 10,30 horas de hoy el Señor Ministro recibió en audiencia especial al Embajador de Bolivia Sr. Adalberto Violand, quién concurrió acompañado de funcionarios de esa Misión Diplomática. A la referida audiencia asistieron el Sr. Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores y el Señor Julio Phillipi.

En primer término, el Embajador Violand agradeció al Ministro su deferencia al adelantarle la fecha de la audiencia, que en principio había sido acordada para el día 28 del presente. Asimismo, manifestó que el próximo día 30 viajaría a La Paz a fin de participar en una Reunión de Embajadores que había convocado su Cancillería.

En consecuencia, ha deseado continuar el diálogo iniciado a fin de tener una visión global del asunto y poder así transmitir a su Gobierno los avances alcanzados en esta negociación.

El Sr. Ministro, luego de hacer una síntesis de lo anteriormente tratado con el Embajador, puntualizó que se mantenía como punto de partida la Nota del 19 de diciembre de 1975 a la cual podría hacersele un Addendum que contendría la aclaración o interpretación de aquellas materias que fueron consideradas como "aristas" (desmilitarización, compensación marítima y aprovechamiento de las aguas del río Lauca).

Se haría un sondeo preliminar al Perú a fin de detectar la receptividad que tendría en ese país una fórmula de trueque (por ejemplo Tacora por una mayor extensión de playa), que le fuera atractiva y que permitiría llegar al término de esta negociación. Este sondeo

/...

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Department of South America

MEMORANDUM RES. NO. 116

FROM: DIREL
TO: DIGEN, INFO DIPLAN, SUBSEC, MINGAB

RE: Audience granted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago

The Minister received the Bolivian Ambassador Mr. Adalberto Violand in a special audience today at 10:30 a.m. Mr. Violand was accompanied by officials from Bolivia's Diplomatic Mission. The audience was attended by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and by Mr. Julio Phillipi.

First, Ambassador Violand thanked the Minister for being willing to move the audience up to today's date, as it had originally been scheduled for 28 April. He also said that on 30 April he would travel to La Paz to participate in a meeting of Ambassadors that had been called by his Foreign Ministry.

Therefore, he would like to continue the dialogue they had started, so that he would have a global view of the matter and could thus inform his Government of the progress made in these negotiations.

After summarizing what had been discussed previously with the Ambassador, the Minister stated that the starting point was still the Note of 19 December 1975, to which an Addendum containing a clarification or interpretation of those matters deemed "differences" (demilitarization, maritime compensation and use of the waters of the River Lauca) could be added.

A preliminary poll of Peru would be carried out to determine how receptive it would be to a formula of exchange (e.g., Tacora for a greater extension of beach) that would be attractive to it and would allow us to bring the negotiation to an end. This poll

lo haría Chile, debiendo existir previamente unaacuerdo entre nuestro país y Bolivia sobre la fórmula ya referida y que se materializaría por parte de Bolivia, después de que haya recibido el corredor.

Otra fórmula que podría estudiarse, manifestó el Sr. Ministro, sería que Bolivia llegara a un acuerdo con el Perú sobre el aprovechamiento de las aguas del río Mauri, que permitiría ampliar las obras de regadío de Tacna. Este es un problema que se viene arrastrando desde 1923 entre Perú y Bolivia y tal como acotó don Julio Phillipi, Perú le asigna una especial importancia ya que en las ruedas de conversaciones y al tratarse el caso de la servidumbre, manifestaron su interés en que este problema fuera resuelto.

El señor Ministro reiteró más adelante que las negociaciones con Bolivia tenían como base el acuerdo de 1975, en el cual se establece como condición para la cesión del corredor, la compensación territorial.

Volviendo al sondeo que se haría al Perú el Ministro manifestó que ese país debe exhibir ante su opinión pública que ha obtenido algo de esta negociación, especialmente ante la opinión pública de la zona fronteriza.

El Embajador preguntó a don Julio Phillipi si él consideraba viable que estas fórmulas pudiesen ser aceptadas por Perú. El Sr. Phillipi le contestó que objetivamente Perú tenía interés en estas materias, pero que razones políticas podrían influir el curso de los acontecimientos.

Más adelante el Embajador Violand expresó que en la respuesta peruana había algo de positivo, cual era que había levantado el veto a parte de la carretera, posición que podría capitalizarse. El Ministro concordó en que esto había sido un avance positivo, pero manifestó que Chile había declinado, en su totalidad, la Nota del Perú.

El Embajador Violand, finalmente, reiteró los agradecimientos al Sr. Ministro, terminando de esta forma la audiencia. A esta asistió la Consejero Srta. Liliana [illegible] B., quien tomó y redactó las notas precedentes.

Santiago, 20 de abril de 1977.-

VO BO
PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Ministro Consejero
Director de Relaciones Internacionales

would be carried out by Chile, because there would have to first be an agreement between our country and Bolivia on the formula mentioned above, to be carried out by Bolivia after it received the corridor.

The Minister said that another formula that could be studied would be for Bolivia to reach an agreement with Peru on the use of the waters of the River Mauri, which would allow it to expand the irrigation works in Tacna. This is a problem that has been hanging over Peru and Bolivia since 1923 and, as Julio Philippi mentioned, Peru considers it to be especially important because in the round of talks and in the discussion of the easement, they stated their interest to see this problem resolved.

The Minister later reiterated that the negotiations with Bolivia are based on the agreement of 1975, which established territorial compensation as a condition for the cession of the corridor.

Returning to the poll of Peru that would be taken, the Minister said that Peru must show the Peruvian people—and particularly the people in the border area—that they have obtained something from this negotiation.

The Ambassador asked Julio Philippi whether he though it viable for these formulas to be accepted by Peru. Mr. Philippi answered that objectively Peru had an interest in these matters, but that political reasons could influence the course of the events.

Later Ambassador Violand stated that there was something positive in Peru's response, which was that they had withdrawn the veto on part of the highway, a position on which they could capitalize. The Minister agreed that this had been a positive step, but said that Chile had declined Peru's Note in its entirety.

Finally, Ambassador Violand reiterated his thanks to the Minister, thus ending this audience. The audience was attended by the Counselor Miss Liliana Núñez B., who took and drafted these notes.

Santiago, 20 April 1977

PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Minister Counselor
Director of International Relations

Annex 222

Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Bolivia, signed at Santiago on 10 June 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 165 to its Memorial

Durante los días 8, 9 y 10 del mes de junio de 1977, el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República de Bolivia, General Don Oscar Adriázola Valda, efectuó una visita Oficial a la República de Chile, atendiendo a una invitación que le formulara el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Chile, Don Patricio Carvajal Prado.

En el transcurso de su visita el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia fue recibido en audiencia especial por el Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la República, General de Ejército Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, con quien sostuvo un cordial intercambio de puntos de vista sobre asuntos de mutuo interés.

El Señor Canciller de Bolivia visitó, asimismo, al Señor Ministro de Defensa Nacional, General de División Herman Brady Roche, con quien mantuvo un franco y amistoso diálogo.

En el curso de las conversaciones que mantuvieron ambos Cancilleres, sobre temas de orden bilateral y multilateral tuvieron la oportunidad de

On 8, 9 and 10 June 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Bolivia, General Oscar Adriázola Valda, made an official visit to the Republic of Chile, in response to an invitation from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile, Patricio Carvajal Prado.

In the course of his visit, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs was received in a special audience by His Excellency the President of the Republic, Army General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, with whom he had a cordial discussion of points of view on matters of mutual interest.

The Bolivian Foreign Minister also visited the Minister of National Defense, Division General Herman Brady Roche, with whom he had a candid and friendly dialogue.

In the course of the discussions between the Foreign Ministers on bilateral and multilateral issues, they had the opportunity to

analizar el progresivo avance de las relaciones boliviano-chilenas y expresaron su firme voluntad de dinamizar aún más el proceso de estrechar los vínculos de todo orden entre ambas naciones, con miras a cimentar el bien común, fortalecer la amistad de sus pueblos y cooperar así a hacer cada vez más efectivas la paz y solidaridad latinoamericanas.

Animados de este espíritu, como resultado de sus conversaciones, ambos Ministros acordaron la siguiente:

D E C L A R A C I O N C O N J U N T A

Los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile y Bolivia:

Reiteran la indeclinable adhesión de Chile y Bolivia a los principios de las Naciones Unidas y de la Organización de los Estados Americanos y reafirman su propósito de coordinar su acción en ambos Organismos. Renuevan por tanto, su adhesión a los principios de no intervención, autodeterminación de los pueblos, renuncia a la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza y respeto a la soberanía de los Estados.

analyze the progress of the relations between Chile and Bolivia and expressed their firm intent to speed up the process of strengthening the ties of all types between the two nations, with a view toward establishing the common good, strengthening the friendship of their peoples and cooperating to make Latin American peace and solidarity even more effective.

With this spirit in mind, and as a result of their discussions, the two Ministers agreed to the following:

JOINT DECLARATION

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia:

Reiterate the unwavering adhesion of Chile and Bolivia to the principles of the United Nations and the Organization of American States and reaffirm their intention to coordinate their action in both organizations. They therefore renew their adherence to the principles of non-intervention, self-determination, renouncement of the threat or use of force, and respect for the sovereignty of States.

Coinciden, por lo mismo, en la aplicación del principio de solución pacífica de todas las controversias internacionales y hacen votos por que los problemas existentes o que pudieren existir en el Continente tengan siempre un adecuado arreglo a través de esta vía. Por ello manifiestan, a la vez, la alta conveniencia de que alcancen progresivo perfeccionamiento los mecanismos y recursos de solución pacífica de controversias, tanto en el sistema universal como en el regional americano, a fín de vigorizar el ambiente de mutuo respeto, de cabal comprensión y de recíproca confianza entre los Estados.

Manifiestan su decisión de apoyar las reformas a la O.E.A. que tengan por objeto revitalizarla y darle mayor eficacia como instrumento de seguridad y cooperación continental.

Ante la situación de violencia que conmueve al mundo y, especialmente, durante el último tiempo al Continente, con desprecio por la libertad, la integridad y la vida del ser humano, fuera de todo marco legal, expresan su más enérgica condena y repudio al terrorismo como la forma más censurable de violación de los derechos humanos.

They therefore agree to apply the principle of peaceful resolution to all international disputes and sincerely hope that the existing problems or any problems that may exist on the Continent will always be able to be settled through this means. Accordingly, they state that it would be highly preferable for the mechanisms and resources for peaceful dispute resolution to progressively improve, both at the international and the regional level, so that the atmosphere of mutual respect, thorough understanding and mutual trust between nations can be strengthened.

They state their decision to support the reforms to the OAS whose goal is to revitalize it and make it even more effective as an instrument for security and cooperation on the Continent.

In view of the violent situation in which the world finds itself, particularly in recent times on the Continent, and the contempt for liberty, integrity and the life of human beings, outside of any legal framework, they express their most vigorous condemnation and rejection of terrorism as the most censurable form of violating human rights.

Ratifican la posición formulada por los países en desarrollo en organismos y foros internacionales, dirigida a obtener un reordenamiento de las relaciones económicas con las naciones industrializadas sobre la base de un diálogo constructivo. A este respecto, resaltan la importancia de mejorar las condiciones de acceso de los productos de los países en desarrollo a los mercados mundiales. En concordancia con estos propósitos, destacan la conveniencia de buscar fórmulas que permitan garantizar precios remunerativos para las materias primas, a cuyos efectos subrayan que es fundamental eliminar acciones que pudieran distorsionar el mercado mundial para la adecuada comercialización de las mismas. Asimismo, condenan cualquier intento de discriminación que se presente en los organismos financieros internacionales.

Expresan su confianza en que el Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) cumplirá su propósito de coordinación latinoamericana, e impulsará proyectos de interés para la región que contribuyan a su bienestar.

Destacan que el diálogo establecido a través de la Declaración de Charaña corresponde al empeño de los dos Gobiernos de profundizar y fortalecer las rela-

They ratify the position formulated by developing countries in international agencies and forums, aimed at obtaining a re-ordering of the economic relations with industrialized nations on a basis of constructive dialogue. In this regard, they highlight the importance of improving access to the global markets by products from developing countries. In accordance with those goals, they emphasize how appropriate it is to seek solutions that will ensure remunerative prices for raw materials, to which end they underscore that it is fundamental to eliminate actions that could distort the global market for the proper commercialization thereof. They also condemn any attempted discrimination by international financial institutions.

They express their trust that the Latin American Economic System (SELA) will fulfill its purpose of Latin American coordination, and will promote projects of interest to the region that will contribute to its wellbeing.

They emphasize that the dialogue established via the Declaration of Charaña reflects the endeavouring of the two governments to deepen and strengthen the bilateral

ciones bilaterales entre Chile y Bolivia, mediante la búsqueda de soluciones concretas para sus respectivos problemas, especialmente el relativo a la mediterraneidad boliviana.

En este sentido, señalan que conforme a ese espíritu iniciaron negociaciones destinadas a encontrar una solución efectiva que permita a Bolivia contar con una salida libre y soberana en el Océano Pacífico.

Tomando como base el constructivo análisis que ambos Ministros hicieron sobre el curso de las negociaciones referidas al vital problema boliviano, resuelven profundizar y activar el diálogo, comprometiéndose a realizar cuanto esté de su parte para llevar a feliz término esta negociación, a la brevedad posible.

En consecuencia, reafirman la necesidad de proseguir las negociaciones desde el estado actual en que se encuantran, en procura de alcanzar el objetivo que se han propuesto, a fin de consolidar la pacífica conviven - cia y la amplia comprensión que promueva el entendimiento, así como el desarrollo coordinado en la zona.

relations between Chile and Bolivia by seeking concrete solutions to their respective problems, especially with regard to Bolivia's landlocked situation.

Along these lines, they indicate that, consistently with this spirit, they initiated negotiations aimed at finding an effective solution that allows Bolivia to count on a free and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

Taking as a basis both Ministers' constructive analysis of the course of negotiations regarding Bolivia's vital problem, they resolve to deepen and activate their dialogue, committing to do their part to bring this negotiation to a happy end as soon as possible.

Consequently, they reaffirmed the need to pursue the negotiations from their current status, seeking to reach their proposed objective, in order to consolidate peaceful coexistence and broad comprehension that promotes understanding, as well as coordinated development in the zone.

Reconocen la necesidad de activar y promover el intercambio comercial bilateral, sobre la base de la utilización efectiva de los instrumentos existentes y de la aplicación de nuevos mecanismos financieros que estimulen y faciliten dicho intercambio, dentro de un marco de equilibrio y cooperación mutua. A estos efectos el Gobierno de Chile ofreció una línea de crédito de US$ 10. millones destinados a financiar las exportaciones chilenas a Bolivia de bienes de capital y consumo durables, oferta que el Gobierno de Bolivia someterá al estudio de los Organismos competentes.

Acuerdan celebrar dentro de 90 días la primera reunión de la Comisión Mixta Permanente Chileno-Boliviana, instalada en noviembre del año pasado, con el fin de proporcionar un conducto permanente para el encauzamiento de los intereses recíprocos y el trato expedito y oportuno de los problemas que se suscitaren en los campos de la cooperación económica y tecnológica, de la integración física y del desarrollo comercial y cultural.

Finalmente, los Ministros manifiestan su propósito de mantener un diálogo permanente destinado a lograr o coordinar posiciones coincidentes, estimando que ello contribuirá a promover aún más un acercamiento

They recognize the need to activate and promote bilateral trade on the basis of active use of the existing instruments and application of new financial mechanisms that stimulate and facilitate that exchange, within a framework of equilibrium and mutual cooperation. To this end, the Chilean Government offered a $10 million line of credit to finance Chilean exports to Bolivia, of capital assets and durable consumer goods, an offer that the Bolivian Government will submit for study by the appropriate agencies.

They agreed that within 90 days they would hold the first meeting of the Chile-Bolivia Permanent Mixed Commission that was set up in November of last year in order to provide a permanent channel for discussing mutual interests and expeditious and timely treatment of the problems that arise in the fields of economic and technological cooperation, physical integration and commercial and cultural development.

Finally, the Ministers stated their intention to maintain a lasting dialogue to achieve or coordinate consistent positions, because they felt that this will promote even greater understanding

fraterno entre Chile y Bolivia.

Dado en la ciudad de Santiago, Chile, a los diez días del mes de junio de mil novecientos setenta y siete.

PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES DE CHILE

OSCAR ADRIAZOLA VALDA
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES Y CULTO DE
BOLIVIA

between Chile and Bolivia.

Done in the city of Santiago, Chile, on 10 June 1977.

[Signed]

Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile

[Signed]

Oscar Adriazola Valda
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Worship of Bolivia

Annex 223

Letter from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, No 480/114, 19 August 1977 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

E. LA PAZ (DIRELAS)Of.Res.No. 480/114

OBJ.: Remite informativo correspondiente al mes de julio de 1977

REF.: RR.EE.(DIREL)Circ.Res.No. 44 del 9 de Septiembre de 1975.

LA PAZ, 19 de agosto de 1977

DE LA EMBAJADA DE CHILE EN BOLIVIA
AL SEÑOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Como anexo del presente oficio remito a US., un resumen informativo correspondiente al mes de julio ppdo. en el cual se han considerado materias concernientes a las relaciones bilaterales, así como a la política interna y exterior de este país.

CON ANEXO

Dios guarde a US.,

Ricardo Lira
Encargado de Negocios a.i.

RLG/bca.

DISTRIBUCION :

1. - RR.EE. (DIRELAS) c/anexo.
2. - RR.EE. (DIPLAN) c/anexo. INFO.
3. - RR.EE. (OF.PARTES) c/anexo.
4. - E. LA PAZ (ARCHIVO)

20.9.77

14 SEP. 1977

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EMBASSY OF CHILE
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA

S. LA PAZ (DIRELAS) OF.Res.No 480/114
OBJ: Sending informative note for the month of July 1977
REF: F.A.(DIREL)Circ.Res.No.44 of 9 September 1975

LA PAZ, 19 August 1977

FROM THE EMBASSY OF CHILE IN BOLIVIA
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As an attachment, I am sending you an informative summary of this past month of July, which discusses matters concerning bilateral relations and the domestic and foreign policy of this country.

Sincerely yours,

[Signed]
Ricardo Lira
Interim Chargé d'Affaires

[…]

3. Comentarios sobre la cuestión marítima (Ofs.Res.375/91 y 427/103)

El lunes 11 de julio el Presidente Banzer sostuvo una entrevista en el Palacio de Gobierno con el ex Canciller señor José Fellman Velarde, respecto de la cual la prensa señaló que se trataba del inicio de un ciclo de consultas del Primer Mandatario acerca de la cuestión marítima. Esta información fue corroborada por el visitante, quien manifestó que había concurrido al Palacio para plantear sus opiniones sobre la política marítima de las FF.AA. En los comentarios sobre esta conversación, se hizo ver que el señor Fellman Velarde ocupaba el cargo de Canciller del Gobierno del MNR cuando se produjo la ruptura de relaciones con Chile en abril de 1962.

Pasadas algunas semanas, parece más bien evidente que el Presidente Banzer al llamar al señor José Fellman Velarde, lo hizo alentado con fines de carácter político (Of.Res.91); tal vez con el ánimo de atraer algunos sectores del MNR, ya que no se registraron otras consultas sobre el asunto marítimo.

Con referencia a las negociaciones sobre el acceso al mar cabe agregar que, conjuntamente con el despliegue publicitario acerca del viaje del Presidente Banzer a Panamá y Venezuela y de destacar el apoyo logrado en estos países para las aspiraciones bolivianas, la prensa del día 29 incluyó un cablegrama de la agencia " Latin " en el cual se dió cuenta de declaraciones hechas por el señor Subsecretario de RR.EE. en sentido de que se había contemplado una nueva fórmula en las negociaciones y que se esperaba que ella fuese presentada oficialmente. La información de " Latín " dió origen a algunos comentarios negativos en los periódicos " Presencia " y " Los Tiempos ". Por su parte, el Presidente Banzer, comienzos del mes de agosto, manifestó a la prensa lo siguiente, según la versión entregada por el matutino oficialista " Hoy ".

3. Comments on the maritime question (Official Resolution 375/91 and 427/103)[1]

On Monday 11 July, President Banzer held a meeting at the Government Palace with former Foreign Minister José Fellman Velarde, regarding which the press indicated that it was the beginning of a series of discussions by the President about the maritime issue. This information was corroborated by the visitor, who stated that he had gone to the Palace to state his opinions on the maritime policy of the Armed Forces. In the comments on this discussion, it was pointed out that Mr. Fellman Velarde was the Foreign Minister of the MNR Government when relations with Chile were broken off in April 1962.

Now that several weeks have passed, it seems rather obvious that President Banzer called upon Mr. José Fellman Velarde for reasons of a political character (Of. Res. 91): perhaps in order to attract certain sectors of the MNR, because no other discussions on the maritime issue have been recorded.

With regard to the negotiations on access to the sea, it is important to note that, along with the publicity about President Banzer's trip to Panama and Venezuela and the emphasis on the support garnered in those countries for Bolivia's aspirations, the press on the 29th included a cablegram from the "Latin" agency reporting on statements made by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs to the effect that a new formula has been contemplated in the negotiations and that it was expected to be presented officially. The information from "Latin" resulted in several negative comments in the newspapers "Presencia" and "Los Tiempos". For his part, President Banzer made the following statements in early August, according to the version printed in the pro-Government newspaper "Hoy".

[1] [Note that the original in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile is incomplete. Despite best efforts, we were not able to obtain a complete original.]

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

" No se si es evidente esa declaración que viene del Canciller chileno en sentido de que está esperando una nueva propuesta porque nosotros no estamos buscando una nueva propuesta, hemos ratificado lo que hicimos y lo que planteamos y nos mantenemos en esos términos." Se agrega :El Presidente expresó se mantiene contacto con Gobierno de Chile; que en este tipo de negociaciones no es posible fijar plazos y que éstas continuarán por existir disposición de ánimo".

Elementos de la Falange Socialista Boliviana lanzaron a fines de julio, diversos ataques a la conducción de las negociaciones sobre el problema marítimo. La Juventud de esta colectividad adoptó acuerdos en los que propicio una ruptura de relaciones con nuestro país si no se alcanzaba una solución en breve plazo. La actitud de la FSB tuvo un carácter eminentemente político con miras a una proyectada convención nacional.

II.- POLITICA INTERNA.

1.- Discurso del Presidente Banzer con ocasión de celebrarse el Sesquicentenario de la Corte Suprema en Sucre Actividad política (Ofs. Ord. 393/187 y Res. 410 / 100)

En fecha 16 de julio, el Presidente Banzer pronunció,con ocasión del Sesquicentenario de la Corte Suprema, un importante discurso en la ciudad de Sucre. De conformidad a las palabras del Primer Mandatario, el proceso de institucionalización del país se basará primordialmente en la elaboración de un estatuto para el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos; en la reforma del sistema parlamentario; y, finalmente, en la introducción de nuevas disposiciones a la Constitución, previa consulta popular a realizarse en el curso de los próximos dos años. Todo ello culminaría en el año 1980 mediante un proceso electoral.

El discurso del General Banzer mereció, en términos generales, la aprobación de la opinión pública y de la mayoría de las colectividades políticas.

En el curso del mes de julio se produjeron diversos hechos de trascendencia que reflejaron la fase de gran actividad política en que ha ingresado el país; entre ellos cabe citar los siguientes:

a) Anuncio de los sindicatos campesinos que apoyan al actual Gobierno de que en su concentración anual a celebrarse el 2 de agosto proclamarían al General Banzer como candidato presidencial. A este anuncio siguió la publicación de una carta dirigida por el Presidente de la República a los dirigentes campesinos el 18 de julio ppdo., en la cual les solicitó deponer la citada iniciativa, ya que el hecho de presentar su candidatura " entorpecería el proceso de institucionalización del país ".

"I do not know whether the statement by the Chilean Foreign Minister that they are expecting a new proposal is obvious, because we are not looking for a new proposal, we have ratified what we have done and what we have proposed and we will maintain those terms." The President said that he is staying in contact with the Government of Chile; that in this type of negotiations it is not possible to set deadlines and that these will continue because there is willingness to do so.

In late July, members of the Falange Socialista Boliviana [the FSB] launched attacks on the negotiations on the maritime problem. The young people in that organization adopted agreements calling for relations with our country to be broken off if a solution was not reached in the short term. The FSB's stance was fully political in character, with a view towards a planned national convention.

[…]

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

mente fue confirmado el General Javier Cerruto (Aeronáutica). El titular de la cartera Mayor (R) Julio Trigo, anunció que el reordenamiento alcanzará también las direcciones de Transporte, FF.CC. y Administrativa del Ministerio.

III. POLITICA INTERNACIONAL.

1. Visita del Presidente Banzer a Panamá y Venezuela (Of.Res No. 435 106)

El acontecimiento más significativo de la política exterior boliviana en el curso del mes de julio, fue la visita del Presidente Banzer a Panamá y Venezuela, con el fin de entrevistarse con los Jefes de Estado de los citados países. El Primer Mandatario viajó el lunes 25 de julio con destino a Panamá, regresando a esta capital el viernes 29. La comitiva incluyó como los funcionarios de mayor rango al Ministro de Finanzas y al Subsecretario General de RR.EE.

Las entrevistas del General Banzer con los Jefes de Estado de los países antes mencionados fueron programadas de conformidad a la línea política seguida por este Gobierno, cuyos objetivos principales son el robustecimiento de su imagen tanto en el exterior como en el plano interno, así como el logro de apoyo para sus aspiraciones de acceso al Océano Pacífico. Resultó también conveniente para el Presidente demostrar que cuenta con un sólido respaldo de las FF.AA (fue ascendido a General de Fuerza mientras se encontraba en Panamá)y, asimismo, hacer ver que tiene el propósito de institucionalizar el país al reafirmar ante la prensa extranjera sus recientes declaraciones sobre el particular.

Tanto en sus visitas a Panamá como a Caracas, el General Banzer consiguió pleno éxito en dar realce al apoyo a las aspiraciones marítimas bolivianas. La donación de un barco mercante por el Gobierno venezolano y la firma de la declaración conjunta entre ambos Presidentes a bordo del mismo, en Puerto Cabello, y las palabras de solidaridad del Presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez, fueron objeto de múltiples y elogiosos comentarios en los órganos de difusión de este país.

Respecto del contenido de la declaración conjunta suscrita en Puerto Cabello, se destacó en esta capital lo señalado acerca de " la conveniencia de replantear la solución de la salida directa y soberana de Bolivia al mar sobre la base de la constitución de un gran polo de desarrollo integrado en la zona del Pacífico Sur al cual podrían prestar su cooperación organismos internacionales de desarrollo así como otros países ".

2. Dificultades en el Pacto Andino (Of.Res.351 86)

Durante el mes de julio se registraron diversos comentarios acerca de las dificultades que enfrenta el Pacto Andino, particularmente en lo que se refiere al Programa Automotriz.

Annex 224

Joint Declaration of the Presidents of Bolivia, Chile and Peru, reproduced in "Meeting held among Pinochet, Morales and Banzer", *El Mercurio* (Chile), 9 September 1977

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 129 to its Memorial

827
R.)

P O

EL MERCURIO

Santiago de Chile, Viernes 9 de Septiembre de 1977

Fundado en
Año LXXVIII-

PRECIO (IV

Chile:

PRIMER CUERPO

Santiago de Chile, Viernes 9 de

En la Embajada de Chile:

Reunión de Pinochet, Morales y Banzer

- Emitieron declaración conjunta: decisión de impulsar negociaciones sobre la mediterraneidad boliviana
- Versiones de las agencias internacionales sobre el lugar de la reunión

REUNION TRIPARTITA.— *El Presidente del Perú, general Francisco Morales Bermúdez, abandona la residencia del Embajador de Chile en Washington, Jorge Cauas, después de haber sostenido allí una reunión con sus colegas de Chile, general Augusto Pinochet, y de Bolivia, general Hu-*

WASHINGTON.— (Por Mario Oyarzun, enviado especial). — En una sorpresiva reunión de una hora en la Embajada chilena en Washington, los Presidentes de Chile, Perú y Bolivia resolvieron impulsar la solución del problema de mediterraneidad del país altiplánico.

Los generales Augusto Pinochet, Francisco Morales Bermúdez y Hugo Banzer emitieron una declaración conjunta luego de conversar entre las 17.30 y las 18.30 horas en la residencia del Embajador Jorge Cauas.

Los Mandatarios concordaron en que la reunión fue extremadamente cordial y amistosa y se mostraron complacidos de los resultados de este contacto, que es el primero a este nivel entre los tres países.

También es el primer en-

(Continúa en la página 14)



EL MERCURIO
Santiago de Chile, Friday 9 September 1977

At the Embassy of Chile:
Meeting held among Pinochet, Morales and Banzer

- A Joint Declaration has been issued: decision to promote negotiations on Bolivia's landlocked situation.

- Versions of international agencies at the place of the meeting

WASHINGTON.- (by Mario Oyarzun, special envoy)

-In an unexpected meeting that lasted one hour at the Chilean Embassy in Washington, the Presidents of Chile, Peru and Bolivia decided to promote the solution to the landlocked situation affecting Bolivia.

Generals Augusto Pinochet, Francisco Morales and Hugo Banzer issued a joint declaration after holding discussions from 5:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. at the residence of Ambassador Jorge Causas.

The Heads of State agreed that the meeting was extremely cordial and friendly and they expressed their satisfaction with the results of this encounter, which is the first one held at this level among the three countries.

It is also the first meeting

cos están en Alameda con Re. altamente positiva. res

Reunión de Pinochet,

(De la primera página)

cuentro que sostienen los generales Pinochet y Morales Bermudez como Presidentes de sus respectivos países.

Los Jefes de Estado conversaron primero privadamente y luego se unieron a ellos los Cancilleres de Chile, vicealmirante Patricio Carvajal, y de Perú, José de la Puente. El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia no viajó a Washington porque le corresponde suceder al Presidente cuando éste se ausenta del país.

TEXTO DE LA DECLARACION

El siguiente es el texto de la declaración tripartita entregada anoche luego de la reunión de los Presidentes de Chile, Perú y Bolivia:

"Con motivo de la presencia en Washington DC., de los Jefes de Estado Americanos, para realizar la suscripción de los tratados recientemente acordados entre las repúblicas de Panamá y los Estados Unidos de América, a iniciativa del Presidente de Bolivia, los Excelentísimos Mandatarios de Bolivia, Chile y Perú se reunieron en esta capital para considerar el estado de las relaciones entre sus países y la marcha de las negociaciones encaminadas a solucionar el problema de la mediterraneidad de Bolivia.

"Como resultado del cordial y constructivo análisis que realizaron, y reafirmando la voluntad del diálogo que los anima, acordaron instruir a sus respectivas Cancillerías que, conforme a este propósito, continúen los esfuerzos orientados al logro de una solución del citado problema que corresponde al deseo de cooperación, amistad y paz que los inspiran".

VERSION DE UPI

WASHINGTON, 8 (UPI) — Chile y Perú convinieron hoy con Bolivia en la necesidad de continuar los esfuerzos orientados al logro de una solución del problema de la mediterraneidad boliviana, "reafirmando la voluntad de diálogo que los anima" y "que corresponda al deseo de cooperación, amistad y paz" que inspira a los Mandatarios de los tres países.

El acuerdo fue obtenido durante una reunión de una hora concretada en esta capital sólo después de prolongados e intensos forcejeos diplomáticos que en un momento parecieron hacer peligrar la realización de la entrevista.

El Presidente Banzer buscó desde ayer por todos los medios concretar la reunión, pero ésta a ratos se tornó elusiva, no tanto porque Morales Bermúdez y Pinochet se resistieran a la misma, sino porque no se ponían de acuerdo sobre el lugar en que debían celebrar las conversaciones.

Según se dijo en medios diplomáticos, Pinochet se mostró inflexible en materia de sede para la reunión, y la delegación boliviana debió realizar urgentes maniobras ante los peruanos en vista de que el Presidente chileno emprendía esta misma noche el regreso a Santiago.

Las fuentes informativas señalaron que la actitud de Pinochet no se debió a un capricho, "sino a una cuestión de principios".

Finalmente, con la venia del Presidente peruano, los

held between Generals Pinochet and Morales Bermudez in their capacities as Presidents of their respective States.

The Heads of State conversed privately at first and then, Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal (the Foreign Minister of Chile) and José de la Puente (the Foreign Minister of Peru) joined them. The Bolivian Foreign Minister did not travel to Washington because he has to stand in for the President while he is out of the country.

TEXT OF THE DECLARATION

The following is the text of the tripartite declaration submitted last night after the meeting among the Presidents of Chile, Peru and Bolivia.

"On the occasion of the presence in Washington of the Heads of State of the Americas to sign the treaties that have just been entered into between the Republic of Panama and the United States, and at the initiative of the President of Bolivia, the Heads of State of Bolivia, Chile and Peru met in this capital city to consider the status of the relations among their countries and the progress of the negotiations aimed at solving the problem of Bolivia's landlocked situation.

"As a result of the friendly and constructive analysis that they carried out, and confirming the willingness to dialogue that motivated them, they agreed to instruct their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to continue their efforts aimed at reaching a solution to this problem, which takes into account the desire for cooperation, friendship and peace that inspires them."

Annex 225

Telex from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 301, 14 September 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR: 1 PAGINA 1
MINUTA POLITICA

FORMATO PARA MENSAJES
(TELEX Y CABLES)

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	GRUPO HORARIO	MES	AÑO
CIFRADO	301	141230	SEPTIEMBRE	1977

DE: EMBACHILE LA PAZ
A : DIRELAS INFO DIPLAN

Buen informe Ple

1.- HEMOS TENIDO CONOCIMIENTO QUE DOMINGO 11 PRESIDENTE BANZER CONVOCO SU DOMICILIO PRINCIPALES DIRECTORES DIARIOS PARA SOLICITARLES COMPRENSION EN MANEJO INFORMACIONES VINCULADAS NEGOCIACIONES CON CHILE.
2.- CUATRO DE LOS DIRECTORES DIARIOS LA PAZ ACEPTANON PLENAMENTE PLANTEAMIENTOS PRESIDENTE. DIRECTORES "PRESENCIA" Y "DIARIO" CONDICIONARON SU ACTITUD A TENER UN CONOCIMIENTO AMPLIO DE LO TRATADO WASHINGTON.
3.- PRESIDENTE BANZER HABRIA EXPLICADO EN DETALLES REUNION PROMETIENDO ENTREGAR CON POSTERIORIDAD MEMORANDUM COMPLETO SUS ACTIVIDADES.
4.- EN CONVERSACIONES QUE SIGUIERON EXPLICACION DIRECTORES "PRESENCIA" Y " DIARIO" RECORDARON A PRESIDENTE QUE OPINION PUBLICA SE OPONIA CANJE. EN RESPUESTA PRESIDENTE BANZER OBSERVO QUE HABIA QUE TOMAR EN CONSIDERACION QUE PRESIDENTE PINOCHET DEJABA AL CRITERIO DE BOLIVIA ELEGIR TERRITORIOS A CANJEAR SIN IMPORTARLE QUE HUBIERA O NO CONTINUIDAD EN ELLOS.
5.- TANTO DIRECTORES "PRESENCIA" COMO "DIARIO" SE HABRIAN MOSTRADO RENUENTES PREPARAR OPINION PUBLICA PARA UN CANJE TERRITORIAL PORQUE A SU JUICIO YA ESTABA RECHAZADA POR LA OPINION GENERAL. PRESIDENTE BANZER INSISTIO EN PEDIRLES NO LE CREARAN PROBLEMAS Y LE AYUDARAN A GARANTIZAR A BOLIVIA UNA SALIDA AL MAR.
6.- FRUTO ESTA REUNION ES COMUNICADO DE SECRETARIA PRENSA PRESIDENCIA, PUBLICADO PRENSA HOY, EN QUE CRONOLOGICAMENTE SE RELATAN TODOS LOS DETALLES, ACTIVIDADES Y PRINCIPALES PLANTEAMIENTOS REUNION CON PRESIDENTES PINOCHET Y MORALES.
7.- VALIJA MANANA REMITO TEXTO COMUNICADO CUYOS PARRAFOS PRINCIPALES RELACIONADOS REUNION PRESIDENTE PINOCHET ANTICIPO CABLE 302.

DAZA

REFERENCIA:

NOTA DE CLAVE: PRESENTE TELEX ES COPIA TEXTUAL DEL ORIGINAL.

8

OPERADOR C G V Vº Bº CLAVE

FECHA	HORA LLEGADA	HORA DESPACHO	CORRELATIVO
14/09/77	141330	16:58:52	9820

Nº 0047740

FORM. 29 - EXCELSIOR LTDA.

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NUMBER: 301 TIME: 141230 MONTH: SEPTEMBER YEAR: 1977

FROM: EMBACHILE LA PAZ
TO: DIRELAS INFO DIPLAN

1. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT ON SUNDAY 11 PRESIDENT BANZER CALLED TO HIS RESIDENCE [THE] MAIN NEWSPAPER DIRECTORS TO ASK THEM FOR UNDERSTANDING IN HANDLING INFORMATION RELATED TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHILE.

2. FOUR OF THE NEWSPAPER DIRECTORS [IN] LA PAZ FULLY ACCEPTED [THE] PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. DIRECTORS OF "PRESENCIA" AND "DIARIO" CONDITIONED THEIR ACCEPTANCE ON FULL KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.

3. PRESIDENT BANZER APPARENTLY EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE MEETING, PROMISING TO SEND A COMPLETE MEMORANDUM ON HIS ACTIVITIES LATER.

4. IN DISCUSSIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE EXPLANATION, DIRECTORS OF "PRESENCIA" AND "DIARIO" REMINDED PRESIDENT BANZER THAT PUBLIC OPINION WAS OPPOSED TO EXCHANGE. IN RESPONSE PRESIDENT BANZER NOTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT PRESIDENT PINOCHET LEFT IT UP TO BOLIVIA TO SELECT TERRITORIES TO BE EXCHANGED AND THAT IT DID NOT MATTER TO HIM WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE CONTIGUOUS.

5. BOTH DIRECTORS OF "PRESENCIA" AND OF "DIARIO" WERE APPARENTLY RELUCTANT TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR A TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE BECAUSE IN THEIR OPINION IT HAD ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BY THE GENERAL OPINION. PRESIDENT BANZER INSISTED ON ASKING THEM NOT TO CREATE PROBLEMS AND TO HELP HIM ENSURE THAT BOLIVIA OBTAINS AN OUTLET TO THE SEA.

6. THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING WAS COMMUNICATED BY [THE] PRESS SECRETARY OF [THE] PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS TODAY, CHRONOLOGICALLY RELATING ALL THE DETAILS, ACTIVITIES AND PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS MEETING WITH PRESIDENTS PINOCHET AND MORALES.

7. BY POUCH TOMORROW I WILL SEND TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE, PRINCIPAL PARAGRAPHS OF WHICH RELATE TO MEETING PRESIDENT PINOCHET. I SEND CABLE 302.

DAZA

Annex 226

"Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal, 'Our territory won't be sold or given away'", *La Segunda* (Chile), 17 September 1977 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

La Segunda (Chile)

EDITORIAL

Martín Vargas

Esta medianoche un chileno intentará ser el primero del mundo en su actividad. En tierras extrañas entrará a un cuadrilátero y dirimirá, según las reglas de un deporte rudo y hasta destructivo, superioridades con su rival mejicano.

En este momento, estamos ciertos, cada chileno alienta interiormente al compatriota que, con resolución, confianza y valor, acomete la proeza.

Si triunfa Martín Vargas, habrá una alegría explicable. Hemos ido olvidando, desde hace décadas, la costumbre de los triunfos deportivos. La gesta del pequeño osornino ha sido, por eso, acogida con escepticismo por muchos compatriotas, que le asignan pocas posibilidades.

Si Vargas es derrotado, sería deseable que acogiéramos el hecho con sobriedad. Es también una mala costumbre nuestra la de pretender disfrazar las derrotas con el carácter de "victorias morales". Pero si se pierde una vez más, no debemos conformarnos con ello.

Si queremos ser una gran nación, debemos tener un concepto claro del éxito y del fracaso. Es preciso que aprendamos a celebrar el primero, y a premiarlo, como también a sobreponernos a la derrota, y a superarla. Tenemos que dejar de lado tanto el "chaqueteo" a los que triunfan como la glorificación de los derrotados o fracasados.

El empuje realizador de un país se manifieste en el éxito de sus habitantes en sus respectivas actividades. En la producción, en el arte, en el comercio, en el deporte e, incluso, en el campo de las realizaciones políticas.

Hoy un chileno busca triunfar, así como todos debiéramos, cada cual en su esfera, perseguir lo mismo. Si lo logra, celebrémoslo como es debido. Si no, lamentémoslo, pero sin histeria. Otros éxitos nos esperan si sabemos buscarlos con valor y con tesón.

DEMANDA — Por Lukas



—¡Si seguimos importando autos, habrá que importar estacionamientos!

CANCILLER PATRICIO CARVAJAL:

"Nuestro territorio no se vende ni se regala"

Por Antonio Salgado
Fotos: Oscar Molina

"NUESTRO territorio no se vende ni se regala", enfatizó el Canciller Patricio Carvajal, al ser consultado en torno al estado de las conversaciones originadas por la situación de mediterraneidad de Bolivia.

En entrevista exclusiva concedida a "La Segunda", el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores señaló que "con Bolivia hemos tenido una línea muy franca, clara y definida", como consta en el Documento de diciembre de 1975, aprobado en principio por ese país.

"Nuestra oferta sigue válida. Creemos que es la solución que hay. No se puede pensar en una solución que corte ni reduzca la extensión de Chile. Nuestro territorio no se vende ni se regala. En 1907 ya se hizo un canje de 300 metros cuadrados con Bolivia, sin que se presentaran problemas. Y esto de ahora podría considerarse de la misma forma. Nosotros no pensamos modificar los tratados de límites, con países vecinos, a menos que exista un acuerdo bilateral", manifestó el Ministro Carvajal.

El Canciller Carvajal, que viaja la semana venidera a Naciones Unidas para asistir a un nuevo período ordinario de sesiones de dicho organismo, aprovechará la ocasión de continuar conversando sobre dicha materia con los ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia y Perú.

Siempre refiriéndose a la situación boliviana, el Ministro expresó que el acuerdo de 1975, mediante el cual se le ofreció una franja territorial en canje al país del norte, se adoptó con mucho trabajo, esfuerzo y tras numerosas consultas, hasta que se logró la fórmula adecuada.

Todo ello se realizó en forma reservada. Y en ese nivel continúan las conversaciones que tuvieron su punto culminante cuando en Washington —recientemente— se reunieron los Presidentes de Chile, Perú y Bolivia, en la residencia del Embajador Jorge Cauas.

PACTO ANDINO

En la entrevista también se consideró el retiro de Chile del Pacto Andino, hecho que se ha prestado a diferentes interpretaciones. Algunos estiman que dicho retiro tuvo un "costo político" para Chile.

"La medida de retirarse del Pacto Andino se adoptó después de largos estudios en los que participaron los Ministros del área económica y el propio Canciller, en consulta a cada paso al Presidente de la República".

"Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con esta medida para poder continuar adelante con nuestra política económica. Este (el Pacto Andino), tenía un marco muy rígido para contener a políticas económicas de tan diferentes niveles como las de Venezuela, Chile Perú y Bolivia".

Luego añadió el Ministro Carvajal: "Estoy absolutamente convencido que la medida fue buena y abogué para que ella se adoptara".

"Era mucho mayor el "costo político" para Chile mantenerse dentro del Pacto Andino, donde continuamente se producían roces y debates no siempre serenos.

"Hemos visto —pese a los augurios— que ha aumentado el comercio con los países del Pacto Andino y ha constituido un gran incentivo —nuestra posición— para los inversionistas extranjeros".

NACIONES UNIDAS

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile el 5 de octubre próximo intervendrá en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Sus planteamientos generales serán del tipo clásico. Es decir, se referirán a la situación que viven algunas áreas del mundo, especialmente en Medio Oriente y Africa. Chile fijará en cada uno de esos problemas su posición respectiva.

Sin embargo, el mayor énfasis se pondrá en todo lo relacionado con el terrorismo. Estas acciones forman parte de una campaña fomentada por el comunismo-soviético que origina —en numerosos países— la implantación de restricciones de libertades y sistemas de emergencia.

"La restricción de algunos derechos en países con regímenes de emergencia se debe a esa acción, ante la cual la distensión no ha podido contener la subversión que fomenta la Unión Soviética".

Incuestionablemente, Chile será nuevamente blanco de ataques impulsados por la catapulta comunista - soviética, en esta próxima Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, pero su Canciller espera que el mayor conocimiento que se tiene de la realidad chilena en el exterior permita atenuar estas maniobras políticas.

RELACIONES CON ESTADOS UNIDOS

El Canciller se muestra optimista del estado de las relaciones entre Chile y el gobierno norteamericano, luego de la entrevista sostenida en Washington por los Presidentes Jimmy Carter y Augusto Pinochet.

Por supuesto —estima— que el resultado de esta entrevista no tendrá consecuencias inmediatas. En todo caso, la designación de Embajador de Estados Unidos en Santiago ya constituye un avance importante en el desenfriamiento de las relaciones observadas anteriormente.

"Con la designación de Embajador de Estados Unidos, tenemos la esperanza de mantener una relación más activa y completa. Nosotros, fieles a nuestros principios y fe en el mundo libre, hemos estado apoyando a Estados Unidos en la mayoría de los organismos internacionales, tal es el caso del Canal de Panamá, para buscar soluciones satisfactorias. Hemos apoyado a EE. UU. en lo de Puerto Rico, en lo de Corea, por consiguiente derecho de justicia. Hemos marchado muy de acuerdo con la política general de dicho país. Y pese a los ataques de algunos sectores, nuestras ideas en cuanto a ética y justicia no las cambiamos".

PRESIDENTE CARTER

Frente a las versiones conocidas sobre la entrevista entre los Presidentes Jimmy Carter y Augusto Pinochet, el Canciller dijo:

"El Presidente Carter hizo preguntas sumamente diplomáticas y corteses. En ningún caso podría decirse que sus consultas fueron desagradables, impertinentes o inquisidoras. El Presidente Carter es un diplomático innato e hizo las consultas con bastante delicadeza y tacto".

En su respuesta el Ministro Carvajal fue enfático en afirmar que el Mandatario norteamericano en ningún momento preguntó por fecha de elecciones en nuestro país. Más bien, lo hizo refiriéndose a las críticas que se le formulan a Chile en determinadas naciones de Europa Occidental.

Por todos estos antecedentes, el Canciller estima que las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Chile retomarán su nivel normal. Un nivel que seguramente tratará de elevar el nuevo Embajador norteamericano que hasta el momento de su designación en Santiago se desempeñaba en Asunción, Paraguay.

Canciller Carvajal: "Nuestro territorio no se vende ni se regala".

LA TABLE DU ROI
WHISKY-LICORES
(al detalle y por cajones)
HABANOS
AMPLIO SURTIDO EN PERFUMES Y LOCIONES FRANCESAS
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LAS URBINAS 27 (DRUGSTORE-PROVIDENCIA)
GALERIA COUVE LOCAL 1 VIÑA DEL MAR

La fiesta buena será en
El Chancho con Chaleco
Restaurante de Turismo
Menú Dieciochero
ALMUERZO
Huaso Sour
Empanada de horno
Cazuela de ave
Asado vacuno/chilena
Huesillo
$ 130
... Y PARA BAILAR
Los Huaraní
Conjunto electrónico Los láser
y una tonelada de cuecas con
Rubén Páez y sus guatones
EV. RAMON FREIRE 99 (ex Pajaritos)
FONO 575811 MAIPU

FOREIGN MINISTER PATRICIO CARVAJAL

"Our territory won't be sold or given away"

"Our territory won't be sold or given away", Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal said emphatically when he was asked about the status of the discussions about Bolivia's landlocked situation.

In an exclusive interview granted to "La Segunda", the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "we have had a very frank, clear and well defined line with Bolivia", as shown in the document of December 1975, which has been approved in principle by that country.

"Our offer remains valid. We think that this is the solution we have. We cannot consider a solution that cuts or reduces the extension of Chile. Our territory won't be sold or given away. Way back in 1907, 300 square meters were exchanged with Bolivia without presenting any problems. And the matter now could be considered in the same way. We do not intend to modify our boundary treaties with neighbouring countries unless there is a bilateral agreement", commented Minister Carvajal.

Foreign Minister Carvajal, who will travel to the United Nations next week to attend a new regular session of that organization, taking advantage of the opportunity to continue talking about the matter with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru.

Always referring to the Bolivian situation, the Foreign Minister said that the 1975 agreement, by which a strip of territory in the northern part of the country was offered in exchange, was adopted with great labour and after numerous consultations, until the proper formula was found.

All of this was done on a confidential basis. And on this basis continued the talks that culminated when in Washington, recently, the Presidents of Chile, Peru and Bolivia met at the residence of Ambassador Jorge Cauas.

[...]

Annex 227

Verbatim Record of the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Thirty-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/32/PV.7, 26 September 1977 (extract)

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/803/05/pdf/NL780305.pdf?OpenElement>, pp 73 and 88-91

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THIRTY-SECOND SESSION
Official Records

7th PLENARY MEETING
Monday, 26 September 1977, at 3.25 p.m.
NEW YORK

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President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate *(continued)*

1. Mr. MONTIEL ARGÜELLO (Nicaragua) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me, on behalf of my country and on my own behalf, to congratulate you most sincerely on the excellent decision made in electing you to preside over the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. Your merits and experience ensure for our debates an expert guidance which will contribute to their success.

2. I should like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, the head of the delegation of Sri Lanka, for his excellent work as President of the thirty-first session. I also wish to salute Mr. Kurt Waldheim and to congratulate him on behalf of my country on being re-elected Secretary-General of our Organization. During the first year of his new term of office he has discharged effectively the duties imposed on him by his august office in a manner which has reflected his ability, his dignity and his work for world peace. This, together with his long experience in the international sphere, will enable us to carry out more easily the difficult tasks which no doubt will face us in the future.

3. This year we welcome the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Republic of Djibouti. Their presence among us brings us closer to the full application of the cardinal principle of universality for our Organization.

4. In my statement to this Assembly last year[1] I expressed cautious optimism on the question of international peace and security, and some of the events that have occurred since then have confirmed that attitude.

5. The progress achieved in regularizing the situation in Lebanon deserves particular mention. The factors involved led us to fear an extension of the conflict, and its confinement has clearly revealed the existence of a spirit of international responsibility, which all the nations here must welcome.

6. The general situation in the Middle East shows signs of improvement. We hope that in due course the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East will be reconvened and that it will lead to agreements satisfactory to all the parties and will establish a permanent peace that will enable the peoples concerned to resume the course of their development.

7. While paying a well-deserved tribute to the late President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, my Government notes the stagnation in the situation in that country. The resolutions of the General Assembly do not appear to have given effective guidelines for the solution of that dangerous situation. A new effort should be made in the light of the additional factors that might be brought out in a more open and direct discussion of the problem among the parties directly concerned.

8. We cannot fail to be concerned at the rising tensions among the great Powers. The risks of a direct confrontation between them are less than in the past; nevertheless, a rise in those tensions has an adverse effect in the countries that are politically at the periphery, and our peripheral societies are inevitably victims of the tension.

9. Nor can we fail to mention the warlike actions and the profound political disturbances on the African continent. Once more we have seen the direct effects of foreign intervention, which render the solution of conflicts more difficult because it introduces elements which do take account not of the interests of the countries primarily involved but rather of the neo-colonialist strategies and long-term interests of the countries that carry out the intervention.

10. It is our hope that the African continent will develop politically and economically. That will, however, be difficult if foreign intervention persists. We would wish the path to that progress to be freely chosen by the will of the Africans and not imposed on them from outside. We once again energetically condemn intervention as contrary to the principles that should govern relations among peoples.

11. My country was very pleased to note the signing of the treaties on the Panama Canal. We consider that to be an event of far-reaching historical implications that will favourably affect future relations between the United States and Latin America, which has always been in solidarity with Panama concerning its claim to complete sovereignty over its entire territory.

[1] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 14th meeting, paras. 276-329.

218. My Government has stepped up its financial and humanitarian aid to the African liberation movements and to the front-line States. It is our intention to further increase our support in the future.

219. Both in Zimbabwe and Namibia it may prove necessary to arrange for a United Nations presence during a transitional period. Norway is prepared to help within the framework of decisions which the United Nations may make and in agreement with the representatives of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

220. We have been encouraged by the sustained efforts that have been made to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. The Norwegian Government welcomes these efforts. In our view, there may now be a real opportunity to find a solution to the problem that has been hanging over the Middle East and the rest of the world for the whole of this generation. We therefore urge all parties concerned to show the necessary restraint and a true spirit of compromise, so that this opportunity of achieving a lasting and equitable solution will not be lost.

221. In our view, a peaceful settlement in the Middle East must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

222. Since the Palestinian question is one of the main elements in the Middle East conflict, the Palestinians should be ensured participation in the negotiations in a manner to be worked out in consultation with all the parties concerned.

223. A real effort must be made by all parties to break the vicious circle of inflexible positions. The Palestinians must recognize the right of Israel to exist as a State within secure and recognized boundaries, in the same way as Israel must recognize the right of the Palestinians to have a homeland. In this connexion I should like to refer to the communiqué from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting earlier this month.

224. To increase respect for human rights must continue to be one of the basic aims of the United Nations. This follows from the Charter itself.

225. The achievements of the United Nations in the field of spelling out the rights of man have been impressive. The global human rights situation nevertheless gives rise to concern.

226. The importance of the work of the United Nations in the field of elaborating norms for the rights of man can be measured only through the impact such norms make in the daily life of human beings all over the world. Human rights should thus be high on the agenda of international co-operation.

227. There is an urgent need to improve the United Nations machinery for the protection of human rights. In this connexion the idea of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights merits positive consideration. The idea is not a new one, but it has, in the view of my Government, never been examined on its full merits.

228. My Government recently submitted to Parliament a white paper on "Norway and the international protection of human rights". Among the main conclusions here were the following. First, international co-operation for protecting human rights must be strengthened. Flagrant and persistent suppression of fundamental human rights are of international concern. Existing United Nations institutions should be provided with the necessary facilities to work more effectively towards this end. Secondly, we want to support non-governmental organizations which constitute an important supplement to intergovernmental bodies, particularly when it comes to mobilizing public support and understanding for human rights. Thirdly, nothing is more an affront to human dignity than the mass poverty, hunger, unemployment and social misery which are allowed to prevail in so large a part of the world. We cannot concentrate on traditional human rights as long as the basic needs of major groups of the world population have not been fulfilled. But neither can we accept that the need for economic and social development is an excuse for such practices as the use of torture, arbitrary arrests and political suppression.

229. I should like to refer briefly to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. My country considers it essential that the new organization for the exploitation of the sea-bed should be given effective powers that will enable it to safeguard the interests of the international community. At the same time it is obvious that the guidelines for the organization's work must take into account the practical possibilities for exploiting the resources of the sea-bed, and create a basis for a reasonable balance between the various interests involved. The Conference is on the point of entering its most crucial phase. It is vital that all countries attend its next session—which we expect to be the last working session—in a spirit of earnest endeavour and friendly compromise.

230. The Secretary-General's report includes this time the following question: "What, in all frankness, is the real position of the United Nations in the affairs of the world?" *[A/32/1, sect. II]*. I will try to answer this question by some reflections on the importance of the United Nations for a small country like my own.

231. Small countries have very limited possibilities indeed to influence the course of international events. For this very reason they have to rely on a world order founded on the rule of law and not on power, and with rules applying to small and big alike. For this reason our membership in the United Nations—imperfect as the Organization may be—constitutes a corner-stone of my country's foreign policy. For this reason we will contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations' peace-keeping ability and the vital role of the Security Council in this regard. For this reason we are committed to the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to meet the many new challenges that are common to all countries. And for this reason we are also anxious to see that the ongoing efforts to restructure the machinery of the United Nations in the economic and social fields will lead to concrete results during this session of the General Assembly.

232. Mr. ADRIAZOLA VALDA (Bolivia) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: To bring Bolivia's voice once again to the

General Assembly of the United Nations, this universal parliament of historic dimensions where the problems and concerns of the world are discussed, is a great honour and an opportunity to reaffirm my country's support for the basic tenets of our Organization. Solidarity, equality, fraternal collaboration, justice and the defence of peace are basic rules which guide our country in its conduct in international relations.

233. We would also like to emphasize our country's spirit of hope. We wish to make a definite contribution towards realizing the aims of the international community in bringing about a better future for mankind. Our contribution in this world forum will bear the stamp of co-operation and solidarity. Our work is aimed towards ensuring that justice and peace prevail in an increasingly interdependent world.

234. In my statement in this general debate, I wish to express the thanks and congratulations of the Government of Bolivia to Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, who, at an important stage of our work, chaired the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

235. Also on behalf of my country I wish to welcome the President of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, Mr. Lazar Mojsov, whose election fully guarantees that our deliberations will lead to a constructive dialogue.

236. My Government once again wishes to compliment the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, on his work in support of peace and understanding in the world. His devotion has earned the appreciation of the international community.

237. On behalf of the Republic of Bolivia, I wish to welcome the countries that have recently become Members of the United Nations. We know that they will join with us in our efforts to achieve the objectives of our Organization. The admission to membership of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and Djibouti means that we are continuing towards the goal of the universality of our Organization, which Bolivia fervently supports.

238. We are convinced that one of the great achievements of the international community is the dialogue that the General Assembly has made possible. Here we have discussed the most critical problems of the world, we have considered the aspirations of the peoples of the world and we have tried to bring about a world in which we can live together in security, peace and co-operation. On this occasion we are faced with problems of differing magnitude and urgency, and our will for an understanding must be unflagging and in keeping with the principles which for the past 32 years have remained unchanged. Those principles are our chosen weapons in trying to bring about a less tormented future.

239. We are particularly concerned over one problem that troubles the entire world. The policy of racial discrimination and *apartheid* is an offence against our sense of justice. Its continuation makes it difficult for us to consider that the international community has brought about human solidarity and a high level of civilization. Hence we believe that the struggle for liberation which various peoples have been waging in an attempt to bring about genuine independence and nationhood is closely related to the universal struggle here to set aside practices of intolerance. Bolivia has traditionally supported these efforts.

240. The problems which arise from those policies take many forms. For that reason we should like to make special mention of resolution 1514 (XV), which stresses the principle of the self-determination of peoples. In a vast area of the world, efforts to bring about self-determination also mean the fight against racial discrimination.

241. We also wish to express our concern over the conflict in the Middle East. The lack of a settlement there endangers peace not only in that area but in the entire world. For that reason Bolivia wishes to reiterate its support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which laid down the basic and adequate guidelines for a permanent peace, taking into account the interests of all those involved in the conflict. The return of occupied territory, the acceptance of the rights of the peoples of that area and recognition of the existence of all the States involved in the conflict are fundamental factors for a just and final settlement.

242. In keeping with our peace-loving traditions and our inclination to support dialogue, we believe that a delegation of Palestinian people must also participate in the Geneva Conference seeking a realistic solution of the problem of the Middle East. Only thus will all voices be heard, all rights accepted and all aspirations taken into account, so that there can be brought in the region an atmosphere of peace and civilized understanding.

243. Once again, with great regret, we must draw attention to the turn that the arms race has taken. Weapons of mass destruction have gone beyond what we can conceive, and, what is also very serious, their proliferation has consumed resources to the detriment of the expectations of developing peoples for progress and higher standards of living. This is a concern of long standing, but it remains crucial.

244. I should like to reiterate our alarm at the fact that the arms race has extended to some less developed countries and thus has converted certain areas, including the American continent, into hotbeds of tension. The arms race must be replaced by a world-wide commitment not to use force in international relations. At this stage of civilization, it is incomprehensible that mankind can reject dialogue and understanding in favour of regressive positions based on destruction and death. A commitment to reject force, which could take the form of a historic treaty for mankind, would gain our full support. For that reason we support the proposal that a world disarmament conference should ban the use of environmental modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes, such as already agreed at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

245. My country's love of peace and humanitarian feelings prompts us to reiterate our concern over the problem of terrorism, which we regard as one form of violation of

human rights. Indeed I wish to say that this escalation of irrational and systematized violence cannot be considered a valid means of making legitimate any political, economic or social claims. The anguish of world public opinion over innocent victims of terrorist practices should move the international community to seek machinery not only to punish those who use those ignoble weapons but also to prevent acts which offend mankind's deepest feelings in this second half of the twentieth century.

246. We are concerned not only over the fact that human rights are brutally violated by terrorist actions; we are also concerned over any other use of force, practice or method which hinders the full self-realization of man, limits his freedom or prevents his access to well-being, security or the fruits of progress. This conviction and Bolivia's active participation in efforts to protect human dignity have prompted us to become a sponsor of the proposal for the establishment of one of the most important posts the United Nations could offer the world in this area: that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

247. In Latin America, we are convinced that there is now a growing awareness of the need for our part of the world to participate in the settlement of conflicts and world-wide problems. Latin America has begun recently to project a more unified image, one which arises from similar origins, hopes and historical experiences.

248. The gradual integration of Latin America not only has been aimed at broadening markets and economic understanding but also, little by little, it has been creating a genuine political solidarity, which will make possible consistent unified action in international affairs. It is true that the final goal has not yet been achieved. But it is also true that there is the conviction that the role which Latin American countries must play in the solution of problems affecting mankind must be a very important one.

249. Latin American efforts to unify the action of the countries of our group, have been traditional efforts. We have tried to perfect a world system that would ensure peace, understanding and co-operation. Thus, in the Security Council, we have always tried, through a concerted policy, to achieve higher levels of progress and eliminate any situation which might undermine the just aspirations of the peoples of the world.

250. In the interests of that form of co-ordination in particular, Bolivia, two years ago, withdrew its candidacy in the Security Council for the present two-year period, in favour of another Latin American country. We were convinced that by contributing in this way to inter-American unity we were thus winning full support for our claim at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly from our group and from all countries in this Organization. The election of Bolivia to the Security Council would be further proof of Latin American unity, since there can be no rift in a homogeneous region without the risk of a loss of cohesiveness.

251. On another subject, Latin America, together with the other countries of the third world, wishes to see industrialization gradually eliminating the causes of dependence. We are aware that if that is to take place, we must agree to eliminate the most important factors in economic dependence. In this area, I should like to state that among the matters that have caused the greatest concern are the prices of raw materials and stability in the supply of raw materials.

252. For those reasons, we attribute special importance to the Conference on International Economic Co-operation. We see it as a real attempt to establish a new order in this field. Although the North-South dialogue did not achieve certain fundamental goals, it did have certain positive aspects: to wit, the reaffirmation of the integrated programme for commodities and the agreement to create a common financing fund, in addition to other measures which will become increasingly important in the future as we try to satisfy the interests of all nations.

253. Furthermore, the very fact that the North-South dialogue was transferred to the United Nations framework is a significant step because it brings into the world Organization one of the dramatic problems of relations between the developed world and less favoured nations. This forum had always been intended as the place where conflicting positions could be resolved and an understanding reached.

254. As I already stated, Latin America shares its concerns with other countries belonging to the third world. Bolivia in particular agrees with the important conclusions which have been reached by various countries in the non-aligned movement and, in particular, we concur in the discontent with the present situation in international economic affairs and with the decision to develop financial and monetary co-operation among all countries which have been adversely affected by that international economic order which we consider unjust and which we want replaced by a more equitable system.

255. In the political arena, Latin America has to its credit one of the most important achievements in the solution of one of the more important problems affecting our continent. Thus it has been that the formulation of new treaties relating to the Panama Canal, based on sovereignty, mutual respect and international justice, is undeniable proof that there are no problems which cannot be settled provided the parties involved in any difference of opinion or unjust situation show a sincere and clear political will.

256. The spirit which has prevailed between Panama and the United States is a triumph of understanding and a reaffirmation of the fact that there is no hurdle which cannot be cleared, that there is no difficulty which cannot be removed.

257. Our natural satisfaction at the settlement of this problem, which closely affects countries that are dear to us, makes it even clearer to us that other problems of equal importance deserve a similar treatment. We must approach them with a sense of justice, with a desire to bring about an understanding. When a genuine problem is satisfactorily settled, it benefits not only those who are directly affected but also the entire international community.

258. Such matters must be settled taking into account historical and ethical factors which must be continuously

borne in mind. Bolivia has had to deal with a problem which has of late become particularly dramatic, for it pertains to our relations with the rest of the countries of the world, which are now limited and have been for nearly a hundred years by the fact that we are hemmed in as a geographical enclave.

259. We are convinced that dialogue is the supreme instrument for settling international disputes. My country has always shown a desire to reach understandings and to work for settlements that take its vital interests into account as we deal with the problem of our geographical confinement.

260. The lapse of time has, of course, aroused a certain impatience but at the same time it has been a severe test of good faith in negotiations and in this task of bringing about a historical solution which will be an honour to all of America. We are convinced that our continent believes that the restoration to the Bolivian nation of an outlet to the sea is a matter which can no longer be postponed without jeopardizing our oft-proclaimed solidarity.

261. If the unity of our continent means anything at all, it means that Bolivia's isolation limits the effectiveness of its internal efforts to promote economic and social development and limits its participation in the process of integration of Latin America.

262. However, we shall take advantage of every means which may present itself. Furthermore, we are prepared to search for any way of facilitating a solution, but not one which would undermine that solution. The moral authority of the continent must not be adversely affected by lack of understanding. Bolivia's need for an outlet to the sea is a reality recognized by all America. And those who wish to satisfy that need must act soon so that the decisions of our countries will become a historical fact leading to the strengthening of justice, peace and co-operation in Latin America.

263. We believe that any attitudes which disrupt the dialogue will not contribute effectively to the fair and dispassionate settlement of Bolivia's vital problem that its undeniable importance merits. Likewise, matters must be clarified as much as possible in order to facilitate a viable settlement. Hence my Government is still waiting for Chile to obtain Peru's consent in order to open the way to a settlement that will meet the expectations of the Bolivian people and the requirements of justice in today's world.

264. The United Nations cannot, in its universality, confine itself to problems which are considered acute crises of global dimensions. Nor can certain situations be dealt with superficially or indifferently, since, although they may seemingly be limited to only one region, they can have an effect on peace and the ideal of harmonious coexistence.

265. The goal of solving Bolivia's problem of geographical isolation also warrants effective action by our world Organization. This would be in keeping with its duty to fulfil, without reservations, one of its primary responsibilities: that of improving relations among neighbouring countries.

266. Bolivia's thinking, its efforts and its international position, in keeping with our desire for peace and co-operation, are being expressed at this time, when our country is engaged in the task of economic and social development. The Government of our country, presided over by H.E. General Don Hugo Banzer Suárez, faithfully reflects the accomplishments and just aspirations of the Bolivian people. The firm support of the main segments of our population, especially the support of the farmers and workers, attests to the popular and nationalist basis of the Bolivian Government.

267. Development in my country is viewed as an instrument in the service of society. Our actions derive from a humanitarian, revolutionary and authentically Bolivian nationalism.

268. For the past six years, the Government of Bolivia, thanks to political stability, social justice and collective effort, has made surprising progress in all spheres of national activity. This allows us to envisage a process of institutionalization of the country that will promote a national reorganization in keeping with the needs of the people and create an appropriate basis for progress towards the constitutionalization stage. This, in turn, will permit the Bolivian nation to consolidate its development in accordance with its new situation.

269. May I conclude by expressing to those countries assembled here Bolivia's hope that we will realize our common aspiration to shape for mankind a destiny free of violence, based on understanding and exalted by justice.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

Annex 228

Letter from the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 571/148, 28 September 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

RESERVADO

E. LA PAZ (DIPLAN)OF.RES.No. 571/148

OBJ.: Declaraciones de personeros del Gobierno boliviano acerca del canje territorial.

REF.: Of.Res.No. 568/146 del 27.SEP.77

LA PAZ, 28 de septiembre de 1977

DEL EMBAJADOR DE CHILE EN BOLIVIA
AL SEÑOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (DIPLAN)

1.- Frente a la reacción de la opinión pública boliviana en los últimos días, he estimado de utilidad para el manejo de ese Departamento y como complemento de lo informado en mi oficio reservado No. 568/146, proporcionar a US. una relación de las principales declaraciones de personeros del Gobierno o entidades de este país favorables al planteamiento del canje de territorios, hechas durante 1975 y 1976.

2.- El Presidente Banzer en el mensaje dirigido a la ciudadanía el 21 de diciembre de 1975 señaló:

" Debo informar también al pueblo de Bolivia que la respuesta
" chilena, como se esperaba, considera el canje de territorios
" equivalentes que no alteren la extensión territorial de ambos
" países, ni su riqueza ni su seguridad ".
" El Gobierno nacional en este punto, está considerando la pro-
" posición con responsabilidad y procurando que cualquier resul-
" tado no limite las posibilidades de desarrollo del país, sus perspectivas de mejoramiento de nivel de vida del pueblo, y lo
" que es también importante, preservando la riqueza nacional
" constituída por sus recursos naturales. En otras palabras
" no podemos pretender pasar de ser un país enclaustrado a un
" país hipotecado."
" Conforme a los antecedentes que ahora expongo al pueblo, el
" Gobierno considera que la respuesta recibida del Gobierno
" de Chile a la proposición boliviana, cpnstituye una base glo-
" bal aceptable de negociación. "

Estos conceptos fueron reiterados por el Primer Mandatario en un programa de televisión difundido el día 28 del mismo mes.

3.- Con fecha 6 de enero de 1976, se dieron a la publicidad los textos de la proposición boliviana y de

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E. LA PAZ (DIPLAN) RES. No. 571/148

RE: Statements by representatives of Bolivian Government about exchange of territory.

REF: Of.Res.No. 568/146 of 27 SEP 77

LA PAZ, 28 September 1977.

FROM: AMBASSADOR OF CHILE IN BOLIVIA
TO: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIPLAN)

1. In view of the Bolivian public's reaction over the past few days, I think it would be useful for the management of your Department, and as a supplement to what I reported in my confidential official letter No. 568/146, to provide you with the primary statements made by representatives of the Government or entities of Bolivia that are favourable to the exchange of territories, made during 1975 and 1976.

2. In his message to the nation on 21 December 1975, President Banzer said:

"It is my duty to inform the people of Bolivia that Chile's reply, as expected, involves the exchange of equivalent territories that do not alter the territorial extension of both countries, nor their wealth or safety.
In this regard, the National Government is responsibly considering this proposal, and procuring that whichever the outcome, it does not limit the development of our country, its prospects for improving the standard of living of the people and, last but not least, the preservation of the national wealth provided by its natural resources. In other words, we cannot intend to shift from being a confined country to a mortgaged one.
In light of this background that I am now sharing with our people, the Government considers that the reply of the Chilean Government to the Bolivian proposal constitutes an acceptable global basis for negotiations."

These ideas were repeated by the President in a television program broadcast on 28 December.

3. On 6 January 1976, the texts of the Bolivian proposal

la respuesta de nuestro país. Conjuntamente con ello se divulgaron los términos de las instrucciones impartidas por la Cancillería de Bolivia al Embajador en Santiago señor Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía. En estas instrucciones se expresa :

" La Cancillería de la República, en su oportunidad ha enviado
" instrucciones concretas al Embajador de Bolivia en Santiago,
" respecto a la respuesta chilena. En dichas instrucciones se
" acepta globalmente la fórmula consignada en la respuesta, en
" las partes que concuerda con la proposición boliviana, dejando
" pendientes otros aspectos para una etapa futura de negociación.
" De la misma manera se acepta el principio del canje territorial
" como aporte de ambos países, que hagan posible un cordial entendimiento."
" En dichas instrucciones se establece el criterio del Gobierno
" Nacional respecto a los puntos contenidos en la respuesta chileba, que son los siguientes:
" 1.- El Gobierno de Bolivia está conforme en que, para una negociación práctica que permita a nuestro país obtener una salida
" propia y soberana al Océano Pacífico, se considere la realidad
" actual.
" 2.- El Gobierno Nacional está conforme con la cesión a Bolivia
" de una costa marítima soberana, unida al territorio boliviano
" por una faja territorial igualmente soberana, cuyo límite norte
" sea el que divide a Chile con el Perú. En cuanto al límite sur,
" en principio se consideran atendibles los puntos de referencia
" propuestos por la Cancillería chilena, debiendo estudiarse con
" posterioridad los ajustes correspondientes.
" 3.- La aceptación del canje simultáneo de territorios, está
" sujeta a una aclaración respecto al área marítima, en vista de
" que la extensión de las aguas jurisdiccionales, mar territorial
" y mar patrimonial aún no ha sido definida por la Comunidad Internacional.
" En efecto el Derecho del Mar está en proceso de codificación,
" y el mismo no ha avanzado sustancialmente.
" Este punto en consecuencia deberá ser objeto de cuidadosa negociación que contemple principios de la equidad y los intereses
" nacionales.
" 4.- El Gobierno Nacional ha expresado que los territorios que
" serían objeto del canje deberán determinarse mediante una evaluación por los organismos correspondientesde Bolivia y Chile."
" En consecuencia Bolivia se reserva la facultad de negociar las
" zonas que podrían ser objeto de eventual canje."

4.- El 14 de febrero de 1976, el Embajador de Bolivia en Santiago señor Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía entregó a la prensa una declaración escrita, cuyos párrafos finales son los siguientes :

'''.-

and Chile's response were made public. Along with this, the terms of the instructions given by the Bolivian Foreign Ministry to the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Mr. Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía, were also disclosed. These instructions state:

> "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic has sent specific instructions to the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago with respect to the Chilean proposal. In said instructions, the formula set forth in the response is globally accepted, in the parts that agree with the Bolivian proposal, and other aspects are left pending for a future stage of negotiation. In the same way, the principle of territorial exchange is accepted as a contribution by both countries that will make possible a cordial understanding.
> The instructions set forth the National Government's opinion of the points contained in the Chilean response, which are as follows:
> 1. The Bolivian government agrees that for a pragmatic negotiation that allows our country to obtain its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, the current reality must be considered.
> 2. The National Government agrees to the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast, linked to Bolivian territory by a sovereign strip of land, whose northern boundary is the border between Chile and Peru. As for the southern boundary, in principle, the points of reference proposed by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office are considered admissible, but the proper adjustments must be studied afterwards.
> 3. The acceptance of a simultaneous exchange of territories is subject to a clarification of the maritime area, in view of the fact that the extension of internal waters, territorial sea and patrimonial sea has not yet been defined by the International Community.
> Indeed, the Law of the Sea is in the process of being codified, and this codification has not made substantive progress.
> Therefore, this point should be the object of careful negotiation that takes into account principles of equity and the national interests.
> 4. The National Government has stated that the territories that are likely to be exchanged should be determined through an evaluation by the proper organizations in Bolivia and Chile. Therefore, Bolivia reserves the right to negotiate the areas that might potentially be exchanged."

4. On 14 February 1976, the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía provided the press with a written statement, the final paragraphs of which read as follows:

" Me siento orgulloso de haber participado en el éxito político
" y diplomático que está claramente definido por el hecho de que
" nos hemos sentado en una mesa de negociación en Chile; que es-
" te país ha aceptado la existencia del problema de nuestra medi-
" terraneidad y que nos ofrece una solución mediante una costa
" marítima soberana, unida a territorio boliviano por una faja
" territorial igualmente soberana.
" Estimo que limadas las aristas y solucionados los problemas
" colaterales planteados en la respuesta chilena, le correspon-
" derá al pueblo de Bolivia reconocer lealmente este triunfo
" irrefutable, y, además decidir si realmente quiere un acceso
" al Pacífico y si desea aprovechar la coyuntura que se ha pre-
" sentado, haciendo frente a un costo que puede y debe ser mini-
" mizado a fin de obtener las máximas ventajas para nuestra pa-
" tria. A este respecto, debemos recordar que las negociaciones
" están pendientes en relación a varios problemas que son motivo
" de gran preocupación para todos los bolivianos. "

5.- Con fecha 10 de marzo de 1976 el Canciller Guzmán Soriano publica una declaración oficial, de la cual se transcriben las siguientes frases :

" Hemos expuesto categóricamente que se aceptan bases globales de
" negociación, que consulten los recíprocos intereses de ambos
" países, especialmente en aquellos temas en los que existen pun-
" tos de coincidencia, dejando para una etapa futura de negocia-
" ción todos los demás aspectos contenidos en los documentos que
" sustentan tales negociaciones, es decir, la proposición bolivia-
" na y la respuesta dada por el Gobierno de Chile.
" En consecuencia, debe quedar claramente establecido que nuestro
" Gobierno no ha aceptado la desmilitarización de la zona a ceder-
" se a Bolivia, por tratarse de una limitación de soberanía, ni
" la utilización de la totalidad de las aguas del río Lauca, ni
" el canje territorial que comprenda áreas marítimas. "

6.- El 18 de abril el Gobierno boliviano entregó un documento oficial sobre el asunto marítimo, en cuyo punto 3° se lee :

" 3.- El proceso de un pronto retorno soberano al Océano Pacífico,
" actualmente se encuentra en un momento en que, tanto la propues-
" ta boliviana como la respuesta del Gobierno de Chile, están vi-
" gentes y constituyen la base global de las negociaciones futu-
" ras. Todos los aspectos vinculados a la solución propuesta
" están en la mesa de negociaciones. En consecuencia, aún no se
" han concretado acuerdos definitivos ni irreversibles. "

"I feel proud to have participated in the political and diplomatic success that is clearly demonstrated by the fact that we have sat down at a negotiating table in Chile; that this country has accepted the existence of the problem of our landlocked situation and offers us a solution through a sovereign maritime coastline, connected to Bolivian territory by an equally sovereign strip of territory. I think that once the differences are ironed out and the collateral issues raised in the Chilean response are resolved, it will be up to the Bolivian people to faithfully acknowledge this irrefutable triumph and also to decide whether they really want access to the Pacific and whether they want to take advantage of the present climate, incurring a cost that can and should be minimized in order to obtain the maximum advantages for our country. In this respect, we must remember that the negotiations are pending with respect to several problems that are a cause of great concern to all Bolivians."

5. On 10 March 1976, Foreign Minister Guzmán Soriano published an official statement, the following sentences from which are set forth below:

"We have categorically stated that we accept the global bases for negotiation, which take into account the reciprocal interests of both countries, especially with regard to issues on which there are points of agreement, leaving for a future stage of negotiation all other points contained in the documents on which such negotiations are based, i.e., Bolivia's proposal and the response given by the Government of Chile.

Consequently, it must be clearly established that our Government has not agreed to the demilitarization of the area to be ceded to Bolivia, because that would be a limitation of sovereignty, nor to the use of all the waters in the River Lauca, nor to a territorial exchange that includes maritime areas."

6. On 18 April the Bolivian Government presented an official document on the maritime matter, point 3 of which reads as follows:

"3. The process of a prompt sovereign return to the Pacific Ocean is currently at a stage where both the Bolivian proposal and the Chilean response are in effect and constitute the global basis for future negotiations. All aspects related to the proposed solution are on the negotiating table. Therefore, no definitive or irreversible agreements have been reached yet."

7.- Con fecha 15 de septiembre de 1976 el Comandante en Jefe de la Fuerza Aérea de Bolivia señaló a los periodistas en Cochabamba :

" La base global de negociaciones da la idea de que pereciera ser
" la única forma de solución un trueque, porque es bien difícil
" que un país se avenga a regalar o vender un territorio; hay
" que ser bien realistas y no creo que el pueblo de Chile ni nin-
" guno del mundo acepte un obsequio de territorios. "
" Las FF.AA., están estudiando las posibles áreas de trueque si
" se presentara la oportunidad en las negociaciones."

8.- El 19 del mismo mes, " El Diario " publica las siguientes declaraciones del Canciller Adriázola, en entrevista exclusiva concedida a este matutino :

" Sobre el particular y respondiendo una pregunta en torno a que
" si sería Bolivia o Chile quien determine los territorios bolivia-
" nos que serían enajenados a cambio del corredor propuesto al nor-
" te de Arica, Adriázola expresó que"hablar de enajenación tiene
" connotaciones en el leguaje corriente que es preferible avitar".
" Dijo que técnicamente:" sin duda, enajenar es el acto de transfe-
" rir el dominio, empero creo que es más apropiado hablar de canje
" o trueque en extensiones equivalentes ".
" Concretamente señaló que " lo cual significa que Bolivia estaría
" dispuesta, si el arreglo le es satisfactorio, a transferir deter-
" minadas áreas para recibir otras equivalentes que permitan a nues
" tro país retornar soberanamente al mar, para concluir así con
" la asfixia que nos ha impuesto nuestro casi centenario enclaus-
" tramiento. "
" A continuación añadió : " Sobre la cuestión central de su pre-
" gunta, deseo reiterar enfáticamente que el Gobierno de las Fuer-
" zas Armadas de la Nación, ha determinado que es derecho privati-
" vo de Bolivia el señalar las posibles áreas del eventual canje".
" Al referirse al estudio de las alternativas que serían planteadas
" a Chile para compensar territorialmente a ese país por permitir-
" nos un acceso al Océano Pacífico, el Canciller Adriázola informó
" que el Consejo Nacional Marítimo (CONAMAR), " que viene traba-
" jando intensamente, ha estudiado integralmente la problemática
" del Retorno al Mar, dentro de los términos de referencia conteni-
" dos en el marco global de negociación. "

9.- En la edición del 26 de septiembre de 1976, " El Diario " incluye la versión de una entrevista concedida por el Ministro de Defensa de Bolivia General René Bernal Escalante. El citado Secretario de Estado afirmó :

7. On 15 September 1976, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Force of Bolivia told reporters in Cochabamba:

> "The global basis for the negotiations is the idea that an exchange appears to be the only form of solution, because it is very difficult to a country to agree to give away or sell a territory; we have to be very realistic and I do not think that the Chilean people or any other people in the world would accept the gift of territories.
>
> The Armed Forces are studying the possible areas to be exchanged if the opportunity presents itself in the negotiations."

8. On the 19th of the same month, "El Diario" published the following statements by Foreign Minister Adriázola, in an interview granted exclusively to that newspaper:

> "On this point and in response to a question about whether Bolivia or Chile would be the one to determine the Bolivian territories that would be handed over in exchange for the proposed corridor north of Arica, Adriázola said that "speaking of a handover has connotations in everyday language that it would be better to avoid." He said that technically: "without a doubt, a handover is the act of transferring ownership, but I think it is more appropriate to call it an exchange or swap of equivalent extensions."
>
> Specifically he stated: "which means that Bolivia would be willing if the arrangement is satisfactory to transfer certain areas in order to receive other equivalent areas that would allow our country to return with sovereignty to the sea, thereby putting an end to the asphyxiation imposed on us by almost 100 years of confinement."
>
> He then added: "On the central point of your question, I would like to emphatically repeat that the Armed Forces Government of the Nation has determined that it is Bolivia's exclusive right to indicate the possible areas for a potential exchange. With regard to the study of the alternatives that would be proposed to Chile to compensate Chile territorially for allowing us access to the Pacific Ocean, Foreign Minister Adriázola reported that the National Maritime Council (CONAMAR) has been working hard and has thoroughly studied the problem of the Return to the Sea, on the terms of reference contained in the global framework for the negotiation."

9. In its 26 September 1976 edition, "El Diario" includes the version of an interview granted by the Bolivian Minister of Defence, General René Bernal Escalante, who said:

" En este momento de las negociaciones no existe otra alternati-
" va que el trueque de territorios con soberanía, lo que nos da-
" rá finalmente una costa propia al Pacífico. "

10.- Con fecha 30 de octubre, el Consejo Nacional Marítimo (CONAMAR) dió a la publicidad un documento en el cual se refiere a los trabajos realizados por esa entidad y puntualiza su pensamiento frente a las soluciones para superar la mediterraneidad de Bolivia. Cabe observar que este documento se emitió dos semanas después de haberse efectuado en La Paz la Segunda Reunión de Comandantes de Unidades e instituciones militares de las tres ramas de las Fuerzas Armadas de este país (13 al 16 de octubre). Conviene recordar lo señalado en los puntos 7,8, y 9 de este informe :

" 7.- No hay mutilaciones sino canje, pues cesión de territorio
" no es lo mismo que canje territorial. Por eso debemos insis-
" tir en aclarar las cosas. Daremos una extensión determinada
" y recibiremos otra de la misma extensión ganando el acceso al
" mar. En las negociaciones diplomáticas en cualquier parte del
" mundo, no siempre se llega a las soluciones ansiadas. La his-
" toria universal está llena de ejemplos de esta clase. Si se
" piensa en el canje es porque no hay más alternativa por el mo-
" mento. Otra solución puede ser la guerra, pero conviene pregun-
" tarse serenamente y sin apasionamiento alguno, si estamos en
" condiciones de precipitar un conflicto cuando no se dispone de
" recursos humanos ni materiales. Volvamos la vista a un pasado
" sumamente reciente, la Guerra del Chaco y sus dolorosas leccio
nes.

" 8.- Si no estamos en condiciones de hacer cuantiosas erogaciones
" de dinero, hipotecando el país; si no podemos ofrecer compensa-
" ciones en recursos minerales, energéticos, agropecuarios o indus-
" triales ¿ con qué podemos negociar ?. Lisa y llanamente con el
" canje que, lo repetimos, no es mutilación, no es desmembramien-
" to.
" 9.- Nuestros negociadores han logrado la modificación de algu-
" nos planteamientos chilenos, ya no se habla de las 200 millas
" sino de tres millas. No hay tampoco insistencia en la desmili-
" tarización de la franja territorial pues ella estará sometida
" a nuestra soberanía. Además, no se reitera el aprovechamiento
" total de las aguas del río Lauca en beneficio exclusivo chile-
" no. Bolivia estudiará la forma de llevar adelante una acción
"conjunta y beneficiosa para todos, sin exclusividades,perjudi-
" ciales. Mediante una negociación adecuada se aclararán defini-
" tivamente todos los puntos siempre dentro del marco de mutuo

"At this point in the negotiations there is no alternative other than exchanging territories with sovereignty, which will finally give us our own coast on the Pacific."

10. On 30 October, the National Maritime Council (CONAMAR) made public a document discussing the work performed by that entity and specifying its thoughts on the solutions to overcome Bolivia's landlocked situation. It is important to note that this document was issued two weeks after the Second Meeting of Unit Commanders and Military Institutions of the three branches of the Armed Forces had been held in this country (13 to 16 October). It is worth pointing out what Points 7, 8 and 9 of that report said:

> "7. There is no mutilation involved, but rather an exchange, for a cession of territory is not the same thing as a territorial exchange. Therefore we must insist on clarifying the situation. We will give a certain area of land, and will receive another area of the same size with access to the sea. In diplomatic negotiations in any part of the world, people do not always reach the desired solutions. World history is full of examples of this. The reason we are considering an exchange is that there are no other solutions for the moment. Another solution could be war, but we must ask ourselves calmly and dispassionately if we are in a position to precipitate a conflict when we lack both human and physical resources. Let's look back at our most recent past, the Chaco War and the painful lessons learned there.
> 8. If we are not in a position to spend copious amounts of money, thereby mortgaging the country: if we cannot offer compensation in terms of minerals, energy, agriculture, cattle or industrial resources, what can we use to negotiate? Quite simply we can exchange, and we repeat, this is not a mutilation nor a dismemberment.
> 9. Our negotiators have managed to change some of Chile's proposals: they are no longer discussing 200 miles, but 3 miles. Nor is there any insistence on demilitarization of the strip of territory because it will be subject to our sovereignty. Furthermore, the waters of the River Lauca will no longer be for exclusive Chilean use. Bolivia will study how to carry out a joint action that benefits everyone, without any prejudicial exclusivity. Through proper negotiations, all the points will be clarified once and for all, and always in an framework of mutual respect and consideration. Bolivia of 1976 is not the Bolivia of 1904."

ISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
EMBAJADA DE CHILE
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

6-

" respeto y consideración. Bolivia de 1976 no es Bolivia de 1904."

11.- Como se aprecia en las declaraciones citadas en el presente oficio, el Gobierno de este país mantuvo practicamente hasta fines de 1976 su posición favorable al canje territorial. Esta actitud fué el blanco de una intensa campaña de ciertos sectores de la opinión pública evidentemente alentados desde el exterior. Cabe observar que el cambio experimentado en el planteamiento gubernamentel revelado en el Mensaje del Presidente Banzer en la víspera de Navidad de 1976, al rechazar el canje, cabría atribuirlo tanto a la presión interna, como a una fórmula que se buscó frente a la situación engorrosa que se presentaba con la inusitada propuesta hecha por el Perú en el mes de noviembre del mismo año.

Dios guarde a US.,

EMBAJADA DE CHILE EN BOLIVIA ★ LA PAZ

Pedro Daza Valenzuela
Embajador

RLG.bca.

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11. As can be seen from the statements quoted in this official letter, the Government of this country maintained its position in favour of a territorial exchange practically until the end of 1976. This attitude was the target of an intense campaign by certain sectors of the public, who were apparently being encouraged from abroad. It is important to note that the change in the government's proposal revealed in the Message of President Banzer on Christmas Eve 1976, when he rejected the exchange, must be attributed to internal pressure and to a plan being sought to deal with the troublesome situation resulting from the unexpected proposal made by Peru in the month of November of the same year.

Sincerely yours,
[Signed]
Pedro Daza Valenzuela
Ambassador

RLG.bca.

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Annex 229

Joint Press Release of the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia, Chile and Peru, 29 September 1977, recorded in an Aide Mémoire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, *Memoria of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1977*, pp 88-89

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MEMORIA

DEL

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

CORRESPONDIENTE AL AÑO 1977

2147

VISITA DEL MINISTRO DE TRANSPORTES DE BOLIVIA

Entre los días 13 a 20 de mayo visitó nuestro país el Ministro de Transportes y Telecomunicaciones de Bolivia, Sr. Julio Trigo Ramírez. Acompañaban al visitante funcionarios de la respectiva Secretaría de Estado y el Gerente General de la Empresa de Ferrocarriles de Bolivia, Sr. Gustavo Méndez. La invitación cursada por el Ministro del ramo, General Raúl Vargas Miquel, incluyó visitas de la delegación boliviana a los puertos de Valparaíso, Antofagasta y Arica, y dio lugar a la celebración de conversaciones sobre las formas de agilizar el despacho de cargas. Se consideraron también las posibilidades de cumplimiento de los contratos de suministro de vagones para el mejoramiento de la red ferroviaria boliviana.

VISITA A BOLIVIA DE PERSONEROS DE PRENSA EUROPEA INVITADOS EN VUELO INAUGURAL DE LAN-CHILE

El día 24 de mayo llegó a La Paz, procedente de París, un vuelo especial inaugural de nuestra Línea Aérea Nacional. Viajaban a bordo de la nave, el Embajador de Chile en París, Sr. Leonidas Irarrázabal, periodistas y diversas autoridades y personeros de empresas europeas, a quienes se les dio la oportunidad de visitar el país del Altiplano.

NEGOCIACIONES SOBRE LAS ASPIRACIONES BOLIVIANAS DE SALIDA AL OCEANO PACIFICO

Con motivo de la concurrencia de los Jefes de Estados Americanos al Acto de Suscripción de los Tratados del Canal de Panamá en la ciudad de Washington el mes de septiembre de 1977, los Presidentes de Chile, Bolivia y Perú tuvieron oportunidad de analizar el estado de las negociaciones y resolvieron darles un nuevo impulso.

Este propósito quedó consignado en el comunicado de prensa en el cual se expresa:

"Como resultado del cordial y constructivo análisis que realizaron, y reafirmando la voluntad de diálogo que los anima, acordaron instruir a "sus respectivas Cancillerías que, conforme a este propósito, continúen los esfuerzos orientados al logro de una solución del citado problema, que corresponda al deseo de cooperación, amistad y paz que los inspiran".

En cumplimiento de este acuerdo presidencial, los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los tres países se reunieron en la ciudad de Nueva York el 29 de septiembre de 1977.

El resultado de esta reunión quedó consignado en un comunicado de prensa entregado por los tres Ministros, en el que se dice:

"En cumplimiento del mandato que les fuera conferido por los Presidentes de Bolivia, Chile y Perú, en su encuentro en Washington el 8 de septiembre en curso, los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los tres países se reunieron en la Sede de la Representación Permanente del Perú ante Naciones Unidas en la ciudad de Nueva York, con el fin de profundizar el análisis de las negociaciones referidas a la solución de la mediterraneidad de Bolivia.

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING BOLIVIA'S ASPIRATIONS FOR AN OUTLET TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN

As a result of the attendance of the American Heads of State at the Signing Ceremony for the Panama Canal Treaties in the city of Washington in September 1977, the Presidents of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru had the opportunity to analyze the status of the negotiations and they decided to give them a new impetus.

This objective was noted in the press release, which says:

"As a result of the friendly and constructive analysis, and confirming their willingness to dialogue with each other, they agreed to instruct their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to continue their efforts aimed at reaching a solution to this problem, inspired by ideas of cooperation, friendship and peace."

In fulfillment of this presidential agreement, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries met in New York City on 29 September 1977.

The result of this meeting was described in a press release issued by the three Ministers, which says:

"In fulfillment of the mandate given to them by the Presidents of Bolivia, Chile and Peru at their meeting in Washington on 8 September, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries met at the Office of the Permanent Representation of Peru to the United Nations in New York City, in order to further analyze the negotiations regarding the solution to Bolivia's landlocked situation.

"Los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, sin perjuicio de las reuniones que sostendrán sobre la materia y para facilitar la continuidad del diálogo, han previsto la designación de Representantes Especiales. Destacaron, además, la importancia de mantenerse permanentemente informados del desarrollo y estado de las conversaciones".

Definido a tan alto nivel este mecanismo para impulsar las negociaciones, parecía obvio que el paso siguiente debería ser el de materializar el encuentro de los Representantes Especiales. El Gobierno de Chile designó al Embajador Enrique Bernstein para que desempeñara esta función de Representante Especial. Bolivia, en cambio, no designó al suyo.

La oportuna designación de los Representantes Especiales de Bolivia y Chile habría tenido especial significación para hacer avanzar las negociaciones. A este respecto, cabe destacar la declaración hecha por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, Sr. De la Puente, en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, el 29 de septiembre. Expresó:

"En esta Asamblea, el Sr. Canciller de Bolivia se ha referido al consentimiento del Perú para hacer posible alguna solución. Nosotros entendemos que, en estricta lógica, para que el Perú considere la posibilidad de su consentimiento, tiene que tener a la vista una base de acuerdo entre Bolivia y Chile que hasta el momento no ha sido alcanzada. Cuando ello se logre se establecerán los contactos del Perú con Chile sobre la materia, a fin de llegar al acuerdo previo entre ambas partes, previsto en el Protocolo Complementario de 1929".

Más tarde, el 21 de octubre, en declaraciones a la prensa, manifestó:

"Una vez que Bolivia y Chile se pongan de acuerdo, Perú será consultado con el objeto de dar el acuerdo previo previsto por el Protocolo de 1929".

El Gobierno de Chile, deseoso de impulsar la negociación, desarrolló infructuosas iniciativas ante el Gobierno de Bolivia para que los Representantes Especiales iniciaran su actividad. Encontró como respuesta la más incomprensible pasividad boliviana.

Ante esta actitud, el 23 de noviembre de 1977, el Presidente de Chile envió la siguiente carta al Presidente de Bolivia:

"Santiago, 23 de noviembre de 1977

"Excelentísimo Señor
Don Hugo Bánzer Suárez
General de Fuerza
Presidente de la República de Bolivia
La Paz.

"Excelentísimo Señor Presidente:

"En las diversas oportunidades en que nos hemos encontrado le he señalado la prioridad que le asigno a nuestras relaciones con su país y la decisión que me asiste de buscar fórmulas de cooperación que promuevan los intereses mutuos de nuestras dos Naciones.

"El estado actual de las relaciones de Chile y Bolivia hace aconsejable reiterar esos propósitos de cooperación y comprometer nuestra responsabilidad en la búsqueda de fórmulas específicas que la hagan efectiva.

"The Foreign Ministers, without prejudice to the meetings they will hold on the subject and to facilitate ongoing dialogue, plan to appoint Special Representatives. They also emphasized the importance of staying continuously informed of the development and status of the discussions."

Since this mechanism to promote the negotiations had been defined at such a high level, it seemed obvious that the next step should be to hold the meeting of Special Representatives. The Government of Chile appointed Ambassador Enrique Bernstein to carry out the duties of Special Representative. Bolivia, on the other hand, did not appoint its own.

The timely appointment of the Special Representatives of Bolivia and Chile would have had special significance for the progress of the negotiations. In this regard, it is appropriate to note the statement made by the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Mr. De la Puente, at the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September. He said:

"In this Assembly, the Bolivian Foreign Minister has referred to the need for Peru's consent to make any solution possible. We understand that, logically, for Peru to consider the possibility of its consent, it needs to see a basis of agreement between Bolivia and Chile that as of this time has not been reached. When this is achieved, Peru will establish contact with Chile on the subject in order to reach the prior agreement required between those parties, as established in the Supplementary Protocol of 1929."

Later, on 21 October, in statements to the press, he said:

"Once Bolivia and Chile reach an agreement, Peru will be consulted for the purpose of giving the required consent established by the Protocol of 1929."

The Government of Chile, desiring to promote the negotiation, implemented unfruitful initiatives with the Government of Bolivia in order for the Special Representatives to begin their activity. It was met with the most incomprehensible Bolivian passivity in response.

Annex 230

Verbatim Record of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting of the Thirty-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/32/PV.13, 29 September 1977 (extract)

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/803/09/PDF/NL780309.pdf?OpenElement>, pp 119 and 212-214

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THIRTY-SECOND SESSION
Official Records

13th PLENARY MEETING
Thursday, 29 September 1977, at 3.35 p.m.
NEW YORK

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President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate *(continued)*

1. Mrs. SÖDER (Sweden): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this session of the General Assembly. Your election to this high office is a tribute to you personally, to your vast diplomatic experience, and to the leading and constructive role played by Yugoslavia within the non-aligned movement and in the work of the United Nations.

2. I should also like to express my delegation's deep appreciation to Ambassador Amerasinghe, who presided over last year's session with such great distinction.

3. Our Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, continues to serve the world community with total dedication, and I should like to express to him our deep gratitude and to assure him of Sweden's full support for his tireless efforts.

4. As this session of the General Assembly opens, it is also a particular satisfaction for us to be able to welcome two new Members to our Organization: the Republic of Djibouti and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, whose admission we have so strongly and actively supported, both in this Assembly and during our years in the Security Council.

5. When I addressed the General Assembly for the first time last year,[1] I had special reasons to say a few words about the general guidelines of Swedish foreign policy. The foundation of that policy is neutrality. In our country we are united in the view that we should use our neutral position to pursue an active, independent and progressive foreign policy characterized by global solidarity and respect for the equal rights of all human beings. These are our guidelines as we face up to such problems as injustice in southern Africa, the unequal relationship between rich and poor countries, or the plundering and misuse of the resources with which nature has provided us.

6. In Steven Biko the South African people has a new martyr whose death is yet another reminder that racism in southern Africa remains a festering sore in our international society. Developments in southern Africa are important —not only to those who live there. They are of crucial importance for the relations between free Africa and the rest of the world, as well as for international détente in general.

7. *Apartheid* is unique. It differs from other manifestations of evil and injustice in the world, for in South Africa oppression has been legalized; it is written into the country's constitution and permeates the entire fabric of society. A minority has created a system based on the idea of its own racial superiority serving to suppress the majority. Let us not forget that the United Nations was born in the struggle against a system which was obsessed by a similar idea. The undoing of *apartheid* must be a central obligation of the world community. To follow passively developments there is to become, in a sense, an accomplice of the present policy of an oppressive régime.

8. Every form of black African protest in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia has been brutally crushed. The majority of the people is denied every possibility of political expression and participation. It is understandable that the liberation movements of southern Africa, in their despair, finally have seen no alternative to armed struggle.

9. The United Nations was created to solve international conflicts by peaceful means. We must try to make it possible to achieve majority rule in southern Africa with a minimum of violence. Here the United Nations has a dual responsibility: one is to contribute to the abolishment of *apartheid* as soon as possible; the other is to try to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population which always follows a long liberation struggle.

10. We consider the present situation in South Africa to be a threat to international peace. The Security Council, therefore, should impose sanctions to eliminate that threat. We have, as a first step, proposed that the recommendation already adopted by the Security Council calling for the discontinuation of all arms shipments to South Africa be broadened and transformed into a binding decision.[2] Sweden has also proposed further steps, including measures against new foreign investments in South Africa and Namibia. Measures of this kind have already been uni-

1 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 29th meeting, paras. 81-113.

2 See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year*, 1996th meeting, para. 9.

countries, such as the establishment of an integrated programme for commodities and its common fund, the demand for a moratorium on and the reduction or cancellation of debt burdens, etc.

124. We support the second-world countries and people in their struggle to oppose super-Power control, intimidation and bullying and to defend their security and national independence. We support their efforts to improve relations with third-world countries on the basis of equality. We appreciate the efforts of the Western European countries for unity against hegemonism. We firmly support the Japanese people in their struggle for the recovery of the four northern islands.

125. We are for genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament. We have consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. As the first step, all nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances, and in particular will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and that they must dismantle all their nuclear bases on the territories of other countries and withdraw from abroad all their nuclear armed forces and nuclear weapons. We support the demands of the countries and people in the regions of the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and in South-East Asia, South Asia and Latin America for the establishment of peace zones, security zones and nuclear-free zones. We are strongly opposed to the super-Powers' policies of nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly and to their disarmament fraud.

126. The Shanghai communiqué of 27 February 1972 is the basis for the relations between China and the United States at present. According to the spirit of the communiqué, if relations between the two countries are to be normalized, the United States must sever its so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang clique, withdraw all its armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area and abrogate its so-called "mutual defence treaty" with the Chiang clique. Taiwan is China's sacred territory. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and accomplish the great undertaking of unifying our motherland. When and how to liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair, which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever. The above is the unalterable stand of the Chinese Government.

127. Our controversy with the Soviet leading clique on matters of principle will go on for a long time. We will persevere in our tit-for-tat struggle against its hegemonism. At the same time, we have always held that China and the Soviet Union should maintain normal State relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It is none other than the Soviet leading clique that has worsened the State relations between China and the Soviet Union. If the Soviet leaders really want to improve the State relations between the two countries, they should prove this by deeds.

128. We will always bear in mind Chairman Mao's teaching, "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony", and be ready at all times to wipe out any enemy that dares to invade China. Our policy is: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack."

129. We will always bear in mind Chairman Mao's teaching that in our external work we should "get rid of great-power chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholy and completely".[17] We will never seek hegemony or be a super-Power. We will always stand by the oppressed people and nations throughout the world. On behalf of the Chinese Government, Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping solemnly declared from this rostrum in April 1974:

> "If one day China should change its *[political]* colour and turn into a super-Power, if it too, should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to its bullying, aggression and exploitation, then the people of the world should identify it as social imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it."[18]

Here, we the Chinese delegation, would like to reaffirm this stand.

130. The world is advancing amidst turmoil; the people are awakening in the course of struggle. We are now in a new historical period—a period of struggle against super-Power hegemonism. The struggle will be hard and the road tortuous, but the future is bright. "The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history."[19] The people of the world have been tempered in great storms of struggle. They have gained experience, strengthened their unity and grown stronger. It is not the one or two super-Powers but the people of the world that decide the destiny of mankind. Victory unquestionably belongs to the people of the world.

131. Mr. DE LA PUENTE RADBILL (Peru) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Mr. President, it is a special pleasure for me, as Foreign Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Peru, to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this session of the General Assembly since it has brought to that distinguished post a representative of Yugoslavia, a non-aligned country and a friend of Peru, and ensures that our discussions will take place under the most impartial leadership and in a manner commensurate with the international responsibility of the present time.

132. The sure progress of our world Organization under the direction of Secretary-General Kurt Waldehim is an indication that the international community, despite undeniable difficulties, is approaching a consensus among the States which will make it possible for the principles of the Charter to be fully implemented in the foreseeable future. For that reason it is a great pleasure for me to welcome the Governments of Viet Nam and Djibouti, which now join the United Nations as new Members and which by their

17 *Ibid.*, p. 180.

18 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2209th meeting, para. 219.

19 See *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 118.

presence and efforts will contribute to the strengthening of peace.

133. On this occasion afforded to me by the General Assembly I shall limit my statement to the minimum, taking into account the importance of stating the concerns, interests and position of my Government as regards present-day problems but at the same time recognizing the urgency of leading this debate to subjects which in my view may demand special priority and attention.

134. It is with this idea and procedure in mind that I have distributed the complete text of my statement in which I have dealt appropriately with the items of interest and which I hope will be analysed thoroughly in the Foreign Ministries.

135. Naturally, among the complex international topics my country must emphasize those which relate most directly to our international action by giving a detailed picture of our regional concerns and at the same time explaining the situation which obtains in Peru at the moment. This should not be construed as meaning that we are placing in another perspective problems of global import since we are also concerned about them.

136. First of all, I believe it essential to face objectively the meagre results of the North-South dialogue because the conclusion of the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation seems to make an over-all solution impossible in a world which persists in its fragmentation despite its interdependent nature. It is inevitable that in evaluating that forum for negotiation, to which Peru contributed its best efforts, the end result appears to be clearly negative. The responsibility for this rests with the industrialized countries which disregarded our substantive positions without proposing alternative structural formulas. Temporary proposals for financial relief do not constitute a significant factor in a process of negotiation which really extends to another level.

137. On the other hand, we have before us an opportunity to follow new North-South co-ordinates, together with the continuous efforts in the economic debate, at the appropriate levels and in the forums in which decisions can be made, by implementing a comprehensive programme of disarmament under international supervision. This cannot be postponed further if we wish to remove the burden on the world economy represented by the arms race and to free new resources for use in international economic co-operation.

138. As regards the law of the sea, I wish to say that when the United Nations Conference on this subject approaches its goal there will be pitfalls which may lead to a resounding failure. On the one hand there are attempts to change the jurisdiction of coastal States over the maritime areas adjacent to their coasts which are affected by the essentially codifying nature of work in this field. On the other hand there are the difficult negotiations on the sea-bed, which are politically explosive and methodologically bogged down and have been further hampered by threats of unilateral action or simply of abandonment, which jeopardizes what is a common heritage of mankind.

139. From our vantage point and bearing in mind the most pressing objectives which the non-aligned developing countries agree in presenting as inescapable immediate responsibilities, we are concerned by the fact that, far from noting a promising climate in the most critical areas of international security, we see rather that there is little to give rise to optimism in southern Africa, Cyprus or the Middle East. My country has adopted clear and definite positions on these problems and continues to believe that the progress of negotiations must encompass the rights and interests of populations which have been oppressed and cast aside so as to obtain in each of the situations of conflict real changes which will make it possible not only to eliminate the risks for the maintenance of peace but also to develop the just and equitable formulas which are the essential condition of permanent solutions.

140. The consistent objectives of Peruvian foreign policy have led my Government to take more effective action in terms of strengthening its close ties with the brother nations of Latin America, and at the level of Heads of State we have reaffirmed our permanent support for the just cause of Panama in claiming its national rights in the Canal Zone, and have reiterated the political commitment to strengthen the integration of the Andean Group. At the same time, at the highest level and in the same spirit of brotherhood, we have been able to continue dealing with bilateral questions which are part of the constructive relations we have with neighbouring countries with a view to strengthening permanent bonds of peace and solidarity.

141. The interest of Peru in promoting and strengthening regional unity is aimed at ensuring that Latin America will have increasing representation in future discussions for the purpose of establishing juster and sounder bases for a democratically established order among nations which will guarantee human rights and man's fulfilment.

142. The idea supported by the Heads of State of the Andean Group at their meeting in Washington on 8 September last of holding a world conference on inflation is eloquent proof of the continuous concern of my country about the most pressing problems facing the international community.

143. Peru has constantly expanded its integrationist interests because it believes that it is right and necessary to create bonds of unity in the continent and appropriate institutional forms as additional steps towards eradicating the disputes which still exist in the subcontinent. This action in favour of unity, especially in the context of the Bolivarian countries of the Andean Group, has just recieved, at the meeting of Presidents in Washington, decisive support, which augurs well for its success.

144. In the same spirit of understanding which expresses our sincere desire for peace, the meeting recently held in Washington by the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador was particularly heartening. In that cordial encounter both Heads of State examined bilateral matters, especially the more delicate and important ones, without excluding any questions affecting relations between the two countries. The consideration of those questions is to proceed through friendly dialogue and direct contacts between Peru and Ecuador.

145. In that same spirit, I should like to refer to the support repeatedly expressed by Peru of Bolivia's desire for

an outlet to the sea. Peru responded to the initial approaches made to it by presenting a proposal which ensured Bolivia's access to the sea and at the same time included additional elements that, in its view, could lead to conditions guaranteeing peace, co-operation and development in the area where that access is to be provided. Peru does not pretend to view its proposal as a final and definitive formula, but rather as a basis for negotiations which my country believes should be inspired by a determination to achieve an over-all solution of the problems.

146. At this session of the Assembly *[7th meeting]* the Foreign Minister of Bolivia referred to Peru's consent to a possible solution. Our position is that, to be logical, Peru cannot consider giving its consent before it is provided with the basis of an agreement between Bolivia and Chile, which so far has not been arrived at. Once that is done contacts between Peru and Chile will be established in order to reach the prior agreement between the parties, as provided for in the Additional Protocol of 1929.[20]

147. This order of events, however, does not prevent the three countries from holding constructive talks with a view to facilitating a solution of the problem, bearing in mind their respective interests.

148. Proof of that is the fact that the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile and myself held talks today in compliance with the solemn mandate given to us by our Presidents on 8 September in Washington, which will allow for continuing dialogue not only through the Foreign Ministers but also through special representatives who will smooth the way, constructively and dynamically for future meetings of Foreign Ministers. The press release resulting from that important meeting will be distributed to the Assembly tomorrow.

149. I should like now to refer to the positive situation with respect to the Revolutionary Government today with its decision to accelerate the process which will in a short period of time lead to the establishment of complete democracy in Peru. Next year a constituent assembly will be held and a new constitution will be adopted which, with the transfer of power in 1980, will lead to a genuinely democratic political system and the enactment of rules which will ensure the permanent nature of the reforms carried out in my country.

150. Those steps, which will include greater party involvement and greater participation of the masses in the national dialogue, indicate that the Government of Peru knows how to build a political system which guarantees essential economic and social rights together with full political freedom. Compliance with that will confirms and reaffirms the humanitarian designs of my Government because, as the President of Peru, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, has stated:

> "If it is not to struggle for the majority, if it is not to reduce the number of those who are cast aside and exploited, if it is not to increase the participation and distribution of wealth and power, if in short it is not to create a more humane and just society, then politics and democracy have no meaning and simply become a squalid struggle to satisfy personal ambitions."

151. In the meantime, in the economic sector, my country has had to face adverse financial results which obstruct and jeopardize progress towards the advanced objectives of our development process now in full swing.

152. The situation I have described is the result not only of the public expenditure undertaken by the State in assuming primary responsibility for the development process but more importantly of the negative effects of the unfair structure of the world's economy, which has become worse as a result of the recession and the inflationary crisis. Another fact that is decisive in this negative picture is the sudden drastic drop in the prices of our raw materials and our exported commodities, which has had an adverse effect on our balance of payments.

153. Faced with these developments, my Government has decided to reduce public expenditure drastically, to promote domestic savings and to seek more realistic domestic price levels, without compromising the basic needs of the major sectors of the population, to whose improvement the process of change which the Revolutionary Government has initiated and is promoting is precisely directed. At the same time, my Government has decided to honour its external debt obligations, a practice which it has constantly followed and one concerning which it hopes to find the necessary response in the financial community.

154. In briefly describing the present situation in Peru I have not wished to perform an obligatory right but rather to show the interrelationship which exists between our domestic objectives and our international position. This is due to the full observance of a course of conduct which stems from a fundamental philosophy, that is to say, from adherence to principles of consultation and dialogue at the domestic level and to negotiation, understanding and co-operation at the international level. Peru believes that in both spheres a review of conditions of inequality and their restructuring are necessary in order to achieve the domestic and international norms of conduct which correspond to the fundamental requirements of man.

155. Mr. ROVIRA (Uruguay) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to offer you my congratulations on your election to preside over this session of the General Assembly. Your election not only represents a tribute to you personally but also does honour to your country, Yugoslavia, with which Uruguay has maintained cordial relations for many years.

Mr. Ayala Lasso (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the Chair.

156. On behalf of my delegation, I should also like to hail the accomplishments of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and in that connexion to lay particular emphasis on his enduring concern for the political and economic problems of the developing countries.

20 Treaty for the Settlement of the Dispute regarding Tacna and Arica, with Additional Protocol, signed at Lima on 3 June 1929. See League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (No. 2157), p. 401.

Annex 231

Letter from the Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Bolivia to a Desk Officer at the FCO South America Department, No 021/5, 30 September 1977

(Original in English)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

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(9.)

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LA PAZ

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DESK OFFICER | REGISTRY
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30 September 1977

cc: RD
OID
PUSD

Mr R J Miller
South America Department
F C O

GD to see
Then r+u

Dear Robert,

SALIDA AL MAR

1. There has been a good deal of huffing and puffing in the local press about the Salida al Mar in recent weeks, following the meeting of the Presidents of Bolivia, Chile and Perú in Washington on 8 September. It would appear that the Washington meeting went badly for Banzer. (One story, which is probably fairly true, has it that the meeting nearly didn't take place and only did so after Banzer threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Pinochet if he didn't agree to talk).

7/X

2. Reports of the meeting would indicate that while all parties agreed to continue talking no concessions of any kind were made by either Chile or Perú. Certainly Banzer made no triumphal return to Bolivia. He flew quietly into Santa Cruz (his home town) at the weekend and the usual Ambassadorial greeting party at the airport was dispensed with on his return to La Paz.

3. A further sign that little if any progress has been made appeared in Presencia on Monday (26 September). The former Bolivian Ambassador at Santiago, Guillermo Gutierrez, made a blistering and very undiplomatic attack on the Chilean Foreign Minister who three days earlier had said that Chile's position had not changed since December 1975 at which time the Bolivians (through their Ambassador, Gutierrez) had accepted and indeed praised the Chilean plan for a settlement: it was difficult to understand why some sectors of opinion in Bolivia were now opposed to this plan.

4. The most surprising statement followed on 28 September when Banzer declared that he would not take the final decision on any settlement involving an exchange of territory with Chile. This job would be entrusted to a popularly chosen Parliament. This move could be interpreted as an admission by Banzer that he is not going to be able to secure the promised outlet to the sea. It is also a clear sign that there is now no hope of a quick solution to the problem, although Banzer also made the unprecedented suggestion that his Military Government might step down to allow a return to constitutional rule before 1980 if circumstances warranted such a move. Banzer's statement also neatly appears to remove from Banzer's shoulders responsibility for the row that is bound to develop with Perú if and when the Bolivian Parliament (which cynics say will be packed with Banzer men anyway) approves a settlement with Chile. Perú, after all has made it clear enough that any deal with Chile involving territory that was once Perú's would not have her approval.

14/X

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This is standard

5. Footnote. The Ambassador was impressed with the nature of Bolivian feelings about the Salida al Mar when he saw a children's television programme last night. It ended with the children who had taken part in the programme being invited to pray for the return of their sea, which they did very earnestly against a background of pictures and sounds of the sea, including a picture of what appeared to be a North Sea oil rig.

Yours ever

John Culver

J H Culver
Second Secretary

cc: Chancery
Santiago

Chancery
Lima

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Annex 232

Verbatim Record of the Twenty-First Plenary Meeting of the Thirty-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/32/PV.21, 5 October 1977

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/803/17/PDF/NL780317.pdf?OpenElement>

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THIRTY-SECOND SESSION
Official Records

21st PLENARY MEETING

Wednesday, 5 October 1977, at 3.25 p.m.

NEW YORK

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President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate *(continued)*

1. Prince Saud AL-FAISAL (Saudi Arabia) *(interpretation from Arabic):* In the name of God the merciful and compassionate.

2. Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia I have the pleasure to preface my speech by extending to you my sincere felicitations on your election to the high post of President of the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. Your election, Mr. President, constitutes a recognition of your personal qualities and of the important role played by your country in the international field.

3. I should also like to express our appreciation of the sincere endeavours of your predecessor, Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, which had a positive effect on the achievements of the last session.

4. I am also very happy to express, on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, our thanks to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for his untiring efforts to promote the cause of the United Nations and, consequently, to enhance its effectiveness.

5. It is also gratifying for me to associate myself with all those who preceded me in welcoming to the United Nations as new Members the Republic of Djibouti and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The admission of those two new States should be considered a step forward for our Organization towards achieving the goal of complete universality of membership—a source of satisfaction in view of the twilight of military and political colonialism in the world.

6. What dampens this optimism, however, and indeed leads to a pessimistic outlook is the behaviour of certain States and régimes that enjoy membership in this Organization in practising settler colonialism, which is even more dangerous than military and political colonialism, and the violations that those States and entities commit against the purposes and objectives of the United Nations and against human rights, as well as the crimes that they commit against international peace and security. What adds to this gloom is the great number of political and economic issues that remain outstanding on our agenda and that require deliberation and eventual solution.

7. We are today witnessing a greater interaction and interdependence in the economic relations of the community of nations. Added to this are the rising expectations of the peoples of developing countries for a better life. At the same time, we are witnessing the high level of technological capability and the tremendous productive capacity of the industrialized countries. It is only when the industrial countries utilize those resources and technical proficiency for the benefit of the international community at large and offer the emerging nations just opportunities to develop in turn their own resources without exploitation that we can truly state that a new era has dawned and a noble aim of our Organization has been attained.

8. The Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation afforded an opportunity for assessing and deliberating on those problems and seeking appropriate solutions for them. It thereby reaffirmed the conviction that international co-operation was essential in erecting a sound and equitable international economic order.

9. It should be mentioned, however, that there were negative aspects—which need not be mentioned here for the sake of maintaining the spirit of co-operation—that prevented the Conference from achieving its original purpose of establishing a new and just international economic order.

10. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which feels a strong sense of responsibility as a member of the international community, has spared no effort within its power to ensure that the Conference could reach the desired goal of international co-operation. My Government remains ready to play its full part in achieving those goals for the mutual benefit of the developing and developed countries. Saudi Arabia still believes that the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation continues to serve as a valid and sound basis for progress, especially since substantial groundwork has already been achieved through the procedures of the Conference.

11. It seems appropriate to mention these issues because, to a great extent, politics is directly linked to economics. Therefore, if we truly aspire to establish a new international

order, whether on the economic or political level, it is imperative that world tension be diminished and the international community bear its responsibility, no matter how heavy that responsibility may be, in the light of international legality as defined by resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Justice must be the foundation of all deliberations in seeking solutions for issues as a means of resolving conflicts.

12. It is in this co-operative spirit that the League of Arab States has played a valuable role on the regional economic and political levels; in this way it was able to put an end to the long conflict in Lebanon, as well as to provide the assistance that was needed by the Republic of Djibouti in order to consolidate its independence in an atmosphere of tranquillity and prosperity. We must not forget its active role in setting up a fruitful dialogue between African and Arab States for the purpose of bringing about economic and political co-operation between them in order to achieve progress and prosperity for those States and eventually for the whole world. I should also like to refer to the role of the League of Arab States in initiating a similar dialogue between European and Arab countries in order to achieve mutual benefits. All these roles and initiatives by the League of Arab States are undertaken in order to achieve the lofty goals of the United Nations and to strengthen the principles of its Charter and the cause of consolidating economic and political co-operation among its Members and to ensure international peace and security. I should like also to pay a tribute to the constructive role of the Islamic Conference in promoting co-operation among its members in support of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

13. Although these regional developments have contributed to the spread of peace and security at the international level, the continued racial and settler policies in Rhodesia, South Africa and Israel seriously threaten that peace and security. The conduct of the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia constitute a flagrant example of the violation of human rights and of the dignity of man, since the majority of the indigenous population is deprived of the exercise of its civil and political rights despite the numerous resolutions adopted by this Organization. We indeed hope that the good offices of both the United States and the United Kingdom in seeking a peaceful solution to the problems of Rhodesia and South Africa may be brought to a successful conclusion, and thus prevent the deterioration of a situation that could lead to an explosion endangering world peace.

14. In our time, we are witnessing the most abhorrent type of colonialism, that which is exercised by the Zionist entity in Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories, where Israeli settlements are being established one after another in an attempt to rid those lands of their original and rightful inhabitants and replace them with immigrants from every part of the earth. The Zionist régime, besides changing the physical and demographic character of the occupied territories, plays havoc with the spiritual shrines of Jerusalem, which are revered by all monotheistic religions and which mean a great deal to the faithful everywhere. Those Zionist settler practices in the occupied territories constitute a danger which in itself is living proof of Israeli aggressive intentions and explicitly show no intention on Israel's part to withdraw from those territories, thereby seeking to impose a fait accompli. Such practices, accompanied as they usually are by crimes against religious values and human rights, are not new in the region and have existed since the inception of the Zionist entity in the area. What is new is that Israel, while continuing its occupation and trying to make it permanent, is at the same time proclaiming its desire for peace. Israel's conduct in Palestinian and other occupied territories on the one hand, and its obstructionist position towards peace initiatives in the Middle East on the other, offer full proof that Israel does not want or desire peace.

15. The world community, seeking an equitable and peaceful solution for the Palestinian problem and that of the Middle East, and acting through its international organizations and agencies, has adopted resolution after resolution condemning Israeli policy and conduct. It is appropriate in this context to mention the excellent and objective studies undertaken by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, as well as its recommendations *[see A/32/35, chap. VI]*, which deserve careful consideration and implementation. We extend our thanks and appreciation to that Committee for its efforts. Nevertheless, Israel is still determined that any endeavour that could lead to peace shall end in a stalemate.

16. Usurpation, violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, ignoring General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and violating human rights in Palestinian and other Arab territories constitute Israel's infamous record in this Organization. We consider this to be an unprecedented challenge to the will of the international community, world public opinion and the free conscience of mankind. In acting thus, Israel again places squarely on the General Assembly and the Security Council their responsibilities towards the Middle East problem and the question of Palestine and their responsibility towards peace and security in the world.

17. Many of those who preceded me dealt with the question of nuclear proliferation and its dangers and the ways and means of preventing its spread. I should like to mention in this connexion the open secret of Israel's production of nuclear arms and the dire consequences arising therefrom. This daring and blatant act shows that Israel's energy is directed not towards peace but towards augmenting its military menace.

18. We all remember vividly the Israeli naval piracy which enabled it to obtain a shipment of plutonium. Details of this were reported prominently by the international news media and referred to in statements by officials in certain quarters. What increases the danger and gravity of this situation is the irresponsible conduct that characterizes Israel's bloody history in our region, a history of continuous aggression. That is why it is the responsibility of the world community, as represented by its specialized agencies and the States seeking the limitation of nuclear weapons, to take the measures made necessary by the importance of this matter.

19. The Palestinian people and the Arab nations believe in peace based on justice, since peace without justice can never prevail or endure.

20. While striving to attain a just and lasting peace the Arab nations are seeking to establish the international legitimacy of the question of Palestine and of the rights of the Palestinian people, as well as of the Middle East problem in general. The Arab nations spare no effort to pave the way for peace in the area. They have extended their co-operation to all sincere efforts in pursuit of peace within or outside the United Nations. But Israel, with its atrocious practices and aggression in the occupied Arab territories and through barbaric Zionist policies directed against the people of Palestine, international legitimacy and the march towards peace, has frustrated every effort. Thus Israel endangers the prospects of peace and security in the Middle East and brings the whole area nearer to the brink of war. Zionist policies encourage the prospect of war because peace would limit and contain Israel's illegitimate expansionist ambitions and its settler colonialism in the area.

21. In the face of these provocations the Arab countries have resolved to exercise self-restraint in order to avoid the horrors of war in the area. They have concentrated on developing their economic and social resources for the benefit and in the interest of their people and in accordance with their principles and beliefs within the framework of Islamic principles and teachings, which advocate peace. What concerns us most is that the Israeli challenge may compel the Arab countries to react in order to defend themselves and to protect their legitimate rights, which can never be ignored.

22. The Arab nations call upon the international community to fulfil its responsibility by taking appropriate measures to assert its will and to support the legitimacy and the maintenance of peace, which are specifically guaranteed under the Charter of the United Nations. We call upon all States with special relations and involvement with Israel to refrain from providing Israel with military or economic support and assistance. No less important in this respect is the supply of a stream of manpower through immigration. The history of Israel has shown repeatedly that such assistance only perpetuates its aggressive intentions and its challenge to the will of the international community by continued intransigence in the face of international efforts to find a peaceful solution.

23. Thirty years ago, when the General Assembly was in the process of partitioning Palestine and creating the Zionist entity, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia delivered its solemn warning of the consequences of such action and its effect on stability, security and peace in the Middle East. After a lapse of 30 years I find myself compelled today to reiterate at this rostrum what His late Majesty King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Saudi Arabia at that time, said:

> "Remember that in the Preamble of the Charter you have pledged before God and history that you would stand firm against the aggressor and direct your effort to establish world peace and international security. Is not what is being attempted today in Palestine a case of flagrant aggression? ...
>
> "A people who want you to destroy, with your own hands, what you built up yesterday would want you to tear the Charter to pieces with no other object than the fulfilment of their own desires.
>
> ".....
>
> "Remember that within your hands lies the establishment of peace and security in the Middle East. Likewise, within your hands lies the fomentation of disturbances and bloodshed...
>
> "Prove, gentlemen ... that you are only for right and justice.... Prove that right, justice and the halting of aggression come before anything else...."[1]

24. Mr. MKAPA (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, the Tanzanian delegation is very happy to see you preside over the deliberations of the thirty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. We consider your elevation to the high post of President to be a mark of recognition of your personal qualities and your notable role in the efforts of the United Nations to attain its goals, as well as a recognition of the outstanding role played by your country, Yugoslavia, in mankind's quest for a better, just and more secure world order. We are confident that you will discharge your heavy responsibilities with skill and distinction.

25. Allow me also to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe for his remarkable leadership of the thirty-first session.

26. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that two eminent representatives of the non-aligned movement have, in succession, occupied the highest office of our Assembly.

27. The admission to the United Nations of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Republic of Djibouti are great landmarks in the history of the United Nations. Their admission comes as the culmination of long struggles against colonial and imperialist domination in their respective territories, struggles with which the United Nations was closely identified.

28. The independence of Djibouti and its subsequent membership in both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations constitute yet another victory in the rapid process of the liquidation of colonialism in Africa.

29. The presence in our midst of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is in many ways a source of special satisfaction. Viet Nam's legendary struggle against foreign domination and imperialist aggression and its triumph against incredible odds will always be considered one of the most brilliant and inspiring chapters of man's resistance to domination and injustice. There is no doubt that Viet Nam's rich experience in the struggle for national liberation and the defence of freedom will be an invaluable asset to our Organization. The Tanzanian delegation is privileged to have sponsored the membership of both Djibouti and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in the United Nations and we look forward to an era of close co-operation with their respective delegations.

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1 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings* (vol. II), 125th meeting, pp. 1337-1338.

30. In his report on the work of the United Nations over the past year *[A/32/1]* the Secretary-General has been as frank as his sense of realism has permitted. Hopes that 1977 might see a more earnest search for international peace were short-lived. The list of global problems this year is intimidating for, while old problems continue to elude solutions and threaten to worsen, new ones, no less grave and equally pressing, have cropped up.

31. The problems of the Middle East, southern Africa, Cyprus and Korea, some of which are as old as the United Nations itself, have almost become part of our normal life. The prospects for disarmament are rendered ludicrous by the inconsistency between sanctimonious rhetoric and the feverish pursuit of nuclear-weapons superiority. Large populations suffer mass starvation while a few wallow in crass, conspicuous consumption. We witness a deteriorating human environment and the threat of conflicts spilling on to the oceans. All these problems are still on the waiting list for solution, while others join and lengthen the queue.

32. Whether we admit it or not, the world is today engulfed in forebodings of a great upheaval. No amount of dramatization is enough to describe the perilous nature of the circumstances in which we exist today. The behaviour man displays in this situation through action and inaction simply defies comprehension.

33. Yet in reality it is not so much the absence of solutions to these problems as the lack of will to apply the solutions to the problems that is responsible for their continued existence. This situation is both a cause of frustration and a basis for hope. It is a cause of frustration because the human mind is and has proved itself ingenious enough to be able to solve the most complex problems if man decides so to do. It is a basis for hope because we continue to believe that man's instinct for survival, if not his desire for life, has not disappeared and that one day he will act to prevent his extinction.

34. It is, for example, this lack of will that constitutes a stumbling-block to the creation of a new international economic order. The way in which the Conference on International Economic Co-operation ended in Paris this year and the subsequent assessment exercise at the resumed thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly[2] demonstrated that.

35. No one who is honest with himself can today deny the fact that the current international economic situation is in a state of crisis. Nobody, therefore, can pretend that far-reaching changes are not called for if that trend is to be reversed.

36. The Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the sixth special session of the General Assembly in 1974 *[resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI)]* were the first collective attempt by the international community towards the establishment of a new international economic order. The seventh special session of the General Assembly on development and international economic co-operation, which followed in September 1975, adopted concrete guidelines *[resolution 3362 (S-VII)]* for further negotiations intended to lead to the establishment of a new partnership between the developed and the developing countries. So the framework for the solution of the problems of which we are at present seized has already been laid down. The Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States *[resolution 3281 (XXIX)]* and the resolutions of the seventh special session on development and international economic co-operation together constitute the foundation for a new type of relationship among nations based on sovereign equality, justice and interdependence.

37. To suggest, therefore, at this stage that the solution to world economic problems should be more charity—euphemistically called "aid"—for the developing countries, in whatever form the suggestion is presented, is simply to side-track the central issue.

38. The events which followed the seventh special session revealed a persistent lack of political will, particularly on the part of some Western developed countries, to translate the decisions taken at that session into practical action. It was that lack of political will for change which prevented the fourth session of UNCTAD, held in Nairobi, from taking definitive decisions on the crucial issues related to the debt problems of the developing countries, the Integrated Programme for Commodities[3] and the common fund. The UNCTAD Negotiating Conference on a Common Fund under the Integrated Programme for Commodities, held in Geneva in March of this year, broke down without agreement—again because of the negative attitude displayed by some Western developed countries.

39. For example, the Integrated Programme for Commodities, one of the major reforms being proposed for international trade on commodities, seeks to ensure stable prices for the primary commodities and raw materials exported by the developing countries. Stable prices would also ensure reasonable security of supplies, which is obviously of benefit to the consumers, mainly the developed countries. The Programme is being criticized by certain developed countries for interfering with so-called market forces. Yet those very countries which talk about free trade and market forces are the same countries which, first, determine the terms of trade and, secondly, continuously interfere with the so-called market forces by imposing a multiplicity of barriers, tariff and non-tariff, to the importation of both primary commodities and processed goods from the developing countries.

40. This same resistance to structural changes in the world economy also dominated the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation, which went on for more than 18 months. The developed countries were interested mainly in discussing how aid could be given to the world's underprivileged, while the developing countries were interested in fundamental structural changes that would in concrete terms eliminate the very root-causes which led to the condition of being underprivileged.

2 *Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings,* 108th and 109th meetings.

3 See *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fourth Session,* vol. I, *Report and Annexes* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.II.D.10), part one A, resolution 93 (IV).

41. One of the timely opportunities for rectifying economic inequality in the world is presented by the on-going negotiations on the future international legal régime of the oceans. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is taking place to enable the world community to make a critical choice between, on the one hand, perpetuating a legal régime of privilege for a few, with all the social and political consequences we know will surely follow, and, on the other, establishing a just and more progressive legal order.

42. It is a matter for profound regret that those who already have on land more than they deserve are waging the most desperate fight to get everything possible out of the oceans in complete disregard of the rights and interests of the "have-nots". If the developed countries were sincere in their sympathy and their desire to improve the lot of the masses in the developing countries, they would seize this opportunity, for example, to place the international resources of the sea-bed at the disposal of a world authority that would manage and distribute the benefits, primarily to assist the developing countries. That act would not really involve any sacrifice. Unfortunately, the developed countries are prepared neither to do without that wealth nor even to share it equitably. So eager, in fact, are they to add it to their possessions that they are even threatening to seize it and frustrate all the efforts of the Conference in general. In the negotiations Tanzania will continue to stand for justice and equality, for the success of that Conference will be measured not merely by the conclusion of a convention, but by what that convention stands for.

43. It is the desire of the developing countries that changes in the economic relationships between the rich and poor be brought about smoothly and through dialogue. This desire has been amply demonstrated in recent negotiations. But it can be fulfilled only if it is met with similar political will on the part of the developed countries. Unfortunately, most developed countries have not demonstrated such will in concrete terms. The developing countries have displayed a great deal of patience in their negotiations with the developed countries, but that patience is not limitless. The time may come when the very concept of seeking international collaboration on world economic reforms will be questioned. The consequences of such a situation may be too great, but unless positive action is taken now the world may have to face such consequences.

44. As my President stated in an address during his recent state visit to the United States:

> "Confrontation is not a desired strategy of the weak; but if reason, justice and dialogue all fail to bring the international changes needed to win the war against world poverty, then economic conflict is bound to follow. . . .
>
> "The roots of OPEC",[4] he pointed out, "were nourished by decades of gross price-fixing by major oil companies."

45. The choice between dialogue and confrontation lies with those developed countries which continue to disregard the demands of the majority of the members of the international community for structural changes in economic relations between the developed and the developing countries. As my President stated on another occasion:

> "Dialogue or confrontation will depend upon whether the rich will recognize that the poor have a right to economic independence and will then seriously embark on the process of establishing a new relationship between the rich and the poor."

46. On the question of disarmament we concur completely with the Secretary-General when he states that what we claim to have managed to realize as steps towards disarmament so far are, in truth, not disarmament steps at all *[see A/32/1, sect. IV]*. If we are serious about disarming, we must stop vacillating and instead proceed straight to the destruction and prohibition of further production of the most destructive weapons—the nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Any excuse today only breeds in a vicious circle another excuse tomorrow.

47. Efforts designed to move the Middle East conflict from the present stage of a precarious "no war, no peace" situation to a just and lasting peace in the area continue to be frustrated by Israel's continued intransigence. This is clearly manifested in Israel's consolidation of illegal settlements in occupied Arab territories, its addition of new settlements in flagrant violation of international law and in defiance of world opinion, and its persistent refusal to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people.

48. My Government's position on this question is unequivocal. Israel must withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war. The national rights of the Palestinian people must be respected. These are basic prerequisites to a just and lasting peace which will guarantee the independence and security of all the States in the area. And may I add that there can be no meaningful solution if the authentic representative of the Palestinian people—the Palestine Liberation Organization—is not allowed to take part in the negotiating process aimed at resolving the conflict.

49. The unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Comoros continue to be violated through French occupation of Mayotte. It is a matter of profound concern to my Government that this situation continues despite United Nations resolutions and the efforts of the Organization of African Unity. We reiterate our call on the Government of France to respect the Comoros' unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

50. The non-aligned island of Cyprus continues to struggle for its territorial integrity and sovereignty against both internal and external odds. We continue to hope that the implications of the threats to that island will soon be realized and the necessary solution found. The United Nations resolutions on the question cry out for immediate implementation.

51. The legitimate goal of the Korean people for national reunification continues to be frustrated by foreign interference as evidenced by the continued presence of foreign troops in South Korea. Such interference, besides serving as

[4] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

a stumbling block to the reunification of the Korean nation, exacerbates tension in the area. An immediate end must be put to such interference.

52. Allow me, before turning to the issue of southern Africa, to allude briefly to a recent event of important significance. I am referrring to the signing of the United States-Panama treaties on the Panama Canal. My country, which, in concert with other non-aligned countries, has consistently supported the legitimate struggle of the Panamanian people for the recovery of sovereignty over the Canal, could not but welcome this development. It is a victory for the Panamanian people. But above all it is a victory for reason and justice.

53. The question of peace, freedom and independence for Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the enjoyment of equal human and political rights in the Republic of South Africa is not, for Tanzania and for Africa as a whole, a subject detached for academic debate. It is a subject which affects us directly as free and independent States. It affects our very existence as it does affect our developmental efforts.

54. Since this Assembly met last year, there have been significant developments in the area. The armed struggle has been intensified both in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, while the resistance of the African people in South Africa has been more sharply pronounced. There has also been an intensification of the international support for and solidarity with the struggling people of southern Africa as evidenced by the Maputo International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the Lagos World Conference for Action against *Apartheid.*

55. But parallel to these developments, there have been some initiatives taken by some Western Powers aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the burning issues of both Zimbabwe and Namibia. We assume that these initiatives have been taken in the knowledge that the present situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and that the authors of the initiative are now willing and prepared to contribute effectively to the resolution of the conflict by bringing to an end the tyranny and injustice that prevails in southern Africa.

56. If our premise is correct, then we in Tanzania cannot but welcome such moves. For we have always contended and stated quite categorically that the situation prevailing in southern Africa is the direct result of the actions, and is the creation, of the Western Powers. We have used every forum to state this fact. For is it any longer arguable that both the rebel régime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia and the *apartheid* and racist régime of John Vorster in South Africa have maintained their intransigence and defied international public opinion and pressures because of the direct and indirect support which they have been receiving from some of the Western Powers? Is it any longer debatable that denied this Western support both régimes would long since have collapsed? The white minority régimes in southern Africa have survived pressures, not because of some internal magic, but because some Western Powers have been giving them direct or indirect political, economic and military support all these years.

57. It is, therefore, logical to assume that those Western countries which are involved in taking initiatives, be it in Zimbabwe or Namibia, are now prepared to follow their moves to their logical conclusion—namely, first and foremost, to deny the racist régimes the crucial support on which these régimes have greatly relied in the past and continue to do so now.

58. And above all, these countries must also be prepared to take, in concert with the rest of the international community, both within the United Nations and outside, such measures as would effectively bring further pressure to bear on the racist and colonialist régimes. These include effective measures in the Security Council to ensure compliance with United Nations decisions. If this willingness is still not forthcoming—that is to say, if the Western Powers concerned continue to shield these régimes from the effective measures demanded by the international community—then these Powers would certainly have seriously further eroded their own credibility. It is with this background that Tanzania views the recent Anglo-American proposals on Zimbabwe and the initiative of the five Western members of the Security Council in respect to Namibia.

59. In Zimbabwe, the African people have been waging an armed struggle against the rebel régime of Ian Smith ever since 1965 when Smith illegally and unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent and instituted a reign of terror and repression with regard to the African people. The United Nations, for its part, has imposed and maintained sanctions against that régime ever since 1966. These sanctions have been openly violated by South Africa and indirectly violated by many Western Powers. Petrol and petroleum products, as well as other goods and commodities, have continued to reach Rhodesia.

60. In spite of all these odds, the African freedom fighters have continued to intensify the armed struggle and to gain great victories on the battlefield. The stage has now been reached where the initiative is in the hands of the freedom fighters and total victory is certain.

61. On our part, we have given, and we continue to give, whatever assistance we can to the nationalists and to the freedom fighters so that they can effectively wage that struggle.

62. But we have always maintained, and we continue to maintain, that an armed struggle is necessary only if it is the last resort for achieving the objective of freedom and independence in any colonial territory. For we are only too painfully aware of the costs of an armed struggle. The nationalists who fight and die, and those countries which support them, would not opt for armed struggle if the objective could be realized by means other than war. Very regrettably, all other means to achieve that objective in Zimbabwe, as the whole international community is aware, have so far failed.

63. Recently, the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America have put forward the Anglo-American proposals[5] with the declared objective of

5 See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1977,* document S/12393.

attaining a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. In the view of the Tanzania delegation, the Anglo-American proposals do not offer a solution to the Rhodesian problem. They do, however, form a sufficient basis for further negotiations, and it is with this understanding that we have welcomed Security Council resolution 415 (1977) concerning the appointment of the Secretary-General's representative.

64. Clearly, however, until negotiations have been conducted and agreement on the genuine independence of Zimbabwe has been reached, the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and the pressures against Rhodesia by the international community must not only continue, but should be intensified and be more effectively executed and implemented. In this connexion, it is essential that the United Nations should now devise means of compelling the South African régime to implement fully the sanctions against Rhodesia. A heavy responsibility lies with those Western countries which maintain economic and other relations with the South African régime.

65. There is one disturbing tendency in respect of the attitude of some Western countries, in particular those involved in the current initiatives. This element is especially manifested with regard to the question of Zimbabwe. This is their excessive- indeed almost obsessive—preoccupation with the rights of the white minority. Need we stress that what is really at issue is not the rights of minorities but the flagrant denial of the rights of the African majority.

66. A genuine solution to the problem of Zimbabwe does not lie in attempts to safeguard the privileges of the white minority. It clearly rests on the achievement of a genuine freedom and independence where all citizens, irrespective of race, colour or creed, will be treated as equals and would equally contribute to the development of their country. To overemphasize the rights of the white minority is to ignore the reality in Zimbabwe. It is to evade the fundamental challenge. For the issue is not the rights of the white minority but the rights of all Zimbabweans. We must stop making a *cause célèbre* of those who through all these years have arrogantly defied the United Nations and ruthlessly oppressed the African people.

67. With regard to the situation in Namibia, Tanzania has noted with close interest the initiative of the five Western members of the Security Council to help bring about majority rule to Namibia. I believe, however, it is too early at this stage, to render substantive judgement on this initiative.

68. But there are certain basic and known facts which should not be overshadowed or ignored in whatever initiatives are undertaken by the five Western countries with regard to Namibia.

69. Namibia is a United Nations Territory. In addition to its illegal occupation of the Territory, the South African régime has implanted in Namibia its abhorrent policy of *apartheid*.

70. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the United Nations Council for Namibia have adopted various resolutions calling on the South African régime to terminate its illegal occupation of the Territory, but to no avail. On the contrary, the régime has brought in more troops to consolidate its occupation of the Territory. It has intensified its oppression and repression of the Namibian people, and the situation has gone from bad to worse.

71. Several members of the South West Africa Peoples Organization have been arrested on framed-up charges. Others have been detained or imprisoned in South African jails. Many continue to flee from Namibia to safety in neighbouring countries.

72. What we have said for Rhodesia is also true for Namibia. South Africa has been able to defy all United Nations actions and international pressures because of the support it receives from Western Powers, principally from the five Western Powers which are now engaged in the current initiatives. These five, together with several other countries in the Western camp, have been responsible through their support to South Africa, for South Africa's refusal to comply with the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations as regards Namibia. It is thus imperative to stress that these Powers have a particular responsibility for ensuring that South Africa complies with the decisions of the United Nations, in particular, Security Council resolution 385 (1976) on Namibia. It is equally relevant to emphasize that they should in the future refrain from shielding South Africa in the Security Council.

73. As regards the Republic of South Africa itself, we see the situation changing for the worse rather than improving. Since June 1976, when the international community was once again brutally reminded of the meaning of *apartheid* by the wanton massacres of Soweto, the South African régime has intensified its reign of terror. Schoolchildren and innocent people are being arrested, detained and killed. Steve Biko is but the latest well-known victim of *apartheid*. Yet Biko's death does not tell the full story about *apartheid* and its victims. For hundreds have died and their names and their numbers will never be known by the international community.

74. When *apartheid* has been condemned by the whole international community as a crime against humanity, why does it continue to exist? Once again the answer must be found in the actions of those nations whose attitude and, in particular, their economic relations with South Africa, have placed priority on profits from investments over the lives of the victims of *apartheid*.

75. Let me also stress that the perpetrators of *apartheid* will not be induced to change their attitudes or their system by the application of half measures. They will not change because of the verbal condemnations of their system by the Western countries. They will change only when the major Western countries cease completely all economic and military relations with the South African régime. Any collaboration with that régime means only one thing. It means the stregthening of the régime and the intensification of terror against the non-white populations. The most appropriate course of action that the Western countries can take, even at this late hour, is to impose a total arms embargo and an economic boycott of the South African régime. A mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is long overdue. The partners to

South African economic prosperity should not be enraged by accusations of hypocrisy if on the one hand they condemn *apartheid* and on the other they refuse to support the adoption and enforcement of political, economic and military pressures against *apartheid* by the international community.

76. Each session of this Assembly marks lost time in arresting various dangerous trends in the world. But it also offers a new opportunity to strengthen our resolution. Our people want peace, prosperity and security. These aspirations are the linchpins of the Charter of our Organization, and our people look to the United Nations to promote them.

77. We have both the means and the capacity to solve the problems of peace, prosperity and security. All that is asked of us is that we summon the will to address them, sustain the courage to persevere on the course, and stretch the flexibility to adjust to changing perspectives. Before us, as individual leaders and individual countries, lies the challenge of problems, the honour of participation in the solution of these problems, the excitement of struggle, the promose of co-operation and the safety of success.

78. I pledge our delegation's firm commitment to the cause of forging a stronger United Nations family, on this, our one earth.

79. Mr. CARVAJAL (Chile) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I am pleased to congratulate Mr. Lazar Mojsov on his election to preside over the thirty-second regular session of the General Assembly of our Organization. I am certain that the fulfilment of his duties will be characterized by the skill that has distinguished his diplomatic career.

80. I should also like to convey to his distinguished predecessor, Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, and the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, our gratitude for having so wisely and so fairly guided the work of its last session.

81. Chile extends a warm welcome to the new nations recently admitted to this world Organization in keeping with the spirit of universality which is both its inspiration and its raison d'etre.

82. We trust that in the near future the spirit underlying international relations will be improved so as to make possible a more just coexistence among nations and we reaffirm our faith in this institution, which is the most serious effort ever made to ensure a life of peace and justice in this world.

83. We deem it necessary once again to state in this international forum the fundamental principles guiding Chile's foreign policy and its unswerving devotion to them.

84. Our Government has confirmed at the world level its support of the tenets underlying Christian Western culture and has stressed its respect for treaties and other international commitments legally entered into, as a basis for a world order of peace and security. It has also expressed its loyalty to the purposes and principles of this international Organization, whose Charter is the basic legal instrument governing our foreign relations.

85. As stated by the President of the Republic, the Chilean State is evolving towards a democracy whose essential characteristic will be a just equilibrium between rights and duties and between authority and responsibility.

86. The process designed to lead to the new political and institutional régime has three stages: the present one of recovery, then that of transition and finally that of full normality. Once the second stage is completed, a democracy will have been fully established by Chileans, in accordance with their historical traditions and with the greatest possible enhancement of our national character in all its aspects. In that democracy the President and Congress will be elected by votes cast by the citizens. This planned evolution towards a normal situation must not be attributed to weakness on our part vis-à-vis those who pretend to dictate from abroad the path we must follow, for that is a decision taken exclusively in accordance with our national sovereignty.

87. Our normalization process is inextricably linked to the achievement of the goals announced in the planning of the social and economic development of the country, a matter to which our Government is firmly committed.

88. It is an undeniable and fully recognized fact that our economy is now on a solid basis, for it is predicated on a rational and consistent economic policy that has maintained its orientation during the entire period of the present Government's administration.

89. The philosophic basis for this policy is the Government's feeling that mere economic growth cannot be a goal in itself, for it is useless for a country to accumulate wealth and increase its national product if such economic improvements do not better the material, spiritual and moral lot of its inhabitants.

90. The sacrifices exacted by our economic recovery have been substantial, but it is worth pointing out that the progress made in the search for permanent solutions to our social and economic ills has also been substantial.

91. During the first six months of this year the process of recovery of our economy has been carried on at an accelerated pace, and it is with great satisfaction that we can now say that the outlook is frankly encouraging.

92. At the end of the current year we hope to have achieved a yearly growth rate of 8 per cent in our gross national product. Inflation will be down to practically one third of what it was in 1976; real income will be increased by 25 per cent; and unemployment will be almost half of the 1976 figures.

93. The skilful handling of our economic policy has earned Chile the respect of all international financial organizations, and the country can now look forward to a promising future.

94. Those positive results were obtained with no sacrifice of the long-term objectives of the present economic and

social policy, which calls for the allocation of resources to those industries that are capable of producing with comparatively greater efficiency, a decrease in the size of the public sector and, most especially, an ongoing concern for economic development and social justice.

95. Because our basic belief is in the need for rapid economic development and real social progress, the work done directly by the Government stands out as a reflection of its profound concept of every individual as a being with a twofold spiritual and material dimension and as the reason for all the State's activities.

96. Our interpretation of social development is part and parcel of the State's higher policy, which guides us in the pursuit of the objectives we have set for ourselves. We are fully aware that the social aspects are inseparable from the political aspects.

97. Some measures already adopted or still being studied are worthy of special mention in speaking of our social policy: the Social Statute for Business Enterprises; social security reforms; the new Labour Code; the equalization of family allowances and an increase in expenditures for social purposes, which, from a total of 27 per cent of the national budget in 1973, have risen to 51.8 per cent of the current one.

98. Our foreign policy has continued to stress the priority it accords to its relations of friendship and co-operation with America. The historical understanding which is the main feature of the close bonds between Chile and the region is now making progress in promoting the ideals of peace, justice and development.

99. This progress is encouraging and enables us to confirm our hope that Chile and all the other countries in the region will persevere in the path they have followed and that Latin America will shape a regional identity that will enable it to assert its own essential character in this hour of confusion for the free world and assume a more active role in the great problems of world policy. This is Chile's wish, and our country knows that it interprets the deepest feelings of people of the Americas, who wish to participate in a mature and realistic fashion in matters of universal scope.

100. The Chilean Government has spared no effort to expedite the diplomatic negotiations aimed at providing the Republic of Bolivia with an outlet to the Pacific Ocean and an equally sovereign territory to join that shoreline to the Bolivian plateau.

101. In this connexion we have maintained our offer, accepted basically in December 1975, the terms of which are well known to the international community, and we shall continue our efforts to find ways and means which will enable these negotiations to come to a successful conclusion.

102. We have maintained a permanent dialogue with the Republic of Peru on the many aspects of our common interests. This has led to a fruitful understanding and is reflected in the high level achieved in our relations.

103. With regard to our relations with Argentina, Chile reaffirms its permanent, unalterable support for measures aimed at the peaceful settlement of international disputes and reitereates its full adherence to the resolutions stemming from that machinery.

104. In this context, our Government wishes to recall in this international forum the arbitration decision handed down by Her Britannic Majesty on 2 May 1977 *[concerning the islands of Picton, Lennox and Nueva in the Beagle Channel]*, which brought to an end our dispute with Argentina with respect to borders in the southern area of our countries—a dispute which had lasted far too long. Our country can now proudly display to world public opinion this example of the implementation of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, and declares that it will fully respect the terms of that decision.

105. My delegation is pleased to note that the Caribbean countries have brought to the American community rich and varied cultural and economic values which will certainly make a valuable contribution to the task of finding appropriate solutions to our common problems. Chile wishes to maintain with all those countries a fruitful and imaginative understanding, which, while acknowledging the identity of one and all, will still permit joint efforts and mutual assistance in our search for a common destiny.

106. The President of Chile accepted the invitation extended to him by the Presidents of the United States and Panama and participated in the ceremony of the signing of the Panama Canal treaties held at the headquarters of the Organization of American States *[OAS]* in Washington, D.C., on 7 September 1977. The same day, consistent with his previous stand, our President signed the Declaration of Washington,[6] which expressed the satisfaction of the American States at the signature by the Presidents of the United States and Panama of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

107. Like the other States on the western coast of the American continent, we are especially concerned about the security and efficient operation of, and the collection of fair tolls on, that waterway, for through it passes an important part of our trade with the United States and Europe.

108. As to Belize, Chile is following closely the current negotiations between Guatemala and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We hope that the distinguished negotiators will succeed in finding a mutually satisfactory formula reconciling the interests of the population with Guatemala's unquestionable rights in that area.

109. Consistent with its peace-loving tradition and its permanent quest for the rule of law and consensus in international relations, Chile views with concern the existence of an abnormal situation in various areas.

110. My Government hopes that the problems prevailing in the Korean peninsula will find a peaceful solution within a framework of peace, legality and consensus. An important

[6] See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. LXXVII, No. 1999 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 502.

step towards this objective would be the admission to this world Organization of both parties directly involved.

111. The situation in the Middle East is of special concern to us. Not only is peace in the region threatened, but also, due to the position assumed by the great Powers, there is a threat to world peace. Should a new conflict break out in the area, it would be very difficult to contain.

112. On previous occasions we have set forth our Government's views on this matter. In our view, it is essential that Israel withdraw its forces from the Arab territories it has been occupying since 1967, subject to the establishment of mutually acceptable boundaries. It is also necessary to recognize the right of all States in the region—and consequently of Israel—to live within secure and guaranteed boundaries. Moreover, the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland must also be recognized. Only on these conditions, which do not have an order of priority and must be accepted as parts of a whole, will it become possible to achieve the peace aspired to by all inhabitants of the region. That is why we view with concern the illegal, unilateral actions taking place in the occupied territories.

113. We hope that the Peace Conference on the Middle East to be convened in Geneva will be fully successful. The Palestinian people must be legitimately represented there, since their interests will be the main subject of discussion.

114. The Chilean Government has repeatedly expressed interest in a closer relationship with the African nations as a means of recognizing the numerous elements of identity existing between our peoples. Indeed, there are many reasons for our closeness to the countries of Africa: our common status as developing countries and producers of raw materials, the similarity of our essential ideological beliefs in such matters as self-determination, the equality of human beings, and finally freedom, in the widest sense of the term.

115. Ever since African States gained independence, Chile has given them understanding and support in the various stages of the struggle to achieve their legitimate rights. Thus, when the Organization of African Unity was born at the beginning of the last decade, our country offered it our co-operation. The same can be said of the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in which Chile has participated actively and has made its contribution to the cause of freedom and justice.

116. We hope that the difficult situation in Rhodesia will soon find a peaceful solution that will enable a gradual accession to majority rule without anarchy and without economic setbacks.

117. Chile also declares its support for the people of Namibia in the just struggle for their legitimate right to rule their own Territory, within the framework of a peaceful and orderly transition to their assumption of power.

118. We reiterate once again our firm rejection of all forms of racism or racial discrimination.

119. The sixth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was concluded on 15 July. Remarkable progress was achieved in its important work since its session in Caracas in 1974, and in which my country has participated actively.

120. We have noted with satisfaction the international community's acceptance of the principle of an economic zone of 200 nautical miles, which was proposed unilaterally by my country 30 years ago, and jointly with Peru and Ecuador some five years later in the well-known Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone of 18 August 1952.[7]

121. The signing of the Treaty on Antarctica[8] in Washington, D.C. in 1959 may be mentioned as an example of positive achievement in matters of international co-operation. The signatory States declared Antarctica a peaceful and nuclear-free zone, devoted entirely to scientific research. The provisions and the spirit of that treaty have enabled that continent so far to remain a privileged region in the world.

122. Our country, whose sovereignty over the Antarctic between longitude 53° and 90° west is based on indisputable historical, legal and geographical rights, reaffirms its decision to continue its campaign to keep the Antarctic free from pollution and to prevent any change in its present condition and ecological systems.

123. Since the last session of the General Assembly, a number of efforts have been made to introduce political considerations into the decision-making process of international and regional financial institutions. In no way can we accept any impairment of the objectives for which those institutions were created, lest we turn them into political forums, which would soon render them inoperative.

124. The latest General Assembly of the OAS adopted a position in this matter when it declared that these bodies must act in accordance with their charters and with objective criteria. We firmly repeat at this time that statement by the OAS in the conviction that it is a contribution to international peace and development.

125. The Government of Chile supports détente because it believes that it is a means of lessening international tension and because, to the extent that it is applied in good faith, it dispels the threat of world conflict.

126. Nevertheless, we feel that, for the process of détente to be valid, it should be extended to all nations. Only then will its ultimate aim, the maintenance of peace, become real and effective and correspond to the moral desire of mankind.

127. Referring to human rights and terrorism, at the seventh regular session of the General Assembly of the OAS, held in Grenada from 14 to 22 June 1977, we expressed, together with other nations, our concern for human rights, which has merited the attention of America and States Members of this world Organization. In analys-

7 See *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. 1956.V.3, vol. I), 362nd meeting, para. 35.

8 United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778.

ing the causes and circumstances which have led some countries to restrict certain human rights, we must realize that one of the main causes for such action is the planned and concerted subversive and terrorist activities at present devastating the lands and cities of the Americas.

128. How deceptive it is to say that it is hunger and injustice that cause terrorism! The real truth is that it is neither the poor nor the working sectors who inspire and plot terrorist violence. This is to be found, financed by foreign money and weapons, among frustrated and resentful individuals who have wasted all their opportunities in life.

129. In referring to subversive terrorism, we do not mean isolated or unrelated acts of violence, which have existed throughout history. The terrorism which is of concern to us is that which has the political and ideological aim of planned subversion of the democratic order throughout the world.

130. Therefore, we believe that it is essential for competent international organizations, when studying the situation on human rights in a given country, to attempt to verify the extent to which international subversion and terrorism have caused restrictions of certain freedoms and rights. It is necessary to have courage to single out and tackle the causes, so that once and for all subversion, terrorism and repression may be eliminated.

131. The concern necessitated by the equity and objectivity with which the bodies undertaking these studies must act must lead to judgements which will take that factor into account and to studies and measures conducive to the condemnation and eradication of subversive terrorist action as a direct and indirect factor of respect for human rights.

132. The United Nations, which was created to bring peace and brotherhood to the world, cannot remain silent in this chaotic and generalized situation. To remain passive would be tantamount to accepting a role of complicity and would make many lose faith in the legal and ethical effectiveness of this world Organization.

133. In the specific field of human rights, any investigation of alleged violations by a nation entails interference in its affairs and acquires features which make it very similar to a trial, for it becomes a matter of investigating facts that were assumed to have occurred on the sovereign territory of a given nation with a view to obtaining proofs for the purpose of evaluating those facts.

134. It seems, therefore, that in the light of natural equity applied at the international level, the need for due process becomes clear. Due process means the intervention of a body which in its origin and action would be independent of political interests, would have come into being prior to the trial, would have universal competence and, at the same time, would have a pre-established procedure that would ensure the impartiality of the international inquiry, the certainty of the proof and a real possibility for the nation accused to defend itself.

135. In the present state of our international juridical situation, only two achievements may be mentioned in the field of the requirements of justice: that which governs the European Community, and that contained in the Costa Rica Pact,[9] which is now in the process of ratification.

136. Within the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is substantive law which is not given adequate jurisdictional implementation, nor is it in keeping with the procedural requirements inherent in due process.

137. All of those reasons led Chile to submit to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly a draft resolution proposing the study of ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,[10] so that the measures adopted in this field under the competence of this Organization should be universally applied and binding on all Member States, obviating conflicting competencies and giving the States investigated the appropriate guarantees under due process.

138. In spite of showing genuine respect for human rights, the Chilean Government continues to be the victim of singular attack in this field in which no recognition has been shown of its commendable moderation exercised during the emergency.

139. Certain political leaders have been devoting themselves from afar to judging Chile and to proposing actions detrimental to it. As far as my country is concerned, by tradition and its personality, it is strengthened by adversity, and now more than ever we look forward to the future with renewed faith and hope.

140. There are other Western leaders who, differing ideologically with the present Chilean process, have nevertheless been able freely to visit my country and to see for themselves how false is the portrayal that some interested sectors are attempting to give with respect to Chile before international public opinion.

141. We reiterate before this international forum our readiness to receive the representatives of all friendly countries to come and witness with their own eyes how Chile, through the efforts of its sons and daughters, strives in peace to achieve its national destiny.

142. Chile accepts and recognizes international jurisdiction with respect to fundamental human rights, but, along with the best jurists, we affirm that with respect to their implementation and the individual interpretation by each people of the exercise of political, civil, economic and social rights, internal jurisdiction prevails. This individual competence not only derives from national sovereignty but is at the same time an elementary and logical consequence of the principle of self-determination of peoples. The rights of the human being, the rights of the national community and the rights of international society should all be concerted under the guidance of international law, inspired by natural law.

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9 *American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San José, Costa Rica"*, Treaty Series No. 36 (Washington, D.C., Organization of American States, 1970).

10 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 73, document A/10404, para. 9.

143. This political interrelationship and respect has been and will be the prerequisite for the existence and survival of the best form of expression heretofore known to the international community, that is, the United Nations.

144. Mr. FORDE (Barbados): Mr. President, the Barbados delegation wishes to offer you its congratulations on your election as President of the current session of this Assembly. Your election not only redounds to your personal credit, but it also indicates the high esteem in which your country is held. Your country's role over the last 20 years as a rational and mediating influence in world affairs has not gone unnoticed. The members of this Assembly confidently expect that the good sense that has traditionally been displayed by your country will be reflected in your judgement during this session.

145. My delegation also wishes to place on record its congratulations to Secretary-General Waldheim on his reappointment to his high office. His willingness to accept a second term of office may be indicative of his courage, but our decision to re-elect him is clear evidence of the high regard in which he is held.

146. Once again, his admirable report on the work of the Organization has highlighted the main issues which have confronted the United Nations during the past year *[A/32/1]*. Many of these issues have remained unresolved for far too long. Few of them are new. Some of them have reappeared in a new guise. Each of them is crucial for the maintenance of international peace and good order. The most striking of them is the continued failure of the nations of the world to grapple with the challenge of achieving a just economic order and an equitable distribution of the world's resources among all its peoples.

147. The main concern of the poor peoples of the developing countries still remains the stark failure of the world community to answer our urgent problems of disease, food, shelter, water, education and health—in short, our basic human needs. This Assembly's primary duty is still to promote higher living standards, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

148. My Government therefore shares the disappointment and anxiety reflected in the Secretary-General's comments on the lack of real progress towards achieving a new international economic order. The recent Conference on International Economic Co-operation has done precious little towards effecting real structural change, improving the rate of recovery of the world economy or solving the problems of high unemployment, inflation and balance-of-payments deficits which continue to plague our nations, especially the developing non-oil-producing States.

149. For the millions who live in the small developing and relatively resourceless countries, action requires international economic co-operation. Strongly committed though we are to the principles of self-reliance, we cannot simply raise ourselves by our own bootstraps, for a programme of self-reliance can only achieve optimum results if external factors that inhibit internal development are eliminated. For this reason, Barbados, like other developing countries of the world, will continue to place its hope in the movement for concerted international economic co-operation and the establishment of a new international economic order.

150. My Government wishes to commend to this Assembly the solutions recommended in the McIntyre report entitled "Towards a new international economic order", prepared by the Commonwealth Group of Experts and made a document of this Organization.[11] This report examines the discomforting facts about the harshly unequal conditions of life in developed and developing countries. It notes the failure of the developing countries as a whole to meet even the basic needs of much of their population and observes, among other things, that if the present trends continue the balance-of-payments situation of the developing countries will become disastrously unmanageable.

151. The solution of these problems does not lie in the declining sense of urgency and concomitant dash for protectionist policies being adopted by the industrialized developed countries. Instead, there is an urgent need for a new approach to commodity arrangements so as to provide price stability for producers of primary products. The early establishment of a common fund of some $6 billion, as proposed by UNCTAD, is imperative. Measures must be taken to expand the International Fund for Agricultural Development to accelerate agricultural and rural development, and there must also be a concerted effort for industrial development and co-operation between the industrialized and non-industrialized countries.

152. The issue of energy, which was a dominant issue at the Conference on International Economic Co-operation in Paris, is crucial to the restructuring of the economies of developing countries and of the world economic order. The Government of Barbados is aware that the world's non-renewable resources of oil and gas are being rapidly depleted because of the world-wide energy demand. The interests of all peoples of developing countries demand that we exploit, expand and diversify our indigenous and non-conventional sources of energy. Programmes for the transfer of appropriate technology—especially related to the search for alternative sources of energy—must be initiated without delay. This United Nations and its specialized agencies have a crucial role to play in devising such programmes, which will guarantee the flow of resources for investment purposes from developed to developing countries on a massive scale and enable oil-deficient developing countries to develop new energy supplies.

153. One of the direct results of the acute energy situation in the world is the massive increase of indebtedness of developing countries. Those countries continue to be hampered in their efforts to develop their economies by having to service large debts borrowed on the international capital markets. The existence of this chronic indebtedness is symptomatic of the fact that something is fundamentally wrong with the entire structure of the world economy and the international trade system.

154. Regrettably, no significant progress has been made towards framing a comprehensive programme to assist developing countries in overcoming the crushing burden of

11 See document A/AC.176/5.

debt which is an effective barrier to the implementation of development programmes.

155. The seventh special session of the United Nations in 1975, agreed that the level of official development assistance, should produce a net transfer of such assistance equal to 0.7 per cent of gross national product. Between 1965 and 1975 disbursements on official development assistance from the developed market-economy countries to developing countries and multilateral organizations, net of amortization, increased negligibly, from $11.3 billion to $13.6 billion at constant 1975 prices. Between 1975 and 1976, the increase has been equally negligible, and may, in net terms, even amount to a decrease.

156. If there is to be any serious dent in the problem of world borrowing, then assistance should be granted on concessionary terms without the attachment of difficult conditions which at present militate against the fulfilment of development targets.

157. The record of developed countries in providing concessionary assistance has been deplorable. While the developed countries are committed to reaching an official development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of their gross national product, in fact, only two of the industrialized countries have reached this target, and not many others seem to have the political will to do so. Yet the gross national product of the industrialized countries has been rising, while their net disbursement of aid has stagnated.

158. Missing the target, in this regard, knows no ideology. The record clearly indicates that both the United States of America, almost all of the other industrialized free market countries, the Soviet Union and the other centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe—all of which often claim to be most concerned about the welfare of the developing countries, and are equally solicitious for our support—have treated the world's poor most shabbily. The United States of America has transferred less than 0.3 per cent of its gross national product and the Soviet Union less than 0.1 per cent.

159. The record of the members of OPEC is, on the whole, also a cause of concern. Not only is their concessional aid highly concentrated in a handful of countries, mainly Arab and Islamic, but huge portions of the oil-based surpluses which they accumulate are allowed to be siphoned off by developed countries, at no benefit whatsoever to the developing countries.

160. This parsimonious attitude towards developmental concessionary aid has also had a deleterious impact on the effectiveness of this Organization's development programme. It has adversely affected UNDP, a body which is still to be congratulated for the constructive work it is doing in channelling technical assistance to developing countries. UNDP must be given adequate means to continue its extremely important work.

161. In this regard, the factors which are considered to be of greatest significance in indicative-planning-figure allocations must be reviewed. While the Government of Barbados agrees in principle that the granting of technical assistance should discriminate in favour of the least developed countries, we also hold the view that this principle should be applied without jeopardizing the development of countries which are classified as being in the mid-range, because of their *per capita* gross national product. UNDP could be of even greater assistance to our development if, in applying criteria for determining indicative-planning-figure allocations, greater significance was placed on factors such as the narrowness of our industrial base and the virtual absence of natural resources which would permit rapid industrialization.

162. My country's Government would wish this session to direct specific and more urgent attention to the special characteristics of the small island economies—countries of limited markets. The erroneous belief exists that small island countries receive reasonably generous amounts of official development assistance. It is further incorrectly argued that, since they are not among the world's poorest, it would be difficult to make a general case for an increase in their share of world aid.

163. I submit that this represents the misuse of crude aggregates for the determination of eligibility for assistance. The extent of the spurious generosity is measured in *per capita* terms—a criterion of more than doubtful validity for a country like Barbados. A single loan to a single sector for a specific project could not suddenly catapult a small economy like Barbados with a population of 250,000 into that category of developing countries best equipped to sustain improved living standards without external assistance. But crude *per capita* criteria would have us believe so. The sweeping uncritical use of *per capita* aid flows as a measure of the needs of a country for continued external assistance guarantees the perpetuation of an inadequate appreciation of need, in the face of dismally unsatisfactory levels of assistance.

164. My delegation suggests that the aid community rid itself of the simplistic notion that all the social and economic complexities of small economies can be compressed in a *per capita* measurement of gross national product. My delegation further maintains that a country's capacity to sustain an acceptable or agreed rate of economic advance should be the true measure of its need.

165. This Assembly's attention has previously been drawn to the urgent need for an action programme in favour of developing island economies. Resolution 31/156, which recommends such a programme, is in accordance with the decisions taken at the fourth session of UNCTAD in Nairobi which recognized that particular attention should be devoted to such countries. I wish, however, to express my country's disappointment at the rate of progress in implementing the terms of that resolution. Strong and urgent action is called for.

166. My Government considers that the rapid economic development of the less-privileged countries continues to be recklessly delayed by the wanton spending on arms by the developed countries. The record shows that in the last 15 years nations have spent almost $400 billion annually on arms—a shameful waste that is a savage indictment of man's claim to civilization. This conduct highlights the monumental contradiction which the world faces. "Squandermania" on munitions is practised with reckless abandon as

the entreaties of the poor for a new international economic order are met with high-sounding platitudes.

167. Seven years ago this Assembly directed the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the comprehensive programme of disarmament *[resolution 2661 C (XXV)]*. Most of this has not been implemented. Worse still, this Assembly, having recognized the gravity of the arms situation, endorsed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations[12]—action which was undertaken by the Soviet Union and by the United States. Yet this has not been implemented.

168. Barbados welcomes the decision that a special session of the United Nations be devoted to disarmament in 1978. Barbados strongly supports the adoption of a declaration on disarmament which would embody the following basic principles.

169. First, disarmament is the concern and responsibility of all mankind and not an esoteric problem for a few militarily powerful countries.

170. Secondly, disarmament is possible only within the framework of universal confidence and mutual trust. Hence the Government of Barbados believes that an international system of security is a necessary pre-condition for complete disarmament.

171. Thirdly, a corollary of the need to foster confidence is the development of machinery which would permit a reduction of arms and armed forces to take place without any unfair advantage accruing to any nation.

172. Fourthly, the political will to achieve disarmament will not spring into existence *ex nihilo* but must be generated by a mass campaign designed to inform the peoples of the world of the perils that threaten them.

173. Principles are lifeless, however, unless they are applied to real problems, and for this reason Barbados strongly advocates the adoption of a programme of action as the instrument to animate the principles adumbrated in the declaration on disarmament. The limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems are central to a programme of disarmament. Barbados is therefore in agreement with the holding of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the European meetings on mutual force reductions.

174. Barbados is resolutely and unalterably opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is firmly of the opinion that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons *[resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]* should be adhered to by all the nations of the world. A firm commitment and strict observance would, in the view of this delegation, go a long way towards ensuring that the Caribbean, among other regions, remains a zone of peace.

175. In southern Africa there can be found arms merchants plying their military hardware to assist in shoring up decaying colonialist régimes. Barbados was first intimately exposed many years ago—perhaps as many as 30—to the brutality which has so often typified the attitude of the authorities towards black people in southern Africa when one of our nationals suffered death as a result of beatings at the hands of the so-called representatives of law and order. From this stark experience all Barbadians have grown to detest and abhor the doctrine and practice of *apartheid*, and it is against this background that our policies towards southern Africa have been shaped.

176. Barbados hails the courageous struggle being waged by African nationalist freedom fighters, whose actions on the field of battle have been so effective that reluctant Western Powers have been forced at long last to look for solutions to a problem to which they have contributed in no small measure. Once again my country wishes to pay a tribute to those whose lives have been cut short because they sought their freedom from shameful tyranny. Neither we nor history will forget them.

177. Barbados welcomes the Anglo-American proposals as constituting a basis for agreement on a settlement which provides for majority rule without delay and for the full independence of Zimbabwe in 1978. While welcoming the push for peace, Barbados cannot accept peace at any price. The arrangement of a cease fire must not emasculate the Patriotic Front. We applaud the front-line States for their reasonable but firm approach to the Zimbabwe freedom struggle, and will continue to support steps taken to assist them in bearing the heavy burden which they must carry until Zimbabwe is free.

178. Just as last year in this Assembly Barbados urged that there be no sham independence for the Transkei,[13] so today Barbados urges that there be no sham independence for Zimbabwe and no sham independence for a truncated Namibia. The South African policy on Namibia, including the attempt to cling to Walvis Bay, represents a wicked attempt to control without governing, to extend the "bantustan" policy in all but name.

179. During the past year the waters in southern Africa have been troubled. Nowhere has this been more so than in Soweto, where youths and schoolchildren have been cut down by the agents of bitter tyranny. Since the Soweto riots of last year murders and detentions have increased; the latest martyr to fall before the diabolical killers that govern South Africa is Steven Biko, a leader of the "black consciousness" movement of that country. But the white rulers of South Africa and their supporters are not the only guilty persons in this sordid chapter of human history. They have allies in many of the capitals of the world. Their allies are persons who pose as respectable, law-abiding citizens while they give economic support through transnationals corporations to that violent régime.

180. Barbados calls upon all those countries whose transnational corporations operate in South Africa to introduce regulations without delay to put an end to this immoral economic intercourse. The Government of Barbados believes that South Africa should be totally isolated through economic sanctions, including an oil embargo and a mandatory arms embargo.

12 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

13 *Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 26th meeting, para. 19.

181. In conducting a relentless struggle against the system of *apartheid* Barbados welcomed the holding of the World Conference for Action Against *Apartheid* in Lagos and believes that it moved the world a step further along the road to dismantling that inhuman social system.

182. Much as my Government despises the blatant disregard of human rights in southern Africa, it cannot turn a blind eye to disrespect for human rights elsewhere, whether in central or northern Africa, in eastern or western Europe, in northern, central or southern America, in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the world. For us in Barbados two wrongs do not make a right.

183. While Barbados does not subscribe to the view that the question of human rights should be hypocritically or mischievously used as a propaganda tool, it cannot regard as a breach of the principle of non-intervention all comments on and condemnation of violations of civil, political or other rights in places beyond one's own boundaries. Barbados recognizes that the matter of human rights is one of great complexity and delicacy, reflecting as it does the diversity of traditions, codes of behaviour, practices and priorities in different countries and different parts of the world. Nevertheless there are certain violations which must be denounced. It would be unprincipled to overlook these.

184. Barbadian policy has traditionally been motivated by profound humanistic impulses, and Barbados has consequently pressed for and supported instruments that express concern for and protect human rights, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, together with its Optional Protocol. Barbados would like to see all the nations of the world ratify and implement in good faith the terms of these important instruments.

185. On the question of civil and political rights, the Government of Barbados remains unreservedly and without qualification committed to freedom of speech, freedom from victimization on account of political or religious belief, freedom from discrimination on grounds of class, sex or race, the right to a free and open press, the right freely to choose one's leaders, and respect for human dignity, which prohibits acts of unlawful detention or torture.

186. In the field of economic rights, the Government of Barbados is committed to a programme of social justice and accordingly subscribes to the proposition that the people of every country are entitled to have their basic needs satisfied—including the right to work, the right to proper health services, the right to adequate food, and the right to proper housing and to maximum opportunities for education.

187. Barbados wishes to welcome the nations of Djibouti and Viet Nam to this Organization. Both have made their way to independence through difficulties, but my delegation is confident that those two vastly dissimilar States have the capacity to add their own distinctive element to the mosaic that is the United Nations.

188. While welcoming Djibouti and Viet Nam, Barbados wishes to direct the attention of this Organization to the continued and enforced absence of the Central American territory of Belize. Belize is kept out of this Organization and denied access to its privileges, not because of any short-coming or failing on its part, not because of the conduct of an intransigent colonizer, but because of the obduracy of a belligerent neighbour, Guatemala, whose overt and continued belligerence flies in the face of this Organization's sacred principle of universality and of that of self-determination enshrined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. What makes the effrontery of Belize's neighbour more galling is that States which Barbados thinks should really know better, and which are themselves seeking new freedoms, either supply the openly bellicose Guatemala with arms and encourage it with words, or, like some of our so-called friends, remain strangely silent. It is criminal hypocrisy for nations to utter pieties about the right of all peoples to live in security and at the same time surreptitiously to provide weapons to aggressive countries for the purpose of extinguishing that same right. Barbados calls upon all those countries which supply Guatemala with arms to desist from supporting it in its evil intention of invading Belize.

189. Barbados is a small peace-loving, law-abiding Caribbean nation which seeks no quarrel with any country. The people of my country have in the past lived peaceably with all men and we intend to continue to do so. It is our wish that the Caribbean remain free from war and the threat of war. We have no military resources to enforce peace within the region, but in respect of Belize we call upon those who have the power or influence to disturb the tranquillity of the Caribbean to desist from so doing. The Government of Barbados wishes to express its approval of the emphatic response of the United Kingdom to the military threat to Belize last June, and it is heartened by the demonstration of will on the part of the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations as the administering Power of Belize.

190. Barbados looks forward to welcoming a free Belize to this Organization in the near future and urges all nations to assist in enabling Belize to take its rightful place in this Assembly.

191. During the past years the cancer of international terrorism has continued to afflict the entire body of nations, bedevilling the security of the world and causing the death of innocent persons.

192. At the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the Prime Minister of Barbados, the Right Honourable J. M. G. M. Adams, declared an unswerving commitment on the part of the Government of Barbados to the removal of the scourge of terrorism from the face of the earth.[14] The will and resolve of Barbados to work towards this end remain as firm as ever.

193. Acts of terrorism have international ramifications and, particularly when they are executed in a random and senseless fashion, a single country finds it extremely difficult to deal with the menace. Barbados believes it is imperative that instruments be drawn up which would attempt to distinguish nakedly criminal acts from genuine struggles for liberation. Barbados also wishes to reiterate its

14 *Ibid.*, paras. 35 and 36.

support for the principles enshrined in the Conventions of Montreal[15] and Tokyo,[16] and would urge all nations at the earliest opportunity to support the adoption of a convention against the taking of hostages.

194. Barbados, as a small island standing out in the Atlantic, has a natural interest in the proceedings of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The collapse of that Conference at this stage would be particularly detrimental to island communities such as ours, which would be placed at the tender mercies of wealthy predators.

195. Barbados hopes that at the seventh session of the Conference, planned for Geneva in 1978, the countries of the world will demonstrate that, whatever its shortcomings, as a negotiating forum the United Nations is as useful an instrument as we can invent at this stage of mankind's development.

196. Barbados will continue to give its full support to the United Nations, confident in the knowledge that it is an institution whose importance for small States cannot be exaggerated. For small States, this Organization goes some way towards precluding the operation of the law of the jungle and of the more savage inclinations of States. In the past Barbados has always resisted attempts to belittle or disregard the role of the United Nations, and we will continue to cling to the belief that our role is to strengthen this institution and to enable it to accomplish the task with which it is charged by its Charter. At the same time Barbados wishes to reaffirm the right of all States to participate in United Nations activities as sovereign equals and to reaffirm the principle of universality which guarantees the right of all States to be Members of this world body.

197. My delegation comes to this session bringing not might but reason, realizing that wisdom is not related to size, nor vision to power. Barbados will aim to speak out frankly where necessary, but without rancour or malice. Our aim will be to defend principles and to promote policies for their implementation. Barbados will therefore support all efforts designed to advance the economic development of all peoples of all nations, especially those of the poorest nations, holding the view that, since the world's technology has given us the tools to do the job, it would be tragic to fail. Barbados will aim to introduce into the debates of this Assembly a concern for morality and justice in international relationships. Our traditions and best instincts dictate this role to us, and we shall play it without fear or favour.

198. The issues which this Assembly faces are daunting, but to despair would be disastrous. The lives and well-being of this world's millions hang on our decisions. We must not allow our jargon, our euphemisms, our rhetoric and our resolutions to conceal the fact that behind all our words and documents lie food, houses, schools, jobs, disease—even wars, if we fail. This places on us all a very solemn responsibility. For the sake of all the peoples of this world, whether in deserts or on the seas, in villages or in cities, we must continue to work towards the fulfilment of their basic needs.

199. This session must not falter. Let not difficulty blunt our resolve, or experience dim our hope.

200. Mr. LIEVANO-AGUIRRE (Colombia) *(interpretation from Spanish):* My country feels that the election of Mr. Lazar Mojsov to the presidency of this General Assembly is truly a felicitous decision. His intellectual and personal qualities represent the virtues of the Yugoslavs, a people which has upheld the image of the principles of its political organization but which also has coexisted constructively with the various ideological trends of our time and has contributed to the alleviation of tensions created by intolerance in the international community. Mr. Mojsov in the presidency is a guarantee that at this session the international Organization will make a sincere effort to work with the dynamism, authority and efficiency that the maintenance of world peace demands.

201. An effort is now more necessary than ever for the Assembly meets at a time when there are not many reasons for optimism and little progress has been made in finding solutions to the problems that have been discussed in recent years. As such solutions continue to evade us and the problems meet in international forums with the dilatory treatment of bureaucratic routine, the areas for friction become more numerous and the increasing tensions put to stringent tests the systems devised after the Second World War to settle disputes among nations within a freely accepted legal order.

202. Much light would be shed on the true nature of the present conflicts if we started by acknowledging the fact that the post-war world was organized as a political democracy of States recognized as equals—a democracy that was to coexist with an oligarchy of prosperous nations endowed with protective mechanisms rooted in the prestige of tradition and the influence of power.

203. If the democratic spirit of international institutions has had little success in moderating the old and new inequalities, that is due to the constant opposition of the tight network of institutions and practices protecting an economic order based on mechanisms which create and maintain an excessively unequal international distribution of wealth.

204. To appreciate the importance in international life of such practices and institutions, which constitute an economic world of their own, it should be enough to mention matters such as international liquidity; terms of trade between nations; trade restrictions; income distribution at the world level; and the control over technological progress and its effect on the new resources of the planet, such as the riches of the sea-bed or the uses of outer space.

205. While international organizations devise, without insurmountable difficulties, important concepts in matters of political democracy—as in the case of the protection of human rights, the struggle against racial discrimination, or the equal representation of States—on the other hand obstacles systematically arise whenever the powerful vested

15 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971.

16 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963.

interests of a small group of affluent societies are involved, as for them the concepts of equality, equity and human rights are subjects that can be, and in fact are, excluded from the economic sphere, deemed by them to be a reserved area for inequalities, the predominance of power and the maintenance of the privileges and advantages acquired under the old international economic order.

206. Every legal-political organization can resist inequalities up to a certain critical point. One indication that we are nearing that point is that confrontations between developed and developing countries are becoming more and more widespread, and that industrial nations show a distinct tendency to discuss, outside this Organization the very problems that justify its existence. This tendency becomes even more serious when the Governments of industrial societies do not even oppose the consolidation of a certain attitude of public opinion in their countries which is adverse to the international organizations, an attitude inspired by the feeling that belonging to such organizations entails commitments and duties of solidarity that are viewed as hindrances to an unlimited enjoyment of the benefits yielded by their own prosperity.

207. It would, in all truthfulness, be unfair to say that the power, the wealth and the abundance enjoyed by the highly developed countries have been acquired by them at no cost and are unrelated to the strenuous efforts of their people over generations, and to the sacrifices they made to attain their current levels of pre-eminence and well-being. However, even though admitting such achievements and their merits, the explanations for the origin of the wide gap now separating peoples would be incomplete if no mention were made of the decisive role played in the distribution of wealth and poverty inherited by our generation by the power and the monopolistic concentration of their economic organizations.

208. The huge accumulation of wealth now concentrated in a few areas of the world, and which can be distributed among their inhabitants with a certain equity because of institutional mechanisms of those areas, is not only the result of the ingenuity and economic ethics they so frequently boast of, but also of the entrenchment, at the international level, of a pattern of relationships between the peoples of the entire world; between the areas north and south of the equator, and between the temperate and the tropical zones, where the value equations for products was set, in large measure, by means of coercive and often predatory procedures.

209. The mechanisms by which the world markets work, assumed to be automatic and impersonal by the established economic doctrines, were soon distorted by the monopoly prices the industrial societies set for their goods. Thus a situation took shape in which a small number of nations became a privileged world establishment while in the greater part of the world the laws of a free and competitive market for their exports did indeed apply. The inhabitants of these vast areas were despoiled of an ever increasing portion of the economic value of their work and this in a situation where the meagre income they were allowed precluded the use of distributive systems for the improvement of the population's appalling living conditions.

210. It is not therefore idle briefly to point out that the democratic spirit which inspired the Charter of the United Nations and the instruments created for its implementation has proved unequal to permeating economic institutions and practices or has been prevented from doing so.

211. Approaching these subjects somewhat at random, we could start by mentioning the important issue of international liquidity. The record of post-war international monetary institutions is characterized by the constant requests made by the developing countries that the volume of international means of payment should be sufficient for their trade needs and for the financing of the development and modernization processes, new phenomena requiring a revision of the solutions imposed by the victors of the Second World War. That revision became even more necessary in view of the fact that such solutions called for excessive ties between the international means of payment and the currencies of highly industrialized countries and, in practice, adjusted the volume of such means to trade flow of the industrial societies.

212. The systematic reply to such requests was that measures for increasing international liquidity in order to respond to trade needs and the financing of developing countries would lead to world inflation and the disruption of the monetary system and would cause a deep crisis in the economy. Those were the reasons given by the industrial societies in opposing the wishes of the developing countries, and they only tolerated minor reforms which coincided with the requirements of their own economic growth.

213. All that developing countries can do now is watch with amazement as they see how inflation, used as a pretext for refusing the changes requested in the international monetary system, has made its appearance on the world scene on a scale unprecedented in history. And that inflation was due to the political, economic and monetary measures–prompted by domestic and foreign considerations–of the very same industrial nations, which took great pride in their cautious orthodoxy. The crumbling of the foundations of the monetary system created after the war was not the doing of the economic policies of the developing countries. Those countries did not unleash world inflation, reignite the devaluation wars used to secure trade advantages or start domestic inflationary processes of such magnitude that they have been exported to the furthest reaches of the world. Those who dug the grave of the Bretton Woods Agreements were not the developing countries, but precisely the Powers which drew up and imposed those Agreements, which refused to modify them for as long as they served their own interests, and which then ignored them when their mechanisms no longer gave them the advantages initially afforded them. And today, paradoxically, they strive to attribute the crisis in the world economy to the efforts of some developing countries to defend the price levels of their exports, as the oil-producing countries did.

214. This brings us to the problems that result from the need to seek–if the planned new international economic order is to have any meaning–the most efficient means of avoiding the perpetuation of trade situations belonging to a time when the world economy worked on the undisputed assumption that prices of commodities and food-stuffs

should be kept as low as possible while the prices of industrial goods should be free to increase constantly.

215. There would be more clarity and more progress along the road to the establishment of a new international economic order if the industrial societies and their populations were to understand in time that there are no reasons for subjecting the prices of commodities and food to a régime of permanent under-valuation; and that a new division of labour in the world is an imperative which requires that the markets of those affluent societies accept the goods produced by nations in the first stages of their industrialization, just as developed countries should devote their efforts to advanced-technology industries and the production of goods, equipment and services derived from their sophisticated technology.

216. Industrial societies would give proof of the political maturity expected of them because of their progress in other fields if they were prepared to live with the realities of the new era, typified by the disappearance of that resignation with which for centuries the majority of the planet's population bore the yoke of a trade system by virtue of which the prosperity of some was obtained at the expense of the "non-development of others"—to quote a French economist.

217. Unfortunately, the recent conduct of industrial societies with regard to trade is not very encouraging. Their trade laws, the use of restrictive practices such as tariffs and parataríffs, the poor results of the so-called United Nations Development Decades and of the North-South dialogue, and the delay in enforcing the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States all denote an insistence on maintaining the excessive advantages of the old international economic order.

218. It can hardly be though that a contribution is being made to co-operation between States when freedom of trade to expand markets for industrial goods is requested and simultaneously an anachronistic protectionism is applied again whenever commodities or manufactures of new industries in developing countries turn out to be competitive in the markets of affluent societies. It is indeed strangely contradictory to see the protectionist practices, historically devised for "infant industries" in the first stages of their modernization process, now being applied by countries at the summit of technological development against nations struggling laboriously in the initial stages of development. It is contradictory, because with this practice the balanced operation of the international economy is disrupted, as it is also by the restrictive practices and official and private boycotts the developed nations resort to when a situation of obvious scarcity in one commodity triggers a spasmodic increase in its price.

219. Understandably, then, it is trade between developed countries which has grown in recent years, while their trade flows with the developing world have suffered a gradual decrease. These centres of prosperity in the geographical areas where the affluent societies are located have monopolized the benefits of trade expansion, and their experts and economists have come to think that the world economy can function normally even when such expansion is held within the bounds of industrial societies. This gives an insight into their obvious preference for their own economic, financial and monetary alliances and their increasing lack of interest in any effort tending to enlarge their trade with the developing world. Apparently these experts assume that the magnitude of the flow of trade exclusively between highly industrialized societies is a sufficiently dynamic factor to maintain efficient and optimum activity in the world economy.

220. What the experience of history does tell us is that this optimistic assumption is very precarious. It is not new or typical of our age to believe that certain world trade patterns, because they favour one or more nations, can guarantee the smooth functioning of the international economy. In the past, such a claim resulted in deep crises when new nations appeared on the scene competing with traditional Powers in markets that did not expand, because they lacked any system to counteract the concentration of wealth in small areas of the planet.

221. In reality, we see the first signs of a similar situation. The frequency of recessions not followed, as was hoped, by genuine recoveries, the rebirth of protectionism among the major Powers as a tool to fight unemployment, and the low rates of economic activity, are all signs that we are nearing the end of the exceptional opportunities created by the ravages of the Second World War.

222. The reconstruction of the countries deeply affected by the conflict and the modernization of new nations have already created trade imbalances that point to the effects of unequal distribution of world demand. This casts doubt on the too-easily accepted hypothesis that mere expansion of trade between highly industrialized nations is an appropriate foundation for the operation of the world economy, and underlines the need for raising the levels of consumption of a major portion of the world's population kept, in the past as now, in a situation of scarcity and dangerous stagnation by a world market distorted by power mechanisms and monopolistic systems.

223. This is the true meaning of the desire to establish a new international order, all the more justified since it seeks not only to correct inequalities created by the impact of colonialism and the various forms of economic dependence but also to adjust the distribution of world demand to the enormous surge in the supply of goods and services from the gigantic production facilities of the present day, facilities which seem doomed to less and less use of their capacity if the traditional terms of trade are perpetuated.

224. When a structural—and not temporary—imbalance between supply and demand appears in a country, the remedy for it has generally been sought in reforms entailing a redistribution of income. The nations that have been most successful in their growth are those that have not allowed too great a concentration of income in small sectors of their population or territory.

225. I do not, of course, wish to say that the case of a national economy is completely similar to that of the international economy. However, we should be fully aware that today's alarming symptoms of a crisis, strikingly similar to those that preceded the great depressions, make it more than ever impossible to accept the wide gap now

separating the under-developed peoples from those islands of prosperity which shelter affluent societies, standing out solitary and arrogant in an ocean swept by the winds of poverty, backwardness and inequality that afflict the majority of the world's population.

226. This gap becomes even more alarming when new factors loom on the horizon which, if not treated with foresight and equity, will contribute to a serious disruption of coexistence between nations; for we are on the threshold of a critical era, when what is debated is more than the traditional way of distributing the resources known to humanity and used by it for thousands of years. Technology's spectacular progress and demographic pressures have given a sudden economic value to resources and elements in nature that were given scant attention in the past. Such is the case, for instance, with the sea and its wealth, and with the synchronous geostationary orbit that enables satellite communications to reach undreamed-of limits. If the great wealth of goods and resources, whose economic value has only recently begun to reveal itself, is left to the exclusive management of the nations in possession of the most advanced technologies, and if a circumstantial pre-eminence in the field of such technologies were used to claim a new title of ownership over critical resources on this earth, the antagonisms now eroding the coexistence mechanisms of the international community would become even deeper.

227. At a time when there is increasing tension between the democratic spirit of the international Organization and the vested interests of a group of nations which have had ample opportunity to enjoy the advantages acquired in the past, Colombia is confident that the countries entrusted with the maintenance of peace will not, by acts of omission or commission, allow such tension to reach critical limits. In the same way, Colombia trusts that these countries will not yield to the temptation of regarding as a victory or an act of wisdom the possible prolongation of the tottering reign of an economic order which is already posing serious problems to the very countries that derived the greatest benefits from it.

228. A historic example of how goodwill and genuine foresight can eliminate situations which have lost all justification in modern times is the recent settlement between the Governments of the United States of America and Panama concerning the Canal Zone. My country expressed here its most fervent wish that nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of the successful fulfilment of this settlement, for it is a model of the type of solution possible when the work is not influenced by the arrogance of power.

229. My country also wishes, at this session of the United Nations General Assembly, to stress its concern over the universal spread of inflation, a scourge which is causing serious social and economic upheavals in the world. Accordingly, the international community must give it priority consideration—the more so since the swift spread of its effects is showing us that the measures adopted individually by States are not sufficient to tackle a problem which is eroding the economic life of nations and the orderly functioning of the world economy.

230. That is why I feel it timely to suggest to this Assembly that it consider the possibility of convening—as proposed by the President of Colombia during a recent meeting of the Heads of State of the Andean Pact countries held in Washington on 8 September 1977—a world conference on inflation. That conference could discuss inflation's complex causes and the mechanisms which cause it to spread and also adopt adequate global strategies to fight a problem of universal magnitude, worsened by the recent phenomenon whereby contemporary inflation coincides with high rates of unemployment.

231. On behalf of my fellow citizens, I renew here my best wishes to the General Assembly in its efforts to make true progress in the patient and difficult enterprise of filling the gaps left by inequalities among peoples, which are now testing the authority of the international Organization by multiplying the sources of conflict between States, continents and the various geographical and economic areas of the planet.

232. Colombia also hails the entry into the world Organization of such nations as Viet Nam and Djibouti, which will surely contribute their will to work for peace, as well as the valuable experience they have acquired in the course of their unremitting struggle to achieve independence.

233. **Mr. HUQ (Bangladesh):** Sir, on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh and my delegation, it is both a pleasure and privilege for me to congratulate you most warmly on your election as President of this thirty-second General Assembly session. We can say with the utmost confidence that your eminent qualifications, your intimate knowledge of the work of this Organization and the many important services you have rendered on behalf of your country will contribute greatly to the success of our work. It gives us added pleasure that for the second year in succession a Member State of the non-aligned movement is at the helm of our affairs.

Mr. Kaufmann (Netherlands), Vice-President, took the Chair.

234. I should also like to express our deep appreciation to the President of the last session, Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, whose determined and energetic leadership was a major contribution to the successful conclusion of the thirty-first session.

235. I take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General, who in his second term continues his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community with vision, courage and infinite patience. He has successfully upheld the Charter principles of fairness, impartiality and dedication to the cause of peace and human dignity in the world. Bangladesh owes a particular debt of gratitude to him for his continuing sympathy, concern and positive interest in our affairs.

236. Bangladesh hails the admission of the Republic of Djibouti and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to membership in the United Nations as sovereign equals. We extend our fullest co-operation to the delegations of these friendly countries. We expect to work with them in the closest harmony.

237. With the accession of its one hundred forty-eighth and one hundred forty-ninth Members the United Nations

has taken another vital step towards the fulfilment of its goal to embrace all the nations of the world. The approach to universality underscores the dramatic changes that have taken place in the last 30 years since the inception of this Organization. The most striking aspect of change is reflected in the composition and character of contemporary international society: the number of sovereign States in the world has multiplied threefold. However, a vast segment of the world population still remains shackled by the bonds of colonial rule or suffers as victims of political repression.

238. The thirty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly is meeting under the shadow of a deepening political and economic crisis. The Middle East continues to remain an explosive area of tension. Unless the initiatives now under way to bring about a peaceful settlement are brought to an immediate and successful conclusion, that region may very well become the threatre of another all-consuming holocaust.

239. Bangladesh firmly believes that a just and durable peace can only be ensured by the withdrawal of all Israel's forces from the Arab territories it has occupied since June 1967, including the holy city of Jerusalem, and the restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including an independent State in Palestine. Towards this end Bangaldesh urges all parties concerned vigorously to renew efforts for the early convening of the Geneva Conference with the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

240. Bangladesh strongly condemns the continued attempts of Israel to entrench its occupation by colonizing that region through a chain of illegal settlements designed to changed the geographical and demographic composition of the occupied territories. Bangladesh reiterates its total support for the measures recommended by the recent extraordinary meetings held in New York of the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries *[see A/32/255-S/12410]* and of the Foreign Ministers of the States members of the Islamic Conference *[see A/32/261]* towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

241. The great continent of Africa is astir with the promise of total emancipation, but the southern part of it still continues to bleed under the repressive rule of racist minority régimes. Bangladesh fully supports the legitimate struggle of the African people in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa for freedom, liberty and human dignity and is convinced that their efforts are bound ultimately to triumph.

242. While we note the initiatives being taken on the one hand by the United Kingdom and the United States in Zimbabwe, and on the other hand by five members of the Security Council–the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States–in Namibia, Bangladesh believes that independence in these last remaining bastions of colonialism can and must be achieved without concessions to the principles already embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations.

243. Bangladesh welcomes the success of the two important world conferences in Africa this year: the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held in Maputo, and the Lagos World Conference for Action Against *Apartheid*. We firmly believe that the declarations and programmes of action adopted in these forums[17] provide the international community with a concrete framework of action that must be vigorously pursued.

244. Annually the international community records for posterity the dangers inherent in the failure to disarm. Yearly the disarmament debate echoes the refrain that failure to act is a hazardous folly–a madness. And yet, ironically enough, the only palliative is the recognition of the peril and the record of its danger and cost to mankind, with no significant advance being made to halt, control or reverse this process.

245. The record of progress in the disarmament negotiations is indeed pitiful in its content. Only seven treaties adopted by the United Nations General Assembly are in force. Regional and bilateral efforts, particularly by the super-Powers, have failed dismally to live up to even the minimum expectations. What is worse is that moves towards the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons have also been completely ignored, notwithstanding the fact that all armed conflicts since 1945 have been fought with conventional weapons.

246. As we have stated, the dimensions of the problem are well known, in all their staggering impact. What is needed is the will and determination for action to halt and reverse this inexorable drive to destruction and to enable a new international security system to achieve a world free from war. Bangladesh, therefore, attaches great importance to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and the formulation of a declaration and programme of action.

247. While the problems of nuclear disarmament and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons continue to be the predominant concerns, Bangladesh's particular interest will lie in the measures directed towards the protection of the interests of the non-nuclear countries, including security guarantees and measures towards the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, freedom and neutrality in South and South-East Asia and elsewhere. Of overriding priority is the relation between disarmament and development and the widespread concern to find practical and concrete ways to reduce military budgets and to transfer human and material resources to more productive ends, particularly in the cause of economic and social development.

248. Bangladesh has been making every possible effort for peace and stability in the subcontinent on the basis of mutual respect for sovereign equality, independence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We have striven to promote the process of accommodation along all avenues open to us. It is our firm belief that Bangladesh would be able materially to contribute towards building a

17 For the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, see document A/32/109/Rev.1–S/12344/Rev.1, annex V. For the Lagos Declaration for Action against *Apartheid*, see *Report of the World Conference for Action against* Apartheid (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XIV.2), chap. X.

structure of enduring and durable peace in South and South-East Asia.

249. Events in the subcontinent over the past year have once more focused international attention on our part of the world. A spirit of greater understanding and co-operation appears to be emerging throughout the region. We believe that this spirit must be fostered.

250. A series of bilateral meetings between Bangladesh and India on the sharing of the Ganges waters were held in pursuance of the consensus statement *[see decision 31/404]* adopted on 26 November 1976 at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am indeed happy to report that the last meeting held at the official level in New Delhi was concluded on 30 September 1977 with the initialling of an agreement. That successful outcome of highly complicated and protracted negotiations is pre-eminently due to the statesmanship shown by the leaders of the two countries. This agreement covers the sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka between Bangladesh and India for the period from 1 January to 31 May every year. The agreement also provides for study of long-term measures to augment the dry-season flow of the Ganges. It also includes provisions for machinery of implementation by a joint committee to be constituted by the representatives of the two countries. The agreement is for an initial period of five years. It may be extended by mutual agreement at the appropriate time. The agreement will be formally signed at a level and date to be mutually determined by the two Governments. With the initialling of the agreement, the first part of the task was accomplished and it is hoped that a permenent solution may be found through the optimum development of water resources of international rivers flowing through the territories of these countries for the welfare of the millions of people of the two nations. We believe that this agreement will serve as an important milestone in the efforts of the two countries to improve all their relations and to maintain peace and stability in the region. I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh, to convey our most sincere thanks to all of our friends who have contributed towards reaching this agreement.

251. Fruitful steps were recently taken by Bangladesh further to strengthen its relations with Pakistan. We look forward to increasing co-operation with Pakistan in all fields.

252. Bangladesh continues to strive to consolidate its ties with its neighbours and near neighbours, including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

253. We believe that Bangladesh, by virtue of its geographical location as well as its historical and cultural affinities with the people of South-East Asia, stands as a bridge between this region and the subcontinent. It is our intention to pursue every effort to strengthen our relations with our South-East Asian neighbours.

254. Bangladesh has consistently adhered to the principles of non-alignment as the corner-stone of its foreign policy. Bound by deeply rooted historical and cultural ties, Bangladesh has always expressed its sense of solidarity with the Islamic countries and has been persistent in its efforts to strengthen the fraternal relations existing between Bangladesh and those countries.

255. No review of the Asian region in international relations can be complete without reference to the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh strongly supports the initiatve regarding the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the major objective being to safeguard the peace and security of the countries of the region. We believe that, for the Declaration *[see resolution 3832 (XVII)]* to be effective and meaningful, it must be complemented by a commitment on the part of the regional States to the principles of universal collective security, without military alliances, under the umbrella of the United Nations Charter, including their renunciation of the threat or use of force, whether nuclear or conventional, against one another.

256. The international community has in recent years been grappling with two vital initiatives with regard to the progressive development and codification of international law. The deliberations in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea have now reached a crucial decision-making stage. As a coastal developing countries, Bangladesh has a large stake in the successful outcome of the Conference. Of particular importance to Bangladesh is its case pertaining to baselines and the delineation of maritime boundaries. The unique geographical and geomorphological circumstances that govern our coastline led us to submit a formulation covering what we believe constituted a legitimate exception within the universally acceptable norms. At the last session, in spite of overwhelming overt support and no opposition from any State to the inclusion of our proposal in the basic negotiating text before the Conference, our proposal was excluded. We continue to believe that the exclusion of our text, given the nature of the document—that of a negotiating instrument rather than one that had been negotiated—would be tantamount to leaving us isolated. The merit of our case lay in seeking the objective sanction of the Conference as a whole. We are firmly of the view that, for an adequate and proper consideration of the composite informal negotiating text, our formulation should also be taken into consideration at the forthcoming session of the Conference. We believe that a crucial motivation of the Conference must be to accord preferential treatment to the poorer and geographically disadvantaged nations as the logical consequence of the concept of the common heritage of mankind.

257. The United Nations Water Conference was to highlight the need for another major initiative in the sphere of international legal order for the progressive development and codification of the rules of international law regulating non-navigational uses of international watercourses, and particularly the development and use of shared water resources. Given the finite nature of water resources and the ever rising pressures on those resources, Bangladesh believes that the matter is one of paramount importance and urgency, for it raises questions that have an immense bearing on the economic well-being of vast numbers of people on this globe. We would urge the International Law Commission, already charged with the responsibility of pursuing the matter, to expedite the submission of an international convention.

258. As we review these crucial global developments, the position of Bangladesh and its contribution to the develop-

ment process is a matter of intense introspection for us and one that would be of some interest in the international community. Despite the difficulties inherent in the circumstances of its traumatic birth, Bangladesh continues not only to survive but also to grow in stability and strength, thus manifesting the political will of its people and the inner vitality of its society. It has succeeded in overcoming formidable problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Following a political and economic programme endorsed by the people through a nation-wide referendum, Bangladesh has launched far-reaching political, administrative and economic reforms. As a step towards the establishment of democratic institutions on the basis of universal adult suffrage at local and national levels, elections to 4,352 village union councils and 79 municipal councils have already been held, and elections to district councils and to the national parliament are scheduled to be held in December 1977 and 1978 respectively. The administrative and services structures have been reorganized with a view to making those services more efficient and more attuned to the national objectives of economic and social development. A three-year hard-core programme of development, to be completed by the end of the current year, is now being implemented; and a five-year plan, to be preceded by a two-year approach plan within the framework of a 20-year perspective plan, is being prepared.

259. The main thrust of our planned efforts in the economic sector is towards rural development around co-operatives, a rapid increase in food production, the stabilization of prices, population control and population development. About half the country has already been covered under the integrated rural development programme. As a result of increased agricultural production, the importation of foodgrains was reduced from 2.2 million tons in 1974/1975 to 800,000 tons in 1976/1977. Given favourable weather conditions and an adequate supply of inputs, Bangladesh, will, it is hoped, be able to raise its food production within the next few years to the point where it can become fully self-sufficient in food. The prices of essential commodities have also been lowered and the cost-of-living index, which had risen to 500 per cent in 1974, is currently down to 300 per cent, in 1969/1970 prices. A key development strategy is the decentralization of the planning machinery and the generation of self-reliant efforts on the part of the people through their direct participation in the formulation and implementation of the development plans at the local levels. Along with a vigorous family-planning programme, a nation-wide campaign has been mounted for the mobilization and harnessing of the country's vast human resources for productive efforts. The National Foundation for Research on Human Resources Development, headed by the President of Bangladesh, has been set up in the light of the decision of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries. We shall be happy to share our experience in this regard with our sister countries of the third world.

260. The experience of Bangladesh in the field of development indicates however, certain constraints inherent in global factors which call for closer co-operation among the nations of the world.

261. The international community is largely composed of States in a similar position to that of Bangladesh. The hopes and aspirations of those States represent the wishes of the great majority of the world's peoples. It is in those countries that the largest mass of humanity is concentrated and is confronted with the entire range of social and economic ills that characterize under-development.

262. It is here that the world's major political crises rage. Notwithstanding their combined weight, which has transformed the structure and voting pattern of the United Nations, those countries yet remain outside the plane of true decision-making. Their role and integration in this process constitute the most important potential for peace and prosperity in the world.

263. Faced with the series of global problems that now confront the international community, no nation, however rich or powerful, can remain immune, nor can any nation hope to resolve them without the co-operation of all. While modern communications and the advances of science and technology have led us to a common perception of our unity and shared dependence, they have also highlighted the dangers of divisiveness. Differences in military and economic strength are hard realities. While the classic relationship of domination of the many by the few—the so-called vertical polarization—has been somewhat eroded, in its place has emerged the equally disturbing phenomenon of unequal relations among States and the threat to their economic and political sovereignty emanating not only from the big Powers but also from medium-sized and small Powers.

264. If there is any theme that emerges from the foregoing brief analysis, it is the recognition of the basic amalgam between national and international interests, sometimes conflicting, but essentially coinciding. Bangladesh firmly believes that the cardinal function and indeed justification of the United Nations lies in its search for the preservation of the delicate balance between nationalism and international responsibility. The motive force of the Organization—the very essence of its community—lies in the need to protect the weak from the strong through the manifestation of collective responsibility and the strengthening of collective capacity to deal with the problems that face all of our nations. It is towards this end that we must strive.

265. In assessing the work of this Organization we are conscious of its limitations. The Secretary-General himself acknowledged in his report on the work of the Organization that "a miraculous and sudden transformation to a new and better world order is inconceivable" *[A/32/1, sect. I]*. But it is our task to seize the initiatives taken and to build, brick by brick, an edifice that will substantially contribute to the long-term interests of all States.

266. We believe that the foundation already exists; that Governments, including the major Powers, do consciously recognize the value of the United Nations as a vital mechanism for strengthening their relationships and fostering their short-term goals. For countries such as ours, powerless in isolation, the United Nations certainly provides, through cohesion and a shared awareness of problems, a greater strength. It does provide a safety-valve to release gathering tensions when bilateral efforts fail to achieve their objectives.

267. What, then, are the priorities for the future? First, Bangladesh believes that a cardinal imperative is to ensure that sovereignty and genuine freedom of action are not compromised by external interference from any source whatsoever. Secondly, it is our combined task to pursue the unfinished revolution facing the great majority of people, so that the peoples of the developing countries may emerge from bondage into freedom, from exploitation into economic emancipation, and from dependence into self-reliance. Thirdly, it is a vital task to seek the integration of all nations into the decision-making process. No society whether national or international, can fail to ignore even its weakest link without affecting its cohesion. Fourthly, it is our task to seek consolidation of our unity and mutual co-operation, not by a mere affirmation of principles alone, by by meaningful and practical programmes of action and the will to translate them into reality. Finally, it is our task so to use our combined national power as to create and not to destroy, to enter into dialogue rather than confrontation, to built peace and abjure war, to advance human welfare instead of aggravating human suffering.

268. These are the basic elements that, in our opinion, constitute the keystone of the new international political and economic order.

269. As we stand today poised on the threshold of a new decade, we are conscious of the crucial economic stake in the quest for political stability and ordered prosperity in our world. This has placed before us the choice of achieving either unified and balanced progress of all mankind with human dignity, or a world torn by ever-widening social and economic inequalities.

270. The experience of the International Development Strategy of each of the last two decades, while strengthening the ability of the world to identify and recognize problems, also revealed that those Strategies had no real answers to the problems of mass poverty and mass unemployment which face most of our countries in the third world. *Ad hoc* solutions and basically short-term and patch-work remedies were essentially directed to preserve a system which itself was at fault and which tended to perpetuate the inequities of the existing order. The call, therefore, was made for a total restructuring of world economic relationships through a new and just international economic order.

271. Thus, in the last few years, through successive sessions of the General Assembly, through the fourth session of UNCTAD, the Conference on International Economic Co-operation in Paris and other forums, the international community has sought to spell out the pattern of this vital new design. An approach to a global perspective plan should provide greater equity through improved terms of trade, a better quality and greater flow of aid on softer terms, easier access to markets, the sharing of technological know-how and benefits, improved monetary facilities, the easing of indebtedness and a whole range of related issues. Despite the efforts at the various forums and the vital stakes involved, progress towards these ends has been extremely disappointing.

272. One of the chief causes of the resistance to these efforts appears to be the unexpressed fear lurking in the minds of the industrially developed nations that any change in the existing world economic structure, however equitable and rational it may appear to be, would hurt their life-style. The fact, however, remains that if the vast human and other resources of the developing countries can be harnessed into productive use, with a resulting increase in the production of goods and services at a lower cost, that would be to the benefit of the entire world community, and that is the only way to stem the rising tide of inflation, which continues to plague their economies.

273. Some of the glaring absurdities inherent in the existing economic system are underscored by the following facts.

274. First, the developing world, representing 70 per cent of the world's population, commands only 30 per cent of total world resources.

275. Secondly, the share of the third world, with a population of more than 2 billion, in the production of manufactured goods is only 7 per cent.

276. Thirdly, the combined share of all the countries of the third world in total international trade is under 18 per cent.

277. Fourthly, while final consumers in the industrial countries pay over $200 billion for the major primary products of the developing countries, excluding oil, the developing countries receive back only $30 billion of that $200 billion.

278. Fifthly, the total external indebtedness of the developing countries has already exceeded $250 billion and their balance-of-payments deficit is about $30 billion.

279. As a result, the developing countries have been inexorably led to export more, and this has had a deleterious effect on the quality of life of the people of these countries. Such a position is totally untenable when the annual expenditure on armaments has already exceeded $300 billion.

280. In renewing our commitment to pursue the establishment of the new international economic order, Bangladesh believes that there is also a need for continuing introspection and an in-depth evaluation of past performance and a better perception of the conceptual framework in which the new order would evolve.

281. What was essentially lacking was specific action concerning the attack on poverty, the system of production, the distribution of income and wealth, and the socio-economic structures. Among the more significant lessons learned from experience, to which virtually no attention had been paid in the past, was the demonstrated futility of plan models in which the crucial role of a motivated, creative and innovative people as the main driving force in development was completely overlooked. The conversion of this human resources into viable human capital for national development has assumed such urgency that it requires priority attention.

282. Bangladesh believes that, among the essential elements that need to be mapped out in any future perspective

plan for the evolution of the new international order, specific attention must be devoted to the following: first, eradicating poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy and assigning the highest priority to this task for concerted action by the international community; secondly, harnessing the vast human resources for productive use, thus generating more employment and more production of goods and services to be shared by the world community and therefore enriching the quality of life of the people globally; thirdly, strengthening the capacity of developing countries for individual and collective self-reliance through increased co-operation in economic and other fields, the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, to be held in Buenos Aires next August, being of special relevance to this objective; fourthly, radically transforming socio-economic structures, with particular stress on agrarian and rural development, the distribution of wealth and the means of production, greater decentralization at the grass-roots level to ensure the democratization of the political and economic decision-making process, and the promotion of self-management and local leadership; fifthly, focusing on the role and status of women and ensuring their full participation in national development and the decision-making process; sixthly, redefining international policy governing the transfer of financial resources, with particular attention to the needs of the least developed and most seriously affected developing countries and, in this regard, matters that require an exploration of the flow of the resources to be generated are the exploitation of the resources of the sea bed and those to be released through possible disarmament and the long-standing demand of the developing countries for an organic link between special drawing rights and development finance; seventhly, liberalizing trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and meeting the mounting problem of the third world's accumulated debt, including rescheduling of existing debt liabilities and tying debt repayment to real resource transfers, and the conversion of the outstanding debts of the least developed countries into outright grants; eighthly, increasing the availability of and access to food-stuffs through appropriate structural transformation and technological innovation, with the realization that, while the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development has been a remarkable achievement, other mechanisms, particularly the early establishment of a decentralized system of essential food reserves, should be expeditiously fostered; ninthly, ensuring that people affected by natural disasters are always afforded adequate supplies to meet their basic needs, and in this regard, the institutional strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and the possibility of an international disaster relief agency should be seriously explored; tenthly, adapting science and technology in order to promote the cause of development in the third world according to the indigenous requirements of the developing countries and, in this regard, the preparations for and the results of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development will have particular relevance in mapping out a future strategy in this regard; eleventhly, enhancing international co-operation in the field of energy resources and here Bangladesh strongly supports the idea mooted by the Secretary-General regarding the establishment of an energy institute and believes that this should be pursued urgently; finally, paying adequate attention to the economic content of human rights, which has not received equal treatment with the political content, because for the vast majority of people living below the poverty line human rights can be meaningful only when they are assured of their basic economic rights, namely, the right to food, shelter, clothing and education.

283. These are the 12 elements which we believe constitute an essential foundation for the planning of the next development strategy in what we believe must be the decade of equity.

284. Mr. MARTINEZ (El Salvador) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I should like to associate myself and my Government with all those who at this rostrum have congratulated Mr. Mojsov on his election to the presidency of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. That unanimous election constitutes not only a fitting tribute to his great qualities as statesman, jurist and diplomat but also a well-deserved recognition of his country, Yugoslavia, which has succeeded in preserving its independence with dignity in a world in which it is so difficult to escape the influence and domination of extremely powerful and frequently insuperable political and economic forces.

285. It is a pleasure for me to welcome the delegations of Djibouti and Viet Nam, new Members of the United Nations, and to wish them success in their mission and growing prosperity in their countries, which have been welcomed to this great family of nations.

286. The regular session of the General Assembly is particularly overburdened with work, having an agenda which includes more than 125 items. It is true that among these there are, naturally, some which are more or less routine and many others which are not new but have, rather, come to us from previous sessions. These circumstances, however, in no way detract from the significance of the large number of items to be considered.

287. Every year the General Assembly studies numerous reports and various suggestions and proposals on subjects that have repeatedly been considered in previous years. This proves not only the complexity and importance of the subjects but also the great diversity in trends, aspirations, interests and opinions which divide men and peoples and characterize their complexity. Therefore we can in no way attribute to a deficiency in the Organization or to inefficacy on its part the fact that certain items remain for ever on the agenda of the Assembly.

288. Since this is the first time the new Government of El Salvador, which came into office just three months ago, has come before the General Assembly through my representation, I should like to refer, though not at great length, to some of the items we are most interested in or which affect us most closely among the many included on the agenda.

289. To the efforts to attain disarmament, denuclearization, the strengthening of international security, decolonization and so many other noble objectives pursued in this Organization to benefit mankind, we should always add a constant persevering and indefatigable struggle to further the over-all development of peoples, to improve the lot of

the neediest and to eradicate or reduce hunger, ignorance, crime, disease, unhappiness, pain and grief in all their manifestations. All nations–large and small, rich and poor, weak and powerful, developed and developing–must participate in that over-all struggle because it is of benefit to all to ensure the well-being of future generations everywhere in the world, and that can be attained only through general and balanced development which would eliminate the deep differences existing at present and make possible a truly human life for all and not just for a few. His Holiness Pope John XXIII rightly said that the development of peoples was the new name of peace.

290. My delegation regrets that, for reasons which we all know, when we resumed the work of the thirty-first regular session of the General Assembly in mid-September to consider the items left pending last year, namely, development and international economic co-operation, and the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Assembly at its seventh special session–at which time the results of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation recently concluded in Paris should have been analysed–it was not possible to achieve the desired consensus. Since new efforts in that regard will be undertaken at this session, we hope that this time the necessary consensus will be achieved.

291. It would be extremely discouraging if developing countries were ultimately to fail in their efforts to establish and consolidate a new international economic order. That would be tantamount to taking a step backwards from the position of the seventh special session, at which, fortunately, there was a frank spirit of conciliation between the industrialized nations and the developing world which opened up broad prospects for co-operation and understanding, thus keeping alive the hopes of more than two thirds of the population of the world. It is generally recognized that a new international economic order more equitable and just than the one that has prevailed heretofore will favour all those sectors equally.

292. In this connexion I wish to emphasize the importance of the Declaration adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 at their meeting on 29 September last here at United Nations Headquarters *[see A/32/244]* and to highlight, in particular, the concepts expressed by my colleague the Foreign Minister of Uruguay in his brilliant presentation at that time, when he spoke for the Latin American group of States.

293. El Salvador participated and will continue to participate very actively in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The work of the Conference on such important matters as the evolution and codification of this new field of law is of capital importance for the economic development of all the peoples of the world. The body to be established to exploit the sea-bed for the benefit of all must have the necessary powers duly to safeguard the interests of the international community. These and other aspects of the subject must be considered at the forthcoming meetings of the Conference in Geneva on the basis of the composite informal negotiating text,[18] and it is to be expected that at that time we shall overcome the obstacles which have heretofore impeded conclusion of such an important instrument as that on the law of the sea. That instrument appears even more necessary when we consider that delay in signing and implementing it could give rise to unilateral action by maritime Powers which could be detrimental to the interests of other nations.

294. Scattered throughout the agenda of the present session there are items on two problems that are different but are nevertheless interrelated in certain respects. I refer to human rights and international terrorism.

295. My Government is a firm supporter of the exercise and protection of human rights, which are broadly guaranteed in our political Constitution.

296. In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations documents on specific matters, two new instruments have come into force–the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

297. Thus, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which enshrines in the United Nations the principle of non-interference, the subject of human rights, while continuing to fall within the purview of the internal law of States, has been included in the field of international law. This is shown by the existence of declarations of rights, of the covenants I have just mentioned, and of the American Convention on Human Rights, signed in San José on 22 November 1969, which we hope will enter into force soon. States have freely committed themselves to promote, guarantee and respect human rights, and under international public law that commitment is not only of a moral nature; it is unquestionably legally binding.

298. Under the present United Nations system, as well as at the inter-American level, it is incumbent upon the various commissions on human rights to act in cases of violation of human rights. No State may or should bypass those commissions and itself investigate the situation with regard to human rights in another State. There is no doubt that that would be tantamount to intervention, and, although it might be done for humanitarian reasons, it would none the less be intolerable. Furthermore, that attitude may, obviously, be construed as unfriendly and therefore prejudicial to good relations between friendly countries.

299. El Salvador agrees with the idea that the United Nations should have a High Commissioner for Human Rights. That idea that has been under consideration since the French professor René Cassin, whose memory we praise, several years ago suggested the creation of the post of Solicitor-General of the United Nations for Human Rights. No doubt the establishment of the post of High Commissioner would be a positive step in this regard.

300. My country has always been against all forms of discrimination and will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to eliminate the abnormal practices which still persist in some parts of the world and which are prejudicial to man's dignity and therefore a flagrant violation of human rights.

18 See *Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea*, vol. VIII (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.V.4), documents A/CONF.62/WP.10 and Add.1.

301. International terrorism, that terrible scourge which affects many peoples in the world, including peoples of Latin America, and which is spurred on by foreign governments, should be rejected and condemned by all; and it is of concern in the United Nations, since in 1972 the Secretary-General proposed the item for the consideration of this Assembly.[19]

302. In recent years terrorist crimes have occurred frequently in El Salvador, especially kidnappings, extortion and the murder of important and progressive persons useful to the country.

303. My Government, aware of the difficulties encountered in the struggle against this type of common crime, terrorism, will be pleased to co-operate with any efforts which this General Assembly or other United Nations bodies may undertake in order, if not to eliminate, which seems impossible, at least to reduce acts of terrorism and their abhorrent consequences.

304. In the internal struggle against this evil of our times, Governments usually find themselves having to suspend constitutional guarantees in order to maintain public order and to safeguard the institutions of the State. The exercise of this power within reasonable limits cannot, and should not, be interpreted in the international field as being a violation of human rights, since the aim is rather to defend society and individual persons from the danger of terrorist criminals, whether active or potential.

305. The work of decolonization, which has been launched and developed successfully by this Organization for several years, remains among the main items in the agenda of the General Assembly. My delegation will support every initiative to favour the aspirations of peoples wishing to attain their independence, as also the aspirations of those who defend their territorial integrity, such as the cases of Guatemala and Argentina with regard to Belize and the Islas Malvinas, respectively.

306. With regard to Belize, El Salvador, which observed with extreme concern the tension which arose a few months ago in the Central American region, now views with satisfaction the talks between the Guatemalan and British Governments, which offer favourable prospects for a negotiated settlement that will harmonize the aspirations of Guatemala with the interests of the people of Belize.

307. Latin American countries joyously welcome the results of the negotiations carried out for over 13 years between the Governments of Panama and the United States of America on the question of the Panama Canal. President Carter and his immediate predecessors have undoubtedly made laudable efforts to try to give reasonable and just satisfaction to the aspirations of the Panamanian people, which were advocated nobly by its Government. It only remains for the two treaties signed in Washington on 7 September last, which were to replace the original instrument signed in 1903, to enter into force, after the Panamanian people adopts them in a plebiscite and the United States Senate has consented to them as provided for in its Constitution.

308. The Government of El Salvador trusts that the conciliatory efforts made by the United Nations may in the near future, if not bring about a total elimination of the tensions due to the situations in the Middle East and in Cyprus, at least reduce them considerably and, in any case, prevent a worsening of the situation that might lead to new armed conflicts which could obviously endanger the peace and security of all nations.

309. The prospects for the convening of a conference on the question of the Middle East soon, and, above all, the attitude adopted by the Government of Israel in recent weeks, indicate that negotiations may lead to a positive result. A recognition of the existence of Israel by the Arab States, and the just fulfilment of the aspirations of the latter, and in particular of the Palestinian people, would certainly be the pillars of a lasting peace in that area.

310. With regard to Cyprus we also hope that conflicting interests may be reconciled, thus ensuring a peaceful life for all of the population of Cyprus.

311. It is frequently said that today's world is undergoing a period of transition; that the problems it faces are so serious and complex that it remains at the cross-roads; that this is the most critical, the crucial moment in its existence, and so on and so forth. This is repeated year after year from this rostrum and, therefore, we are used to hearing these words, and we almost do not realize that in fact something serious and irreparable could befall mankind. What is true is that events may occur which could lead to a better life for human beings inhabiting this planet, or which, on the contrary, could result in a world disaster or a series of cataclysms which would engulf us in desperation and suffering.

312. This Organization, the United Nations, has the virtue for the world of generating and strengthening the necessary hope and faith in God which is the only thing which can give us peace of mind.

Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) resumed the Chair.

313. Mr. CHARLES (Haiti) *(interpretation from French)*: Mr. President, I have the honour on behalf of the Haitian delegation to offer you my cordial congratulations on your election to the presidency of this Assembly. This choice is bound to lend a special dynamism to the work of the thirty-second session, at which our Organization will face urgent and important problems. My delegation assures you of the same co-operation which it gave your eminent predecessor, whom we salute respectfully on the occasion of his departure.

314. We offer the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, both our tribute and our congratulations for his indefatigable efforts on behalf of the cause of the United Nations.

315. The Haitian delegation is pleased to welcome the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam which has, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, succeeded in recovering its unity and its sovereignty.

316. We are also pleased that our sister Republic of Djibouti has succeeded in achieving its independence, and

19 See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 92, documents A/8791 and Add.1.

we are convinced that it will know an era of peace and prosperity marked by the unity of all its children.

317. Among the issues before this session of the General Assembly, that of human rights is of particular importance for my delegation. Our interest in this question stems from the fact that my country was born out of its claims and struggles for human rights. Therefore, no lesson whatsoever on any matter that could help to promoting human dignity can be foreign to us. Our history, like that of other peoples, has known vicissitudes which have sometimes forced us to take exceptional measures to respond to equally exceptional situations. Nevertheless, we have never stopped believing in the permanent place of human rights in the lives of nations. Very few States can declare that they have not at any time in their history experienced difficult moments which have forced them to suspend some articles of their basic Constitutions, which have been restored as soon as the crisis which made necessary the temporary suspension of these constitutional safeguards was ended.

318. Our country has entered a new phase of its existence. The people of Haiti have understood that the unity and the mobilization of all the country's vital energies are essential if it is to cope successfully with the ever more urgent problems facing the nation. Therefore, the Haitian Government, under the wise leadership of its President-for-Life, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Claude Duvalier, concerned with facilitating national reconciliation, has felt that certain measures aimed at ensuring the maintenance of Haiti's peace and national integrity were no longer necessary. Thus the decision has been taken to normalize the conditions of our daily life.

319. Today, we can affirm that we do not have a single political prisoner in our prisons. We have appealed to the patriotism of our former adversaries to join with us in the great war to be waged against hunger, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, and so on, within the framework of our laws and that of human rights.

320. A series of measures have been taken and the Haitian Government has, *inter alia*, just acceded to the American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José, Costa Rica, and plans to invite the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS to visit Haiti on a date convenient to it so that it may take note on the spot of the positive developments in the situation which have taken place in the political, economic and social sectors. Among other things, the Legislative Chamber of Haiti, on the proposal of the Executive Branch, has just passed a law establishing a Tribunal of State Security where, in accordance with our Constitution, civilians accused of crimes against the security of the State will be judged by civilians. All these are actions which demonstrate my Government's clear desire to promote the cause of human rights.

321. One of the most important events of this year for us in Latin America remains the solution of the Panama Canal problem.

322. The entire Haitian people celebrated the signing of agreements between the United States and the Republic of Panama which confer a new status upon the Canal. We are all the more pleased at this event since at one moment in our history, the building of the Canal had repercussions in Haiti. Indeed, it contributed to a very great extent to the American occupation of Haiti in the name of the need to defend that important line of communication. We join with the people of Panama in welcoming the results of the negotiations which have led to the changes made in the previous Treaty.

323. We should like to believe that the conclusion of the new treaty will usher in a new stage in the relations between Latin America and the United States, a stage which seems to lay the basis of a new approach in their foreign policies.

324. All of us in the Americas feel that this fact marks the end of a system which long held sway—even for too long—and which delayed the development of more harmonious relations between our nations and their powerful northern neighbour.

325. The Republic of Haiti is deeply disturbed by the course of events which in southern Africa, in the Middle East and Cyprus are endangering world peace, closely linked as it is to improved living conditions for the peoples of the third world.

326. The Haitian Government remains deeply concerned at the explosive situation prevailing in Namibia and in Zimbabwe. It fully endorses the Maputo Declaration because of the support which this document gives these peoples and reaffirms its solidarity and backing for the struggle being waged by the liberation movements. We are following with sustained interest the Anglo-American initiatives and the Security Council debates aimed at finding an early solution to the conflict affecting that part of the world. We feel that everything possible must be done to ensure the full success of these steps. However, if these should fail, the Security Council and, with it, the entire international community will have to be prepared to face their responsibilities, using all the means available to them under the United Nations Charter to restore to the African peoples, those victims of so many injustices, the full range of their rights to equality, dignity and happiness.

327. In the meantime, the valiant freedom fighters will ensure and must ensure that their vigilance shall never be found lacking. We believe that in the final analysis it is they who will have to resolve the dispute through the force of their arms. We are convinced that the international community will continue to furnish them the material, moral and political assistance which will permit them to attain their final goal.

328. My Government is also disturbed by the situation of our brothers in South Africa who in their own country are living in a situation bordering on slavery. The human tragedy of *apartheid* has been condemned by all men of goodwill. We condemn any form of discrimination based upon race, religion or nationality. We support unreservedly the Lagos Declaration on *Apartheid* and we should like to express the hope that the programme of action recommended therein will be strictly observed by all members of the international community. This will make it possible for us in the not-too-distant future to welcome here a genuine South African delegation which will represent the majority of the population.

329. The Haitian delegation welcomes the Soviet-American statement on the Middle East issued on 1 October and hopes for the prompt convening of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. We congratulate the Governments of those two States Members of the United Nations for the spirit of understanding and co-operation which they have just shown in accordance with their responsibility as permanent members of the Security Council, the main mission of which is to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. This sense of duty which they have shown cannot but contribute to restoring the prestige of the Council and at the same time it will make it possible for us to perceive the dawn of an era of lasting peace in that region, the peoples of which have too often been victims of the scourge of war.

330. In this regard, we think on the one hand that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), although subject to different interpretations, offer the best framework for negotiations and, on the other hand, that all parties concerned must be represented. Otherwise, we risk not achieving a generally accepted agreement. In the meantime, the parties to the conflict should attempt to refrain from any action which might impede the negotiating process.

331. It is crucial that peace return to this part of the world and we believe that the parties to the dispute will be the first to benefit from this.

332. Regarding the Republic of Cyprus, we deplore the fact that a formula for reconciliation has so far not been found by the parties to the conflict which would make it possible for them to unite above and beyond all conceivable differences in a larger community: their motherland. The United Nations will have to ensure that new initiatives be taken to resume the negotiations. For our part we shall support all solutions adopted by the parties themselves, without any outside pressure.

333. My delegation would like to stress that its position on the question of Cyprus does not constitute derogation from either the principle of self-determination or from that of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of States. These principles constitute the corner-stone of the foreign policy of the Haitian Government. We consider Cyprus to be a special case which recalls in many respects the situation of the island of Haiti, which we share with the Dominican Republic. We remain firmly devoted to the principle of self-determination and the right of all peoples to national independence. Any attempt on the part of certain States, whether or not they are former colonies, to recolonize young newly independent States or those soon to become independent, will not be endorsed by the Republic of Haiti.

334. My delegation is also pleased with the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-second session of an item on the non-use of force in international relations *[item 37]* and it intends to work in the coming days in close co-operation with the other interested delegations in order to achieve the framing of a draft convention on that subject. We see no reason not to endorse such steps, because actually we ourselves, we Haitians, have no force to which we could conceivably resort, apart from the fierce will of our people to resist aggression wherever it may come from. With the formal acceptance of such a principle through a convention, the need for the arms race, which is swallowing up so much of the resources that could be used for humanitarian purposes, will disappear.

335. In regard to the question of the law of the sea, my delegation deeply regrets the absence of real progress in the negotiations and it reaffirms its devotion to the principle of the common heritage of mankind. It urges the industrialized countries to demonstrate, at the next session, more understanding and a greater desire for co-operation, so that a treaty may be arrived at without undue delay.

336. On the national level, my Government, exercising its full sovereignty, opened in Port-au-Prince, in the period from 10 to 14 August 1977, the first phase of the negotiations between the Republic of Cuba and Haiti on the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone of the two States. At the end of this month the representatives of the two Governments are to meet in Havana to finalize the agreement in this regard.

337. After more than three decades of ceaseless debate of the question of the economic development of the third world countries, the United Nations will have no trouble in summing up what has been accomplished because, despite the proliferation of organizations, negotiations and international arrangements, the problems of the underdeveloped countries still demand, even more urgently, the attention and concerted action of the industrialized world.

338. These problems remain with us in all their gravity, and their solutions seem to depend much more on the high degree of understanding and global dialogue ushered in by the new international order than on the national policies of governments formulated and carried out in isolation.

339. Therefore the Haitian Government wishes to express its regret that the last Conference on International Economic Co-operation did not lead to the structural changes required by the international economic system and did not offer certain immediate solutions to pressing problems confronting the third-world countries.

340. So far it has not been possible to find any acceptable solution to the problem of the fluctuation of commodity prices, which affects the development process. Generally speaking, attempts made to improve the position of the countries producing raw materials and to provide them with outlets on the world market have been quickly neutralized by the consumer countries.

341. As far as the commodity prices are concerned, they have recently risen sharply. Unfortunately, not all the developing countries benefit from this to the same degree. Some of them, including my own country, are in a situation where this price increase in commodities means merely an increase in the prices of manufactured products, whether consumer products or capital goods. The producers have quickly passed on the increases to the consumers. As a result the developing countries with very few commodities to export or engaged in the export of products the foreign market demand for which is weak, find their trade deficits increased. For those countries that are near bankruptcy as

an immediate consequence of this increase, it means that appropriate measures should be taken immediately to make it possible for them not only to reduce the immense deficit they face now in their balance of payments but also to diversify and expand the bases of their economies, in order to facilitate the growth of their exports and make them more competitive on the world market. They would thus be able to obtain the currency they badly need for financing their development plans. Only in this way will they be able to break out of the vicious circle of chronic underdevelopment and for the first time to enjoy an even relative degree of economic independence. This assistance, whatever form it may take, will be acceptable provided that it is not accompanied by conditions prejudicial to the integrity and political sovereignty of the States concerned.

342. The increase in commodity prices is not the only factor responsible for the exorbitant prices of manufactured goods. Mention has been made of the cost of the processing of raw materials into semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, without stressing the present inflationary wage policy. It is high time the developed countries recognized that in the present situation it is no longer possible for poor countries to continue to subsidize the standard of living of the populations of the rich countries. One way of obviating this difficulty would be to encourage local processing of raw materials, as this would be of considerable help in overcoming or at least reducing the effects of paralysing endemic unemployment.

343. Another factor which also has an impact on the increase in the prices of manufactured products is the high cost of shipping. Here, too, the industrialized countries enjoy a *de facto* monopoly which makes it possible for them from one day to the next to increase the already exaggerated prices in this area of maritime transport.

344. Not only are these prices arbitrary, they are very often discriminatory. The specious pretext of the profitability of certain routes as compared with others makes it possible for them to impose lower prices on routes between industrialized countries and higher ones on routes linking industrialized and developing countries, with very little importance attached to the factor of distance. This is a truly unjust situation which must be remedied.

345. The increase in petroleum prices has disrupted national economies to such an extent that it deserves to be considered separately. Its consequences on the Haitian economy have been immediate and particularly trying. Last year Haiti paid approximately $16 million more for the same quantity of petroleum as it bought the previous year. This is equivalent to half the total of foreign aid it received during that same year. Faced with this situation and to avoid general stagnation, the Haitian Government took prompt measures to reduce the tax on petroleum imports, thus helping out the consumers and particularly the low income groups most affected. This action by the Haitian Government, although it reflects the determination of the Government to maintain the standard of living of its population, will cost our treasury a great part of the income which could have been used to finance investments in the public sector. That situation continues to demand great sacrifices of my country. We have accepted them willingly, because we feel that the claims of those third-world oil-producing countries are just. In return, we hope that those countries will be able, as rapidly as possible, to develop a plan for aid to the developing countries, giving priority to those whose need is greatest.

346. By the same token, it would be well for the countries having a surplus of capital to give investment preference to the developing countries. That would enable them, first, to contribute to the rapid raising of the living standards of the populations of those countries by reducing unemployment rates; secondly, not to participate in the total deterioration of the environment seen in the developed countries, which are already victims of over-industrialization; and, thirdly, to demonstrate their solidarity with their less fortunate brothers of the third world.

347. As if the picture were not sufficiently gloomy, an acute food crisis is currently being felt in various areas of the world. This is largely the result of adverse climatic conditions affecting the environment. While some of those countries will be able, as these conditions change, to regain their former productivity, others, such as the Sahelian countries, which have been so gravely affected, run the risk of reaching the point of no return unless the international community, FAO, WHO and non-governmental institutions speedily grant them the necessary aid and assistance.

348. Finally, in other countries where traditional, archaic production methods have remained the same, the earth is unable to feed an ever-growing population. Hence it has become necessary for rich lands to be cultivated more intensively and for poor areas not yet cultivated to be exploited through the application of modern agricultural techniques. Developed as well as developing countries, in co-operation with FAO and the International Development Association, will have to create the necessary conditions for the development of that land.

349. For its part, the Haitian Government has embarked on a vast programme of agricultural expansion providing for the intensive utilization of fertilizers, the more extensive use of agricultural machinery and the irrigation of thousands of hectares of unirrigated land.

350. In any case, we feel that the problem of the shortage of agricultural products on a world scale cannot and will not be solved without the establishment of an international plan for production and consumption with the participation of FAO.

351. One factor that could undermine the results of an international agricultural policy is the world population growth, which will have to be controlled by a strict national population policy, with the assistance of the international agencies concerned.

352. Two of the most urgent problems confronting the world economy, which have had particularly disastrous effects upon the economies of the developing countries, are monetary instability and inflation. The system of floating currencies in which the developing countries keep their reserves has been a harmful one, because of the uncertainty it creates in international trade and in the over-all development plans of developing countries. There can no longer by any doubt that the present monetary system has been

unable to meet the expectations of the developing countries. The increased volume of world trade which it was aimed at promoting has benefited only the developed countries.

353. IMF must be reconstituted by according greater participation to the developing countries at the decision-making level. Finally, it is important that measures be taken to guarantee international monetary stability. This stability, I must say, will not be sufficient to redress the trade balance between rich and poor countries. That will be achieved only by reviewing the entire system of international trade relations, and eliminating protective measures, such as prohibitive taxes, quota and preference systems, and so forth.

354. We are far from believing that these goals which we have outlined here are easy to attain. To assume so would be to underestimate the scope of the task. We know that it is a tremendous one. However, it is not beyond our capabilities; it merely calls upon all our physical, intellectual, moral and economic resources.

355. In conclusion, the Haitian Government would reaffirm its loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and its trust in the reason and wisdom of the representatives here assembled. We are convinced that with their goodwill these problems which at first sight seem insoluble will gradually be solved to the satisfaction of all mankind.

356. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives wishing to exercise their right of reply. As representatives will recall, the General Assembly has decided that statements in exercise of the right of reply shall be limited to 10 minutes, and I am sure that representatives will co-operate in complying with that limitation.

357. Mr. MOLINA-ORANTES (Guatemala) *(interpretation from Spanish):* At the end of yesterday afternoon's meeting the representative of the Cuban Government used offensive, slanderous language when referring to the Government of Guatemala in connexion with my Government's claim against the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Territory of Belize, which is occupied by that great Power.

358. The Cuban representative stated that the Territory of Belize had not acceded to independence because:

> "... the reactionary dictatorship which oppresses Guatemala is prepared to annex it by force as soon as the Administering Authority withdraws." *[19th meeting, para. 268.]*

And the Cuban representative continued, in scurrilous language, with his impertinent and false accusations against my country, with the veiled threat that Cuba backs the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize.

359. I should like the Cuban representative to know that we are not intimidated by his veiled threats, even though still fresh in our memory is the world-wide indignation over the flagrant interventions in Africa, and in various countries of Latin America and other parts of the world to which there has been an attempted exportation of the Cuban revolution.

360. In calling the Government of my country a dictatorship the Cuban representative seems to ignore the fact that in the last 20 years Guatemala has seen a succession of seven Governments of varying political credos freely elected by the people; that there are in our system of government an executive branch, a legislative branch and a judicial branch, fully independent one from the other, and these branches guarantee the exercise of democracy and the transfer of power. He forgets that freedom of expression, as well as competition among political parties, are guaranteed.

361. The Cuban representative seems to have forgotten that all these characteristics of democracy have long been abandoned in his own country and replaced by a strong police system, which is not the best of Utopian systems.

362. By referring to the problem of Belize, the representative of Cuba is interfering flagrantly in an affair which is not within the competence of his Government in any way, an interference which my Government firmly rejects.

363. In my statement to this General Assembly on 30 September this year *[15th meeting]* I said that throughout its history the Government of Guatemala had maintained its faith in the efficacy of peaceful means for the settlement of conflicts among States, difficult though that may seem. In that firm conviction, we have entered into negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom to make new arrangements for the just and honourable settlement of the age-old controversy with that great Power over the territory of Belize, a settlement which would reconcile the interests of the population of Belize with the legitimate rights of the Guatemalan nation.

364. I also express the hope of my delegation that the negotiations at present in progress will not be disturbed by undue interference by countries peripheral to the dispute which fail in their duty to keep hands off and to remain impartial—an attitude which should prevail during negotiations—and, instead of contributing to a solution of the conflict, exacerbate it and render it more complex.

365. We reiterate our rejection of Cuban intervention in the settlement of the dispute over Belize.

366. Today, the representative of Barbados at this meeting has described Guatemala as belligerent and bellicose with reference to its age-old claim to the territory of Belize. In fact, the Guatemalan attitude vis-à-vis the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which is claiming a Territory that was taken from Guatemala by no other means than force, is firm and unflinching. Guatemala has even been accused of having "evil intentions" of invading Belize. But the representative conveniently remains silent on the significant fact that Belize, as a British colony, is protected by the entire military strength of the colonizing great Power, which maintains in that area overwhelmingly powerful military equipment and the most sophisticated weapon in the world. On several occasions the area has been visited by naval units of that Power, employing a gunboat policy which is totally anachronistic in our time.

367. The representative of Barbados praised, with a very understandable fidelity, the attitude of the United Kingdom Government but did not mention the fact that the unusual deployment of British armed forces might be either bellicose or belligerent.

368. Once again, my Government reiterates that it is not seeking military confrontation with the United Kingdom because it has faith in those peaceful means of settling conflicts that are the very foundation of this Organization. For that reason, we view with hope the negotiations at present under way with the United Kingdom Government and we trust that with good faith and a determination to resolve the conflict, a satisfactory agreement may be found.

369. Mr. ROS (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The Minister for External Relations of Chile, Mr. Patricio Carvajal, in his statement this afternoon referred to sovereignty over areas of Antarctica which are under the sovereignty of Argentina. As a result, we feel obliged to reject those statements.

370. Similarly, with regard to what he said about relations with Argentina, my delegation would like to point out that the position of Argentina in that respect has been publicly stated and is well known to the Government of Chile.

371. Mr. VIERA (Cuba) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The representative of Guatemala has referred at length to the statement made yesterday by the Minister for External Relations of Cuba *[19th meeting]*, in which, with dignified words and appropriate adjectives, he referred to the policy and the régime obtaining in Guatemala, in particular in relation to its threat to the independence of Belize.

372. It would be proper to recall once again that, independent of seven successive Presidents, those who hold power in Guatemala today are the direct descendants of the régime which in 1954, against the will of the people of Guatemala, was imposed on that country by the Central Intelligence Agency. And it is not just Cuba that says this; it is to be found in the reports of investigations of the United States Congress.

373. The present régime is also a descendant of the régime which allowed the territory of Guatemala to be used for action by traitors and mercenaries against Cuba. The ruler of Guatemala in power at that time recognized that publicly. The forces which committed acts of imperialist aggression against Cuba and which were defeated within 72 hours were armed, trained, prepared and launched from that country.

374. That is also the régime which, throughout its long history of voting in the United Nations on any colonial issue, on *apartheid*, on the Middle East or on any other such issue is always to be found on the side of the most reactionary tendencies and opposed to the will of the peoples.

375. It appears that our statements of Cuban support for the independence and territorial integrity of Belize disturb the representative of Guatemala. He would be even more concerned if he were to read again the records of the last session of the Assembly and were to see that 115 countries supported the right of self-determination and independence for the people of Belize.

376. For all those reasons, my delegation, in addition to condemning the chauvinist and war-mongering statements of the Government of Guatemala and once again drawing the attention of this Assembly to the threats hanging over the people of Belize, joins with the delegations of Jamiaca and Barbados in reiterating its condemnation and in stating that Belize is not independent because of the policy of the Government of Guatemala.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.

Annex 233

Confidential Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the General Directorate for Foreign Policy, No 424, 20 October 1977 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MEMORANDUM RESERVADO Nº 424

DE DIREL (DIRELAS)

A DIGEN

I.- Al mediodía de hoy, 20 de octubre, el señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores concedió una audiencia al señor Embajador de Bolivia, D. Adalberto Violand A., en el curso de la cual éste último comunicó oficialmente que dejará sus funciones en este país en fecha próxima. Expresó que lo traía al Ministerio la misión de dar la para él triste noticia de su partida y que hacía uso de esta oportunidad para agradecer muy especialmente al señor Ministro la especial deferencia que siempre le había dispensado, así como todas las atenciones y actitud cordial que siempre había encontrado en esta Cancillería. El señor Canciller tomó nota de estas expresiones y le consultó acerca de si había recibido una invitación para comer en su residencia, el día 8 de noviembre. El Embajador Violand confirmó que sí la había recibido, pero que lamentaba tener que excusarse pues esa fecha coincidía con la inauguración de las oficinas del Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, en nuestra capital, y con la recepción que ofrecería con ese motivo, preparada con mucha anterioridad por su Embajada. Se deja abierta la posibilidad de fijar una fecha apropiada con posterioridad.

Ambos personeros departieron por unos instantes acerca de las frecuencias a Chile de las aeronaves del Lloyd Aéreo y de su itinerario. El Ministro Carvajal manifestó que se alegraba de los progresos de esa línea aérea y particularmente del hecho que la iniciación de los vuelos a Chile significaba una nueva vía de comunicación y acercamiento entre los dos países.

II.- Entrando de lleno en el tema de la negociación marítima, el Embajador Violand consultó al Sr. Ministro si nuestro Gobierno estará representado en la Comisión, recientemente acordada para la materia, por el Sr. Julio Phillippi. El Canciller Carvajal le adelanta que es probable que haya que buscar a otra persona, pues el Sr. Phillippi está por el momento completamente dedicado a su participación en los grupos de trabajo acordados con Argentina y que, en todo caso le asegura

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM No. 424

FROM DIREL (DIRELAS)
TO DIGEN

I. At noon today, 20 October, the Minister of Foreign Affairs granted an audience to the Ambassador of Bolivia, Adalberto Violand A., in the course of which Mr. Violand officially informed him that he would be leaving his position in this country in the near future. He said that what brought him to the Ministry was the mission of giving notice of his departure, which was sad for him, and that he would like to take this opportunity to thank the Minister for the special deference that he has always shown to him, as well as for all the courtesies and the cordial attitude that he has always encountered in this Foreign Ministry.

[…]

II. Broaching the issue of the maritime negotiation, Ambassador Violand asked the Minister whether our Government will be represented in the Commission, recently agreed to for this matter, by Mr. Julio Phillippi. Foreign Minister Carvajal informed him that it is likely that they will have to find someone else because for the moment Mr. Phillippi is completely dedicated to his participation in the working groups agreed to with Argentina and that in any case, he assured him

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MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

que la persona que se designe será de gran capacidad y experiencia.

Refiriéndose a esta nueva etapa de las negociaciones, el Embajador Violand señala que abriga la esperanza que constituya una fase más dinámica, con mayor fluidez y consulta si, ya en la Reunión de Cancilleres, se establecieron las bases para la mecánica de su funcionamiento. Al respecto, le expresa el señor Ministro que, en principio el sistema de operar de la Comisión, de hecho ya estaba fijado por cuanto esta no es sino una continuación de un sistema instituído con anterioridad y del que participaban por parte de Chile, los juristas Enrique Berstein y Julio Phillippi y que vió paralizadas sus funciones como consecuencia de un acto unilateral del Perú. La idea es ahora, le explicó, que Bolivia y Chile, en forma bilateral, avancen en un Acuerdo y luego sostengan conversaciones bilaterales con Perú. Se trata de tener la posibilidad de ir consultando períodicamente al país del norte, cuando se considere conveniente, para que no suceda lo que con anterioridad pasó, cuando ambos países habían llegado a un posible acuerdo y todo se desmoronó con la negativa peruana. Se insistiría en la vía bilateral, pues es evidente que hay muchas partes en la negociación en la que Perú no tiene nada que ver. Lo anterior, no significa que en un determinado momento, en caso, por ejemplo, que llegue a producirse un estancamiento, no exista la posibilidad de una reunión a Alto nivel de caracter tripartita.

El Embajador Violand tomó nota de cuanto le manifestaba el señor Ministro y expresa que, a su parecer, el mecanismo se vislumbra como más efectivo.

A manera informativa y como anécdota, el Canciller Carvajal le refiere que encontrándose reunidos, los tres Ministros, en la Sede Diplomática del Perú en Nueva York y en circunstancias que se estaba redactando el comunicado de prensa que emitirían, se informó al Canciller Adríazola de las declaraciones del Presidente de su país, en el sentido que el canje territorial propuesto por Chile sólo podría ser decidido por el Parlamento, precisamente en el momento en que los tres comentaban lo dificil que sería lograr acuerdos si en vez de tres Gobiernos Militares estuvieran negociando tres Gobiernos con Parlamento en funcionamiento y con todas las presiones de sectores políticos que ello involucra. Termina el Ministro el relato de la anécdota pero, agregando que esa noticia se había complementado con otra, acerca de que el Presidente Banzer había declarado que el proceso se estaba haciendo muy dinámico y que debería hacerse una pausa, declaración que, en realidad desconcierta un poco a nuestro Gobierno.

that the person appointed would be a person with great ability and experience.

With respect to this new stage in the negotiations, Ambassador Violand indicated that he hoped that it will be a more dynamic phase, with greater fluidity, and asked whether at the Meeting of Foreign Ministries the bases had been established for how it would work. In this regard, the Minister said that in principle, the way the Commission would operate has already been set, because it is merely a continuation of a system begun earlier, in which legal scholars Enrique Bernstein and Julio Phillippi participated on behalf of Chile. Their duties were suspended as the result of a unilateral act by Peru. The idea now, he explained, is for Bolivia and Chile to bilaterally progress towards an Agreement and then hold bilateral discussions with Peru. The idea is to be able to continue consulting the northern country periodically, when deemed appropriate, so that what happened in the past will not happen again, when both countries had reached a possible agreement and everything fell apart with the Peruvian refusal. They would insist on the bilateral path, because it is obvious that there are many parts of the negotiations that have nothing to do with Peru. This does not mean that at a certain point in time, a tripartite high-level meeting could not be held if, for example, the negotiations came to a standstill.

Ambassador Violand took note of what the Minister had told him and said that in his opinion, the mechanism seemed to him more effective.

By way of information and anecdotally, Foreign Minister Carvajal told him that when the three Ministers met at the Diplomatic Headquarters of Peru in New York, as they were drafting the press release that they would issue, Foreign Minister Adriázola was informed of the statements by his country's President, that the territorial exchange proposed by Chile could only be decided by the Parliament, while at the very same time, the three were discussing how difficult it would be to reach agreements if instead of three Military Governments, three Governments with a functioning Parliament were negotiating, with all the pressure from political sectors that that would involve. The Minister finished relating the anecdote, but he added that he had heard another one, i.e., that President Banzer had stated that the process was becoming very dynamic and that a break should be taken, a statement which our Government found a little disconcerting.

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Respecto de la primera parte del comentario del Ministro, el Embajador Violand retrotrayéndose a los orígenes de las negociaciones, recuerda que el Presidente Banzer, en una reunión en Cochabamba ante más de cien personalidades, dijo que iba a hacer una consulta respecto de este tema del canje. Opina el Embajador que su Presidente no ha sido conciso en aclarar si esta consulta a un Parlamento especial para esta materia o a un Parlamento democráticamente elegido. El señor Ministro le responde que, de acuerdo a sus antecedentes, en esta última ocasión, el Presidente Banzer se ha referido a Parlamento democráticamente elegido. Sobre el particular, el Embajador visitante, manifiesta que se preocupará de conocer más a fondo cual es el real significado de la declaración de su Presidente.

En cuanto a la pausa en las negociaciones que considera el Presidente Banzer necesaria, su Embajador opina que con ello quiso referirse precisamente a la conveniencia de llevarlas al nivel de Comisión. Confidencia, que ha tenido conocimiento que para elegir al Representante de su país, ya se ha presentado una terna.

III.- Dejando el tema de la negociación, el Sr. Ministro consulta al Representante boliviano, en que estado se encuentra al proceso de institucionalización de su país. A lo anterior, responde el Embajador que ya en noviembre de 1974, al dictarse el Estatuto de Gobierno con el que asumieron las Fuerzas Armadas, se dijo que el país se constitucionalizaría en 1980. Recuerda, que el Presidente Banzer, hace poco, dijo que dependería de las condiciones internas el que este proceso se adelante o se retrase, pues se trata de no repetir errores del pasado y perder la estabilidad política que tanto ha costado. No hay, por lo tanto, plazos definidos y no se sabe aún si se volverá al sistema tradicional bicameral o no.

IV.- Se da por concluída la entrevista, no sin antes reiterar el Embajador visitante, sus agradecimientos al señor Ministro por las atenciones recibidas.

V.- Asistió a la reunión y tomó estos apuntes, la funcionaria a cargo del escritorio Bolivia, Primer Secretario, Carmen Lynam.

Santiago, 20 de octubre de 1977

With respect to the first part of the Minister's comment, Ambassador Violand went back to the origins of the negotiations and recalled that President Banzer, at a meeting in Cochabamba in the presence of more than a hundred dignitaries, said that he was going to make a consultation about this issue of the exchange. The Ambassador believes that his President has not been clear whether this consultation would be made to a special Parliament established for this matter or to a democratically elected Parliament. The Minister answered that according to his information, on the most recent occasion, President Banzer had referred to a democratically elected Parliament. In this regard, the Ambassador stated that he will find out more about the real meaning of the President's statement.

As for the break in the negotiations that President Banzer considers necessary, his Ambassador opined that what he meant by that was that they should be referred to the level of a Commission. Confidentially, he is aware that a slate of three candidates has been presented to elect his country's Representative.

[…]

IV. The meeting was concluded, but not before the visiting Ambassador again thanked the Minister for all the courtesies received.

V. The official in charge of the Bolivia Desk, First Secretary Carmen Lynam, attended the meeting and took these notes.

Santiago, 20 October 1977

Annex 234

Letter from the President of Chile to the President of Bolivia, 23 November 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 76 to its Memorial

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS
NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO-BOLIVIANAS

1975-1978

ANEXO 18

Santiago, 23 de noviembre de 1977.

Excelentísimo Señor
Don Hugo Banzer Suárez
General de Fuerza
Presidente de la República de Bolivia
LA PAZ

Excelentísimo Señor Presidente:

En las diversas oportunidades en que nos hemos encontrado le he señalado la prioridad que le asigno a nuestras relaciones con su país y la decisión que me asiste de buscar fórmulas de cooperación que promuevan los intereses mutuos de nuestras dos Naciones.

El estado actual de las relaciones de Chile y Bolivia hace aconsejable reiterar esos propósitos de cooperación y comprometer nuestra responsabilidad en la búsqueda de fórmulas específicas que la hagan efectiva.

Aprecia mi Gobierno la importancia especial que, en el conjunto de nuestras relaciones, tiene la negociación que está en curso para dar a Bolivia una salida soberana al Océano Pacífico.

Mi Gobierno mantiene inalterable la voluntad política que dio origen a esas negociaciones y está dispuesto a impulsarlas de acuerdo con los deseos y con la intensidad que Vuestra Excelencia estime aconsejable.

Nuestros Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores convinieron en Nueva York, con ocasión de la Asamblea de Naciones Unidas, la designación de Representantes Especiales para activar la negociación. En esta materia, mi Gobierno también está preparado para coincidir si Vuestra Excelencia estima procedente y útil, acelerar la acción de los Representantes Especiales de nuestros dos países.

Considero que en la etapa actual de la negociación sería aconsejable hacer una evaluación de lo actuado, precisar los problemas que se deberían superar y sugerir acciones futuras. Los Representantes Especiales podrían efectuar una útil labor al respecto.

Reconocida la importancia de esa negociación me parece necesario destacar las posibilidades de cooperación que existen en otras áreas. En el momento actual las relaciones entre nuestros dos países pueden enriquecerse substancialmente si nos abocamos a buscar fórmulas que intensifiquen nuestras relaciones económicas, que alienten la cooperación cultural, científica y tecnológica, que superen problemas contingentes, que incrementen y mejoren los sistemas de comunicaciones y que hagan más fluido y eficaz el régimen de libre tránsito en favor de Bolivia que nuestras dos Naciones han pactado.

Santiago, 23 November 1977

His Excellency
Hugo Banzer Suárez
General of the Armed Forces
President of the Republic of Bolivia
La Paz

Dear Mr. President:

On the various occasions on which we have met, I have indicated to you the priority that I attach to our relations with your country and my decision to seek formulas for cooperation that will promote the mutual interests of our two Nations.

The current state of the relations between Chile and Bolivia makes it advisable to reiterate those purposes of cooperation, and to be faithful to our responsibility in the search for specific formulas that will make it effective.

My Government appreciates the special importance that the current negotiations to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean have in the context of our relations.

My Government maintains unchanged the political will that gave rise to these negotiations and is willing to move ahead with them in accordance with the desires and the with the intensity that Your Excellency deems advisable.

At the United Nations Assembly in New York, our Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to appoint Special Representatives to activate the negotiations. In this regard, my Government is also prepared to agree, if Your Excellency deems it proper and expedient, to accelerate the action of the Special Representatives of our two countries.

I consider that at the current stage of the negotiations it would be advisable to evaluate what has taken place, to specify the problems that must be overcome and to suggest future action. The Special Representatives could perform useful work in this regard.

Having acknowledged the importance of these negotiations, I believe that it is necessary to point out possibilities for cooperation that exist in other areas. At the present time the relations between our two countries could be enriched substantially if we aimed to seek formulas to intensify our economic relations, to promote cultural, scientific and technological cooperation, to overcome contingent problems, to increase and improve the communications systems and make the free transit system that our two Nations have agreed in favour of Bolivia more fluid and more effective.

Tengo la convicción de que si nuestros Gobiernos se aplican con voluntad a la búsqueda de medios y fórmulas que hagan posible esa cooperación, se podrá llevar adelante una obra perdurable de mutuo interés.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
General de Ejército
Presidente de la República de Chile

I am convinced that if our Governments apply themselves to seeking means and formulas that make this cooperation possible, a lasting work in our mutual interest can be advanced.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
Army General
President of the Republic of Chile

Annex 235

Letter from the President of Bolivia to the President of Chile, 21 December 1977

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 77 to its Memorial

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS
NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO-BOLIVIANAS

1975-1978

ANEXO 19

PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA

La Paz, 21 de diciembre de 1977

Excelentísimo Señor
Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
General de Ejército,
Presidente de la República de Chile,
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

Excelentísimo Señor Presidente:

He leído con el mayor detenimiento la atenta nota de Vuestra Excelencia, fechada el 23 de noviembre pasado.

Desde nuestro encuentro en Charaña, al que concurrí persuadido del deber patriótico que tiene todo boliviano de hacer cuanto esté de su parte, para procurar la solución del enclaustramiento geográfico que afecta a mi Patria, ha sido norma invariable de mi conducta el expresar a Vuestra Excelencia, con la más absoluta sinceridad, las inquietudes de mi Gobierno respecto del proceso negociador en sus diferentes etapas.

El estado en que se encuentran las negociaciones encaminadas a poner fin a la mediterraneidad boliviana nos obliga a serias reflexiones. Con el fin de situarnos ante las perspectivas reales de lo que podría hacerse en el futuro, considero básico efectuar un breve repaso de lo acontecido a partir de agosto de 1975. Sólo después de dicho análisis podremos determinar los alcances prácticos que tendría la voluntad política que Vuestra Excelencia reafirma para impulsar la trascendental gestión diplomática en que Bolivia está empeñada.

Como parte de un plan de armoniosa convivencia, de integración y desarrollo compartido, mi Gobierno propuso, en Agosto de 1975, iniciar negociaciones destinadas a la obtención de una faja territorial soberana, al Norte de Arica, con continuidad geográfica.

Se requerían, asimismo, como Vuestra Excelencia lo sabe, otras condiciones que hicieran del acceso a través de la franja, una forma mínima aceptable de solución al enclaustramiento boliviano, al buscarse en el conjunto, un instrumento más que garantice a mi país un ritmo adecuado de desarrollo económico y social. En esta concepción representaba, obviamente, carácter primordial, la extensión del frente marítimo y la capacidad de total soberanía que Bolivia debería ejercer sobre el territorio objeto de las tratativas diplomáticas.

Al planteamiento boliviano, Vuestro Gobierno respondió formalmente el 19 de diciembre de 1975, condicionando el eventual arreglo, a factores que dificultaron "ab

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA

La Paz , 21 December 1977

Excellency
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
General of the Army,
President of the Republic of Chile,
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

Mr. President:

I have thoroughly read Your Excellency's kind note dated 23 November.

Since our meeting in Charaña, which I attended persuaded by the patriotic Bolivian duty that every Bolivian person has of doing whatever is on his behalf to seek the solution for the geographical confinement affecting my country, which has been my invariable conduct by expressing to your Excellency, with the most absolute sincerity, my Government's concerns regarding the negotiating process in its different stages.

The status of the negotiations aimed at ending the Bolivian landlocked situation forces us to serious reflections. In order to place ourselves before the real prospects of what could be done in the future, I think is basic to make a short review of what happened from August 1975. Only after such analysis we would be able to determine the practical scope of the political will reaffirmed by Your Excellency to boost the significant diplomatic negotiations that Bolivia is committed to.

As part of a plan of harmonious coexistence, integration and shared development, my Government proposed, in August 1975, to start negotiations aimed to obtain a strip of sovereign territory, in the North of Arica, with geographic continuity.

As Your Excellency well knows, additional conditions were also required that could make such access through the strip, a minimally acceptable solution to Bolivia's confinement by searching together for an additional instrument to ensure my country an appropriate rhythm of economic and social development. Obviously, in this vision the extension of the maritime front and the capability for full sovereignty that Bolivia would exercise over the territory the subject of the diplomatic negotiations represented a fundamental character.

Your Government formally responded to the Bolivian proposal on 19 December 1975, conditioning the eventual arrangement on factors that hindered "ab

initio" el proceso negociador. No obstante, con los documentos boliviano y chileno se constituyeron términos generales, en el entendido que sobre esa base global sería posible avanzar en la búsqueda de coincidencias que promoviesen un arreglo basado, es cierto, en recíprocas conveniencias, pero también en un elevado sentido de justicia internacional.

La siguiente etapa correspondió a la consulta que el Gobierno de Chile efectuó al Gobierno del Perú, sobre la transferencia a Bolivia de un territorio soberano al Norte de Arica, en aplicación del artículo 1º del Protocolo Complementario al Tratado de Lima de 1929.

El Gobierno del Perú demoró aproximadamente once meses para absolver la referida consulta. En ese lapso, ¿qué podía avanzarse concretamente con Chile, que no estuviese librado a lo que finalmente diría el Perú? ¿no sabemos acaso que cualquier transferencia de territorios en esa zona debe, forzosamente, contar con el consentimiento peruano?

El Gobierno del Perú, al fin, en noviembre de 1976, hizo conocer sus puntos de vista en torno a la consulta que el Gobierno de Chile le formulara.

Vuestro Gobierno, Señor Presidente, se limitó a declinar la consideración del planteamiento peruano, arguyendo que el mismo incidía en materias propias de la soberanía exclusiva de Chile. Empero, Bolivia esperaba que Chile hiciera gestiones posteriores para establecer tal situación; esclarecimiento fundamental, como está demostrado, para que el Gobierno de Chile pueda perfeccionar la entrega de un territorio que es el objeto concreto y jurídico de la negociación.

Se puede ingresar a una discusión abstracta interminable sobre este tema, pero estamos ante decisiones políticas directamente vinculadas con la necesidad vital que tiene Bolivia de reintegrarse al Océano Pacífico y las expectativas sobre las que debo atender requerimientos impostergables de mi pueblo.

Convencido de que la justicia internacional debe ser el sólido fundamento sobre el cual se construya el futuro de una convivencia realmente armoniosa en el área del Pacífico Sur, el 24 de diciembre de 1976, propuse a Vuestra Excelencia, a través del Embajador boliviano en Santiago, criterios y principios que creo oportuno reafirmar y recordar, porque corresponden a definiciones fundamentales adoptadas por mi Gobierno.

"1. Ratificamos nuestra proposición original de paz, desarrollo e integración que permita solucionar el enclaustramiento geográfico de Bolivia, a través de una salida libre y plenamente soberana desde el territorio nacional hasta el Océano Pacífico;

2. En aras de una solución que haga honor a la justicia internacional, a la colaboración fraterna y la más amplia solidaridad se propone al Gobierno de Chile que modifique su planteamiento, eliminando la condición relativa al canje territorial. Se propone asimismo, al Gobierno del Perú, que modifique su planteamiento referido al establecimiento de un área territorial bajo soberanía compartida;

3. El Gobierno de Bolivia ofrece, en cambio, de acuerdo con la proposición original de agosto de 1975, los aportes que sean necesarios, en términos equitativos, para el

initio" the negotiating process. Despite that, the Bolivian and Chilean documents constituted general terms, and it was understood that on that global basis it would be possible to move forward with seeking an agreement that would promote an arrangement based on reciprocal conveniences, but also with a high sense of international justice.

The next stage consisted in the consultation the Government of Chile made with the Government of Peru pursuant to Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty of Lima, regarding the transfer to Bolivia of a sovereign territory at the North of Arica.

The Government of Peru took approximately eleven months to answer this consultation. During that period, what could be concretely advanced with Chile which is not subjected to what Peru would ultimately say? Don't we know that any territory transfer in that area must have Peruvian consent?

Finally, in November 1976 the Government of Peru revealed its points of view to the Chilean consultation.

Your Government, Mr. President, limited itself to decline to consider the Peruvian proposal, arguing that it impacted on matters within the exclusive sovereignty of Chile. However, Bolivia was expecting Chile to make subsequent efforts to establish such situation; clarification which is critical, as demonstrated, for the Government of Chile to be able to give Bolivia a territory which is the specific and legal subject of the negotiation.

We can enter into an abstract and endless discussion on this issue, but we are facing political decisions directly related to the vital need of Bolivia to be reintegrated to the Pacific Ocean and the expectations on which I have to serve ineluctable requirements of my people.

Convinced that international justice should be the solid ground to build the future of a friendly and peaceful coexistence in the area of the South Pacific, on 24 December 1976, through the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, I proposed to Your Excellency, certain criteria and principles that I deem appropriate to reaffirm and recall, because they correspond to fundamental definitions adopted by my Government:.

"1. We ratify our original proposal for peace, development and integration, which will provide a solution to Bolivia's geographic confinement, through a free and fully sovereign outlet from Bolivian territory to the Pacific Ocean.

2. With the goal of a solution that does honour to international justice, brotherly cooperation and the broadest solidarity, I propose that the Government of Chile modify its proposal to eliminate the condition regarding an exchange of territory. I further propose that the Peruvian Government modify its proposal regarding the establishment of a territorial area under shared sovereignty.

3. In exchange, the Bolivian Government offers such contributions as may be necessary, on equitable terms, to the

establecimiento de un gran polo de desarrollo tripartito en la zona costera que sería transferida a la soberanía boliviana, del que se deriven beneficios recíprocos para Bolivia, Chile y Perú".

Aprecio vuestro propósito de impulsar las negociaciones desde el estado en que se encuentran, lo cual podría lograrse mediante la designación de los Representantes Especiales, acordada por nuestros Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, en la ciudad de Nueva York.

No obstante, me pregunto: ¿en qué marco de proyecciones verdaderamente trascendentes se realizaría dicha tarea? ¿Acaso una evaluación de todo lo actuado no nos llevaría a reconocer los mismos obstáculos que hoy enfrentamos?. Vuelvo a repetir, que es preciso que nuevos factores se incorporen a nuestro diálogo para superar la actual etapa; factores que necesariamente deberán recoger un espíritu de mayor amplitud en las condiciones que se exigen para el arreglo; en torno al cual pueda congregarse la decisión unánime de mi Patria.

El establecimiento de las nuevas condiciones que se requieren para proseguir gestiones que puedan llevarnos al logro del objetivo que nos fijamos en el encuentro de Charaña, no está en manos de Bolivia.

Sólo bajo esas nuevas circunstancias podrá tener sentido la reunión de los Representantes Especiales y ellas determinarán el ritmo e intensificación de las negociaciones.

De lo contrario, temo que, a pesar de las buenas intenciones entremos en otra fase dilatoria a la que no quiero exponer a mi pueblo que espera, desde hace 99 años, el concurso solidario de naciones que deben buscar entendimientos justos y estables por imperativo de su vecindad.

Quedo en espera de la pronta respuesta de Vuestra Excelencia, a la vez que le reitero las expresiones de mi más distinguida consideración.

HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
General de Fuerza
Presidente de la República de Bolivia.

establishment of a great tripartite development hub in the coastal zone that would be transferred to Bolivian sovereignty, which would result in mutual benefits for Bolivia, Chile and Peru."

I appreciate your intention to boost the negotiation from its current status, which could be achieved by appointing Special Representatives as agreed by our Ministers for Foreign Affairs in New York City.

However, I ask myself, under which framework of significant projections would be made this task? Wouldn't an assessment of the actions to date lead us to recognize the same obstacles we face today? I repeat, it is necessary that new factors are included into our dialogue to overcome the current stage, factors that must necessarily embody a spirit of widening of the conditions required for the settlement under which the unanimous decision of my Country can be reached.

The establishment of new conditions to overcome the current stage and lead us to the aims we set at the meeting of Charaña is not in the hands of Bolivia.

Only under these new circumstances would the meeting of Special Representatives make sense, and such circumstances will determine the rhythm and intensification of the negotiations.

Otherwise, I fear that despite good intentions, we can enter into another phase of delay, to which I do not want to expose my people who are waiting for 99 years, for the solidarity of other of nations to seek fair and stable understandings, as an imperative of the neighbourliness.

I look forward for Your Excellency's prompt response, and reiterate the expression of my most distinguished consideration.

HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
General of the Army
President of the Bolivian Republic

Annex 236

Letter from the President of Chile to the President of Bolivia, 18 January 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 78 to its Memorial

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO-BOLIVIANAS

1975-1978

ANEXO 20

SANTIAGO DE CHILE, Enero 18 de 1978

Excelentísimo Señor
Don Hugo Banzer Suárez
General de Fuerza
Presidente de la República de Bolivia
La Paz.

Excelentísimo Señor Presidente y estimado amigo:

En Carta personal dirigida a Vuestra Excelencia el 23 de Noviembre último, junto con exponerle la prioridad que asigno al estrechamiento de las relaciones de amistad con Bolivia, le reiteré la intención de mi Gobierno de impulsar la negociación en curso destinada a satisfacer los anhelos de ese país hermano en el sentido de obtener una salida soberana al Océano Pacífico.

Consulté entonces a Vuestra Excelencia acerca de la conveniencia de promover, con ese objeto, la acción de Representantes Especiales de nuestros países acordada dos meses antes, en Nueva York, por los respectivos Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Su primer objetivo sería evaluar lo actuado, precisar los problemas que han de ser superados y sugerir acciones futuras.

Insistí, por último, en la conveniencia de estrechar los vínculos entre nuestros dos países, en los diversos campos de la cooperación internacional.

A fines de diciembre pasado, recibí su atenta respuesta, fechada el 21 del mismo mes.

Con el fin de situar las perspectivas reales de la negociación en que nos encontramos empeñados, Vuestra Excelencia estimó oportuno efectuar un breve repaso de lo acontecido a partir de agosto de 1975, cuando el Gobierno de Bolivia presentó sus lineamientos para iniciarla.

Como, al recordar la propuesta chilena, clara y precisa, de 19 de diciembre del mismo año, Vuestra Excelencia hace una referencia a "factores que dificultaron" ab initio "el proceso negociador", estimo conveniente recordar que esa propuesta fue aceptada en términos generales y sin objeciones por Bolivia, como consta en nota oficial de su Embajador en Santiago.

Señala también Vuestra Excelencia que el Gobierno del Perú "demoró aproximadamente once meses" para absolver la consulta formulada por Chile en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el Protocolo Adicional al Tratado de Lima de 1929; y se pregunta "qué podía avanzarse concretamente con Chile que no estuviese librado a lo que finalmente diría el Perú".

A este respecto es conveniente tener presente que, en el lapso indicado, se celebraron dos ruedas de conversaciones, en Lima y Santiago, destinadas justamente a

Santiago, Chile, 18 January 1978

Excellency
Hugo Banzer Suárez
General of the Army
President of the Bolivian Republic
La Paz.

Your Excellency Mr. President and dear friend:

By personal letter addressed to you on 23 November, along with exposing the priority that I assign in strengthening the friendly relations with Bolivia, I reiterate my Government's intention of promoting the ongoing negotiation aimed at satisfying the longings of the brother country to obtain a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

I then asked Your Excellency about the convenience of promoting, with such objective, the action of the Special Representatives of our countries agreed two months ago, in New York, by the respective Foreign Ministers. Their first objective would be to evaluate the activities to date, specify the problems to be overcome and suggest future actions.

Finally, I insisted in the convenience of strengthening the ties between our two countries in various fields of international cooperation.

Towards the end of last December, on 21 December, I received your kind response.

In order to locate the real prospects of the negotiations that we are committed to, Your Excellency considered it appropriate to make a brief review of what happened from August 1975 to date, when the Government of Bolivia submitted its guidelines to commence it.

As Your Excellency makes reference to "factors that hindered" ab initio "the negotiating process" while remembering the clear and precise proposal of Chile of 19 December 1975, I consider appropriate to recall that this proposal was accepted in general terms and without objections by Bolivia, as stated in an official note of its Ambassador in Santiago.

Your Excellency also points out that the Government of Peru "took approximately eleven months" to answer the consultation made by Chile pursuant to the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty of Lima, and wonders "what could be concretely advanced with Chile which is not subjected to what Peru would ultimately say?".

In this regard, it should be noted that, during the indicated period, there were two rounds of talks, in Lima and Santiago, designed precisely

esclarecer algunos puntos importantes que el Perú deseaba conocer con mayores detalles: y que, además nuestros dos Gobiernos continuaron, entre tanto y sobre determinados aspectos, las negociaciones sobre las bases propuestas por Chile. No faltaron ciertamente, en ese mismo lapso, contactos entre los Gobiernos de La Paz y de Lima.

Pareciera desprenderse de un párrafo de la carta de Vuestra Excelencia un cargo para Chile que estimo indispensable desvanecer: Chile se habría limitado a declinar la consideración del planteamiento formulado por Perú en noviembre de 1976, sin realizar, como lo esperaba Bolivia, gestiones posteriores. Es efectivo que mi Gobierno descartó el referido planteamiento por considerar que incidía en cuestiones ajenas a la consulta y propias de su soberanía. Si no realizó gestiones posteriores, tampoco tuvo conocimiento de alguna iniciativa de Bolivia en este sentido ni recibió ninguna sugestión de parte de su Gobierno para promoverla. Por lo demás, las negociaciones no se paralizaron entonces. Prueba de ello fueron el viaje que el Señor Ministro de Relaciones boliviano realizó sucesivamente a Lima y Santiago en Junio de 1977; las entrevistas que tuvimos con Vuestra Excelencia en la ciudad de Washington en el mes de septiembre siguiente; y las que celebraron posteriormente los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia, Chile y Perú, en Nueva York, también en el mes de septiembre del mismo año. En todas ellas hubo acuerdo para proseguir las negociaciones.

Recuerda también Vuestra Excelencia la posición que había asumido en su mensaje a la Nación boliviana el 24 de diciembre de 1976, de la cual fuí prevenido, horas antes, por el Embajador en Santiago, a quien expuse en forma muy clara la posición de mi Gobierno.

Vuestra Excelencia se sirve, finalmente, apreciar mi propósito de impulsar las negociaciones destinadas a otorgar una salida soberana a Bolivia al Océano Pacífico mediante la designación de Representantes Especiales, acordada en septiembre pasado. Junto con expresar dudas acerca de los resultados que esos Representantes pudieran alcanzar, estima que no está "en manos de Bolivia" establecer nuevas condiciones que permitan proseguir las negociaciones.

A juicio de mi Gobierno las bases propuestas por Chile y aceptadas en términos generales por Bolivia son las únicas viables y realistas para permitir la satisfacción de los anhelos del país hermano. Mal podría, por tanto, proponer otra variante. Pero estoy cierto que sobre esas bases sería posible lograr un acuerdo susceptible de obtener la aceptación del Perú. Me fundo en las declaraciones del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de ese país hermano y amigo quien en dos oportunidades, ha declarado que los planteamientos de noviembre de 1975 "no son necesariamente una fórmula de solución final, sino alternativa, elemento de diálogo".

Continúo estimando, por tanto, que, a fin de evitar un estancamiento de las negociaciones, sería útil la designación de Representantes Especiales tal como fue convenido hace apenas cuatro meses. Resulta para mí evidente que, si ellos proceden a una evaluación de los puntos de acuerdo y de aquellos que han de ser superados y formulan sugerencias de acción futura a nuestros Gobiernos, las negociaciones habrán de progresar. No se trata de una "fase dilatoria" como parece pensarlo Vuestra Excelencia, sino justamente de evitar el estancamiento del diálogo.

La negociación en que estamos empeñados no es fácil. Demandará paciencia y buena voluntad recíprocas. Esto bien sabíamos al iniciarla. La importancia del resul-

to clarify some important points that Peru wanted to know in further detail: and also that, meanwhile, our two Governments continued the negotiations over certain aspects on the basis proposed by Chile. And certainly, during the same period there was not a lack of contacts between the Governments of La Paz and Lima.

It seems to be a charge on Chile in a paragraph of Your Excellency's letter, which I consider essential to dispel: Chile limited itself to decline to consider the Peruvian proposal made on November 1976, without performing any further action, as expected by Bolivia. It is true that my Government rejected the aforementioned proposal because it considered issues unrelated to the matter and part of its own sovereignty. If it did not make subsequent actions, it was not aware of any initiative by Bolivia in this sense, or received any suggestion of its Government to promote it either. By the way, negotiations were not stopped then. Proof of this was the successive trips made by the Bolivian Foreign Minister to Lima and Santiago in June 1977, the interviews we had with Your Excellency in the city of Washington in September, and those meetings subsequently held by the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia, Chile and Peru in New York, also during September of the same year. In all of those meetings an agreement to pursue negotiations was reached.

Your Excellency should also remember the position assumed in your message of 24 December 1976 to the Bolivian nation, which was informed to me only a couple of hours before by the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, to whom I clearly expressed the Chilean position on that respect.

Finally, Your Excellency appreciates my purpose to boost the negotiations aimed at granting Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean through the appointment of Special Representatives, as agreed on last September. Together with expressing doubts about the results that these Representatives could reach, you consider that it is not "in the hands of Bolivia" to establish new conditions to overcome the current stage and continue with the negotiations.

The view of my Government is that the bases of the Chilean proposal and accepted in general terms by Bolivia, are the only viable and realistic way to satisfy the longing of the brother country. I could not, therefore, propose a different alternative. But I am confident that on these bases it would be possible to achieve an agreement capable of being accepted by Peru. I rely on the statements of the Foreign Minister of such brother and friend country, who has declared twice that the November 1975 proposals "are not necessarily a final solution formula but an alternative, an element of dialogue".

Therefore, I still consider that in order to avoid obstructing the negotiations, it would be useful to appoint the Special Representatives, as was agreed just four months ago. It is clear for me that if they come to an evaluation of the points of agreement and those that must be overcome, and make suggestions for future action to be taken by our Governments, the negotiations will progress. This is not a "delaying phase" as Your Excellency seems to think, but a way to avoid the stagnation of the dialogue.

The negotiation in which we are engaged is not easy. It will demand patience and reciprocal goodwill, as we knew when we started it. The importance of the final result

tado ha de compensar el tiempo que dediquemos a despejar incógnitas y dificultades que son inherentes a gestiones diplomáticas de esta magnitud.

Me valgo de esta oportunidad para reiterarle Señor Presidente y estimado amigo las seguridades de mi más alta consideración.

Saluda a Vuestra Excelencia,

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
General de Ejército
Presidente de la República de Chile

will compensate the time we devote to clarify doubts and difficulties which are inherent to diplomatic efforts of this magnitude.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to you Mr. President and dear friend the certainty of my highest consideration.

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
General of the Army
President of the Republic of Chile

Annex 237

Confidential Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia by Bolivia's Extraordinary Ambassador, 13 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 177 to its Memorial

REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO

INFORME CONFIDENCIAL

AL : Gral. Div. Aérea Oscar Adriázola Valda
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO

DE : Lic. Willy Vargas Vacaflor
EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO EN MISION CONFIDENCIAL

ASUNTO: NEGOCIACION MARITIMA, PROPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CHILE

FECHA: 13 de marzo de 1978.

INTRODUCCION.- La mision que tuvo a bien confiarme Vuestra Excelencia, a nombre del Supremo Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas, fue cumplida en Santiago de Chile el día viernes 10 del mes en curso. Se llevaron a cabo dos reuniones, durante el mismo dia, en la Cancilleria chilena. En la primera, realizada en horas de la mañana, estuvieron presentes el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Vicealmirante Patricio Carvajal, el Embajador de Chile en Bolivia, el que suscribe el presente informe, el Encargado de Negocios a.i. de Bolivia en Chile y una funcionaria de la Cancillería chilena, que ofició de secretaria. En la segunda, efectuada en la tarde, después de que el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores conversó con el Presidente de la Republica, estuvieron presentes los ya mencionados funcionarios más el Embajador Bernstein.

Las conversaciones se desarrollaron en un ambiente de franqueza, que permitió identificar las aclaraciones básicas para una adecuada comprensión y confirmacion de definiciones, en relación con los temas que se abordaron. La natural cortesía diplomática no fue óbice

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REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

TO: Air Force General Oscar Adriázola Valda
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP

FROM: Lic. Willy Vargas Vacaflor
EXTRAORDINARY AMBASSADOR ON A CONFIDENTIAL MISSION

RE: MARITIME NEGOTIATION, PROPOSAL OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT

DATE: 13 March 1978

INTRODUCTION. The mission entrusted to me by Your Excellency, on behalf of the Supreme Government of the Armed Forces, was carried out in Santiago, Chile, on Friday the 10th of this month. Two meetings were held on the same day, at the Chilean Foreign Ministry. The first meeting, held during the morning, was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal, the Chilean Ambassador in Bolivia, who is the author of this report, the interim Chargé d'Affaires of Bolivia in Chile and an official from the Chilean Foreign Ministry, who served as secretary. The second meeting, which was held in the afternoon after the Minister of Foreign Affairs had talked with the President of the Republic, was attended by the officials mentioned above, plus Ambassador Bernstein.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of openness, and thus were able to identify the basic statements for a proper understanding and confirmation of definitions, with respect to the issues discussed. The natural diplomatic courtesy was not a

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para plantear con sinceridad y amplitud, poniendo suficiente énfasis en el propósito de lograr esclarecimientos esenciales, los aspectos que fueron consignados en el Pliego de Instrucciones, así como en los que surgieron del diálogo.

La siguiente es una relación suscinta de los temas concretos que fueron analizados:

1. Condición del Canje Territorial.- Representa para el Gobierno de Chile la condición esencial y sine qua non de la propuesta de 19 de diciembre de 1975. Dicho Gobierno no considera posible ni procedente una revisión de la misma, bajo ninguna circunstancia, debiendo entenderse que el trueque sería "metro por metro, kilómetro por kilómetro" y está referido al territorio continental, más lo que pudiera resultar del punto 2.a) (áreas marítimas).

2. Las llamadas Tres aristas.- Si bien forman parte de la propuesta, no constituyen los elementos esenciales por cuanto un eventual acuerdo sobre éllas no significaría haber conformado una base de entendimiento global, ya que lo esencial es el "trueque".

Chile está de acuerdo en que pudiera agregarse a la propuesta un aden-dum que incorpore clarificaciones que faciliten la negociación; cuyo beneficio debe tomarse en cuenta en confrontación con lo que surge en lo expuesto en el punto anterior.

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hindrance to fully suggesting with sincerity the aspects that were set out in the instructions, with sufficient emphasis on achieving essential clarifications, as well as the aspects that arose during the course of the talks.

The following is a succinct description of the specific topics that were discussed:

1. Condition of the Territorial Exchange. This represents for the Chilean Government the essential condition and the sine qua non for the proposal of 19 December 1975. The Government does not think it is possible or proper to revise it under any circumstances, having to understand that the exchange would be "metre for metre, kilometre for kilometer" and refers to continental territory, plus the result of point 2.a) (maritime areas).

2. The so-called Three differences. Although they are part of the proposal, they are not essential elements because any agreement on them would not mean to have agreed on a basis of global understanding, because the essential part is the "exchange".

Chile agrees that an addendum could be added to the proposal to incorporate clarifications to facilitate the negotiation; the benefit of which must be taken into account in comparison with the result of the previous point.

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a) Compensación sobre áreas marítimas.-

Este elemento sería negociable entre cero y tres millas, sujetos a compensación.

b) Río Lauca.-

Habría posibilidad de considerar este tema en una Comisión Especial, pero en forma paralela y simultánea a la negociación marítima, aun cuando formalmente no sería parte de ella. Adelantaron su interpretación en sentido de que se trata de la "totalidad de las aguas que se generan en territorio chileno para formar el río internacional".

c) Desmilitarización.-

Bolivia oportunamente haría una declaración en función de su propia soberanía respecto de su vocación pacifista y de que las fuerzas militares en el corredor sólo son de vigilancia y seguridad policial, de salubridad y para garantizar la actividad comercial.

3. Otras formas de compensación por el corredor.- Chile no considera otras formas de compensación, ya que el trueque a su juicio debe ser territorial, equivalente y simultáneo, así fuera discontínuo. Cualquier desarrollo económico no sería a título de compensaciones sino una complementación que surgiría como resultado de las mejores relaciones entre los dos países.

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a) Compensation on maritime areas.

This element would be negotiable between zero and three miles, subject to compensation.

b) Lauca River.

It would be possible to discuss this issue in a Special Commission, but in parallel and at the same time as the maritime negotiation, even though formally it would not be part of it. They announced their interpretation that it involves "all of the water generated in Chilean territory to form the international river".

c) Demilitarization.

At the proper time Bolivia would make a declaration based on its own sovereignty regarding its desire for peace, stating that its armed forces in the corridor are only there for vigilance and police safety, health and to ensure commercial trade.

3. Other types of compensation for the corridor. Chile does not consider other forms of compensation, because in its opinion, the exchange must be a simultaneous exchange of equivalent territory, even if it is not continuous. Any economic development would not be in respect to compensation, but in respect of the complementarity that would arise as a result of the improved relations between the two countries.

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4. Ampliación del frente marítimo.- La iniciativa chilena, presentada originalmente al Canciller peruano, en relación a un eventual arreglo entre Bolivia y Perú a propósito de ampliar el frente marítimo al norte de la Línea de la Concordia, dando en compensación las azufreras del Tacora y los canales del Uchusuma y el Mauri, se nos manifestó que había sido rechazada por la Junta de Gobierno del Perú.

Chile no estima viable ni posible, por distintas razones, que pueda revisar su propuesta original respecto del límite sur del corredor.

5. Gestiones de Chile después del pronunciamiento peruano.- Aparte de lo referido en el punto anterior, el Gobierno de Chile no ha realizado ni considera que deba realizar ninguna gestión con el Perú para lograr su consentimiento en el marco del Protocolo de 1929 y así, el Canciller Carvajal manifestó categóricamente, que correspondía al país interesado (Bolivia) realizar gestiones para flexibilizar la posición peruana y lograr una aceptación que viabilice la negociación con Chile, cuya propuesta, la reiteraban, se basaba en una posición realista y sincera, para atender la demanda de una salida soberana al Pacifico.

Naturalmente, al haberse negado Chile (declinado) a considerar el pronunciamiento peruano están a la espera de que las negociaciones avancen en la identificación de fórmulas (Chileno - Bolivianas) que serían consultadas oportunamente con el Perú y que con ese propósito habían designado al Representante Especial en la persona del Embajador

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4. Expansion of the maritime front. The Chilean initiative originally submitted to the Peruvian Foreign Minister, with regard to a potential arrangement between Bolivia and Peru in order to expand the maritime front to the north of the Concordia Line, giving the sulfur mines in the Tacora and the canals of the Uchusuma and the Mauri as compensation, we were told that it had been rejected by the Junta Government in Peru.

For various reasons, Chile does not think that it is viable or possible to revise its original proposal regarding the southern boundary of the corridor.

5. Chile's dealings after the Peruvian pronouncement. Apart from the matters described in the previous point, the Chilean Government has not engaged in any dealings with Peru (nor does it think that it should do so) to obtain its consent in accordance with the Protocol of 1929, and therefore, Foreign Minister Carvajal said categorically that it was up to the interested country (Bolivia) to make efforts to make Peru's position more flexible and to obtain its acceptance that would make the negotiations with Chile viable, and this proposal, they repeated, was based on a realistic and sincere position, to meet the demand for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific.

Naturally, since Chile refused (declined) to consider Peru's pronouncement, they are waiting for the negotiations to move forward with the identification of formulas (Chilean and Bolivian) on which Peru would be consulted at the opportune time, and to this end they had apparently appointed a Special Representative in the person of Ambassador

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Phillipi. No adelantaron, empero, ningún criterio sobre cómo podría avanzarse dadas las actuales circunstancias.

6. Reunión de los Representantes Especiales.- Chile ha nominado al Embajador Phillipi para esta reunión y está a la espera de que proceda en igual forma el Gobierno de Bolivia. La comprensión que se tiene es que no se trata de una "tripartita" y que el delegado peruano podría ser convocado para realizar consultas y requerir su parecer para la viabilidad de los acuerdos que pudieran adelantar Bolivia y Chile.

Estuvo de acuerdo, en ese sentido, con la declaración del Canciller de la Puente a su retorno de la reunión que sostuvieron los tres Cancilleres en New York (octubre/77.).

7. Ritmo e intensidad de las negociaciones.- Si para perfeccionar la transferencia del territorio ofrecido, que es el objeto jurídico y concreto de la negociación, la condición principal es el consentimiento peruano y el precio inmodificable el trueque, mediando la circunstancia objetiva de que el Perú ha presentado una otra condición limitativa como es el tropezoide bajo soberanía compartida, y no habiendo Chile realizado ni deseando realizar ninguna gestión para lograr el asentimiento peruano, se precisó que mal podría solicitarse a Bolivia definición sobre el canje, (que reiteradamente se nos manifestó que había sido aceptado). Las razones principales en que nos fundamos para el rechazo del trueque, fueron:

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Phillipi. However, they did not state any opinion as to how progress could be made, given the current circumstances.

6. Meeting of the Special Representatives. Chile has nominated Ambassador Phillipi for this meeting, and is waiting for the Bolivian Government to do the same thing. Its understanding is that this is not a "tripartite" situation and that a Peruvian delegate could be called for consultation purposes and to request his opinion on the viability of agreements proposed by Bolivia and Chile.

In this regard, it agreed with the statement by Foreign Minister de la Puente upon his return from the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in New York (October/77.).

7. Rhythm and intensity of the negotiations. If the primary condition for transferring the offered territory, which the specific and legal object of the negotiation, is Peru's consent, and the unalterable price is the exchange, then given the objective fact that Peru has imposed another limiting condition, which is the trapezoid under shared sovereignty, and since Chile has not engaged in any negotiations to obtain Peru's consent (nor does Chile want to do so), it was specified that there was no way to ask Bolivia for a definition of the exchange (and we had been told on numerous occasions that it had been accepted). The primary reasons for our rejection of the exchange were:

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Que los antecedentes del problema le asignen una característica de reparación historica.

No obstante, aún considerando globalmente el canje , ha perdido presentación política ante la opinión pública y las Instituciones de Bolivia, no por efectos circunstanciales de política interna (proceso electoral que vive Bolivia) sino, fundamentalmente, por el cumplimiento de una condición (inciso m): la consulta y aprobación por parte del Perú . Es decir, la propuesta tenía una clausula suspensiva sin cuyo cumplimiento no era válida. Y ahora el Gobierno de Chile se desentiende de ese compromiso y pretende transferir a Bolivia tal responsabilidad, que no le compete asumir ni jurídica, ni política, ni diplomáticamente.

El rechazo (declinación) a considerar la proposición peruana sitúa la negociación a fojas cero, más aún si, como se nos manifestó, no consideran la realizacion de gestión alguna para lograr el consentimiento del Perú, que les permita perfeccionar la transferencia del territorio.

Por lo anterior, se expresó que no corresponde al Gobierno de Bolivia marcar el "ritmo e intensidad de las negociaciones".

8. Satisfacción de la moral histórica del Perú.- Planteado este punto, se recibió la siguiente respuesta: "Si el reclamo peruano se refería a la devolución del Huascar y un Pabellón para izar su bandera en el Morro de Arica, el Gobierno de Chile, como en el pasado, ahora y en el futuro, rechazarían el pedido" y que no comprendían otro alcance

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That the background to the problem makes it an issue of historic reparation.

Nevertheless, even considering the exchange globally, it has lost any appeal for the Bolivian public opinion and institutions, not because of circumstantial effects of internal politics (the current election process in Bolivia) but fundamentally because of the satisfaction of a condition (paragraph m): consultation with and approval by Peru. In other words, the proposal had a suspension clause the non-compliance of which would render it no longer valid. And now the Chilean Government is going back on its commitment and attempting to transfer the responsibility to Bolivia, even though it is not legally, politically or diplomatically within Bolivia's remit.

Rejecting (declining) consideration of the Peruvian proposal puts the negotiation back at square one, even more so if, as we were told, they will not consider engaging in any negotiations to obtain Peru's consent, which would allow them to proceed with the transfer of the territory.

For the foregoing reasons, it was stated that it is not up to the Bolivian Government to mark the "rhythm and intensity of the negotiations".

8. Satisfaction of Peru's historical moral. When this point was raised, we received the following answer: "If Peru's claim related to the return of the Huáscar and a pavilion where it could raise its flag at El Morro in Arica, the Chilean Government, as in the past, present and future, would reject the petition""and would see no other outcome

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por la subjetividad del planteamiento.

9. Proposición del enviado presidencial G. Amunategui.- La posibilidad que adelantó el señor Amunategui de "metro por kilómetro" está descartada debido a que, sin ninguna explicación, se reiteró que el trueque es condición esencial "de metro a metro, kilómetro por kilómetro".

10. Apreciación del estado de la negociación.- Aclarando previamente que el propósito de la misión que se me había confiado era el de lograr clarificaciones a puntos específicos, para una evaluación realista del estado de las negociaciones, estimé oportuno transmitirle la apreciación que personalmente me merecían:

La negociación, por la inflexibilidad de las condiciones que parecían insuperables en las actuales circunstancias, están en un proceso circular vicioso, ya que esencialmente el trueque y la falta de títulos para la transferencia han minado la posibilidad de un entendimiento y que había que explorar otra u otras alternativas no sustitutivas al planteamiento de una salida soberana al Pacífico. Tal vez para alcanzar este objetivo era necesario una aproximación gradual, con una fórmula trascendente, esencialmente política y de gran expresión de solidaridad para con Bolivia, que no exija el trueque territorial como condicion ni, de ser posible, la consulta al Perú.

11. Territorio que vincule a Bolivia con el Pacífico, bajo un estatuto de autonomía.- De acuerdo con las instrucciones recibidas,

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due to the subjective nature of the proposal.

9. Proposal by the presidential envoy G. Amunategui. The possibility raised by Mr. Amunategui of "metre for kilometre" is rejected because, without any explanation, it was reiterated that an essential condition for the exchange is “metre for metre, kilometre for kilometre”.

10. Evaluation of the status of the negotiation. After indicating that the purpose of the mission entrusted to me was to clarify specific points, for a realistic evaluation of the status of the negotiations, I thought it would be appropriate to send you the evaluation that I believe they deserve:

Due to the inflexibility of the conditions, which seem insurmountable under the current circumstances, the negotiation is in a vicious circle, because essentially the exchange and the lack of titles for the transfer have eliminated the possibility of an understanding, and it was necessary to explore other alternatives to the proposal for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific. Perhaps to reach this objective, a gradual approach was needed, with a transcendent formula, essentially political and with an great expression of solidarity with Bolivia, one that would not demand the exchange of territory as a condition nor (if possible) a consultation with Peru.

11. Territory linking Bolivia with the Pacific, under a status of autonomy. In accordance with the instructions received,

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se planteó exploratoriamente este tema en la reunión de la mañana, para dar lugar a consultas al más alto nivel. La respuesta fue positiva en principio, por cuanto se reconocía que era difícil apreciar que en las actuales circunstancias las negociaciones avancen para lograr la solución final. En la reunión de la tarde la actitud fue reticente.

De todas maneras, se caracterizó con mayor profundidad el alcance de "autonomía" enfatizando que el acuerdo político permitiría crear las fórmulas jurídicas adecuadas. La necesidad de consulta en los términos del Protocolo Complementario de 1929 quedó a consideración y responsabilidad de Chile, toda vez que el planteamiento en cuestión "pudiera ser viable" (expresion del Canciller).

12. Ferrocarril Arica Vis Viri.- El Canciller chileno se mostró partidario del arrendamiento de este tramo ferroviario, la administración por Bolivia de un sector del puerto y de depósitos para carga, como un paso de aproximacion. Le hice ver que en realidad no constituiría una solucion intermedia, debido a que no se entronca en el espíritu y alcances de lograr una salida al Pacifico por un territorio que se aspira sea soberano y que era preferible avanzar con el concepto de territorio autónomo que naturalmente comprendería la explotación de los servicios de puerto y transporte.

13. Reajuste de tarifas ferroviarias.- El tema fue introducido por el Canciller chileno, explicando las razones que asistían a su Gobierno para aprobar las nuevas tarifas, cuyo nivel reajustado aún no había

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we explored this topic at the morning meeting, so that consultations could be made at a higher level. The answer was positive in principle, because it was recognized how difficult it was to see that the negotiations would advance to reach a final solution under the current circumstances. The attitude was reticent at the afternoon meeting.

In any event, the scope of "autonomy" was described in greater detail, emphasizing that the political agreement would make it possible to create appropriate legal solutions. The need for a consultation under the terms of the Supplementary Protocol of 1929 was left for the consideration and responsibility of Chile, to the extent that the proposal in question "could be viable"" (expression of the Foreign Minister).

12. Railway from Arica to Vis Viri. The Chilean Foreign Minister was in favour of leasing this part of the railway, with Bolivia managing a sector of the port and warehouses for cargo, as a step towards rapprochement. I made him see that in reality, it would not constitute an interim solution, because it is not consistent with the spirit and scope of achieving an outlet to the Pacific through territory where we aspire to have sovereignty and that was preferable to move ahead with the concept of autonomous territory that would naturally include the exploitation of port and transport services.

13. Adjustment of railway rates. The issue was brought up by the Chilean Foreign Minister, who explained his Government's reasons for approving the new rates, the level of which had not yet been

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llegado al que estaba vigente en Bolivia. Dijo que se trataba de una empresa privada que no podía recibir un subsidio del Estado.

En respuesta expresé que no era comprensible, cómo en momentos en que nuestra opinión pública estaba hipersensibilizada por la virtual paralización de las negociaciones marítimas, se había adoptado una medida de esta naturaleza que iba a trasladar sus efectos negativos al plano social y económico. Tomé este hecho como ejemplo de que habían que encarar los problemas con ánimo de dar soluciones concretas y duraderas, ya que la frecuencia con que se presentan, indudablemente irritan nuestras relaciones.

Tratándose de un servicio público sujeto a una concesion que originalmente fue dada por el Estado Boliviano a la empresa inglesa, cuando Antofagasta estaba bajo su soberanía y en conocimiento de que dicha concesion vencía a corto plazo más, quisiéramos saber, expresé, si era posible esperar que la empresa ferroviaria boliviana pudiera tomar a su cargo esta explotación, en igualdad de condiciones, habida cuenta de que el volumen mayor de carga es de y a Bolivia, en el tramo de Antofagasta - Ollague.

No hubo recepticidad y se quedo en que el análisis del tema se lo haría en la comisión mixta a reunirse el lunes siguiente.

14. Nivel de las Representaciones Diplomáticas.- Debo mencionar que el Canciller de Chile manifestó su preocupación por la designacion del Embajador boliviano, indagando sobre el cuál es la decisión

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adjusted to the levels in force in Bolivia. He said that it was a private company that could not receive subsidies from the State.

In response, I told him that it was not understandable how, at a time when our public opinion was hypersensitive due to the virtual shutdown of the maritime negotiations, an action of this nature had been taken that would transfer its negative effects to the social and economic level. I took this as an example of the fact that the problems needed to be faced with the goal of coming up with specific, lasting solutions, since the frequency with which they arise would undoubtedly have a harmful effect on our relations.

Since this is a public service subject to a concession that was originally granted by Bolivia to the English company, when Antofagasta was under its sovereignty, with full knowledge that the concession would expire in the short term, we wanted to know whether it was possible to expect the Bolivian railway company to take over these operations, on the same conditions, in view of the fact that the majority of the cargo on the stretch Antofagasta-Ollague is from and to Bolivia.

They were not receptive to this idea, and it was agreed that the issue would be analyzed by the mixed commission at the meeting to be held next Monday.

14. Level of Diplomatic Representations. I must mention that the Chilean Foreign Minister stated his concern with the appointment of the Bolivian Ambassador, and asked what decision

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al respecto. Ante una respuesta evasiva, manifestó que había que establecer si el deseo es el de mantener las representaciones a nivel de Encargados de Negocios.

El presente informe señor Canciller, lo presento como una síntesis objetiva de las conversaciones realizadas. He evitado toda interpretacion posterior a las reuniones, con objeto de trasladar a su conocimiento una versión lo más exacta posible de lo acontecido.

Poniéndome a sus órdenes para cualquier ampliación de este informe o del cometido de la Misión que me encomendó, me es grato expresarle mis consideraciones más distinguida.

La Paz, 13 de marzo de 1978.

had been made in this regard. When he received an evasive answer, he said that it was necessary to determine whether the desire is to maintain the representations at the level of Chargés d'Affaires.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I am submitting this report as an objective summary of the discussions that were held. I have avoided any interpretation subsequent to the meetings, so as to give you the most accurate version possible of what happened.

I am at your disposal for any additional information about this report or the performance of the Mission that you entrusted to me, and am pleased to express to you my most distinguished considerations.

La Paz, 13 March 1978.

Annex 238

Confidential Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to Chile's Directorate General for Foreign Policy, No 116, 15 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

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MEMORANDUM RESERVADO N° 116.71

DE : DIREL

A : DIGEN, INFO MINGAB - SUBSEC - EMBAJADOR DAZA - DIPLA

I.- A petición del Encargado de Negocios a.i. de Bolivia, el Sr. MInistro de esta Cartera, concedió hoy 10 de marzo, a las 9.00 horas, una audiencia al Encargado de Negocios de Bolivia a quien acompañaba el Embajador Sr. Willy Vargas Vaca Flor.

El Ministro Consejero Saavedra, procedió a presentar al Embajador Vargas al Canciller chileno y expresó que se trataba del Secretario Nacional para los asuntos de Integración de Bolivia, quien era, además, hombre de reconocida lealtad al Presidente Banzer por lo que contaba con toda su confianza, razón por la que lo había elegido como su Enviado Especial para la delicada Misión que lo traía a nuestro país.

II.- Luego de expresar sus saludos al Sr. Canciller y de agradecer se le hubiera otorgado audiencia con tanta prontitud, el Embajador Especial Sr. Vargas dió a conocer que la misión específica que lo traía a Chile era la de representar al Presidente de su país para manifestar la preocupación que lo embarga respecto de

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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM No. 116

FROM: DIREL
TO: DIGEN, INFO MINGAB – SUBSEC – AMBASSADOR DAZA – DIPL

I. At the request of the interim Chargé d'Affaires of Bolivia, the Minister of this Portfolio granted an audience today, 10 March, at 9:00 a.m., to the Bolivian Chargé d'Affaires, who was accompanied by Ambassador Willy Vargas Vaca Flor.

Minster Counselor Saavedra presented Ambassador Vargas to the Chilean Foreign Minister and stated that he was the National Secretary for issues concerning Bolivia's Integration, and was also a man of recognized loyalty to President Banzer, and therefore had his entire trust. This is why he had been selected as his Special Envoy for the delicate Mission that brought him to our country.

II. After greeting the Foreign Minister and thanking him for granting him an audience so soon, Special Ambassador Vargas announced that the specific mission that brought him to Chile was to state on behalf of his country's President his concern regarding

la negociación marítima. Ello, especialmente, en las actuales circunstancias que se viven en su país, que en este momento se ve enfrentado a una enconada campaña electoral en la que se quiere dar la mayor participación a todos los sectores de opinión boliviana.

Naturalmente, dice, el peso de la opinión pública, en una situación como la actual, adquiere mucho mayor dimensión y una parte muy importante de ella está vinculada e interesada grandemente en el asunto marítimo.

Sobre el particular y a nombre de su Gobierno quiere conversar con el Sr. Ministro dentro de la más absoluta sinceridad para que el análisis de lo que ha sido la negociación hasta ahora permita clarificar sus puntos más importantes, para que una vez confirmadas estas pautas pueda continuarse el diálogo que logre arribar a acuerdos específicos. Para ello, y sin pretender hacer de esta conversación un interrogatorio, desea formular al Sr. Canciller algunas consultas para lograr un esclarecimiento adecuado de las materias que comprende la negociación.

Consulta si respecto del "canje territorial" ha variado la posición de Chile, sobre todo después de conocer la respuesta del Perú y el discurso de Navidad del Presidente Banzer.

Al respecto, el Sr. Ministro le recuerda que la actitud de Chile es muy conocida y que Perú contestó directamente a la proposición chilena. Acerca del Discurso de Navidad del Presidente

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the maritime negotiations – particularly because of the current circumstances in his country, which is currently faced with an election campaign in which they want to give the greatest participation to all sectors of the Bolivian public.

Naturally, he says, the weight of public opinion, in a situation like the current one, takes on a much greater dimension, and a very important part of that public opinion is related to and greatly interested in the maritime question.

On this point, and on behalf of his Government, he would like to talk with the Minister with complete sincerity so that an analysis of the negotiation to date can clarify the most important points, so that once these points are confirmed, the dialogue to reach specific agreements can be continued. To do so, and without any intention of turning this conversation into an interrogation, he would like to ask the Foreign Minister several questions to clarify the matters involved in the negotiation.

He asked whether Chile's position on the "territorial exchange" has changed, particularly now that it has learned Peru's response and heard President Banzer's Christmas address.

In this regard, the Minister reminded him that Chile's position is very well known and that Peru directly answered Chile's proposal. Regarding President Banzer's Christmas Address,

Banzer le indica que, conocida la intención del Mandatario boliviano de hacer ese llamado a Perú y a Chile, intención que fuera trasmitida por el propio Embajador Violand dos días antes del discurso, el Presidente Pinochet contestó en fecha previa a que éste fuera pronunciado "que esa era la condición principal y que no podía ser cambiada". Lo mismo, se expresó posteriormente en la entrevista de Washington de los tres Presidentes y fue reiterado por él mismo, en numerosas oportunidades, tanto al propio Canciller Adriázola como al Embajador Violand.

Explica el Sr. Ministro que no se trata de una condición impuesta por el capricho de una persona. Le narra las dificultades internas para redactar la nota de 1975; y que la única manera que lograron vencerse las opiniones en contra de importantes sectores fue que se estableciera la condición de trueque.

Le señala también que hay clara conciencia de que, en principio, esa fórmula alcanzó aceptación por parte de Bolivia. Tanto así que el Canciller Adriázola, en dos oportunidades, le manifestó que los términos de la nota de 1975 habían sido básicamente aceptados por Bolivia. Incluso le dió a conocer que había recorrido distintas guarniciones militares donde había obtenido apoyo para este principio de acuerdo. Indica el Ministro que posteriormente el Canciller Adriázola le había narrado los viajes del Embajador peruano

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he said that now that he knows the Bolivian President's intention of making this call on Peru and Chile, an intention that was transmitted by Ambassador Violand himself two days prior to the address, President Pinochet answered before the speech was given that "that was the principal condition and that it could not be changed." The same thing was stated later at the meeting of the three Presidents in Washington, and has been repeated by himself on numerous occasions, both to Foreign Minister Adriázola and to Ambassador Violand.

The Minister explained that this was not a condition imposed at the whim of a person. He described the internal difficulties in drafting the note of 1975' and said that the only way that they managed to overcome opinions against important sectors was to establish the condition of an exchange.

He also said that there is very clear awareness that, in principle, that formula was accepted by Bolivia – so much so that Foreign Minister Adriázola had twice told him that the terms of the 1975 note had basically been accepted by Bolivia. He even announced that he had gone round various military garrisons, where they had obtained support for this principle of agreement. The Minister said that afterwards, Foreign Minister Adriázola had told him about the trips by the Peruvian Ambassador,

Sr. Llosa, al interior de Bolivia, principalmente a Cochabamba, donde en conversaciones con políticos, sectores castrenses y de prensa había logrado revertir el apoyo de éstos a la fórmula propuesta por Chile y que en principio ya había aceptado el Gobierno boliviano. Recordó que el Embajador Gutiérrez al llegar a Bolivia había declarado textualmente "que traía el mar en el bolsillo".

Declara el Ministro que le asiste la certeza de que tanto el Presidente Banzer como el Canciller Adriázola tienen clara conciencia de que la línea de Chile ha sido en esta materia sólo una e invariable. Pero que Chile comprende que por razones internas de la política de su país el Presidente Banzer pueda ahora decir en público algo diferente. Indica que lo que se pide por Chile es que se mantenga la superficie de su territorio por lo cual la compensación debe hacerse kilómetro a kilómetro, metro a metro. Hay que considerar, también que la cesión a Bolivia no sólo involucra territorio terrestre sino que hay que tener presente que está el valor agregado del océano.

Hace un parangón de esta situación con el Acuerdo logrado entre Arabia Saudita y Jordania en que Arabia dedió una franja costera en el Golfo de Aqaba a Jordania, obteniendo en compensación una superficie mayor que la cedida.

Expresa que es un convencido que el Presidente Pinochet siente una real amistad por el Presidente Banzer y

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Mr. Llosa, to the interior of Bolivia, primarily to Cochabamba, where in discussions with politicians, military sectors and the press, he had managed to reverse their support for the formula proposed by Chile, which in principle had already been accepted by the Bolivian Government. He pointed out that Ambassador Gutiérrez upon arriving in Bolivia had stated that "he brought the sea in his pocket".

The Minister said that he is certain that both President Banzer and Foreign Minister Adriázola are clearly aware that Chile has taken the same unchanging position on this matter throughout. But that Chile understands that for internal political reasons of his country, President Banzer may say something different in public. He said that what Chile is asking for is to maintain the surface of its territory, and thus compensation must be made kilometre for kilometre, metre for metre. It is also important to consider that the cession to Bolivia not only involves ground territory, but also the added value of the ocean.

He compared this situation with the Agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Jordan in which Saudi Arabia ceded a coastal strip of land on the Gulf of Aqaba to Jordan, obtaining as compensation more surface than it had ceded.

He said that he is convinced that President Pinochet feels genuine friendship for President Banzer and

que debe entenderse que su deseo de cooperación es indudablemente sincero. Pero, que si se le pide que borre esa condición se verá en la imposibilidad de hacerlo. Hace presente que no estima que el problema pueda ser demasiado grande para Bolivia pues su superficie es mayor a la chilena y su densidad de población es mucho menor. Explica que el actual Gobierno de Chile no podría siquiera considerar disminuir su territorio por lo peligroso que esto resultaría debido a la presión de la opinión pública y al propio juicio de la historia.

Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, espresa el Sr. Ministro, se podrían revisar algunos puntos llamados aristas, aclararlos y exponer los razonamientos de una y otra parte para volver a una situación de entendimiento como la que existió en un principio.

El Embajador Vargas responde que si bien es cierto que la exposición del Sr. Canciller corresponde a la realidad de las circunstancias de ese entonces, no es menos cierto que dichas circunstancias han cambiado después de la respuesta peruana, la que trajo un completo cambio de imagen de la situación ante la opinión pública de Bolivia, cambio que ha sido exacerbado por la actitud de la prensa y por la campaña política por la Presidencia. Hace referencia a que la propuesta chilena, aceptada en principio, es desde luego anterior a estos hechos y que producidos

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his desire for cooperation must be seen as unquestionably sincere. However, if he is asked to erase this condition, he will be unable to do so. He noted that he does not see how the problem could be so great for Bolivia, because Bolivia has more surface area than Chile, while its population density is much lower. He explained that the current Chilean government could not even consider reducing the size of its territory because this would be too dangerous, given the pressure of public opinion and the judgment of history.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Minister said that certain points referred to as differences could be reviewed and clarified, and both parties could state their reasoning to return to the situation of understanding that existed at first.

Ambassador Vargas responded that although it is true that the Foreign Minister's statement is consistent with the reality of the circumstances at that time, it is no less true that those circumstances have changed following Peru's response, which brought about a complex change in the image of the situation among the Bolivian public, a change that has been exacerbated by the attitude of the press and by the political campaign for the Presidency. He referred to the fact that the Chilean proposal, accepted in principle, was before these events and that now that they have occurred,

éstos, Chile podría reconocer que hay un nuevo elemento que requiere que se la readecúe. Señala el Embajador visitante que durante un viaje a Chile del Canciller Adriázola, el Sr. Gregorio Amunátegui le habría expresado que la compensación no necesariamente debía de ser equivalente.

Tal afirmación es de inmediato desestimada por el Sr. Canciller. Reitera lo dicho en el sentido de que el trueque es metro a metro, según lo manifestado por el propio Presidente de la República. Lo único que podría admitir variaciones es la compensación respecto del área de mar patrimonial, pues se aceptó en principio que se aplicará la medida internacionalmente aceptada al momento del canje.

Continuando con sus consultas el Embajador Especial pregunta: si el canje, necesariamente tendría que ser territorial; si debería tener carácter simultáneo; si podría tener un carácter mixto (territorial y creación de un polo de desarrollo u otra fórmula).

La respuesta del Canciller es clara: es territorial, es simultáneo, no admite fórmulas mixtas de compensación.

El Embajador Vargas hace entonces mención del tema de las aristas (Aguas del Lauca, desmilitarización y mar patrimonial) y sugiere eliminar de la negociación marítima propiamente tal la primera de éstas. Explica el Sr. Canciller que si el Gobierno

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Chile could recognize that there is a new factor that requires that it be adjusted. The visiting Ambassador said that during a trip to Chile by Foreign Minister Adriázola, Mr. Gregorio Amunátegui had told him that the compensation did not necessarily have to be equivalent.

This statement was immediately denied by the Foreign Minister. He repeated what was said about the exchange being metre for metre, as stated by the President of the Republic himself. The only thing that could be changed was the compensation with respect to the patrimonial sea, since it was agreed in principle that the internationally accepted measurement would apply at the time of the exchange.

Continuing with his questions, the Special Ambassador asked whether the exchange necessarily had to be territorial; whether it had to take place simultaneously; whether it could be mixed (territorial and creation of a development hub or another formula).

The Foreign Minister's answer was clear: it is territorial; it is simultaneous; mixed forms of compensation are not allowed.

Ambassador Vargas then mentioned the topic of the differences (the waters of the River Lauca, demilitarization, and the patrimonial sea) and suggested eliminating the first of these from the maritime negotiation. The Foreign Minister explained that if the Government

de Bolivia solicitara oficialmente ese punto, no podría ser siquiera considerado por el Gobierno de Chile pues el problema se ha arrastrado desde 1938 y necesita una definitiva clarificación. Manifiesta que no se trata de la totalidad de las aguas pero sí de las que nacen dentro del territorio chileno. Insiste el Sr. Vargas que el tema se podría apartar del general, porque no constituye en esencia parte de él. Debe tomar su propio término de negociación.

El Sr. Ministro, nuevamente, da las razones que asisten a nuestro Gobierno para declararlo condición de la negociación y señala que es materia que, de una vez por todas, debe quedar saneada para que no constituya una espina en las relaciones entre los dos países como ha sido hasta ahora. Le indica además que el Lauca se encuentra dentro de la región que comprende la negociación.

Ante la sugerencia del Embajador Vargas de que el asunto del Lauca se trate simultáneamente pero no como parte de la negociación, el Sr. Ministro indica que ello sólo sería factible si queda claramente establecido que también se logre un acuerdo simultáneo.

Respecto de desmilitarización, se deja constancia que ha habido conversaciones en el sentido de buscar en el momento oportuno la creación de una Comisión Ad Hoc y que no sería un asunto que entorpezca la negociación. Al efecto, el Embajador Vargas

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of Bolivia officially requested this point, it could not even be considered by the Government of Chile, because the problem has been going on since 1938 and needs to be cleared up once and for all. He said that it did not involve all of the waters, but only those that have their source within Chilean territory. Mr. Vargas insisted that the topic could be separated from the rest of them because in essence it is not part of them. It ought to have its own term for negotiation.

The Minister again gave our Government's reasons for declaring this a condition of the negotiations and indicated that it is a subject that, once and for all, must be cleared up, so that it will not constitute a thorn in the flesh of the relations between the two countries, as it has thus far. He also said that the River Lauca is in the region covered by the negotiations.

In response to Ambassador Vargas's suggestion that the issue of the River Lauca be dealt with simultaneously but not as part of the negotiation, the Minister indicated that that would only be feasible if it is clearly established that a simultaneous agreement must be reached.

With respect to demilitarization, the Minister stated that there have been discussions to find the proper moment to create an Ad Hoc Commission and that it would not be a matter that would disrupt the negotiations. In this regard, Ambassador Vargas

adelantó que tenía entendido que había acuerdo de que el asunto sería resultante de una declaración unilateral soberana de Bolivia.

Acerca de la compensación que se establezca para el área de mar patrimonial, el Sr. Ministro se remite a lo ya expresado.

Manifiesta el Sr. Canciller que si beneficia en algo a la situación del Gobierno de Bolivia el hecho de que se avance en estos temas, no habría ningún problema por parte de Chile para comenzar a trabajar en la elaboración de un Addendum sobre el particular que tuviera buen efecto en la opinión pública de ese país.

Le refiere el Sr. Canciller a su visitante que la intención chilena era hacer de la negociación un factor dinámico de solución de problemas y por ende de acercamiento entre ambos países. Que así lo había demostrado invariablemente y lo ratificaba en Nueva York en reunión que sostuvieran los tres Cancilleres (De la Puente, Adriázola y Carvajal). Se produjo el hecho en Nueva York que el Canciller De la Puente recibe un mensaje en el que se le informa que el Presidente Banzer acababa de hacer declaraciones en el sentido de que había que hacer una pausa en la negociación, que hasta el momento había tenido un ritmo dinámico y que se dejaba ahora pendiente la decisión sobre la compensación territorial hasta que en su país hubiera un Congreso. Recalca así lo infundado de los ataques de la prensa

said that he had understood that there was an agreement that the matter would be resolved by a unilateral sovereign declaration by Bolivia.

As for the compensation established for the area of patrimonial sea, the Minister referred to what had already been stated.

The Foreign Minister said that if the situation of the Bolivian Government were benefited somewhat by the fact that progress was made on these issues, Chile would have no problem with beginning to work on an Addendum on this matter, that would have a positive effect on the public opinion in that country.

The Foreign Minister told his visitor that Chile's intention was to make the negotiation a dynamic factor in solving problems and therefore a factor in rapprochement between the two countries. That Chile had always demonstrated this and that it ratified this in New York at a meeting held by the three Foreign Ministers (De la Puente, Adriázola and Carvajal). It happened in New York that Foreign Minister De la Puente received a message informing him that President Banzer had just made statements to the effect that there would have to be a break in the negotiation, that thus far they had been progressing rapidly and that now the decision on the territorial compensation would be left pending until there was a Congress in his country. He thus emphasized that the attacks by the Bolivian

de Bolivia hacia nuestro país a quien culpa del "estancamiento de la negociación" y demuestra que la idea de la pausa vino de Bolivia, del propio Presidente de la República.

Señala el Sr. Canciller que, no obstante lo anterior, Chile ha seguido trabajando; le informa de su gestión oficiosa ante el Perú para que considerara la idea de un trueque por una extensión de costa que cedería a Bolivia a cambio de las azufreras del Tacora y las aguas del Uchusuma y del Mauri. Idea que posteriormente fue rechazada por el Gobierno peruano según le expresara el propio Canciller de la Puente quien, en principio, se había manifestado interesado en la proposición. Le señala también que Chile ya procedió a designar su Delegado para la Comisión Especial que acordaron establecer los tres países involucrados en el problema.

Indica el Sr. Vargas que Perú no ha cumplido con esta idea de la Comisión Tripartita y quiere participar sólo como Observador.

Aclara el Sr. Canciller Carvajal que dicha Comisión no tiene carácter tripartito a pesar de ser triangular. Se trata, le explica, de que Chile y Bolivia, a través de sus Delegados, avancen en el estudio de las materias que vayan conduciendo a acuerdos parciales y vayan informando a la vez a Perú de ellos para que someta a su Gobierno los puntos en los cuales se necesite de su aprobació

El Sr. Vargas opina que le parece ambiguo el sistema ya que el Perú, como lo hizo anteriormente, podría echar atrás la negociación.

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press on our country, which they blamed for the "stagnation of the negotiation", were unfounded, and demonstrated that the idea of taking a break came from Bolivia, from the Bolivian President himself.

The Foreign Minister said that notwithstanding this fact, Chile had continued working; he informed him of his unofficial dealings with Peru to get Peru to consider the idea of an exchange for an extension of coastline that it would cede to Bolivia in exchange for the sulfur mines in Tacora and the waters of the Uchusuma and the Mauri. This idea was later rejected by the Peruvian Government, as stated by Foreign Minister de la Puente himself who, in principle, had stated that he was interested in the proposal. He also said that Chile had already appointed a Delegate to the Special Commission that the three countries involved in the issue had agreed to establish.

Mr. Vargas said that Peru had not complied with this idea of the Tripartite Commission and that it wants to participate solely as an observer.

Foreign Minister Carvajal explained that this Commission was not tripartite even though it was triangular. He explained that Chile and Bolivia, through their delegates, would study matters that lead to partial agreements and that they would inform Peru through them so that Peru could submit to its Government the points on which its approval was needed.

Mr. Vargas said that the system seemed ambiguous to him, because Peru could reject the negotiation, as it previously had done.

El Sr. Ministro disiente de esta opinión y le hace mención de lo que expresara el Canciller de la Puente en Nueva York cuando hizo presente que Bolivia y Chile sólo deberían pedir su acuerdo al Perú cuando llegaran a un entendimiento entre ellos.

Le insiste que Chile está a la espera que Bolivia designe su Delegado.

Pregunta Vargas acerca de qué otra gestión ha hecho Chile fuera del sondeo a Perú de un trueque con Bolivia.

El Sr. Ministro Carvajal le expresa que es a Bolivia a quien corresponde presentar proposiciones ya sea al Perú o a Chile. Son los propios interesados los que deben buscar soluciones a sus problemas.

Expresa Vargas que estamos en una negociación "circular viciosa".

Continúa sus consultas preguntando al Sr. Canciller sobre qué posibilidades de éxito puede tener un entendimiento chileno-boliviano.

Indica el Sr. Canciller que habiéndose producido un cambio de Gobierno en el Perú cree que este país podría hacer más flexible su posición. Desgraciadamente señala, la contestación del Perú y su propuesta de "soberanía compartida" son de la paternidad del Canciller de la Puente quien creó o según su propia declaración desenterró la fórmula que ya se había estudiado durante el Gobierno de Leguía.

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The Minister dissented from this opinion and mentioned what Foreign Minister de la Puente had said in New York when he remarked that Bolivia and Chile could only ask for Peru's agreement once they had reached an agreement between themselves.

He insisted that Chile is waiting for Bolivia to appoint its Delegate.

Vargas asked about what other actions Chile had taken in addition to sounding Peru out on an exchange with Bolivia.

Minister Carvajal said that Bolivia is the one that has to make proposals, either to Peru or to Chile. The parties with problems are the ones who have to seek solutions to their problems.

Vargas said that our negotiation is a "vicious circle".

He continued his questions by asking the Foreign Minister how possible it was that an understanding between Chile and Bolivia could be reached.

The Foreign Minister said that since there had been a change in the Peruvian Government, he thought that Peru could make its position more flexible. Unfortunately, he said, Peru's answer and its proposal of "shared sovereignty" were created by Foreign Minister de la Puente, who came up with, or to use his words, "revived" this formula that had already been studied during the Leguía administration.

Consulta Vargas a qué se refirió el Presidente Morales Bermúdes en Washington cuando habló de que había que restituir al Perú su moral histórica.

Contesta el Sr. Canciller Carvajal diciendo que si se refería a la colocación de una bandera peruana en el Morro de Arica o al hundimiento o entrega del Huáscar, no le vé ningún futuro a la gestión que pudiera hacer el Perú en ese sentido. Hay cosas que es necesario no mover para no revivir rencores.

Pregunta Vargas si se pudieran encontrar soluciones intermedias para eliminar la condición de tener que contar con la aceptación del Perú, para otorgar una faja de territorio soberana a Bolivia. Sugiere el otorgamiento de una concesión arrendamiento sobre el ferrocarril de Arica a La Paz en favor de Bolivia.

Responde el Sr. Canciller diciendo que en muchas oportunidades ha expresado a Bolivia que podemos seguir conversando y avanzar en la idea de un ferrocarril operado por Bolivia, que llegue a almacenes bolivianos, que embarque sus productos en barcos que naveguen bajo su bandera, etc. Incluso sugiere que podríamos formar una Compañía Mixta de Navegación boliviano-chilena, con todos los aportes y asistencia que Chile pueda dar. Señala que esta sería una magnífica aproximación que pueda conducir más tarde a la solución definitiva.

Al continuar la reunión, en el curso de la

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Vargas asked what President Morales Bermudes was referring to in Washington when he said that Peru's historic moral had to be returned to it.

Foreign Minister Carvajal responded that he was referring to placing a Peruvian flag on the Morro de Arica or to the sinking of the Huáscar. He saw no future for any actions that Peru might take in this regard. There are things that must be left unmoved so as to not stir up old resentment.

Vargas asked whether intermediate solutions could be found to avoid having to have Peru'' acceptance, to grant a strip of sovereign territory to Bolivia. He suggested granting Bolivia a leased concession to the railway from Arica to La Paz.

The Foreign Minister answered that Bolivia had been told on many occasions that we can keep talking and move ahead on the idea of a railway operated by Bolivia, which reaches Bolivian warehouses, that loads its products onto ships sailing under its flag, etc. He even suggested that we could form a joint Bolivian-Chilean Navigation Company, with all the contributions and assistance that Chile could give. He said that this would be a magnificent approach, that could later lead to a definite solution.

When the meeting was continued, in the course of the afternoon,

tarde, el Embajador Vargas hace una recapitulación de lo tratado en la entrevista sostenida horas antes.

Reitera que, ante el cambio de circunstancias políticas internas de su país y la respuesta peruana, se ha transformado en escollo máximo de la negociación la condición del trueque impuesta por Chile.

Expresa que lo más probable es que Perú no cambie su posición de insistir en la "soberanía tripartita".

Señala que estos dos puntos hacen que la negociación no tenga presentación política en su país y que se debe tratar de buscar soluciones intermedias.

Refiriéndose a la nota (carta) del Presidente Pinochet en que declara vigente la propuesta de 1975, señala que, si bien las aristas pueden limarse, se mantiene la falta de entendimiento en lo principal que es el trueque.

Por otra parte, dice, se hace necesario buscar una fórmula que comprometa a Chile y a Bolivia pero que no requiera del consentimiento del Perú. Sugiere que se puede caracterizar el "corredor" como una concesión de autonomía de explotación del sistema ferroviario. Contesta el Sr. Vargas diciendo que no sólo al servicio ferroviario sino también a la faja geográfica ofrecida en las negociaciones pero sin cesión de soberanía. Se trata, dice, de con esta fórmula llegar a crear las condiciones que un mejor momento

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Vargas summarized what they had discussed at the meeting hours before.

He repeated that, given the change in internal political circumstances in his country, and the Peruvian proposal, the condition of an exchange imposed by Chile has become an enormous stumbling block in the negotiation.

He said that the most likely thing is that Peru will not change its position in insisting on "tripartite sovereignty".

He said that these two points make the negotiation politically unpresentable in his country and that we should try to seek interim solutions.

Referring to the note (letter) from President Pinochet declaring that the 1975 proposal was in effect, he said that although the differences could be reconciled, there was still lack of understanding on the main issue, which is the exchange.

Moreover, he said, it has become necessary to find a formula that is binding on Chile and Bolivia but does not require Peru's consent. He suggested that the "corridor" could be characterized as a concession of autonomy to exploit the railway system. Mr. Vargas answered that the concession should not only be for the railway service, but also for the strip of land offered in the negotiations, but without cession of sovereignty. He said that this is a means of creating the conditions that at a better political

político faciliten el trueque.

Le expresa el Sr. Canciller que se estudiarán las posibilidades pero que hay que cuidar las susceptibilidades del Perú. Hay que analizar muy a fondo el Tratado, pero es una posibilidad que ciertamente se puede explorar.

Ya que se toca el tema del ferrocarril, el Canciller recuerda al visitante boliviano la deuda pendiente que asciende a más de 3 millones de dólares, que el Gobierno de Chile necesita para mejorar las condiciones del servicio de Arica a La Paz.

Hace mención luego al ferrocarril Antofagasta-Bolivia y dice que las nuevas tarifas están plenamente justificadas ya que de ellas depende la posibilidad de subsistir de este ferrocarril. Recuerda que el Gobierno de Chile no tiene con la compañía que lo opera un Convenio de tarifas pues no es del Estado. Se trata, añade, de una compañía privada que, en el tramo que opera, da el servicio a un costo más bajo que el impuesto por Bolivia en los tramos bolivianos del mismo ferrocarril. Hace también mención de que la autorización de alza concedida por Chile hizo luego de un exhaustivo estudio de costos reales que a Chile interesa tanto como a Bolivia pues no hay que olvidar que el ferrocarril atiende parte sustancial del transporte de cobre de Chuquicamata.

Indica el Canciller que Bolivia podría solucionar su problema creando mejores condiciones en sus carreteras

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point in time would facilitate the exchange.

The Foreign Minister said that they would study the possibilities, but that it is important mind Peru's sensitivity. The Treaty must be analyzed in detail, but it is a possibility that certainly can be explored.

Now that they were addressing the issue of the railway, the Foreign Minister reminded his Bolivian visitor of the outstanding debt that amounts to 3 million dollars, which the Chilean Government needs in order to improve the conditions of service between Arica and La Paz.

He then mentioned the railway from Antofagasta to Bolivia and said that the new rates are fully justified because the survival of this railway depends on them. He pointed out that the Chilean Government does not have a rate agreement with the company that operates it, because it is not a State-owned company. It is a private company that, on the stretch that it operates, provides the service at a lower cost than the cost charged by Bolivia on the Bolivian stretches of the same railway. He also mentioned that the authorization granted by Chile was given after an exhaustive study of the actual costs, which is as much in Chile's interest as it is in Bolivia's, because we must not forget that the railway serves a substantial part of the transport of copper from Chuquicamata.

The Bolivian Foreign Minister said that their problem could be solved by creating better conditions on their highways,

las que constituyen la competencia natural del ferrocarril. Recuerda que en la parte chilena, la carretera a Tambo Quemado está practicamente finalizada, en cambio en la parte boliviana faltan todavía más de doscientos cuarenta kilómetros.

El representante especial boliviano dice que, sin dejar de reconocer cuan ciertas son las observaciones del Sr. Canciller, Chile debería tratar de encontrar una solución al problema de las tarifas por cuanto su alza representa para Bolivia un aumento por concepto de fletes de más de dos y medio millones de dólares.

El Canciller señala que Chile no está en condiciones de subvencionar a este ferrocarril pues se trata de un ferrocarril privado y además dentro del esquema político del Gobierno se ha establecido que las propias compañías del Estado deben autofinanciarse.

El Embajador Vargas sugiere que nuestros países debieran hacer esfuerzos de imaginación para solucionar problemas como el del alza de tarifas. Que él veía la posibilidad de que al terminar la concesión de operaciones a la compañía inglesa del ferrocarril Antofagasta-Bolivia, su país podría presentarse a la licitación a que se llame para operar el servicio por cuenta propia. El Canciller Carvajal, le manifiesta que lo ideal es que siga bajo administración de la compañía inglesa, ya que los Estados son generalmente malos administradores y sus empresas funcionan a pérdida; además, indica, está demostrado que Bolivia impondría alzas mayores. De hecho

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which are the natural competition of the railway. He said that in the Chilean section, the highway to Tambo Quemado is practically complete, whereas in the Bolivian section it is still missing two hundred and forty kilometres.

The special Bolivian representative said that although he recognizes the truth of what the Foreign Minister was saying, they must try to find a solution to the problem of the rate increase, because this increases Bolivia's freight costs by two and a half million dollars.

The Foreign Minister said that Chile is not in a position to subsidize this railway, since it is a private railway, and besides, within the political scheme of the Government, it is has been established that State-owned companies ought to pay for themselves.

Ambassador Vargas suggested that our countries should make an effort to envisage a solution to the problems such as the rate increase. He saw the possibility that once the concession granted to the English company to operate the railway from Antofagasta to Bolivia is over, his country could participate in a public tender for the service and operate it for its own account. Foreign Minister Carvajal said that the ideal thing would be for it to remain under the English company's administration, because States are usually poor managers and their companies operate at a loss; besides, it has been shown that Bolivia would raise the rates even more. Indeed,

ya tiene mayores precios en los tramos internos del mismo servicio. Por otra parte, le dice, Chile no estaría de acuerdo, ya que como ha indicado, gran parte del volumen de la carga corresponde a mineral chileno.

Pregunta el Sr. Ministro si, para avanzar en estas conversaciones exploratorias de una nueva fórmula, Bolivia ha considerado mantener las relaciones a nivel de Embajadores o a nivel de Encargado de Negocios. Chile, le expresa, necesita saber qué decide Bolivia a este respecto, para actuar en consecuencia.

El visitante boliviano expresa que, no puede adelantar un juicio en este sentido por no haber recibido instrucciones.

Se le reitera la sinceridad de propósitos de nuestro Gobierno.

Se despide el visitante agradeciendo la receptividad del Sr. Canciller para concederle una audiencia; expresa que destacará ante su Gobierno el interés de Chile de seguir negociando y reitera los saludos que envió con él el Presidente de la República y el Canciller Adriázola.

SANTIAGO, 15 de marzo de 1978.

CLN/mmv.

V° B°

EDUARDO CISTERNAS PARODI
Director de Relaciones Internacionales

it already has higher rates on the internal stretches of the same service. Moreover, Chile would not agree, because as he has already mentioned, a large part of the cargo is Chilean minerals.

The Minister asked whether, in order to move ahead with these exploratory discussions to find a new formula, Bolivia had considered keeping the relations at the level of Ambassadors or at the level of Chargés d'Affaires. Chile needs to know what Bolivia decides in this respect, to be able to act accordingly.

The Bolivian visitor said that he cannot announce any decision on this matter because he has not been given any instructions.

It was reiterated to him the sincerity of our Government's purposes.

The visitor says goodbye by thanking the Foreign Minister for granting him an audience; he said that he would emphasize to his Government Chile's interest in continuing to negotiate and repeated the greetings sent with him by the President of the Republic and Foreign Minister Adriázola.

SANTIAGO, 15 March 1978.

CLN/mmv.

Approval
EDUARDO CISTERNAS PARODI
Director of International Relations

Annex 239

Letter from the President of Bolivia to the President of Chile, 17 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, *History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978* (1978), pp 74-75

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO - BOLIVIANAS

1975 - 1978

ANEXO 21

PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA

La Paz, 17 de marzo de 1978.

Excelentísimo Señor
Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
General de Ejército,
Presidente de la República de Chile,
Santiago.–

Excelentísimo Señor Presidente:

Me corresponde dar respuesta a su carta de 18 de enero último, en circunstancias en que, pese a mi mejor voluntad, concluye el diálogo que resolvimos reanudar el 8 de febrero de 1975, bajo tan aparentemente prometedores auspicios.

Muchos esclarecimientos estaban ausentes hasta hace muy pocos días. Puesto que ellos eran indispensables para haber podido ingresar a una nueva etapa del diálogo bilateral –la de los Representantes Especiales, acordada en septiembre del año pasado–, me esforcé en lograrlos acudiendo al expediente de enviar a Santiago un Emisario Confidencial.

Infelizmente, las dudas que buscábamos disipar por ese medio, lo han sido, en efecto, pero en un sentido totalmente negativo y contrario a mis más íntimos deseos. En la conversación que el Embajador Vargas mantuvo, en dicha calidad de Enviado Confidencial, con el señor Canciller de la República de Chile y cuyos términos me han sido transmitidos personalmente en los últimos días, se han aclarado conceptos y se han confirmado temores que anduvieron todos estos años como una nebulosa, a pesar de las insistentes gestiones desarrolladas por nuestra diplomacia.

Personalmente, me he preguntado en más de una ocasión cómo, no obstante las optimistas expresiones de Vuestra Excelencia, hubiese sido posible superar problemas y avanzar en acciones futuras. Soy un convencido de que esto es posible sólo cuando existe una firme voluntad política, claramente expresada y plenamente resuelta, de alcanzar un objetivo, máxime si éste es de índole internacional y el ánimo coincidente de las partes soberanas comprometidas se hace indispensable.

El Enviado Confidencial trajo noticias muy desalentadoras, que confirmaron las preocupaciones que, con toda franqueza, trasmití a Vuestra Excelencia en mi carta del 21 de diciembre del año pasado. Entre otras menores, no fue sin sorpresa que me enteré que el Canciller Carvajal declaró al Embajador Vargas que su Gobierno no

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA

La Paz, 17 March 1978.

His Excellency
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Army General
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago.-

Dear President:

I am writing in response to your letter of 18 January of this year, in circumstances that, despite my best will, concludes the dialogue we resolved to resume on 8 February 1975, under such promising auspices.

Many explanations were absent until a very few days ago. Since they were indispensable for entering a new phase of bilateral dialogue (between the Special Representatives, as agreed to in September of last year), I made an effort to obtain them, going so far as to send a Confidential Envoy to Santiago.

Unfortunately, the doubts that we sought to dissipate by that means were indeed dissipated, but in a negative manner and contrary to my deepest desires. In the discussion that Ambassador Vargas had as Confidential Envoy with the Chilean Foreign Minister, the terms of which were personally reported to me in recent days, concepts were clarified and fears were confirmed that had been hovering all these years like a nebula, despite the insistent actions taken by our diplomats.

Personally, I have wondered on more than one occasion how, notwithstanding the optimistic expressions by Your Excellency, it could be possible to overcome problems and make progress with future actions. I am convinced that this is possible only when there is firm political will, that is clearly expressed and fully resolved, to reach an objective, particularly if it is of an international nature, and the coinciding motivation of the sovereign parties involved becomes indispensable.

The Confidential Envoy brought very discouraging news that confirmed the concerns that I had sent to Your Excellency, with total candour, in my letter of 21 December of last year. Among other minor concerns, I was surprised to learn that Foreign Minister Carvajal had told Ambassador Vargas that his Government had not

había hecho ni consideraba que debía hacer ningún esfuerzo destinado a buscar el acuerdo previo del Perú, de que trata el Protocolo chileno-peruano de 1929; y que todas las condiciones para otorgarnos una salida soberana al mar por el Norte de Arica, señaladas en la respuesta del 19 de diciembre de 1975, sobre todo la relativa al canje territorial, permanecían inalterables y no serían objeto de negociación ulterior.

Aunque tal rígida postura, convertiría la proposición chilena, de una base para conciliación de criterios en un "diktat" innegociable, todavía me pregunto: ¿cómo alentar otras etapas, sin exponerme a engañar a mi pueblo con instancias dilatorias e inútiles?

Las aclaraciones logradas han servido, pues, para iluminar un panorama penosamente negatorio. Nos demuestran, de una vez por todas, que el Gobierno de Chile ha abandonado el espíritu que guió el encuentro de Charaña y, al hacerlo, destruye el fundamento esencial del diálogo que, con la mejor buena fe de mi parte, restablecimos hace tres años.

No le queda, en consecuencia, a mi Gobierno otro camino que el de suspender las relaciones diplomáticas con el que preside Vuestra Excelencia, como lo está notificando hoy mismo a Vuestro representante el Canciller Adriázola. Tal actitud deberemos observar los bolivianos, en tanto Chile no llegue a comprender que en nada le beneficia mantener indefinidamente asfixiado a todo un pueblo que, pese a cualquier adversidad, se reintegrará un día al Océano Pacífico. Nos alienta la esperanza que tal día llegará, no sólo porque Chile revisará su hasta ahora radical posición, sino porque contamos con el consenso internacional que avala la justicia de nuestra causa y porque, siendo de vocación noble y pacífica, mi pueblo tiene la virtud del valor, que lo engrandece aún más cuando las dificultades se agigantan.

Saluda a Vuestra Excelencia,

HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
General de Fuerza
Presidente de la República de Bolivia.

made or even considered any efforts to seek Peru's prior agreement, as set forth in the Chilean-Peruvian Protocol of 1929; and that all the conditions for granting us a sovereign outlet to the sea through the North of Arica, as indicated in the response dated 19 December 1975, particularly with respect to the exchange of territory, would remain unchanged and would not be subject to further negotiations.

Although this rigid stance would turn the Chilean proposal from a basis for reconciling criteria into a non-negotiable "diktat", I still ask myself: how can I encourage further steps without deceiving my people with useless meetings that are a waste of time?

The clarifications given have thus made it clear that the situation is painfully pointless. They have shown us, once and for all, that the Chilean Government has abandoned the spirit that guided the meeting in Charaña and in so doing, is destroying the key foundation for the dialogue that, with the greatest good faith on my part, we re-established three years ago.

Consequently, my Government has no other path than to suspend diplomatic relations with the Government presided over by Your Excellency, as I am informing your representative Foreign Minister Adriázola today. We Bolivians must take this stance until Chile understands that it in no way benefits from keeping an entire people indefinitely asphyxiated, as they will reintegrate to the Pacific Ocean someday, despite any adversity. We are encouraged by the hope that that day will arrive, not only because Chile will revise its radical position to date, but also because we count on an international consensus that endorses the fairness of our cause and because, with a noble and peaceful desire, my people have the virtue of valour, which makes them even greater as their difficulties increase.

I salute Your Excellency,

HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
General of the Army
President of the Republic of
Bolivia.

Annex 240

Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
17 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, *History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978* (1978), pp 78-79

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO - BOLIVIANAS

1975 - 1978

ANEXO 23

DECLARACION DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE

En el día de hoy, 17 de marzo de 1978, el señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia hizo llegar a nuestro Encargado de Negocios a.i. en La Paz, una nota en la que comunica la decisión de su Gobierno de suspender las relaciones diplomáticas con Chile.

Para justificar esta medida el señor Ministro manifiesta que la reanudación de relaciones diplomáticas entre Chile y Bolivia concretada en la entrevista de Charaña se fundó en el propósito de "conferir al diálogo que se reiniciaba, la finalidad primordial de alcanzar a través del mismo, una solución justa para el enclaustramiento geográfico que nos fue impuesto hace ya 99 años". Agrega que durante el tiempo transcurrido, el Gobierno de Chile no manifestó ánimo alguno de flexibilidad y mantuvo todos los condicionamientos de su proposición de 19 de diciembre de 1975. Añade que recientes gestiones confidenciales realizadas a iniciativa de Bolivia le han dado la evidencia de que el Gobierno de Chile ha abandonado el compromiso esencial que justificó la reapertura del diálogo que fundamentalmente buscaba su retorno soberano al mar.

El Gobierno de Chile ha recibido con profunda extrañeza estas afirmaciones por los siguientes motivos:

1.- La reunión de Charaña se efectuó a iniciativa del Presidente de Chile. En ella ambos Jefes de Estado resolvieron únicamente –como lo dice en forma expresa el Acta suscrita en esa oportunidad– "buscar fórmulas de solución a los asuntos vitales que ambos países confrontan, como el relativo a la situación de mediterraneidad que afecta a Bolivia, dentro de recíprocas conveniencias y atendiendo a las aspiraciones de los pueblos boliviano y chileno".

2.- El Gobierno de Chile propuso, en diciembre de 1975, concretar bases para una negociación, las que fueron aceptadas por Bolivia en términos generales.

3.- Con posterioridad, como queda demostrado por las numerosas reuniones entre los señores Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de ambos países; por manifestaciones expresas del Presidente de Chile al Presidente de Bolivia y por instrucciones permanentes a nuestra Embajada en La Paz, el Gobierno chileno ha venido reiterando su propósito de impulsar las negociaciones destinadas a satisfacer la aspiración de Bolivia de tener una salida soberana al mar.

4.- Durante una reunión celebrada en Nueva York, con ocasión de la última Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Bolivia y Perú acordaron el nombramiento de representantes especiales precisamente para impulsar las negociaciones.

5.- Según cable transmitido por la Agencia Ansa, el Presidente Banzer, en declaraciones al diario "Presencia", reconoció en esos mismos días que los acontecimientos relacionados con las negociaciones habían sido muy dinámicos, "por lo que

DECLARATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE

Today, 17 March 1978, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a note to our interim Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz reporting his Government's decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Chile.

To justify this measure, the Minister states that the resumption of diplomatic relations agreed to in the Charaña meeting was based on the intention to "bestow on the dialogue being re-established, the primordial purpose to reach through it a fair solution to the geographic confinement that was imposed on us 99 years ago." He goes on to say that in the meantime, the Chilean Government has not shown any flexibility and has maintained all the conditions from its proposal of 19 December 1975. He further states that recent confidential actions taken at Bolivia's initiative have shown that the Chilean Government has abandoned the essential commitment that justified reopening the dialogue that fundamentally sought its sovereign return to the sea.

The Government of Chile received these statements with profound surprise, for the following reasons.

1. The Charaña meeting was held at the initiative of the President of Chile. At it, both Heads of State resolved solely to "seek formulas for solving the vital matters that both countries face, such as the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, taking into account their reciprocal interests and addressing the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples."

2. In December 1975, the Chilean Government proposed grounds for negotiations that were accepted by Bolivia in general terms.

3. Thereafter, as shown by the numerous meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries, by the express statements of the President of Chile to the President of Bolivia and by permanent instructions to our Embassy in La Paz, the Chilean Government has been reiterating its purpose to advance the negotiations aimed at satisfying Bolivia's aspiration to have a sovereign outlet to the sea.

4. During a meeting held in New York, on the occasion of the last General Assembly of the United Nations, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Bolivia and Peru agreed to appoint special representatives specifically to move ahead with the negotiations.

5. According to a cable transmitted by Agency Ansa, President Banzer, in statements made to the newspaper "Presencia" acknowledged on those same days that the events related to the negotiations had been very dynamic, "and therefore

anunció que su Gobierno ingresará a una pausa a fin de analizar la situación"; y que sería el futuro Parlamento elegido por la voluntad popular el que definiría si Bolivia aceptaba o rechazaba el canje territorial propuesto por Chile. Agregó que su Gobierno no tomaría decisión final sobre el asunto.

6.- En cambio, el Gobierno de Chile insistió en poner en ejecución el mecanismo acordado en Nueva York. En efecto, en carta del 23 de noviembre de 1977., el Presidente Pinochet expresó textualmente al Presidente Banzer: "Mi Gobierno mantiene inalterable la voluntad política que dio origen a esas negociaciones y está dispuesto a impulsarlas de acuerdo con los deseos y con la intensidad que Vuestra Excelencia estime aconsejable". En carta posterior de 18 de enero de 1978, le manifestó: "Continúo estimando, por tanto, que a fin de evitar un estancamiento de las negociaciones, sería útil la designación de representantes especiales tal como fue convenido hace apenas cuatro meses. Resulta para mí evidente que si ellos proceden a una evaluación de los puntos de acuerdo y de aquellos que han de ser superados y formulan sugerencias de acción futura a nuestros Gobiernos las negociaciones habrán de progresar. No se trata de una 'fase dilatoria' como parece pensarlo Vuestra Excelencia, sino justamente de evitar el estancamiento del diálogo".

7.- El 10 de marzo recién pasado, un enviado especial del Presidente Banzer, su Ministro de Integración, señor Willy Vargas, se entrevistó en Santiago con el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile para analizar el estado actual de las negociaciones y manifestar que, en atención a que el clima necesario para la negociación marítima se había perturbado, su Gobierno deseaba explorar la posibilidad de buscar una solución de "medio camino", la cual, sin sustituir la negociación en curso, permitiera alcanzar algunos objetivos inmediatos. El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile expresó al Enviado Especial del Presidente Banzer, la disposición de su Gobierno para estudiar estas proposiciones con el debido detenimiento para llegar a una solución compatible con los Tratados vigentes.

8.- La decisión de suspender las relaciones diplomáticas se produce en los precisos momentos en que termina una reunión técnica chileno-boliviana, presidida por los Subsecretarios de Transportes de ambos países y destinada a perfeccionar las actuales facilidades de tránsito de que disfruta Bolivia. Esta reunión ha concluido justamente hoy con la firma de acuerdos ampliamente favorables para los intereses del país vecino.

Todo lo anterior revela que no existe ningún hecho que explique la inusitada decisión tomada por el Gobierno de Bolivia, la cual viene a perturbar la convivencia americana, hoy más necesaria que nunca.

Santiago, 17 de marzo de 1978.-

he announced that his Government would take a break in order to analyse the situation" and that it would be the future Parliament elected by the people that would decide whether Bolivia accepted or rejected the territorial exchange proposed by Chile. He also said that his Government would not make a final decision on the matter.

6. However, the Chilean Government insisted on executing the mechanism agreed to in New York. Indeed, in a letter dated 23 November 1977, President Pinochet said the following verbatim to President Banzer: "My Government maintains unchanged the political will that gave rise to these negotiations and is willing to move ahead with them in accordance with the desires and the with the intensity that Your Excellency deems advisable." In a subsequent letter dated 18 January 1978, he said to him: "Therefore, I still consider that in order to avoid obstructing the negotiations, it would be useful to appoint the Special Representatives, as was agreed just four months ago. It is clear for me that if they come to an evaluation of the points of agreement and those that must be overcome, and make suggestions for future action to be taken by our Governments, the negotiations will progress. This is not a 'delaying phase' as Your Excellency seems to think, but a way to avoid the stagnation of the dialogue."

7. On 10 March of this year, a special envoy from President Banzer, his Minister of Integration, Mr. Willy Vargas, met with the Chilean Foreign Minister in Santiago to analyse the current status of the negotiations and stated that, since the necessary climate for the maritime negotiations had been disrupted, his Government wished to explore the possibility of finding a "middle-of-the-road" solution which would not replace the current negotiations but would allow us to reach certain immediate objectives. The Chilean Foreign Minister told President Banzer's Special Envoy that his Government was willing to study these proposals with due care to reach a solution that is compatible with the Treaties in force.

8. The decision to suspend diplomatic relations was taken at the very end of a technical meeting between Chile and Bolivia presided over by the Undersecretaries of Transport of both countries, with the aim of perfecting the current transit facilities that Bolivia enjoys. This meeting ended today with the signing of agreements that were highly favourable to the interests of the neighbour country.

All of the foregoing demonstrates that there are no facts to explain the unusual decision taken by the Bolivian Government, which will disrupt the harmony in the americas—today more necessary than ever before.

Santiago, 17 March 1978.—

Annex 241

Official Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia breaking-off diplomatic relations with Chile, 17 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 147 to its Memorial

SECRETARIA GENERAL DE INFORMACIONES
DE LA PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
Y CULTO
10 AGO. 1990
No. Inventario 01698

La salida al mar: una necesidad imperiosa

LA PAZ - BOLIVIA
1978

DECLARACION DE PRENSA
(Ruptura de Relaciones Diplomáticas con Chile)

BOLIVIA DETERMINO LA RUPTURA DE RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS CON CHILE

(La Paz, 17 de marzo de 1978)

1.— Hoy, 17 de marzo, el Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación ha determinado la ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas con el Gobierno de la República de Chile, decisión que acaba de ser comunicada al Representante de ese país en Bolivia.

2.— Para comprender los alcances de esta medida, hay que confrontarla con su antecedente inmediato, es decir, con la reanudación de estas relaciones, acordada el 8 de febrero de 1975. En efecto, en tal ocasión se justificó la reapertura de los cauces normales de la relación bilateral boliviano-chilena, porque los dos Gobiernos habían resuelto, al más alto nivel y como expresión de una voluntad de mutuo entendimiento, conferir al diálogo que se restablecía un fin concreto y primordial, con sentido histórico: el de buscar, en negociaciones francas, una solución justa y viable para el enclaustramiento geográfico que le fue impuesto a Bolivia hace noventa y nueve años, mediante una salida plenamente soberana hasta el Océano Pacífico.

3.— Durante el tiempo transcurrido desde entonces, el Gobierno de Bolivia ha desarrollado los máximos esfuerzos para encontrar coincidencias básicas y términos justos en procura de alcanzar la solución del centenario encierro boliviano.

4.— No obstante y al cabo de tres años, desestimando tales empeños, ignorando la expectativa de todo un pueblo y despreciando un alto sentido de solidaridad americanista, el Gobierno chileno mantie-

PRESS STATEMENT
(Breaking-off Diplomatic Relations with Chile)

BOLIVIA DECIDED TO BREAK–OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE

(La Paz, March 17, 1978)

1. Today, March 17, the Government of the National Armed Forces has decided to break-off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Chile, a decision that has just been announced to the Representative of that country in Bolivia.

2. In order to understand the extent of this measure, it must be compared with its immediate predecessor, that is the resumption of those relations, agreed to on February 8, 1975. In fact at that time, resumption of normal Bolivian-Chilean bilateral relations was justified since both governments had decided, at a very high level and as an expression of a will for mutual understanding, to bestow on the dialogue that was being re-established a specific and primordial purpose with a historical content, that of searching in frank negotiations a fair and viable solution for the geographical isolation imposed on Bolivia ninety-nine years before by means of a fully sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

3. In the time elapsed since then, the Government of Bolivia has exerted its outmost efforts to find basic common grounds and fair terms in the attempt to reach a solution for the century long Bolivian isolation.

4. However, after three years of ignoring such efforts, disregarding the expectations of an entire people and scorning a high degree of the Americas' feelings of solidarity, the Chilean Government has maintained,

ne, sin ánimo alguno de flexibilidad, todos los condicionamientos iniciales, lo cual convierte lo que debió ser una base para la conciliación de criterios, en un "diktat" innegociable. actitud que no sólo contradice la naturaleza de cualquier proceso de negociación, sino que desconoce el espíritu del documento de Charaña y descarta toda posibilidad de avanzar hacia un arreglo.

5.— Recientes gestiones cumplidas a iniciativa de Bolivia, mediante el envío a Santiago de un Embajador en Misión Especial, dan, además, la evidencia de que el Gobierno de Chile ha abandonado el compromiso esencial que explica históricamente la reapertura del diálogo, el mismo que, se justificó por la decisión de ponerlo al servicio fundamental de nuestro retorno soberano al mar quedando así, totalmente desvirtuada su razón de ser.

En efecto, la gestión confidencial, lejos de encontrar la receptividad requerida para identificar nuevos factores que dieran proyección efectiva a la instancia de los Representantes Especiales, confirmó posiciones y conceptos muy desalentadores, como el que Chile, al margen de mantener inmodificables todas sus exigencias contenidas en el documento del 19 de diciembre de 1975, no había hecho y consideraba que no debía hacer ningún esfuerzo destinado a buscar el acuerdo previo con el Perú, en el marco del Protocolo de 1929. Ello, obviamente, tal como se analizó en las declaraciones del 14 de febrero pasado, imposibilitan impulsar negociaciones con perspectivas reales de culminarlas en la práctica.

6.— Frente a tales hechos y luego de agotar todas las instancias y cuanto puede hacerse para persuadir al Gobierno de Chile a que adopte actitudes

with no attempt at flexibility whatsoever, all its initial conditions, thus making what should have been the basis for a conciliation of criteria a non-negotiable attitude or "diktat" which not only counteracts the nature of any negotiation process, but willfully dismisses the spirit of the Charaña document and discards any possibility of making progress towards a solution.

5. Recent endeavors carried out at the initiative of Bolivia, by means of sending an Ambassador on Special Mission to Santiago, provide additional evidence that the Government of Chile has abandoned the essential commitment that provides a historical explanation for resuming dialogue that was justified by the decision to place it at the fundamental service of our sovereign return to the sea, thus leaving it totally devoid of a raison d'être.

In fact, far from finding the required receptivity for identifying new factors that would provide an effective projection to the Special Representatives level, the confidential enterprise confirmed highly disappointing positions and concepts, such as that Chile, in addition to maintaining all their demands contained in the December 19, 1975 document without any modification, had not exerted any efforts aimed at obtaining a previous agreement with Peru, neither did it consider it should exert any efforts for that purpose, within the framework of the 1929 Protocol. Obviously, those positions make it impossible to promote negotiations with real prospects of achieving their goals in actual fact, as it was analyzed in last February 14 statements.

6. In the face of those facts, and after exhausting all instances and everything that could be done to persuade the Government of Chile to adopt attitudes

que permitan garantizar evidentes avances hacia la solución planteada por Bolivia, el Gobierno de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación considera de su deber determinar la ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas con ese país, puesto que, por los antecedentes anotados, las mismas han perdido, en tanto Chile mantenga una postura inflexible, toda significación para el pueblo boliviano.

7.— Es preciso dejar constancia que esa decisión responde a un cuidadoso análisis de la situación. Se la adopta luego de haberla examinado con la seriedad que aconseja el manejo responsable de los negocios exteriores, como ha sido norma invariable en la conducta del Gobierno presidido por el señor General don Hugo Banzer Suárez. Ella se inspira también en la innegable buena fe con que ha obrado el Gobierno en el curso de las negociaciones marítimas y porque, como lo dijo en anterior oportunidad, nadie es responsable de que esa buena fe no sea respetada. Se acudió a Charaña con el sano propósito de buscar una solución para el magno problema nacional, ya que el servicio a los altos intereses de la Patria no debe estar limitado por el temor ante la incertidumbre de cualquier resultado. Nuestra permanente preocupación ha sido la de mezclar el más arraigado anhelo nacional con la demagogia o la discusión circunstacial, tan frecuentes en los afanes de la política interna.

8.— El Gobierno de Bolivia se reserva las instancias multilaterales a nivel regional y mundial, especialmente en el marco del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, para replantear su demanda marítima. En esos foros, nuestros Representantes expondrán ampliamente los fundamentos y los alcan-

that would guarantee observable progress towards the solution proposed by Bolivia, the Government of the National Armed Forces considers it its duty to decide to break-off diplomatic relations with that country. By all background information provided, those relations have lost all meaning for the Bolivian people, as long as Chile maintains an inflexible position.

7. It is necessary to enter into the records that the decision is the result of a very thorough analysis of the situation. It has been taken after having examined it with the earnestness required by a responsible management of external affairs, as it has been the invariable standard of governmental behavior during the presidency of General Hugo Banzer Suarez. It is also inspired in the undeniable good faith of all the actions of the Government during negotiations about the sea, and, as it was pointed out previously, no one is responsible for the lack of respect for that good faith. We went to Charaña with the earnest purpose of looking for a solution to the foremost problem of our nation, since serving the higher interests of the motherland should not be constrained by fear of uncertainty about any results. Our constant concern has been avoiding the combination of the deepest-rooted national aspiration with demagoguery or circumstantial debate, so frequent in internal political activities.

8. The Government of Bolivia reserves multilateral instances at the regional and global levels, specially in the framework of the Security Council of the United Nations, to again voice its demand of access to the sea. In those fora, our Representatives will fully present the basis and the extent

ces de las negociaciones iniciadas por Bolivia el 26 de agosto de 1975.

9.— Proclamamos una vez más el derecho irrenunciable que asiste a la nacionalidad boliviana para reintegrarse al Océano Pacífico y reasumir la soberanía marítima de la que fuimos brutalmente despojadas mediante una injustificable guerra de conquista.

10.— Denunciamos nuevamente la agresión consumada contra el patrimonio geográfico de Bolivia, con el desvío de las aguas del río Lauca, perjuicio cuya reparación fue firmemente sostenida en el curso de las negociaciones marítimas.

11.— Consideramos, asimismo, que obstaculizar sistemáticamente la solución del enclaustramiento geográfico de Bolivia, no puede constituir un objetivo internacional y que tal actitud adquiere la forma de otra agresión, esta vez dirigida en contra del propósito de arribar a entendimientos constructivos, de los cuales habrían resultado innegables beneficios, como los de restituir la confianza entre pueblos vecinos y alentar los ideales de paz, desarrollo e integración en la comunidad americana.

12.— Hacemos un vehemente llamado a todos los bolivianos para que, por encima de diferencias políticas y otras de carácter circunstancial, expresen su vigorosa voluntad convergente al logro de nuestro retorno soberano al mar, porque la historia nos enseña que sólo triunfan aquellas causas que cuentan con la fortaleza de una férrea unidad nacional. Llegará el día en que Bolivia, por la indeclinable decisión de su pueblo, se reintegrará al Océano Pacífico porque ningún país puede permanecer eterna-

of the negotiations initiated by Bolivia on August 26, 1975.

9. We proclaim once again the unremitting right due to the Bolivian nation to reintegrate itself to the Pacific Ocean, and to reassume the maritime sovereignty of which we were so brutally dispossessed in an unjustifiable war of conquest.

10. We denounce once again the aggression carried out against Bolivia's geographical heritage by the diversion of the waters of the Lauca River, the

reparation of that damage was firmly sustained during the negotiations about access to the sea.

11. We also consider that systematically placing obstacles to the solution of Bolivia's geographical isolation cannot be an international objective, and that such an attitude takes on the shape of another aggression, this time aimed at the purpose of arriving at constructive agreements which would have provided undeniable benefits, such as the re-establishment of trust among neighboring countries, and it would have promoted ideals of peace, development and integration in the community of the Americas.

12. We vehemently call upon all Bolivians to set aside their political differences and other circumstantial differences and to express their strong will converging on the achievement of our sovereign return to the sea, because History teaches us that only those causes succeed that can count on the strength of an ironclad national unity. The day will come when Bolivia, by the unremitting decision of its people, will return to the Pacific Ocean because no country can eternally



remain in isolation, nor can any nation be insensitive to the demands for solidarity, because the international consensus guarantees the justice of our cause, and because we Bolivians have the virtue of courage that grows to gigantic proportions in adversity.

Annex 242

Declaration of the Government of Chile of 23 March 1978

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, *History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978* (1978), p 80

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

HISTORIA DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES CHILENO - BOLIVIANAS

1975 - 1978

ANEXO 24

DECLARACION DEL GOBIERNO DE CHILE

El mismo día, 17 de marzo de 1978, en que Bolivia comunicó oficialmente su decisión de romper relaciones diplomáticas con Chile, el Presidente Hugo Banzer respondió una carta personal que el Presidente Pinochet le había enviado el 18 de enero próximo pasado.

En ella, el Jefe de Estado de Bolivia se refiere en especial a la conversación que su Enviado Confidencial, el Ministro Willy Vargas, mantuvo el 10 del mes en curso con el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile.

Se refiere el ilustre remitente a la inalterada condición de compensación territorial para ceder una salida al mar, señalada en la Nota chilena de 19 de diciembre de 1975 y expresa que el Embajador Willy Vargas "le ha aclarado conceptos y confirmado temores que anduvieron todos estos años como una nebulosa a pesar de las insistentes gestiones desarrolladas por la diplomacia boliviana".

Es increíble que el Gobierno de Bolivia haya tenido una nebulosa al respecto en circunstancias que esa condición –la compensación territorial– había sido reiterada personalmente de Presidente a Presidente, de Canciller a Canciller y a los dos Embajadores que Bolivia tuvo en Santiago en los tres últimos años.

Por lo demás, en las entrevistas concedidas en dos oportunidades el mismo día por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile al Enviado Confidencial boliviano, el primero reiteró los puntos de vista chilenos expresados en múltiples oportunidades anteriores. Ellos no constituyeron, por tanto, ninguna novedad que el Gobierno de Bolivia no conociera de antemano. Estas entrevistas se realizaron en presencia del Encargado de Negocios en Santiago y del Embajador de Chile en La Paz. En la segunda estuvo también presente el representante chileno designado para las negociaciones con Bolivia, Señor Enrique Bernstein.

El Gobierno de Chile reitera que en la negociación con Bolivia ha procedido con la seriedad que caracteriza la dirección de sus relaciones internacionales.

Santiago, 23 de marzo de 1978.

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE

The same day, 17 March 1978, on which Bolivia officially communicated its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Chile, President Hugo Banzer answered a personal letter that President Pinochet had sent him on 18 January last.

In it, the Bolivian Head of State referred in particular to the conversion that his Confidential Envoy, Minister Willy Vargas, had on the 10th of this month with the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The illustrious sender referred to the unchanged condition of territorial compensation to cede an outlet to the sea, indicated in the Chilean Note of 19 December 1975 and says that Ambassador Willy Vargas "has clarified concepts and confirmed fears to him that had been hovering all these years like a nebula, despite the insistent actions taken by Bolivian diplomats."

It is incredible that the Bolivian Government has a nebula about this in circumstances when that condition—territorial compensation—has been reiterated personally from President to President, from Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister, and to the two Ambassadors that Bolivia had in Santiago in the past three years.

Moreover, in the interviews granted on two occasions on the same day by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Confidential Envoy of Bolivia, the Minister reiterated Chile's point of view expressed on multiple prior occasions. Therefore, there was not any type of great change that the Bolivian Government was not previously aware of. These interviews were held in the presence of the Chargé d'Affaires in Santiago and the Chilean Ambassador in La Paz. The Chilean representative appointed for the negotiations with Bolivia, Mr. Enrique Bernstein, was also present at the second interview.

The Chilean Government reiterates that in its negotiations with Bolivia it has proceeded with the seriousness that characterizes the management of its international relations.

Santiago, 23 March 1978

Annex 243

Verbatim Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/S-10/PV.5, 26 May 1978

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/105/71/PDF/NL810571.pdf?OpenElement>

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Official Records

5th PLENARY MEETING
Friday, 26 May 1978, at 10.45 a.m.
NEW YORK

President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (*continued*)

1. Mr. ADRIÁZOLA VALDA (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Once again it is my pleasant duty to express to you, Mr. President, the satisfaction it gives me to see you presiding over our work. Although it would be redundant to repeat the very justified and unstinted praise showered on you, allow me at least to reiterate the admiration of my Government and of the delegation of Bolivia for the tact and skill displayed in the exercise of the presidency, which has been characterized not only by the number of sessions of the General Assembly but also by the variety of items dealt with, all of them of acute and vital interest for the purposes of the Organization.

2. I wish to place on record also my sincere appreciation of the efforts and ability displayed by Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas in guiding the work of the Preparatory Committee for this special session. While his gifts as a skilful diplomat and negotiator are well known to us, the convening of this session and the quality of the report he has submitted [*A/S-10/1*] show him to be a statesman of great worth, whose spirit is at the service of peace and of the essential purposes of the United Nations.

3. In referring to those who have worked with so much devotion for the cause of disarmament, which is the cause of peace, it would be an unwarranted omission not to mention with gratitude the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and his tireless efforts to establish peace whenever it has been breached.

4. Bolivia, a country in which with profound faith we nourish the hope that men and nations will be able to move forward to their destinies in an atmosphere of stable peace, strengthened by understanding and justice, is most pleased to attend this lofty universal encounter. It has been convened for the noble purpose of achieving, through solidarity and action, the fundamental agreements and categorical responses which mankind awaits with justified anxiety in order to be able to direct its evolution and constant improvement, in freedom from the fear of a holocaust.

5. The representatives of the Powers, and of large and small countries alike, have responded to the call by the United Nations, no doubt convinced that the supreme task of preserving peace and security requires decisive and unanimous participation.

6. Heads of Government have come from various parts of the world with a solemn mandate from their respective peoples to strive to ensure that from the present deliberations there will emerge a clear prospect of peace and cooperation, of brotherly understanding and shared well-being.

7. Entire nations have placed in our hands their aspirations and the choice of doing away with the threat of a generalized conflict and of mass destruction.

8. Whether or not we disappoint immense populations who have placed their confidence in us will depend on our intelligence, imagination and sincere political will.

9. This then is a commitment of exceptional historical significance. We are faced with the need which will brook no delay to agree on the foundations to build a different world, at a time when, as the President of France so rightly described [*3rd meeting*], we face the "dawn of the third millenium" of mankind, a world in which there is no room for the mistakes of the past, a world capable of renouncing armed confrontation and in which from day to day the ideas of an increasingly harmonious and constructive coexistence will become tangible realities.

10. The welcome presence in this universal forum of high State officials ensures that new and painful conflagrations will not be due to indifference.

11. We have spoken of small and large countries because that is the characteristic of our international community and because it determines the existence of different priorities, needs and consequently of interests and options which are also different, in order to face the challenge of our times.

12. Bolivia, as a founding Member of the United Nations, from the outset shared the just concern aroused in the international community by the stockpiling of weapons. We have watched with a heavy heart how a major part of scientific and technological advances is allocated to create and manufacture instruments of war of incalculable destructive capacity.

13. Hence from our modest sphere of influence, we have never spared our most resolute support for every effort made within the Organization or outside it, to halt the enormous expenditure represented by existing arsenals, to limit the possession of weapons to logical defence needs and to put an end to the nuclear race to which the great Powers are committed. We have done so because we believe that the possession of increasingly sophisticated and

costly instruments of destruction is a grave threat not only to the peace of the world but to the very future of the human race.

14. Indeed, we know well that peaceful coexistence can only be achieved with the whole-hearted support of every nation constituting the world community. Nevertheless, we are bound to recognize that the vast majority of countries do not have the same ability to help to achieve so lofty a goal. It is the great Powers which possess the tools likely to have the greatest impact on the decisions determining the march of mankind; they are, therefore, called upon to shoulder a greater burden of responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.

15. I said earlier that we face a commitment of exceptional significance because of the pressing need to halt the boundless expansion of the arms race. We have decided upon the implementation of a vast plan for general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate to emphasize that there will be insurmountable obstacles to that plan, unless we first establish a commitment of truly historical scope. Such a world consensus of far-reaching projections is essential if an atmosphere of mutual confidence through frank and unconditional co-operation is to be restored.

16. The various degrees of progress to which I have already referred, furthermore, prevent us from attempting to achieve the solutions we are seeking through a common approach.

17. No pressure or circumstances can compel the States of the developing world to stand by impassively while measures are taken which delay their economic growth, prolong their state of dependency, restrict their access to markets, and prevent them from controlling their trade in raw materials, in other words, which make technological know-how an exclusive heritage and the new instrument of domination.

18. The mistrust engendered by these conditions is aggravated by the unbridled arms race, the annual cost of which, according to the latest data confirmed here, amounts to $400,000 million, while the majority of mankind suffers from poverty, hunger, epidemic disease and illiteracy.

19. This horrifying situation aggravates the maladjustments and inequitable treatments in international economic relations and brings with it the contradiction which threatens to worsen the imbalances, creating a state of permanent confrontation between the industrialized nations and the developing countries.

20. Therefore, as we see it, it is essential to go beyond a programme for the systematic reduction of armaments or the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

21. It is vital that the great Powers define permanent criteria with a view to reconciling their respective interests without ignoring the aspirations of the less advanced countries. Only a universal consensus of these practical and moral dimensions can guarantee the success of the efforts we are making today.

22. The two great Powers bear a heavy responsibility. Willingly or not, they have taken on the highly dangerous role of becoming the guardians of a peace based on coercion and the threat of the most powerful. An armed peace, full of risks, for which they are sacrificing their own peoples and depriving them of the great and noble task of building a shared universal prosperity, an order based on equality that would eliminate differences dividing peoples into rich and poor, prosperous and dispossessed, at a time when the development of science and technology could contribute to bring about a human race worthy of the destiny for which it was created, in a society made up of all the peoples and nations of the world, in an open and complete co-operation that could make good any short-coming or lack that it might suffer.

23. Otherwise, no plan of action will be valid. We do not question the wisdom that will be reflected in the principles proposed, but the transition from theory to deeds of positive benefit can only be achieved with the full co-operation of the political will of the international community on the basis of the rules they have adopted to improve the coexistence of nations. Were this not to be done we would once again suffer a loss of faith in the mechanisms of co-operation, with very discouraging results.

24. To forestall these dangers it would be appropriate to consider a set of practical measures embodying a strong element of solidarity.

25. It would be really significant, for example, if countries with high military budgets could allocate a percentage of those resources to a fund to be administered by the United Nations, to be used solely to support the efforts of developing nations to improve the living conditions of their respective peoples, particularly for food and health projects.

26. The generosity of such a gesture would lead to a new era of brotherly co-operation among the affluent and poor peoples.

27. The special session that we are holding already has valuable material contained in the various proposals submitted by the Preparatory Committee.

28. I consider that we should support the proposal for a study, to be prepared without delay, on the relationship between disarmament and development.

29. Bolivia, which has been the victim of armed aggression, also has a keen interest in strengthening the machinery for a satisfactory collective security and for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

30. We consider as basic the proposals urging a joint endeavour in the elimination of hotbeds of tension or possible conflicts.

31. Unsatisfied aspirations, and plans to maintain unjust

situations indefinitely sometimes make unbridgeable gaps between neighbouring nations, fomenting suspicion and distrust. Such situations must lead to an escalation of arms, thus diverting resources that should be allocated to progress, and delaying the solution of socio-economic problems in depressed areas.

32. My country, determined in its devotion to peace, has always rejected any warlike methods despite the humiliating limitations imposed upon it 100 years ago by an unjust war when it was deprived of its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

33. Being land-locked, Bolivia has been enormously handicapped in its economic and social development, and therefore, in 1975, despite the historical, legal and moral background of the problem, we proposed a formula for peace, integration and development for the southern Pacific that would at the same time allow us to have a sovereign outlet to the sea.

34. The United Nations was fully aware of the efforts made by Bolivia to arrive at an appropriate settlement. Unjust conditions and inflexible positions banished any prospects of such a dialogue, in conjunction with the withdrawal of the goodwill that originally justified the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Chile.

35. Bolivia, and no other country, submitted a constructive plan for creating a major development zone in the area covered by the proposed agreement. We wished in this way to restore our sovereign outlet to the sea by peaceful means, at the same time offering an opportunity for development of the areas adjacent to Bolivia's coastal territory. To reject such a lofty show of selflessness amounts to an aggression against the good faith of a State, an aggression that is undoubtedly one of the most serious that can occur at the level of relations between States. Despite these adverse factors we shall not lose faith in the possibilities of a dialogue, when new and more favourable circumstances open the way.

36. In our opinion the arms race is a distortion of the creative powers of man. Any human endeavour that is the result of superior values should be carried out for an ethical purpose. It is therefore inadmissible that the limitless resources of human intelligence should be placed at the service of irrational destruction.

37. In a world where man astounds himself; where, because of his inventiveness, the mysteries of space are being solved; at a time when incredible technological progress at times makes reality resemble science fiction, we cannot accept the fact that violence, intimidation and insecurity continue to cast shadows on the future of mankind.

38. As signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[1] we cannot fail to express our great satisfaction that both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have acceded to it. It is, of course, encouraging that these Powers recognize the will for peace shown by Latin America in that instrument. The effort to safeguard that region of the planet from the risks of a nuclear war also represents a sound model from which other regions have drawn inspiration in declaring zones of peace, through the decision of their Governments and peoples reflecting their absolute repudiation of war and their solemn profession of peace.

39. In this respect, we believe that Latin America has demonstrated its political maturity and made an important contribution to peace. We are confident that this same maturity, which is to our honour, will inspire new regional contributions to the problems being debated in the world today.

40. Bolivia, as a living part of America and of the developing world, could bring to a debate such as this no other message than that of its faith that reason will prevail over fear and that peace based on understanding and justice will ultimately reign.

41. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union, I should like to congratulate you on the occasion of your election to the presidency of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I wish you all success in the performance of that most responsible task.

42. There is no problem in international politics today which is more important and urgent than that which has brought together in this hall the representatives of 149 States of the world. To stop the arms race and to achieve real disarmament—such is the challenge of the entire course of world developments. The meeting of that challenge will affect the destiny of every man on earth.

43. The problem of disarmament is the focus of attention of the United Nations, and rightly so. Indeed, compliance with the principal requirement of the Charter of the United Nations, which is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", means, above all, especially in the present circumstances, to seek to curb the arms race. The very convening of this special session of the General Assembly attests to this.

44. Following consistently its fundamental line with regard to disarmament questions, the Soviet Union has come to the current session with the firm intention of contributing to its success. The session will live up to the expectations of all peace-loving peoples and States if it helps to bring closer the end of the arms race, and disarmament. It is our firm conviction that the core of the whole problem lies in moving from good intentions and non-committal recommendations, vague in practical terms, even if useful, to concrete—and I stress "concrete"—steps along this main avenue of world politics to lasting peace. As long as half a century ago the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin, referring to the verbal pacifism of certain countries which were much less ready to take effective action to ensure peace, said that:

> "We would prefer, on this and similar issues, to hear the fewest possible general statements, solemn promises

[1] Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

and pompous phrases, and to see as many as possible decisions and measures which were genuinely simple and clear and would really lead to peace, not to mention the complete elimination of the risk of war."

45. War preparations in the world are assuming too dangerous a character for the alarm not to be sounded. In the arsenals there has already been accumulated a destructive potential of such magnitude that, if activated, it could jeopardize the very survival of man on earth. Is that not enough? Yet that potential continues to grow.

46. In the course of the celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, characterizing the essence of the current world situation, said:

"International relations are now at a crossroads, as it were, which could lead either to a growth of trust and co-operation or to a growth of mutual fears, suspicion and stock-piles of arms; a crossroads leading ultimately either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war. Détente offers the opportunity of choosing the road of peace. To miss that opportunity would be a crime. The most important, most pressing task now ... halt the arms race which has engulfed the world."

47. We must realize the stark truth: if we miss this chance, in certain highly important areas, we could reach a point beyond which any possibility of concluding appropriate agreements would be altogether non-existent—and for obvious reasons, since certain types of weapons which are being developed simply do not lend themselves to joint control over their quantity or qualitative characteristics.

48. Unfortunately, scientific and technological progress, meant to serve exclusively the good of mankind, is being used in no small measure to create ever newer means of destruction. The pace of their development far outstrips the progress of international talks on arms limitation. No sooner has an understanding, limited though it may be, been reached on one type of weapon than two or three new types, often even more sophisticated and dangerous, immediately emerge.

49. And what about the huge material and intellectual resources of mankind spent so unproductively on the manufacture of means of annihilation? Over $1,000 million a day are spent on armaments—I stress this—a figure which cannot even be imagined by a normal person. How much faster the peoples would advance along the road of socio-economic development if they were not saddled with the enormous burden of huge military expenditure.

50. We have witnessed a dramatic aggravation of such problems of global dimension as those of providing people with food, medical assistance and housing and supplying industry with raw materials and energy. The environment of this planet may be threatened, and in a very real way. To postpone the solution of such problems would only exacerbate the situation. Yet the funds needed for this are still being devoured by the Moloch of armaments.

51. From any viewpoint, mankind is facing an immediate choice between halting and subsequently reversing the arms race, ending the madness imposed on the world and thus ensuring lasting peace and the possibility of solving the problems of economic development, and allowing the machine of material preparations for war to continue to gain speed, deprive the peoples—or, to be more precise, rob them—of their national wealth and push the world towards catastrophe.

52. The peoples' choice is perfectly clear. If we look at the voting record of the United Nations, which is a sort of mirror image of world politics, even if not always accurate, we see that decisions in favour of peace, détente and disarmament are carried by an overwhelming majority of States.

53. Why then are more and more twists being added to a spiralling arms race? There can be but one answer. The crux of the matter lies in the policy being pursued by certain States, which disregard both the will of the peoples and the decisions of the United Nations, even when they join in taking these decisions.

54. Coinciding with the work of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in New York, another kind of session will be held not far from here, that of the NATO Council. Represented at that session will be a number of States on whose behalf statements are being made here in favour of disarmament. What are the items on the agenda of the NATO session? There is no secret about it; they deal with a further build-up of military preparations as projected into the 1980s.

55. One is prompted to ask what is basic to the policy planning of those States: the continuation of the arms race or the possibility of disarmament?

56. Thus we see how some Governments display inconsistency in yielding to the pressure of those quarters which have thrown in their lot with military production, amassing fabulous profits from arms manufacture.

57. In order to befuddle people, to whip up the arms race they deliberately create myths or, at worst, keep harping on old stories like that of a "Soviet military threat".

58. Every unbiased person knows that whenever the Soviet people have had to go to war it was to repel the aggressors, for wars have been imposed on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has never unleashed war, and it will never do so.

59. It has been claimed from this rostrum in a somewhat suggestive manner that the Soviet missiles termed SS-20 in the West are not aimed in one particular direction but can be turned to aim at any part of the world. In a word, that argument is introduced to confuse the issue by invoking the same trumped-up "Soviet threat". Is it not time American nuclear and missile weapons can be turned in various directions? Yet first and foremost they can be turned in the easily predictable direction. Also, we may ask, why are they deployed in Europe at all?

60. Many of those present must have noticed that repre-

sentatives of some countries generally find it difficult even to pronounce the word "disarmament"; they would rather speak of control. Control over what? Control over armaments; they say it openly, in so many words. But the volume of armaments in the world can be increased to five times the present level even if they are under control. But is that the road to peace? I must remind representatives that this special session has been convened to promote disarmament, and not to whip up the arms race. Therefore, the causes of the continuing arms race are well known to us, and not only to us.

61. We realize full well how many complications and obstacles there are on the road to disarmament. Nevertheless, our Party, our State, the socialist community, are all decisively opposed to any feelings of despair. Peoples, States and responsible Governments are capable of changing this situation if they go about it in the right way instead of pursuing a policy designed to deceive the peoples.

62. No small body of experience has already been accumulated in containing the growth of armaments in a number of areas. Bilateral and multilateral agreements, over 20 in number, have made it possible to close certain channels for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to narrow other channels. Is not the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] indicative of that? Therefore, it is possible to continue advancing beyond the ground gained.

63. Despite all its ups and downs, the current international political climate, of which détente has been a dominant feature for several years now, is favourable to serious arms limitation efforts. There has been no such precedent in the history of the interrelationships between the two world social systems. Some degree of international trust has been created, though still, of course, insufficient. A powerful impetus to all these processes was given by the recent talks of Mr. Brezhnev with the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany.

64. It is essential to make full use of the favourable conditions obtaining at present. Political détente should merge with military détente, otherwise the positive gains in international relations achieved through the years of hard effort by many peoples and States may well vanish. To admit that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of détente, which is actually the case, means admitting that there is no reasonable alternative to disarmament.

65. There is yet another factor which favours disarmament. The reality of the present situation is such that approximate equality or parity exists in the military field, sufficient to ensure defence, and that is recognized by both sides. However, the existing balance of military power is somewhere at the level of the Mont Blanc. As things are going, it may soon reach still greater heights. To halt the build-up of armaments and then to reduce their level without upsetting the established correlation of forces, that is, without prejudicing the security of anyone, is an opportunity which must absolutely not be missed.

66. On behalf of the Soviet Union, the delegation of the USSR is able to say quite clearly that, if other States are prepared to disarm, the Soviet Union will not be found amiss. Military superiority is not our goal. There is not a single objective which our country intends to attain by military means. We perceive the security of our State and international peace in general through the prism of curbing the arms race, and of agreements on disarmament, agreements concluded in good faith, accommodating equally the interests of all contracting parties.

67. We do not claim to have exhaustive answers ready for all the questions arising with respect to disarmament, which is a vast problem not easy to solve. However, we have our own clear ideas in that respect. The call for disarmament has been inscribed on the banner of our socialist State since the very moment it was hoisted over the world. Concrete initiatives in this field have been tried and tested in the course of the long struggle for disarmament waged by the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist States. The limitation of armaments, disarmament measures, are an integral part of the programme of struggle for peace, international co-operation and for the freedom and independence of peoples put forward by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Congresses.

68. From the high rostrum of the General Assembly in this special session on disarmament, our country urges all participants and all the States of the world to agree on a number of immediate steps capable of halting the arms race, and to do so without delay.

69. What then is to be done in the first place?

70. We believe that the time has come to raise the question of the complete cessation of a further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with large military potentials.

71. More specifically, and taking into account the fact that military arsenals consist of various components of armaments, the Soviet Union proposes that the following measures be implemented: cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons; cessation of the production and prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction; cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability; the renunciation of the expansion of armies and the building up of conventional armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the countries which have military agreements with them.

72. Thus, appropriate measures which would radically alter the current most alarming situation and put an end to the frenzy of armaments would cover all the components of existing arms and armed forces. Such measures, if implemented, would not upset the present-day correlation of forces of States. No one stands to lose, while the gains for the cause of peace would be enormous.

73. Is it a simple thing to agree on such measures? Of course not. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss all these measures in their totality, and, of course, it is pre-

pared not only to discuss them but also to implement them within a specified limited period of time. To make a start, we are even prepared to take up any of these measures. Since the main danger stems from the accelerating nuclear-weapons race specifically, priority could be given to the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

74. From the moment the atomic bomb was developed, the Soviet Union proposed that it be banned. At that time our proposal was not accepted. Today it is much more difficult to solve the formidable problem of nuclear arms. Yet it can be solved. A fatalistic approach to this undoubtedly most complex problem is alien to us.

75. Seeking to put the matter on a practical plane, the Soviet Union proposes that talks on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to their complete destruction should get under way.

76. How do we visualize such talks?

77. Of course, all the nuclear Powers must take part in them. Such a complex problem cannot be solved on a selective basis. Evasion by any Power would place a heavy burden on its policy. That does not mean that the number of participants would be limited to just five. It would be useful if a certain number of non-nuclear States also joined in the talks.

78. Precisely how many and who will participate could be agreed on, for instance, within the framework of an appropriate preparatory committee. The same procedure could be followed in working out the agenda for the talks and in determining the specific questions to be discussed and acted upon.

79. No one should nurture any illusions since the problem is exceedingly complex in purely technical terms as well. But what is much more important is the political aspect. Unless we approach the matter in a practical manner it will not budge an inch.

80. It goes without saying that the elaboration and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually destroy their stockpiles should go hand in hand with and be inseparable from the strengthening of international legal guarantees for the security of States. It is not fortuitous that the General Assembly adopted some time ago the well-known decision on the non-use of force in international relations along with the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*]. The conclusion, in accordance with United Nations decisions, of a relevant world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations would be a major step forward in that direction.

81. We suggest that, at the current special session, the General Assembly should adopt a decision of principle to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the question of the non-use of force. What is more, it should establish a procedure for their preparation and set a date for their beginning. That would reveal in deeds rather than in words those who intend firmly to do their utmost to relieve mankind from the threat of nuclear war and those who would rather do the opposite.

82. Another major question which we are emphasizing in the context of slowing down the nuclear arms race is the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The relevant treaty has played and continues to play a very useful role in this respect. However, further efforts are required.

83. This, like many other international issues, requires unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions by States. For its part, the Soviet Union is undertaking such an action. I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that it is a significant action.

84. From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

85. We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the goodwill evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

86. The Soviet Union is prepared to enter into an appropriate bilateral agreement with any non-nuclear State. We call upon all the other nuclear Powers to follow our example.

87. Nuclear weapons, should they find their way into the hands of States in conflict with their neighbours, could trigger an all-out nuclear conflagration. We never fail to draw attention to this danger to world peace. Here, a single mistake would be one too many. Incidentally, this is one of the main reasons why plans to develop nuclear weapons in the Republic of South Africa and in Israel cause such great concern. Everything must be done to prevent these plans from being carried out.

88. We must support in every possible way the desire of States to see certain geographical areas free of nuclear weapons. That is precisely the attitude of the Soviet Union.

89. A few days ago, during the visit to Moscow of the President of Mexico, Mr. López Portillo, our country signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

90. Honestly speaking, we had some doubts on that score because of some well-known short-comings and weak points in that Treaty. Nevertheless, we decided to assume the obligation to respect the denuclearized status of the Latin American continent. We proceed from the premise that such an obligation will remain valid only if the

other nuclear Powers respect the status of that zone and if its participants ensure a truly nuclear-free régime for it.

91. The Soviet Union will continue through practical action to contribute to the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. In other words, here, too, our aim is the same: to reduce the threat of a nuclear conflict. It is of course important that they be truly nuclear-free zones.

92. Sometimes we hear it said: we too favour non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but wonder if it would not harm international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The answer is no; it would not harm it. It is possible, without infringing upon the interests of non-nuclear countries in this field, to preclude at the same time the possibility of someone—let us say in the deserts or jungles of Africa or Latin America—from trying to find some roundabout way of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

93. The Soviet Union has for many years now been helping a number of countries to have their natural uranium enriched at Soviet facilities. We have always been engaged in other forms of co-operation in this field. And this does not lead to a greater nuclear threat.

94. There is yet another way of preventing nuclear weapons from proliferating all over the globe—that of limiting the number of territories on which they are stationed. The Soviet Union submits for discussion by the participants in this special session the question of not stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of State where there are no such weapons at present. In fact, there is no technical difficulty that could stand in the way of its solution. All that is required is the political will on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear States. Indeed, some non-nuclear countries have already declared that they will not condone the emplacement of nuclear charges on their territories. This practice could well become universal.

95. For their part the nuclear Powers would undertake not to station nuclear weapons—warheads, bombs, shells, mines—in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. As a result, we would thus be able to erect yet another obstacle in the way of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent a possible destabilization of the strategic situation.

96. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is ready to assume an obligation to this end, and we call upon the other nuclear Powers to do the same. If they agree not to station nuclear weapons in areas where there are none at present, we believe that it would then not be difficult to couch such an agreement in treaty language.

97. Quite recently at the very highest level, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, declared:

> "We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances—aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power—could compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defence."

If this attitude met with the support of all the other nuclear Powers, the situation in the world would become much calmer.

98. It is useful to recall in this connexion that the socialist countries of Europe addressed a proposal to all participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to sign a treaty on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. That proposal still stands and awaits implementation.

99. The specific feature of the arms race today is that it is becoming increasingly qualitative in character. Hence, it is particularly imperative to prevent the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. This is another problem that could well have been tackled a number of years ago.

100. Unfortunately, the pace of talks on that subject has been slow. We favour redoubled efforts in order to reach agreement at last. Prototypes of new lethal and merciless weapons developed in laboratories and design offices must not be allowed to reach the mass production lines.

101. All that is happening now in connexion with neutron weapons proves how much more closely they threaten humanity. Some people express surprise at a powerful wave of protests on the European continent and throughout the world against plans to produce these weapons in the United States and subsequently to station them in Western Europe. But the peoples and the world public have been quick to realize that this is a particularly vicious and cruel means of mass destruction intended specially to annihilate all living things.

102. The Soviet Union favours a complete prohibition of neutron weapons—not because we would be unable to meet this challenge in an appropriate way. What happened in the case of atomic and then thermonuclear weapons bears that out. As a matter of principle we are against adding a new dimension to the arms race.

103. We propose that agreement be reached on the mutual renunciation of the production of nuclear neutron weapons before it is too late. Last March, jointly with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention on the subject[2] to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. We expect a clear and unambiguous reply to that proposal.

104. The Soviet Union does not intend to begin the production of neutron weapons unless the United States or any other States does so. Our country declares this in the clearest possible fashion. Neutron weapons must be banned once and for all. We say clearly to the peoples of certain countries where sometimes support is voiced for neutron

[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27*, vol. II, document CCD/559.

weapons: beware lest you be deceived; be on your guard; it is reason rather than folly that must triumph.

105. A fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations now under way in various international forums or on a bilateral basis could be one of the concrete results of this special session. In a number of cases a considerable amount of work has already been accomplished, and that strengthens the conviction that the arms race can be curbed.

106. Let us first turn to the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic offensive arms. These talks arouse particular interest all over the world and the reasons for that are, we believe, understandable. Too much is at stake.

107. During all the years that those talks have been going on, the Soviet Union has consistently been seeking a mutually acceptable understanding. And we cannot be held responsible for the fact that the talks have dragged on for so long. But I do not wish to dwell on that here.

108. Now, many of the difficulties in the talks have been overcome. As we see it, possibilities exist for resolving the remaining issues as well. Indeed, they exist objectively. We proceed from the premise that mutual efforts can make it possible to arrive at an agreement which would accommodate equally the interests of the security of both sides and serve the broad interests of a stronger peace.

109. Immediately after signing the agreement which is now being prepared, the Soviet Union would be ready to enter into negotiations which should lead, with all the necessary factors being taken into account, to a substantial reduction—I repeat "reduction"—of the levels of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement.

110. It seems that there are grounds for expecting a successful completion of the talks on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This is an area of curbing the arms race on which the efforts of many States have been concentrated for several years now. The role of our country in this is well known. What is required now is to bring the matter to a conclusion—to ban tests in all the environments, that is to say, to ban underground tests as well.

111. Clearing the path towards constructive agreement, the Soviet Union has travelled its part of the way to meet its partners in the negotiations—the United States and Great Britain—and has done so on the issues that presented the greatest difficulties. We have agreed to verification on a voluntary basis, to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and to the entry into force of the treaty—even if initially not all the five nuclear Powers become parties to it, but only the USSR, the United States and Great Britain.

112. But it is not only important to ensure an early signing of the treaty. It is no less important that the example set by the three Powers with respect to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests be convincing enough to be followed by others. An end must be put to nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and by all those who conduct them.

113. It is necessary to complete in the near future the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. What is needed is a decisive spurt—as they say—and that is what we are calling for. The problem of control which has arisen can be resolved on the basis of national means of verification supplemented by well-considered international procedures.

114. Another type of weapons of mass destruction—radiological weapons—must be banned. Those are weapons known to affect living organisms by non-explosive radioactive emanation. An agreement can be said to be in the offing; a relevant draft convention has already been partly agreed upon. Here again, we stand for a speedy completion of that work.

115. The Soviet Union believes that it is an important and positive factor of the international situation today that the talks in progress cover not only types of weapons of mass destruction but also armed forces and conventional armaments.

116. It is an established fact that 80 per cent of the world's military expenditures go for conventional armaments. A great number of people in the post-war period alone have fallen victim to weapons called "conventional" but which now, as a result of their amazing accuracy and complete coverage of large areas, have a most devastating power.

117. The talks being held at Vienna dealing with the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe are highly important in that respect.

118. In that area the two most powerful military and political alliances confront one another. But here, too, an approximate military parity has been reached between them. Therefore, through agreed measures it is possible to reduce the level of that equilibrium without upsetting it in anybody's favour, without prejudicing anyone's security.

119. Such is our approach to those talks. Unlike the NATO countries, we have not expanded our armed forces in central Europe for a long time, nor do we intend to increase them in the future by one single soldier, by one single tank. Our approach is also shown in our desire to do our utmost to find mutually acceptable solutions; but far from everything depends on us.

120. We continue to hope that the talks will be concluded successfully, that the other side will abandon its desire to secure unilateral advantages for itself and to change the correlation of forces. Military détente on the European continent can and must make substantial headway.

121. The talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean are now in progress between the USSR and the United States. But it is clear that the parties directly involved are not the only ones

interested in their success; so, too, are many unilateral States. It can even be said that an agreement on the limitation of armaments in such a vast part of the world would have a noticeable effect on the international situation as a whole.

122. So far, the discussions concern "freezing" military activities in the Indian Ocean at the present levels. Of course, this is only a beginning. Later on we are prepared to seek ways of drastically reducing such activities, including the dismantling of foreign military bases. Thus, the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, put forward by littoral States and supported by the majority of States Members of the United Nations, will take a more definitive shape.

123. As you can see, talks on various aspects of disarmament cover a broad spectrum of problems. I shall also mention here the Soviet-American consultations on the limitation of international trade and transfers of conventional armaments. This is, of course, an urgent problem, but a clear-cut political approach must underlie its solution. One cannot place on the same footing the aggressor and his victim; one cannot allow any encroachment on the rights of peoples waging a legitimate struggle for their liberation from colonial and racist oppression.

124. The strengthening of international treaties and agreements in force in the field of disarmament would be a significant lever for ending the arms race.

125. Why is it that about one third of the States Members of the United Nations still have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Why is it that almost one third of the States Members of the United Nations are not parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water?[3] Why is it that more than half of them are not parties to the convention banning bacteriological weapons,[4] or to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof? [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*] Can one consider this situation as normal?

126. It is a situation which calls, purely and simply, for accession to existing treaties and agreements rather than general statements on the desirability of disarmament. No excuse sounds convincing here.

127. We hope that the special session on disarmament will have its authoritative say and will strongly urge States to make their contribution to strengthening the international treaties in force.

128. Before concluding, mention should be made of yet another practical step which could scale down the arms race and at the same time release additional funds for development needs. That step is the reduction of the military budgets of States. This is not a new problem for the United Nations. Yet, despite all the resolutions adopted on that score, there has been no progress towards its solution.

129. The Soviet Union takes the initiative in order to get things moving. We propose that the States having large economic and military potential—and in the first place the countries that are permanent members of the Security Council—should agree to reduce their military budgets, not in terms of percentage points, but in absolute figures. Of course, the idea still stands that part of the amount thus freed would be diverted to meet the needs of developing countries. In other words, if that helps, we are prepared, along with others, to reduce our military budget on such a basis.

130. Such is the general outline of our approach to the problem of the arms race and disarmament. This is the essence of the document entitled "Practical measures for ending the arms race: proposals of the Soviet Union" which we are submitting for consideration by the special session of the General Assembly [*A/S-10/AC.1/4*].

131. The Soviet Union believes that the steps proposed are essential if we wish to halt the arms race. They could actually lead to a break-through in achieving military détente and lead to a radical lessening of the threat of war.

132. At the same time, all these steps are feasible in practice. They take into account the present balance of forces in the world. Their implementation will not result in unilateral advantages for anyone.

133. The special session of the General Assembly can realistically, without going to extremes, assess the state of affairs in the field of disarmament in the world. It must explicitly speak out on the objectives and priorities in this field, confirm, on the basis of the collective experience of States, the well-considered and fundamental approaches to the problem of disarmament. But what is required is that all participants display a genuine desire for peace, free from the risk of war and armed conflicts. The responsibility of all—practically of every country—for the present and the future of the peoples of the world is too great today for them not to co-operate in good faith in meeting the truly historic challenge of disarmament.

134. The more concrete the programme of action in the field of disarmament worked out at the session, the more clear-cut and definite its decisions, the greater will be its effectiveness. It is obvious that such decisions will be recommendations, but they will be recommendations in favour of peace and against the danger of war.

135. The Soviet Union, and we are not alone, favours the holding of a world disarmament conference, the forum which would be in a position to adopt at once effective decisions truly binding on all States. The success of the special session should help in convening such a conference. That means that we should give serious thought to a specific and early date for the holding of this world conference.

136. A few words concerning yet another item on the

[3] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.
[4] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

agenda of the special session: the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. We are convinced that here a great degree of circumspection should be displayed. It is easy to dismantle the well-adjusted machinery. But would that be beneficial for disarmament, or could it possibly play into the hands of those who actually oppose disarmament?

137. We see no need to give up the existing negotiating channels or to restructure them radically. Of course, the existing bodies should produce more results than has been the case so far; we are in favour of that. Indeed, any machinery, any subsidiary body or its work, can only be as good as the policies of the States represented on it. Changing the names or the signboards of such bodies would make little difference.

138. The Soviet Union will do everything in its power so that decisions of the special session of the General Assembly and the document it adopts serve as real guidelines for States in their advance towards the radical solution of the problem of disarmament, up to general and complete disarmament, and to removing the very material basis of war. It goes without saying that, as always, we shall give thorough consideration to any constructive proposals in that direction which may be made here.

139. Both within the United Nations and outside it we are prepared to co-operate constructively with all those who actually strive for disarmament. There exists in particular a natural and organic foundation and basis for co-operation between socialist countries and non-aligned States which contributes in no small measure to the strengthening of international security, freedom and the independence of peoples.

140. The socialist countries, welded together by unity of purpose and ideals, both in the field of domestic policies and in their international activities, will continue to use all their influence and all their prestige to ensure peace.

141. One would wish that the loud appeals for peace and the denunciation of war, heard from this high rostrum, would reach the remotest corners of the world and shake it so mightily that the voices of the advocates of the arms race, uniformed or not, would be drowned by the powerful voices of the peoples themselves, who long to live in conditions of lasting peace and reliable security.

142. Mr. MONTES (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): For my delegation it is a particular pleasure to take part in this general debate, Mr. President, under your skilful and efficient guidance. In the course of the last three sessions you have set an outstanding example of skill and competence in conducting the proceedings of the General Assembly, thus contributing to the successful outcome of the Assembly's debate on the delicate questions before it.

143. I should like to add the gratitude of the Government of Argentina to the many expressions extended to you by many other delegations. In so doing we wish to assure you of our conviction that on this occasion too, so important for the cause of disarmament, we shall, thanks to your renewed efforts, be able to conclude successfully the arduous work that lies before us.

144. It is a coincidence that augurs well that the President of this session of the Assembly should happen to be a citizen of a country which has made such a signal contribution in the field of disarmament, characterized by an independent political approach and constructive ideas, among which it is fitting to mention its decisive support for the non-aligned initiative for the convening of this self-same session.

145. It is no exaggeration to affirm that this special session which has just begun may well become an historic landmark. The United Nations, for the first time since it came into being, has decided to devote its undivided attention to a comprehensive consideration of all the aspects of the problem of disarmament. This is the first time that this universal body has brought together such high-level political representatives, including the prestigious participation of many heads of State and Government, for the sole purpose of making an in-depth evaluation of the grave situation created by the arms race, for laying the foundations for promoting negotiations which will make it possible to halt it and initiating a process of genuine disarmament, as well as examining the significance which disarmament might have in terms of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and to economic development. It is also the first time that such a comprehensive meeting on this subject has been given such thorough, careful and lengthy preparation.

146. In other words, this event is attended by so many favourable circumstances that it may very well mark the beginning of a promising stage on the difficult and tortuous road to the final objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

147. We should avoid arousing false hopes by shutting our eyes to the facts which we have to face, but that does not mean that we should allow those facts to feed a paralysing scepticism that would dismiss out of hand any possibility of change.

148. In disarmament, as in all other human endeavours, there are no insuperable obstacles provided there is the will and determination to overcome them, particularly when the very physical survival of the human race and of our civilization is at stake. This is therefore no mere moral option: it is nothing less than an inescapable moral imperative.

149. The time is right for us to halt and think matters over. The Disarmament Decade proclaimed by this very General Assembly is about to come to an end without so far having lived up to any of the justified expectations of world public opinion. On the contrary, the spiralling arms race goes on at an even higher rate of escalation, and has reached unimaginable extremes, in terms of quantity, destructive power and danger of weapons as well as in terms of the increasing resources devoted to arms production.

150. When statistics show that the world is spending more than $1,000 million a day on weapons and there are

immediate prospects of substantial increases in this sum, one does not require a particularly fertile imagination to understand the seriousness of the situation. At the present time, nuclear arsenals are 8 million times more powerful than those used to obliterate Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In other words, these stockpiles are capable of annihilating more than 12,000 million human beings, that is to say, approximately four times the present world population.

151. The super-Powers alone enjoy the doubtful privilege of possessing armaments many times more powerful than what is needed for their mutual destruction and, incidentally, to destroy every vestige of life on this planet.

152. This means that in any generalized nuclear conflict between the two super-Powers there would be no possibility for any nation to proclaim itself neutral, or for innocent peoples to remain passive spectators. They would all, without exception, willingly or not, find themselves involved in the holocaust and suffer its consequences.

153. It is precisely this common destiny which faces mankind in the not at all unlikely presumption of a nuclear war which creates a factor of interdependence among all countries and renders indispensable their participation in efforts to call a halt to the arms race and to introduce a minimum of security in international relations.

154. Disarmament must therefore be a collective effort. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that those nuclear States with a nuclear arms monopoly, and hence the capacity for total destruction, bear a relatively far greater responsibility.

155. Any arbitrary attempt to shift this responsibility to the vast majority of countries which maintain only a minimum level of armaments compatible with defence requirements would not fail to be interpreted as a subterfuge designed to give primacy to collateral questions of disarmament and to avoid the adoption of concrete measures in the field of nuclear weapons.

156. We are fully aware of the difficulties of every kind involved in the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, we believe it to be an urgent and immediate necessity to take genuine steps in that direction. Setting limits to deterrence levels, which are in any case extremely high, is not enough. A start must be made as soon as possible on the gradual and balanced, but effective, reduction of these weapons.

157. Nor should the categorical reaffirmation of the priority of nuclear weapons, so often proclaimed in General Assembly resolutions, be allowed to detract from the importance of devoting attention at the same time to other weapons systems.

158. In this context, the delegation of Argentina regrets that the current negotiations have not yet produced a draft treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We should like to think that this delay is due to the laudable desire to consider all the precautions and safeguards which are essential for all nuclear-weapon Powers to sign such a treaty, and similarly to prevent vertical proliferation.

159. Similarly, we would have welcomed a treaty on chemical weapons. Once again, we should like to express our confidence that after such substantial and prolonged preparation, the scope of the prohibition will be complete and not partial, to avoid the repetition of similar errors contained in other instruments which reduced their acceptability.

160. Along the same lines, the delegation of Argentina believes that this special session of the General Assembly should reach an agreement to promote without delay negotiations designed to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as an agreement to prohibit those weapons which cause unnecessary to indiscriminate suffering.

161. The final document to be submitted for our approval should, in the part devoted to the programme of action, include clear provisions on these points.

162. I shall now turn to a subject which is being debated with increasing intensity in various international forums: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our position in this respect has been repeatedly explained, but I should like to avail myself of this forum and this opportunity to make it absolutely clear.

163. My Government whole-heartedly endorses the objective of avoiding the spread of those weapons. Argentina is not only concerned with the undeniable risks inherent in such a proliferation, but over and above that, we declare our opposition to nuclear arms as such wherever they may exist and whoever may possess them. Unreservedly we declare here once again that they must be totally eliminated forever and as soon as possible.

164. In stating our views we believe it essential to add equally clearly that the danger of horizontal proliferation is intimately linked with the more serious and immediate danger of uninterrupted vertical proliferation. We fail to understand the selective thinking of those who evince constant concern at horizontal proliferation but at the same time continue to manufacture ever more devastating and sophisticated nuclear weapons and display a persistent unwillingness to reduce their number or to embark resolutely on nuclear disarmament.

165. We have also maintained that there should be no confusion between ends and means. The objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically, should have the unrestricted and unreserved support of the entire international community. The proper means to attain this goal, in the view of the Government of Argentina, is not the non-proliferation treaty.

166. We respect the motives of the many countries which have acceded to the treaty, and thus consented to limitations to their sovereignty, in the conviction that this was the only way to avert a nuclear threat and to ensure for their peoples the benefits of the peaceful uses of this technology.

167. For our part, we rejected the treaty from the very beginning because it is clearly discriminatory in nature inasmuch as, for the first time in history, it legitimizes a division of the world into two categories of countries: those who are to be given a completely free hand in the nuclear field and those who are to be subject to restrictions.

168. Furthermore, we were convinced that it could not be applied in practice, since it did not impose on the nuclear Powers clear-cut obligations to disarm in this area, that is to say, it did not require the elimination of vertical proliferation as an acceptable *quid pro quo* for the prevention of horizontal proliferation.

169. We regret to note that events have vindicated us. The treaty was not only discriminatory in principle, but also proved to be so in practice. In 1968, the year in which it was opened for signature, the Soviet Union possessed 1,100 strategic nuclear warheads, and the United States 4,200. In 1977, seven years after the treaty entered into force, they possessed 4,000 and 8,500 respectively. Thus, instead of complying with the commitment freely entered into to initiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, they continued to intensify their arms rivalry.

170. Moreover, the promises of technological assistance for nuclear development for peaceful purposes were also not followed by the results expected, as is shown by the records and documents of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held in 1975.[5]

171. Yet, despite the serious shortcomings I have mentioned, the fact that so many countries failed to sign the non-proliferation treaty gave rise to unjustified suspicions which mar international relations and impede the unquestionable right of all to make the fullest use of the peaceful applications of atomic energy. A series of restrictive and discriminatory measures, which in some cases disregarded contractual obligations formally entered into, has compounded the difficulties encountered by many States in their attempts, made at great cost to themselves, to diversify their sources of energy.

172. To equate arbitrarily the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the presumed possibility of producing nuclear weapons, and therefore to impose unjustified limitations on the transfer of technology and nuclear material, is tantamount to an attempt to perpetuate the scientific and technological oligopoly of a handful of industrialized States, to the direct detriment of the interests of the developing countries. The situation becomes even more serious in the case of restrictions that involve non-proliferating technologies, thus nullifying the focal concepts of international co-operation in this field.

173. At the risk of repetition, we should like to stress that we shall unreservedly support any fair and appropriate initiative to prevent any type of proliferation and that we shall continue to co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as we have always done, in laying down and observing the respective safeguards. However, with equal firmness we must stress that we shall exercise to the full our inalienable right to acquire, refine and apply advances in nuclear technology for the benefit and progress of the Argentine people.

174. My country, together with other Latin American republics, took an active part in the negotiating process which culminated in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and Argentina signed it in the same year, seeing it as an instrument that was entirely in keeping with the objective of prohibiting the acquisition, manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear arms in the area and of ensuring respect for its prohibitions by nuclear-weapon Powers, both inside and outside the continent.

175. Unlike the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco recognizes no category of privileged countries. All the sister States of Latin America are placed on a precisely equal footing in assuming the obligations it lays down. By creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Treaty makes a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament while providing due protection for nuclear development for peaceful purposes.

176. I have great satisfaction in announcing here that the Government of Argentina, in strict compliance with its principles, has initiated the procedures necessary for the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We do so in the confidence that it will be signed by those nuclear-weapon Powers which have not yet done so, thus enabling it to enter fully into force.

177. This decision is a further demonstration of the spirit of peace and harmony underlying our policy and of our unstinting support for the idea of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons when this goal is sought by appropriate and equitable measures.

178. My Government, in order to demonstrate its devotion to the cause of disarmament, has also initiated proceedings for the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and also on the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which we signed in 1972 and 1971 respectively.

179. Argentina sees disarmament as a common endeavour of all the Members of this Organization. No self-respecting country which wishes to preserve its national identity can fail to participate in taking decisions liable to affect, directly or indirectly, interests vital to its security, sovereignty or future as an independent State. We therefore believe that the United Nations today, having become an almost completely universal body, should be more active in playing the leading role in the field of disarmament assigned to it by the Charter.

[5] See NPT/CONF.35/I-III.

180. Under the Charter, the General Assembly, made up of the 149 Member States, is the deliberative body that is competent to determine the principles, procedures and priorities of disarmament, and to discharge the function of supervising the application of agreements that may be arrived at pursuant to its recommendations.

181. The First Committee of the General Assembly could be instructed to devote itself exclusively to examining disarmament questions at its annual meetings and to establish a subsidiary body that would have the task of preparing the comprehensive disarmament programme.

182. Argentina commends the initiatives along these lines that have been put forward. We also support the idea of convening a second special session within three or four years with the object of reviewing and evaluating progress on all the points we may agree upon on this occasion, and also in drawing up the programme mentioned.

183. These are activities which are particularly appropriate to deliberative bodies, in which all States should be represented so that they can make known their positions and thus contribute to a clear definition of the views and general will of the community of nations. It is obvious, however, that no effective disarmament measure can be imposed by a majority of votes. Every measure requires first a process of negotiation, which is almost always slow and detailed because of the complexity of the issues involved, and in which due account must be taken of the different interests involved, with an appropriate balance of rights and duties and also of effective methods of verification.

184. In turn, all concrete measures presuppose the participation in the relevant negotiations of all militarily significant States, whose consent is indispensable if those measures are to be put into effect. It is hardly necessary to point out that this applies particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. No one can seriously imagine that certain nuclear Powers are going to subscribe tamely to instruments produced by other nations without their participation or without their wishes having been taken into account. Measures arrived at in this way would be doomed to failure, or at best would be only partially effective—which in the field of nuclear disarmament would provide no guarantees.

185. This suggests some ideas which I should like to voice on the item relating to disarmament negotiating machinery. Argentina has the privilege of being a member of that negotiating organ *par excellence*, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which meets at Geneva. Ever since it became a member in 1969, Argentina has cooperated resolutely in ensuring that the Conference discharges its specific function of producing genuine disarmament agreements and not mere collateral "non-armament" measures.

186. We believe that it was loyalty to the objectives of the Conference that explained the voicing in some cases of constructive criticisms designed to improve its functioning. We have said on various occasions that basically the Conference has all the necessary ingredients for successful work. But, with equal candour, we have expressed our doubts as to the scope of the instruments it was negotiating in the absence of France and the People's Republic of China.

187. In this connexion, we have maintained for some years now that the Conference should rid itself of those features which constitute an obstacle to the participation of those two nuclear Powers since no one State can be made to join a body which it does not find satisfactory. In its note to the Secretary-General dated 11 May 1977, the Argentine delegation proposed that the General Assembly should consider at its special session: "The possibility of improving the structure and working procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion, it would be necessary to revise the composition of the Conference, to grant *de jure* membership to all nuclear-weapon States and to change without delay the present system of co-chairmen." [*See A/S-10/1, vol. III, document A/AC.187/48.*]

188. Among the very interesting initiatives submitted by France to the Preparatory Committee, which Argentina has studied with care and enthusiasm, there is the proposal to replace the Conference by a new negotiating body with closer links with the United Nations [*ibid., vol. VI, document A/AC.187/105*]. We note that the French proposal, apart from revealing an encouraging change in attitude, has many points in common with similar concerns expressed by other countries and in particular with the most recent document from the group of 15 in the Conference.[6] We are convinced, therefore, that at this special session we have a real possibility of working out an understanding which will accommodate the different viewpoints and make it possible for France to become a member of a negotiating body.

189. We sincerely trust that the People's Republic of China will adopt a similar attitude, since its participation would undoubtedly give new momentum and meaning to the disarmament negotiations.

190. We also believe that the French suggestion concerning the establishment of a satellite monitoring agency under United Nations jurisdiction and international control should be examined at this session with a view to giving it immediate concrete expression, since this would constitute a distinct advance in the field of disarmament verification.

191. In the fourth part of the draft final document prepared by the Preparatory Committee [*ibid., vol. I*] the Assembly has a series of viable options with regard to disarmament negotiating machinery. In our view, there are no irreconcilable differences among them and with a minimum of flexibility and a spirit of compromise they can be reconciled. It is our bounden duty to reach a consensus on this point because the political will of States is just as important for the future of disarmament as are structures and carefully adjusted procedures which would make possible the equitable negotiation of the various agreements.

[6] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27*, vol. II, document CCD/563.

192. I should like now to say a few words about the work done by the Preparatory Committee for the special session. It was a great honour for my country that an Argentine citizen should have been unanimously elected to preside over its proceedings. In approving this appointment, my Government was particularly mindful of the delicate responsibility involved in the discharge of this function and of the need to make a contribution to the constructive performance of the Committee's task with all the guarantees necessary for impartiality in the conduct of its work. It is not for me, of course, to appraise the performance of Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, but I should like to place on record the satisfaction felt by the Argentine delegation at the efficient, positive and particularly harmonious way in which the Committee carried out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Thanks to the dedicated work of all its members and the Secretariat, a climate of sincere co-operation was established which made it possible for all decisions to be adopted by consensus and led to the successful preparation of this session.

193. It is true that appreciable differences still exist in certain parts of the draft final document, but there is no doubt that the Preparatory Committee went as far as it possibly could in resolving them. It is now for this Assembly to take up the challenge and resolve the differences still outstanding. I am convinced that in the next few weeks we shall find the right solutions to the problems that remain.

194. The current state of international relations is particularly delicate. The easing of political tensions which has been much in evidence in recent years has been severely tested by the emergence of new hotbeds of armed conflict. There are also indirect and more subtle methods of aggression, which encourage terrorist violence in order to channel ambitions for domination in various countries. This state of affairs is disquieting because if it persists it will inevitably have the effect of reviving latent suspicions and antagonisms, and this in turn will give additional impetus to the arms race.

195. Accordingly, if disarmament is really the aspiration of us all, in addition to the principles, priorities and measures which we may determine here, it is our bounden duty to buttress with deeds, not mere declarations, policies designed to strengthen peace, security and confidence among nations. Only in this way shall we be able to give this first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament genuine content and real prospects of success.

196. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker in the general debate is the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency Mr. Helmut Schmidt and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

197. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I consider it a particular privilege to address this august assembly today under your distinguished presidency. Our two countries enjoy cordial and friendly relations and we are happy to see you at the helm of the important work of the General Assembly, already for the third time this year. My delegation is therefore confident that this special session will come to a mutually agreed and satisfactory close.

[*The speaker continued in German.*][7]

198. On behalf of my country and its people I wish to say that it is our desire—and we are going to do everything in our power to make it come true—that the nations of the earth will find their way to lasting peace. We sincerely wish for peace because we have experienced two world wars which claimed millions of victims. We also wish for peace because we are most directly affected by the fact that large areas of the world are suffering from military conflicts.

199. The Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, welcomes the fact that the United Nations, by convening this special session of the General Assembly, is making the world more deeply aware of the dangers of the arms race. We have supported the initiative of the non-aligned countries from the very beginning. The United Nations is thus intensifying the efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control, subjects which have been on the agenda of this Organization for the past 32 years.

200. I am speaking on behalf of a country that cannot and will not act as a big Power. My country, however, is aware of its share of the responsibility for peace. The treaties that we have concluded have, in many ways, made manifest our renunciation of force in a binding form as far as international law is concerned, and will continue to be our guidance.

201. With the invention of nuclear weapons, mankind has entered a new age. It is fundamentally different from all previous ages. The revolution in military strategy brought about by nuclear weapons has created new conditions for war and for peace. Every conflict between States or alliances equipped with nuclear weaponry therefore implies a risk that has no equivalent in history. Nor is that risk confined to parties to a conflict; it threatens their neighbours and whole continents and, in the extreme case of a global war with nuclear means of mass destruction, the entire planet—with predictably catastrophic consequences for several generations.

202. Ever since, we have lived with a system of mutual nuclear deterrence of the super-Powers. Three and a half decades of nuclear peace have not yet given a final answer, however, to the question of how peace without fear can be achieved. That is too short a span of time to make it possible yet to draw conclusions of historical significance. Armed peace has lasted since 1945 in an epoch that has abounded with profound differences and conflicts of interest between those who hold nuclear power. The efforts since the Second World War to achieve disarmament and arms control, which began with the Baruch Plan, have, however, fallen short of the original expectations of the peoples. Nevertheless, several important results have been achieved in connexion with the partial nuclear test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the limitation of

[7] The English version of this part of the statement was supplied by the delegation.

strategic nuclear weapons. The Disarmament Decade [*resolution 2602 E (XXIV)*] proclaimed by the United Nations at the beginning of this decade has not been without positive results. At the same time, the results of efforts to reduce conventional sources and armaments have so far been disappointing.

203. Outside the system of deterrence and the alliances protected by nuclear weapons, political conflicts since 1945 have led to a number of wars in many parts of the world that have been fought with modern, non-nuclear weapons with great destructive power. In the interests of peace today, we need a comprehensive political partnership for security. Only in this way will it be possible to set in motion a process of genuine arms limitation and reduction. At this juncture, I wish to pay my respects to President Carter for the energy and force of conviction with which he has promoted this process.

204. I believe that the concept for a more stable peace consists of four elements: first, a policy of political, strategic and military balance; secondly, a policy of détente, of conflict containment and of reconciliation of interests; thirdly, the capacity for effective crisis management; and fourthly, the predictability and the calculability of political and military conduct.

205. We know from experience, however, that in a world full of mistrust and radical conflicts there is no simple or quick recipe for achieving these four basic elements of solidarity to establish security on a stable basis. Disarmament can be brought about only where trust prevails, and trust will develop only where there is security.

206. The policy of security as a policy for peace must today be global in scope if it is to be successful. Events in the Middle East, in the eastern Mediterranean, in Africa or in south-east Asia concern all of us because they may hamper—indeed, place gravely in jeopardy—the process of détente and mutual trust which is growing slowly.

207. It is not enough to give our attention exclusively to nuclear weapons. World-wide agreements among the nuclear Powers themselves cannot prevent the outbreak of conventional regional wars. Such wars can escalate and culminate in a clash between the big Powers. The prohibition of the use or threat of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations must therefore apply to all weapons, both nuclear and conventional. Whoever is the first to take up arms of whatever kind and to resort to or threaten military attack violates this prohibition. This prohibition is comprehensive; either it applies totally or not at all. Those who try to restrict it to the first use of certain weapons must ask themselves whether they would consider an attack launched with other weapons less prohibited. Should a country which is threatened by a neighbour heavily armed with conventional weapons be less protected than others by the prohibition of the use of force?

208. Regional agreements on conventional forces and armaments must therefore be sought on a par and simultaneously with efforts to limit armaments in the nuclear sphere; not only at home in Europe but in all regions.

209. The balance which I have just mentioned seems to me to be the most important principle from which all efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament must start. For so long as a world Government with a world police force and monopoly of weapons appears Utopian, the stabilization of balance will remain our principal task. Balance is today an indispensable element of a strategy for safeguarding peace.

210. Attempts to reach agreement on arms limitations that are not aimed at establishing a stable balance offer little prospect of lasting success. Arms limitations must therefore serve to create a stable balance of forces at a lower level.

211. Though progress towards arms limitation has up to now been modest, it has at least brought one important strategic result: the super-Powers have redefined their own security requirements. They no longer automatically regard the unilateral growth of nuclear power as an increase in their own security. I consider that to be major progress.

212. Insecurity will be generated if one side exposes a potential adversary to growing uncertainty. Concern about increasing inferiority or imponderabilities, fear or political miscalculation could lead a State that, rightly or wrongly, feels inferior, to panic and act irrationally. The more the awareness of this risk spreads and encourages Governments to draw appropriate conclusions in the field of armaments the more will it be possible to gain the necessary recognition for the principle of a balance of forces.

213. Balance is definitely not a one-time but a continuous task. Economic and social changes also can create instability and hence new dangers. That aspect must not be neglected.

214. Military balance need not necessarily take the shape of total arithmetical identity of all kinds of armed forces and weapons. But an over-all parity in terms of security policy must be established. This must also be understood and accepted psychologically by those concerned.

215. A policy of balance can by no means be confined to the military sphere. Balance must rather be sought in foreign policy and in the economic and social fields, for the sake of domestic and international peace.

216. A fruitful policy of détente and the containment of political conflicts presupposes the existence of a considerable degree of balance in terms of security policy, or at least it goes hand in hand with the establishment of such a balance.

217. In Europe we have learned that there is a very close link between military security and détente. Since the Western alliance formulated its strategy for defence and détente a decade ago in the Harmel Report,[8] encouraging results have been achieved on the road to détente in Europe.

[8] Report on the future tasks of the Alliance, approved at the first Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Brussels on 13 and 14 December 1967.

218. On this basis the German *Ostpolitik* has, since 1969, fundamentally improved the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Eastern neighbours in a process of normalization and reconciliation. It has also been possible to stabilize the situation in and around Berlin.

219. Such efforts to reduce political conflicts must be intensified and must be extended to other regions. The fear that the other side always wants arms limitation only in order to secure a political advantage for itself can only be overcome in a long confidence-building process.

220. Even given the mutual will for balance and détente, acute, unforeseen conflicts can bring on a crisis situation. That is why the capacity for effective crisis control is necessary. It presupposes first of all that communication between the parties to a conflict is not broken off at any time. The world's statesmen must talk to one another, listen to one another and, therefore, know one another.

221. Crisis control demands the political will, first, to avoid provocations; secondly, to make one's own options unmistakably clear; thirdly, to defuse dangerous situations through readiness for compromise; and fourthly, to enable those concerned to save face.

222. Recent history has furnished several examples of successful crisis control. I recall, for example, the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuba crisis of 1962.

223. The mastering of those serious crises has, by the way, had a long-term effect. It has initiated the process of rethinking by the big nuclear-weapon Powers and created the psychological bases for the policy of détente and disarmament. Without the experience gained in these crises, which had led for the first time to the direct confrontation of the nuclear Powers, the partial test-ban treaty,[3] the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the strategic arms limitation talks would have been difficult to achieve. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 should also be numbered among those agreements. I welcome the fact that the Soviet Union, too, has now acceded to Additional Protocol II of this Treaty.

224. Because even the most successful peace policy can never entirely rule out sudden conflicts, we must all, by means of constantly improving methods of crisis control, ensure that conflicts remain manageable.

225. The greater the calculability of the political and military conduct of those involved, I should like to add, the less the danger of acute crises, and the prime condition of calculability is a frank and open attitude.

226. The anxiety caused by unpleasant or dangerous surprises can be considerably allayed by greater frankness regarding military capacities and arms production. The fact that in the meantime concrete data of the military potential on both sides are being disclosed in the strategic arms limitation talks and at the Vienna negotiations is a big step forward in building mutual confidence.

227. The disclosure of such data by those concerned will make possible a reliable assessment of the military options of the other side and of its capabilities.

228. An unequivocal data base can generate or strengthen the confidence which in due course should make a verified and balanced reduction of military spending possible. My country has made its contribution to the preparatory work undertaken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the comparability and disclosure of military budgets.

229. The same frankness must characterize the observance of agreements. In this way, each country's security is enhanced when the security requirements of others are respected. My country has, in major treaties, agreed to act with frankness and to submit to international inspection. This concept, which is supported by our people, will remain our policy.

230. If, however, in the name of peace, arms control were to be abused for hegemonic power politics or for the purpose of creating a discriminatory class system of international law, it could not meet with approval. Attempts to impose restrictions on nations which had no part in bringing them about would not meet the requirements of peace.

231. The element of predictability, necessary for security and peace, must go far beyond frankness concerning military capabilities. It must apply above all to the basic concept and the objectives of political strategies. The better future developments can be predicted, the less the danger of surprise and, as a consequence, the greater the prospects for international security. Anyone who acts unpredictably is liable to create hazards.

232. The agreement following the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks was the first effective limitation of nuclear arms. This limitation became feasible only because, owing to the existence of satellites, the problem of international verification could be left aside. We in the Federal Republic of Germany hope that the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks will soon be brought to a successful conclusion.

233. In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, too, the two great Powers have explicitly undertaken to reduce their nuclear armaments, and we must take them at their word.

234. The Treaty has definitely proved valuable in limiting nuclear armaments. On the whole, it has so far halted the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

235. On the other hand, non-proliferation policy must not become an obstacle for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For so many countries not possessing sufficient sources of energy, nuclear power is indispensable. Article IV of the Treaty gives the signatory States explicit assurance on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This assurance in the Treaty was the determining factor for ratification by our Parliament, and it must be upheld without subtracting from it.

236. The growing use of nuclear energy makes it neces-

sary, however, to strengthen international measures to prevent its misuse, and this is especially true for the use of plutonium. For this purpose, effective improvements of the present non-proliferation régime must be borne by a broad international consensus. This Treaty—an important instrument of the non-proliferation policy—might otherwise be jeopardized.

237. In acceding to the Treaty, over 100 countries have undertaken an internationally binding commitment to renounce nuclear weapons and thereby made a substantial contribution to international security. By so doing they have acquired rights which must be respected.

238. In Europe, détente has progressed considerably in the course of this decade. The treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on 3 September 1971 and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe signed on 1 August 1975 have given concrete expression to the prohibition of the use or threat of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Today there exists a greater measure of mutual trust in Europe than at any time in the past decades. This is, I hope, an encouraging experience for other regions as well. It is the result of a joint endeavour in which, apart from the two great Powers, all members of the two alliances as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe have constructively participated.

239. Yet the fact remains that in Europe the biggest accumulations of arms and armed forces confront each other. What now needs to be done is to establish a military balance at a lower level, thus making security more stable.

240. At the negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments which began at Vienna five years ago, we aim, together with our allies, to establish parity by means of balanced reductions. The result of the negotiations should be common collective ceilings on both sides.

241. During the recent visit to my country by Mr. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, both sides stated for the first time in a joint East-West declaration that they deemed it most important that neither side should seek military superiority and that approximate equality and parity sufficed to safeguard defence. I agree with Mr. Gromyko; we, too, consider this declaration a major conceptual contribution to the safeguarding of peace, all the more so because the Soviet Union has shown in this declaration its willingness to discuss weapons up to now not covered by the strategic arms limitation talks, such as medium-range missiles.

242. Owing to their huge destructive power, these weapons are as lethal a threat to Europe and other regions as are the strategic intercontinental weapons to the super-Powers. They therefore cannot be ignored in a system of military balance. It is under this aspect also that we are looking with great interest at the proposals made by President Giscard d'Estaing [*3rd meeting*].

243. Considering the devastating consequences which the Second World War, unleashed by Hitler, had for our people and many other European peoples, no one can doubt our vital interest in arms control and disarmament.

244. That is why, as long ago as 1954, my country renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We agreed then that the observance of this pledge should be subject to international verification.

245. The Federal Republic of Germany considers the conclusion of a convention providing for an effective and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons to be particularly urgent. It therefore welcomes the ongoing bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States which aim at a joint initiative.

246. We are convinced that it is possible to work out an international verification system, including on-site inspection, which would not prejudice the legitimate interests of civil industry and research. Our experience as a country which has renounced the production of chemical weapons and submitted to international control shows that such controls can indeed be effective and without economic harm and that their cost can be reasonable.

247. We are ready to make our experience in this field generally available. Therefore, I invite all interested States to come to the Federal Republic of Germany and see for themselves that adequate verification of a ban on production is possible.

248. The Federal Republic of Germany hopes that it will soon be possible to draft a convention prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. We are ready to participate in the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban and to make our institutions available for this purpose.

249. From what I have just said, it can be seen that my country has served the aim of maintaining stability and security through arms limitation by a broad range of different treaty commitments and that it is determined to continue to do so.

250. The defence contribution which the Federal Republic of Germany makes to the North Atlantic Alliance as one of its members serves the aim of security through balance. This collective defence alliance is—in view of the over-all situation in Europe—indispensable for the security of my country. I wish to emphasize that my country has integrated its armed forces fully into the joint organization of the Alliance.

251. The North Atlantic Alliance is exclusively oriented to collective defence. A few days from now it will again demonstrate its will to secure balance and to maintain collective self-defence but, equally, its will for détente and arms limitation. It is a reliable factor in the international partnership for security which I mentioned earlier on. The European Economic Community, too, is a partner, in particular where political and economic stability are concerned. Its establishment is a regional answer to historic experience and to the challenges of the present. From the

outset its establishment was always one of the political aims of my country.

252. In view of the obstacles in the way of rapid progress towards internationally agreed arms limitation, I think a confidence-building offensive is called for, and it is quite feasible.

253. The confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference have proved valuable. In my opinion, they should be made binding upon all States in Europe as from now. We therefore welcome the proposals in this direction made by the French President. Over and above this, confidence-building measures in all parts of the world could serve to improve the political climate for disarmament and arms control. They should in each case make allowance for regional conditions. Consideration should be given in this connexion to the notification of military exercises, exchange visits of members of the armed forces, and invitations to Governments to send observers to military exercises. Such regional agreements could form the basis for a future world-wide convention on confidence-building measures. We welcome the fact that confidence-building measures are contained in the draft joint programme of action [*see A/S-10/1*].

254. The growth of confidence cannot, of course, I should like to add, be confined to the sphere of military security. The elimination of mistrust, fear and hostility is an all-embracing, universal task. This is a perspective which extends into the future and which concerns young people. It is up to the older generation to make the younger generation in our countries more appreciative of this perspective. This is a task of great consequence which the United Nations should take upon itself. We are willing to make a material contribution to a new United Nations programme aimed at fostering understanding among the young generation of all nations. In the course of this year, on the basis of our bilateral experience we shall present a proposal for such a programme.

255. In connexion with this special session of the General Assembly, many references have been made to the disproportion between expenditures for military purposes, on the one hand, and for agricultural, infrastructural and industrial development purposes by the great majority of nations, on the other. Those references are justified; the facts give just cause for concern. There are, indeed, highly productive countries which have a large military potential and which make exceptionally heavy financial outlays for it, but which at the same time make a totally inadequate contribution to the transfer of capital and technology to developing countries.

256. Weapon supplies are no substitute for economic development; on the contrary, the transfer of weapons has assumed proportions that have made it one of the most serious international problems. It is to President Carter's credit that he already drew attention to this with great urgency last year. Regulating the international transfer of armaments must feature prominently in our efforts to achieve arms limitation—and I wish to express my full agreement with Vice-President Mondale [*2nd meeting*].

257. Initiatives in this direction will bear fruit if both suppliers and recipients agree to exercise restraint. With this aim in mind we support the proposal embodied in the programme of action for a study of the related problems. In particular, I would very much like all countries which export armaments to undertake to disclose their supplies.

258. However, dangers arise not only from arms supplied by Governments but also from the commercial exploitation of discarded military equipment. Consequently, the study must also cover the possibilities of controlling private trade in military equipment.

259. I should like to take this opportunity to outline my own country's policy in this field. We refuse, as a matter of principle, to grant aid for the export of weapons. Only in exceptional and, on the whole, very limited cases do we allow any weapons at all to be supplied to countries outside our own alliance. According to analyses prepared by the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, German supplies of weapons to the third world account for only three hundredths of 1 per cent of our gross national product. According to our estimates, that is the equivalent of two tenths of 1 per cent of our total exports. I should like to add that we strictly forbid weapons to be exported to areas of international tension.

260. On the other hand, we have massively increased our development aid budget, so that it is now the equivalent of more than one tenth of our defence effort. If every country in the world could say that of itself, many people in the developing countries would be better off. Those who build up their armaments beyond what is needed for their defence are limiting their capacity for material aid to others.

261. Material want, hunger and poverty are intolerable in many places. Only healthy economic and social development serves the cause of peace. Social justice is not merely a domestic but just as much an international necessity. If we succeed in limiting armaments and cutting our military expenditures we shall be releasing funds which can be used to make additional transfers to the developing countries.

262. My country will continue to increase the scope of its development assistance—although I prefer to speak of economic co-operation rather than aid, since we are all dependent on one another. That is why we expect solidarity to be reciprocated with solidarity—solidarity in a two-way form.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

263. Mr. President, let me sum up in a language which is more widely understood in this chamber than my own.

264. The task, as we see it, with regard to armaments—nuclear and other weapons alike—is to bring about balanced and verifiable limitations, to effect specific and balanced reductions and, it is to be hoped, one day to bring about the total elimination of arms. Complete and internationally controlled disarmament remains the goal.

265. If it is to be successful, that process requires a com-

prehensive security policy, based on four guidelines: first, political, strategic and military balance; secondly, détente, containment of conflicts and reconciliation of interests; thirdly, capacity for effective crisis control; and, fourthly, predictability and calculability of political and military conduct. With those guidelines in mind, we are co-operating in the talks at Geneva and Vienna with a sense of commitment and initiative.

266. This special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an opportunity to demonstrate the credibility of international efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control. We hope the Assembly at this special session will avail itself of this opportunity. To this end it is necessary that we be able to discuss the existing problems frankly but without polemics, and to reach our decisions by consensus. That would be a demonstration of our ability to work together in a global framework to strengthen peace and security.

267. With that aim in mind, I put forward the following proposals: first, our experience with the verification of our commitment not to produce chemical weapons is at the disposal of other nations; secondly, we shall make available our seismological facilities for the verification of a comprehensive test ban; thirdly, we support restrictions on the international transfer of conventional arms; fourthly, we support efforts to increase confidence through a greater degree of frankness as regards military expenditures and activities; and fifthly, we shall have reached our goal only if the nations succeed in trusting each other. Here much will depend on the young people. This is why we are in favour of the United Nations considering specific ways of bringing the youth of different nations into closer contact.

268. It has been the general experience that all-embracing, new, dramatic concepts for global disarmament hold out no prospect of success. What we need instead are many individual advances, step-by-step progress, each step taken with the determination to harmonize conflicting interests.

269. Anyone who dismisses the idea of compromise in principle is not fit for peace. If he is not prepared to meet others half way he cannot expect them in turn to move towards him. Anyone who cultivates enemy stereotypes and prejudices will himself be regarded as an enemy.

270. There is far too much enmity in this world. What we need instead is a spirit of solidarity, which must ensue from the recognition that no one can guarantee his own security and peace alone.

271. The historical experiences of nations differ from one another, and their ideologies differ even more. My personal experience of the Second World War made me a committed member of a political party and movement in my country which has fought for arms limitation for the past 115 years. For the past 20 years I have devoted my energy to this cause with determination, with realism and with a sense of commitment.

272. I have done so because I know that the horrors of the past must not be repeated. We Germans know that preventing this is to a large extent our task.

273. The world can be confident: we Germans will live up to that task.

274. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany for the important statement he has just made.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

Annex 244

Verbatim Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/S-10/PV.6, 26 May 1978

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/105/72/PDF/NL810572.pdf?OpenElement>

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Official Records

6th PLENARY MEETING
Friday, 26 May 1978, at 3.35 p.m.
NEW YORK

President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker in the general debate is the Prime Minister of Canada. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

2. Mr. TRUDEAU (Canada): Mr. President, I congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this special session devoted to disarmament. It is indeed fitting that the office be filled by such a distinguished representative of a country in whose capital the idea of holding this special session was first advanced in 1961.

3. Canada takes its place in a world discussion on disarmament as an industrial country, geographically placed between two heavily armed super-Powers, with an obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age. We are a member of a regional defensive alliance that includes three of the five nuclear-weapon States. We are none the less a country that has renounced the production or the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada's armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional-armed aircraft the nuclear-equipped planes still assigned to our forces in North America. We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear arms. We have not, for more than a decade, permitted Canadian uranium to be used for military purposes by any country. We are a country that maintains strict controls over exports of military equipment and does not export any to areas of tension or actual conflict. We are, on the other hand, a major source of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

4. My excuse for reciting these facts is that it has been an assumption of our policy that countries like Canada can do something to slow down the arms race. But, obviously, we can do a great deal more if we act together. That is why such a great responsibility rests on this special session. It is not the business of this session to negotiate agreements. That will be the task of others. What we are here to do is to take stock and to prescribe. We must impart a fresh momentum to the lagging process of disarmament.

[*The speaker continued in French.*]

5. We could not have chosen a better moment to pause and survey the disarmament scene. What strikes us first is a general tendency to add to arsenals, on the pretext that there is no other way to correct what are believed to be imbalances in security. It is on this premise that the logic of the arms spiral is based and we must take it into account in our discussions. We must recognize it for what it is: a search for security, however elusive. To attempt to divorce disarmament from security is to be left only with the bare bones of rhetoric.

6. How to achieve security through disarmament is the theme of the great debate that has been waged through much of the present century. We are taking up that debate again at this special session, but the terms of the debate have been drastically altered in the last 25 years by two developments. One is the advent of nuclear weapons which has forced us to assimilate the concept of unusable power. The other is the transformation of the international political map which has brought a whole host of new international actors into the disarmament debate. It is useful, none the less, to review the principal strands of the historic debate to see what relevance they may have to our efforts at this special session.

7. The broad spectrum of proposals to achieve greater world stability and the reduction of tensions ranges all the way from what is sometimes called the declaratory approach to the notion of general and complete disarmament.

8. The declaratory approach encompasses the whole complex of non-aggression pacts, treaties of guarantee, security assurances and bans on the use of certain weapons. The classic example of this type of approach was the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. The parties to it, which included all the major Powers of the time, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and pledged themselves to settle disputes by peaceful means only. The Pact was regarded as the portent of a new era. The more devastating judgement of historians is that it clouded the vision of the statesmen of the 1930s.

9. The declaratory approach is, however, not dead. It is implicit in the idea of a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. That idea is being seriously advanced by some and seriously entertained by others. It is difficult to dismiss summarily because it would give expression and authority to a widely shared concept of international morality.

10. It may have a part to play as an assurance to coun-

tries that have renounced nuclear weapons. But it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament. They need be violated only once to become mere scraps of paper. They have no impact on capabilities nor on the resources devoted to those capabilities. Indeed, their effect may be negative by diverting attention from the requirement of all real disarmament, namely, the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

11. If the declaratory approach places unreasonable reliance on the value of good intentions, the notion of general and complete disarmament has proved to be equally unrealistic.

12. It is important to remember how wide a range of vision was embraced by the concept of general and complete disarmament in the early 1960s. What was envisaged was not only the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, the cessation of weapons production and the elimination of weapons stockpiles. The counterpart to global demilitarization was a global security system involving reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

13. That ideal need not be abandoned. General and complete disarmament remains the ultimate goal of our efforts. In practice, it raises serious questions in the minds of the negotiators. What should be the military balance at each stage of the process? What kind of an inspection system would give us assurance that engagements were being carried out? What would be the composition of an international disarmament organization and with what powers would it be invested? What would be the nature of the arrangements for keeping the peace in a disarmed world? Finally, what would be the impact of this ambitious concept on the security, not to speak of the sovereignty, of the parties?

14. One day these questions will have to be answered. But it must be admitted that today they remain unanswered. In the circumstances, it is only natural for us to aim at a less lofty goal and seek to bring about a disarmed world by building it brick by brick.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

15. This is the course we have pursued over the past decade or so. Over that period, we have managed to negotiate a number of instruments of arms control on which we can look back as useful milestones in the construction of an international security system. As a result, the deployment of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and in outer space has been precluded; biological weapons have been prohibited; environmental warfare has been outlawed to a great extent; agreements have been reached to ban nuclear tests in all environments except under ground, and to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries not yet possessing them. These are not negligible measures even though all militarily significant States have not yet adhered to them.

16. Such measures are sometimes described as peripheral. I believe that to call them peripheral is seriously to underrate them. They are a great advance over declarations of intentions because they deal with capabilities and are, therefore, verifiable—which intentions are not. They have an effect on the arms race by closing off certain options. It is true that the measures taken so far have foreclosed options that were in large part hypothetical. But they set the stage for an attack on the heart of the arms race by foreclosing options that are real and, in the absence of restraint, inescapable.

17. Against this background, then, I should like to turn to the nuclear arms race. The preservation of peace and security between the nuclear Powers and their allies rests today primarily on the mutual balance of deterrence. Simply put, that balance means that any act of nuclear war by either Power would be incalculable folly. Nevertheless, the apparent success so far of this system in preventing a global war should not close our minds to the problems that it presents.

18. What particularly concerns me is the technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry. It is, after all, in the laboratories that the nuclear arms race begins. The new technology can require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. What this means is that national policies are pre-empted for long periods in advance. It also complicates the task of the foreign-policy maker because of the difficulty of inferring current intentions from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier. Thus, however much Governments declare that they intend to pursue a policy of peace, their declarations cannot help but be called into question, for they have allowed the blind and unchecked momentum of the arms race to create and put at their disposal military capabilities of an order of magnitude that other Governments cannot prudently ignore. In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making.

19. There is also a high risk that new weapons systems will revive concerns about a first-strike capability of disarming; or that they will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they will increase problems of verification. All this suggests that stable deterrence remains an inadequate concept. And such a concept is a poor substitute for genuine world security.

20. These dangers have been perceived by both major nuclear Powers. I believe that both are serious in wanting to arrest the momentum of the nuclear arms race. They have been engaged in a dialogue on strategic arms limitations for some years. The dialogue has produced some useful quantitative limits and others are under negotiations. But the process is painstaking and, as I have watched it with a full appreciation of its importance to the security interests of my country, I have wondered whether there may not be additional concepts that could usefully be applied to it.

21. The negotiations under way between the major nu-

clear Powers have shown that it is possible to confirm or codify an existing balance of forces. But they have also shown how difficult it is to go beyond that and to cut back on weapons systems once they have been developed and deployed. That is not only because they are there and vested interests have been created in their deployment; it is also because it has proven immensely complex to achieve the magic formula of equal security by placing limits on what are quite often disparate weapons systems.

22. The conclusion I have reached is that the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds. This could be done by a combination of four measures. Individually, each of these measures has been part of the arms control dialogue for many years. It is in their combination that I see them as representing a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear arms race. These are the measures I have in mind.

23. First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices. Such a ban is currently under negotiation. It has long been Canada's highest priority. I am pleased that the efforts of Canada's representatives and those of other countries stand a good chance of success during 1978. The computer can simulate testing conditions up to a point, but there is no doubt in my mind that a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons development.

24. Secondly, an agreement to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads. I am satisfied that, in the present state of the art, such an agreement can be monitored—as it must be—by national technical means.

25. Thirdly, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The effect of this would be to set a finite limit on the availability of nuclear weapons material. Such an agreement would have to be backed up by an effective system of full-scope safeguards. It would have the great advantage of placing nuclear-weapon States on a much more comparable basis with non-nuclear-weapon States than they have been thus far under the dispensations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.*]

26. Fourthly, an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. This will require the development of the necessary openness in reporting, comparing and verifying such expenditures.

[*The speaker continued in French.*]

27. A strategy of suffocation seems to me to have a number of advantages. It is not merely declaratory because it will have a real, though progressive, impact on the development of new strategic weapons systems. It will have that impact in three ways: by freezing the available amount of fissionable material, by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested, and by reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure. It is also a realistic strategy because it assumes that, for some time to come at least, total nuclear disarmament is probably unattainable in practice. It avoids some of the problems encountered in the negotiations currently under way in that it does not involve complex calculations of balance but leaves the nuclear-weapon States some flexibility in adjusting their force levels by using existing weapons technology. It has at least the potential of reducing the risks of conflict that are inherent in the technological momentum of strategic competition.

28. The ultimate intent of a strategy of suffocation is to halt the arms race in the laboratory. But an offer to halt the arms race at any stage is a step in the direction of genuine disarmament. The President of the United States has shown the way in recent weeks with his far-sighted postponement of a decision to produce a new battlefield nuclear weapon. We must all hope that the response of the Soviet Union will make it possible to extend that postponement indefinitely.

29. So much for the vertical dimension of the nuclear problem. I should now like to say a word about the horizontal spread of nuclear capabilities.

30. There are those who have a fatalistic view of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They argue that nuclear proliferation is ultimately unavoidable and that there is little sense in putting undue constraints on the international flow of nuclear energy resources in the hope of being able to stem the process.

31. I do not share that view. I note with satisfaction that the list of countries said to be on the verge of a nuclear weapons capability is not very different today from what it was a decade or so ago. I believe that the greater dissemination of nuclear weaponry would reduce security and that Governments must define their policies and say that proliferation can be stopped.

32. We in Canada have perhaps gone further in our support for an effective non-proliferation system than have most other countries. In part, this is the result of national experience in nuclear co-operation. But in much larger part it is a reflection of public opinion in Canada which does not believe that we would be serving the cause of a rational world order by being negligent in the requirements we place on Canadian nuclear exports.

33. I make no apology for Canada's precedent-setting safeguards policy, though it has been criticized by some as being too stringent. Canada is asking of others no more than what we have ourselves accepted voluntarily as a party to the non-proliferation Treaty.

34. Canada judged it necessary to adopt a national policy, even though nuclear transfers were already within the compass of international regulation, because we were truly concerned about our role as a nuclear supplier. The inter-

national safeguards system, as it stood, did not seem to us adequate to deal with the problems posed by the advance of nuclear technology. Our object was to bring about a new, more effective international consensus on this matter. My country recognizes that the international system will need time to adapt to the new energy situation. It is now accepted by all that nuclear energy will have to play an increasingly important part in meeting ever-growing world energy needs. It is equally accepted that the benefits of nuclear energy must be accessible to all countries without alternative energy sources. Directly after an energy crisis, it is only natural that many countries would like to aim at a high degree of energy independence. In particular, they will expect to be protected against the interruption, without due cause, of essential supplies of nuclear fuel. Any new system will need to accommodate these aspirations.

35. But we also have to consider that we are hovering on the threshold of a plutonium economy. We shall have to make sure that the vulnerable points in the fuel cycle are capable of being adequately safeguarded by technical means and that, where that cannot be effectively done, we can devise institutional arrangements for international management. I, for one, believe that in the end the best prospect for countries to ensure their national energy security lies in an international system that carries the confidence of nuclear suppliers. There are limits to the contribution that can be made by nations acting unilaterally. I believe that Canada's efforts to date have been constructive and effective, but further achievement can be made only through multilateral agreement. We intend to play our full part in the working out of the assurances and the constraints that will inevitably have to form part of an enhanced international system of non-proliferation.

36. While nuclear proliferation remains a source of concern, it has shown itself amenable to control. That is more than can yet be said about the transfer of conventional weapons.

37. The problem of conventional weapons is serious. This special session cannot afford to leave it unattended to. Conventional weapons give rise to feverish spending. Eighty per cent of the world's military expenditures are for conventional purposes. Some 15 per cent of those expenditures are accounted for by developing countries. Well over half of these developing countries devote at least 10 per cent of their public spending to military purposes; nearly a quarter of them spend in excess of 25 per cent. It is with conventional weapons that 133 wars have been fought since 1945, involving 80 countries and killing 25 million people. Meanwhile, the transfer of conventional weapons has assumed massive proportions; in the aggregate, some $20 thousand million are being expended on it each year. Is is therefore not possible to oppose the nuclear arms race rather than the conventional arms race. Both threaten world security; both are absorbing resources better devoted to other purposes; both are the legitimate business of an Organization whose purpose it is to harmonize the actions of nations.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

38. The traffic in conventional arms involves producers, consumers and the transactions between them. What can we do about it?

39. The more closely we look at the problem, the more clearly we can see that the question of sales is not easily divorced from the question of production. The production of military equipment is attractive for countries with an appropriate industrial base which require such equipment for their own armed forces. It contributes to national security; it reduces external payments; it creates jobs. Moreover, the attraction of production for defence is enhanced by the fact that some 70 per cent of new technology today derives from the military and space sectors.

40. The problem is that the more States go into the production of weapons to meet their own security needs, the more tempting it is for them to try to achieve lower unit costs and other economic benefits by extending their production runs and selling such weapons abroad. Almost every country that produces some military equipment finds itself, to a greater or lesser degree, caught on the horns of this dilemma. My country is no exception.

41. Of course, any particular country intent on making a contribution to world security could decide to abstain from producing arms, but what significance would such a gesture actually have? So long as arms are being bought, arms will be produced. There is no particular moral merit in a country that is buying arms but not producing them. And if the main reason for not producing them is not to be involved in selling them, it will have no practical impact on the arms race, because other suppliers that we are encouraging by our purchases will readily fill the gap.

42. One way out of the dilemma would be for suppliers, acting in concert, to practise restraint. That is easier where the incentive for arms sales is mainly commercial. It is more difficult where considerations of foreign policy are involved. Canada is not an important exporter of military equipment; we account for about 1 per cent of world sales. We could accept any consensus that might be arrived at among suppliers to cut back on military exports. We recognize that our position differs from that of others. The major Powers, in particular, sometimes see arms sales as a measure of maintaining a balance of confidence in situations where political solutions continue to elude the parties. But the major Powers must also recognize that a balance of confidence can be achieved in such situations at lower levels of cost and risk. I welcome the recent decision of the United States and of the Soviet Union to look for a basis of mutual restraint in their sales of conventional weapons.

43. Restraint by suppliers will help, but it is an incomplete answer to the arms traffic problem. It may also cause resentment among potential arms purchasers. For better or for worse, much of the arms traffic takes place between industrialized and developing countries. The purchasing countries seek, as is their right, to ensure their own security. In many cases, they seek no more than to maintain law and order on their national soil. To curb their right to acquire arms by purchase, even to place qualitative re-

straints on such purchases, would revive much of the acrimony of the North-South dialectic. It would be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as another instance where the rich are trying to substitute their judgement for that of the poor. Moreover, attempts to curb the transfer of conventional weapons would do nothing to change the incentive for acquiring them.

44. It is at the level of incentives that we are likely to manage best to come to grips with the problem of conventional weapons exports. The incentive to acquire arms is rooted in apprehensions of insecurity. The best way to allay such apprehensions is through collective regional arrangements. The countries of Latin America have set the world a useful example in turning their continent into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and in persuading outside Powers to respect that status. Similar arrangements are conceivable, in Latin America as elsewhere, to deal with the acquisition of conventional arms. It would be for regional decision-makers to devise incentives for restraint and sanctions for excess in the accumulation of conventional arsenals and in the build-up of conventional forces. In the long run, that seems to me the best prospect of curbing the conventional arms race without damage to the relations between nations.

45. While we are exploring these and other ways of making progress on disarmament, we must also strengthen our joint capacity to maintain international peace and security. Substantive progress on disarmament is at best a matter of years, if not of decades. Meanwhile, the security of nations is bound to remain precarious. In a world of 150 or more States, many of which have claims upon their neighbours and where resource shortages and population movements raise questions of life and death for millions of people, violence within and between States is a regrettable fact of life.

46. The United Nations was created to restrain and, if possible, to prevent war. Its record is a mixed one. But whatever we may think of its capacities, we must work as best we can to improve and to strengthen them. Recent events have demonstrated once again both the uncertainties of peace-keeping operations and the continuing need to make those operations a success. It must be be our objective to create the conditions that will permit all Members to respond quickly, impartially and effectively to threats to peace whenever they are called upon by the United Nations to do so. I make this plea on behalf of a country that has made peace-keeping a special plank in its defence policy and has participated in every major peace-keeping operation of the United Nations.

47. Let me add a word about a third subject on our agenda, about institutions. It is easy enough to change institutions, but new institutions do not necessarily make intractable issues less intractable.

48. I believe that it is right for the United Nations to deal with disarmament at two levels. Disarmament is a common concern of the world community and there must be a deliberative body in which all Member States can periodically bring their views to bear on the disarmament process, as we are doing here today. Actual negotiations, however, must continue to be pursued in a body of more manageable size operating on a basis of consensus. The decision of France to rejoin the disarmament dialogue is of major importance. It is a promising omen for the success of our deliberations. We also hope that the People's Republic of China will see its best interests served by joining its efforts to those of others in advancing the cause of disarmament.

49. Proposals have been made also to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for research on disarmament matters and to make the results of such research more widely available. We welcome proposals of this kind. In this, as in other matters of public policy, Governments can only benefit from more informed discussion. Disarmament is the business of everyone, but only a few are able to follow the issues. The consequence is that special interests dominate the debate and distort the conclusions. We must make sure that they do not carry the day. Dispassionate research and analysis, presented in terms that people can understand, would do much to right the balance.

50. As long ago as 1929, that most eloquent advocate of disarmament, Salvadore de Madariaga, spoke of disarmament as being "really the problem of the organization of the world community". In the larger sense of the word, history has proved him right. The arms race we are here to stop is a symptom of the insecurity of nations. But it is more than that. It is a latent source of world catastrophe. That is why this special session has been called together. It is the first major assize on disarmament to have been held since the end of the Second World War. We must not allow the opportunity to pass without putting our imprint on the course of events. We cannot expect to settle all the issues in our deliberations and we certainly shall not settle them by producing paper. What we must try to achieve is a reasonable consensus on broad objectives and on a plan of action for the next few years. If we can do that, if we can hold out hope that the arms race can be reversed, we shall have taken a significant step towards the better ordering of the affairs of our planet.

51. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister of Canada for the important statement he has just made.

52. Mr. CORRÊA DA COSTA (Brazil): Mr. President, it is with renewed pleasure that I extend to you the sincere congratulations of the Brazilian delegation on your unanimous election to the presidency of this special session of the General Assembly. Over the past year we have grown accustomed to the very high standard of leadership with which you have presided over our deliberations.

53. I should also like to express to Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina our deep appreciation for the significant contribution that he has already made to our work in his capacity as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. We are confident that under his able and experienced guidance the *Ad Hoc* Committee will successfully fulfil its mandate.

54. For many years disarmament has been a priority goal

in international negotiations. This Assembly, interpreting the unanimous voice of the community of nations, has time and again restated this objective in the course of its regular annual sessions.

55. In the organs specifically mandated to carry on disarmament negotiations, it was immediately established that the crux of the problem was the indiscriminate accumulation of nuclear weapons. Ten years ago, in 1968, a consensus was reached, and this is reflected in the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that disarmament negotiations should produce, as a first step, meaningful results in areas such as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the freezing of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and, lastly, the reduction and destruction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles. At the same time, the limitation of the uncontrolled acceleration of the arms race was sought. Negotiations were proposed with a view to the prohibition of the development and production of certain weapons, such as chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as to the establishment of machinery for collective security that would provide the climate necessary for the attainment of our chief goal.

56. Since then the arms race has gained new impetus, and the quantitative growth in stockpiles has gone hand in hand with their rapid qualitative refinement. Over $400 thousand million are being spent this year on research and development and on the production and refinement of existing systems and of new types of weapons. This process mobilizes the talents of over half of the most renowned scientists in such fields as engineering and chemistry.

57. Vertical proliferation has even given rise to theories that lend credibility to the tactical use of weapons of mass destruction, no matter how harmful the effects. Never before have the overtones of the "balance of terror" been so present in the world scenario.

58. In view of this prospect, the concrete measures of disarmament which have been negotiated so far are minimal, one could say negligible. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, the only continent today that is totally free from these weapons happens to be uninhabited. The ban on nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, in addition to being only partial in scope, is of limited or no use for the purposes of disarmament, or even of arms control. There is little confidence that the international commitments in force are capable of ensuring the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. And there are even those who argue that the military use of outer space serves the purposes of strengthening strategic equilibrium and, consequently, international stability. As for the oceans, the only progress that has been made deals with the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in a manner that does not seem to figure in the strategic plans of any Power whatsoever. The strategic arms limitation talks, for their part, have been limited to quantitative measures, that is to say, to the freezing of stockpiles at certain levels, acknowledgedly high, without affecting the destructive capacity in the hands of the two super-Powers.

59. In the field of conventional weapons, it was only possible to achieve agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. A preliminary agreement on chemical weapons is expected shortly between the super-Powers. Still in the conventional weapon field, we have reason to be alarmed by the fact that technological development is oriented towards the creation of weapons of mass destruction, the employment of which is particularly degrading because of their cruel and indiscriminate effects. Paradoxical as it may seem, the efforts of the international community still concentrate on collateral measures of disarmament. We do not ignore the importance of such measures, but the priority is certainly questionable.

60. Last September, when opening the general debate at the 6th meeting of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the Minister for External Relations of Brazil, Mr. Azerado de Silveira, expressed confidence that the present special session would be a positive step in multilateral negotiations for disarmament. We view it as a favourable opportunity for a critical evaluation of the results that have been obtained so far and for the adoption of decisions that will open up new perspectives for tangible results.

61. In the General Assembly, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in other forums, Brazil has never failed to make positive contributions, within the limits of its possibilities, towards promoting the true objectives of disarmament. It has been the opinion of Brazil that, in multilateral negotiations on disarmament, maximum priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. Nowadays, it is common for us to run up against tolerant or even fatalistic attitudes towards the accumulation of nuclear weapons. It seems that living with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust over a prolonged period generates a kind of acceptance of the risk. And we can only put a stop to this peril if the international community faces up squarely to the question—in other words, if it can effectively halt the arms race, reverse it and finally destroy the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

62. In this process, it is undeniable that the primary responsibility falls on the nuclear-weapon States. Concrete initiative by these States, through the exercise of the political will to give practical form to the responsibility which is theirs, is thus an essential element for the success of the multilateral negotiations.

63. The negotiating process for disarmament cannot be dissociated from the general conditions of peace and security. There will be no disarmament while there is no peace and security. By the same token, there will be no peace and security while the arms race continues unabated—a dilemma which cannot be solved by half-way measures. The solution will only become possible when the question is confronted as a whole, in an objective manner, with due respect for the symmetry between the continued existence of situations of tension in some areas, on the one hand, and the security needs of States, on the other. It is there-

fore essential to ensure that the implementation of disarmament measures does not entail imbalances of a military or other nature that would tend to frustrate the ultimate goal.

64. As for the conditions of security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, it is Brazil's understanding that these conditions should be based upon concrete and unequivocal commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapon States until the complete elimination of all stocks of nuclear weapons. Such commitments should explicitly include respect for the nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace set up as the result of an agreement concluded in an independent and sovereign way by the countries of those regions. They should also explicitly include positive guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against such zones.

65. It was in the light of this understanding that Brazil signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[1] That Treaty, with its Additional Protocols I and II, is a real breakthrough which does honour to the peaceful traditions of our hemisphere. The banning of nuclear weapons implies not only that the region should remain free of these weapons, but also that it should be safeguarded against possible nuclear threats.

66. These two elements are essential for the perfect definition of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In the Treaty of Tlatelolco the signatories undertook concrete commitments on the banning of nuclear weapons, a stand that gives moral and political support to the positions we have been taking for many years in favour of disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, however, requires, as a counterpart, the assumption of a series of obligations by the countries that possess nuclear armaments, including the obligation not to use such weapons in the region.

67. For this reason, Brazil fulfils all the requirements of article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In practice, Brazil's position has had, and continues to have, the merit of encouraging the States that have not done so to sign Additional Protocols I and II, an indispensable requirement if the Treaty is to come into force.

68. In this connexion I must stress that, as stated in a public declaration by the Brazilian Government, in accordance with the principles of international law, Brazil committed itself *ipso facto*, by signing and ratifying the Treaty, to doing nothing contrary to the Treaty's objectives. To that extent the Treaty is already in force for Brazil, which will do nothing inconsistent with the goals of that instrument. In making a precise definition, in the case of Latin America, of the rights and duties inherent in the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, we are also rendering a service to other regions that wish to establish similar arrangements.

69. While favouring the cessation of the utilization of nuclear energy for military purposes, Brazil does not admit any hindrance to the peaceful utilization of such energy, so long as non-discriminatory and universal safeguards are respected. Safeguards of this nature are indispensable in the promotion of confidence among States, in an atmosphere of international co-operation. To that end they must be applied to all States, without discrimination. None of these measures, however, must be of such a nature as to permit interference in the sovereignty of States, or as to affect the scientific technological or economic development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

70. On the other hand, it is imperative that a mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations be maintained in disarmament negotiations. In this connexion, we do not accept international instruments that preserve situations of privilege and discriminate between States. Such treaties, in our view, are unjust and unfair. Brazil strongly supports the equal participation of all States in disarmament negotiations, as a corollary of the principle of sovereign equality, which is inscribed in the Charter of the United Nations. Such participation is an essential premise if the results of the negotiations are to meet the rights and interests of all States, and not merely those of a limited group of countries that today hold greater power.

71. The existing processes of negotiation for disarmament have been extensively explored. Neither creating new forums nor amending the rules of procedure of the existing negotiating bodies will suffice to bring about radical changes in the present state of affairs. Less cumbersome machinery and processes will not be effective unless they are accompanied by the unequivocal political will to put them into operation. It is clear, however, that the formal aspects of the question should not be put aside. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Preparatory Committee for the special session, Brazil has supported proposals for the reformulation of the negotiating machinery for disarmament. We have done so because we are convinced that faulty machinery may hinder the political will and slow down progress in the field of disarmament.

72. Disarmament measures can, and should, have repercussions upon the establishment of the new international economic order. Brazil maintains that there must be a commitment to apply significant portions of the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures to the promotion of the economic and social development of the less developed countries.

73. This is, in essence, Brazil's stand on disarmament. We are fully aware of the complexity of the question and recognize its political and security implications. Nevertheless, this understanding does not mean that we accept the idea that disarmament is a Utopian goal. In the light of these observations, the delegation of Brazil will take part in the debates of the special session in a constructive spirit, willing to contribute to the success of the task entrusted to this Assembly.

74. The present state of affairs is an additional challenge to our imagination and political ability. It is never too late to act. In the field of disarmament, inaction amounts to accepting an intolerable accumulation of risks. The primary

[1] Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

responsibility for disarming rests with those who have the nuclear weapons; it is, however, incumbent upon the non-nuclear-weapon States to contribute positively to speeding up the adoption of effective disarmament measures.

75. Therefore, all countries have responsibilities in the process of disarmament For this very reason we are meeting in special session. This General Assembly is undoubtedly the most representative forum of organized international society, and from it must emanate the ultimate guidelines, the imaginative and daring solutions required to ensure a peaceful future for mankind.

76. Mr. GARBA (Nigeria): It is a very happy coincidence, Sir, that this first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is taking place under the presidency of a representative of a very prominent non-aligned State. The initiative to convene this special session emanated from the non-aligned movement which, as long ago as its first summit conference, held in 1961 in the capital of your country, adopted a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or of a world disarmament conference. Fourteen years later, in 1975, the non-aligned Ministers for Foreign Affairs, at their meeting at Lima, Peru, observed with considerable apprehension the acceleration of the arms race and the spiralling accumulation of more and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction by the two military alliances. They therefore recommended to their heads of State that they renew their call for the convening of a special session of this Assembly devoted to disarmament. Thus it was that at their fifth summit conference, at Colombo two years ago, the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries firmly decided to work for the convening of the special session which we commenced three days ago. In view of the great and constructive role which your country has always played in the meetings of the non-aligned, it is fitting and proper that you are presiding over this session which is the fruition of one of the most significant initiatives of our movement.

77. It is no longer necessary to try to justify the need for this special session. The monumental disaster which is implicit in the state in which we find ourselves at present is obvious to all but the captains of the military-industrial complexes and their patrons on both sides of the armed camps. Thirty-three years after the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, in which we all vowed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, we are witnessing a situation of unprecedented and escalating preparedness for war. The military alliances have developed and perfected sophisticated weapons of mass destruction capable of exterminating mankind several times over.

78. A world conflagration can no longer be confined to specific theatres. The nuclear-weapon genie, in its present state of perfection and effectiveness, will be far beyond the control and expectations of its master once it is let out of its bottle. Thirty-three years after the first nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we cannot claim to have seen the total effect of this most cruel weapon on its unfortunate victims. Yet the destruction and human suffering, tragic as they were, resulted from what can now be considered no more than a toy bomb in comparison with the size and total destructive capacity of the warheads now available in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

79. Equally staggering is the increase in the military expenditures of the two alliances since the end of the Second World War. Figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicate that the total military expenditure in 1948 was about $65 thousand million. In 1977 the figure jumped to $400 thousand million. The investment of such a staggering amount in armaments at a time when there is utter neglect of the requirements of development in most parts of the world is a great reflection on the sense of priority of world statesmen.

80. Four years ago the General Assembly, at its sixth special session, adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order [*resolution 3201 (s-vi)*], whose main theme was the assurance of a decent standard of living for peoples everywhere. A comprehensive programme of action was duly adopted for the new international economic order. Today very little has been done to implement this programme because of the unwillingness to transfer resources from the developed world to the developing world, where there is such crying need. Since the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was launched four years ago, the amount of resources transferred from developed to developing countries has actually declined in real terms.

81. The target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product set for official development assistance in the Second United Nations Development Decade has since been found to be much lower than the actual requirement if we are even to start out on the road to the new international economic order. Yet not only has that inadequate target not been met—except by a few developed countries—but there has actually been a tendency towards decline in many cases. The difficulties confronting the economies of the developed countries cannot be used as an acceptable explanation because these difficulties have not been reflected in expenditures on armaments, which have increased rather than decreased yearly. Obviously the members of the major alliances have no scruples about making development assistance the first victim of any real or imaginary difficulty. The vested interests in military expenditures on the other hand are such that no one dares reduce them even in the interest of the long-term peace and security of humanity.

82. I am firmly convinced that as long as 25 per cent of the world's scientific manpower and 40 per cent of the world's expenditure on research and development is tied to the unproductive military sector, as long as the world expends 7 per cent of its gross national product on armaments, economic and social progress cannot run its full course. The link, therefore, between disarmament and development is not only obvious but deserves to be explored in depth so that much of the vast resources, human and material, channelled into the production of armaments can be released for the promotion of economic and social development.

83. The Nigerian Government is therefore in full support of the study of disarmament and development as part of the programme of action that will emerge from this special session. Such a study should not be undertaken as an academic exercise; rather, it should be carried out in a manner that will facilitate the redeployment of manpower and resources into the more beneficial areas of economic and social development, particularly in the developing parts of the world.

84. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, proclaimed the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. We are already over eight and a half years into the Disarmament Decade and, sad to say, none of the elements of the programme for the Decade has been accomplished. In the area of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, no measure has been agreed upon since 1969. Indeed, the situation with respect to nuclear-weapon competition is worse today than when the Decade was proclaimed.

85. In spite of the agreement reached during the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of nuclear warheads possessed by the rival super-Powers, not to mention the greatly improved sophistication of their means of delivery. Production and refinement have outstripped and nullified any effect which that agreement could have had. In a situation where even a fraction of the present arsenals of the super-Powers can destroy the world several times over, we cannot take consolation in these negotiations until they are geared to the reduction of up to 50 per cent of the nuclear-weapon arsenals and to a halt to the qualitative improvement of their means of delivery. It is not enough just to talk about limitation of strategic arms; it is time actually to reduce these most dangerous weapons.

86. The era of concentration on collateral measures should be considered at an end. The 1960s saw a proliferation of such measures—the partial test-ban treaty, the ban on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We congratulated ourselves on the successful conclusion of these measures by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today we are all dismayed that the necessary follow-up steps to these confidence-building measures have not been taken. We are all now aware, if ever there was any doubt, that disarmament will not be achieved by talking about and taking "convenient" measures while the real issues are left virtually untouched. After years of devoting attention to collateral measures, world opinion now demands concrete and direct measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. This is the only road towards stemming the danger of a nuclear holocaust which now threatens humanity.

87. A positive first step in this direction will be the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty—a treaty that has been the subject of inconclusive negotiation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and lately in a trilateral forum. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly reflected the hope of humanity in this respect when, in its resolution 32/78, it declared that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session devoted to disarmament. It is now clear that a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be adopted at this special session; nevertheless, its importance indeed transcends the mere marking of a session, even an important one like this first special session devoted to disarmament.

88. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would, for the first time, mark the effective beginning of the end of nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, by providing concrete proof that the nuclear-weapon States do intend to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by which they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. A comprehensive test ban treaty would be a more persuasive reason for wider adherence to the Treaty than verbal appeals or threats of unilateral conditions imposed by the cartel of suppliers of nuclear materials.

89. For countries such as Nigeria and other early adherents to the Treaty, which foreclosed their nuclear option in the expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would also fulfil their obligation and enable us to look forward to a world free from the nuclear arms race, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would reverse the prevailing feeling of frustration and bitter disappointment.

90. Moreover, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would further enable the international community to isolate and effectively check that international leper in the comity of nations, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, whose nuclear ambition—to blackmail the opponents of its criminal policy and in defiance of the firm determination of the Organization of African Unity with regard to the denuclearization of Africa—is well known. Recent reports of the plans of the *apartheid* régime to acquire nuclear capability, and the assistance provided by some Powers to that régime in the nuclear field, are therefore quite alarming. Africa, which has declared its firm intention to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone, cannot stand idly by in the face of this threat to its security. Appropriate action will have to be included in the programme of action of this special session to deal with this urgent and grave matter.

Mr. Asencio-Wunderlich (Guatemala), Vice-President, took the Chair.

91. Racism breeds war; it has been a prime source of conflict in the modern world. The people of Africa, Asia and Latin America have suffered tragically from racists who have used military power to subjugate, oppress and exploit them. Today, Africa is not only still suffering from the iron hand of racist oppressors, but the worst manifestation of this criminal action, *apartheid*, is being sustained by the sheer brute force of armaments. In addition, the peace and security which we eagerly anticipated in the wake of African liberation from the colonial yoke have not been realized because of the constant stream of weapons pouring into the hands of the oppressors of the African people and a simultaneous denial of the means of defence

to the oppressed. Intra-State and intra-African disputes are being fanned by neo-colonialist motivations and the refusal to believe that the African peoples can make the right choice from their political options.

92. Let me take this opportunity to say that Nigeria, and indeed Africa, will not tolerate a late twentieth century equivalent of the partition of our continent. Regional arrangements in defence of peace and security must be made on the initiative of the African countries and the Organization of African Unity. Africa will not, and must not, be made the new theatre of the cold war.

93. It is clear to all that very little has been achieved over the last decade in the area of disarmament. The task of this special session is to correct this situation by establishing a programme of action for the effective pursuit of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Such a programme will necessarily be in two parts, namely, the conclusion of agreements on measures that are now ripe and urgent, and on measures of a long-term nature.

94. Among the former should be the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the conclusion by the nuclear-weapon States of an agreement substantially reducing their stockpiles of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery, an agreement on the prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, concrete measures regarding the conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament to economic and social development purposes, particularly in developing countries, effective steps to back up regional decisions on denuclearization, as in the case of Africa, and the promotion of disarmament awareness by the United Nations through a co-ordinated system of public information and education.

95. Since the other measures are fairly clear, I shall only elaborate briefly on my last point in this category, that is, the promotion by the United Nations of disarmament awareness. Too often we tend to overlook the important role which peoples generally and moulders of public opinion and public officials in an advisory capacity to Governments can play in the adoption of disarmament measures. Two years ago, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament recommended that the United Nations publish annually a Disarmament Yearbook and consider publishing a disarmament periodical. We have all seen how useful the Yearbook has been; but by its nature its circulation has been limited. The periodical must be conceived in short, easily readable form and be suitable for mass circulation.

96. I believe the time is now ripe to take an additional step. The United Nations must now launch a programme designed to give in-depth knowledge on disarmament issues to public officials so as to create a cadre of such officials in countries, mostly developing countries, which are currently short of such expertise. Under such a programme, the General Assembly would authorize the annual award of about 20 scholarships of up to six months' duration for officials mainly from developing countries, but also including a few from the developed countries. The recipients would undergo a course in New York or at Geneva consisting of lectures, seminars and on-the-job observation organized by the Centre for Disarmament. They would conclude the course by being attached to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

97. The cost of such a programme would be included in the regular budget of the United Nations. It would represent no more annually than the cost of one military vehicle or the equivalent of five seconds' expenditure on armaments at the current annual rate. Surely this is not too much of an expenditure for the cause of disarmament and international peace and security. I therefore hope that this proposal will receive the support of all as part of the programme of action emanating from this special session.

98. I said earlier that this programme of action should consist of measures ripe for immediate implementation and those of a long-term nature. Having identified the former, I shall now turn to the long term. Obviously, the most efficient manner to deal with these latter measures would be to conceive them in the context of a comprehensive programme on disarmament that would lead to general and complete disarmament.

99. It will be recalled that in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopted in December 1969, proclaiming the Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate on such a programme.

100. The Conference neglected to carry out that important assignment. In 1976 the Nigerian delegation submitted to the Conference a working paper on the conclusions of the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade and the tasks to be performed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament[2]. In that working paper the Nigerian representative at the Conference called attention to the Committee's neglect of the task of working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Later, at succeeding sessions, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on that question. In the last of these resolutions, resolution 32/80, adopted on 12 December 1977, the Assembly took note of the decision of the Conference to set up an *ad hoc* working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament and requested the Committee to continue its work on the subject and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.

101. As representatives will see from the special report of the Conference in document A/S-10/2, the *ad hoc* working group on the comprehensive programme did no more than hold preliminary meetings. It did, however, direct the preparation of a document containing a comparative analysis of the various proposals submitted under this subject.

102. If Nigeria has over the past four years actively pro-

[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27*, vol. II, document CCD/510.

moted the elaboration by the Conference of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is because we firmly believe that there is need for a co-ordinated approach to disarmament negotiations. The time lapse since the General Assembly called upon the Conference to elaborate such a programme in 1969 has served to strengthen further the need for such a programme as an essential element in the disarmament process. Thus the scope of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will have to be broadened beyond the original perspective of the General Assembly reflected in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV). Such a programme should be a reference point not only for the Conference but for disarmament negotiations conducted in all other forums, so that, taken together, these negotiations will form a co-ordinated effort that will permit discernible progress in the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament. This special session must therefore make sure that work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme on disarmament will continue without any further delay.

103. I shall now speak briefly on the type of machinery which the special session should establish for disarmament. In the view of the Nigerian Government this issue should be approached in three parts.

104. The first part should be the forum for deliberation and for giving political directives in the field of disarmament. Such a forum should necessarily allow the participation of all Member States, in conditions of sovereign equality and taking account of the abiding interest of all in disarmament, which is intimately linked to their security and well-being. It should also be possible to convene such a forum as and when necessary and should, when in session, concentrate on issues of disarmament without distraction. In its desire to avoid the proliferation of organs while ensuring that the task envisaged will be discharged effectively, my delegation supports the reconvening of the Disarmament Commission established by the General Assembly in its resolution 502 (VI), adopted on 11 January 1952. The composition of the Commission should be the entire membership of the United Nations as decided by the General Assembly in its resolution 1252 D (XIII) of 4 November 1958, supplemented by resolution 1403 (XIV) of 21 November 1959. Considering that there will also exist a negotiating forum, the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission will have to be re-examined and will have to include new terms necessitated by the developments expected from this special session.

105. The second part of the machinery should be the negotiating organ. The Nigerian delegation believes that four factors should be borne in mind in this connexion: first, that for a negotiating organ on disarmament to be of maximum effectiveness, it must ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; secondly, that while such an organ should not be unwieldy, it should also not be unduly restrictive and representation in it should take account of the interest of all regions of the world in disarmament negotiations; thirdly, that a close link should exist between the organ and the United Nations; and, fourthly, that the experience and expertise on disarmament negotiations over the years should be harnessed in such an organ. Bearing in mind the fourth factor, the conclusion of my delegation is that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be the negotiating organ on disarmament. However, it should undergo such reform as will link it more closely to the United Nations, encourage the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, and take account of the growing interest in disarmament negotiations. To mention two possible reforms, my Government firmly believes that the institution of co-chairmanship should forthwith be abolished and that the Committee should be expanded by the addition of a few new members.

106. The third aspect of the machinery should be Secretariat support services. Two years ago the Centre for Disarmament was created for this purpose. It may well be necessary to look at the Centre in the light of the additional tasks which will devolve on the Secretariat as a result of the special session. My delegation keeps an open mind.

107. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament affords the United Nations and its Member States the opportunity of proving once again that the Organization can live by the ideals of its Charter. The peoples of the world look up to us to save them from the real threat of extermination which the present state of nuclear preparedness portends. We cannot afford to fail them.

108. MR. CHŇOUPEK (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, may I extend to Mr. Mojsov my sincere congratulations on his election as President of this special session. In his person we are congratulating an outstanding representative of a country with which my country enjoys traditional ties of mutual esteem and co-operation. I am convinced that under his experienced leadership this session will achieve concrete and positive results.

109. We have met here in order to discuss, for the first time in the 33 years of the existence of the United Nations and with the participation of representatives from 149 countries of the whole world, such significant and vitally important questions of the present day as those pertaining to disarmament.

110. This fact alone represents an event of profound political significance in the life of our Organization; it is a concrete expression of the will of States to achieve progress in this key issue; it is an important milestone on the road to the achievement of lasting peace—an objective earnestly desired by the whole of mankind.

111. And if mankind, as is often correctly pointed out, is today standing at a fateful crossroad, then, as at any intersection, one road must be chosen. Since so much is at stake, it is hardly conceivable that we should do nothing. Unlike the past, however, when every road ended inevitably in the hardships of war, today humanity has a different, more reliable choice: to aim at the relaxation of tension, at the strengthening of peace, and at creating a balance of confidence instead of a balance of fear among countries.

112. Lately the world has not only embarked upon this road, but can already look back on the part which has been covered, marked by the milestones of international agreements—United Nations resolutions and, above all, that of the historic Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held at Helsinki. And what is even more important is that, proceeding along this road, mankind has succeeded in eliminating the oppressive tension of the old war and has become accustomed quickly and with relative ease to peaceful coexistence. After all, even this session could not have been convened if détente had not become the main tendency in world developments.

113. Surely, much of what until recently was an unattainable wish, is now being gradually implemented. In Europe, which has gone down in history as a place of interminable conflicts, tension and the epicentre of the two most terrible wars, people today enjoy the foundations of security and co-operation that have been laid.

114. They do not want to live on a powder keg. Just as the needle of a magnetic compass persistently seeks the North Pole, so humanity aspires instinctively to peace.

115. In recent years a great deal has been accomplished for the sake of these truly humane aspirations. Numerous negotiations are conducted on a wide range of issues. Some of the channels of the arms race have already been closed off; not all of them, however, and by no means the most dangerous ones.

116. In this situation, naturally, political détente alone is no longer sufficient. It is absolutely necessary to take concrete steps in the field of disarmament and not to acquiesce in the fact that developments in the military sphere are still heading in a different direction. It stands to reason that there is no sense in talking about détente, on the one hand, while proceeding, on the other hand, with the development and manufacture of new types of weapons, raising military expenditures and kindling ever new hotbeds of war.

117. Moreover, as is generally known, armaments entail exceptionally harmful social and economic consequences, undermining the natural endeavour of nations to achieve a higher level of development. It is one of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a new equitable economic order and draws off immense material and human resources exactly from where they are most needed. To what extent would the standards of living of peoples be raised and how many burning problems facing mankind could be resolved by the funds thus saved! For instance, if at least for the duration of this session the arms race were halted, we would save $30-35 thousand million, an amount which almost exceeds by a factor of eight the financial assistance which is to be paid from United Nations Development Programme funds for the implementation of projects in the fields of industry, agriculture and in the infrastructure of the developing countries during the whole Second United Nations Development Decade.

118. For all these reasons mankind is placing great hopes in this session of the General Assembly. It is not attracted by the concept of guaranteed destruction so eagerly put forward by militarists, whereby the present arsenal of nuclear weapons might be equal to destroying all of mankind 15 times over, which in itself is apparently the best guarantee that there will be no war.

119. We put the question unequivocally: as opposed to the possibility of war, we put forward the alternative of peace; as opposed to the arms race, we put forward co-operation and peaceful emulation. That is why we intend to take an active part in the constructive work of the current session.

120. But to take a step forward means to weigh, with a sense of the highest responsibility and in a rational and pragmatic way, while taking into consideration the sound judgement and realism of all, the question of how to unite our thinking and what should be our common priorities. And not only that: we must reach agreement on concrete steps, too, and on that basis devise a realistic course of action that would make for tangible progress in the question of disarmament.

121. For our part, I can with full responsibility declare on behalf of my Government that Czechoslovakia, together with its allies—as we have already stated in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Bucharest in November 1976—is prepared, in keeping with the most intrinsic aspirations and interests of our people, to participate actively in the struggle to safeguard peace and for the continued relaxation of tension. President Gustav Husák stated recently: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is resolutely opposed to the continued arms race and to the manufacture and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction."

122. History is full of examples of peace being advocated or proclaimed, but also replete with evidence that more often than not these were just empty words thrown to the four winds. We do not find many genuine attempts in history to create peace, to prepare the prerequisite conditions for it—in other words, to organize peace, if I may so express myself. And even despite the fact that all the best representatives of humanity, being guided by humane and noble ideals, have always been against wars, attempts at preserving peace were doomed to failure because in the course of all earlier periods of history objective conditions did not exist for halting wars and establishing lasting peace.

123. This was achieved only as a result of the Great October Revolution—that revolutionary event in the history of mankind which inexorably influenced its development, cutting substantially into the socio-economic roots of wars and causing such a change in the relationship of forces between peace and war that the strategic initiative was fully taken over by the forces of peace and progress. Lenin, in his penetrating diagnosis, proved quite clearly and irrefutably that imperialism and wars are communicating vessels, two inseparable terms representing the sum of the causes and effects of wars. However, in the present-day world, in the new correlation of forces which exists, there are factors which limit the possibilities of militarist expansion and clearly delineate the principles of peaceful coexistence—in

other words, a modern Rubicon—which cannot and must not be crossed without involving the mortal danger of self-destruction.

124. All the more absurd and, let us be frank, all the more futile, are efforts to perpetuate armaments by advancing ever new reckless projects such as nuclear bombs with reduced radiation and increased destructive effect or, vice versa, the production of the neutron weapon, which is so far the most dangerous project of its kind. It is no wonder that the absurdly inhuman nature of that weapon has united all of peace-loving humanity into a common wave of indignation.

125. Moreover, the neutron bomb attests to the existence of a deliberate, malicious design on the part of certain military-political circles to create types and systems of weapons which blur the differences between nuclear and conventional war and dangerously lower the threshold blocking the way to a global thermo-nuclear catastrophe. To yield in this matter to the pressure of the militarists would be tantamount to diverting for a long time and seriously jeopardizing genuine prospects for lasting peace and development. This must be taken into account by the respective Governments.

126. The post-war decades have shown with sufficient clarity that the socialist and other peace-loving countries could not and never can be talked to from a position of strength. The instigators of such attempts have never been able to net any gains; all they could enter into their books were losses. And what did mankind stand to gain from this? Only stepped-up tensions, cold war and teetering on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe.

127. We are therefore of the view that the question of the complete prohibition of the production, deployment and use of neutron weapons must be specifically stressed in the programme of action on disarmament which is to be adopted by this session. In our view, the best way to solve this burning issue is to conclude the agreements on which concrete proposals were this year submitted by the socialist countries in the Geneva Disarmament Committee.[3]

128. All these true facts that I have stated should strengthen our determination to achieve real and tangible results in this special session under the scrutiny of the peoples of our countries and of the whole world in order to overcome the feelings of futility and fatalism, which is our highest political and moral duty—in a word, to make this special session a success.

129. Our position on the halting of the arms race and on disarmament is embodied in the drafts of the main provisions of the declaration on disarmament and the programme of action [*A/S-10/1, vol. V, documents A/AC.187/81 and 82*]. Together with other socialist countries we have submitted them as working documents for the deliberations of this session, prompted as we were by a desire to adopt a document all parts of which would reflect sober judgement, a correct evaluation of today's world and which would be well balanced, objective and guarantee equitable relations and the responsibility of all countries and, what is equally important, would also be generally acceptable. We also fully support the proposals which were made in this connexion at the last meeting by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko. They have faithfully reflected our point of view on this matter.

130. Thus, if this session is to make real progress towards the implementation of the supreme goal of our Organization—"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—then its final documents must indeed be a programme of "action", in order to be conducive to success in new disarmament negotiations. We have no need of rhetoric, of mere proclamations of even the noblest intentions, nor of voting or efforts to speed up the process at any price beyond what is realistically possible; what we need are concrete deeds and practical measures.

131. The pivotal issues in this set of problems are of course the questions related to nuclear weapons, that is, the halting of nuclear armaments, complete nuclear disarmament and averting the threat of nuclear war. It is after all nuclear weapons that are the most destructive force in today's military arsenals which could easily turn our world into a smouldering wasteland. This task is all the more pressing since, in the last 10 years alone, the world stockpiles of these weapons have grown more than three times. We are therefore convinced of the urgency with which we should demand that all nuclear Powers should undertake to halt further production of all types of nuclear weapons and to proceed gradually to reduce their accumulated stockpiles until they are completely liquidated.

132. At the present time, conditions are undoubtedly ripe for reaching an agreement on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Thanks to the intensive work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, the technical aspect of supervision which for a long time represented a serious obstacle to progress has practically been resolved. We think it is absolutely essential, should this agreement indeed be reached and for it to be really effective, that all nuclear Powers, without exception, accede to it.

133. Incidentally, on the subject of supervision, past experience has shown that fully effective supervision measures, once agreed upon, have never caused any difficulties in practice and have met every expectation placed in them. What is, after all, always decisive in such a case is political will and a sense of responsibility, not new organizations or agencies.

134. Another requirement is that of preventing the continued spread of nuclear arms, of strengthening and achieving full universality in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, along these lines, of enhancing the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Peaceful co-operation among States in the field of nuclear energy must not be allowed to become a channel for nuclear armaments. This danger is further

[3] *Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27*, vol. II, document CCD/559.

complicated by the fact that a dozen countries by now possess the capability of developing, without any major difficulty, nuclear weapons of their own. It is also for this reason that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic supports the idea of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in different parts of the world.

135. Of exceptional urgency, in our view, are also such important questions as a total ban on the development and manufacture of all new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems thereof. There is evidence that the development of such qualitatively innovative weapons is now leaving the realm of Utopia and becoming the reality of the present day, and that everything that mankind has so far experienced in wars is but a remote, dying echo of what the disastrously destructive effects of such new weapons could be.

136. Our session is offered an exceptional opportunity to create a favourable and constructive atmosphere for the successful culmination of such important current negotiations as the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, the three-Power talks on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the negotiations on the ban of chemical and radiological weapons.

137. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is deeply convinced that the most realistic and most dependable way in which this session could effectively contribute to the final elimination of the threat of war consists in the adoption of the most recent disarmament initiatives of the Soviet Union, submitted by Mr. Brezhnev, aimed at both qualitative and quantitative arms reductions by the major Powers in both the nuclear and conventional fields and which are undoubtedly in consonance with the aspirations of the majority of the countries represented in this hall.

138. The session would make a significant contribution to the cause of peace were it to appeal simultaneously to all States to adopt decisive international measures in order to avert the still existing danger of nuclear war and, in particular, to conclude a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It is only natural, after all, that nuclear disarmament measures must go hand in hand with strengthening political and international legal safeguards for security.

139. The political and economic situation in the world demands urgently that, in the question of limiting arms expenditures and substantially reducing military budgets, attention should be paid to concrete and practical negotiations.

140. In the over-all context of the disarmament effort, an essential place is occupied by regional arms limitation measures to reduce armed forces and armaments, including conventional weapons.

141. We cannot be satisfied that the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, in which my country is also a participant, have now been going on for five years, so far without any tangible results. We are of the view that the Vienna talks, which represent the first experiment of this kind in history, must extricate themselves from an interminable debate on mere technical details, must free themselves from all the variants of "asymmetrical" models that are contradictory to the main agreed principles, and must proceed with the main issue, namely, the preparation of a concrete agreement. For our part, we are prepared to do everything to achieve such a mutually acceptable agreement.

142. Of considerable importance in this respect was the recently concluded Belgrade meeting of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe where many inspiring proposals were submitted for détente in the military sphere, among them the programme of action aimed at military détente in Europe and containing such significant measures as, for example, the proposal that the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe conclude a treaty not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, as well as a number of other proposals. Let me beg, also, from this rostrum that practical consideration be given these proposals in a manner that should be agreed upon on the basis of general consent among the States participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

143. May I also touch upon the matter of machinery for disarmament negotiations. In the Czechoslovak Government's view, the United Nations, the General Assembly and other bodies, together with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, constitute a sufficiently widespread and representative apparatus for multilateral disarmament negotiations, although we frequently wish for—and, in many instances, we are striving to achieve—a higher yield from their efforts. However, we have earlier voiced our apprehension that the laboratory-type analyses which are conducted as to who should negotiate, and where and how, might soon push into the background the main issue, in other words, negotiations on a specific concrete agreement. What we lack is not the machinery, nor is it the structure or organizational form that underlies these difficulties, but rather the political will of some States to accept the idea of disarmament and to proceed with its implementation in practice.

144. Czechoslovakia believes, therefore, that the session will best fulfil its purpose if it becomes a prologue to the convening of a world disarmament conference. It is that conference precisely that might become the appropriate, duly representative and authoritative forum, having machinery at its disposal which will make it possible to adopt concrete, effective and far-reaching measures.

145. However, the convening of that conference is being continually delayed by some States, including two permanent members of the Security Council. This is not particularly far-sighted, because world public opinion desires the convening of that conference and is fully aware that participation in it by all States is necessary, especially those possessing nuclear weapons. The Czechoslovak Government supports the idea that the Assembly at the current session should determine the specific date for the convening of that conference and should establish a body that would be engaged in its practical preparation.

146. I have already stressed that at this session the Assembly is facing an exceptionally difficult and responsible task, namely, to strengthen and further deepen the current positive trends in international development and to prepare joint measures for carrying them over into the military sphere.

147. I am glad that I can reaffirm the determination of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to do its utmost to ensure that our deliberations are conducted in a spirit of fruitful, constructive and creative discussion, and that the decisions taken by us form a realistic foundation for reaching a decisive turning-point in the disarmament effort.

148. In this we are motivated by the essential optimism of our world outlook. We are deeply convinced that the policy of détente, disarmament and development will overcome all obstacles placed in its way by its adversaries, provided, of course, that we all turn the energy devoted to the speeches we make on disarmament into energetic action. In this process there can be no passive onlookers.

149. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Disarmament today is not an option, it is not one of the alternatives in front of us. Disarmament is a fundamental condition for the very survival of mankind. In a world where the number of missile-deliverable warheads of the two major nuclear Powers alone is somewhere around 12,000, with a combined explosive power of the equivalent of 1.3 million bombs of the size of that dropped on Hiroshima, one can no longer conceive of security outside the process of real disarmament.

150. I have to state with regret that there is not a sufficiently widespread and clear awareness in this world of the serious risk posed by the arms race to the present and the future of mankind. The secrecy around its main processes, the illusion created about disarmament negotiations, the wide publicity given to some of man's space adventures, have almost turned the arms race into a "science fiction" show, a sort of gigantic sports competition capable of providing audiences with a variety of sensations, except that such audiences are not composed of mere spectators but of real actors, that the settings are not made of cardboard, that there is no awakening after the nightmare and that this is a matter of their own survival. We have to emphasize here how dangerous are the illusions about the arms race and disarmament negotiations and how urgent it is to look at things as they really are and to take action, before it is too late, to put an end to the most dangerous course upon which mankind has embarked.

151. That is the meaning of the initiative taken by the smaller nations of the world, the developing and non-aligned countries to convene this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

152. We have arrived now at an historic moment, We must understand that moment in order to seize the opportunities it offers and to exploit those opportunities. That is the task before us now. What is new and historic about the present situation consists essentially of two points: first, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is the symptom—perhaps I could say the proof—that the question of disarmament has become a universal concern. Disarmament is no longer a matter of the two alliances or for a small number of States; all countries are now being actively engaged in the formulation of policies and priorities—their own policies and priorities. The second factor that makes this a major historic turning-point is that the international community is now beginning to tackle disarmament in the way in which such complex problem areas must always be tackled, namely, in terms of an over-all plan of clear priorities and a set of "here-and-now" steps, adding up to a co-ordinated whole.

153. The very fact of my presence here is an illustration of the new conditions in the world. A small country such as mine has a vital interest in disarmament. It is concerned about what is going on in the field of armaments, has subsequently decided to act and, over the years, has submitted various proposals aimed at enhancing the cause of disarmament.

154. The current decade should have been what it had been proclaimed to be, the Disarmament Decade. The fact is that, as a result of world evolution over the seven years which have elapsed so far, it seems to deserve the name of armaments decade. Not only has no disarmament measure been put into effect as an action meaningful to the basic trend, not only have no reductions of the present stockpiles been made and not only has no bomb or nuclear missile been destroyed, but the arms race continues to spiral unabated and to acquire new dimensions, thus creating new premises for its further intensification and for increasing the danger of war. The technological character of the arms race has been enhanced, the stock of weapons of mass destruction has grown at a fast pace, the military importance of the oceans and of space has become greater and more and more States have been involved in the competition in armaments.

155. In spite of the obligations undertaken by Governments in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the strategic arms limitation agreements, the arms race has been stepped up. The arms race has become a planetary phenomenon mirrored by the increased weight of developing countries in world military expenditures, by the expansion of the geographical area and the increase in the number of countries kept supplied in various degrees with sophisticated major weaponry of the latest model.

156. While this is true there is also a tendency to assess the prevailing trend by ignoring its context and to infer or to give the impression that the main danger comes from the developing countries. Let me stress here the fact that the largest accumulation of armaments in the developing countries can be signalled in just a few conflict areas or tension zones where the independence of nations is threatened. Even in these cases, however, developing countries play an entirely minor role in the over-all picture considering that it is only now that their armed forces are taking shape.

157. True enough, this horizontal proliferation has al-

ready resulted in an even greater scope and destructiveness of local wars and a higher risk of confrontation between the leading military Powers and consequently it is a factor which increases the danger of a new world war. We should, nevertheless, emphasize that behind this situation lies the primary responsibility of the most heavily armed countries which maintain the arms race and determine its dynamism.

158. The report of the Secretary-General on the economic consequences of the arms race, which is before the General Assembly,[4] makes it clear that the driving force behind this world-wide arms race is constituted by the qualitative arms race among the largest military Powers, owing chiefly to their virtual monopoly in the development of advanced military technology, to their overwhelmingly large share of world production and world exports of advanced weaponry and to the global character of their political and military interests. It may be asserted that the horizontal proliferation of armaments is, to a large extent, the direct expression of the competition between the largest military Powers and, in many cases, a means of promoting certain political and economic interests.

159. The arms race constitutes the main obstacle to development efforts. The establishment of a new international order calls for the elimination of obstacles to development and for the utilization of all ways and means to bring about a rational management of resources and interdependencies and thus to allow all nations of the world equal access to the fruits of progress as well as free and independent development. This explains the intense interest in the problems of disarmament viewed in close connexion with other global problems and with concerted efforts to restructure the world. It is true that until recently the developing countries showed little interest in the various aspects of disarmament which were viewed as problems specifically affecting the developed countries. The feeling that we shall die of starvation before dying of the effects caused by an atomic war is being replaced by the conviction that we shall die of starvation if we do not uproot the causes of a new world war. The arms race is in total incompatibility with the efforts aimed at the establishment of a new international economic and political order. This is true not only because the possible and probable outcome is a devasting war; it is due also to the fact that the armaments escalation constitutes the most powerful factor of preserving the present system of international relations and exacerbating all its negative aspects.

160. As the Secretary-General's report, which I have just mentioned, makes clear, the burden of armaments rests especially on the shoulders of developing countries which, criticized as they are by the international community, too often make exorbitant expenditures by comparison with their modest resources, the result being balance-of-payments deficits, rising foreign debts, decreased favourable effects of imports on growth and a notable decline of accumulation possibilities at a time when the bridging of debts requires even higher growth rates.

[4] United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

161. It is to be stressed that we do not regard disarmament as a universal remedy to contemporary problems. It does not and cannot solve the opposition between rival ideologies, nor does it solve territorial disputes or conflicts of economic and political interests between nations. But disarmament will help to divert the efforts exerted to solve outstanding issues towards the field of political negotiations, thus keeping open the options of further co-operation between States having different social conceptions or interests. Disarmament would therefore entail the "demilitarization" of national policies and of international relations, the elimination of strategic considerations from the process of decision-making, a method which is currently affecting the international development of States and international co-operation. Disarmament and the establishment of a new economic order are, however, complementary in the sense that real progress towards the bridging of economic gaps between States, the reduction and abolition of inequities in world economic structures and a mechanism devised to solve global problems would eliminate many of the present sources of tension and threats to peace and implicitly remove the roots of the present competition in armaments. Progress in the field of disarmament thus constitutes one of the principal factors of a new type of security for all nations.

162. As to the final documents to be adopted at the end of this special session on disarmament, it is the view of my delegation that disarmament should be approached in a comprehensive manner, and that our efforts should be aimed at real disarmament. Work should be resumed on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

163. The following elements, we feel, should be reflected in the final document. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that disarmament is general and complete and that war will no longer be an instrument for settling international problems; and that such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The highest priority should be given to disarmament matters related to nuclear weapons. All States should have the opportunity to express their views on the substance and basic principles of such a programme and on its scope, on practical ways and means of implementing it, and on other aspects of the programme, they should participate actively, on terms of full equality, in all phases of the negotiations on the drafting of the programme, so that it may embody the will of all peoples and give expression to their fundamental interests.

164. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States and of all other major military powers in the efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all armaments is indispensable if the disarmament efforts are to have a full measure of success.

165. As disarmament is a matter of great concern to all States and all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about, and to under-

stand, the prevailing situation in the field of the arms race and of disarmament. In this connexion, the United Nations has a central role in keeping with its obligations under its Charter. The problems of disarmament affect the security and the very lives of peoples, and they should know what action to take in this direction so that they may have their say and defend their vital interests. That is why the peoples of all countries must be fully informed, and periodic reports must be issued on the current state of armaments and its consequences, and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race.

166. The United Nations which, under its Charter, bears responsibility for disarmament, should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts in this connexion.

167. No disarmament, or disarmament-related, measure should adversely affect the scientific, technological or economic future of nations. All nations have full rights of access to all achievements of science and technology, without any restrictions whatsoever.

168. The international agreements in the field of disarmament that have already been concluded should become universal, and all parties should fulfil all the obligations arising from these treaties.

169. The programme for general and complete disarmament should ensure that States have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens. It should also ensure that States provide and support agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

170. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence of stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within a specified time-limit. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place after a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and, where appropriate, that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are ready to become operative.

171. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage. Security could thus be ensured equally for all.

172. All disarmament measures should be implemented, from beginning to end, under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties were honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out at each stage. To implement control over, and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured of unrestricted access, without veto, to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

173. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and for settling international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the necessary measures should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations the manpower agreed to be necessary for an international peace force equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat to use, or any use of, arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.

174. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on, and implementation of, measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress towards agreement on the total programme, and in such a way as to facilitate and form part of that programme.

175. I wish to express the full support of my delegation for the proposals made by the Secretary-General at the opening of this session. I see particular merit in the proposal to establish an advisory board, on which matter I wish to comment briefly.

Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) resumed the Chair.

176. The problem is in the way the General Assembly works. It is a forum for making statements and finding compromises by cutting a heel here and a toe there. In that way it plays a very important role, of course, but it cannot stand alone. What is lacking is an institution for digesting or processing, for transforming the raw material of the positions adopted at one session into inputs for the next session. Without such processing, the elaboration of a strategy and a consensus on problems and directions for solutions becomes exceedingly difficult. The tendency for the General Assembly to reconsider exactly the same item in exactly the same way year after year is well known. The idea of putting items on the agenda only every second year is to hide the real problem, not to solve it. What is being done is the collation of existing proposals with no fundamental questions answered.

177. What is needed is to create an institution with which the General Assembly can enter into a dialogue in such a way that a consensus of views on the problems faced and the strategy to deal with them, rectified and adjusted as one goes along, emerge from the dialogue. The chief institutional requirements for the advisory board fol-

low from this role as dialogue partner of the General Assembly. It must be similar enough to the General Assembly to permit a genuine dialogue, and different enough to make that dialogue dialectical in the classic sense.

178. What is proposed, therefore, is a body that is much smaller than the General Assembly, with greater weight being placed on expertise; a body that is nevertheless politically representative, sufficiently permanent and organized in terms of expert status; a body with a great inclination to raise basic questions and cut through sheer rhetoric; and finally, of course, a body with purely advisory status.

179. This points to an organization similar to the Commission on Development Planning: some 28 experts, appointed for perhaps five years at a time. Its tasks would be to draw up an annual report on the situation in the field of disarmament and on priorities and problems as it sees them, before the session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly could request it to consider specific questions, and the advisory board could itself raise any issues it felt pertinent.

180. It is to be noted that this is in no way a substitute for the research and documentation functions of the Secretariat. It would be a powerful supplement to it and they could work effectively hand in hand. The basic point is, of course, that the annual reports would not commit Governments but would nevertheless indirectly have a considerable influence on the work of the First Committee—the Committee dealing with political and security questions—steering it in a specific direction and all the time being a little bit ahead of it. If the General Assembly is to fulfil the dynamic and co-ordinating role in disarmament clearly envisaged in the conception of a special session on disarmament, an institution pretty much along these lines seems to me to be essential.

181. That will be the organ to ensure that disarmament negotiations take into account the security interests of States and the progress made in other United Nations bodies dealing with security and also to ensure that disarmament negotiations are relevant to the developments in military technology.

182. Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): Sir, it is a special pleasure for the Philippine delegation to see you presiding over this special session of the General Assembly, the third in a row within a year. Your enviable record is totally unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. That the membership of our Organization should have chosen you as President of the General Assembly not only for its thirty-second regular session but also for its eighth, ninth, and tenth special sessions is a fitting and well-deserved tribute to the qualities of leadership and the wisdom you have consistently shown as a diplomat and as a man in public life. Our warmest congratulations, Sir. We wish you the best as you guide the deliberations in this crucial special session on disarmament.

183. We are brought together here in extraordinary session to consider once again the most immediate and intractable threat to human survival on earth—the arms race. Spaceship earth is being packed with nuclear dynamite, in the name of security. Yet, sooner or later on earth's orbiting course, those explosives are bound to go off through accident or miscalculation or by design, with incalculable results for all human life.

184. The holding of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a measure of the level of concern which is felt throughout the world. It is a measure of the dismay that solutions have yet to be found to the madness in which States, large and small, have been caught up. This session may possibly set loose new and creative forces in the world community. It may possibly lead to the discovery of new and promising approaches to arms limitation and disarmament which have thus far escaped us. It can assist, and already has assisted, in mobilizing and informing world public opinion, a force which may demand increasingly faster progress on the part of the nations assembled here.

185. All nations, large and small, are fellow riders on spaceship earth. Yet the fate of our community depends entirely too much on the actions and inaction of too few—the most militarily significant States, which balance all our futures on a razor's edge of precarious nuclear parity. We had reason to hope that in the months between the time our decision was taken to hold this session and now, steps would have been taken which, although not of the greatest military significance in themselves, would have given cause for hope to all peoples that the tide could finally be reversed. Such steps might have included actions jointly agreed on and taken or, on the other hand, they could have included examples of individual national restraint and goodwill. An agreement on a comprehensive test ban remains to be concluded. An agreement to destroy and prohibit the most lethal chemical weapons—in particular, nerve gas—remains uncompleted.

186. No State has found it possible in the interim to stimulate progress by identifying and taking steps leading to reciprocation by others and thus to new agreements. We recall the example of the prohibition of bacteriological and biological weapons, an agreement which followed quickly upon the initiative taken by a major Power to declare the destruction of stockpiles and a halt in production of these fearsome agents.

187. We welcome and applaud the decision not to deploy sophisticated radiation weapons. At the same time, we deplore the lack of undertakings to refrain from the development and deployment of new types of heavier, more accurate multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles and of cruise missiles. It would seem clear and logical that the least we could do in the absence of arms reductions and disarmament would be to refrain from those things which we have not yet done.

188. If vertical proliferation continues, so does horizontal proliferation. No undertakings have been forthcoming to suspend sales and delivery of nuclear reprocessing plants with capability for concentration of weapons-grade material nor to forgo such arrangements in the future. Nor has the build-up throughout the world of conventional arms been any less resistant to restraint. The sums being

spent on arms by countries with pressing domestic needs are well known to all, and such sums continue to increase as the demand for the latest technology in armaments spreads. Thus there is little to suggest that in preparation for this special session it has not been "business as usual" in the arms race. The deadly momentum of the arms competition has thwarted efforts to slow it or to turn it aside.

189. Regrettably, the extent to which our current exercise in the removal of brackets from the draft documents of the special session will contribute to tangible measurable progress towards a disarmed and secure world, remains an open question. It will, of course, be useful to agree both upon the general character of the armaments competition and upon an agenda of steps to be taken. Not since the United States[5] and USSR[6] draft treaties on general and complete disarmament has there been as comprehensive a treatment of the arms problem as is proposed in the draft documents before us.

190. Might I suggest, however, that there is nothing to prevent one or the other major Power from announcing during this session the definite steps it is taking to initiate a process of change from the present situation. Such steps might well include an announcement of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, a reduction in the stockpiles of such materials, a moratorium on the production or deployment of any new weapons, systems or their testing, the destruction of stockpiles of nerve-gas weapons and a moratorium on all nuclear tests pending a comprehensive ban.

191. These are only suggestions. There are many such steps which could be taken without greatly affecting the condition of essential parity in hyper-destructive weaponry. What are required are steps which will break the vicious circle of action and reaction towards ever-increasing armaments. What is required is initiation of a new kind of process. Our problem is as much one of the restoration of sanity as one of dealing with hardware. Increases in hardware are seen and interpreted as threats and lead to matching hardware. This has been the main characteristic of the arms race. Similarly, measures of restraint will be seen as a reduction of threat and will in time lead to an atmosphere in which substantial arms reduction measures can be negotiated.

192. As I have suggested on earlier occasions, what are required are acts of high statesmanship to establish a new trend, a trend which will serve initially to reduce the oscillatory arms increases on each side and will lead, when persevered in, to an oscillation of a different kind, a competition to match measures leading to reduction of tension and arrest of the arms build-up. It is from such changed conditions that fruitful negotiations can lead to useful results. The international community has up to now not given sufficient attention to the creation of the necessary conditions and atmosphere for success. The conditions are psychological in nature as well as physical and have as much to do with perceived threat as with actual threat.

193. One of the dangers we face in approval of the bracketed or unbracketed documents is the fact that everything has been put into the pot, so to speak, and thus we have before us a recipe for a stew which, while it may be savoury in itself, consists of a *mélange* of unrecognizable ingredients. The risks are obvious. Nothing may receive sufficient emphasis to appear compelling, to amount to a mandate, to galvanize opinion and support for change and progress. In particular, the text before us makes only passing reference to the relationship between disarmament and international peace and security. We venture to suggest, as we have done before, that this relationship may be more fundamental to the question of progress towards disarmament or the lack of progress than any other single factor. We must make a distinction here between arms limitation or reduction and general and complete disarmament. Arms reduction can, of course, be very substantial indeed without infringing State security, given the tremendous overkill capacity now available. However, arms reductions as such suffer from one severe limitation: depending on the fever chart of international affairs, which is to say the imagined level of threat, suspicion or fear, reductions may quickly turn to additions.

194. Only in comprehensive disarmament is there any hope of lasting world peace. Yet in the absence of effective, tried and true mechanisms for the maintenance of international peace and security, general and complete disarmament cannot and will not occur. The nature of security is changing. Heretofore, military strength and force of arms have provided what little security has existed in our anarchic world. But what lessons have we drawn from the fact that force of arms provides a rapidly diminishing increment of security as arms continue to pile up? As there is no defence against new weapons of mass destruction, in particular against nuclear weapons, so there is no real security. Nations are thus unable to perform one of their prime functions, namely, to assure the security of their peoples.

195. In the United Nations we have a world Organization charged by its Charter with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but as yet unable to discharge this function effectively or, in any case, not effectively enough for nations to feel secure in disarming. How, then, can we talk about disarmament without prescribing the degree to which the United Nations must assume the functions which the Members are no longer able to perform? The prime requisite for disarmament has thus largely escaped our attention and our creative efforts.

196. In this regard we particularly welcome the decision of the General Assembly at its thirty-second session requesting the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. We see this as a necessary first step, but only a first step, in what must inevitably become one of the most important searches in human history, namely, the search for

[5] See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. F and document DC/205, annex 1, sects. E, F, and *ibid., Supplement for January to December 1963*, document DC/208, annex 1, sect. H.

[6] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867 and *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964*, document DC/209, annex 1, sect. A.

the means to provide security for the human community as a whole in the absence of national means of doing so. We should not delude ourselves or mislead the public into believing that disarmament will be achieved in the absence of a solution to this historic question.

19. A major factor, of course, concerns the extent to which Governments are prepared to enter into this search. The question of international peacekeeping and peacemaking in the context of the process of disarmament has as yet received little attention from States Members of the United Nations. In many instances, we do not believe the connexion between the two problems has yet become clear. If the special session should succeed only in one particular—in establishing clearly this interdependence between disarmament and emergence of an alternative world security system, the session would have succeeded in a most important respect. We would most urgently suggest the formation of a working group to consider the progress report on the study of the Secretary-General [*A/S-10/7 and Corr. 1*], and to initiate an ongoing approach to the relationship between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. Nations will have to choose: they cannot have disarmament without security, or security without disarmament.

198. Perhaps the foregoing considerations contain a clue to the reason for the lack of attention to comprehensive disarmament both in the documents before us and in the work done relative to the arms race in recent years. Whatever the reasons, it seems important to re-establish firmly that nothing less than general and complete disarmament is our goal, and that in fact nothing less will provide for global security at a time when retention of only a very few nuclear weapons can work havoc among us. One of our main aims in this session should surely be to re-establish the pre-eminence of the goal of comprehensive disarmament, even while we delineate the steps necessary to both short- and long-range progress.

199. In respect of the long-range effort for comprehensive disarmament, it is not too soon to begin to consider the nature of an international disarmament organization. It will be recalled that the draft treaties for comprehensive disarmament did, indeed, make provision for the establishment of an international disarmament organization and that there have been periodic attempts to focus the attention of the international community on the necessity for a new United Nations agency with responsibilities in this area. Thus, we are particularly interested in the proposal of the Netherlands for seeking the views of Members concerning an international disarmament organization, and its establishment, for example, at a second special session on disarmament [*A/S-10/1, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/108*].

200. The number of disarmament agreements is rapidly proliferating, and with them the necessity for their oversight, as well as for the organization of review conferences and for the development of effective verification measures and processes to assure the compliance of States. The Government of the Philippines feels that these rapidly growing responsibilities should be vested in an international disarmament organization providing a clearing house for verification information from satellites. The responsibilities of the new agency can grow in keeping with the developments in the disarmament field and, conversely, new tasks can be assigned to the international disarmament organization as it gains experience and expertise. The Government of the Philippines, therefore, will strongly endorse the proposal of the Netherlands on the establishment of an international disarmament organization.

201. The portions of the world which live in dire want may be more sensitively aware than others of the tremendous waste of resources in the conventional and nuclear arms race. Many figures and comparisons have been provided in recent years. Thus, for instance, the cost of a new nuclear missile submarine is the equivalent of nearly half a million homes. The world is denying itself tremendous gains in social goods and services by its prodigious investment of treasure in the arms race. The mountainous production of military hardware is creating a "throw-away" world society through manufacture of non-consumable goods, now reaching a substantial percentage of the gross national product of many countries. From the long-range historical view, the diversion of such huge quantities of materials to arms production can only be seen as an unconscionable indulgence in the face of world needs. Thus, the suggestion that a conscience tax of a small percentage of arms expenditures of the militarily significant Powers be exacted and devoted to development needs seems appropriate and would serve two needs: first, it would provide funds for life-serving ends; secondly, it would remind the States involved of the extent to which their expenditures are defrauding themselves and the world of funds needed to meet social goals.

202. Closely related to the question of disarmament and development is the problem of reduction of military budgets. One of the most promising ways to reduce arms lies in the gradual shrinkage of military budgets. In this approach, the difficult problems of balancing asymmetrical weapons systems against each other do not arise. Military establishments choose their weapons, but paradoxically must do so with less. We earnestly hope that the very important initiative with respect to development of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on military expenditures of Member States will contribute to the possibility of reduction of arms by the budget-cut approach, and that the envisaged pilot test of the reporting instrument will soon be carried out.

203. The major requirements for halting and reversing the arms race might be summarized as integrity, ingenuity and initiative. Without specifying, it must be clear that there have been deficiencies in each area. History will condemn us severely if we do not succeed in staunching this flow of the life-blood of our societies into suicidal channels.

204. Our special session cannot resolve the question of disarmament. Nor should we expect it to. It can, however, become a turning-point for the reversal and end of the arms race. It could be a turning-point for change in the ways in which we address this question. The late Lord Bertrand Russell of the United Kingdom stated that man-

kind has never refrained from any folly of which it was capable. It is our profound, noble and most urgent task to prove Lord Bertrand Russell wrong.

205. Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco and on my own behalf, most warmly congratulate you on your election to the presidency of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

206. This renewed expression of confidence in yourself is a manifestation of the esteem you enjoy among us and the embodiment of your fully proved competence. We are sure that the Assembly will find in your experience the best possible guarantees that this session will be guided to the success for which the entire international community hopes.

207. Morocco, as a non-aligned country, can only welcome your election to the presidency of our Assembly since this election is an act of recognition and a tribute to your country, Yugoslavia, which hosted the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade and which has constantly sought to promote the principles of disarmament in order to strengthen the cause of peace and international security.

208. I wish also to express my gratitude to Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, who guided the work of the Preparatory Committee with far-sightedness and efficiency, with the result that the Assembly has available important documents which, we are sure, will make our task easier.

209. I should like also to pay a tribute to the Secretariat in the person of Mr. Kurt Waldheim for the important contribution he made to the preparation for this session and for all the services provided for the success of our work.

210. Responsibility in the field of disarmament falls in the first instance to our Organization, which is entrusted by the Charter with the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly has undertaken praiseworthy efforts to check the arms race and to promote détente. To this end, it has encouraged the establishment of negotiating bodies which have made a signal contribution to the adoption of various disarmament measures. Unfortunately, the attainment of the main objective of general and complete disarmament has been impeded by the lack of political will among States and by mutual mistrust among Governments.

211. The lack of progress in this field, which is characterized by an unbridled race for the acquisition of the most sophisticated and destructive weapons, has led the countries Members of the Organization to decide, on the initiative of the non-aligned countries, to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This initiative is all the more praiseworthy since it provides the Assembly with the opportunity to assert its direct responsibility with a view to strengthening the role entrusted to it by the Charter to draw up principles of disarmament and to provide appropriate negotiating bodies.

212. This special session is, in fact, of major interest. It will allow the overwhelming majority of countries—large and small—to participate in a discussion from which they have thus far been excluded and thus to measure the true impact of disarmament on their security and development. Similarly, we hope that this special session will make the great Powers more aware of their special responsibility in the field of disarmament, in particular of nuclear disarmament, and will thus lead to positive progress in the negotiations now under way.

213. The unprecedented growth in and intensification of the arms race, the serious dangers posed by immense stockpiles of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, the persisting hotbeds of tension in the Middle East and Africa mean that a heavy threat of insecurity is weighing over mankind as a whole.

214. Thus, in the Middle East the arms race and the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons by Israel, which has not adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, endanger international peace and security in this region. In this respect we reaffirm that just and lasting peace can be established in this region only with the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, whose legitimate representative is the Palestine Liberation Organization, to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian State in its homeland.

215. A heavy threat also hangs over our continent of Africa because of South Africa's intention to acquire nuclear weapons. The Organization is in duty bound to ensure the effective implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa [*resolution 1652 (XVI)*] and to bring the necessary pressure to bear on the racist régime of Pretoria, in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and those of the Organization of African Unity.

216. Furthermore, our African continent is threatened with general destabilization because of the competition there among the great Powers and their recourse to ideological warfare. Foreign intervention in conflicts between African countries as well as aggression by some African countries against their neighbours are inevitably leading to an arms race engaged in by States seeking to protect their security. This arms race is undoubtedly impeding economic development and threatening world peace.

217. With regard to Africa, it is necessary that the principles of the Charter be observed and that the Organization of African Unity be left to settle inter-African conflicts with the means at its disposal, in order to permit member States to live in security enjoying full respect for their territorial integrity. It is in this spirit that His Majesty King Hassan II responded to the appeal of President Omar Bongo, current President of the Organization of African Unity, regarding the events which recently caused bloodshed in Zaire. His Majesty's response thus reflects a concern to limit the problems of our continent to a purely African framework and is designed to strengthen the unity and solidarity of member States and to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

218. Another hotbed of tension has been created because of the persistence of racist and colonial régimes in southern Africa. The Kingdom of Morocco, which has constantly provided all kinds of assistance and material and moral support to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania, is deeply convinced that those movements have the absolute right to have recourse to all appropriate means—including armed combat—in order to achieve their national aspirations to independence and freedom. The complete decolonization of southern Africa is the first condition for the cessation of the stockpiling of weapons in that region.

219. The Kingdom of Morocco, which has taken part in the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has a twofold concern in the security of the western Mediterranean: first of all as a Mediterranean country anxious to see the Mediterranean become a zone of peace, and secondly since it assumes special responsibility as guardian of the Straits of Gibraltar, which is a strategic and economic route of first importance. We hope that this route will remain a zone of innocent passage, preserving the peace and security of coastal countries.

220. All our regional policy has always been derived from the idea of the unity of the Maghreb. We have always endeavoured to achieve this unity for the greater good of our peoples, convinced as we are of our common destiny. Consequently, we have always called for regional disarmament, and my country was the first to advocate a reduction of tension in our region.

221. This was particularly stressed in February 1967 in a message which His Majesty King Hassan II addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, with a view to checking the arms race in the Maghreb. His Majesty stated, among other things:

"Out of loyalty to these principles and in view of the national obligations we assume, we have undertaken the total mobilization of our resources in order to ensure development and progress for our country and prosperity for our people.

"You know that the achievement of such objectives is hardly easy. We are devoting thereto all our own human and material resources and all the assistance we receive from international organizations and friendly countries. We have even reconverted our institutional and administrative structures on the basis of this priority option at the social and economic level and towards the achievement of which we are at this time focusing all our efforts.

"Because of all these considerations and in order to translate this conviction into fundamental reality, we would like this principle of disarmament to be extended also to the region to which our country belongs. For this purpose, we propose to Your Excellency that, under the aegis of the United Nations, a committee be set up that would have a twofold mission:

"First, to recommend to Algeria and Morocco that they renounce any increase in their respective military potential in order to safeguard North Africa from the dangers inherent in the arms race;

"Secondly, to proceed *in situ*, using appropriate ways and means, to verify the arsenal of each of the two parties concerned, both in quality and in quantity, and to evaluate the respective level of requirements for maintaining order in each of the two countries concerned, Algeria and Morocco."

222. The convening of this special session devoted to disarmament is all the more significant since it coincides with the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade. The General Assembly has repeatedly stressed the close links between disarmament and development. In this respect it is enough to recall General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) declaring the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. Paragraph 6 of this resolution recommends that a substantial part of the resources freed by disarmament should be channelled to the economic development of the third world, most particularly in the field of technological progress.

223. The growing awareness of the General Assembly in this respect is merely the reflection of the concern of world public opinion at the escalation of military expenditures, particularly in the field of nuclear weaponry, an escalation that is proportionate to a growing lack of funds devoted to international co-operation between developed and developing countries. It is sufficient to remember that expenditures on weaponry at the moment amount every year to $400 thousand million, while official development assistance to developing countries scarcely exceeds $20 thousand million.

224. Besides this squandering on military expenditures, we should also deplore the fact that other human, natural, scientific and technological resources are being used for armaments when they could have been better utilized to combat poverty, hunger and want, to solve urgent problems in the economic and social fields which hinder development in several regions of the world and to guarantee world stability and peace.

225. On this point, it is my duty as a member of a country of the third world to draw the Assembly's attention to a new fact which may assume considerable proportions.

226. We note that some developing countries are unfortunately tempted to divert some of the possibilities open to them to the establishment of a military or war industry and, following the example of the great Powers, are even beginning to trade in arms. This can, of course, only have serious repercussions on their economic and social development.

227. Morocco, for its part, will support any initiative designed to reduce international tension, one of the main consequences of which is precisely the stockpiling of arms. If tension is eased, it will be possible to establish the necessary conditions for a positive dialogue with a view to establishing a new international economic order that will meet the aspirations for justice and well-being of our peoples.

228. We hope that this special session will reaffirm the importance of the links existing between development and disarmament, and that our discussions will lead to concrete results making it possible to put an end to the current impasse.

229. While welcoming the efforts made and measures already taken for general and complete disarmament, we can only express, without pessimism, our conviction that what has been achieved thus far seems inadequate by comparison with the dangers attendant on humanity as a result of the quantitative and qualitative increase in the arms race, particularly in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

230. Piecemeal measures have, of course, been taken in the nuclear field, such as the Moscow Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, together with the outcome of the first round of strategic arms limitation talks.

231. The Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes in the need to put an end to nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, in any region of the world.

232. The non-nuclear States which have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a right to claim the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy together with effective guarantees for security, particularly through a commitment on the part of the great Powers not to use nuclear weapons against those countries—indeed, not even to threaten to have recourse to nuclear weapons against them.

233. On this occasion I should like to recall that when the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco decided to undertake the necessary studies with a view to building a nuclear power station to meet the ever-increasing needs of the country in terms of electric power, and the immense phosphate reserves yielded by the Moroccan subsoil made it possible for Morocco to produce uranium, His Majesty King Hassan II proposed that the United Nations appoint a committee of wise men to ensure that the uranium should not be enriched for military purposes. To this end, His Majesty King Hassan II proclaimed the willingness of Morocco to agree to an annual or biannual visit. This solemnly declared commitment from the highest authority in the Kingdom is in addition to the obligations already entered into by Morocco under the Agreement concluded on 30 January 1973 with the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of guarantees within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Morocco is a party.

234. In informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 25 November 1976 of the foregoing, the Government of His Majesty King Hassan II was careful to assure him that, while wishing to have a nuclear power station, Morocco wished only to have all the means likely to accelerate its economic development for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

235. Morocco is convinced of the need to create an atmosphere of understanding and confidence between peoples and is desirous of devoting its energies and potential to the development effort. It has therefore adhered to all international conventions on disarmament and is taking an active part in all the negotiating bodies working in that field.

236. I should also like to pay tribute to the initiative which the Latin American States have taken in concluding the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We also welcome the praiseworthy efforts of the African States to declare the continent of Africa a nuclear-free zone, together with the initiative taken by Iran and Egypt with a view to considering the Middle East as a denuclearized zone.

237. The extreme seriousness of the situation of the over-arming of the world in which we live makes it obligatory for us to undertake a primordial task for present and future generations: that of organizing, at world level, a campaign of information, the aim of which would be to make available to the vast masses of the public information and facts concerning this matter and thus to make public opinion throughout the world more alive to the need for greater efforts to achieve disarmament.

238. Despite the complexity of the problems of disarmament and the dilemmas States are confronting at the moment, we must overcome our hesitation and our susceptibilities in order that the necessary decisions may be taken. Humanity as a whole has its eyes riveted on the Assembly and expects it to be equal to the historic task entrusted to it.

239. Mr. ADAMOU (Niger) (*interpretation from French*): It is now more than 30 years since the philosophers of disarmament, in the name of safeguarding peace and security, undertook the difficult mission of curbing the tendency of States to race to produce and buy engines of death. Thirty years of excellent professions of faith, masterly speeches in the major diplomatic forums.

240. But the picture remains desperately grim. Threats have become more acute because over the years we have seen the growing sophistication of the moral and physical ideas of inflicting death. The panoply of conventional weapons has grown beyond every stretch of the imagination; that of atomic and thermo-nuclear armament has reached the point of saturation where the devices already in existence alone could destroy our poor planet several times over. It has reached the stage where, without playing with words, the cynicism of destruction is pushed to the point of drawing a distinction in the production of arms between those that are "clean" and those that are "dirty", as if ending of life could take any account of aesthetics other than that banal death, intended to be as widespread as possible.

241. Since that time we have witnessed the most refined forms of international hypocrisy. Those who produce, refine, proliferate and sell arms do not hesitate to play at being heroes of peace. They meet, sometimes alone, sometimes among experts, to propose a brief respite in the new international balance of terror to which, willy nilly, all the

populations of our planet are in subjection. They have succeeded in creating successive conflicts in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, in order to find gullible partners capable of abandoning their economic development for a few ruinous wars to prove the "credibility" and "feasibility" of the arms put into their hands.

242. More than 30 years of sterile attempts! How can we blame the countries of the third world for their concern about it and for wishing to see this conference on disarmament convened under the flag of the United Nations? Just another conference? Perhaps. But we still have faith in our institution and the proposals of the non-aligned countries, which we shall support, cannot but tend to promote favourable conditions for a solution of the problem. More than 30 years! But let us look at the facts.

243. As early as 24 January 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations invited the International Atomic Energy Commission, which had just been established, to submit proposals to the Security Council for ensuring the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, eliminating atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction from national armaments and taking effective safeguard measures.

244. The commitment of all peoples to this noble enterprise was especially sanctioned 15 years ago by the conclusion of a number of treaties. Thus we saw the birth of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to cite but a few. Those treaties, to which must be added the agreement concluded in 1972 during the first round of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, were signed or entered into force during the present decade, which the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session solemnly proclaimed the Disarmament Decade.

245. While there is undoubtedly an encouraging sign in all this, it also must be recognized that the results obtained have fallen short of our hopes. Indeed, we cannot abandon ourselves to exaggerated optimism at a time when the most authoritative voices are deploring the absence of tangible progress to halt the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race.

246. Niger, a developing country, cannot help but be swayed by this wind of pessimism when everyday facts show to what extent the industrialized countries, in their rush towards the heights of terror, pay scant attention to development problems. Is it not scandalous to see those countries relegate to second place their responsibility in the struggle against under-development and its evils while they indulge in a mad waste of human and material resources to satisfy their insatiable appetite for domination, which has nevertheless cost them two military adventures of world dimension within the space of 20 years during this century!

247. For additional proof we need only ask the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or to look at the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race which the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. These documents show, *inter alia*, that the arms race has cost humanity $6,000 billion since the Second World War, that is to say, as much as the gross national product of the whole world in 1975.

248. It also appeared that it would be sufficient to contribute 1 per cent of the military budgets of the industrialized countries to assistance for the development of agriculture to bring its value, by the end of the decade, to the level of $5 thousand million a year, decided on in 1974 by the World Food Conference.

249. These revelations make even more desperate the economic impotence of the third world, which, faced with the diabolical feats of the rich countries, are waging an unequal struggle against the evils which today stimulate economic uncertainty, foment unrest and increase violence.

250. These evils are complete destitution for 700 million human beings and malnutrition for more than 400 million and the permanent threat of endemic disease for more than 1 thousand million inhabitants of developing countries. To them are added famine, illiteracy and natural catastrophes which are so many obstacles and threats to the full development of people.

251. This grim picture, far from showing a clumsy pessimism, underlines the unfortunate priority status of arms investments in the industrialized countries and the pernicious effect that those expenditures have on the capacity of the rich countries to give the economic assistance the third world nevertheless looks for in the form of aid and comprehension in its liberation struggle and economic development.

252. For we in Africa still believe in [illegible]ration based on mutual respect as the source of [illegible] and harmony among nations.

Mr. Asencio-Wunderlich (Guatemala), Vice-President, took the Chair.

253. This desire for co-operation in peace and security is best illustrated in the attempts at political and economic integration which have marked the 30 years during which our States have exercised international sovereignty. Some have been crowned with success because they established joint bodies of a continental or subregional nature. We see in this desire for *rapprochement* in the economic field an essential factor for peace and collective security; a concrete approach at the regional level to problems of détente and disarmament.

254. To that end, 15 countries of the community of States of Western Africa have just signed at Lagos an historic pact of non-aggression.

255. Hence it is not with a light heart that the African peoples today see that their rich partners, obsessed by the

progress of science, have not always tailored their policy to the needs of true solidarity.

256. It is this hesitation and absence of determination in trying to find solutions to the problems of Africa which are the basis of the obstacles which stand in the way of the progress of the international community towards the new economic order and the inevitable elimination of the last bastions of colonialism.

257. Strengthened by this unanimous opinion, the delegation of Niger is convinced that the reduction of military investments and the reconversion of the armaments industries will hasten the establishment of a just and durable economic order.

258. We are also aware of the fact that the overnight elimination of the arms industries throughout the world would inevitably lead in many countries to social and economic difficulties which would be difficult to overcome. That is not the wish of my delegation. We must not allow this to become an excuse to prevent political will from working towards the reduction of arms and the progressive reconversion of armaments industries. International peace and collective security would unquestionably gain in that event.

259. Disarmament, in the opinion of my delegation, also involves a struggle for the triumph of a just cause, a struggle for the elimination of all sources of conflict in the world.

260. This truism, however, does not yet seem to be impressed upon the whole world. In southern Africa and in the Middle East, terrorism has been elevated to State law and the hopes of innocent populations are daily drowned in blood.

261. It is highly regrettable that in this last quarter of the twentieth century the international community allows itself to be distracted by the minority and retrograde régimes of southern Africa dominated by a handful of blood-thirsty people who hark back fondly to the Nazi era, to which Africa paid a heavy ransom, although that is not fully recognized today. After having been bled white throughout contemporary history, African peoples are once more subjected to the trial of strength and obliged to sacrifice the best of their men to regain in their own ancestral land the freedom and independence which is their unquestionable right. The valiant sons of Africa have for a long time now taken up arms to fight against the tainted régimes of Vorster and Smith, despite the powerful arsenal which has been given to them by their allies.

262. It is high time that those who arm the enemies of Africa put an end to the discrimination and sectarianism which characterize their attitude in defence of democratic freedoms.

263. Let them agree, in the name of the ideal of peace which has brought us together in this forum, to give up that attitude of complicity against the African people.

264. During these difficult times, when age-old African wisdom is being sorely tried by battles for influence and pockets of tension set afire here and there by those who hark back to times which will never return, we are firmly convinced that the African States will gain by cultivating the virtues of dialogue and tolerance in their relations.

265. On 7 December 1977, in a statement before the First Committee, Niger made an appeal along these lines and proclaimed its refusal to believe in armed victory in conflicts which pit two States against each other.[7] Such a victory, we say, would at most create—and history has proved this—a climate of frustration calculated to breed hatred among peoples, thus paving the way for the self-destruction of the victors and the vanquished. In saying this we are firmly convinced that no developing country has the power today to dominate another, because the will for independence is so firmly anchored in the spirit of our peoples that they prefer unnatural alliances to the loss, even to a brother people temporarily become their enemy, of one iota of their sovereignty and their territory.

266. In these conditions, realism forces our States to safeguard and respect the principles which heretofore have assured victory over the forces of evil and alienation.

267. It is indeed regrettable—even mad—for African countries to be involved in a real race against time in the arms field, resulting in the diversion of a large part of their meagre resources—perhaps I should say simply their resources—to the accumulation of a war arsenal which is generally out of all proportion to their legitimate defence and security needs. Considerable financial resources, which could play a leading role in the economic development of these countries, are siphoned off to the unproductive armaments sector.

268. The feeling of insecurity springing from their inability to respond to the noble aspirations of their people pushes them into the arms of a foreign Power from which they request arms to face a danger which, in truth, exists only in their imagination. In doing so they are unconsciously playing the game of the big Powers and fuelling the struggles for influence of the antagonistic blocs. This clearly demonstrates an erroneous idea of what security is, and it paves the way for the forces of evil and division. It is only natural that the over-arming of some countries in a zone should be a cause for concern among their neighbours, especially those whose only aspiration is to improve the standard of living of their people in peace and harmony. This concern naturally breeds distrust, which one day will result in open hostility between countries condemned by history and geography to live together.

269. Niger is against such an eventuality because it is incompatible with the needs and the solidarity of Africa and with the march of our peoples towards progress and unity.

270. My country has unshakeable confidence in the capacity of the African States to silence their quarrels and to

[7] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee*, 55th meeting.

honour the commitments which they have assumed before God, before their peoples and before history. I refer to the consolidation of their independence and the quest for their unity. This will be their way of preparing the coming of this era of confidence, the prelude to the general and complete disarmament for which this august Assembly earnestly appeals.

271. This is an abiding concern of the Government of Niger, under the leadership of His Excellency Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche, President of the Supreme Military Council, our Head of State who, speaking of African problems, said: "The first thing to do is to ask everyone to admit that it is up to each State member of the Organization of African Unity to respect its neighbouring State, whatever régime or form of society that society has chosen."

272. Without clashes or hue and cry Niger has since given proof of its devotion to the cause of peace, in making its modest contribution to the attempts to settle the burning problems of the region. In doing so it has simply obeyed a natural impulse which drives us towards dialogue rather than confrontation.

273. We cannot close this chapter on security without mentioning the Zionist entity which, since its creation, has posed an almost insoluble problem to the world at large and to the United Nations in particular. No one is condemning a country to defencelessness, nor asking it to expose the lives of its people to the anger and vengeance of others. In the Middle East, the problem of security is crucial, but in no case can it justify aggression for the purpose of preventing aggression, territorial conquest in the name of the Bible, or the refusal to negotiate in the name of security. The numbers of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council are ample proof that whole generations of diplomats have tried to find a just and equitable solution. But the tension continues despite all that has been done because distrust has been elevated into a doctrine which is incompatible with the objectives and idea of peace which it is the purpose of this special session to seek. We voice the hope that the recommendations and research programmes on disarmament which are adopted will mitigate the spirit of escalation and cut down the problems of the Middle East to their proper size.

274. The special session devoted to disarmament is a laudable initiative. The thanks for it are due to the non-aligned countries, which had the idea in 1961. That is not surprising in a movement which has made a most positive contribution to East-West détente. Was not non-alignment born out of the refusal of the third world to be associated with the division of the world into two antagonistic blocs? The movement bore the sign of conciliation and hope when it was created. However, it must remain faithful to its image, and now, more than ever, be an influence for peace and concord between nations.

275. Niger is proud to belong to that school of thought whose virtues and principles are a constant source of inspiration to its leaders.

276. This session, for which it worked so hard, once more gives that movement an opportunity to reaffirm its faith in the future. We venture to hope that this Assembly will help it by examining in depth the noble ideas that it submitted to that end regarding the declaration of principles, the programme of action and the machinery for negotiation. These ideas demonstrate the conviction of the non-aligned countries that general and complete disarmament remains the key to lasting peace and security, their legitimate preoccupations in the field of development, and their confidence that the United Nations will do its best to solve the problems of international peace and security.

277. However, our movement's initiative would have been fruitless without the open-mindedness and readiness which have been shown by all Members. The various proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee are ample proof of this. We believe they are a positive contribution to the permanent dialogue between nations in such a vital sphere as disarmament.

278. We offer our heartfelt congratulations and thanks to all those who, in one way or another, have contributed effectively to the holding of this session, which marks an epoch in the history of the Organization.

279. Their joint efforts resulted in a draft final document [*A/S-10/1*] which should sanction our debates. It reflects the complexity of the disarmament question. Despite the fact that there are still numerous points of disagreement, optimism always prevails. The fact that certain matters are no longer controversial gives us reason to think that the divergencies are not insurmountable.

280. Indeed, we note with satisfaction the reaffirmation of the incompatibility of the arms race with the principles of the United Nations Charter, which, in our view, is the first and fundamental step on the road to disarmament. Furthermore, it has been generally agreed that lasting peace and security can neither repose on the stockpiling of weapons nor be maintained by doctrines of strategic superiority or the precarious balance of deterrence. Moreover, we are justified in welcoming the affirmation that in our world, with its limited resources, there is a close link between arms expenditures and economic and social development.

281. In this connexion, the idea of creating an international disarmament fund for development deserves our consideration. It is nevertheless to be hoped that this initiative will not be diverted from its true purpose by a restrictive interpretation which would have development financed from the expenditures of the industrialized countries in the field of armaments, since the developing countries, in connecting disarmament with development, did not intend it that way; their main preoccupation is the reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and the reconversion of the arms industries to development purposes. Any other solution would be a mere palliative in a field where there is an imperative need for energetic decisions.

282. Such considerations prompt us to hope that the fund to be created will be fed by the voluntary, but regular and progressive, renunciation by nuclear States and the large

arms producers of a certain percentage of their military budgets, including commitments from the private sector. This formula would allow development to be financed at the expense, rather than in favour, of armaments progress.

283. Furthermore, most of the proposals have highlighted a concern for the democratization of the disarmament negotiations. This session will provide a response by strengthening the role of the General Assembly in guiding the general disarmament policy; for while effective disarmament is the exclusive prerogative of a minority of countries, on the other hand, the effects of nuclear and bacteriological weapons will recognize no boundaries. This sad possibility is enough in itself to open the negotiating forums on disarmament to the small countries.

284. With regard to regional disarmament conferences mentioned in certain proposals, we see in them one more means of promoting mutual trust between neighbouring States. However, here we must not fail to see the wood for the trees and allow them to conceal the absence of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

285. As to the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, while it is closely linked to the deployment of weapons of the same kind, we could sanction no action which would forbid the access of our States to such use.

286. Nevertheless, we continue to see a danger to our people in the free use of nuclear energy and technology by the irresponsible white minorities in southern Africa.

287. Before concluding, we wish to welcome the delegations of non-governmental organizations, whose presence among us attests to the international public's need for information and participation in this field. Their contribution to our deliberations will be a first step in the satisfaction of that legitimate need.

288. We should like here to pay a tribute to the delegations from the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which, by their desire to attend this session, have shown courage, as well as faith in the future.

289. This special session devoted to disarmament has already had, and certainly will have, a great impact on the world. The participation of eminent heads of State and Government of numerous Member States, by conferring particular solemnity and importance upon its work, should usher in a new era of the fulfilment of our hopes. We hail these leaders as messengers of peace.

290. We are convinced that this session will justify the hopes placed in it and that the General Assembly will go beyond mere rhetoric to adopt specific decisions on all the items before us, the main one being the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament by the necessary democratization of the negotiation and supervision machinery and the creation of a special disarmament fund for development

291. That is the modest contribution of my delegation. Even if it is a dream, we still wish to believe in it, because the arms race and its political, economic and social effects prove beyond doubt that disarmament is essential for the survival of mankind.

292. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 53 of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (A/S-10/1), which the Assembly adopted at the first plenary meeting, I call on the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Mr. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

293. Mr. M'BOW (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) (*interpretation from French*): It is an honour for the Director-General of UNESCO to speak at this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, in greeting the heads of State and Government, Ministers and all eminent representatives of Member States gathered here to take part in its work, I wish to say how happy I am to have the opportunity of placing before you the views of the organization I head on one of the crucial problems of our time.

294. The decision of the General Assembly, in accordance with the proposal of its Preparatory Committee, to invite me to address it in plenary meeting seems to me to confirm the importance of the role that UNESCO has constantly played within the United Nations system in the building of peace. This role is one that UNESCO has always shared with all the bodies within the system; therefore I will venture during this brief statement to echo some of the concerns which my colleague Dr. Mahler, Director-General of the World Health Organization, has particularly asked me to put before you.

295. While UNESCO's action in regard to the subject of this special session of the General Assembly is of a specific nature, its Constitution assigns it the purpose of "advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims". But, as the Constitution further specifies, "peace based exclusively on the political and economic arrangements of Governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind".

296. Therefore, in the 32 years of its existence UNESCO has endeavoured to work in the field of its competence and according to the means proper to it, through research and action, to consolidate peace. It is convinced that without peace and reduced tension the solution of the problems confronting humanity will be seriously and no doubt irrevocably jeopardized. But it has always felt that any international settlement attained to the detriment of freedom, the dignity of peoples and respect for individuals could never claim to be a true peaceful settlement in terms of spirit or lasting quality. That is why the UNESCO General Confer-

ence has linked the struggle for peace to the condemnation of all forms of oppression, discrimination or exploitation among peoples—not only because they inevitably engender violence but also because they are themselves forms of violence and a manifestation of the spirit of war.

297. With those principles as a basis, UNESCO has always faithfully followed the guidelines of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

298. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, the Executive Board of UNESCO defined the bases of "UNESCO's contribution to United Nations action in favour of general and complete disarmament". At its eleventh session, in 1960, the General Conference considered that "one of the main tasks of UNESCO was to create public opinion favourable to the implementation of United Nations resolutions condemning warmongering propaganda and favouring general and complete disarmament". In 1962, at its twelfth session, the General Conference expressed its support for the conclusions of the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General to study the economic and social consequences of disarmament. Sixteen years ago, the General Conference was already asking for the establishment of long-term plans in the fields of education, scientific research, communications media and the elimination of illiteracy, taking into account the major responsibility UNESCO would have to assume when large quantities of resources were liberated by disarmament for international programmes of social and economic development. At the same time the Director-General was authorized to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that UNESCO was ready to provide him with all studies under its terms of reference which he might need in order to analyse the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

299. It goes without saying that this offer still holds good today, and I wish to renew it here. More recently, at its eighteenth session in 1974, the General Conference took care to state in one particular resolution that "peace cannot consist solely in the absence of armed conflict but implies principally a process of progress, justice and mutual respect among the peoples designed to secure the building of an international society in which everyone can find his true place and enjoy his share of the world's intellectual and material resources, and that a peace founded in injustice and violation of human rights cannot last and leads inevitably to violence".

300. The medium-term plan of the Organization, adopted at the nineteenth session of the General Conference at Nairobi in 1976, is permeated with the same ideas. It is geared to enabling UNESCO to make a most active contribution towards the establishment of a new international economic order likely to remedy the inequalities between nations and peoples in order to give a solid foundation for peace. Participants at the round-table discussions on the future of the third world held under the auspices of UNESCO in Mexico in December 1977 came to the conclusion that "all the real problems in the new international economic order are inextricably related and linked to the matter of general and complete disarmament".

301. Now, since 1945, at what cost has a third world war been avoided? For how many days have the guns really been silent throughout the world? The axis of conflicts—which none the less continue to implicate the industrial Powers, large or small—has shifted towards the poor countries, but this in fact changes nothing in a situation in which men, women and children whose lives are as valuable as any other lives continue to die because of war.

302. But nations which have in this twentieth century sacrificed more than 100 million victims to war continue as though caught up in a giddy spiral, spending an enormous amount of their ingenuity, their energy and their resources, according priority to the manufacture of machines of death that are ever more sophisticated and terrible. And these nations can meet here and together seek to find the means of moving towards "general and complete disarmament". This seems to me to sum up most strikingly both the wisdom and the folly of our time, justifying our greatest hopes and, unfortunately, our greatest concern. The peoples of the world, getting the better of the fear that arises from their differences, are beginning intuitively to glimpse the fundamental solidarity of the human race. This is a decisive turning-point in the history of mankind and of the community of nations. For the member States of UNESCO, for those now present, the representatives of the States of which I am speaking, and for all of us, the question of disarmament is a collective challenge, one that is unavoidable and total. Taking up this primary challenge would mean not only delivering humanity from the threat of unprecedented bloodshed but also having the means to struggle victoriously against poverty, disease, ignorance and other scourges besetting so many peoples, scourges which the United Nations system cannot at present combat effectively because of lack of adequate resources.

303. In this respect, the sum of military expenditures for the world as a whole has often been quoted from this very podium. What is less well known is that it is one fourth higher than the amount spent on education throughout the world. As for military research and development, today it absorbs the talents of about 500,000 research workers and engineers. This fact is, of course, of concern in itself. But what is of even greater concern is that the tendency is constantly increasing. While before the Second World War military research and development represented only 1 per cent of military expenditures, today it represents no less than 10 to 15 per cent. In other words, while millions of men, women and children continue to live in destitution or to die of diseases that could easily be remedied at so little cost, $40 to $60 thousand million are spent on refining the technologies of death and destruction, representing three or four times more than the amount spent on development assistance and more than twice the total expenditures on education in the developing countries.

304. These figures become all the more significant if we realize that the eradication of smallpox cost only $300 million and that malaria, which today affects half the world and in Africa alone kills 1 million children under five years of age, could have been reduced to the level of ordinary illness for an annual expenditure estimated by the World Health Organization at $2 thousand million.

305. In truth, all that is needed is to earmark for development only part of the material and human resources devoted to the preparation of war in order substantially to change the face of the planet, to narrow the widening gulf between the rich and the poor countries and to reduce the areas of poverty which still exist in many industrialized countries. A number of essential activities in terms of nutrition, health, literacy, development of education, training of scientific and technological staff, setting up of research centres, cultural development, environmental protection, to name a few of the fields in which the specialized agencies are active, are hampered or even stymied for lack of material resources. This shortage, in turn, intensifies inequalities and gives rise to new tensions.

306. Thus to the development of nuclear weapons must be added the so-called conventional weapons race, which extends to the smallest and poorest States. Feeding on every injustice, projecting every selfishness in the present world, such an arms race arouses fearsome world interests linked to the arms industries, multiplies the dangers of a world conflagration and engenders conflicts.

307. Such a state of affairs not only brings terrible threats to our very lives; it also determines a system of a choice of investments, favours economic structures which, once they have become essential to the life of nations, will subsequently make it all the more difficult to carry out the essential reconversion of the weapons industry to peaceful activities.

308. Thus, before dreaming of the immense benefit which mankind could derive from a reversal of this situation, it is primarily the conditions and processes of such a reconversion of the scientific and technological potential of the world to purposes beneficial to all the peoples of the world that the United Nations system is inviting the leaders of the developed nations to ponder upon when it proclaims the need to establish a new international economic order. The economic, social and political problems arising from this reorientation would make it seem one of the most complex tasks and it would be scarcely realistic to underestimate the difficulty of achieving this objective. But it ought to be one of the major lines of action for the international community in the last 25 years of the twentieth century. For the reconversion of the arms industry must obviously be thought of only in the context of a true establishment of peace at the world level and a world-wide vision of the development of mankind. It presupposes in fact that the industrial potential, today geared to military activity, can be reconverted to activities beneficial to all the peoples of the world.

309. This is an ethical requirement and also an economic imperative if we want to avoid reconversion of the arms industries entailing, in countries which would agree to attempt it, crises the fear of which helps precisely to perpetuate this type of activity.

310. The effort is essential. How can we conceive of a world where relations of reciprocity would replace those of unequal exchange, where differences of culture, of colour, of opinion would no longer perpetuate injustices, but begin to learn from each other how to lay the bases of a humanism at the level of all peoples, when there is no genuine peace?

311. In fact the United Nations—and UNESCO—have often been invited to take action. It is quite clearly the determination to give practical effect to the commitments undertaken, to carry out one's promises to the full, which is most often lacking. Countries whose high level of development makes them able to change the restrictive social and economic process of weapons stockpiling have, in this respect, a special responsibility towards the international community, towards the small and medium-sized States now at the mercy of decisions taken elsewhere but which none the less affect their future. This spirit of common responsibility of nations which inspired the project for a new world order requires that all peoples, finally recognized as being equal in dignity and in rights, take part in the making of decisions which concern humanity as a whole.

312. Confidence will certainly emerge from the political, diplomatic and technical measures which the Assembly will take, in accordance with the Charter. To increase that confidence, however, more will be needed. That is why I am firmly convinced that in this essential and long-term task it will fall to education to create a movement of public opinion throughout the world favourable to disarmament and peaceful co-operation. One of our main objectives has to be to strive to include education on disarmament in the syllabus of schools, universities, wherever learning or skills are acquired.

313. Examining at a recent debate what might be the specific contribution of UNESCO to the work of the General Assembly, the members of the Executive Board of UNESCO stressed that we had to get to the deep-seated roots of the problem through action on minds by developing international understanding through education and by making the best possible use of the means of communication. They recalled that this programme, which several described as moral disarmament, could be successful only if relations between States were radically changed, because it is from these relations that inequalities become more acute and that tensions leading to catastrophes are produced.

314. The action on the "minds of men" must clearly not be one of propaganda, but of information. Communication between peoples and nations in this respect is of decisive importance, particularly the regular dissemination of free and responsible information, applying the results of in-depth research work in the fields of psychology, sociology, economics and history in order to throw light on human behaviour and to do away with cultural prejudices and to bring people closer together.

315. It is above all by contrasting, on the one hand, the burden that any war, even a potential war, imposes, and, on the other hand, the immense benefits of peace, that public opinion can apply its full weight and help Governments to achieve disarmament.

316. Pursuant to the decisions of the eighteenth and nineteenth sessions of the General Conference, UNESCO established a vast education and information programme to

promote peace and international understanding, in which research work and scientific publications, symposia and seminars help to compile the knowledge that the means of communication then disseminate.

317. I should like to mention, among other works, the bibliographic studies on the economic and social aspects of the arms race and disarmament and on the dangers for mankind and man's environment posed by modern weapons and techniques of war; a study on the role of international organizations—in particular the United Nations—and on the role of the regional organizations in the slowing down of the arms race and the promotion of disarmament; an anthology of scientific texts representing the various disciplines concerned with the effort at disarmament; finally, a world survey on education for disarmament.

318. I should also like to mention the symposium organized in April last at headquarters on "the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them". Participants in this symposium from every intellectual and geographical horizon studied not only the international, economic, diplomatic and military structures but also—and, I would even say, above all—the psychological factors which contribute to weaken any political will to proceed to effective disarmament.

319. The Executive Board stressed the interesting conclusions of that meeting, some of whose suggestions might, it seems to me, be worthy of the Assembly's attention. They included suggestions to organize in 1980 an international congress on education and disarmament; to study the concept of disarmament from the viewpoint of international law and *jus gentium;* and to develop new uses of audiovisual means in order most effectively to disseminate information on disarmament. *Inter alia,* a film festival on the arms race and disarmament was proposed.

320. At the conclusion of the discussion which I have just mentioned, the Executive Board, while welcoming the fact that the Director-General of the Organization had been invited to take part in the work of this special session, recalled that "UNESCO has a vital role to play in the creation of a general climate conducive to the cessation of the ever-increasing arms race and favourable to disarmament and must, in the fields within its competence, make an effective contribution to the creation of such a climate, which would facilitate increased aid to developing countries, the establishment of a new international economic order and the promotion of international cultural understanding".

321. I believe that UNESCO is playing this role effectively, devotedly and competently with all the efficiency that its means permit. It is not a case of imposition. No international organization really has the means for that. It is a matter of persuading and convincing people, appealing to reason and good sense, but also to high-mindedness and fully understood solidarity, beneficial to all. It is a long and difficult struggle and sometimes not a very rewarding one, for these are ideas which have to silence guns, but it is one which has with it all the hope of the world.

322. As I was saying, world solidarity is not to be taken for granted. It is our most recent and most precarious conquest. There is nothing irreversible about it; it is what we shall make of it. By our actions we can develop it or stifle it. Since we have begun to grasp the vital need that every man has of every other man, we see a glimmer of the end of an age in which the strength of some has inevitably meant the weakness of others; where success for some, far from leading to the happiness of others, of necessity has meant their failure; where war alone has sanctioned peaks and slumps and beat the rhythm of history.

323. We are now on the threshold of a new era, when we know that war can be set aside, because the possibilities of the mind and the will of man are infinite.

324. However, we are still hesitating at this decisive crossroads of our future. We remain torn between the demons of mistrust, which we have dragged along with us from the very earliest horizons of time, and the call of a universal consciousness which today has gained a foothold in part of us only.

325. History has already known lost opportunities. There is no fatal choice for good. Peace is offered as one option among others, to be taken and defended, not as a need independent of our choice. We have to deserve it, and deserve it quickly. The balance of nuclear terror expresses all the dangers of our present uncertainty as we waver between war and peace. It is, if you like, the negative sign of our wisdom. It is the fear of war. It is not yet confidence in peace. We have to want this peace with enough strength, with enough imagination, with enough courage to attain it.

326. For my part I can assure the Assembly that UNESCO, which will follow the work here and study the conclusions reached with particular interest, will do everything in its power in the fields within its competence and in close co-operation with the other institutions and agencies within the system and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, to accomplish the tasks which without a doubt the Assembly will assign to it, since both the reduction and the progressive disappearance of arms will be the most signal proof that man, finally reconciled to himself, can hope to enjoy some day the peace in justice and brotherhood that has been his aspiration since time immemorial.

327. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Chile has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

328. Mr. DIEZ (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Chile regrets to have to speak in exercise of the right of reply because of statements made this morning by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia. Such statements are counterproductive for his country's objective of securing an outlet to the Pacific. The only way to this end is through resumption of the dialogue between Bolivia and Chile. The frank and flexible attitude of Chile and its readiness to co-operate in the solution of Bolivia's land-locked situation, with due regard for existing treaties and within the norms of justice and equity that must rule international

relations, are the expression of the will of its people which, together with its sympathy for Bolivia, has an awareness of what are the appropriate means of giving it practical effect.

329. We hope that calm and the spirit of conciliation will mark the future decisions of the Government of Bolivia on this matter.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.

Annex 245

Verbatim Record of the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/S-10/PV.9, 30 May 1978

(Original in English)

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/105/75/PDF/NL810575.pdf?OpenElement>

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Official Records

9th PLENARY MEETING
Tuesday, 30 May 1978, at 3.35 p.m.
NEW YORK

President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (*continued*)

1. Mr. Rovira (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like first of all, on behalf of my country, most especially to greet the President, Mr. Mojsov, and congratulate him on the honour conferred upon him when he was chosen to preside over this special session of the General Assembly dedicated to disarmament.

2. Uruguay, which has long maintained and cultivated good relations with his country, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, sees in this distinction a tribute not only to his eminent qualities, but also to his country.

3. I should like also to express the satisfaction of my country at the election of Mr. Ortiz de Rozas to preside over the *Ad Hoc* Committee of this session. That constitutes a just recognition of his country, the Republic of Argentina, on whose old friendship Uruguay prides itself, of Latin America and, especially, of his brilliant intellectual and moral qualities as a talented diplomat, opportunely brought to the fore by the heads of the delegations of Sri Lanka, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Greece, when submitting his nomination [*1st meeting*].

4. The draft of the final document prepared by the Preparatory Committee for this special session of the General Assembly [*see A/S-10/1, vol. I*], presided over by Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, to which he referred in his statement, presupposes an outstanding effort for conciseness about the very complex gamut of facts affecting the disarmament question, about the suggestions and clear and intelligent measures taken to reach—even if gradually and to the extent possible—the lofty and final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

5. I therefore avail myself of this opportunity to transmit the congratulations of my delegation to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and to its members, representing 54 countries, for such fruitful work. That constitutes an eloquent indication that the work to be undertaken here and the conclusions to be reached under the expert guidance of the President of the General Assembly and the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, will undoubtedly be at least another step forward in the arduous task of the disarmament process and the gradual reorientation of the fabulous riches currently being absorbed by the arms race, and it constitutes also a stimulus to development and a denunciation of poverty, backwardness, lack of culture, subhuman living conditions and the uncertainty of the future experienced by the great masses of the world population.

6. This Assembly must bear in mind particularly what the representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Yugoslavia have said, *inter alia*, that no limitation should be placed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that attempts to establish a complete monopoly by a small group of nuclear Powers must be rejected. That would be to the detriment of the interests of the developing countries.

7. My country shares the deeply felt desire of our world to reach a genuine state of peace through work and security, without fear of war, doomsday of apocalyptic dimension or any other type of conflict which would impede development; without strategic, political or any other type of discrimination, and with equal opportunity for all.

8. If we really want work such as that undertaken by this session to achieve its final and logical goals, the first thing which should be disarmed is men's minds.

9. In referring to this question during the last session of the General Assembly, I spoke the following words from this rostrum on behalf of Uruguay:

> "It seems to us that the peoples of the world are under the impression that disarmament is exclusively a subject for rhetoric which they support as a matter of course as a worthy cause, whereas the reality is that, with the passage of time and contrary to what might be hoped, armaments of an increasingly sophisticated and deadly nature are escalating in all regions of the globe.
>
> "For a variety of reasons, vast amounts of the incomes of States and the resources of mankind are poured into the stockpiling of means of destruction, while millions of human beings are dying in the streets for lack of food and while others exist in subhuman conditions for lack of proper integral development.
>
> "It is urgently necessary in this field as in others to achieve solid results which will not only serve to maintain international peace and security but will permit us to continue to speak with moral authority and to rely upon the confidence of our peoples on an item so perverted by reality."[1]

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 13th meeting, paras. 202-204.

10. If one takes a look at the world situation today, those words are still relevant. The description given yesterday by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China [*7th meeting*] of the increase in the nuclear power for military purposes of the super-Powers which are in the vanguard with this type of terror weapon requires no comment on our part. May God grant that the work of this session will be able to improve that dark prospect.

11. That is why I hasten to add that my delegation will give its firm support to every initiative designed to achieve the high goals set for this meeting.

12. Traditionally a country devoted to peace and freedom, within a framework of order and justice, a firm defender and promoter of the self-determination of all peoples, of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, and of the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and of broad arbitration, Uruguay will strongly support the observance of those fundamental rules of international law as well as the active application of all possible measures in the field of disarmament that the present circumstances will permit.

13. Specifically, my delegation will support any initiative that fulfils the following requirements: first, the promotion of nuclear disarmament and an emphasis on the prevention of nuclear war; secondly, support for the proposal to restructure the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to improve the working methods of that body, which should be revised in the light of the principle of the juridical equality of States, so that every nuclear Power will participate; thirdly, efforts to prohibit the use of conventional weapons, especially such particularly inhuman weapons as napalm and other incendiary weapons and, in this respect, to put emphasis on the initiative in favour of convening next year a United Nations conference on this question; fourthly, an agreement on a convention for the non-use of nuclear weapons; fifthly, an agreement on the elimination of all chemical weapons; sixthly, emphasis on the importance of reaching agreement on a treaty banning nuclear testing in general, with the aim of submitting it for the consideration of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and eventual transmission to the General Assembly; seventhly, the commencement of multilateral negotiations aimed at preventing the arms race from being extended to the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof; eighthly, encouragement of the formulation of joint declarations by the major nuclear States whereby they would undertake to reduce their military expenditures and use the savings thus obtained for the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries; ninthly, the convening of a world assembly on disarmament; and lastly, equal participation by all States, including those possessing nuclear weapons, in the international negotiations on disarmament.

14. Let me express a few thoughts that clarify and explain the position of my country as I have just presented it.

15. The world is now suffering and has suffered for many decades—almost since the end of the Second World War—from a very special type of limited war, that is, guerrilla war, from which my country has suffered and which, as an ideological base, is found today all over the world. especially in the non-Marxist States, both developed and underdeveloped; it is aimed at the disruption and fall of those States.

16. On this subject, may I be allowed to observe that for this type of war, of which my country can provide a unique and little known experience, disarmament offers no solution. It is not the weapons employed in this type of war that concern the Assembly now; what is at stake in this case is the question of cultural values imposed in an almost scientific, calculated, deliberate and devious manner by small extremist minorities through the use of violence and terror.

17. This is a subject that deserves the greatest attention and it should not escape the consideration of an Assembly such as this, or factual and scientific study by its specialized bodies, because disarmament is indissolubly linked to a whole series of conflicts that could threaten peace in any country or groups of countries and consequently could have repercussions on world peace. Here I should like to remind those present what the Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic said along the same lines, that an indirect and more subtle means of aggression exists which promotes terrorist violence for the purpose of dominating various countries [*5th meeting*].

18. It does not seem necessary to insist on the fact that mere technology is the most important factor which identifies the times in which we live.

19. Thus Raymond Aron may speak of the "technological era"; Michel Poniatowski of the "society of scientific development"; Zbigniew Brzezinski of the " 'technotronic' society", because of the relevance of technology and electronics; Pierre Bertaux has spoken of the "mutational society", referring to the mutation imposed on society by technology' and A.M. Hilton has spoken of the " 'cybercultural' society", alluding to the influence of the technology of cybernetics in today's culture.

20. The creation of other neologisms, such as the "neotechnic" industrial society, the atomic era or the space age obviously also has a technological connotation.

21. In a book that is well known, Francesco Alberoni employs the following equation: $P = f(ST)$, which shows that the power of nations, P, is a function of the territory, T, and of technical capacity, S. Since T is invariable, any increase in power will depend on the increase in technological capacity, hence the competitive race among nations for bigger and better technology to strengthen, above all, economic development on the one hand and war power on the other.

22. If we are in a technological age, war is also necessarily technological.

23. R. Buckminster Fuller was the man to foresee one of the outstanding consequences of technology, putting it in one phrase: "to do more with less". With fewer resources, technology produces more; with fewer causal components,

it obtains greater effect. Fuller calls this principle that of "comprehensive ephemeralization", and its meaning can be understood from a simple example: with one quarter of a ton of communication satellites, more information is disseminated than by using 15,000 tons of submarine cables; with 100 kilograms of computers a greater calculation capacity is obtained than by using 2,000 million kilograms of traditional calculating machines.

24. This principle of ephemeralization, translated into war technology, shows that half a kilogram of botulism toxin has a greater lethal power than the whole range of weapons used in the last 100 wars in history; and what could be said of the H bomb, a few kilograms of which have the destructive power of millions of tons of TNT, or other refined devices of the present-day war "gadgets" arsenal?

25. Neo-technology, therefore, from the point of view of warfare promotes a change of scale, a quantitative jump, that in present-day circumstances allows anyone in the world to grasp the ready availability of those instruments capable of condemning humanity and the biosphere to total destruction.

26. Professor Gaston Bouthoul adds to the three classic population sectors—namely, the primary, secondary and tertiary—yet another, the quaternary, which is that covering destructive activity, that of the population dedicated to do research on, produce and use the weapons necessary for war.

27. J. Robert Oppenheimer said, and with reason, that 90 per cent of all scientific researchers in history are alive in our time, thus giving a notion of science and technology in our age. Alastair Buchan mentions that 25 per cent of the world's scientists, who constitute 90 per cent of all scientists in the history of mankind, are dedicated to research on weapons. In turn, as Arnold Toynbee has said, "the single art of war evolves at the expense of all the arts of peace", so anyone can realize the enormous impact of technology in mutation, not only quantitatively but also in the sense of the qualitative jump represented by available and potential weapons. Those weapons are the non-conventional ones, and the type of war brought about as a consequence of their possible use has been known since Nagasaki as non-conventional warfare.

28. Non-conventional weapons are atomic weapons in the following varieties: A bombs and H bombs, whose effects are heat, ionizing radiation and expansion waves; reduced residual radiation bombs, whose effects are heat and expansion waves but not radiation; neutron bombs, whose effects are the result of radiation and not of heat and expansion, being therefore lethal to living beings but permitting the conservation of buildings and materials.

29. Chemical and biological weapons are also non-conventional weapons and together with atomic weapons they constitute the trilogy of modern warfare.

30. The ABC, or complex of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, A, B and C, is considered by strategists as the absolute in weapons.

31. Those weapons that permit climate modification or psychotropic weapons are also non-conventional weapons.

32. Rockets, aircraft, satellites and guided missiles are some of the possible delivery systems of atomic weapons.

33. If warfare technology and the sophistication thus provided daily increases the destructive power of those weapons, it is legitimate to think that this same technology has the power to invent means and create instruments to defend human life against those weapons. In this sense, some possibilities are: the technology of defensive weapons, such as, for example, ABMs or anti-ballistic missiles, detection systems and so on; the technology of biological defences, deriving from the resistance to radiation of certain biological organisms and the support means, based on the advances made by biology, bioengineering, chemistry and genetics; the technology that makes possible the control of absolute weapons, such as the discovery of photo-verification techniques, seismographic detection, measurement of radioactivity, use of satellites, and so on, as highly reliable elements for the evaluation and monitoring of warfare potential; the technology geared to find solutions to potentially conflicting problems, attacking their causes, as well as that having to do with research in the field of ribosomic biosynthesis of proteins; or attacking the consequences, such as decontamination and environmental purification technology, or the technology of recycling, that can be precisely considered technologies at the service of research for peace.

34. Simone de Beauvoir has stressed the contribution of technology in the depersonalization of modern man and his becoming "a thing". Ludwig von Bertalanffy has referred to a process of progressive de-anthropomorphization, conditioned by science and technology. Gerald Leach in his book *The Biocrats*[2] shows the danger of manipulating man himself, his will, his psyche, his organism and his genes as the greatest danger of technology.

35. These also are weapons, instruments of destruction, to which technology itself must and can find the antidote.

36. If, as remarked by Lyman Bryson, in his work *Science and Freedom,* blind technological materialism is not contained by scientific humanism, then not war but the very future of man as such, his destiny, will be at the mercy of a final and surely fatal test.

37. It is worth while to make some observations concerning the meaning of psychology about war and peace and consequently about disarmament. There are two inexorable areas to be considered in the problem of arms control. One is the arms race, the other pacifism. Pierre Haser says that the problem of peace has become too important to leave to the pacifists. In turn, Herbert Butterfield thinks that the *leit-motiv* of the arms race advocacy is the "tendency of power as such to expand indefinitely until faced with a greater power".

38. There we have the *primum movens* of the psychological implications of the arms race. Arms control becomes a

[2] Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972.

sort of symbiosis, a sort of marriage between the pro-armament and pacifist attitudes of man. It does not imply disarmament and, in turn, it is a path to peace.

39. Klaus Knorr in his work, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, referring to the usefulness of weapons, says: "Utility is a matter of perception and values. It is essentially subjective, and this fact precludes computation and prevents comparison between countries and over time."[3] Knorr uses a simple formula that shows that U = V − C where U is the usefulness of arms power, depending on certain values, V, and on certain costs, C. The usefulness depends on the difference of total values and total costs. Among the values, what is taken into account includes territorial integrity, survival, security and assets such as respect and prestige, which, as a minimum, have a high psychological content. Among the costs, what is taken into account includes economic expenses, financial expenses, moral damages, guilt complex, injured dignity and so on.

40. The fact that scientists, rulers, strategists and military men can line up either for or against optimistic or pessimistic theories is also a psychological attitude, since there are enough arguments to feed both conceptions.

41. The well-known concept of nuclear deterrence is based on psychological suppositions, as shown by James E. Dougherty: "The concept of deterrence is something more than a strategical-military concept. It also belongs to the realm of psychology, since it entails an effort to influence other people's behaviour through dissuasion, namely, through the threat of inflicting an unacceptable amount of punishment in retaliation for a certain undesirable form of behaviour, such as miiitary aggression."

42. Y.A. Maslow, who in a way is the craftsman of humanist psychology, attributes to dissuasion the outstanding role in the search for security when he affirms that "everything seems less important than security and protection".

43. Albert Einstein, on the other hand, believed that fear was the priority psychological factor and said: "Atomic energy can intimidate humanity and induce it to put order in its international affairs, something it would not do without the pressure of fear."

44. Anyway, dissuasion is an intellectual game and its condition is a high degree of rationality on the part of the parties to a conflict.

45. Nuclear strategy is based on the mutually assured destruction (MAD) principle or assurance of mutual destruction. In order for such deterrence to exist, it is necessary to possess enough nuclear power to inflict irreparable damage on the other party. This balance of terror was the one leading to the first strategic arms limitation agreement in May 1972, which is aimed at freezing nuclear capacity without undercutting the retaliation force of each of the parties.

46. General Pierre Gallois, in his book *The Balance of Terror: Strategy in the Nuclear Age*,[4] holds the theory of "proportional deterrence", based on the possibility available to lesser Powers of acquiring a deterrent force capable of inflicting on a potential aggressor losses equal to the value of what it puts at stake. Thus, a small Power can acquire a deterrent force and hence contribute—according to Gallois—to the maintenance of peace. Here, returning to Knorr's equation U = V − C, what we are dealing with is trying to create the conviction of the lack of usefulness, U, of a potential act of aggression because of the danger hovering over the values, V, brought into play.

47. The psychological approach is related also to arms control, as stated by Donald Brennan, when he says: "A great deal of the considerable complexity of arms control has its origin in the fact that this is a very subjective question: you could not find two specialists that could see the implications in the same manner."

48. But it is on the aggressive behaviour of communities where psychologists lay the greater emphasis concerning the dangers of war confrontation.

49. We should quickly recall here certain points of view.

50. Dr. Alex Comfort relates aggressive behaviour to population density. G. M. Carstairs related aggression to the delimitations of the territory over which man or a community exercises control.

51. Frank Fraser Darling maintains that man is the one species that can lie, either to others or to himself. No other animal species lies. Man, by falsifying truth, loses authenticity and that attitude breeds aggression.

52. Joseph S. Weiner relates aggression to overcrowding, due to the repeated emotional stress to which individuals are subjected, which comes to create in man an emotional hyperreactivity, which constitutes the base of all aggressive behaviour.

53. C. H. Waddington differentiates animal aggression, which is interspecific, from human aggression, which is intraspecific, because of the speech capacity that man has and the complicated semantic mechanisms that always carry the probability of provoking confrontation.

54. John Dollard, in his study *Frustration and aggression*,[5] relates human aggression to frustrating experiences, either individual or social ones. Frustration breeds aggression and aggression exacerbates frustration, as in a vicious circle which ends finally in a consummated act.

55. Philip Noel-Baker, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, believes that man has acquired, through evolution and history, a spirit of contradiction, a sinalagmatic attitude which places him as forming part of a dualism, like fighting against something, or even doubling his personality and fighting against doubt, as Hamlet does. Class struggle itself, which Marxism claims as one of its conceptual columns, is in part the fruit of the psychology of Karl Marx, whose motto was precisely *De Omnibus Dubitandum*—everything is subject to doubt. Noel-Baker believes

[3] Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p. 8.
[4] Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1961.
[5] Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939.

that it is necessary to create an ethos in international affairs that will allow communities to pass from a sinalagmatic attitude to an analagmatic one.

56. B. F. Skinner, the most distinguished behaviourist psychologist, in his polemical book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*,[6] considers that aggression related to our culture is linked to two factors: "the futile desire of uncontrolled freedom and blind faith in human dignity".

57. Man cannot be free, for this thinker, because his acts are partly programmed in his genes and partly conditioned by the physical and social environment. His dignity is an illusion, because man cannot attribute to himself credit for his own conduct. In this manner, he ends up in aggression, which at this stage puts survival into question. The solution lies in the search for self-control through behavioural engineering and the aid of culture.

58. Without prejudice to the solutions proposed in the draft final document of the Preparatory Committee—and the difficulties involved in its preparation, of which the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, made us aware with great wisdom and tact at the inaugural meeting, can be seen by merely reading it—my delegation considers that the Assembly should take into account the possibility of promoting the creation of an advisory polemological body that would work under the supervision and trusteeship of the United Nations. with the tasks that I shall now mention.

59. That advice is indispensable and the contribution thus provided by an institute of that character would surely offer the best and most complete information on a question already complex in itself that is in a process of very rapid change. It would also be the appropriate channel for such information to reach the peoples of the world, making available in a direct and untarnished form the whole magnitude of the problems that beset us.

60. Polemology—from the Greek *polemos*, war—is a scientific study of war and peace with the aim of drawing conclusions for the preservation of peace.

61. The aim is to shift the treatment of the cycles of war and peace from the political forum, where that problem is traditionally dealt with, to the scientific arena. In polemology, war and peace are approached with the usual scientific methodology: the establishment of comparable facts, the creation of theories of interpretation, the demonstration of those theories and the processing of their application.

62. Karl von Clausewitz, in his well-known treatise *On War*,[7] establishes that war is the continuation of politics through other means. Therefore, war could be an instrument at the disposal of men.

63. Polemology puts that assertion in doubt, and maintains that men are those who, in given psychological circumstances, become passive pawns in the game of war. Polemology tries in that way to extract from human sciences, and specifically from those dealing with behaviour, the necessary elements to disentangle the bellicose attitude of man. Polemology also differs from "traditional pacifism" that supposes that a minimum of good will can put an end to conflicts, and tries axiologically to judge those conflicts without an objective basis.

64. The aim is to become better acquainted with the causes, rhythms and functioning of war, so as to obtain a "functional pacifism", very different in nature from "traditional pacifism".

65. Here I should like to repeat what was mentioned by the Vice-President of the United States [*2nd meeting*], who referred to the forces driving the arms race—such as technology, international tension and legitimate concerns over security—without failing to mention irrational factors. All Governments, he said later on, must strengthen institutions and have the necessary knowledge to control arms.

66. As is well known, war was considered as God's plague, as the Lord's punishment sent to man. In that way, to the rider of the Apocalypse was attributed the power to banish peace from earth so that men could slit each other's throats:

> " . . . the beast that ascendeth out of the bottomless pit shall make war against them, and shall overcome them, and kill them." [*Revelation 11:7.*]
>
> "A noise shall come even to the ends of the earth; for the Lord hath a controversy with the nations, he will plead with all flesh; he will give them that are wicked to the sword . . .
>
> "Thus saith the Lord of hosts, Behold, evil shall go forth from nation to nation, and a great whirlwind shall be raised up from the coasts of the earth.
>
> "And the slain of the Lord shall be at that day from one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth . . .
>
> "Howl, ye shepherds, and cry; and wallow yourselves in the ashes, ye principal of the flock, for the days of your slaughter and of your dispersions are accomplished; and ye shall fall like a pleasant vessel." [*Jeremiah 25:31-34.*]

67. The Council of London attributed, in 1665, the ravages of the epidemic to the Lord's curse, aimed at chastising the citizens of London for the unholy writings of Thomas Hobbes.

68. The theological perspective of war and peace ended up declericalizing itself, deconsecrating itself, and was thus replaced by a certain form of knowledge embodied in three disciplines—morality, sociology and law.

69. But these three disciplines showed a clear tendency to set normative criteria concerning the approach to war and peace. And hence, there were held to be just wars and unjust wars—a precedent for which can be found in Em-

[6] Knopf, New York, 1971.
[7] Modern Library, New York, 1943.

peror Constantine—of the defenders of good, confronted with the artifices of evil.

70. Scientific research on war and peace, based on objective criteria and not on axiological and normative premises, started late in history, and it was in our century, and above all after the Second World War, that the first steps were taken. In the 1940s, with the publication of the monumental work *A Study of War*, which was the result of the multidisciplinary study of 70 authors working under the direction of Quincy Wright for 15 years,[8] the bases of polemology were set down. From then on, and with the advent of atomic weapons, research on war and peace not only became objective, but the reason for its existence was the preservation of the human species threatened with extinction by ionizing radiation.

71. Albert Camus said that each generation brought with itself dreams and desires for the making of a new world, but, he added, his generation brought with it the desire that the world not be destroyed.

72. Polemology studies war and peace.

73. As to war, it analyses its etiology, its causes. They may be: structural, trying to search for relationships among economic, ethnic, political, demographic and aggression structures; conjunctural, analysing the effect of the historical context; occasional, namely, the consequence of immediate motivations.

74. Wars can be, furthermore, limited, for they concern only the military apparatus of nations; total, for they concern the whole military and civil context of nations; intentional and unintentional. The type corresponding to the intentional type of war is the Clausewitz model, that is, "the continuation of politics through military means". It is the so-called model of "cataclysmic war", described by Leo Tolstoy in *War and Peace* where war appears as an undesirable and not as a premeditated element, the product of blind or aleatory forces that confront man with the consummated act.

75. The sword of Damocles of nuclear war, according to polemologists, is not included in the canons of strategic war. An intentional war between two reasonable States is hard to envisage, but an error or accident, a lack of calculation, an escalation, can indeed become the cause of atomic disaster. Thus, Thomas Schelling, in his book *Arms and Influence*,[9] says:

> "There is not a foreseeable process through which the United States and the Soviet Union can be dragged into nuclear war. If war breaks out, it will be as a result of a totally unforeseen process, of reactions that it is not possible to predict exactly, of quite unpremeditated decisions, of developments that will not be under complete control. War has never evaded uncertainty, but, with the data provided today by technology, geography and politicology, it is not easy to see how a world war could come to pass unless it is due to uncertainty."

76. Here I would like to remind the Assembly of what the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union said in his statement a few days ago [*5th meeting*]—that one error would be enough to unleash a nuclear conflict. The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany justly remarked [*ibid*] that what went into a policy of security should bear in mind the effective capacity to manipulate crises and the predictability of military conduct. He said later that any unpredictable behaviour was risky.

77. Therefore, strategic war gives way to unintentional, accidental war, the result of escalations in conflict situations. The threat of war is contained in the "accidents" that can happen in conflict situations, which would in turn provoke uncontrollable chain reactions.

78. Hence polemology takes as the core of its goals the study of the "conflict theory" so that the multidisciplinary scientific knowledge thus obtained allows it to forecast the whole possible range of accidents.

79. The general theory of conflict is based on the fact that social systems suffer disturbances and that these disturbances develop with coincidences and analogies that can be rationalized. Family, labour, economic, political, religious, ethnic, ideological, cultural, and international conflicts present a set of similar patterns, a certain evolutionary isomorphism, in spite of multiple and obvious differences. Scientific analysis allows for the deduction of basic and common concepts that will constitute a conflict theory, which will in turn make forecasting possible, as is done in economic theory, or prospective analysis. In the economic cycles of prosperity and depression, what is involved is the acquisition of knowledge to take measures to increase prosperity and inhibit depression. Medical science does the same with the cycles of health and disease, and polemology, in the war-peace cycles, aims, through scientific knowledge, to strengthen peace and diminish the risks of war. Polemology covers many other aspects, from the cultural anthropology approach, where the end is to look for ethnic bellicosity in the processes of culture shock and cultural interpenetration, even to the search of quantifiable parameters in demography, economics or econometrics, which can clarify conflict situations, and again to the mathematical approach to the problem, using set theory, the game theory of John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, the war theory of Lewis Richardson, of the conflict simulation models using computers and "gaming".

80. As for peace, polemology studies its different forms and the factors that tend to alter the equilibrium on which it is based. It is argued that the state of peace is not the natural state of man, because strategy or biological science of behaviour indicates an innately aggressive behaviour. But this is seen in man and not in animals, where it is rare for struggles to the death to exist within the same species. Raymond Aron already stressed this in his book *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*,[10] when he said that "the difficulty of peace is to be found more in the humanity than in the animality of man. Man is the being who prefers revolution to humiliation and his own truth to life."

[8] University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.
[9] Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.
[10] Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1966.

81. There is positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace is the absence of war. Positive peace implies that communities agree to live together within the frame of reference set out by a minimum of common values. Negative peace is the one that preoccupies us because of its immediate dangers. On the basis of that concept, negative peace—or the absence of war—involves simply trying to abolish war, prohibiting it as is done in the Charter of the United Nations in paragraph 4 of Article 2, contenting itself with the prohibition of war as a means of resolving conflicts, but without proposing other solutions to replace war and without suppressing conflict situations themselves. The measures of negative peace only permit the accumulation of tensions that will end in the inevitability of war. The road to follow is that of positive peace, which goes to the origin of conflicts in order to avoid them and peacefully resolve a given situation. For this it requires the assistance of knowledge and reason, of science and of rationalism.

82. There is, also, a static and a dynamic peace. Static peace, the result of the *status quo*, such as the peace of Versailles, which Carl Schmidt called "the legitimization of booty", condemns a society to immobility. In a society such as ours, subject to rapid change, the only possible option is dynamic peace.

83. In the encyclical *Populorum Progressio*, the parallelism between peace and development, change and peace, was drawn. Alfred North Whitehead attributed to development the feature of imposing "change within order and order in change", sensing in this way the necessary symbiosis of those two elements so dear to dynamic peace, to peace in development.

84. Johan Galtung, who carried out a study of 35 different theories of peace at the request of UNESCO, paid for by the International Peace Research Association, applies to the analysis of these theories the thermodynamic concept of entropy, which includes elements such as the perspective of statistical physics and the concepts of order and uncertainty.

85. A priority task of polemology is the study of "peace conditions", namely, the requirements for the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of peace. United States Senator Fulbright called those "peace conditions" "our need" when he said: "If the common danger can serve to measure the intensity of our need, the existence or absence of the community's positive feelings must measure our capacity".

86. Emeric de Vattel defines "peace conditions" as the *jus necessarium*, the law of need, that could very well be the natural law of the atomic age. The "peace conditions", the *jus necessarium*, "our need", or whatever you wish to call it, are related to a number of interdependent factors, but the first and most fundamental of them is the study of arms control.

87. The methodology of peace research is varied and pleomorphic. However, it can be put together in two great currents. On the one hand there is the historico-analytical current, represented above all by Raymond Aron, E. H. Carr, Morgenthau and Schwarzemberger, and based in historical analysis, the detection of analogies and their generalization.

88. Thus, for example, Gaston Bouthoul, Director of the Polemological Institute of France, initiates the analysis of the great phases such as the Sinic Peace, starting in the year 211 B.C. with the unification of China by Huang-Te; the *Pax Romana*, which goes from the year 30 B.C. to the year 350 A.D.; the *Pax Britannica*, which goes from the year 1814 to 1914; and the *Pax Atomica*, in which, since 1945, the world has been living.

89. There is another current—it could be called the modern or mathematical method—that uses statistics, mathematical analysis, building of models and the detection of quantifiable parameters and information processes as such, and even relations with semantics, as in the case of "semantic implications", and analyses, using data processing, documents, speeches and newspaper reports of a given community, searching for those terms and models with strong impact, affective or emotional, in order to measure the hostility and aggression derived therefrom. Karl Deutsch, Johan Galtung, Anatol Rapoport, K. E. Boulding, Lewis Richardson and Thomas Schelling are the most outstanding authors.

90. Concerning the organizations that carry out polemological research, these can be classified into three types, namely, institutes of international relations, research institutes on national security that present and carry out studies on strategic subjects, and institutes on peace research itself. Among the latter, for example, we could mention the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), created in 1966 in commemoration of the 150 uninterrupted years of peace in Sweden; a private institute that carries out similar research, with headquarters at Oslo; the Department of Peace Research of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), founded in London in 1964; the Polemological Institute of France, already mentioned, created in 1945; the Centre for the Sociology of War, at Brussels; the Polemological Institute of Groningen, in the Netherlands; and the peace research institutes of the United States of America, united in a central organization, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA).

91. In other words, many other institutes have appeared all over the world since the 1960s with the aim of putting scientific knowledge at the service of peace and the containment of war proliferation.

92. My delegation considers that the United Nations should supervise the functioning of a polemological organ whose aim could be the study of peace in the light of science; the promotion of multidisciplinary research on peace, its realization and perfection; the study of aggression and its causes; the collaboration in the said studies of all the Member States through their scientific staff; the research and analysis of all the conflicts occurring in the world; the establishment of a data collection network on conflict situations, similar to world or regional meteorological networks; the elaboration of theoretical pro-

grammes, models and *sui generis* scientific solutions for each conflict situation in the critical stage; the elaboration of forecasting methods put at the disposal of Member States; the creation of a world polemological information bank that includes the majority of related disciplines; and the preparation of periodic, dynamic and readaptable plans of polemological character for the strengthening of world peace and international security.

93. Here I should like to mention the proposal put forward by the President of the Republic of France. He said that there should be an instrument of disarmament studies at the level of the world Organization [*3rd meeting*] and he suggested that it be created.

94. As the President of the General Assembly said in his outstanding opening statement before this Assembly on 23 May, never in the history of the world have such great sums been used as they are today for weapons and armies, thus becoming such a very burden, even for the most powerful and richest countries in the world—which proves the madness of continuing on this road. Only the destruction of civilization and human life itself can be found at the end of that road.

95. Of the more than 3,000 resolutions adopted by the United Nations since its creation, about 200 deal with disarmament, as was said in the same statement by the President, but—as he immediately went on to add—no serious breakthrough has been attained in this area.

96. Even if we want to, we cannot be over-optimistic about concrete, tangible results in this meeting.

97. While this enormous effort is being made and enormous sums squandered, whole peoples suffer from hunger, lack of aid, lack of education and lack of a future. Such a situation is a challenge to the human conscience. By itself, it is a cause of frustration, of tension, resentment and aggression. The arms race keeps up its deadly pace.

98. This Assembly is the object of attention of the whole world. Many are those who have put their trust in what can be done here. Let us not disappoint that hope, because the United Nations will then be mortgaging its credibility and, indeed, its own future.

99. These are the fervent wishes of Uruguay.

100. Mr. SONODA (Japan)[11]: Mr. President, on behalf of the Government of Japan, I should like to congratulate Your Excellency on your assumption of the high office of President of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I am confident that, under your impartial leadership, and benefiting from your excellent judgement and wealth of diplomatic experience, the special session will prove to be most fruitful.

101. The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San Francisco 33 years ago. It clearly states at the very beginning that the peoples of the United Nations have resolved to combine their efforts "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind". All the nations which gathered to found the United Nations committed themselves to this solemn pledge, and all the nations which have since joined this august body have given the same solemn undertaking.

102. During these 33 years, however, the world has seen a great number of armed conflicts and a continuous increase in armaments, including nuclear weapons. I cannot help feeling a sense of deep disappointment at this state of affairs.

103. At the same time, I am greatly encouraged that unremitting efforts have been made to bring lasting peace to the world, and that the present special session on disarmament being held is one concrete accomplishment of such efforts.

104. Having recovered from the devastation of the Second World War, with the understanding and co-operation of the other countries of the world, Japan now has one of the strongest economies in the world. In the past, an economically powerful country has invariably been a military Power as well. However, Japan has rejected such a course, and has consistently endeavoured to use its economic capabilities for contributing to the stability and prosperity of the international community.

105. The Constitution of Japan proclaims that:

> "We, the Japanese people . . . desire peace for all time . . . and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world."

It then states that:

> " . . . the Japanese peo ever renounce war as a sovereign right of the na d the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."

106. In the proud spirit of such a Constitution, which it is hoped will open new vistas for humanity, Japan has maintained the fundamental policy of refusing to become a military Power which may threaten other States. It has instead made international co-operation the foundation of its foreign policy.

107. At the basis of my country's decision to choose such a path, which is a challenging experiment without parallel in history, lies our firm determination that "such a war must never break out again"—a determination deeply rooted in the heart of each and every Japanese through bitter experiences in the Second World War. Today, more than 30 years since the end of the war, the Japanese people still hold firmly to this determination. Japan will never act counter to it.

108. The fervent longing of the Japanese people for lasting peace, and their firm resolve to devote themselves to its attainment, coincide in every way with what the Charter

[11] Mr. Sonoda spoke in Japanese. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

of the United Nations demands of the countries of the world. Japan, aspiring to be a pioneer in the establishment of new standards of behaviour for sovereign States within the world community, is determined to strengthen still further its diplomatic efforts dedicated to peace and based on international co-operation.

109. As is well known, Japan is the only country which has experienced the indescribable horrors caused by nuclear weapons. In a flash, the atomic bombs which were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 33 years ago reduced those two cities to ashes and took the lives of nearly 300,000 people. Of those who luckily escaped death, the agony and suffering of some 370,000 men, women and children continue even to this day. This agony is not confined to nationals of Japan alone. For the sake of future generations of mankind, we must never forget the stark realities of the suffering and devastation caused by nuclear weapons.

110. Today, Mayor Araki of Hiroshima, and Mayor Morotani of Nagasaki, are present in this hall, representing the citizens of those two cities.

111. Today's nuclear weapons have a destructive capacity which defies comparison with that of the atomic bombs used against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If nuclear weapons were ever to be used again, the ensuing devastation and suffering would be enormous, quite beyond our imagination. The Japanese people are firmly united in the conviction that such a tragedy must never be repeated. I believe that this determination is shared today not only by the Japanese people, but also by the peoples of the entire world. In the light of such a world-wide conviction, I think it would be highly significant to proclaim 6 August as Disarmament Day.

112. Today, the representatives of a variety of non-governmental organizations, which have for many years worked in Japan for the abolition of nuclear weapons, have come in great numbers to this session. They are more than 500. Their presence reflects the burning conviction of the Japanese people that our ultimate goal, the abolition of nuclear weapons, must be achieved at the earliest possible date.

113. Based on the strong desire of the Japanese people for the abolition of nuclear weapons, my country has, as a matter of national policy, consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles, of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons, even though it possesses the capacity to develop such weapons. The reason for which my country became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373(XXII), annex*] was also our desire for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

114. On behalf of the Government and the people of Japan, I wish to state yet again that my country is firmly committed to these three non-nuclear principles. At the same time, I strongly urge the nuclear-weapon States to make every possible effort to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used, and to banish all nuclear weapons from the earth.

115. The nuclear-weapon States ought to be in a position to understand better than any other country the horrors of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to our survival. The non-nuclear-weapon States, whatever their ideology or political system, earnestly desire the removal of the ever-present threat posed by nuclear weapons. It must be concluded, therefore, that there should be no difference whatsoever among the nations in their desire totally to eliminate nuclear weapons. I am firmly convinced that if each and every nation resolves to strive yet harder on such a premise, the total abolition of nuclear weapons will come within our reach. This is our duty towards the generations to come.

116. While the attainment of general and complete disarmament should undoubtedly be the common goal of all the countries of the world, it should not be forgotten that for each country disarmament is a problem which is closely linked to the requirements of ensuring national security. In the present international community the balance of power among countries, whether on a regional or a world-wide scale, is a significant factor in the maintenance of international peace and security. If we wish to move towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament there is no way open to us other than to keep this ideal always in mind and proceed step by step with concrete and feasible measures.

117. So far I have outlined my country's basic thinking on disarmament. I should like now, against this background, to give my Government's views on some of the main issues.

118. First, I should like to re-emphasize the fact that to make progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, with the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, is the task facing us today to which the highest priority should be given. To attain that goal it is most essential to adopt feasible measures, step by step, in the direction of first halting the nuclear arms race and thereafter reducing existing nuclear arsenals. In order to arrest the nuclear arms race it is necessary to prevent any further increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. To this end, international efforts should be intensified to make the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons truly universal and on that basis to strengthen further the non-proliferation régime. In this connexion, I am firmly convinced that the imperatives of preventing further nuclear proliferation and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an essential energy source, can and must be pursued in harmony.

119. The Government of Japan believes also that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where suitable conditions exist can be useful in preventing proliferation. My country hopes that international endeavours to establish such zones will be continued and that the nuclear-weapon States will give their positive support, including assurances that they will not attack such zones with nuclear weapons.

120. International efforts to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States can achieve little without the efforts of the countries which now possess nuclear

weapons to achieve nuclear disarmament. Positive contributions by all the nuclear-weapon States are indispensable if the ultimate goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons is to be attained. However, there has been little progress in the efforts made so far by the nuclear-weapon States for the reduction of their nuclear armaments. I cannot help feeling a sense of deep disappointment and strong frustration. The two major nuclear-weapon States have particularly heavy responsibilities in this regard. I strongly request that the United States and the Soviet Union, mindful of those responsibilities, work for the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement in the second round of strategic arms limitation talks, and should promptly follow it with further talks on the substantial reduction of their strategic arms.

121. Furthermore, my country urges China and France to become parties to such existing treaties as the partial test-ban treaty[12] and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to participate in disarmament negotiations, beginning with the negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

122. The first specific step towards halting the nuclear arms race should be the comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. It is indeed regrettable that more than 1,000 nuclear-weapon tests have been conducted in the past 33 years and that at least 8 tests have already been conducted this year. I should like to appeal strongly to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to reach agreement at the earliest possible date in their current trilateral consultations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and to make it possible for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to start multilateral treaty negotiations this summer. At the same time, I should like to request all countries to refrain from setting off any nuclear explosions, whether for military or for peaceful purposes, before the conclusion of such a treaty.

123. Another realistic step towards arresting the nuclear arms race would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear explosions. Japan has promoted this idea ever since 1969. I should like to take this opportunity to urge the nuclear-weapon States to halt the production of fissionable nuclear materials for explosive purposes, except in such quantities as are necessary for non-explosive and non-weapons purposes. In order to ensure compliance with such measures, the nuclear-weapon States should accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards similar to those which are applied to the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international agreements.

124. The establishment of effective systems of verification is no doubt indispensable in ensuring concrete progress in disarmament. In the field of a comprehensive test ban, Japan, with its highly advanced seismological research, has been contributing to the establishment of a system of verification of nuclear tests using seismological methods. It is our intention further to strengthen our efforts in this field. Japan appeals strongly to the countries concerned to intensify international efforts, including their efforts through the United Nations, for the purpose of developing effective systems of verification for a variety of disarmament measures.

125. Mankind will be able to reach the stage of making significant progress towards the substantial reduction of existing nuclear weapons only when all nuclear-weapon States have proceeded with the concrete measures that I have suggested for halting the nuclear arms race. I am convinced that this is the road along which mankind must advance towards the abolition of nuclear weapons.

126. Together with that of nuclear disarmament, the task of banning chemical weapons, which are also weapons of mass destruction, is urgent. My country, throughout the 10 years of deliberations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has made strenuous efforts for the early attainment of this goal, which have included the submission of a draft treaty banning chemical weapons.[13] I should like to request that, with the convention banning biological weapons[14] already concluded, negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons be promptly undertaken.

127. The international community is today witnessing an enormous build-up of conventional weapons as a result of their production and international transfer. Such an accumulation is fraught with the danger of inducing the outbreak of armed conflicts and the escalation of armed conflicts in areas of tension.

128. On the basis of its fundamental position of devotion to peace, Japan refrains from exporting weapons to any part of the world, thus maintaining a highly exceptional, indeed a unique, position among the advanced industrialized countries. Furthermore, my country has taken the initiative in advocating the commencement of international studies with the aim of restraining the unlimited international transfer of conventional arms, while appealing to the major arms suppliers to start consultations with a view to voluntary restraint in the export of arms to areas of conflict. We appreciate the fact that in positive response to this appeal, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun consultations aimed at curbing arms exports.

129. This question of the international transfer of conventional arms is undoubtedly a delicate and difficult one as it has a direct bearing on the security of a great number of countries. Nevertheless, we cannot bypass this question simply because it is difficult. While fully recognizing the complex nature of this problem, I earnestly hope that the first step towards achieving restraint in the unlimited international transfer of conventional weapons will be taken at this special session.

130. It goes without saying that the prime aim of disarmament is the preservation of international peace and secu-

[12] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43).

[13] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27*, annex I, sect. 2.

[14] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

rity. I should like at the same time to emphasize that as we move forward with disarmament the resources so far allocated to armaments should be released for the prosperity and development of the international community, in particular for the developing countries.

131. World military expenditure, which is increasing year by year, has now reached the staggering figure of almost $400 billion annually. On this one day alone more than $1 billion is being spent for military purposes. This amount, 20 times as much as the total amount of the official development assistance from the developed to the developing countries, constitutes a serious obstacle to the economic and social development of the world community.

132. It is essential that all the countries of the world, including the nuclear-weapon States, should bear this in mind and make ever greater efforts in the field of disarmament in order that we may devote our resources and energies to the prosperity of the whole international community, and particularly to the development of the developing nations.

133. Disarmament is a complex and difficult problem. Progress in it can be achieved only through the unremitting concerted efforts of all the countries of the world for the common goal of attaining general and complete disarmament. I very much hope that concrete results will be attained at this special session for the improvement of the disarmament machinery to encourage such concerted efforts.

134. Finally, it must be emphasized that the aim of disarmament will not be achieved in the final analysis unless distrust among countries, which underlies the arms race, is removed. We must break the vicious circle in which mutual distrust causes increases in armaments and increases in armaments breed distrust. Instead, we must build relationships in which mutual trust promotes disarmament and disarmament builds mutual trust.

135. Inspired by the wisdom born of its own bitter experiences in the past war, my country has decided to dedicate itself to peace and has based its diplomacy on a policy of avoidance of hostility with any country. It has striven to deepen exchanges and communications, thereby building a relationship of mutual trust with all the countries of the world regardless of their political system, power or geographical distance. I believe it is precisely such endeavours that will build a firm basis for efforts at disarmament.

136. As I stated at the outset, the basic policy of Japan is to devote itself to peace. Japan has adhered firmly to the stringent policy of not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons. It has refrained from exporting weapons to the rest of the world. I therefore feel personally proud in stating that Japan occupies a highly advanced position in the field of disarmament.

137. It is our strong hope that specific progress will be made in nuclear disarmament and other disarmament fields through concerted international efforts. Various constructive proposals have been made and will continue to be made at the present session of the General Assembly. The crux of the matter, however, is the achievement of actual and concrete progress in our disarmament efforts.

138. I most earnestly hope that the present special session may prove to be a constructive forum that will lead to concrete achievements in the field of disarmament and may thus give a strong impetus to the international effort for general and complete disarmament.

139. Before concluding my statement, let me share with this audience my deep convictions on the question of nuclear weapons.

140. Distinguished delegates who represent nuclear-weapon States, I trust that you know better than anyone else the horrors of nuclear weapons, which could annihilate mankind. Nuclear weapons remind me of the tusks of the mammoth, which ultimately caused the mammoth's self-extinction. It is my earnest hope that nuclear-weapon States will give careful thought to the future of mankind and pursue responsible policies.

141. Distinguished delegates who represent non-nuclear-weapon States which are under the dark shadow of existing nuclear weapons, we can never forget the horrifying holocaust that could be caused by nuclear weapons. Let us unite in our total commitment and proceed together for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

142. I should like to conclude my statement with this sincere appeal to all representatives gathered here today.

143. Mr. AYALA-LASSO (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, first of all I should like to extend to you my Government's congratulations and my own on your election as President of this special session of the General Assembly, which I am sure you will guide with the same expertise as the session which immediately preceded it.

144. I am also pleased to congratulate Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas on his effective guidance of the work of the Preparatory Committee, which has laid down such useful foundations for the special session, and on his well deserved election as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

145. The problems this Assembly must face are serious and far-reaching. Disarmament and related problems were the first to be taken up by the General Assembly at its initial session, thus fulfilling the praiseworthy profession of faith in the Preamble of the Charter, which commits the peoples of the United Nations to doing away with the scourge of war.

Mr. Rolandes (Cyprus), Vice-President, took the Chair.

146. As a dramatic paradox between the hopeful time when the United Nations Charter was signed at San Francisco and its coming into force, there was the ill-fated August when the first atomic bombs of plutonium and uranium exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ushering in the era of massive death and total destruction.

147. It was therefore natural that the first resolutions of the General Assembly of 1946 were directed towards, on the one hand, limiting arms and, on the other, establishing the Atomic Energy Commission to take up the problem of the use of this enormous destructive force.

148. Various formulas, from a limited disarmament commission to a plenary commission, were tested. Meanwhile the kilotons produced by fission atomic bombs gave way to the era of megatons with the fusion bomb which made its debut in the Bikini atoll.

149. From the simple intention to reduce arms, thinking moved forward in the 1960s to the idea of general and complete disarmament. But a 33-year struggle was necessary before there was success in convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to the specific problems of disarmament. That is the enormous significance of this session of the Assembly and of the unavoidable problems it will have to consider.

150. The stockpiled nuclear power, which has been called the world megatonnage and is equivalent to 60 tons of dynamite for every inhabitant of the earth, meant that until a short time ago we believed that a new war was not possible because of the so-called balance of terror, because it would affect all mankind and there would be no victory for any Power.

151. Yet its spectre emerges from the shadows when major world leaders maintain that total war is inevitable, although it may be postponed; when high officers of other Powers in public statements do not reject the possibility; and when the main actors of this great military drama increase their nuclear arsenals and are set on manufacturing new and terrible weapons of mass destruction.

152. Among the disarmament measures to which Ecuador considers priority should be given are the following: first, total prohibition of any kind of nuclear testing; secondly, prohibition of the testing or production of new weapons of mass destruction, whether radiological, chemical, biological or meteorological; thirdly, effective destruction or limitation of rocket delivery systems; and fourthly, a commitment by each State not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in case of conflict.

153. Existing treaties prohibit nuclear tests in the atmosphere, on the sea-bed and in outer space, but they omit the subsoil where the most complex nuclear warheads have been tested. It is indispensable to fill this vacuum by reaching an appropriate agreement.

154. On the other hand, the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222(XXI), annex*] has to be reviewed to provide effective assurance that in those environments only peaceful activities will be carried out. The use of satellites for military purposes or the manufacture of anti-satellite weapons and killer satellites are a threat to all. The recent incident of the fall of the Cosmos 974 satellite in Canada makes it essential to draw up adequate safeguard rules for the use of nuclear energy in outer space.

155. Although environmental destruction is apparently independent from disarmament it has to be linked to it. Besides the effects of environmental pollution by radioactive isotopes as a result of nuclear testing, the use of defoliants has transformed some parts of the world with their deadly effect in climatic changes and, regrettably, meteorological weapons that can dramatically alter life are not inconceivable.

156. The delicate biochemical balance of the atmosphere cannot be altered without lethal consequences for the human being whose only sources of oxygen are the land biomass and the marine phytoplankton. It is essential, therefore, to prohibit any testing of weapons on either land or sea, which may alter that balance.

157. While certain weapons of mass destruction, it is true, are the most dangerous for the existence of humanity and the continuation of its history, nevertheless the so-called conventional weapons also have negative importance.

158. While on the one hand the developed countries that sell weapons urge the developing countries to devote their efforts to promoting human rights and to furthering their plans and programmes for social and economic development which would benefit the vast masses of the population, on the other hand they encourage the investment of considerable financial resources in war devices which are not always in accord with the real interest of the peoples. Thus, an atmosphere of instability and distrust is created which leads to a breach in regional balance and ensures a continued source of income for the arms suppliers.

159. In the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for this year it is pointed out that in this field: "There is also a qualitative change—in the 1950s large numbers of second-hand weapons were sent to third-world countries, often without any supplementary equipment, such as spares and support equipment, or training agreements. Today, the arms market is a buyer's rather than a seller's market, and any importer able to pay is likely to find a seller of even the most sophisticated armaments."

160. According to another authorized source, purchases of weapons by developing countries are at present larger than purchases by the industrialized countries, the estimate being that two thirds of purchases of all kinds of weapons are made by developing countries.

161. Without doubt, in this as in other aspects, the two super-Powers bear a primary responsibility. During recent years both are estimated to have exported weapons to all regions of the world to a value of $55 billion (the United States $35 billion and the Soviet Union $20 billion).

162. Here it is fitting to recall what the President of the United States said on the subject:

> "Let us seek to reduce the annual dollar value of arms sales, limit the transfer of sophisticated arms and lessen the scope of our agreements of co-production

with other States. And, what is equally important, let us strive to have other nations, whether free or not, join us in this effort."

163. In this connexion my delegation would consider the possibility that, on the initiative of the States of each region, regional conferences be held to prevent and limit conventional weapons as long as appropriate conditions exist. This we consider to be interesting.

164. In this respect, Ecuador agrees with those who have raised the question of regional disarmament as an important phase for world-wide disarmament. It should be considered to be the duty and responsibility of States large and small to adopt, together with world-wide disarmament measures, those regional disarmament measures which could well be accelerated by an effective reduction of tensions and, above all, by means of the peaceful settlement of disputes, which would have a most encouraging effect on the restriction of military expenditure. We shall therefore support the proposal to study the regional aspects of disarmament, without any exception or discrimination, as well as any negotiation to that end.

165. On 9 December 1974 Ecuador and seven other Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho, in which each one committed itself to: "... promote and support the building of a lasting order of international peace and co-operation and to create the conditions which will make possible the effective limitation of armaments and an end to their acquisition for offensive purposes, so that all possible resources may be devoted to the economic and social development of every country in Latin America."

166. Furthermore, we should bring back to life the spirit of the joint United States-Soviet declaration of 1961[15] on general and complete disarmament under international control which established the principles that were to lead to the inescapable goal of disarmament.

167. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace represent valuable contributions because they are positive steps towards general and complete disarmament.

168. In this respect I should like to express the satisfaction felt by Ecuador that the Government of the United States of America has announced its intention of obtaining authorization to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco[16] and that the Soviet Union has subscribed to Additional Protocol II of that instrument. That Treaty is an example of the peaceful desires of Latin America and of its repudiation of nuclear weapons. It is to be hoped that France, with its glorious humanitarian tradition, will adhere to Additional Protocol I and that the Latin American States which have not yet done so will take the necessary steps to become parties to the Treaty.

169. The arms race affects the very survival of mankind and is therefore of concern to all States. There can be no indifference in that respect, and although the responsibility of the super-Powers is paramount on the subject, every country should participate actively to contribute towards the solution of the problems implicit in this drama which affects all of us.

170. We cannot overrate the correlation which exists between disarmament and economic development. According to the statistical information of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, $360 billion are invested annually in arms; that means that the terrifying figure of almost $1 billion a day is spent on weapons, while there are geographical areas in which the inhabitants suffer from hunger and subhuman conditions. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has pointed out that the world investment in arms exceeds the amount spent both on education and on health.

171. The Committee established under General Assembly resolution 32/174 to undertake negotiations leading to the establishment of a new international economic order has indicated that disarmament might be one of the most effective means of ensuring the real transfer of resources which would benefit the developing countries. Article 15 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [*resolution 3281(XXIX)*] further establishes the commitment to promote disarmament and use the resources thus released for economic and social development.

172. It is essential that one and all contribute decisively to make possible a new order which will ensure peace and progress. Technological advance must be at the service of mankind and must facilitate collective advancement. For this reason, Ecuador considers that greater opportunity should be given for the developing countries to enjoy the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of the relevant safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

173. Furthermore, we must not forget that social and economic development necessitates the use of resources and funds which must be provided by the developed countries, in compliance with their obligation to work towards the establishment of a new international economic order, quite apart from the funds released by an adequate disarmament policy, which could also contribute to that end.

174. The United Nations is the appropriate forum in which to consider and discuss the problems pertaining to disarmament. Ecuador is in agreement with the idea of setting up a new disarmament body, to function within the framework of the United Nations under the direction of the General Assembly, the work of which would be carried out in accordance with the normal rules of the Organization, with any State having the right to submit initiatives on the subject to that body and to participate in its work without prejudice to the existence of specialized negotiating bodies.

175. I believe that in the disarmament debates sufficient attention has not been paid to the real causes which could

[15] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

[16] Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

bring about armed conflicts and therefore lead peoples, for reasons of national security, to the need of arming themselves. The fact is that it is the existence of conflicts or tensions which could give rise to a breach of peace and of international security. Therefore it is essential that within the context of disarmament we study how to lessen tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means, including the setting up of United Nations bodies for conciliation and good offices and the strengthening of existing machinery. The arms race is largely a consequence of the problems which still remain in the international field. That is why every country should work for, facilitate and co-operate in the solution of existing problems and the elimination of what leads to international tension.

176. The United Nations came into being as a competent body to ensure peace and to save future generations from the scourge of war. Its constituent Charter therefore establishes the unavoidable obligation to contribute to the maintenance and preservation of peace and condemns force as a means of creating, altering or taking away rights. Therefore every country must give its undertaking to co-operate in ensuring compliance with the objectives pursued by the World Organization, and within that context each country is also bound to make a positive contribution to the peaceful solution of existing problems, which will make possible the adoption of effective measures to limit expenditures on armaments.

177. The only thing that can restore to a world convulsed by conflicts a feeling of security, without which there can be no peace, is the determination of all countries, large and small, to place their full trust in the United Nations, in the machinery for the peaceful solution of disputes and in its firm responsibility in contributing to peace, understanding and international co-operation.

178. Ecuador, being convinced of these principles, wishes to reaffirm its support for the international bodies charged with preserving and maintaining peace, and reiterates its will to make a dynamic contribution to ensure compliance with the objectives for which this special session of the General Assembly is met. Further, it will give resolute support to any initiative directed to that end and it will unwaveringly pursue its traditional policy of peace, remaining open to co-operation and good understanding.

179. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): May I begin my statement by extending the congratulations of my country to the President of this special session devoted to disarmament. We believe that no other choice could have been wiser. His personal qualities make him particularly well qualified to conduct the delicate and complex negotiations which are to take place in the coming weeks.

180. Furthermore, the very idea of a special session devoted to disarmament was born in Yugoslavia, at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade in 1961. It is only natural that Yugoslavia, one of the principal advocates of non-alignment, should, through him, preside over this important special session to which the non-aligned movement accords special interest.

181. Indeed, this session is taking place at a time when it is becoming more than ever necessary to seek ways and means of preserving mankind from total destruction and of alleviating the ills of all kinds affecting two thirds of the population of the world.

182. That is why my country has advocated the idea of this special session from the very outset and why we have constantly given it our steadfast support. This support derives from our belief that only a democratic and representative framework such as this will guarantee the objectivity of our debates and the universality of our decisions, conditions without which we cannot realistically expect to resolve the many complex problems arising in this area of concern to the entire international community.

183. Over the past nine years, ever since in December 1969 the General Assembly declared a Disarmament Decade [*resolution 2602E(XXIV)*] efforts have been made, often within the United Nations system, at times outside it, to achieve the objectives which we have all set for ourselves for the end of this Decade.

184. In this constant search, inspired partly by a moral obligation to bring about general and complete disarmament and partly by the need to use some of the resources thus made available to promote development, unfortunately no important result has been recorded thus far. But if no solution, even a partial one that would be theoretically or practically feasible, has yet been found in the second aspect of our global objective, certain measures at least have been taken within the framework of the first aspect.

185. In addition to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, several treaties and conventions have been concluded stressing the peril of the arms race and governing the activity of States in two vital but, it is true, limited areas.

186. Those negotiations, even if conducted successfully, and those international instruments, even if ratified by the majority of States—which is not the case—are only examples of sporadic action and of palliatives which are not part of a global and integrated approach to the problem of disarmament in all its ramifications.

187. It goes without saying that we do not question the desirability of those partial measures, which have at least been useful to some extent and have contributed to a growing awareness of the problems which exist in this area. But we must admit that these measures fall far short of the hopes raised by the Disarmament Decade and which are very half-hearted in relation to the task to be accomplished. In fact, the only step towards general and complete disarmament was the proclamation of zones of peace and denuclearized zones in certain parts of the world.

188. But despite the initiatives I have just mentioned the general tendency that the Disarmament Decade aimed to correct is continuing and gaining ground. Instead of promising progress in the field of general and complete disarmament, there has been an unbridled arms race and military

arsenals have been increased and improved even since the declaration of the Decade.

189. Never has the capacity of man to eliminate all traces of life and civilization from the surface of the earth been so great. Never have resources devoted to that task reached such proportions. This frightening paradox, so often denounced from this rostrum, the keen awareness of it that States are constantly declaring and the absence in their conduct of any convincing sign that they are doing anything to remedy it, are a constant source of surprise.

190. The reasons which have led to this situation are much more complicated than might seem at first sight. They are of different kinds. There are certain areas in which States simply do not want to take action because the present state of affairs suits them. That lack of action is covered by something which fits very neatly into current diplomatic language and is known as "lack of political will". Clearly, that element is of essential importance, because such a will is a *sine qua non* of any negotiations. It is only when that will is manifested, only when it has been demonstrated, that serious discussions leading to lasting agreements can begin.

191. There is another problem which is handicapping any kind of progress towards general and complete disarmament. There is a climate of distrust that prevails between the nuclear Powers and the militarily important countries. That distrust, justified by the idea that the limitation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of their proliferation is aimed in reality only at the perpetuation of the present military situation in which the two super-Powers will maintain a quantitative and qualitative monopoly, has seriously contributed to military escalation and political and economic disequilibrium throughout the world. The desire for hegemony on the part of some countries and their aggressive policies of intimidation are hardly likely to promote a process which is complicated enough without that. This outdated policy, sometimes conducted by mini-Powers that have only just freed themselves from the colonial yoke, creates a desire for security in other States. This desire, while legitimate, engenders a spiral of violence in the final analysis and leads all sides to resort to the possibly illusory formula of peace through over-arming. Finally, for certain countries the arms race and the maintenance of their military superiority guarantee the possibility of their pursuing their colonialist designs and subjugating their colonial peoples. One need look only at the situation in the Middle East and in southern Africa to assess the danger that such situations represent for the future of mankind.

192. Both politically and militarily speaking, those are a few of the reasons why, two years before the end of the Disarmament Decade, the objectives of the Decade are far from being attained and the hopes originally aroused are far from being fulfilled. Although it has been established that those are the direct causes of the failure of our initiatives, be they unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, we cannot validly dissociate those questions from the institutional aspects of the process in which we find ourselves engaged. For negotiations as complex and controversial as disarmament negotiations to achieve concrete results, it is important for all countries, on a democratic basis, to be able to put forward their views on all the problems pertaining to the arms race. But the unsuitability of present institutional arrangements and their narrow, unbalanced nature impede progress of any kind to a very considerable degree.

193. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament provides us with a rather telling example here. That Conference, open to just a few countries, could not provide us with an appropriate framework giving suitable guarantees to justify a complete halt to the arms race.

194. The many problems relating to the question which has brought us here cannot even begin to be solved over the long term until they are dealt with in a representative framework, one representing the various views and opinions existing throughout the world. This special session of the General Assembly reflects the view of the majority of States that only this kind of approach will give us a reasonable chance of success in our common undertaking.

195. We believe that our task must be to change methods that we have used in the past, explore new approaches and establish a plan of action that will make it possible to overcome past inadequacies and obstacles.

196. Proposals along those lines have already been made by the Secretary-General. He has suggested that $1 million be devoted to national and international efforts for disarmament for each $1 billion at present being devoted to armaments [*1st meeting*].

197. The head of State of France, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, presented to the General Assembly [*3rd meeting*] a practical plan of action at the world-wide level based on three essential principles. All those proposals, which will certainly be discussed in detail, have the initial merit of introducing the element of democracy into a debate that is of concern to the entire international community. They are also a new approach, rather than the old familiar path that has so far led nowhere. On those grounds alone they deserve to be among the possibilities considered in this continuing quest for general and complete disarmament.

198. The General Assembly should be guided by a sense of urgency in taking the following measures, without which no genuine disarmament can be achieved.

199. First and foremost, all action should be continued to eliminate the sources of tension that exist throughout the world which might at some time drag the world to the brink of a widespread disaster. This task is especially urgent and essential, inasmuch as those sources of tension are generally in areas well known for their racist character and their aggressive and expansionist policies. Serious studies have been carried out in that area and suggest that the régimes of Pretoria and Tel Aviv are trying to equip themselves with atomic weapons. Consequently there is an urgent need to find just and lasting solutions to the problems that underlie international tension.

200. We must next continue to strengthen regional dis-

armament and, within that framework, further complete and clarify the concepts of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones. In order to protect those zones from nuclear proliferation, it is important that all States—and particularly those which possess nuclear weapons—recognize their status as denuclearized zones and solemnly pledge to respect them as such.

201. In the circumstances, the responsibilities of the States in those areas and the other States must be identified, both individually and to each other. Verification and control machinery must be established to ensure respect for the existing rules. Finally, in order to prevent wrong interpretations with unpredictable consequences, it is necessary to define the legal relationship between the status of those zones and existing international law, and the conditions that should govern the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

202. Initiatives to create such zones should be taken by States belonging to them and which are obviously those most concerned by the implementation of agreements in that area. Those agreements, to be applicable, must take into account the specific conditions existing in each area and the political and military balance there which in most cases represents an important factor in international stability. Disarmament in those circumstances, the political and military importance of which goes well beyond the region in question, must be guided by the need to preserve that stabilizing equilibrium.

203. I shall speak now of institutions. This session should consider, on the one hand, the creation—preferably within the United Nations—of effective international machinery to control the application of decisions that have been taken and follow-up action, and on the other hand, the reorganization of existing negotiating structures. In this respect, the most urgent task is to abolish the idea which seems to have gained ground over the past few years that certain countries, because of their possession of astronomic quantities of the most modern and therefore the most destructive weapons in the world or because they are more directly threatened than others with the possible use of those weapons, are empowered to decide on behalf of the international community on subjects as important as disarmament. That is a problem which concerns mankind as a whole, however, and all mankind must take part in discussion of it. Any approach not taking that truth into account seems to us to be quite unrealistic.

204. The arms race has caused political instability and is a direct source of an omnipresent nuclear threat. Today—more than yesterday and certainly less than tomorrow—it is a no less disturbing threat to the economic and social development of the world. In spite of the growing dangers to the international community of the accumulation and sophistication of military arsenals and in spite of the total impoverishment of two thirds of mankind, there is a growing imbalance between resources devoted to armaments and resources devoted to development.

205. There is, however, no doubt about the relationship between disarmament and development, two objectives which States have set for themselves and have pledged to pursue with the same vigour.

206. The quantitative objectives set for the Second United Nations Development Decade are far from having been reached, yet astronomical sums have been devoted to an undertaking the most certain result of which is the complete destruction of mankind. The distortion of priorities in this area is best illustrated by the fact that with every passing year the world spends $400 billion on arms, whereas the net flow of public assistance for development barely exceeds $15 billion annually.

207. A number of proposals have been made to remedy that situation, aimed primarily at establishing a proper balance between expenditures in the two areas and especially designed to bring about a system which could guarantee a steady increase in funds freed by a decrease in military expenditure. All those proposals are valid, but they are based on one unknown fact which, so far, has been difficult to determine: the real amount of military budgets, particularly the military budgets of certain nuclear super-Powers.

208. It should be stressed, on the other hand, that hunger, ignorance and sickness which continue to rage throughout most of the world are all very serious problems and that their solution should not be linked to uncertain progress in negotiations on disarmament.

209. Those are the tasks that should be performed by this special session. In this connexion, a number of suggestions and proposals—some of long standing and others more recent—have been put forward.

210. Once we have established the framework and principles to guide our future action in the light of their debate, we should then begin the final process leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The most appropriate framework for that task seems to us to be an international conference like this one, or at least held under the auspices of the United Nations; it should be most carefully prepared, as required by the dangers threatening the world. In our common attempt to build a world of peace and concord, free from fear, lasting solutions must urgently be found to the problems posed by the arms race. The very survival of mankind is at stake. We believe that in the search for these solutions we cannot afford to fail.

211. Mr. Carlos ALZAMORA (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, my delegation is pleased by your election, which we consider to be particularly auspicious because it was in Belgrade nearly two decades ago that the non-aligned countries for the first time pointed out the need for this event. We fully trust that under your skilful guidance this Assembly will arrive at the results that are the aim of its convening and to which mankind so urgently aspires.

212. Forty years after the discovery of the fission process and more than three decades after the application of that unprecedented war technology, the international community has called this meeting, of special relevance for the evaluation of the sombre course that has been pursued and to review the scope of the steps taken in the past decades of negotiations on disarmament.

213. Many of the speakers who preceded me agree on the correct description of the situation to which an unbridled arms race has brought us and which has become a constant factor causing growing alarm, one of gargantuan proportions, in contemporary international relations. There is no doubt some scepticism about a precise description of nuclear arms. Our opinions range from those of the most pessimistic scientific sources which state that nuclear war would not only destroy mankind but would also lead to such ecological changes as would make the planet uninhabitable, to points of view which might be described as being of a macabre optimism, which maintain that such a conflagration would not necessarily destroy all mankind, although obviously the survivors would be living in an indescribable world.

214. I believe that the very presence of representatives of all States Members of the United Nations in this special session is sufficient proof that there is a collective awareness of the urgent need to try to make new efforts of political will to counteract this threat to all forms of life. There should be a profound effort to do away with the very dynamics of the most harmful forms of destruction ever placed in the hands of man by a scientific imagination which gives the lie to the creative and rational idealism of our essential selves.

215. This is, therefore, an opportunity which we cannot allow to escape us since it is required of us by future generations to prove that on attaining a universality in international relations, the twentieth century was able to take a qualitative jump into maturity, that is was able to control and redirect the instinct of aggression which has today become systemic in all official and underground forms of violence which convulse the planet.

216. Therefore, this General Assembly is unique in its content among the noblest endeavours of our times, because it must arouse the political imagination of an enervated world grown indolent in the face of the reality of violence and dangerously accustomed to the obsolete doctrine of an international stability sustained by the balance of terror. At the same time, a realistic and pragmatic basis for international agreement must be introduced, so that an alternative form of international security may be established—that is, new means of control and balance, first, to contain and—secondly, to reverse the modernization of weapons in terms of mutually desirable and politically balanced programmes for defence and security.

217. Thus presented, the twofold aim of this Assembly would seem to be unattainable. Nevertheless, the purpose of this forum, to activate the most recondite creative resources of nations, must be reflected precisely in a combination of idealism and realism. This must be done not only because of a shared apprehension about the nuclear *status quo*, but in the light of numerous but ephemeral past attempts at arms control and disarmament. The manner in which the present Assembly was conceived leads precisely to a bringing together of sources which converge in the concentration of efforts at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels on the basis of agreed principles and an effective programme of action for disarmament.

218. As a non-nuclear country, we believe that it is no longer legitimate or desirable to depend on a doctrine of a nuclear strategic balance which combines a relaxation of tensions and deterrence with chance, in unknown proportions, because the perpetuation of that balance of terror quickly leads to a suffocating atmosphere of international insecurity, with ruinous results for the world economy. In that atmosphere, the non-nuclear countries become theoretical, and frequently actual, targets of strategic rivalry, and thus the processes of peaceful agreement which are often the result of sincere and prolonged efforts of diplomatic closeness and friendly conciliation are hindered. That is why so many nations view with growing alarm the fact that what was considered to be the final instrument of deterrence, the final guarantee of stability—the nuclear weapon—is now being improved, as they say, leading the strategists of the nuclear Powers, and particularly of the super-Powers, to plan conflicts which they themselves had previously termed impossible, as a justification for the stockpiling of their nuclear arsenals.

219. We have accordingly affirmed that in the idealistic and realistic work that is to be undertaken in this forum, the non-nuclear countries, particularly the non-aligned countries, whose endeavours since Colombo[17] have led to the convening of this special session, must be able to contribute their ideas, speak and exercise their rights. In an interdependent world of global interconnexion, such as the present world, there can be no fruitful results without the participation of all countries, regardless of their strength, position or experience.

220. For the careful building of an alternative system of international security there are natural prerequisites which this Assembly has been considering. I refer to the search for the most effective formula to combine partial attempts at arms control, from the strategic sphere of the great Powers to those concerning the so-called conventional weapons, so as to arrive at a pragmatic order on the way towards the supreme goal of general disarmament under international supervision, in terms of the following shared priorities: to halt the nuclear arms race and not add to it new and incalculable dimensions; to adopt agreements to reduce nuclear weapons; to halt the production of new weapons of mass destruction; to improve the policy of both vertical and horizontal nuclear non-proliferation; to improve and increase nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; and to halt the further sophistication of conventional weapons and look into the bases controlling their transfer. In other words, to start a race in the opposite direction that will mean the effective beginning of disarmament with a parallel effort at every level for peaceful agreement and the maintenance of international peace and security.

221. Each of these priorities is in itself a complex objective, involving in turn subordinate objectives. And for the present Assembly to be as successful as we all hope it will be it must achieve an operative combination of a supreme goal with the present practice of a step-by-step method.

[17] Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976.

222. But to bring a halt to the nuclear-arms race is, above all, the paramount responsibility of the nuclear Powers. Given this situation, we look with expectation to the possibilities of future agreements on the limitation of strategic arms of greater significance. We also await the successful conclusion of an agreement, so often announced, on the total cessation of all nuclear tests, which would give a more efficient psychological impetus to the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament.

223. As for the production of new weapons of mass destruction, we believe that the time has come to prohibit chemical weapons and to freeze research into new weaponry of unimaginable effects which would be a destabilizing factor in international relations. As a supplement to these goals, it is important that agreements already arrived at to control weapons in the oceans and outer space be strengthened without affecting the satellite monitoring system that guarantees their observance.

224. Implementing a nuclear non-proliferation policy in turn requires realistic and consistent measures, because it is obvious that the privilege of nuclear monopoly that our voluntary and collective renunciation—something that is without parallel in history—bestowed on the nuclear Powers has not been met with the reciprocal contribution which is its indispensable counterpart. They have neither halted the nuclear-arms race nor have they put an end to nuclear-weapon tests in their arsenals, nor have non-nuclear countries been given guarantees of security that—with the universal commitment to non-proliferation—were the essential objectives of the 1968 treaty.

225. To the unpostponable compliance with this commitment, which is the moral and political basis of our renunciation of nuclear weapons and the condition for respecting the Treaty, must be added the guarantee for free access to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the basis of universal, standardized and non-discriminatory safeguards that will ensure its correct purpose and use.

226. We believe that the qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear-weapon-free zones must be based on agreements similar to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, naturally taking into account the geographical and geopolitical characteristics of each region. And my delegation welcomes the recent advances made towards the improvement of that instrument, which so faithfully expresses the peace-loving nature of Latin America.

227. The international transfer and modernization of conventional weapons has increased beyond measure in our time and is of great cost, particularly for the developing countries, the drainage of whose scanty financial resources paradoxically serves to fill the coffers of the developed countries, which have found in the war industry one of their most lucrative sources of activity. It is therefore logical to seek understandings between suppliers and buyers of weapons as a parallel step to mutual reduction agreements where there must be complete guarantees for national defence and security that are essential for the developing countries. In this respect, we deem it desirable and advisable that the most effective measures be introduced gradually at the regional level, where *de facto* there is a better combination of the understanding of the individual security of each State with the necessary bases of growing credibility and trust which inspire any effective diplomatic effort.

228. Linking disarmament to development is an aspect that has aroused a growing interest among nations, since they are all bound to find resources of every kind to meet their multiple and growing economic and social needs, especially the developing countries for which defence needs represent a particularly heavy burden, especially at a time when the negative international panorama increasingly aggravates the economic prostration of the third world nations.

229. In connexion with this, various initiatives are being submitted that deserve the support of my delegation. We particularly appreciate the declaration made on this aspect of the disarmament problem—among others treated with singular relevance—in the lucid, realistic and visionary statement of the President of France. We also welcome the initiative of the Secretary-General on beginning to devote a percentage of military expenditures to efforts at disarmament, linked as it of necessity is to disarmament's relation with development.

230. But this also means that we shall have to begin to think of the crucial problem of reconverting the war industry in realistic but imaginative terms which will protect its present and future potential in the field of development and co-operation. This is a political and economic task of a complexity and importance that has not yet been sufficiently dealt with, but which is as decisive as are diplomatic negotiations for disarmament. Because the horrifying figure of $400 billion is not only a measure of the arms madness of our time but also a definite indicator of the dangerous magnitude and influence that the war industry has acquired as a factor of international economic life, generating its own dynamics and its own political and military pressure. Therefore, the dismantling of the political and psychological strategy now based on the balance of terror and destruction must include a parallel redirection of the war industry and the vast interests created in its shadow in 30 years of ideological and military confrontation towards developmental and peaceful purposes of full and mutual benefit.

231. In terms of these priorities, this Assembly must agree on a declaration of principles that, instead of being a rhetorical enunciation, would mean a real political commitment, capable of mobilizing Governments towards implementing a programme of action for disarmament. This programme of action must be conceived of in such a way as to advocate realistic policies that are sufficient to overcome the tardiness of the present process, the present shortcomings and the imbalance in the approach to disarmament questions, by setting specific goals and, if possible, a flexible time-table. The work of the Preparatory Committee, which was presided over with outstanding distinction and brilliance by Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, constitutes a valuable and positive contribution to this task. Finally, this Assembly must agree on a means adequate for a follow-up to these negotiations, within the historic commitment that guides its efforts, and to this end seek a substantial revi-

sion of the deliberative and negotiating organs on disarmament.

232. For the attainment of these three goals there must be a combination of the efforts of the non-nuclear Powers and the nuclear Powers in a balanced manner, both as regards responsibilities and as regards obligations, because it is unacceptable that there should be any suggestion of a division of responsibilities so that the nuclear States would be responsible for nuclear disarmament, and conventional disarmament would be the responsibility of non-nuclear-weapon States. For it is an irrefutable fact that once again it is the nuclear-weapon States that also stockpile the most impressive and sophisticated arsenals, which it is increasingly questionable to call conventional armaments. The disarmament process must be gradual. There must be an adequate balance of responsibilities among all States, which at various stages would maintain an adequate level of security for each. From this conviction flows the need to bring to the reformed deliberative and negotiating bodies the points of view and interests of non-nuclear States which are now inadequately represented. From this, in turn, flows the unavoidable need to reach agreements so as to strengthen to the fullest extent the role of the United Nations itself in the complex and urgent field of disarmament.

233. I do not believe it inaccurate to suggest in this context that only when significant advance is made in the key sectors of nuclear strategic disarmament will there be progress at the regional and bi-national levels regarding the problem of conventional arms with a sufficient complementary impact to assist in replacing the balance of terror with an untried system of international security and a new era in international relations.

234. This is the conclusion we are led to on the basis of the fragmentary but well known experience of small countries which so far have served only as a kind of defence quarantine before the nuclear epidemic, or even helped to consolidate the present nuclear monopoly. I am referring specifically to the notable commitments entered into and fully complied with by the non-nuclear countries in regard to non-proliferation, denuclearized zones and zones of peace, as well as various approaches to arms control at the regional and subregional level. Latin America has made consistent and constant efforts of real historical importance in this experiment. Among these, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Declaration of Ayacucho are outstanding. The latter is an exemplary contribution to limited agreement on reduction of arms expenditures on our continent which, in addition to other regional and subregional initiatives, Peru had the honour to promote.

235. As an active and simultaneous participant in the work of the General Assembly, of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the World Disarmament Conference, of the Preparatory Committee for this special session and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Peru has also lent the United Nations permanent support in its peace-keeping mission with military contingents and diplomatic envoys.

236. In a categorical and striking reaffirmation of this aspiration to peace and concord, President Morales Bermúdez has declared that:

> "The same purpose of peace which led Peru to become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to participate actively in disarmament forums, to raise the Declaration of Ayacucho as an initiative, and to promote talks with neighbouring and friendly countries, leads me to declare today that the Government of Peru is permanently willing to consider, with the greatest interest, any new formula for agreement in the region which will strengthen present trends to restore mutual confidence in the region and the credibility necessary to control conventional weapons."

237. In this spirit, Peru now firmly supports the proposal set forth in this forum by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela [*2nd meeting*] to seek the most appropriate means to ensure the prompt implementation of the Declaration of Ayacucho, being as it is intended to achieve an effective agreement on arms limitation which will make it possible to devote larger resources to the economic and social development of Latin America.

238. Strategic approaches which sought to find in weapons of mass destruction the guarantee for security are bankrupt. Nuclear States are not safer, nor are the non-nuclear States. But the arms race, activated by the fruitless rivalry which maintains that strategy, continues to grow and become more dangerous. We now have weapons for every conceivable situation. But that is not enough, and more have to be invented, and more deadly ones. Thus the process is self-sustaining and expands in an uncontrolled and malignant manner.

239. It is therefore up to us, the non-nuclear countries, the countries of the third world and the non-aligned countries, to fulfil our responsibility to our peoples and to the entire world community. The time has come for the vehement and just protest of countries such as ours to prevail. We had no participation in or responsibility for its creation, but we are involved in an atmosphere of intolerable violence, so counter to the dearest principles and interests of mankind, its security and its survival.

240. The peoples we represent demand that the lengthy process of building an elementary order of security and progress should not be interrupted by terror or threat. Many nations, like mine, have made a powerful contribution to the making of the human adventure something worthy of being lived. Today they firmly demand that this Assembly for ever discard the ominous possibility that there will be no future generations or that they will be forced to rebuild from its beginning all our civilization and our culture.

241. Mr. OWONO ASANGONO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): May I be permitted, first of all, to congratulate the President on behalf of my delegation, and to pay a well-deserved tribute to him once more now that he is presiding over this important special session of the General Assembly. It is not by chance that now that the General Assembly is meeting to deal with the contro-

versial and complex question of disarmament, it is his country, Yugoslavia, which is entrusted to preside over our deliberations. The efforts of the Government of Yugoslavia and its people, whose conduct is based on the lofty principles of the policy of non-alignment, the promotion of peace and peaceful coexistence among nations, to contribute to the cause of disarmament, together with the excellent diplomatic qualities that characterize Mr. Mojsov, are in themselves the best demonstration that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is being held on an objective basis and that it will find the means to establish an adequate process of control, reduction and elimination of strategic weapons, and set up the conditions for lasting international peace and security for the benefit of the peaceful and genuine development of the international community in all aspects.

242. International peace and security, which are more than fundamental objectives enshrined in the San Francisco Charter, would have no significance and could not be achieved if they did not go hand in hand with the integrated development of the entire international community. In other words, there can be no peace and security without development, just as there can be no development without peace among all the peoples in the world.

243. This close relationship between development and world peace leads us to the question of disarmament. It is for this obvious reason and in this context that major changes take place in our society, which seeks with ever more determination the above-mentioned objectives of economic and social progress, international peace and security, and finally disarmament. It is also for this obvious reason that on many occasions the international community has attempted to look to itself to establish world organizations such as this one and to conclude world agreements and treaties. It is for this same reason, therefore, that once more we are meeting in a special session of the Assembly, because the international community is clamouring for social and economic well-being and for peace and security.

244. The Disarmament Decade solemnly proclaimed by this General Assembly in 1969 is now almost at an end and nothing specific has been done to make a reality of the great purposes and objectives that inspired the international community at that time. Many resolutions and declarations have been adopted since the creation of the United Nations, but they have had no positive results. Efforts at the bilateral level have also clearly failed. Thus, we continue to live under the constant threat of a third world confrontation and the use of weapons of mass destruction. We are witnessing an excessive and dangerous increase in the proliferation and refinement of all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons; the strengthening of the great military alliances; an increase in the numbers of offensive weapons and in their marketing; and the constant augmentation of military budgets, involving a vast consumption of human and natural resources. In short, this heightened state of military competition among States, far from reconciling their interests for peace, security and social and economic well-being, increases the danger and the threat of war among them. International peace and security have been placed on the market at a paltry and inhuman price.

245. Moreover, the maintenance of this state of affairs has extremely harmful economic and social consequences which are incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

246. My delegation believes that this special session of the General Assembly is a historic one, unique in the annals of the United Nations, both because of the very nature of the issues it is called upon to resolve and because it is the first of its kind devoted to this question of vital importance.

247. The problem of disarmament, which has been stressed by the United Nations since its inception, is one of the difficulties confronting this world Organization in attaining its lofty aims. My delegation hopes that this special session will assist the nations of the world in assuming their responsibilities, subordinating their political and hegemonistic convictions and seeking a new pacific approach in international relations, so that confrontation and ambition for power may be replaced by tolerance, understanding and mutual respect.

Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) resumed the Chair.

248. I should like to repeat at this time the words spoken in the General Assembly in 1975 by Mr. Nguema Esono Nchama, the Vice-President of the Republic and Minister for External Relations of Equatorial Guinea. He said:

> "The Government of Equatorial Guinea understands international peace and security to mean not only the absence of hostilities among nations, but also the full exercise by all peoples of their fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, situations threatening international peace and security are those created by colonialist, imperialist and racist régimes, the economic exploitation practised by economic Powers over developing countries, the increasing presence of military bases of the major Powers scattered all over the world, as well as the proliferation of nuclear weapons for war purposes and the constant zeal shown by the Powers in perfecting their military technology.
>
> "My Government, which has no ambition to dominate and is neither a producer nor consumer of these nuclear devices, . . . considers that the solution to this problem of disarmament is as simple as it appears complex, if, with goodwill, the major Powers concerned will only co-ordinate their efforts and rationalize their policies in order to eliminate the causes which have given rise to this nuclear weapons race."[18]

249. Direct responsibility for ensuring a world of peace, prosperity and social well-being for the entire international community rests effectively with this Organization and, in particular, with each one of its Members. However, the same cannot be said as regards responsibility for the specific problem of disarmament, which my delegation be-

[18] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2356th meeting.

lieves is solely and exclusively within the competence of the super-Powers and the major producers of destructive weapons.

250. The arms race among the great Powers, aside from the danger it represents to international peace and security, provides the main impetus for the arms race among the other countries of the world. The danger of disturbance of the peace and the international social order becomes ever greater as this competition intensifies and States endeavour to stockpile all the weapons available to them and to improve their quality. The question of the arms race is exactly comparable to that of opium addiction: it begins with the producer and then spreads until it reaches all the strata of society.

251. As the representatives of a third-world country, my delegation is participating in this special session in the full conviction that our legitimate demands that the arms race be curbed and for international control of all conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction will be heard. It is well known that we do not have much to offer in order to make general and complete disarmament effective; on the other hand, we have a great deal to lose if the present situation of confrontation continues. The third-world countries have understood that they cannot participate in this opium addiction because that would automatically mean the total destruction of their legitimate aspirations to progress, social well-being and a peaceful life. None the less, our countries are increasingly the victims of Machiavellian temptations and conspiracies, even though they have no part in the interests and intentions that have led to the present state of tension and confrontation.

252. Our primary objective is the economic and social development of our States and the effective achievement of our independence and national sovereignty within a peaceful community of nations. As I have just pointed out, these aspirations have been constantly undermined by foreign forces and influences that use all methods and formulas within their reach—colonialism, neo-colonialism, economic discrimination, the use of force, threats, and so on.

253. As far as my country is concerned, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has increasingly been the victim of barbarous attacks by the information media of the West in order to defame the Constitutional President for Life of our Republic, His Excellency Masie Nguema Biyogo Ñegue Ndong, and his Government. We are well aware of the influential circles and the motives that guide those media and their interests in Equatorial Guinea. That is why they can never say anything good about Equatorial Guinea. Our head of State has quite rightly always stated that we shall know we have departed from the true path of the revolution when those information media cease to criticize the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. My country enjoys peace, tranquillity and harmony. We do not attempt or claim to match others. The rights of all are guaranteed in so far as unity, sovereignty and national independence are guaranteed. We prefer to preserve these national principles rather than to submit to the whims of any imperialist Power. We have repeatedly stated our principle of mutual co-operation with all the countries of the world as long as they respect our principles of independence and national sovereignty. It is shameful that the Western press feels incapable of criticizing the violations of human rights that continue in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Palestine, while at the same time it sees fit to report events the human mind cannot accept which are to the detriment of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea has been independent since 5 March 1969, when it assumed its international responsibilities.

254. The establishment of the movement of non-aligned countries is justified by this state of constant conspiracy to which our States have been subjected—States members of this great independent movement, which includes almost all third-world countries. To defend our legitimate aspirations, our countries have done all in their power to see that the international community undertakes to provide a solution to the thorny problem of the arms race, dealt with by the Belgrade and Colombo Conferences in 1961 and 1976, thus making possible agreement among the international community.

255. The third-world countries neither produce nor consume nuclear weapons, nor are they members of large alliances and military pacts. None the less it is inevitable that a third-world confrontation would have as a target the defenceless regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. That is inevitable because, despite their inoffensive positions and their peace-loving nature, it can be stated that, starting from the Second World War, the only confrontations that have involved the interests of either of the major overarmed Powers, with a consequent danger to international peace and security, have always had as their settings Africa, Asia and Latin America. We have only to think back and remember the imperialist wars imposed on the peaceful peoples of Korea, Viet Nam and Democratic Kampuchea, on the Asian continent, the liberation struggle of the valiant Cuban people and the struggle for the achievement of national sovereignty over its canal by the people of Panama, in Latin America; the valiant peoples of Algeria, Guinea, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and so on, on the African continent; and the imperialist war to which the people of Palestine and the Arab countries, in the Middle East, have been subjected, to mention just a few.

256. All of these struggles waged in defence of legitimate rights have been and are being used by foreign Powers for hegemonistic purposes and to disturb the peace in disregard of the fact that the interests of our peoples are at stake. Our territories have been chosen as fields of confrontation for hegemonic disputes among the super-Powers.

257. As a member of the non-aligned movement, my Government resolutely supports the idea of general and complete disarmament and will defend it everywhere. But we know that to be impossible if the major Powers that are holding the cards try to distract the attention of the world community. Nothing and no one can stand in the way of the super-Powers in putting an end to this situation of conflict. None the less, for decades we have conducted fruitless negotiations while the super-Powers have been increasingly strengthening what they call their defence

systems, while occupations and the maintenance of military bases continue to be the means for certain privileged States to achieve security, while espionage, bribery and military questions continue to be the order of the day. My delegation cannot accept the security of one State being based on the insecurity of others. We should like to draw attention to and stress the fact that the major Powers should on this occasion respond to the imperatives of world peace, which rest in their own hands.

258. World peace and international security are highly complex concepts which involve different elements of the social life of the international community, and they will never be effectively achieved unless all these elements are taken into account. Therefore international peace and security are inconceivable while some peoples suffer racial discrimination and colonialism. World peace is inconceivable in a world in which the sovereign rights of peoples are disregarded every day. International peace can never be possible in a world of economic injustice and hegemonic rivalry.

259. I must stress what my delegation means by international peace and security, because the objective of disarmament rests on precisely that foundation. But before going into the real concept of disarmament we should analyse the causes of the present proliferation of weapons. In my delegation's view, the defence of its sovereignty and independence by each State is a general and sacred right of all peoples without distinction. But this right in no way can or should extend beyond the territory of the State to that of second and third States, against their will and to the detriment of their most fundamental rights.

260. In this context we cannot accept the present trend towards the proliferation of military bases under the orders and control of a few nuclear Powers. My delegation forcefully condemns that policy which is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Hence we condemn the foreign occupation of the territory of independent peoples in the Korean peninsula, the Arab territory of Palestine and the naval base of Guantánamo in Cuba, and the presence of colonialist occupation forces in Namibia and Zimbabwe and of expansionist and secessionist forces in Cyprus. These occupations, which are sources of friction, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and are incompatible with the over-all principles of disarmament.

261. The Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea feels that, with the expulsion of Spanish colonialist occupation forces from Guinean national territory in 1969, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea fulfilled one of the highest national duties that any State can be called upon to fulfill. My Government does not accept and will not accept the stationing of foreign forces on its territory. As a third-world country we can make no other contribution to the cause of disarmament. We cherish peace with independence, national sovereignty and mutual respect.

262. My delegation hopes that at the present session the Assembly will thoroughly study all aspects of these harmful elements that not only violate the fundamental rights of States but are also an obstacle to the cause of disarmament.

263. It is almost impossible to progress in the field of disarmament if we do not first root out the causes of the present friction among States. Rivalry between East and West cannot guide our future evolution. We are in duty bound to review our conduct in international relations if we truly wish to give realistic meaning to the question of disarmament. I would even venture to state that the stockpiling of any types of weapons by any party would be unimportant and danger-free if States based their relations on respect and mutual trust, on understanding, co-operation and tolerance. The policy of genuine détente between East and West could in itself determine world disarmament to a great extent.

264. But the world is obsessed with the need to behave otherwise and therefore all human and material resources are being used to promote violence and to bring about the destruction of the human race. The $360 billion of military expenditure during the past year confirms this madness of mankind.

265. My delegation feels that this is a very appropriate forum for serious reflection by the international community on this very grave problem which may determine the future of our peoples. There are two possibilities before us —a second Hiroshima or the achievement of a world of peace, progress and social well-being.

266. We are all aware of the negative effects of the arms race which results in a squandering of human and material resources, the hindering of national development efforts and above all the constant danger of the outbreak of war with the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. While the developed countries can well afford the luxury of devoting themselves to those types of activities because the future of their populations is secure, the objectives of the developing countries are quite different. Even so, the developed countries should not forget that international moral law requires that they give up the arms race since they not only harm the interests of the third-world countries but also create harmful consequences for their own populations.

267. We have listened with great relief to the statements made by the super-Powers and all the atomic-weapons producers. We welcome with many of them the idea that part of the resources now allocated to military budgets could be used to improve the standard of living of all the countries of the third world in the short term. All the problems today faced by the developing countries are rooted in the inadequacy of their economic development and a solution might be found by eliminating these superfluous expenditures.

268. Military agreements and treaties concluded by States for purposes of defence, while they are a partial formula for a balance of power in the world, cannot be considered a solution to the present state of tension and the dangers of world war. This means that measures must be taken to prohibit the use of given weapons of mass destruction. It would be extremely useful if agreements were reached among States determining zones of peace, nuclear-weapon-free zones. Therefore, my Government supports efforts to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and supports the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits the use of

nuclear weapons in Latin America. The African continent, which is constantly exposed to the threat of war and to the intervention of the super-Powers, should also be safeguarded by a similar treaty and my Government supports efforts made by other African States to this end.

269. My delegation feels that at the present session the Assembly will take necessary measures to mobilize all available resources from Governments, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens in order to heighten awareness throughout the world of the need for effective and immediate disarmament. The programme of action should include the preparation of a global plan based on an in-depth analysis of past experience, of the problems involved in disarmament, its causes and all immediate, short-term and long-term measures which may put an end to the production, use and spread of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

270. In the nuclear sphere my Government feels that nuclear technology used for peaceful purposes is a valuable contribution to the progress of peoples and that all the nations of our world have a right to obtain such technological knowledge and to improve it and are entitled to an exchange of experience. The International Atomic Energy Agency should therefore control this technology and prepare related programmes.

271. My delegation will support all the measures agreed on by this General Assembly for the reduction and control of armaments in the world. We are especially in favour of the recommendations made by the countries of the non-aligned movement, which include a declaration and programme of action, because we feel that they are realistic objectives capable of committing the international community to effective disarmament. Similarly, we support the recommendations made by the 13-member group of expert consultants.[19] Their implementation by all States would not only achieve the much desired objective of effective disarmament, but would also guarantee a basis for the development of the international community.

272. In conclusion, my delegation is convinced that the international community, which has twice suffered the horrors and consequences of war, is without doubt aware of the seriousness of the present threat of the arms race and of the very important role which it must play, together with major Powers in particular, which have a special responsibility.

273. My delegation is confident not only that this special session of the General Assembly will be useful in bringing out and assessing the facts but also that it will be recalled in history by future generations as a meeting of minds for the creation of a world that will flourish in peace, harmony, understanding, progress and social well-being.

274. The PRESIDENT: Two representatives have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply. Members are aware that, in accordance with the practice of the General Assembly at previous sessions, such statements shall be limited to 10 minutes. I now call on those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

275. Mr. ROLÓN ANAYA (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to thank the President and at the same time express my gratitude to the Chilean delegation for having highlighted the importance of the statement made by the Minister of my own country at the 5th meeting by speaking in exercise of its right of reply.

276. Now that the problem of the Panama Canal has been resolved, with the new treaty which restores the principles of justice between two States, the problem of the landlocked situation of Bolivia is that of greatest concern among all the questions that affect disarmament, peace, integration and development in Latin America.

277. The Minister of my country has summarized the objective facts concerning the failure of negotiations which have been conducted at great length without practical result. When matters become interminably confused, something must be done. Are we not here involved in trying to remove from the sphere of mere good intentions the need of the world for disarmament? The problem for the solution of which in 1975 Bolivia offered a formula of peace, integration and development, with a specific proposal concerning the establishment of a nucleus of development on the Pacific, is not simply a matter between neighbours; it is of trinational, even multinational, interest, if peace and integration are of concern to the entire continent.

278. Moreover, to be effective dialogue must not only be begun; it must also be useful and it must come to an end. It cannot take place as a mere diplomatic diversion, out of touch with reality and time. We cannot have an inconclusive dialogue without objectives merely for the sake of distraction. Also, I repeat that the problem is not merely binational; it is not a simple dialogue; it is in fact a "trialogue", if I may use a neologism; it affects another country, not only by virtue of a treaty but also because of the historical and natural influence of that other country in the area.

279. Bolivia is not taking a negative position; even less a position of partiality that would exclude others.

280. We do not and will not close our minds to the possibility of a reconsideration of this painful situation which affects us so much. Bolivia whole-heartedly desires a solution which will result in peace, integration and development that would not only meet Bolivia's interests, namely by giving us an outlet to the sea—something which could be as specific and practical as, for example, the case of Walvis Bay which, together with the rest of the world, we are claiming for Namibia in Africa—but which could also be of direct benefit to Chile and Peru in conditions of integrated co-participation in development.

281. Our joint aspirations must find a point of practical convergence. Bolivia at this time is experiencing a democratic transition to the election of government officials. However, all Bolivians want positive, not elusive negotia-

[19] See *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

tion—truly constructive and appropriate negotiation not only for Bolivia, but also for Chile and Peru. In the meantime, the establishment of a zone of peace such as that provided for in the draft resolution and the plan of action for disarmament submitted by the Preparatory Committee [*see A/S-10/1*] commands the firm support of my delegation. We want that zone in the Pacific and throughout Latin America, for the integration and development of all the peoples of the region, and we want to contribute to the implementation of the doctrine of Tlatelolco and the Declaration of Ayacucho, through the most recent proposal of Venezuela, which we support and to which we shall contribute in this General Assembly.

282. Mr. DÍEZ (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Bolivia has brought to a multilateral forum a situation which is of interest to the three countries of our region. Chile has been prepared to hear the Bolivian request to resolve the problem of access to the sea. It was upon the initiative of the President of Chile that the Presidents of Bolivia and of my country met in Charaña. It was the Government of Chile which in December 1975 proposed that a basis be established for negotiations, a basis that was accepted in general terms by Bolivia.

283. Subsequently, meetings were held to resolve a complex problem which not only affects the interests of Chile and Bolivia but is also governed by two treaties: a treaty with Peru and the treaty of peace and friendship signed with Bolivia in 1904.

284. At a meeting held by the Foreign Ministers of Peru, Bolivia and Chile during the General Assembly last year here in New York, it was agreed that each of the Ministers would appoint a representative to facilitate finding a solution. The Bolivian Government has not yet appointed its representative, while the other participants in the meeting have.

285. At the same meeting we were informed of a statement made by President Banzer to the newspaper *Presencia,* transmitted by the ANSA agency. In that statement the President of Bolivia said that he preferred that a decision on an exchange of territories, which is what Bolivia initially agreed to with Chile, be reached by a freely elected congress in Bolivia and therefore he preferred a delay in the negotiations.

286. Subsequently, Bolivia suspended diplomatic relations with Chile.

287. The means which Bolivia has—and here I repeat what I stated a few days ago in this very General Assembly—of attaining its aspirations is direct dialogue with Chile on the basis of territorial compensations and with respect for all treaties in force which affect the situation in the area. My country has been and continues to be prepared to hold talks and to take whatever steps may be necessary so that Bolivia can make a reality of what today is not a right, namely, access through Chilean territory. Access to the sea through Chilean territory will be the culmination of friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of a territorial exchange and with respect for all treaties in force, the inviolability of which is reaffirmed today by the Government of Chile.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

Annex 246

Letter dated 1 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc A/S-10/18, 2 June 1978

(Original in English)

<https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/ff5669f6c76a3790852577c00068acbd/eba5f1faab1df372852577c90051ea6b/$FILE/A-S10-18.pdf>

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A/S-10/18
2 June 1978
ENGLISH
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Tenth special session
Agenda item 8

GENERAL DEBATE

Letter dated 1 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

At the afternoon plenary meeting on Tuesday, 30 May 1978 (A/S-10/PV.9, p. 101) the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations and Head of that country's delegation to the tenth special session of the General Assembly, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, made incorrect statements. I could have, in turn, replied, but preferred not to, not for lack of sound arguments, of which there are plenty, but in order not to strain the patience of the General Assembly and, particularly, not to become involved in an argument which might add a spirit of bitterness and mutual recrimination to the suspension of relations between Bolivia and Chile, which is far from my intention.

Nevertheless, I feel bound to inform you and, through you, the international community of the views of my Government with regard to the statements of the representative of Chile and to request you to have this letter distributed as a document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly under agenda item 8.

The representative of Chile referred first to Bolivia's having accepted "in general terms" his Government's original proposal; that was indeed correct. A proposal "in general terms" neither implies nor can constitute an accomplished fact, still less total unqualified acceptance that would pre-empt any further action, since in a matter of such importance, in which national sensitivities are so intimately involved any decision obviously required the agreement of the Bolivian people if it was to be final and valid.

The second point raised concerned the treaties in force between Bolivia and Chile and between Chile and Peru in connexion with which, as the speaker mentioned, there is a "complex problem". One of these certainly provides for what Peru has called the "specific interests" that it has at stake in any negotiation involving the territories that belonged to it until the war of 1879, a very small part of which was being offered to us on an exchange basis, although the necessary prior

consultations had not been carried out or acceptance of the proposed condominium been secured, which would mean that the Government of Chile was offering to exchange territories the transfer of which would require prior negotiations with a third party if it was to be regularized. Such regularization was not achieved during the negotiations.

Bolivia could not accept as valid an offer of that nature or continue negotiations based on such insecure and fragile foundations, particularly since reference was made in the over-all offer to territorial compensation not only for the sovereign access corridor, but also for the territorial sea and the 200-mile economic zone, even before the latter has been sanctioned by the convention still under consideration by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The prospects for a solution became more remote when the Peruvian reply was announced proposing a tripartite administration, which made it quite clear that the Government of Peru did not accept the Chilean formula. The Chilean Foreign Ministry rejected it outright without even considering to what extent it might lend itself to negotiation or be compatible with the new approach of peace, integration and development proposed by Bolivia.

It is only logical that this patently uncertain and elusive state of affairs should be disappointing to the people and Government of Bolivia.

It must also be pointed out that the people of Bolivia has been waiting patiently and peaceably for a hundred years in the hope that Chile would understand its situation and that such understanding would bring about a just and final solution. But it wants genuine negotiations on terms that will be of positive benefit to the countries of the area and Latin America in general.

It is natural that a people overwhelmed by neo-colonialist pillage - in addition to the dismemberment caused by the loss of its entire coastline of 400 kilometres, with an area of 150,000 square kilometres, after a typical war of conquest which caused such immense damage, years later, because of the unilateral diversion of the river Lauca - should feel that it had again been cheated and insulted, inasmuch as a merely symbolic reparation, amounting to no more than the tiny 10-kilometre strip of territory offered by Chile, was craftily filched from it.

The seeming dialogue proposed is merely the monologue of <u>diktat</u> with a view to a categorical "take it or leave it". That serves to show the world community how futile negotiations with no end or objective were. The outcome once again was, despite Bolivia's unvarying peaceful attitude, in its unfailing respect for the rules laid down by the United Nations Charter, that a solution to its fateful exclusion from access to the sea was again postponed.

This statement is not being made in any polemical spirit: its sole purpose is to place these facts on record on the occasion of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I thank you for your attention to this letter.

(<u>Signed</u>) Mario ROLON ANAYA
Ambassador

Annex 247

Letter dated 5 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc A/S-10/19, 6 June 1978

(Original in English)

<https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/ff5669f6c76a3790852577c00068acbd/fc8c8e668e168a80852577c90051ea7d/$FILE/A-S10-19.pdf>

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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28 JUN 1978

Tenth special session
Agenda item 8

GENERAL DEBATE

Letter dated 5 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ambassador of Bolivia to the United Nations, Mr. Mario Rolón Anaya, has seen fit to address to you a communication (A/S-10/18) referring to my reply to his statement during the special session convened to deal with the important questions of world disarmament, in which he had made reference to some matters relating to my country.

Although the relations between Chile and Bolivia are within the exclusive competence of the two countries, I consider it necessary to state the views of my Government concerning the matters raised by the Ambassador of Bolivia, in view of the fact that he has requested that his letter should be circulated and regarded as a document of the General Assembly.

The views of my Government are the following:

1. There is no territorial problem pending between Chile and Bolivia. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Trade of 20 October 1904 definitively established the frontiers between the two countries.

2. The Treaty was signed 20 years after the cessation of hostilities between the two countries in connexion with the War of 1879. It was approved by the Congress of Bolivia and duly ratified.

3. The Treaty of 1904 provided for heavy obligations on the part of Chile, which were duly complied with and were intended to give Bolivia the most complete and free right of transit to the Pacific Ocean.

4. The facilities referred to have been improved and increased through treaties and agreements which reflect Chile's constant desire to remain faithful to the spirit that motivated the negotiators of the Treaty of 1904. As a result of this process, Bolivia today has greater transit facilities than any other land-locked country in the world.

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5. Notwithstanding the fact that Bolivia has no right to any part of Chilean territory, my Government agreed to enter into negotiations with that country with a view to satisfying its aspirations to obtain a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean. To that end, in December 1975, the Chilean Government formulated a proposal whose essential basis was an exchange of territory. That proposal was explicitly accepted by Bolivia.

6. During 1976 and 1977 negotiations were carried on with a view to clarifying and determining more precisely other aspects of the Chilean proposal. One of those aspects was the extent of the exchange in relation to the coastal area, to which the Ambassador of Bolivia refers in his note addressed to you. It proved possible to reconcile different views and arrive at agreements in principle on these and other points.

7. Even though the negotiations were never interrupted and were always given impetus by Chile, including action at the Presidential level, the Bolivian Government decided to terminate them abruptly by suspending diplomatic relations with my country on 17 March 1978.

8. Thus Bolivia has interrupted a negotiation process carried on by my Government with the utmost seriousness and with a firm desire to satisfy a Bolivian aspiration.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated in the same manner as the note from the Ambassador of Bolivia.

(Signed) Sergio DIEZ URZUA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex 248

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the General Committee of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 26 October 1979

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly,
Ninth Regular Session, 1979, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1,
OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2 (1980), pp 353, 356-372, 386-388 and 395-397

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GENERAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING

Date: 26 October 1979
Time: 11:35 a.m.
Place: Salón Libertador (Sheraton)

President: Mr. Gustavo Fernández Saavedra
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia

Present: Messrs.:

Raymond Mathieu	(Haiti)
Rafael Angel Calderon F.	(Costa Rica)
Leonardo Kam	(Panama)
J. Eugenio Jacquet	(Paraguay)
José A. Zambrano Velasco	(Venezuela)
Wolsey P. Louis	(Dominica)
Oliver H. Jackman	(Barbados)
Alfred A. Rattray	(Jamaica)
Eliseo Pérez Cadalso	(Honduras)
Gonzalo Romero	(Bolivia)
Ernesto Vela Angulo	(Colombia)
Viron P. Vaky	(United States)
Eladio Knipping-Victoria	(Dominican Republic)
Mauricio Rosales Rivera	(El Salvador)
Roel F. Karamat	(Suriname)
Raúl A. Quijano	(Argentina)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Leonte Herdocia	(Nicaragua)
Jerome Jones	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Mario Marroquín Nájera	(Guatemala)
Julio César Lupinacci	(Uruguay)
Raúl Falconí	(Ecuador)
João Clemente Baena Soares	(Brazil)
Carlos García Bedoya	(Peru)
George Odlum	(Saint Lucia)
George Louison	(Granada)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Jorge Luis Zelaya	(Assistant Secretary General)

[…]

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2. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (Item 19 on the Agenda) (AG/doc.5/79)

The PRESIDENT: The second item on the order of business is to discuss the report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.5/79) (Item 19 on the Agenda).

The Delegation of Bolivia has asked for the floor in order to discuss this matter, but first I give the floor to the Representative of Chile for a point of order.

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The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Daza): In the prior plenary session, this Representative spoke in order to state my country's position on the speech of the President of the Republic of Bolivia at the opening session. That fact did not change the position we have been maintaining regarding item 19 on the agenda, which will be discussed here. Indeed, from the time of the Preparatory Committee meeting in Washington to date, my Delegation has been opposed to including this issue, because all indications emanating from the Bolivian authorities themselves have confirmed that this report seeks to affect sovereign Chilean territory and the validity of an international treaty that is in full force and effect, matters over which this Assembly has no jurisdiction whatsoever.

Once again, my Delegation would like to point out the serious precedent that is being set. I believe I am not mistaken that, with this action, the Assembly is opening up a Pandora's box, which will hold drastic surprises in the future for many of the countries here represented, and certainly for the entire Inter-American system.

It is impossible for me to participate in a debate in which the territorial sovereignty of my country is disputed, just as I would not be able to participate in a debate discussing some matter under the exclusive sovereignty of other States. This is why my Delegation will not participate in the discussion of this matter. I will now leave this Room and will return and make our contribution when the meeting addresses other matters over which the OAS actually does have jurisdiction. With your permission, then, I will now leave. [The Representative of Chile leaves the Room.]

The PRESIDENT: Note is taken of the statement made by the Delegation of Chile. The Representative of Bolivia has the floor to make his presentation on Item 19 on the agenda.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Romero): Thank you, Mr. President. I have the honor of reading a report on Bolivia's maritime problem, for the information of this General Committee.

1. History

For the last 100 years, Bolivia has been existing in a situation of enforced geographic containment as a result of the war with Chile in 1879.

On account of that war, Bolivia lost 158,000 square kilometers of territory from the department of Litoral. The coastline lost exceeding 400 kilometers in length and included the good ports of Tocopilla,

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Cobija, Mejillones and Antofagasta, and the coves of Paquíca, Gualeguala, Cabre and Tames.

Bolivia's rights to its territory of Atacama on the Pacific Ocean go back to pre-Colombian times. Since Spanish colonial days, they have been based on incontrovertible legal terms. Indeed, the Pacific coastal border of the Real Audiencia of Charcas and later, that of the Republic of Bolivia, extended from the mouth of the Loa river at 21° 27' south latitude in the north, to the upper end of the Copiapó valley, at 27° south latitude in the south.

During the days when our nations were declaring independence, their new territorial boundaries were based on the principle of "Uti possidetis juris of 1810", a long standing principle of American Public International Law. Consequently, as far as Chile was concerned, there could be no doubt about the legitimacy, sovereignty and jurisdiction that Bolivia exercised over its territory on the Pacific Coast. Chile's recognition of these Bolivian rights was evident not only in the text of that country's constitution, but also in the first bilateral instrument signed by both nations, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, approved by the Chilean Congress in 1833 and 1834.

After 1842, a change came about in Chile's conduct as that country became aware of the existence of enormous riches in Bolivia's coastal areas. We will make more specific reference to this point later. It was then that the Chilean Government got its National Congress to pass a law by which it pushes its boundary with our country north to the 23rd parallel, south latitude. In view of this development, Bolivia sent several successive diplomatic missions to Chile to defend its sovereignty and assert its rights. Nevertheless, from 1843 on Chile made several advances north toward Bolivian territory. New advances came in the 1850s as part of a deliberate policy of expansion as laid out in no uncertain terms by their geopolitician, Diego Portales. These plans even went beyond Bolivia's territory, as the invasion did not stop at the Bolivian territory that Chile said was its but continued into Peru.

So much did Chile's interest grow that it proposed to the Bolivian envoy Dr. Tomas Frías, in 1864, the purchase of the rich Bolivian zone of Mejillones. This proposal showed clearly that Chile considered those territories to belong to Bolivia, because no one buys what is already theirs.

So serious became the problems caused by the frequent Chilean incursions into Bolivian territory that it became

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imperative to sign a boundary treaty, which was done in 1866. In that treaty, Bolivia ceded to Chile the land between the 27th and 24th parallels and Bolivia's southern boundary with Chile was fixed at the latter. In addition, the treaty established a nefarious *medianería*, an agreement by which both countries shared in whatever resources were found in the area between the 25th and 23rd parallels.

In 1874, only eight years after the first boundary treaty, and following new difficulties, a second instrument had to be signed. This fixed the 24th parallel. The boundary eliminated the *medianería*, and stipulated in the fourth clause a new source of problems, that for 25 years Bolivia could not levy any new taxes on Chilean persons, industries or capital.

Sheltered by the arbitrary concessions of a dictatorial Bolivian government, groups of Chilean citizens settled on coastal lands. One of these groups which represented certain extra-continental economic interests, gave the Chilean government a pretext for starting the conflict. While the terms of these concessions were being finalized with the Bolivian state, the company offered a payment of 10% of its profits. The Bolivian Congress preferred, however, to impose a tax of 10 cents per hundred pounds on exports of nitrate. For protection, the company turned to the Chilean government, which invoked the 1874 treaty. Faced with Chile's threats, the Government of Bolivia rescinded the contract with the company and Chile with no declaration of war, occupied Bolivia's coast by force of arms.

Thus, in 1879, Bolivia found itself dragged into a war which it neither wanted nor sought. Unarmed, it had to defend its sovereignty, and requested the application of the Defense Treaty of Alliance which it had signed with Peru.

The war was waged on unequal terms. Chile had armed itself on a par with its intentions. Bolivia and Peru were caught napping and were almost completely without arms. The inevitable result was the consummation of Chile's expansionist plans towards Atacama and Tarapacá.

In 1884, Bolivia had to sign a truce. Under the terms of this document, Chile continued occupying the Bolivian territory conquered during the war, controlled the customs houses and imposed advantageous terms in which they could send their goods freely into Bolivian territory. Because of this treaty, Bolivia had its coast

under military occupation and was left without ports or transportation facilities. It had to endure a burdensome customs yoke and was economically strangled to the degree that it had no choice but to sign the 1904 Treaty.

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Since it signed this treaty, Bolivia has not ceased its efforts to return to the Pacific Ocean. In 1910, the Bolivian Government requested the foreign ministries of Peru and Chile to re-establish Bolivian access to the sea by ceding to it the territories of Tacna and Arica, which were in the temporary possession of Chile.

After that, the problem took on such importance that in 1925, the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, the arbitrator of the frustrated plebiscite over possession of the territories of Tacna and Arica, proposed their transfer to Bolivia. The proposal was not accepted. Three years later, Peru and Chile signed a treaty whereby Arica was delivered to Chile and Tacna returned to Peru. The protocol to this treaty was specified that neither party could turn over the territories in question to a third party without the prior consent of the other party.

In their bilateral relations, and continuing Bolivian efforts, Chile offered Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean on several occasions. Among these are the following:

- Under the terms of the Treaty of Transfer of Territories of 1895, Chile was committed to deliver Tacna and Arica to Bolivia if the plebiscite agreed upon with Peru favored it.

- If this attempt failed, Chile agreed to turn over Vítor Cove, up to the Camarones gorge, or an equivalent piece of land.

- In January 1920, Chile agreed to give Bolivia access to the sea, north of Arica.

- In 1923, when Bolivia proposed a revision of the 1904 Treaty, Chile agreed to sign a new treaty to placate Bolivian demands, provided that it did not imply any disruption of Chilean territorial continuity.

- In 1950, Chile agreed to enter into direct negotiations “aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.”

- In 1956, Chile once again stated its agreement to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation through “strictly confidential Negotiations.”

- In 1961, the Chilean Ambassador in La Paz reiterated his country's offer, in a memorandum addressed to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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- In 1975, new negotiations between Chile and Bolivia started. The negotiations failed because of Chile's insistence on receiving territorial compensation which, in the end, brought about the rupture of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

All of these agreements amounted to nothing in the end since Chile made offers that depended on the convenience of the moment or to avoid any chance of conflict with third powers. Once the danger passed or circumstances changed, Chile forgot the negotiations.

On the other hand, if it were true–as has been alleged–that Bolivia never had any right to the sea, how then can it be explained that Chile was ready to negotiate the matter?

2. Background of the 1904 Treaty

After the battle of Tacna, or Alto de la Alianza, on 26 May 1880, Bolivia terminated its active participation in the War of the Pacific. Four years later, on 4 April 1884, the governments of Bolivia and Chile, as said before, signed a Truce in Valparaiso.

Article 2 of this pact provided that the lands of the Atacama coast would remain in the possession of Chile until a peace treaty were signed. During the term of this truce, Chile was to govern the lands between the 23rd parallel and the mouth of the Loa River at the Pacific Ocean under the political and administrative regulations established by Chilean law.

Moreover, to benefit its own industry, Chile demanded in Article 5 that Bolivia would not change any duties on Chilean products.

Finally, under Article 6, Chile imposed a heavy war compensation because it alleged Bolivia had confiscated property owned by Chilean residents. This article stipulated that, at the port of Arica, import fees based on the Chilean tariff schedule would be charged on goods going to Bolivia, and that no other fees could be levied on them upon entry into Bolivia. Chile provided that it would take approximately 55% of the total amount collected by the Arica customs house, that is, 25% to cover the customs service and 30% to cover the value of the Chilean property mentioned above.

Four years after the pact was signed, Chile created the Province of Antofagasta in the Bolivian territory it had occupied. The

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formal protest made by the Bolivian government against this violation of the provisions of the truce was completely ignored.

The tense relations between Argentina and Chile stemming from border problems and the possibility that Bolivia might form an alliance with Argentine to relieve the oppressive effects of the truce led the Government of Chile to the decision to sign a new treaty with Bolivia.

As a result, three treaties were signed in Santiago on 18 May 1895.

The first was a Treaty of Peace and Amity. In it, Bolivia acknowledged Chile's domain over the lands south of the Loa River to the 23rd parallel.

The second was a trade and transit agreement.

The third was a special treaty covering the transfer of territories; this provided that if Chile acquired permanent domain and sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, it was required to transfer them to Bolivia in the same form and extension in which it received them. Should it not obtain those territories, Chile was to cede Vitor Cove or some similar lands to Bolivia, as noted in the preceding chapter.

Even though they were ratified by both countries, those treaties were never enforced.

At the beginning of this century, when Bolivia was suffering the damaging effects of the situation imposed by the truce, Chile sent as its Ambassador Plenipotentiary, Mr. Abraham Konig, who gave in his country's name, in an official note addressed to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most eloquent possible proof of how things actually stood. The note began by retracting the commitment made in 1895 with respect to Tacna and Arica. "In an attempt to put it as clearly as international affairs sometimes demand– Chile stated in Konig's note that Bolivia must not count on the transfer of the TERRITORIES OF TACNA AND ARICA, EVEN IF THE RESULTS OF THE PLEBISCITE ARE FAVOURABLE TO CHILE… CHILE HAS OCCUPIED THE DEPARTMENT OF LITORAL AND HAS TAKEN IT OVER ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME RIGHT THAT GERMANY HAD TO ANNEX ALSACE LORRAINE TO ITS EMPIRE… OUR RIGHT ARE BORN OF OUR VICTORY, THE HIGHEST LAW AMONG NATIONS… THAT THE LITORAL IS RICH IN RESOURCES AND WORTH MANY MILLIONS WE ALREADY KNEW. WE ARE KEEPING IT BECAUSE IT IS VALUABLE. IF IT WERE NOT, RETAINING IT WOULD BE OF NO INTEREST.…"

With these arguments as the true causes of the war, Chile successfully forced the signing of the Peace Treaty of 20 October 1904, which signified the loss of the Bolivian coast.

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The 1904 Treaty was imposed at a time there was already a clear understanding in the Americas with respect to proscribing the use of force in international relations. A century before Europe was to do so, the Americas denied the validity of territorial gains won by the use of armed force. The Marshall of Ayacucho, Antonio José de Sucre, Bolivia's chief lieutenant, had already proclaimed in 1829 that victory does not confer rights.

The principle of proscription of armed force had been advocated in the Americas since the appearance of the first multilateral instrumented aimed at regulating relations among the nations. It appeared in the conclusions of the Congress of Panama of 1926, the First Congress of Lima, 1847, the Washington Agreement, 1856, and the Second Congress of Lima, 1854.

But it was the First International Conference of the American States, held in Washington in 1889, a series of conferences that would ultimately bring the Organization of American States into existence, that it was proclaimed that no *res nullius* territories existed in the Americas; that wars of conquest between American nations were unjustifiable acts of violence; that territorial insecurity inevitably led to the ruinous system of armed peace.

At this International Conference of American States of 1889, the participating countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Venezuela and the United States of America – signed a unanimous Recommendation (the only abstention, logically enough, being that of Chile), which contained the following basic points:

(1) The principle of conquest shall be repudiated by American international law;

(2) Any cession of territory carried out under the threat of war or in the presence of armed force shall not be recognized and shall be null and void;

(3) Any nation which has been deprived of its territory in this way may demand that the validity of the cession be submitted to arbitration.

The 1904 Treaty, concluded after the categorical Recommendation signed by the participants in the Congress of 1889, contradicts the principles set forth in the Recommendation. Chilean armed forces occupied in the coastal territory of Bolivia. A country under military occupation does not have freedom of consent.

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The aforementioned principles, as well as those set forth in later International Conferences of American States, were admitted in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted on 7 May 1968. That convention states that a treaty is void if it has been procured by the threat or the use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodies in the Charter of the United Nations.

Bolivia mentions these antecedents because, in its opinion, they fully demonstrate the justice of its case.

3. Economic damages resulting from the War of the Pacific

The economic damages that Bolivia had suffered, and still suffers, as a result of the Peace Treaty of 1904 are enormous.

In the first place, as already noted, that instrument meant the loss of 158,000 square kilometers of its coastal territory, that is, an area larger than that of Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and El Salvador put together. That simple comparison reveals the magnitude of the loss.

But in the economic area, the losses are even greater.

The territory lost to Bolivia as a result of the war was the site of a discovery made at the end of the last century. This discovery was the fabulous Chuquicamata copper deposits, considered among the most important in the world. Thanks to them, Chile is the world's largest exporter of copper and the second-largest producer of that metal, after the United States.

To date, Chile has exported more than 20 million tons of copper. Although this figure is difficult to comprehend precisely, compare it with the reserves of all of Asia, almost 1.5 million tons, the reserves of Western Europe, estimated at 2.3 million tons, and those of the USSR, approximately 16 million tons.

In other words, in this century Chile has exported as much copper as these other continents put together. This does not take into account the enormous reserves still being discovered.

It is estimated that at the current rate of extraction, the mines of Chuquicamata will not run out of copper until the end of the next century. Quite justifiably, the late Chilean President, Salvador Allende, termed Chuquicamata the "wages of Chile." Wages that for a century Bolivia has been paying with the resources of mines located in what was once its territory.

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Chile's booty from the War of the Pacific was not restricted to land and copper. One of the economic causes of the War of 1879 was Chile's intention to take the guano deposits, a natural fertilize left by sea birds over the centuries.

It is estimated that in last fifty years, Chile has extracted from these natural guano deposits more than one million ton of fertilizer for the farm lands of central and southern Chile. This is also a natural resource taken away from Bolivia.

Besides guano, there are the sodium nitrate (saltpeter) deposits in the former Peruvian province of Tarapacá and the Bolivian one of Atacama.

After the military occupation of that Bolivian province had been completed in 1880, Chile exported annually some 12,500 tons of nitrate, which accounted for approximately 20 percent of its total export earnings. While synthetic nitrate invented early in the century, drastically cut international consumption of natural nitrate, until that time, Chilean exports of nitrate and its derivative, iodine, provided nearly 70 per cent of government revenues. Until just before World War I, Chile had a world monopoly on nitrate production.

Some medium-sized nitrate firms are still operating in that former Bolivian coastal province.

Another point worth mentioning is that at present Chile produces nearly ten thousand tons of sulfur and some of the major deposits of this mineral are in the Ollague district, in the former Bolivian province of Atacama.

That province also has deposits of molybdenum, manganese, lithium, iron, and silver in varying quantities.

The port city of Antofagasta owes its progress and prosperity particularly to its trade with Bolivia. It is one of the Chilean ports that Bolivia is virtually forced to use for its exports and imports. The rates of the railway to that port are also being constantly and unilaterally raised. On the other hand, Bolivian goods are subject in all Chilean ports to regular deterioration and pilferage.

Last, but not least, the economic damages that Bolivia suffers are similarly high in marine resources. Without a coast, Bolivia has been deprived of great fish and shellfish riches and the natural resources of the ocean floor.

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4. Jurisdiction and competence

The topic of the maritime problem of Bolivia on the Agenda of the ninth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, and its consideration, are based on a solid legal foundation, as spelled out in the Charter of the U.N., the world agency of which the Organization of the American States is a regional organ.

In its Article 14, the Charter of the U.N. states:

> The General Assembly (unless the matter is before the Security Council) may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

These purposes and principles are also mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter in the sense of bringing about "by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". And again in point 3 of Article 2: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered".

Moreover, in the part on Regional Agreements, Article 52(2) of Chapter VIII states: "The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council".

Paragraph (3) of the same article states: "The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council".

The aforementioned article reinforces the application of Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter which state that "the Security Council may investigate

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any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction", and "any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation" – regardless of origin – "to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly".

In complete accord with those universal precepts, the Charter of the Organization of American States, in which the Organization is declared to be a regional agency of the United Nations, unequivocally establishes in Article 1 the main purpose of its existence and of its service on behalf of the Member States. It states that the goal is "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence".

Article 2 of the Charter specifies that one of the essential purposes of the organization is "to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States".

Furthermore, Article 52(a) establishes that the General Assembly may "consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States".

Finally, Articles 80 to 90 of the Charter, related to the powers and duties of the OAS Permanent Council, include provisions that authorize it to take cognizance of "any matter referred to it by the General Assembly or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs"; it also has the power to keep vigilance "over the maintenance of friendly relations among the Member States, and for that purpose shall effectively assist them in the peaceful settlement of their disputes," in accordance with procedures such as:

> Any party to a dispute may resort to the Permanent Council to obtain its good offices. The Council, in this case, shall have the power to assist the parties and recommend the procedures it considers suitable for peaceful settlement of the dispute.
>
> If the parties so wish, the Chairman of the Council will directly refer the dispute to the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlements.

This summary recapitulates some of the legal grounds underlying the presentation of Bolivia's landlocked situation to the Organization of American States. In the light of the precepts cited, such landlocked situation, a situation

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for 100 years, has militated against the peace and security of the nations of the Continent; it is also a possible cause of difficulties and conflict, not just for the nations directly involved, but for the sub region and the whole Continent, through the ramifications it may generate. In short, it is a factor that has delayed the development and progress of Bolivia as a nation and as a member of the Andean Pact, the Latin American Association of Free Commerce, the Treaty of the Cuenca de Plata and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty. All this represents an obstacle to the development, prosperity and welfare of the continental community.

Because it lies at the geographical center of the continent, forming part of all the three major regional basins of the River Plate, the Pacific Ocean and the Amazon, Bolivia's logical role has been that of regulator of the continental balance.

As a result of the 1879 war, Bolivia's influence and presence on the shores of the Pacific Ocean came to an end. The balance between the states was upset in such a way that so far, it has not been possible to restore it. The result has been a tense situation that is characterized by, among other developments, the break in relations between Bolivia and Chile. The break is the result of Chile's persistence in imposing conditions that are unacceptable if an understanding is to be reached, and the unrelenting will of the people of Bolivia to regain an outlet to the sea.

The justice of the Bolivian cause and the existence of unsettling factors, deriving a situation imposed by force that has not changed in the past 100 years since the War of the Pacific, are obvious. In fact, the cause has been acknowledged internationally in a long series of declarations expressing concern for keeping the peace and harmony of the region. The most recent of these is the Declaration of Havana, whereby the countries of the world gave their support to the just and legitimate claim of Bolivia to regain full and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The declaration also called upon member States of the international community to declare their solidarity with that alienable right of the Bolivian people. The countries reaffirmed that constructive and fruitful security and peace in the Americas demands that that problem be solved. Consequently, they supported all efforts made with so noble a motive and means of the peaceful negotiations set forth in the United Nations Charter. The tensions created by the situation described above are also seen in the arms race, the subject of formal international declarations and the root cause behind the opening of official disarmament negotiations.

The 1879 War must end. The state of anxiety that lingers in the southern Pacific must dissipate. The 100-year

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separation of Bolivia from the Pacific, a status closely ties to these circumstances, must come to an end. Rules for peace and stability in the region must be found. This matter is unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the Organization of American States and it is the duty of the Organization to help find a prompt solution to the problem.

Distinguished Delegates, this is Bolivia's position on item 19 on the agenda for the ninth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of the American States. Thank you, Mr. President. [Applause.]

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Representative. Item 19 on the agenda is under consideration. The Representative of Venezuela has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF VENEZUELA (Mr. Zambrano): On behalf of Venezuela and in fulfillment of the express instructions of its President, Luis Herrera Campins, I would like to submit a draft resolution on the landlocked situation of Bolivia for the consideration of the General Assembly.

Allow me, as a Venezuelan, to restate the hope that we have that, based on fair, equitable agreements, a stable peace may be established in the area.

To use that well-known expression, Bolivia is "the beloved daughter of the Liberator." It would be redundant to extol the sense of brotherhood that unites us.

Chile, as a nation and a people, means a great deal to us. It is worth remembering that the "Intellectual Liberator of America," our common Andrés Bello, made Chile his second Country, and Chile was a nation that provided generous shelter to exiled and persecuted Venezuelans in the dark hours for the civic-minded republicans in our Country.

We are living in a time in which consideration is being given to revising treaties considered perpetual. This makes us more aware that, in international relations, a rigid position could lead us to ignore the requirements of justice, which are given greater importance in some historical periods, under certain circumstances. In this order of things, such rigidity is an expression of political sterility. The draft resolution we are submitting for the consideration of the Assembly reflects the growing solidarity of the countries in this Hemisphere with Bolivia's cause.

This solidarity is based on the very justice of its petition and the need to redress a historic injustice.

The problem that concerns us is political in its origins and political in its consequences. Political must be the analysis made by the OAS,

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as a regional Organization, and political must be the resolution that emerges from here, as a majority expression of the States of the Continent.

That political will must inspire the new rules, which reflect standards of justice and equity, recognizing Bolivia's right to the sea.

Dispossession based on force and instruments originating in circumstances of inferiority for some of the signatory States does not support the historical irreversibility of arrangements made in the past.

One of the cornerstones of American International Law is the so-called Sucre Doctrine, which can be summarized in the formula, "victory does not generate rights," and it is worth adding, even less so, territorial rights, as in the specific case at hand.

Today, the idea that force confers the right to dispossess the loser has not just been left behind, but is now condemned, in a world that knows that peace will not rest on a secure foundation if it is not built on justice.

The rejection of force as a way to create rights in the international order has been an indispensable assumption underlying the Hemisphere's reasoned objection to colonial enclaves, and its rejection of intracontinental relations consisting of the despicable conduct of powers that distributed areas of influence in the world, during the past century, under a policy of realpolitik, under the reductionist, brutal terms of machtpolitik, the politics of force.

All legal determinations that stem from violence contain a seed of injustice. If we want an integrated America, with growing relationships among our countries based on mutual respect and solidarity, we have to throw the historical claims that separate us in the dustbin of history, eliminating their causes.

One day of war leads to 100 years of hatred. And hatred cannot be the foundation of the joint progress that history requires of us at this time.

The weakest link in this growing and multifaceted process of integration consists of our territorial disputes, through which so much family blood has been spilled on this continent.

Obscure interests may seek to interrupt the growing efforts toward integration or to paralyze the political audacity to which we are called in the complex period in which we live. When this happens, their actions tend to

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revolve around the reassertion of border and territorial disputes, presented as insoluble, based on the terms in which they are stated.

Our countries have to show that they have a capacity that goes beyond simply knowing how to listen to such arguments.

Our countries have to show that they have acquired the maturity involved in knowing how to hear and assess the justice of the arguments of those other States with which they had major disagreements in the past.

The new American Law will arise from political will, and this will not entail negation of our own countries, but the recognition that the future of each State is a shared future including the sovereign, free and just existence of other nations. Most importantly, this applies to those countries whose geographic nearness leads them to have a common destiny.

In my statements made in the general debate, I spoke of the mutilation that led to a landlocked Bolivia. I did so as the spokesman for a people that has had solidarity with and support for the just cause of this sister Republic as a historical constant in its international policies. [Applause.]

For the past 100 years, we Venezuelans have supported Bolivia's Right to the Sea. Our moral authority is derived from the conduct of our liberating troops, which only crossed our borders from the Caribbean coast to the hill of Potosí, behind Bolívar, constructing sister republics, without increasing our territory by one inch. [Applause.]

The Bolivian littoral has been unredeemed Bolivia since the War of the Pacific. And as long as its unredeemed status crushes the daily work of this nation, to which we are united by multiple, permanent, ties, the Continent's liberty, justice and peace will be incomplete, awaiting a just settlement.

This is why, Mr. President, I come here today in all sincerity on behalf of Venezuela to submit, for the consideration of the Assembly, a draft resolution on the problem of Bolivia's landlocked status. I am convinced that the political will that is shown in this statement will contribute to stimulating the sincere search for concrete, just and equitable formulas in the spirit of American brotherhood and integration; in short, a search for a concrete formula that will provide Bolivia with sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean. The draft proposal is:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DECLARES:

1. That it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia will obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean.

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2. To achieve foregoing the objective and to consolidate a stable peace that will promote the economic and social progress in the area of the Americas directly affected by the consequences of the confinement of Bolivia, in a spirit of American fraternity and integration, the ninth General Assembly of the Organization of American States,

RESOLVES:

1. To recommend that the States most directly concerned with this problem that they open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean. Such negotiations shall take into account the rights and interests of the Parties involved, and might consider, among other things, the inclusion of a port area for integrated multinational development, as well as the Bolivian proposal that no territorial compensation be included.

2. To continue consideration of the topic "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" at the next meeting of the General Assembly.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. [Applause.]

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The REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU (Mr. García Bedoya): In view of the importance of this topic being discussed, I am obviously not going to make analogies that have no relation to it.

Mr. President, linked by geography and the imperatives of being close neighbors, as well as by a history of which we have shared a large part of its chapters, Peru and Bolivia, logically sharing the same culture and origins, constitute a real spiritual community. These authentic solid foundations are the soul of the relations between Peruvians and Bolivians, their real *raison d'être*.

The vicissitudes of the past have accented the sentiments of affection that distinguish us. Thus, within these communitarian sentiments that constitute the natural source of our relations, Peru understands and supports the maritime cause of Bolivia.

Peru has already shown concrete evidence of its political will to contribute to a final solution for Bolivia's recovery of a maritime coast, which will be the guarantee of peace, integration and development between our nations. Then as now, Peru supports the Bolivian cause due to the sentiments mentioned above and due to the unavoidable compliance, if it should come to that, with the clear provisions of an international treaty. Therefore, we think that the solutions that this organization could make recommend to the States involved could only be understood within respect for treaties, for the rights and for the interests of the parties involved.

Mr. President, Peru's political will remains in effect, just as the brotherhood between our two nations remains unchanging, and the time is right to tell Bolivia and the Americas that the Peruvian people and their Government look with expectant hope for the day on which through the pathway of law, friendship and understanding, the Pacific Ocean can again return to bathe the land of our sister land Bolivia with its waters. [Applause.]

For these reasons, Mr. President, the Delegation of Peru will support the draft resolution being considered by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Foreign Minister of Peru. The Representative of Argentina has the floor.

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The REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (Mr. Quijano): Thank you, Mr. President. In the long history of bilateral relations with Bolivia, the Bolivian confinement has been a reason for constant concern, and this circumstance is reflected in numerous instruments and declarations in which Argentina has stated its brotherly bond and its concern about this problem.

We believe that the problem of "Bolivia's sovereign outlet to the sea" is extremely serious, that my country recognizes and hopes will be resolved because, among other reasons, it is essential to the development and progress of this sister nation.

Mr. President, that is why we have been very interested in the draft proposal submitted by the Delegation from Venezuela, which has been so well received at this meeting. But we would have liked to have a bit more time to try to reach some more complete agreements, which would have allowed us to avoid having any reservation about its text.

We have two reservations, and to clarify our position, I would like to state them.

The first is in the second declaratory paragraph, in which it is proposed to "… consolidate a stable peace, which would stimulate economic and social progress…" We believe that fortunately, peace in America and in our region is not at stake here, and this is essential in this case– and is why we must cooperate to reach a solution.

What must be consolidated is the economic and social progress of the whole region, specifically of our sister Republic, Bolivia.

Therefore, we believe that the words "a stable peace that will promote" may be unnecessary in the text.

Our other reservation, which is more serious, and more important, has to do with the words that appear at the end of point 1 of the operative part, "…and might consider, among other things…" the OAS would be moving onto shaky ground.

Reference was made here to the Pandora's Box that could be opened should treaties be revised, and the States' responsibilities in decisions related to problems that affect the territorial sovereignty of other States was referred to. We would like this historic ninth General Assembly of the OAS to develop a well thought-out and heartfelt recommendation—that I hope all the American States support—rather than a formula for negotiations. We recommend that the parties negotiate bearing in mind their own interests as well as the spirit of American unity that has been stated in this Room, not only today, but from the start of this Assembly and even before that, when the Permanent Council decided to include this item on the agenda.

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We believe we would enter on dangerous ground if we suggested parameters for the negotiations. We are concerned about the procedure indicated by the draft resolution; therefore, we would prefer that the final words of the first paragraph of the operative part be eliminated, limiting this to a strong, brotherly recommendation that a solution be sought for this problem, taking into account the rights and interests of the parties involved, as stated in the text, without imposing any limitation on the negotiations. We believe that it is not the responsibility of the OAS to specify details regarding possible negotiations.

If there were a consensus in the Committee–but we have no intention of spoiling the harmony of this debate–, we would prefer that those words be eliminated. If, however, the drafters of the resolution could not withdraw them, we would then request that they be voted on separately, pursuant to Article 75 of our Rules. We make this request because we wish to avoid limiting the scope of those negotiations in any way.

As you all know, at this time, Argentina is involved in a major round of negotiations with respect to a territorial issue, and we know how delicate these steps can be and in order to adopt any measure, it is necessary to act without pressure and without external limitations. The mediation in which we are currently involved is an example, because it has been carried out within a very broad framework. We believe that problems of this nature require that freedom, and that only the parties themselves may set limitations.

Argentina's position was formulated yesterday by our Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is based on our desire, which we trust will be achieved, that Bolivia may soon solve its problem and may return to being a power with coasts on the Pacific Ocean. Thank you very much.

[…]

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The REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (Mr. Quijano): The Argentine Delegation's fundamental purpose in submitting its proposal was to emphasize how important we feel it is to include this phrase in the draft resolution.

As I said in my speech earlier, it is a position of principle that we want to respect and maintain, because we believe that we are venturing into highly dangerous territory. I also said that in no way did I want to alter the harmony of this historic meeting and that if there were objections or negative reactions to my proposal, I was not going to insist on it.

Mr. President, if you agree, I would withdraw the motion [applause], requesting that the minutes reflect Argentina's express reservation to this paragraph, which we consider a dangerous precedent. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: That's very nice of you, Mr. Representative of Argentina. Your speech will facilitate the vote on the draft resolution. Therefore, we are going to proceed with a roll-call vote. We will draw straws to determine which delegation will vote first. [He draws a ballot] Saint Lucia.

[The roll-call vote is held, with the following result:]

Saint Lucia	Yes
Grenada	Yes
Haiti	Yes
Costa Rica	Yes
Panamá	Yes
Paraguay	Yes

Venezuela	Yes
Dominica	Yes
Barbados	Yes
Jamaica	Yes
Honduras	Yes

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Bolivia	Yes
Colombia	Yes
United States	Yes
Dominican Republic	Yes
El Salvador	Yes
Suriname	Yes
Argentina	Yes
Mexico	Yes
Nicaragua	Yes
Trinidad and Tobago	Yes
Chile	Yes
Guatemala	Yes
Uruguay	Yes
Ecuador	Yes
Brazil	Yes
Peru	Yes

The PRESIDENT: The Assistant Secretary General now has the floor to announce the result of the vote.

The ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL: The result of the vote is as follows: 25 votes in favor; no votes against, no abstentions. [Applause.]

The PRESIDENT: Let the record show, first, that this resolution approved by this General Committee will be considered by the plenary assembly.

Second, I would like to point out that the reservation made by the Delegation of Argentina will also be in the minutes.

The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Romero): First, I would like to give thanks, on behalf of the people of Bolivia and its Government, for the resolution approved at this historic Assembly, which is identifying new ways to conduct international negotiations in the Hemisphere.

I am deeply grateful to the representatives who have voted for Bolivia here, and at the same time, my Delegation is going to explain its vote at this time.

It is my honor to start by confirming, first, the favorable vote Bolivia has cast for the draft resolution submitted by Venezuela.

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Secondly, the Delegation of Bolivia nevertheless confirms that it reserves all rights to present its own points of view on the way to recover sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean at the time when the negotiations recommended by the General Assembly are initiated. Thank you very much. [Applause.]

Annex 249

Minutes of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 31 October 1979

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Ninth Regular Session, 1979, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2 (1980), pp 272, 277-283 and 286

[p 272]

MINUTES OF THE TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

Date: 31 October 1979
Time: 3:30 p.m.
Place: Salón Libertad

President: Mr. Gustavo Fernández
Representative of Bolivia

Present: Messrs.:

Raymond Mathieu	(Haiti)
Luis E. Guardia Mora	(Costa Rica)
Mario López Escobar	(Paraguay)
Hilarión Cardozo	(Venezuela)
Wolsey P. Louis	(Dominica)
Michael King	(Barbados)
Alfred A. Rattray	(Jamaica)
Carlos Zambrano Escalante	(Honduras)
Gonzalo Romero	(Bolivia)
Carlos Bernal Téllez	(Colombia)
Irving G. Tragen	(United States)
Eladio Knipping-Victoria	(Dominican Republic)
Mauricio Castro Aragón	(El Salvador)
E. R. Nahar	(Suriname)
Raúl A. Quijano	(Argentina)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Saúl Arana Castellón	(Nicaragua)
Victor C. McIntyre	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Pedro Daza	(Chile)
Mario Marroquín Nájera	(Guatemala)
Julio César Lupinacci	(Uruguay)
Raúl Falconí	(Ecuador)
Marcelo Raffaelli	(Brazil)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
George Louison	(Granada)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Jorge Luis Zelaya Coronado	(Assistant Secretary General)

[…]

[…]

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3. Consideration and approval of the draft resolutions submitted by the General Committee

a. Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean (AG/doc.1147/79 rev. 1)

The PRESIDENT: Under consideration is the draft resolution on access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean (AG/doc.1146/79 rev. 1). The Representative of Chile has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Daza): Mr. President, the resolution that we have before us for consideration warrants several observations.

We cannot accept that the situation derived from the Bolivian aspiration to have sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean be linked to stable peace in the region. Peace can only be affected if the States are not willing to respect each other and comply with their obligations. I reiterate here my country's commitment to peace and the absurdity of arguing that the legitimate exercise of rights conferred by a treaty could constitute a threat to peace.

In the operative part there is a recommendation that the States concerned with this problem open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean. My country has always been willing to negotiate with Bolivia. Therefore, the call must be directed specifically at Bolivia, which was the country that broke the relations with Chile and put an end to the process of negotiations that was underway.

The operative part also contains another element: involving this Assembly in the substantive parts of any eventual negotiations.

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This resolution, which was adopted at the place and under the circumstances known to the Representatives, by attempting, as I have indicated, to establish rules pursuant to which the parties involved must engage in negotiations, in order to reach a solution to the aspiration of one the Member States, and which above all affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another, constitutes a flagrant violation of one of the basic principles of this Organization, that "the international order is essentially made up of respect for the personality, sovereignty and political independence of States".

This attempt to use a vote to revoke an instrument such as a Peace Treaty that is in full force and effect between Chile and Bolivia violates another principle set forth in that same Charter, which provides that the international order is essentially constituted by the "faithful fulfilment of the obligations arising from treaties".

The powers of the Assembly are the result of the principles established in the Charter of the Organization and, therefore, there must be a perfect match between them.

Consequently, we cannot say that the Assembly is empowered to adopt a resolution of this type by virtue of what is established in Article 52(a) when it says that it "may consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States". This is a procedural rule; the rule in Article 3(a) is a substantive rule and therefore takes precedence over that which refers to the powers of one of the organs of the Organization, such as the General Assembly, which is not allowed to depart from the principles that constitute its *raison d'être* under any circumstances.

In addition, the sponsor of this resolution established that this is a political problem and that its solution must be of a political nature. That constitutes an express admission that when the Assembly considered and adopted this resolution, it had completely departed from the essential legal principles to which that I have referred, thereby setting a nefarious precedent that is affecting my country today and will affect others in the future.

Historical experience shows that when an organization of this type, like the OAS, which is a free association of its States that comprise it on the underpinning basis of respect for fundamental legal rules, departs from those rules, it almost immediately begins to lose its moral authority, first, because of the precedent that we have mentioned, and second, because it very logically gives rise to reticence and distrust on the part of its members.

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Consequently, Chile emphatically declares that, in accordance with the legal rules indicated, this resolution does not obstruct it or bind it or obligate it in any way.

On repeated occasions I have indicated Chile's willingness to negotiate a solution with Bolivia to its aspiration to have free and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The way to reach that goal is direct negotiation, conducted at a level of professionalism and mutual respect, without any interference, suggestions or dictates from anyone.

Once again Bolivia has rejected this way, and the path that it has chosen through this resolution, in an attempt to condition and put pressure on Chile, creates an insuperable obstacle to opening negotiations that will satisfy its aspiration and duly contemplate the dignity and sovereignty of both parties.

This Assembly has closed that path. It has made the possibility of Bolivia obtaining satisfaction of its maritime aspiration more remote.

As long as it insists on the path indicated by this resolution, as long as it rejects the proper and logical path of free negotiations without any conditions between the two countries, as long as it attempts to put pressure on Chile through foreign interference, Bolivia will have no outlet to the sea through Chilean territory. The responsibility will not have been Chile's. Thank you, Mr. President.

[…]

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The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Representative. The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. de Campero): Thank you, Mr. President. I truly admire the specious attempt by the Representative of Chile to turn an exhortation by the General Assembly into a command that does not exist.

Mr. President, I believe that the General Assembly has full jurisdiction, within the terms of the Charter, to exhort, encourage, and push nations to resolve their differences. This is the case with the vote held the other day. Therefore, I emphatically declare that my Delegation recognizes the full jurisdiction of the General Assembly to make this type of documents. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Representative. The Representative of Argentina has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (Mr. Quijano): Mr. President, because of the importance of the decision being considered, it is undoubtedly the most important one in this meeting of the General Assembly, the Argentine Delegation would like to briefly explain its vote.

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My Delegation supported in the General Committee, and will support in the plenary, the proposal that it is in the interest of all countries in the Americas that a fair and equitable solution be found that provides Bolivia with a sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean.

For Argentina, which has been associated with this problem in different ways for 100 years, the step being taken is of paramount importance. A mere look at the slow evolution of this topic and the great lack of interest in it by a large sector of the international public, even on occasions within the ambit of the OAS, having followed this question for past years, shows the importance of the document we now have before us.

Argentina has followed the topic very closely and has endeavored to do its part to alleviate the grave difficulties that Bolivia has faced because of the disadvantageous situation of lacking a maritime littoral. For years there has been a Bolivian free trade zone in the port of Rosario, on the River Paraná. Moreover, to facilitate its international trade and to reach that port from Bolivia, we have contributed engineers and capital to construct the railway that enters Bolivia at our common border and crosses Bolivia to the North, where it should ultimately reach the Department of Beni.

Now it is a question of taking a new step, one of a more political nature. It would be easy to support the draft that has been submitted without any reservations, solely stating that the solution must be found within the existing legal framework. But that would seriously limit the process that this Assembly, and, of course, the Argentine Republic, want to put into practice without delay.

We prefer, however, the more difficult, but also more realistic, road, of arguing that the negotiations that are fostered must have as their sole guideline the consideration of the rights and interests of the parties involved. They are the only ones in a position to decide on the terms and procedures for the negotiations. Any other factor that might be included to force the will of the parties would only have a symbolic value, or worse, could adversely affect the negotiations.

For all these reasons, through knowing all too well of the dimensions of the problem, we must repeat, with a great sense of responsibility and with our permanent affection for our sister Republic of Bolivia, the reservation made with respect to the additional guidelines proposed in the second portion of operative paragraph 1 of the draft we are considering.

But, notwithstanding this comment, we support the resolution because we are convinced that it will not fall into a void and that its political and moral value, as the expression of the thinking of the countries in the

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Americas, must contribute to implementing a process that will conclude in the near future with a solution that Bolivia not only needs for its development, but to which it is fully entitled. Thank you very much.

[…]

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The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Representative. Having heard the presentations made on the topic we are considering, I submit to a vote the draft resolution presented by the General Committee.

All those in favor please so indicate by raising your hand. The Representatives [Vote.] The result of the vote is 21 votes in favor, one against and no abstentions. Approved.

I want to add that the text of this resolution will be accompanied by the explanations of the vote that have been made at this meeting by the delegates who have taken the floor, and, additionally, those made when the resolution was approved in the General Committee. The Representative of Paraguay now has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PARAGUAY (Mr. López Escobar): In homage to the cardinal principles cited in our speech and proceeding on the basis that a solution to the conflict implies the active cooperation of the OAS, but that the powers involved are those that will engage trilaterally in the relevant negotiations, the Delegation of Paraguay very respectfully requests that the President record our reservation with respect to the second part of Point 1, which says:

> … and might consider, among other things, the inclusion of a port area for integrated multinational development, as well as the Bolivian proposal that no territorial compensation be included.

The PRESIDENT: The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Romero): Thank you, Mr. President. I reiterate my Delegation's thanks for the vote in favor of the resolution. On a prior occasion I noted that Bolivia reserved the right to make specific proposals if the negotiations were opened. Please have this statement, which has been repeated, recorded in the minutes. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: That is what we will do, Mr. Representative.

Annex 250

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX–O/79), Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, 31 October 1979

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Ninth Regular Session, 1979, *Proceedings*, Vol. I, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2 (1980), pp 55 and 57



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2
2 July 1980
Volume I

NINTH REGULAR SESSION
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA
OCTOBER 22-31, 1979

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1980

AG

AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79)

ACCESS BY BOLIVIA TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN

(Resolution adopted at the twelfth plenary session
held on October 31, 1979)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

In a spirit of fraternity, and with a view to the integration of the Americas,

DECLARES:

That it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and

CONSIDERING:

That it is necessary to achieve the foregoing objective and to consolidate a stable peace that will promote the economic and social progress of the area of the Americas directly affected by the consequences of the landlocked status of Bolivia, and

RESOLVES:

1. To recommend to the states most directly concerned with this problem that they open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean. These negotiations shall take into account the rights and interests of the parties involved, and might consider, among other things, the inclusion of a port area for integrated multinational development, as well as the Bolivian proposal that no territorial compensation be included.

2. To continue consideration of the topic "Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia" at the next session of the General Assembly.

AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79)

ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A L'OCEAN PACIFIQUE

(Résolution adoptée à la douzième séance plénière
tenue le 31 octobre 1979)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

DECLARE

Qu'il est de l'intérêt permanent du Continent de trouver une solution équitable qui assure à la Bolivie un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique, et

CONSIDERANT

Qu'il est nécessaire d'atteindre dans un esprit de fraternité et d'intégration américaine le but mentionné au paragraphe précédent et d'asseoir une paix durable, qui stimule le progrès économique et social dans la région du continent directement touchée par les conséquences de l'enclavement de la Bolivie,

DECIDE:

1. De recommander aux Etats les plus directement concernés par le problème susvisé, d'entamer des négociations en vue de la concession à la Bolivie d'un accès territorial libre et souverain à l'Océan pacifique. Dans la conduite de ces négociations, l'on devrait tenir compte des droits et intérêts des Parties en cause et l'on pourrait envisager, entre autres éléments, l'établissement d'une zone portuaire de développement multinational intégré; l'on pourrait de même retenir la position prise par la Bolivie qui s'oppose à toute compensation territoriale.

2. De poursuivre l'étude du point "Rapport sur le problème que crée pour la Bolivie l'absence de littoral" à la prochaine session de l'Assemblée générale.

Annex 251

Chilean Ministry of National Defence, Undersecretary of the Navy, Supreme Decree No 923, 26 November 1979

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL
SUBSECRETARIA DE MARINA
DEPTO. ADM.-747-

: OTORGA A YACIMIENTOS PETROLIFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS PRIMERA RENOVACION DE CONCESION MARITIMA SOBRE UN SECTOR DE TERRENOS DE PLAYA, PLAYA, FONDOS DE MAR Y PORCIONES DE AGUA, EN EL LUGAR DENOMINADO EL CHINCHORRO EN EL PUERTO DE ARICA.-

MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL
Subsecretaría de Marina
-7 DIC. 1979
TRAMITADO

DECRETO SUPREMO Nº 923

SANTIAGO, 20 NOV. 1979

Hoy se decretó lo que sigue:

VISTOS Y TENIENDO PRESENTE :

Que por D.S. (M) Nº.180 de 8 de Febrero de 1961 y con vencimiento al 31 de Diciembre de 1979 se otorgó a Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos concesión sobre un sector de Terrenos de Playa, playa, fondos de mar y porciones de agua en el puerto de Arica, con el objeto de amparar el tendido de la cañería subterránea y submarina del terminal del oleoducto Sica Sica - Arica y mantener fondeadas 2 boyas para naves mayores de 10.000 toneladas de registro grueso y 3 orinques permanentes de señalización.

Que por D.S. (M) Nº.1161 de 6 de Diciembre de 1967 se amplió y modificó el referido Decreto de concesión, aumentando a 3 el número de boyas y estableciendo su tonelaje para naves de más de 10.000 toneladas y hasta 20.000 toneladas de registro grueso, y además se agregó una cañería de descarga al mar del agua purificada proveniente del deslastre de los buques tanques.

Que se ha solicitado la renovación de esta concesión, no existiendo impedimentos reglamentarios en acceder a dicha petición.

Que en la presente renovación las 3 boyas se clasificarán para naves de más de 30.000 y hasta 50.000 toneladas de registro grueso de acuerdo a la mayor nave que ha ocupado esas boyas (S/S "BELOBO" de 42.789 toneladas de registro grueso el 27 de Junio de 1978); asimismo los 3 orinques permanentes de señalización se denominarán "boyarines permanentes de señalización", de conformidad a la reglamentación en actual vigencia; y

de acuerdo a los antecedentes acompañados; lo manifestado por la Comandancia en Jefe de la Armada (D.G.T.M. y MM.) en oficio Ordinario Nº.12230/27/214, de 19 de Noviembre de 1979; lo establecido en el D.F.L. Nº.340 de 1960 y artículos pertinentes de su Reglamento aprobado por D.S. (M) Nº.223 de 11 de Marzo de 1968,

//..

REPUBLIC OF
CHILE MINISTRY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE
NAVY ADMIN. DEPT. 747

[Stamped:]
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Undersecretary of the Navy
7 DECEMBER 1979
PROCESSED

GRANTING YACIMIENTOS PETROLÍFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS A FIRST RENEWAL OF ITS MARITIME CONCESSION OVER A SECTOR OF BEACHFRONT LANDS, BEACH, SEABED, AND WATER PORTIONS IN THE EL CHINCHORRO AREA OF THE PORT OF ARICA

SUPREME DECREE No. 923

SANTIAGO, 26 NOV. 1979

It was decreed, on this day, as follows:

RECITALS:

Whereas, by means of Supreme Decree (M) No. 180 of 8 February 1961, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos was granted a concession, with expiry on 31 December 1979, over a sector of Beachfront lands, beach, seabed and portions of water at the port of Arica, for the purpose of allowing the laying of underground and submarine pipes of the Sica Sica – Arica oil pipeline terminal and keeping 2 buoys anchored for vessels larger than 10,000 gross registered tons and 3 permanent marker buoys.

Whereas, by means of Supreme Decree (M) No. 1161 of 6 December 1967, the aforementioned Decree for concession was expanded and amended, increasing the number of buoys to 3, establishing its tonnage for vessels between 10,000 tons and 20,000 gross registered tons, and further adding a sea discharge pipe for purified water from the de-ballasting of tanker ships.

Whereas, renewal of the concession has been requested, and there are no regulatory obstacles to granting such request.

Whereas, through this renewal, the 3 buoys shall be classified for ships between 30,000 and 50,000 gross registered tonnage, based on the largest vessel that has used those buoys (S/S "BELOBO" at 42,789 of gross registered tonnage on 27 June 1978); moreover, the 3 permanent marker buoys will be called "permanent marker buoys" in conformity with the regulations currently in force; and

in accordance with the accompanying background, the statements made by the Office of the Commander in Chief of the Navy (General Maritime Territory and Merchant Navy Office) via its Ordinary communication No. 12230/27/214 of 19 November 1979, the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 340, of 1960, and the relevant articles of the Rules approved via Supreme Decree (M) No. 223 of 11 March 1968,

D E C R E T O :

1.- OTORGASE a YACIMIENTOS PETROLIFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS, con domicilio en Arica, Barrio Industrial El Chinchorro S/N, PRIMERA RENOVACION de la concesión sobre un sector de TERRENOS DE PLAYA, PLAYA, FONDOS DE MAR Y PORCIONES DE AGUA, que disfruta según D.S. (M) Nº.180 de 8 de Febrero de 1961 modificado por D.S.(M) Nº.1161 de 6 de Diciembre de 1967, en el lugar denominado El Chinchorro en el puerto de Arica, comuna y provincia del mismo nombre, región de Tarapacá, e individualizada en la ubicación señalada en el plano 30/60, visado por la Autoridad Marítima de Arica.

2.- El sector de terrenos de playa se encuentra inscrito a nombre del Fisco, en mayor extensión, en el Conservador de Bienes Raíces de Arica a fojas 25 vuelta Nº.60 del Registro de Propiedades de 1935. Tiene una superficie de 700 m2. Deslinda y mide: Al Norte y Sur, con terrenos de playa, en 35 mts. en cada deslinde; al Este con terrenos de playa en 20 mts; y al Oeste, con playa en 35 mts.

3.- El sector de playa tiene una superficie de 1.400 m2. Deslinda y mide: al Norte y Sur, con playa, en 70 mts. en cada deslinde; al Este, con terrenos de playa sector concesionado, en 20 mts.; y al Oeste, con fondos de mar, en 20 mts.

4.- El sector de fondos de mar tien una superficie de 26.580 m2. y es una faja de 20 mts. de frente por 1.329 mts. de fondo que se extiende a continuación del sector de playa concesionado.

5.- Las porciones de agua están destinadas a mantener fondeadas tres (3) boyas para naves de más de 30.000 y hasta 50.000 toneladas de registro grueso y tres (3) boyarines permanentes de señalización.

6.- El objeto es amparar la cañería subterránea y submarina del terminal del oleoducto Sica Sica - Arica, elementos de señalización del oleoducto y de amarra para las naves en faena y una cañería de descarga al mar del agua purificada proveniente del deslastre de los buques tanques.

7.- El plazo será de VEINTE (20) AÑOS, a contar desde el 1º de Enero de 1980 y vencerá el 31 de Diciembre de 1999.

8.- Esta concesión se otorga a TITULO GRATUITO, en virtud a lo establecido en la letra "D" del acuerdo sobre el Oleoducto de Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos de Sica Sica a Arica suscrito el 24 de Abril de 1957.

9.- Esta concesión se regirá por las disposiciones contenidas en el D.F.L. Nº.340 de 1960, por el Reglamento sobre Concesiones Marítimas, aprobado por D.S. (M) Nº.223, de 1968, por el Reglamento General de Orden, Seguridad y disciplina en las Naves y Litoral de la República, y por las leyes o reglamentos que en el futuro los modifiquen o reemplacen.

It is hereby DECREED:

1. THERE IS HEREBY GRANTED to YACIMIENTOS PETROLIFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS, domiciled in Arica, Barrio Industrial El Chinchorro S/N, a FIRST RENEWAL of the concession over a sector of BEACHFRONT LANDS, BEACH, SEABED, AND PORTIONS OF WATER it holds by virtue of Supreme Decree (M) No. 180, of 8 February 1961, as amended by Supreme Decree (M) No. 1161, of 6 December 1967, in the El Chinchorro area of the port of Arica, in the municipality and province of the same name, Tarapacá Region, identified at the location indicated on map 30/60, as approved by the Maritime Authority of Arica.

2. Title to the sector of beachfront lands is recorded in the name of the State, more specifically on left-hand page 25 of the 1935 Land Register of the Arica Real Estate Registry. It covers an area of 700 m^2. Its measurements and boundaries are: To the North and South by beachfront lands, at 35 m in each direction; to the East by beachfront lands at 20 m, and to the West by beach at 35 m.

3. The beach sector covers an area of 1,400 m^2. Its measurements and boundaries are: To the North and South by beach at 70 m in each direction; to the East by the conceded beachfront lands at 20 m; and to the West by seabed at 20 m.

4. The seabed sector covers an area of 26,580 m^2, and is a strip 20 m long and 1,329 m wide running next to the sector of the beach concession area.

5. The portions of water will be used to keep three (3) anchored buoys for vessels between 30,000 and 50,000 gross registered tons, and three (3) permanent marker buoys.

6. The purpose is to cover the underground and submarine pipes of the Sica Sica – Arica oil pipeline terminal, markers for the oil pipeline and mooring buoys for the work vessels, as well as a sea-discharge pipe for the purified water for the de-ballasting of tanker ships.

7. The period shall be TWENTY (20) YEARS as from 1 January 1980; it shall expire on 31 December 1999.

8. This concession is granted FREE OF CONSIDERATION pursuant to Section "D" of the agreement on the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos's Sica Sica – Arica Oil Pipeline signed on 24 April 1957.

9. This concession shall be governed by the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 340 of 1960, the Maritime Concessions Rules approved by means of Supreme Decree (M) No. 223 of 1968, the General Order, Safety and Disciplinary Rules Aboard Vessels and in the Coastal Area of the Republic, as amended or substituted in the future.

10.- El presente decreto deberá ser reducido a escritura pública por el concesionario, facultándose al Tesorero Provincial de Arica para suscribirla en representación del Fisco, siendo suficiente causal de derogación el incumplimiento de esta obligación. Los gastos de reducción a escritura pública serán de cargo del concesionario.

Tómese razón, comuníquese y regístrese en la Dirección de Tierras y Bienes Nacionales del Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización.

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, GENERAL DE EJERCITO,
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA.

RAUL BENAVIDES ESCOBAR, TENIENTE GENERAL,
MINISTRO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL.

Lo que se transcribe para su conocimiento.

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
DIRECCION NACIONAL DE FRONTERAS
Y LIMITES DEL ESTADO
OFICINA DE PARTES
Nº 1421
Entrada 12 DIC. 1979
Salida

C.G.R. 5
T.G.R. 2
C.J.A. 1
M.T.C. 1
DGTM.y MM. 9
D. ADM. 2
ARCHIVO 1

JOR.-221179/
-747-

10. The concessionaire shall have this decree memorialized in a notarial deed; the Provincial Treasurer of Arica shall be authorized to sign said deed on behalf of the State; a failure to comply with this obligation shall be grounds for the abrogation of this Decree. The expense for notarization shall be borne by the concessionaire.

This decree is to be acknowledged, notified, and filed with the Office of National Property and Assets of the Ministry of Land and Settlement.

AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, ARMY GENERAL, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

RAUL BENAVIDES ESCOBAR, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Transcribed for the record.

[Stamped:]

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

NATIONAL OFFICE OF FRONTIERS AND LIMITS OF THE STATE

PARTIES OFFICE

No. 1421

Received: 12 DECEMBER 1979

Completed:

Annex 252

Official Message from the Chilean Delegation to the Organization of American States to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 401, 24 November 1980

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MINUTA: POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL

541854

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
ORDINARIO	401	241325	NOVIEMBRE	1980

DE : DELCHILE O.E.A.

A : MINISTRO SUBROGANTE

*** DESPACHO INMEDIATO ***

MINISTRO DICE :

"1.- CONFORME LO PREVISTO, EN TERCERA SESION COMISION GENERAL SE INICIO 11:00 HORAS DELEGACION URUGUAY PRESENTO PROYECTO RESOLUCION Y SOLICITO FUESE APROBADO POR CONSENSO.
2.- A CONTINUACION INTERVENCION URUGUAY HICE SIGUIENTE DECLARACION PARA DEJAR CONSTANCIA EXPRESA RESERVA A MENCION RESOLUCION NR.426 EN PREAMBULO PROYECTO:

"SENOR PRESIDENTE:

MI DELEGACION AL INICIO DE ESTA ASAMBLEA GENERAL HIZO EXPRESA Y FORMAL RESERVA A LA INCLUSION DEL TEMA 13 EN LA AGENDA DE ESTA REUNION. COMO ES DEL CONOCIMIENTO DE LOS SENORES DELEGADOS ESTA POSICION ESTA BASADA EN QUE NO ATRIBUIMOS A LA ORGANIZACION DE ESTADOS AMERICANOS NI A NINGUN ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL FACULTADES PARA PRONUNCIARSE SOBRE ASUNTOS QUE SON DE LA EXCLUSIVA COMPETENCIA INTERNA DE LOS ESTADOS=QUE AFECTEN ASUNTOS QUE ATANEN A SU TERRITORIO Y A SU SOBERANIA O A LAS RELACIONES BILATERALES ENTRE ESTADOS.
EN EL PUNTO ESPECIAL QUE HOY NOS OCUPA REITERO LAS MINIFESTACIONES QUE HICE EN EL DEBATE GENERAL DE ESTA ASAMBLEA DE QUE EL RESPETO A LAS NORMAS JURIDICAS POR LAS CUALES SE RIGE ESTA ORGANIZACION ES LA BASE DE SUSTENTACION DE TODA CONVIVENCIA EN EL SISTEMA.
NO OBSTANTE ESTA POSICION DE PRINCIPIO, EN ESTA OPORTUNIDAD AL TENER CONOCIMIENTO DE LA EXISTENCIA DE UN PROYECTO DE RESOLUCION QUE RECONOCE AL TRATAMIENTO DEL TEMA EL MARCO PROPIO DESDE EL CUAL DEBE SER ESTUDIADO Y FRENTE A LAS PERSPECTIVAS DE OBTENER UN CONSENSO, MI DELEGACION CON EL MAS AMPLIO ESPIRITU DE COOPERACION HA CONCURRIDO A ESTA REUNION.
SIN EMBARGO, PARA HACER POSIBLE EL CONSENSO QUIERO ENFATIZAR QUE EN NINGUN CASO ESTO SIGNIFICA UNA VARIACION DE NUESTRA CLARA POSICION SUSTENTADA EN LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LA PAZ SOBRE ESTA MATERIA.
QUIERO HACER EXPRESA RESERVA CON RESPECTO A LA MENCION QUE SE HACE DE LA RESOLUCION 426 EN EL PREAMBULO DE ESTE PROYECTO, QUE MI DELEGACION VOTO EN CONTRA EL ANO PASADO. MANTENEMOS RESPECTO A ESA

FORM 29 - EXCELSIOR LTDA.

REFERENCIA:

A.R.R. 18962

24/11/80 241704 17:25:02

OPERADOR V9 B9 CLAVE

OFFICIAL MESSAGE

541854

Classification	Number	Time Origin	Month	Year
ORDINARY	401	241325	NOVEMBER	1980

From: DELCHILE O.E.A. [CHILEAN DELEGATION, OAS]

To: ACTING MINISTER

*** IMMEDIATE DISPATCH ***

THE MINISTER STATES:

1.- AS ESTABLISHED, THE THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE BEGAN AT 11:00 AM. THE URUGUAYAN DELEGATION PRESENTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE APPROVED BY CONSENSUS.
2.- AFTER THE PARTICIPATION OF THE URUGUAYAN DELEGATION, I MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO LEAVE EXPRESS RECORD OF OUR RESERVATIONS AGAINST THE INCORPORATION OF RESOLUTION NO. 426 TO THE DRAFT PREAMBLE:

"MR. PRESIDENT:

AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MY DELEGATION FORMALLY EXPRESSED ITS RESERVATIONS AGAINST THE INCORPORATION OF ITEM 13 TO THIS SESSION'S AGENDA. AS THE DELEGATES KNOW, OUR POSITION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT WE DO NOT CONFER ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES OR ON ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION THE POWER TO RULE ON MATTERS WHICH ARE UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES, WHICH ARE RELATED TO THEIR TERRITORY OR SOVEREIGNTY, OR WHICH AFFECT THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.
AS FOR THE SPECIAL MATTER WE ARE ADDRESSING TODAY, I REITERATE THE STATEMENTS I MADE AT THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THIS ASSEMBLY, IN THAT THE OBSERVANCE OF THE LEGAL RULES WHICH GOVERN THIS ORGANIZATION IS THE FOUNDATION SUSTAINING OUR COEXISTENCE IN THE SYSTEM. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, ON THIS OCCASION, OUR DELEGATION HAS COME TO THIS MEETING WITH THE HIGHEST SPIRIT OF COOPERATION SINCE WE ARE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH ADDRESSES THE MATTER FROM AN APPROPRIATE PERSPECTIVE FOR ANALYSIS AND SINCE WE KNOW ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING CONSENSUS IN SUCH REGARD.
HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MAKE CONSENSUS POSSIBLE, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT OUR AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER DOES NOT IN ANY WAY MODIFY THE CLEAR POSITION WE EXPRESSED AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN LA PAZ.
I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCORPORATION OF RESOLUTION NO. 426 TO THE PREAMBLE TO THIS DRAFT, WHICH OUR DELEGATION

REFERENCE:

11/24/80 241704 17:25:02 A.R.R. [Signature] 18962

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR: 9 PAGINA: 2

MINUTA: POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL

541855

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
ORDINARIO	401	241325	NOVIEMBRE	1980

DE : DELCHILE O.E.A.

A : MINISTRO SUBROGANTE

RESOLUCION LA MISMA ACTITUD DE RECHAZO.SOSTENEMOS,QUE FUE UNA EXTRA-
LIMITACION DE LAS FACULTADES DE ESTE ORGANISMO.NO LE RECONOCEMOS
VALIDEZ A ESA RESOLUCION Y MANTENEMOS LA POSICION QUE LA ORGANIZA-
CION NO TIENE FACULTAD ALGUNA PARA PRONUNCIARSE SOBRE ASUNTOS QUE
SON PRIVATIVOS DE LA SOBERANIA CHILENA.
AL CONCURRIR AL CONSENSO CREEMOS QUE CONTRIBUIMOS A EVITAR QUE
SE CONTINUE EN LA SENDA DEL DEBILITAMIENTO DE LAS BASES DE LA O.E.A.
Y HACEMOS UN APORTE AL ESPIRITU DE COOPERACION QUE QUEREMOS VER IM-
PERAR EN LA ORGANIZACION.
3.- DELEGADO BOLIVIA SR.MARCELO OSTRIA HABLO EN SEGUIDA TERMINOS
PONDERADOS DESTACANDO ALCANCE TIENE PARA BOLIVIA RESOLUCION 426
E INSISTIENDO CONCEPTO SOLIDARIDAD ASI COMO CONVENIENCIA ENCON-
TRAR SOLUCIONES PRACTICAS ENCAMINADAS A LOGRAR PAZ EFECTIVA Y
DESARROLLO.DESTACO ENTENDIMIENTO DIRECTO BASE REAL DEBE PROPICIAR
SOLUCION.
4.- DELEGACION MEXICO,ECUADOR,PERU,ARGENTINA,PARAGUAY,BRASIL,
REPUBLICA DOMINICANA,NICARAGUA,ESTADOS UNIDOS,COSTA RICA,COLOMBIA
Y HONDURAS INTERVINIERON PARA APOYAR CONSENSO Y MANIFESTAR SATIS-
FACCION POR ESPIRITU ANIMA PARTES INVOLUCRADAS.-

DAZA

REFERENCIA:

A.R.R.

FECHA			OPERADOR	Vº Bº CLAVE
24/11/80	241704	17:25:10		18962

VOTED AGAINST LAST YEAR. WE CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THAT RESOLUTION. WE HOLD THAT IT EXCEEDS THE POWERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION. WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THAT RESOLUTION TO BE VALID AND WE THUS MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT THE ORGANIZATION HAS NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER TO RULE ON MATTERS WHICH ARE EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED WITH CHILE'S SOVEREIGNTY.
WE CONTRIBUTE TO CONSENSUS BUILDING IN THE BELIEF THAT WE HELP PREVENT THE OAS' FOUNDATIONS FROM WEAKENING. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE RULE IN THE ORGANIZATION.
3.- NEXT, THE BOLIVIAN DELEGATE, MARCELO OSTRIA, SPOKE IN THE FOLLOWING WEIGHTED TERMS, HIGHLIGHTING THE SCOPE THAT RESOLUTION 426 HAS FOR BOLIVIA. HE INSISTED ON THE IDEA OF SOLIDARITY AND THAT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS SHOULD BE FOUND TO ACCOMPLISH THE STATES' EFFECTIVE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT. HE STATED THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE REACHED THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATION BY THE PARTIES.
4.- THE DELEGATIONS OF MEXICO, ECUADOR, PERU, ARGENTINA, PARAGUAY, BRAZIL, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, NICARAGUA, THE UNITED STATES, COSTA RICA, COLOMBIA, AND HONDURAS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR AGREEMENT AND SATISFACTION WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED.

DAZA

Annex 253

Minutes of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 27 November 1980 (extract)

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Tenth Regular Session, 1980, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/X.O.2 (1981), pp 138 and 197

[p 138]

MINUTES OF THE SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Date: 27 November 1980
Time: 2:00 a.m.
Place: Hall of the Americas

[…]

[p 197]

h. The maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1299/80)

The PRESIDENT: We will now consider the draft resolution on the maritime problem of Bolivia [AG/doc.1299/80]. The Representative of Chile has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Scheggia): Thank you very much, Mr. President. In the General Committee, my Delegation established its point of view about this draft resolution, and on this occasion I would like to refer to that declaration. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Loayza): Thank you, Mr. President. When the draft resolution was considered in the General Committee, my Delegation emphasized Bolivia's special conditions with regard to its sovereign outlet to the Pacific, and we would like for the considerations indicated on that occasion be transcribed within this resolution. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. If there are no objections, the draft resolution is considered approved. Approved.

Annex 254

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 481 (X–O/80), The Bolivian Maritime Problem, 27 November 1980

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Tenth Regular Session, 1980, *Proceedings*, Vol. I, OEA/Ser.P/X.O.2 (1981), p 28



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2
15 May, 1981
Volume I

TENTH REGULAR SESSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOVEMBER 19—27, 1980

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1981

AG

AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80)

THE BOLIVIAN MARITIME PROBLEM

(Resolution adopted at the sixth plenary session,
held on November 27, 1980)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), adopted by the General Assembly at its ninth regular session, which declared that the search for an equitable solution whereby Bolivia would obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean was a matter of continuing hemispheric interest; and

CONSIDERING:

That, in the interest of the hemisphere, it is essential that that solution, while taking into account rights, aspirations, and interests, be found within the framework governing the relations among the parties involved, a matter that will be followed with interest by the countries of America,

RESOLVES:

To urge those states most directly concerned with the problem of Bolivia's access to the sea to initiate a dialogue, through the appropriate channels, to find the most satisfactory solution.

AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80)

PROBLEME DE L'ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A LA MER

(Résolution adoptée à la troisième séance plénière
tenue le 27 novembre 1980)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

VU

Sa résolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), adoptée à sa neuvième session ordinaire, où elle a déclaré qu'il est de l'intérêt permanent du continent de rechercher une solution équitable qui assure à la Bolivie un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique, et

CONSIDERANT

Que, dans l'intérêt du continent, il est nécessaire que cette solution tienne compte des droits, des aspirations et des intérêts des parties concernées, et respecte en outre les règles qui président à leurs relations; qu'il s'agit d'une question qui sera suivie de près par les pays de l'Amérique,

DECIDE

D'inviter instamment les Etats directement concernés par le problème de l'accès de la Bolivie à la mer à ouvrir par les voies appropriées un dialogue qui conduise à la solution la plus satisfaisante de ce problème.

Annex 255

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the General Committee of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 7 December 1981 (English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Eleventh Regular Session, 1981, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XI.O.2 (1984), pp 425, 482-483 and 486-488

[p 425]

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

Date: 7 December 1981
Time: 5:30 p.m.
Place: Hotel La Toc – Room "A"

President: Mr. Peter Josie
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Industry and Tourism of Saint Lucia

Present: Messrs.

Ernesto Arrieta Peralta	(El Salvador)
César Elvir Sierra	(Honduras)
Manuel E. Tavares Espaillat	(Dominican Republic)
Cherrie J. Orr	(Jamaica)
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann	(Nicaragua)
Hilarión Cardozo	(Venezuela)
Filiberto Ginzo Gil	(Uruguay)
Gustavo Santiso Gálvez	(Guatemala)
Juan Manuel Castulovich	(Panama)
Charles A. T. Skeete	(Barbados)
Raúl Falconí	(Ecuador)
Alberto Quiroga García	(Bolivia)
Edouard Francisque	(Haiti)
Raúl A. Quijano	(Argentina)
Dessima Williams	(Grenada)
Alberto Nogués	(Paraguay)
René Rojas Galdames	(Chile)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
Carlos Bernal Téllez	(Colombia)
Herbert B. Thompson	(United States)
Ruwaldo E. van Bochove	(Suriname)
Victor C. McIntyre	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Marco César Meira Naslausky	(Brazil)
José Rafael Echeverría	(Costa Rica)
Wosley P. Louis	(Dominica)
Kenneth A. Browne	(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua and Barbuda)
Barry B. L. Auguste	(Saint Lucia)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[…]

[p 482]

3. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/CG/doc.12/81) (item 15 on the agenda) (conclusion)

The PRESIDENT: Since there is no delegation that wishes to take the floor, I submit for the consideration of the distinguished members of the General Committee the desires expressed by the distinguished Ministers of Chile and of Bolivia to listen to the working group that this same Committee appointed with respect to item 15 on the agenda. If there is no objection, I will give the floor to the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica so he can give his report.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF COSTA RICA (Mr. Echeverría): Thank you very much, Mr. President. I cannot add much; I will simply read the draft resolution.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED:

Resolutions AG/RES. 426 and AG/RES. 481 of sessions nine and ten, respectively, of the General Assembly, which declared it to be of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia obtains a useful sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean,

[p 483]

RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate its support for the contents of these resolutions.

2. To encourage the States involved to initiate a dialogue, through the proper channels, that would permit the most satisfactory solution to the Bolivian maritime problem.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

[…]

[p 486]

[...]

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Rojas): Thank you, Mr. President. First, I would like to especially thank my distinguished colleague, the Representative of Costa Rica, Ambassador Echeverría, for the intelligent efforts made to reconcile our sister Delegation of Bolivia with the one over which I preside, and to seek an understanding that has reached a happy culmination. At the same time, I would like to emphasize the dignity with which the Foreign Minister of Bolivia has handled his position in this matter.

I would, however, like to explain why I have reached a consensus on this occasion. During this meeting, Mr. President, I said that the

[p 487]

OAS should be a meeting place and not one of confrontation, but for this to happen it is important to combine positions. In that spirit I have joined this consensus to approve this resolution, even though we have serious objections to part of its text. My country's position on resolution AG/RES. 426 is well known, as we consider it unlawful and contrary to the basic principles of this Organization. Therefore, the fact that we are joining the consensus does not in any way mean that we are changing our position, because we do not recognize the validity of that resolution and because the OAS has no authority whatsoever to rule on matters that are within the domain of Chilean sovereignty. By joining in the consensus, we believe that we are contributing to weakening the legal part of the OAS and are thus making a contribution to the spirit of cooperation that we want to see prevail in our Organization. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

[…]

[p 488]

THE PRESIDENT: The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Romero): Thank you, Mr. President. My first words must be to thank the Delegation of Panama, which has supported us from the beginning on the draft resolution as well as the wise, correct, and gentlemanly speech by distinguished Ambassador Echeverría from Costa Rica. I must also not forget, Mr. President, the various delegations that have dealt with this issue with interest, giving initiatives, suggesting formulas, and in such a way that I also want to have the record reflect my thanks.

The distinguished Delegation of Chile has made some reservations to its vote, and I would like to add, Mr. President, that we also reaffirm our opinion, which fortunately is included in the resolution, that we have managed to update the resolution of 1979, which to a certain extent, Mr. President, means that there are lookout points on this journey by two sister nations which can be reconciled. There are stars that point the way, Mr. President, and I think that the OAS is one of those stars. The proof is clear that we are reaching a consensus.

In my opinion, the OAS has great authority—one to encourage, stimulate and promote everything related to agreement, peace, harmony and equilibrium. Once again, Mr. President, I would like to say that in this belief, and on this road, we will seek the solutions that two sister nations can find. Thank you very much.

Annex 256

Minutes of the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 10 December 1981

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Eleventh Regular Session, 1981, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XI.O.2 (1984), pp 239 and 292-293

[p 239]

MINUTES OF THE EIGHT PLENARY MEETING

Date: 10 December 1981
Time: 8:15 p.m.
Place: Hotel La Toc, Room "A"

President: Mr. Peter Josie
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Industry and Tourism of Saint Lucia

Present: Messrs.

Ernesto Arrieta Peralta	(El Salvador)
Diego Landa Celano	(Honduras)
Eladio Knipping Victoria	(Dominican Republic)
Keith Johnson	(Jamaica)
Casimiro Sotelo	(Nicaragua)
Edith Márquez de Pereyra	(Venezuela)
Francisco Bustillo del Campo	(Uruguay)
Hernán Hurtado Prem	(Guatemala)
Juan Manuel Castulovich	(Panamá)
Charles A. T. Skeete	(Barbados)
Manuel Romero Cevallos	(Ecuador)
Armando Loayza Mariaca	(Bolivia)
Fritz N. Cinéas	(Haiti)
Raúl A. Quijano	(Argentina)
Dessima Williams	(Grenada)
Uldaricio Figueroa	(Chile)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
Carlos Bernal Téllez	(Colombia)
Herbert B. Thompson	(United States)
Eugene R. Nahar	(Suriname)
Victor C. McIntyre	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Barry B. L. Auguste	(Saint Lucia)
Marcelo Vargas	(Mexico)
Gilberto Ferreira Martins	(Brazil)
O'Neale Sinclair Barrow	(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua and Barbuda)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[...]

[p 292]

1. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1463/81)

[...]

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Daza): Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, when this draft was approved in the General Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country made a statement, the terms of which I would like to be included in the minutes of this meeting. Thank you, Mr. President.

[...]

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Loayza): Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to speak, on behalf of my Delegation, which would appreciate it if the minutes could also reflect the statement that the Head of the Bolivian Delegation made in the General Committee, when this draft of such importance to my country was approved, under the title "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia". Thank you.

[...]

[p 293]

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU (Mr. Marchand): Mr. President, I ask that the declaration made by Peru when this document was approved in the General Committee also be recorded in the minutes. Thank you very much.

Annex 257

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 560 (XI–O/81), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 10 December 1981

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Eleventh Regular Session, 1981, *Proceedings*, Vol. II Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XI.O.2 (1982), pp 95 and 97



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2
24 June, 1982
Volume I

ELEVENTH REGULAR SESSION
CASTRIES, SAINT LUCIA
DECEMBER 2-11, 1981

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1982

AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81)

REPORT ON THE MARITIME PROBLEM OF BOLIVIA

(Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session,
held on December 10, 1981)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN AND CONSIDERING:

Resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) and AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) adopted by the General Assembly, at its ninth and tenth regular sessions respectively which declared that the search for an equitable solution whereby Bolivia would obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean was a matter of hemispheric interest,

RESOLVES:

1. To reconfirm its support for the content of the above-mentioned resolutions.

2. To urge the states concerned to initiate, through the appropriate channels, a dialogue that will make possible the most satisfactory solution of the Bolivian maritime problem.

AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81)

RAPPORT SUR LE PROBLEME DE L'ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A LA MER

(Résolution adoptée à la huitième séance plénière tenue le 10 décembre 1981)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

VU ET CONSIDERANT

Ses résolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) et AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) où elle a déclaré qu'il est de l'intérêt permanent du continent de rechercher une solution équitable qui assure à la Bolivie un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique,

DECIDE:

1. De renouveler son appui aux dispositions des résolutions précitées.

2. D'inviter instamment les Etats concernés par le problème de l'accès de la Bolivie à la mer à ouvrir par les voies appropriées un dialogue qui conduise à la solution la plus satisfaisante de ce problème.

Annex 258

Minutes of the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 20 November 1982

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Twelfth Regular Session, 1982, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XII.O.2 (1983), pp 212 and 222-223

[p 212]

MINUTES OF THE EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION

Date: 20 November 1982
Time: 11:30 a.m.
Place: Hall of the Americas

President: Mr. Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia

Present: Messrs.

Eladio Knipping Victoria	(Dominican Republic)
Raúl Falconí	(Ecuador)
Fernando Volio Jiménez	(Costa Rica)
Fernando Salazar Paredes	(Bolivia)
Luis M. de Posadas Montero	(Uruguay)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
Victor Chrysostom McIntyre	(Trinidad and Tobago)
H. H. Naarendorp	(Suriname)
Sonia M. Johnny	(Saint Lucia)
M. Patricia Durrant	(Jamaica)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua y Barbuda)
Francisco Posada de la Peña	(Colombia)
Policarpo Callejas Bonilla	(Honduras)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Herbert B. Thompson	(United States)
Pedro Daza	(Chile)
Armando Muñoz Pinzón	(Panama)
Mario López Escobar	(Paraguay)
Gustavo Santiso Gálvez	(Guatemala)
Yvette Goddard	(Barbados)
Winston K. Davis	(Grenada)
Juan José Uranga	(Argentina)
Ernesto Arrieta Peralta	(El Salvador)
Alarico Silveira Junior	(Brazil)
Víctor Giménez Landínez	(Venezuela)
Leonte Herdocia	(Nicaragua)
Gabriel Ancion	(Haiti)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[…]

[p 222]

[…]

t. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1604/82)

The PRESIDENT: Under consideration is the draft resolution on the maritime problem of Bolivia [AG/doc.1604/82]. The Representative of Chile has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Daza): Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to formally request that, following the precedent set on other occasions, and by virtue of Article 84 of the Rules of the General Assembly, the minutes reflect the following declaration on the resolution entitled "Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia."

The resolution approved in the General Committee goes beyond the authority of the General Assembly. The Government of Chile does not recognize any authority of either this General Assembly or any international organization to express itself on matters of exclusive internal competence or on how Chile should conduct its bilateral affairs.

Resolution AG/RES. 426, adopted on 31 October 1979, with the negative vote of Chile, continues to be illegal and constitutes no impediment to Chile. The resolution to which this statement refers and which is now submitted to this plenary meeting is not binding on Chile.

For these reasons, and to be consistent with Chile's non-participation in the consideration of this matter, Chile is not taking part in the vote on this resolution. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: That will be done. The Representative of Paraguay has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PARAGUAY (Mr. López Escobar): Thank you, Mr. President. I want to repeat, Mr. President, the words of my Foreign Minister on the occasion to approve this draft. Thus, he said:

> My Delegation voted in favor of the draft resolution that has just been approved, with the express reservation that we believe, conforming to what we have stated on prior occasions, that said resolution must be interpreted as an exhortation to the Parties involved in the so-called maritime problem of Bolivia to find a solution through peaceful negotiations. Therefore, Mr. President, Paraguay reiterates and notes that, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and faithful to its policy of non-

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> intervention in the internal affairs of other States, what is called the maritime problem of Bolivia must be conducted within the principles established in Article 3 of the OAS Charter.

Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Representative. …

Annex 259

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 602 (XII–O/82), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 20 November 1982

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Twelfth Regular Session, 1982, *Proceedings*, Vol. I, OEA/Ser.P/XII.O.2 (1982), pp 35-37



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OEA/Ser.P/XII.0.2
15 December 1982
Volume I

TWELFTH REGULAR SESSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOVEMBER 15-21, 1982

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1982

AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82)

REPORT ON THE MARITIME PROBLEM OF BOLIVIA

(Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session,
held on November 20, 1982)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) of October 31, 1979, AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) of November 27, 1980, and AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) of December 10, 1981, in which it is asserted that it is of continuing interest to the hemisphere to find an equitable solution through which Bolivia might gain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean; and

CONSIDERING:

That the need persists to attain the foregoing objective, in a spirit of fraternity and with a view to the integration of the Americas, and to consolidate a stable peace that will promote economic and social progress in the area of the Americas directly affected by the consequences of Bolivia's landlocked status,

RESOLVES:

1. To reaffirm resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) adopted on October 31, 1979 as well as the subsequent resolutions AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) adopted on November 27, 1980 and AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/80) adopted on December 7, 1981.

2. To recommend once again to the parties directly concerned with the problem that they set in motion negotiations to provide Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial link with the Pacific Ocean.

3. Either of the parties may request the inclusion of the topic "Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia" on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF CHILE

"Resolution AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82) goes beyond the authority of the General Assembly. The Government of Chile does not recognize any authority of either this General Assembly or any international organization to express itself on matters of exclusive internal competence or on how Chile should conduct its bilateral affairs.

Resolution AG/RES. 426, adopted on October 31, 1979, with the negative vote of Chile, continues to be illegal and constitutes no impediment to Chile.

Resolution AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82), to which this statement refers, is not binding on Chile.

For these reasons, and to be consistent with Chile's nonparticipation in consideration of this matter, Chile is not taking part in the vote on this resolution."

AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82)

RAPPORT SUR LE PROBLEME DE L'ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A LA MER

(Résolution adoptée à la huitième séance plénière
tenue le 20 novembre 1982)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

VU

Les résolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) du 31 octobre 1979, AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) du 27 novembre 1980, et AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) du 10 décembre 1981, par lesquelles elle a déclaré qu'il est de l'intérêt permanent du continent de trouver une solution équitable qui assure à la Bolivie un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique,

CONSIDERANT

Qu'il demeure nécessaire d'atteindre, dans un esprit de fraternité et d'intégration américaine, l'objectif signalé au paragraphe précédent et d'instaurer une paix stable apte à stimuler le progrès économique et social dans la région de l'Amérique, directement touchée par les conséquences de l'enclavement de la Bolivie,

DECIDE:

1. De confirmer dans toute sa teneur la résolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) adoptée le 31 octobre 1979, ainsi que les résolutions AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) et AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) rspectivement adoptées les 27 novembre 1980 et 7 décembre 1981 par l'Assemblée générale.

2. De recommander une fois encore aux parties directement concernées par le problème sous référence d'entamer des négociations visant à assurer à la Bolivie une passerelle territoriale libre et souveraine vers l'Océan pacifique.

3. Chacune des parties peut demander l'inscription du point "Rapport sur le problème d'accès de la Bolivie à la mer" à l'ordre du jour de la prochaine session ordinaire de l'Assemblée générale.

DECLARATION DE LA DELEGATION DU CHILI

La résolution excède les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée générale. Le Gouvernement du Chili ne reconnaît ni à l'Assemblée générale ni à aucun autre organisme international la faculté de statuer sur des questions qui relèvent exclusivement de sa compétence intérieure ou sur la façon dont il mène ses relations bilatérales.

La résolution AG/RES. 426 adoptée le 31 octobre 1979 avec le vote négatif du Chili continue d'être illégitime et n'engage nullement le Chili.

La résolution dont fait état cette déclaration ne lie pas le Chili.

Par conséquent, dans la ligne de l'attitude prise par le Chili en ce qui a trait à sa participation à l'examen de cette question, ce pays ne prendra pas part à la mise aux voix de la présente résolution.

Annex 260

Official Message from the Chilean Delegation to the Organization of American States to the Directorate for Multilateral Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 297/298, 14 September 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

PUBLICA DE CHILE
STERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR 1 PAGINA 1

MINUTA POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL 284964

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	297/8.	141520	SEPTIEMBRE	1983

DELCHILE OEA

DIMULTI INFO DIBILAT-DIPLAN

REGRES.
1.- DURANTE MI PERMANENCIA EN CARACAS EMBAJADOR FERNANDO SALAZAR DE BOLIVIA, ME EXPRESO TENIA URGENCIA CONVERSAR CONMIGO AL REGRESAR WASHINGTON. CONVERSACION QUE SE EFECTUO EN EL DIA DE HOY.

2.- EMBAJADOR DE BOLIVIA ME EXPRESO QUERIA CONVERSAR SOBRE ULTIMOS ACONTECIMIENTOS SE HAN PRODUCIDO EN LAS RELACIONES ENTRE NUESTROS DOS PAISES Y FORMA ENCARAR PROXIMA ASAMBLEA OEA.

3.- ME INDICO QUE EN MINISTERIO RELACIONES EXTERIORES BOLIVIA SE HA PRODUCIDO UNA EVOLUCION EN EL TRATAMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA MARITIMO QUE IBA DESDE UNA ACTITUD DURA COMO LA QUE TUVO CANCILLER VELARDE, A UNA POSICION DE FRANCO ENTENDIMIENTO Y COLABORACION COMO ES LA QUE BUSCO CANCILLER TAMAYO Y QUE AHORA PROSIGUE ACTUAL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES BOLIVIA, QUE ESTA ORIENTADA A ABRIR UN PROCESO QUE PERMITA RELACIONES POSITIVAS CON CHILE.

4.- ME CONSULTO SI CONOCIA LA INICIATIVA DE COLOMBIA A LA QUE LE RESPONDI QUE ESTABA ENTERADO DE ELLA DE MANERA GENERAL.

5.- CON RESPECTO A ESTA INICIATIVA ME EXPRESO SALAZAR, QUE SU GOBIERNO HABIA SENALADO A GOBIERNO COLOMBIANO SU AGRADECIMIENTO POR UNA INICIATIVA DESTINADA A REANUDAR RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS CON CHILE, QUE ELLO OBVIAMENTE ACEPTABAN. EXPRESARON A CANCILLER COLOMBIANO, QUE A FIN DE ATENDER UNA SERIE DE PROBLEMAS RESPECTO A LOS CUALES EXISTIA UNA GRAN SENSIBILIDAD EN SU PAIS, LA INICIATIVA COLOMBIANA DEBERIA REALIZARSE EN FORMA MAS LENTA QUE LA PROPUESTA. A ESTE RESPECTO Y ANTES DE LA REUNION DE LOS DOS MINISTROS, DE CHILE Y BOLIVIA, QUE COLOMBIA PROPONIA SE EFECTUARA EN BOGOTA EN SEPTIEMBRE, ELLOS PREFERIAN QUE MINISTRO BOLIVIANO SOSTUVIERA REUNION INFORMAL CON US. DURANTE ASAMBLEA NACIONES UNIDAS. POSTERIORMENTE DEBERIA EFECTUARSE DESARROLLO ASAMBLEA OEA. Y CONCEBIR LA REUNION DE BOGOTA POSTERIOR A ESTOS DOS ACONTECIMIENTOS.
CONTINUA EN MI TELEX 298.-

DAZA

REFERENCIA
REFIEROME CONVERSACION SOSTENIDA CON EMBAJADOR BOLIVIA OEA.

PROHIBIDO FOTOCOPIAR SIN AUTORIZACION O REPRODUCIR SIN PARAFRASEAR

OPERADOR J. F. T. V°B° CLAVE

FECHA 14/09/83 HORA LLEGADA 141807 HORA PRODUCCION 18:35:50 CORRELATIVO 13484

OFFICIAL NOTE 284964

Classification	Number	Time Origin	Month	Year
CONFIDENTIAL	297/8	141520	SEPTEMBER	1983

From: DELCHILE OEA [CHILEAN DELEGATION, OAS]
To: DIMULTI [Directorate for Multilateral Policy] CC: DIBILAT [DIRECTORATE OF BILATERAL AFFAIRS] – DIPLAN [Directorate for Planning]

REQRES.

1.- DURING MY STAY IN CARACAS, AMBASSADOR FERNANDO SALAZAR OF BOLIVIA EXPRESSED THAT IT WAS URGENT TO HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH ME UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON. WE HELD THAT CONVERSATION TODAY.

2.- THE AMBASSADOR OF BOLIVIA STATED THAT HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THE LATEST EVENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND HOW TO ADDRESS THE UPCOMING OAS ASSEMBLY.

3.- HE MENTIONED THAT THE BOLIVIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS MADE PROGRESS IN THE TREATMENT OF THE MARITIME PROBLEM, SHIFTING FROM THE RIGID STANCE ADOPTED BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VELARDE TO THE POSITION OF FRANK UNDERSTANDING AND COLLABORATION SOUGHT BY FOREIGN MINISTER TAMAYO, WHICH THE CURRENT MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA MAINTAINS AND WHICH AIMS AT COMMENCING A PROCESS THAT PERMITS POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH CHILE.

4.- HE INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER I WAS AWARE OF THE INITIATIVE OF COLOMBIA, TO WHICH I RESPONDED I WAS GENERALLY AWARE OF IT.

5.- WITH REGARD TO THIS INITIATIVE, SALAZAR TOLD ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD EXPRESSED ITS GRATITUDE TO THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE INITIATIVE AIMED AT RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE, WHICH THEY CERTAINLY ACCEPTED. THEY TOLD THE COLOMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT, IN ORDER TO ADDRESS A SERIES OF ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE COUNTRY WAS MOST SENSITIVE, THE COLOMBIAN INITIATIVE SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN LESS SWIFTLY THAN AS PROPOSED. IN THIS REGARD, AND BEFORE THE MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTERS OF CHILE AND BOLIVIA TOOK PLACE, WHICH COLOMBIA PROPOSED TO HOST IN BOGOTA IN SEPTEMBER, THEY WOULD PREFER THE BOLIVIAN MINISTER HOLD AN INFORMAL MEETING WITH YOU DURING THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY. THEN THE OAS ASSEMBLY WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND THE BOGOTA MEETING WOULD BE HELD AFTER THESE TWO EVENTS.

CONTINUES IN MY TELEX 298.-

DAZA



PUBLICA DE CHILE
ISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR 1 PAGINA

MINUTA POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL 285(

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	298	141521	SEPTIEMBRE	1983

E: DELCHILE OEA

.: DIMULTI INFO DIBILAT DIPLAN

CONTINUO MI TELEX 297.-
6.- MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE BOLIVIA PENSABA, QUE ASAMBLEA OEA. DEBERIA SERVIR AL PROPOSITO DE COLOMBIA. BOLIVIA ESTABA OBLIGADA INCLUIR TEMA PROXIMA ASAMBLEA, PERO, A FIN DE SERVIR ESE PROPOSITO, BOLIVIA SE LIMITARIA A EMITIR UN INFORME MUY BREVE QUE ESTARIA ORIENTADO ENFATIZAR DIALOGO CON CHILE SIN PERSEGUIR OBTENER DE LA ASAMBLEA NINGUNA RESOLUCION. QUEDARIAN SATISFECHOS CON QUE ALGUNOS PAISES COMO COLOMBIA U OTROS HICIERAN DECLARACIONES QUE INSTARAN AL DIALOGO.

7.-EXPRESE A SALAZAR, QUE SIEMPRE HABIAMOS SIDO PARTIDARIOS DEL DIALOGO CON BOLIVIA PARA RESOLVER NUESTROS ASUNTOS, PERO QUE DEBIA HACERLE PRESENTE QUE EL CLIMA DEL DIALOGO HABIA SIDO PERTURBADO PRECISAMENTE POR BOLIVIA DEBIDO A LA RUPTURA DE RELACIONES CON CHILE, SU ACCION EN LOS ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES Y LA ACTIVA CAMPANA DESARROLLADA EN CONTRA NUESTRO PAIS, TODO LO CUAL HABIA CREADO UN PROFUNDO IMPACTO EN LA OPINION PUBLICA CHILENA QUE NO FAVORECIA, EN LA ACTUALIDAD, NEGOCIACIONES CON BOLIVIA. LE AGREGUE, QUE SE TRATABA DE UN LARGO PROCESO EN QUE DEBIAN RECTIFICARSE LAS ACCIONES BOLIVIANAS A FIN DE CREAR UN CLIMA POSITIVO EN NUESTROS DOS PAISES.

8.- POR LO EXPRESADO POR SALAZAR QUEDA DEFINIDA UNA ESTRATEGIA BOLIVIANA EN LA OEA QUE ESTA ORIENTADA A INTRODUCIR EL TEMA EN LA PROXIMA ASAMBLEA, EN LA FORMA MAS PACIFICA POSIBLE A FIN DE FACILITAR LA MATERIALIZACION DE LA INICIATIVA COLOMBIANA.

9.- ME FORME EL CONVENCIMIENTO DE QUE SALAZAR ESTA ACTUANDO CON INSTRUCCIONES MUY CLARAS SU CANCILLERIA. SIN EMBARGO CONOCIENDO LAS BELEIDADES DE LA POLITICA DE SU PAIS, SE ADELANTO A EXPRESARME QUE CUALQUIER CAMBIO A ESTE POSICION ME LA HARIA SABER EN FORMA INMEDIATA.

10.- AGRADECERE A US. SUS COMENTARIOS PARA EL CASO SE PRESENTE NUEVA OPORTUNIDAD CONVERSAR CON SALAZAR.

F I N

DAZA.

REFERENCIA

REFIEROME CONVERSACION SOSTENIDA CON EMBAJADOR BOLIVIA OEA.

PROHIBIDO FOTOCOPIAR SIN AUTORIZACION O REPRODUCIR SIN PARAFRASEAR

OPERADOR J.F.T. Vº Bº CLAVE

FECHA 14/09/83 HORA LLEGADA 141849 HORA PROCESO 19:22:00 CORRELATIVO 13

CONTINUATION OF MY TELEX 297.-
6.- THE BOLIVIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BELIEVED THAT THE OAS ASSEMBLY WOULD SERVE COLOMBIA'S PROPOSAL. BOLIVIA WAS BOUND TO INCLUDE THE MATTER IN THE FOLLOWING ASSEMBLY, BUT, TO THIS END, BOLIVIA WOULD MERELY ISSUE A BRIEF REPORT AIMED AT LAYING EMPHASIS ON A DIALOGUE WITH CHILE, WITHOUT SEEKING OR OBTAINING ANY KIND OF RESOLUTION FROM THE ASSEMBLY. THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH HAVING CERTAIN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS COLOMBIA OR OTHERS, MAKING STATEMENTS URGING FOR DIALOGUE.

7.- I TOLD SALAZAR THAT WE HAD AT ALL TIMES BEEN IN FAVOR OF ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE WITH BOLIVIA TO RESOLVE OUR ISSUES, BUT THAT I HAD TO REMIND HIM THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF DIALOGUE HAD BEEN DISRUPTED PRECISELY BECAUSE BOLIVIA HAD RUPTURED RELATIONS WITH CHILE, ITS ACTION BEFORE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE ACTIVE CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED AGAINST OUR COUNTRY, ALL OF WHICH HAD HAD A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE CHILEAN PUBLIC, WHICH CURRENTLY DID NOT FAVOR ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOLIVIA. I ADDED THAT THIS WOULD BE A LENGTHY PROCESS, IN WHICH BOLIVIAN ACTIONS HAD TO BE RECTIFIED SO AS TO CREATE A POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT IN BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES.

8.- BASED ON THE STATEMENTS BY SALAZAR, BOLIVIA'S STRATEGY BEFORE THE OAS AIMS AT INTRODUCING THE MATTER IN THE UPCOMING ASSEMBLY, AS PEACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE REALIZATION OF THE COLOMBIAN INITIATIVE.

9.- I AM CONVINCED THAT SALAZAR IS ACTING ON VERY CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY. HOWEVER, AWARE OF THE WHIMSICALITY OF HIS COUNTRY'S POLITICS, HE TOLD ME, IN ANTICIPATION, THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM ME OF ANY CHANGE IN THIS POSITION.

10.- I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH SALAZAR.

THE END

DAZA.

Annex 261

Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Attitude of the Most Important Bolivian Officials (from Government and Parliament) During the Administration of President Siles, that Evidences an Anti-Chilean Climate, 15 September 1983 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

1983

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
DIRECCION DE PLANIFICACION
Dpto.Evaluación y Análisis

R E S E R V A D O

B5

ACTITUDES DE LOS MAS IMPORTANTES PERSONEROS BOLIVIANOS (DEL GOBIERNO Y DEL PARLAMENTO) DURANTE LA ADMINISTRACION SILES, QUE CONFIGURAN UN CLIMA ANTICHILENO

I.- GOBIERNO

A.- Presidente Hernán Siles Zuazo.

B.- Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores

* Señor Mario Velarde Dorado;
* Señor Marcial Tamayo Sáenz;
* Señor José Ortiz Mercado.

C.- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

II.- PARLAMENTO

Nota: Se deja constancia que, en algunos casos, las declaraciones que se citan en este documento parecen confusas y carentes de sentido completo; sin embargo, ellas son transcripciones textuales de las informaciones recibidas en este Ministerio.

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

PLANNING DIVISION

Assessment and Analysis Department

ATTITUDE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BOLIVIAN OFFICIALS (FROM GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT) DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT SILES, THAT EVIDENCES AN ANTI-CHILEAN CLIMATE

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

RESERVADO

216

I.- GOBIERNO

A.- PRESIDENTE HERNAN SILES ZUAZO

* Siendo aún Presidente electo, el señor Siles Zuazo declaró en conferencia de prensa en Lima:

"Como Uds. saben las relaciones con Chile están interrumpidas y se mantendrán en esa situación hasta tanto no se resuelva ese problema que es un puñal de injusticia en el corazón de América. Uds. todos se benefician de lo que significa el acceso al mar, a la comida del mar, a las diversiones de los niños en las playas. Saben que las grandes rutas oceánicas sirven para el transcurso e intercambio de cultura.

En nuestra patria estamos encerrados injustamente, indignadamente, pero pensamos que la evolución de la política en América Latina sirva para procurar y que honre a los propios chilenos. Además, este problema no sólo corresponde a Bolivia y Chile, también incluye al Perú, y en ese contexto creemos que la tradición común y el sentido de justicia que anima a nuestros pueblos expresados en sus gobernantes será útil para que se avance hacia una paz sin sombra".

Consultado respecto posibilidad se realice canje territorial con Chile como fórmula solución mediterraneidad, Presidente Siles Zuazo manifestó ello era: "absolutamente inadmisible. Por eso fracasó gestión del General Banzer".
(Télex ORD. 980 de Embachile Lima, de fecha 6/10/82).

* Con motivo de la XI Conferencia Permanente de Partidos Políticos de América Latina, celebrada en La Paz pocos días después de la transmisión del mando, el Presidente Siles demandó la solidaridad latinoamericana para encontrar soluciones al "magno problema del enclaustramiento geográfico de la nación", por constituir un factor adverso que incide en su economía y desarrollo.
(Télex RES. 306 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 12.10.82)

* Después de aprobarse en la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la OEA (1982) una resolución sobre la mediterra

neidad boliviana, el Presidente Siles Zuazo manifestó:"

"Estamos conscientes resultado obtenido en Washington es producto de la vigencia de un régimen democrático. El organismo hemisférico estableció que es interlocutor válido y demandante justificado, quien pide la reivindicación marítima. El gobierno de la UDP empieza a dar resultados positivos, como lo demuestra el reciente éxito internacional".
(Télex RES. 361 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 21/11/82)

*

Con motivo de celebrarse el "Día del Mar" (23 marzo), el Presidente Siles expresó:

"En los últimos años, la justa causa marítima boliviana se ha afirmado y reconfortado con el creciente apoyo y solidaridad universales,a la declaración de la VI Reunión Cumbre de los Países No Alineados, efectuada en La Habana, acaba de añadirse la categórica declaración realizada en Nueva Delhi hace pocos días, el Parlamento Andino y otros foros internacionales.Bolivia cuenta con el auspicio moral de cien países que conforman más de la mitad de la población del globo. Por su parte, en el plano regional, la mayoría de los Estados miembros de la OEA ha reiterado -en sucesivas oportunidades- su plena adhesión al derecho que nos asiste para recuperar una salida al mar por vías pacíficas. Bajo este criterio, mi gobierno está dispuesto a examinar con espíritu amistoso y constructivo cualquier iniciativa que pueda surgir en el ámbito internacional que tienda a buscar soluciones equitativas y prácticas a este problema centenario.

Es mi más vivo anhelo hacer llegar a los pueblos y gobiernos de algunos países vecinos la certeza de que, al reafirmar Bolivia el indeclinable derecho de obtener una salida al mar, no motivan a sus gobernantes otros propósitos que los de integrar a Bolivia a la gran familia americana".
(Télex RES.064 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 25/3/83.)

*

Con ocasión de un nuevo aniversario de la independencia de Bolivia, el Presidente Siles señaló en su mensaje oficial:

"Nuestro país ha reiterado, con la firmeza necesaria, el derecho irrenunciable que tiene a poseer un acceso sobe

rano al Pacífico, sin compensaciones territoriales de ningún género, traduciéndose ello en una inobjetable conquista con la resolución de la OEA en su XII Asamblea General"
(Télex RES. 180 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 08/08/83.)

* En entrevista radial concedida al periodista Ted Córdova Claure, Presidente Siles declaró:

"Proceso boliviano está trascendiendo y -por vecindad- repercute hacia el Sur. Nuestro ejemplo aisla y pone en dificultades a regímenes como el de Pinochet. Hay muchos bolivianos en el Norte de Chile que informan orgullosamente allá lo que ha conseguido este pueblo, fortaleciendo las tendencias democráticas en el país mapochino. Estamos sumamente satisfechos porque hemos hecho una contribución a la democracia".
(Télex RES. 205 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 05/09/83.)

B.- MINISTROS DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

1.- Señor Mario Velarde Dorado

* El primer Canciller del Gobierno Siles, Sr. Mario Velarde, al tomar posesión de su cargo expresó que:

"En cuanto a Chile, la política boliviana es tratar de continentalizar la reivindicación marítima". (Télex RES. 305 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 11/10/82).

* En la ceremonia de saludo del Cuerpo Diplomático al Canciller Velarde, con motivo de haber asumido sus funciones, éste señaló:

"La posición del gobierno constitucional es clara y categórica respecto al enclaustramiento geográfico al que estamos sometidos desde hace 103 años. Bolivia tiene el legítimo derecho de poseer acceso soberano al Pacífico. Todas nuestras acciones en el campo internacional estarán encaminadas a que Chile repare esta injusticia histórica.

Nuestra política será fiel reflejo de las aspiraciones de nuestro pueblo. No habrá más abrazos de Charaña, no habrá más anuncios triunfalistas, producto de una deformación pragmática que quiere ganar fama a costa de nuevas e inaceptables mutilaciones del territorio boliviano.

Hemos de ser consecuentes con aquellos pasos que en tal sentido han dado gobiernos patriotas. De ahí que reafirmaremos en todo momento, la resolución de la O.E.A. que reconoce, en forma definitiva, nuestro derecho de obtener una salida soberana y útil al Océano Pacífico.

Esperamos que la comunidad interamericana y toda la comunidad internacional den pasos concretos para pasar de lo declarativo a lo práctico, de modo que Bolivia pueda encaminarse serena, pacífica y efectivamente hacia las grandes rutas que abren el Océano Pacífico.

Deseo reafirmar que toda iniciativa respecto al problema marítimo boliviano, no podrá contemplar compensación territorial de ninguna índole, como vía de solución.

Por otra parte, el gobierno constitucional de Bolivia no reanudará relaciones con Chile mientras este país no de muestras palpables de su disponibilidad de llegar a una solución real y conveniente a esta cuestión que indudablemente representa un riesgo para la seguridad del continente, pues la paz en América del Sur estará siempre amenazada mientras persista el enclaustramiento boliviano. La paz no es solamente la ausencia de una guerra. No puede haber paz para un pueblo privado de acceso al mar por la razón de la fuerza. La mediterraneidad, en nuestro caso impuesta por las armas, es una limitación a nuestra soberanía y un escollo que afecta negativamente a nuestro desarrollo económico y social.

No podrá haber un nuevo orden interamericano, como el que se viene propiciando, que no pase por una solución real al problema del enclaustramiento geográfico de Bolivia".
(Télex RES. 332 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 03/11/82).

* Al referirse a la estrategia que Bolivia llevaría a cabo en la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. (1982), el Canciller Velarde declaró:

"La opinión pública internacional sabe ahora que existe no sólo un interlocutor válido, sino legítimo, para tratar enclaustramiento Bolivia. Este es el gobierno constitucional del país. No quiero referirme a las expresiones del Ministro de RR.EE. de Chile, porque habría que aludir al tipo de interlocutor que tendríamos enfrente".
(Télex RES. 350 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 15/11/82).

* Durante la celebración de la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. (1982), el Canciller Velarde pronunció un discurso relacionado con la mediterraneidad de su país, en algunas de cuyas partes manifestó lo siguiente:

"... Los bolivianos hemos demostrado reiteradamente que el problema de nuestro enclaustramiento geográfico excede los límites de la relación bilateral. Así lo definen

el origen económico y las circunstancias históricas del conflicto ..." "... por último, el interés continental de lograr una solución al daño emergente de la pérdida de nuestro litoral, que se produjo sólo en virtud de la razón de la fuerza. Por ello mismo persiste la necesidad imperiosa de establecer la solidaridad americana con espíritu constructivo que consolide la paz. Cobra pues importancia incuestionable la interposición activa de buenos oficios que permitan acelerar y garantizar el verificativo real de negociaciones destinadas a viabilizar la conexión territorial boliviana, soberana, libre y útil hacia el Océano Pacífico, sin la inclusión de compensaciones territoriales ...".

"... Aquí considero pertinente subrayar que la situación de mediterraneidad de Bolivia se origina en circunstancias históricas emergentes de una guerra de conquista y no en imperativos de orden geográfico ...".
(Memoria Anual 1982 de Delchile O.E.A.).

*

El entonces Canciller chileno, Sr. René Rojas, dió respuesta a la intervención del Ministro Velarde, quien a su vez contrarreplicó expresando, entre otros, los siguientes conceptos:

"... El distinguido Sr. Canciller de Chile ha hecho referencia a una presunta doctrina divisista de un militar boliviano. No lo ha dicho pero su nombre es el de García-Meza, ex-Presidente de Bolivia que lamentablemente es un hombre que nos avergüenza. Pero lo que pasó con García-Meza es que repitió casi exactamente a su maestro en materia de geopolítica que es el General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. La delegación de Bolivia ha escuchado los manidos argumentos que acaba de exponer el delegado de Chile, encaminados como siempre a impedir que se recuerde a la comunidad internacional el despojo de 1879, que el enclaustramiento geográfico de Bolivia se ha puesto en evidencia recordando la usurpación y conquista que efectuó el invasor chileno contra el indefenso pueblo de Antofagasta, hasta culminar con la posesión total del territorio que abarca el litoral marítimo de Bolivia y sólo prevalido de la superioridad de las armas y la prepotencia que le da la fuerza ...".
(Memoria Anual 1982 de Delchile O.E.A.).

* Después de aprobarse en la la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. (1982) una resolución sobre la mediterraneidad boliviana, el Canciller Velarde declaró:

"Hemos recuperado el terreno perdido entre 1980 y 1981 por la ineptitud y complacencia chilenófila de la tiranía instaurada por García-Meza. Los bolivianos tenemos -ahora- el punto de partida para seguir adelante y lograr una aplicación práctica del espíritu de la resolución interamericana de 1979. Es un hecho sin precedentes desde el tiempo en que se mandó una delegación a la Liga de las Naciones. Estamos orgullosos de representar a la democracia. Gracias al heroico esfuerzo del pueblo boliviano se derrotó una dictadura que paralizó al país: Ahora se abren las relaciones internacionales de Bolivia".
(Télex RES. 361 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 21/11/82).

* Con motivo de celebrarse el "Día del Mar" (23 de marzo), el Canciller Velarde señaló:

"Bolivia no reanudará relaciones con Chile si no existe compromiso previo de ese país para tratar la solución de la gran causa marítima, problema que ya no es continental sino mundial".
(Télex RES. 064 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 25/03/83).

* Las declaraciones formuladas por el Canciller Schweitzer a "El Mercurio", en relación a la mediterranidad de Bolivia, provocaron una airada reacción del Ministro Velarde, quien se expresó en los siguientes términos:

"Acabo de leer "El Mercurio" de Santiago, el nuevo Canciller de Chile vuelve a las andadas de su antecesor cuando afirma la existencia de compatibilidad entre la posición chilena y la conmiseración del mundo con Bolivia. No acepto el término conmiseración, no toleramos la arrogancia y la falta de educación de un profesional sobre quien me referí en frase generosa.

Bolivia no ha pedido ni recibido conmiseración de la comunidad internacional. Ha demandado justicia y logrado reconocimientos expresos sobre su derecho inalienable a

recuperar una salida directa, útil y plenamente soberana al Pacífico.

El Palacio Quemado está analizando cada palabra de lo que dijo el Canciller chileno -por si estas expresiones cambian- ya que el jefe de la diplomacia de Chile no es Schweitzer, es Augusto Pinochet".
(Télex RES. 088 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 12/04/83).

2.- Señor Marcial Tamayo Sáenz

* Con motivo de asumir funciones, el Canciller Tamayo señaló:

"Nuestra actitud tiene que ser exactamente inversa a la hasta ahora planteada por Chile. Seguirán suspendidas las relaciones con La Moneda, puesto que el condicionamiento chileno relativo a que primero deben haber vínculos diplomáticos y después, un proceso de negociación o conciliación, me parece equivocado. Hemos convertido -en el breve período de régimen constitucional- un asunto bilateral en una gran presión multilateral. Esto último debiera ser el punto de partida para una diplomacia activa y dinámica, veremos los métodos para continuarla, pues hemos llegado a una etapa en que toda la opinión mundial hace presión para que se le de solución al problema y se aliente la esperanza de una salida durante el proceso democrático".
(Télex RES.122 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 17/05/83).

3.- Señor José Ortiz Mercado

* El actual Canciller Ortiz Mercado, en su condición de tal, no ha emitido hasta ahora declaración oficial alguna acerca de la mediterraneidad boliviana, ni respecto de Chile y su gobierno.

En todo caso, cabe destacar que siendo Ministro de Defensa -cargo que desempeñó hasta que fue nombrado Canciller-, durante la ceremonia de graduación de guardiamarinas (1982) declaró en parte de su intervención:

"No habrá paz en América mientras Bolivia siga enclaustrada".
(Télex RES. 385 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 11/12/82).

C. MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

* Con motivo de un nuevo aniversario de la ocupación de Antofagasta por el Ejército chileno, la Cancillería boliviana emitió el tradicional comunicado reiterando:

"la indeclinable voluntad de ejecutar todas las acciones políticas y diplomáticas -en el plano bilateral y multilateral- para concluir con el enclaustramiento geográfico resultante de aquel acto de agresión".
(Télex RES. 023 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 14/02/83).

* Después de aprobarse en la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. (1982) una resolución sobre la mediterraneidad boliviana, el entonces Subsecretario General de RR.EE., Sr. Franklin Anaya, indicó:

"Es prematuro adelantar la reanudación o no de relaciones con Chile para negociar una solución al problema marítimo. En todo caso, es inaceptable la condición de trueque territorial".
(Télex RES. 361 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 21/11/82).

* Al asumir funciones como Subsecretario General de RR.EE., el Sr. Carlos Rivas, refiriéndose a la mediterraneidad de Bolivia, indicó:

"No hay hombre en la patria que se niegue al propósito de alcanzar la reivindicación de nuestro querido litoral, razón ésta por la que redoblaremos esfuerzos hasta ver flamear nuestra bandera orgullosa en las costas del mar".
(Télex RES. 139 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 10/06/83).

* El Sr. Carlos Serrate, miembro de la delegación boliviana a la XII Reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. (1982), al ser considerado el Informe Anual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, señaló:

"... que a consecuencia del Golpe de Estado en Chile, en 1973, se habían violado los derechos humanos de varios extranjeros, muchos de ellos bolivianos, los que fueron asesinados o se encuentran desaparecidos por su condición de indios, de indios bolivianos...".
(Memoria Anual 1982 de Delchile O.E.A.).

II.- PARLAMENTO

* Con motivo de celebrarse el "Día del Mar" (23 de marzo), el Presidente del Senado, Julio Garret, señaló:

"Debemos robustecer el poderío nacional para que -sumado a la potencia del Perú- nos permita demostrar a Chile que el tiempo y el curso de la historia no están de su parte, que la balanza del poder en la región favorecerá a los países despojados y que, por tanto, una solución pacífica y negociada es esencial para el resguardo de su propia seguridad. El desarrollo conjunto de Bolivia y Perú sobrepasará ineluctablemente al de Chile..." "...Es a partir de esa premisa sobre la que debemos trazar una estrategia internacional coherente y sustantiva que haga posible el retorno al Pacífico". (Télex RES. 064 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 25/03/83).

* Con ocasión de la visita protocolar que efectuara el nuevo Embajador de Panamá al Presidente del Senado, Julio Garret, este último le manifestó:

"Agradecemos el reiterado apoyo panameño a la sagrada causa de Bolivia..." "...La diplomacia altiplanense aprovechará la presidencia de Alberto Illueca en la próxima Asamblea General de la O.N.U. para plantear el problema centenario de la mediterraneidad".
(Télex RES. 207 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 05/09/83).

Como complemento a la información anteriormente proporcionada, se considera conveniente hacer presente algunas actuaciones de la Administración Siles y del Parlamento boliviano en relación a las llamadas "protestas nacionales" ocurridas en Chile":

* La Comisión Congresal del Parlamento boliviano, que funciona durante el receso de las Cámaras Legislativas, formuló una declaración de solidaridad con el pueblo chileno (junio de 1983).

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* Con motivo de la manifestación efectuada el 12 de julio frente a nuestra Misión Consular en La Paz, los asistentes entregaron un "manifiesto por la democracia" suscrito, entre otros, por el Sr. Mario Rueda, Ministro de Informaciones en ese entonces, y por el Sr. Hugo Aranda, Subsecretario General de la Presidencia de la República.
(Télex RES. 163 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 12/07/83).

* El 11 de Agosto se llevó a cabo una nueva manifestación frente al Consulado General de Chile en La Paz. Cabe destacar que el grupo fue encabezado por el diputado comunista boliviano Simón Reyes, quien hizo entrega de un documento en que se solicitaba "libertad para el pueblo chileno".
(Télex RES. 187 de Congechile La Paz, de fecha 11/08/83).

C O N C L U S I O N

Las acciones descritas reafirman la permanente estrategia del gobierno boliviano de intentar internacionalizar el tema de su carencia de litoral, planteándolo en foros internacionales aunque éstos carecen de competencia para intervenir en él.

La Administración Siles, valiéndose de la simpatía relativamente general que ha despertado en la comunidad internacional dada su condición de régimen democrático, ha desarrollado una ofensiva diplomática particularmente hostil respecto de Chile.

JAU/ift/aaa
Santiago, 15 de Septiembre de 1983



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RESUMEN DE LAS CONVERSACIONES

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ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

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CONVERSACIONES CHILENO-BOLIVIANAS

- Acogiendo una amistosa invitación del Excelentísimo señor Presidente de Colombia, Belisario Betancur, nuestro país aceptó concurrir a la ciudad de Bogotá con el objeto de dar inicio a una fase de acercamiento con Boli - via, recomendada por la Resolución Nº 686 aprobada el 18 de noviembre de 1983 por la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. en Washington, demostrando con ello que lo animaba un claro espíritu de conciliación y buena vecindad.

- Esta manifestación de buena voluntad de parte del Gobierno de Chile ya había sido evidenciada con ocasión de la última Asamblea General de Na - ciones Unidas celebrada en septiembre de 1984 en Nueva York, donde en pre - sencia del Canciller de Colombia señor Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, el Ministro del Valle convino con su colega boliviano en emitir un Comunicado Conjunto que definiera aspectos de procedimiento para llevar adelante la citada Re-- solución de la O.E.A.. (Se incluye anexo Proyecto de Comunicado Conjunto).

- Momentos antes de suscribirse el referido comunicado, el Canciller de Bolivia intervino en el debate general de la Asamblea, dedicando gran parte de su discurso a tratar el tema de la aspiración marítima boliviana utilizando en él, frases y expresiones que, a juicio de nuestro país, con - tradecía el espíritu que debía inspirar el diálogo entre Estados abocados a solucionar asuntos de interés mutuo. En vista de lo anterior, el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile se vió entonces obligado a poner término a esta primera fase de acercamiento.

- No obstante considerar el Gobierno de Chile su convicción de que sólo una negociación bilateral, situada dentro de un clima de mutuo respeto y de seriedad haría factible el estudio de la aspiración marítima boliviana y, demostrando, una vez más, el alto espíritu de conciliación que lo animaba, en el transcurso de la última reunión de la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. celebrada en el mes de noviembre de 1984 en la ciudad de Brasilia, accedió concurrir a Bogotá para proseguir con la fase de aproximación entre los dos países que había sido interrumpida en la ciudad de Nueva York.

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Annex A

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CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN DISCUSSIONS

In response to a friendly invitation of His Excellency the President of Colombia, Belisario Betancur, our country accepted to visit the city of Bogotá with the aim of initiating a phase of rapprochement with Bolivia, proposed under Resolution No. 686 approved on 18 November 1983 by the General Assembly of the O.A.S., in Washington, thus demonstrating that it encourages a conciliatory and neighborly spirit.

This attitude of willingness of the Government of Chile had already been evinced at the last General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1984 in New York. There, in the presence of the Colombian Foreign Minister, Mr. Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, Minister del Valle and his Bolivian colleague agreed to issue a Joint Communiqué that would define the procedural aspects for carrying out the Resolution of the O.A.S. mentioned above. (The Draft Joint Communiqué is included as an annex).

Moments before signing the aforementioned release, the Bolivian Foreign Minister spoke at the general debate of the Assembly and dedicated a large part of his speech to Bolivia's maritime aspiration, using phrases and expressions which, in my country's opinion, contradicted the spirit that should have inspired the dialogue between States determined to resolve matters of mutual interest. In light of the foregoing, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile was forced to put an end to this first stage of rapprochement.

Although the Government of Chile was convinced that the only possible way to study the Bolivian maritime aspiration was through bilateral negotiations in an environment of mutual respect and seriousness, and after demonstrating once again its high spirit of conciliation, during the last meeting of the General Assembly of the O.A.S., held on November 1984, in the city of Brasilia, it agreed to attend a meeting in Bogotá in order to continue with the process of rapprochement between both countries, which had been interrupted in the city of New York.

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- Con anterioridad a esta reunión, programada para los primeros días de febrero del año en curso, el señor Gustavo Fernández, antes de dejar su cargo de Canciller de Bolivia emitió una declaración señalando que existían "diversas bases acordadas previamente entre los dos países" para asistir a Bogotá y específicamente que:

a) Chile y Bolivia estaban "dispuestos a negociaciones en el marco del sistema interamericano y bajo el auspicio del Presidente de Colombia, Belisario Betancur".

b) El asunto tenía carácter multilateral y era de interés hemisférico.

c) No existía compromiso para la reanudación de relaciones hasta que "la negociación muestre indicios suficientes de que estamos próximos a una solución favorable a los intereses bolivianos".

d) Las negociaciones buscarán consolidar una "paz permanente en la región", especialmente entre los tres países (Bolivia, Chile y Perú), que intervinieron en la guerra del Pacífico que originó la mediterraneidad boliviana.

e) "La Paz permanente en la región significa que los intereses de los tres países deben estar apropiadamente en la solución".

f) La solución debía implicar una salida propia, soberana y útil de Bolivia en la costa del océano pacífico. Esa costa debe estar vinculada geográficamente a Bolivia.

g) La negocación no incluía compensación territorial de ninguna naturaleza por parte de Bolivia.

- Esta declaración, que fue ampliamente publicitada, dió origen a un Comunicado dado a conocer por el Ministro del Valle en el cual se indicó que el Gobierno de Chile no había asumido previamente compromiso alguno con Bolivia sobre aspectos sustantivos tendientes a satisfacer la aspiración marítima de ese país, dejando en claro que Chile no aceptaba condiciones para asistir a la cita de Bogotá.

Before that meeting, scheduled for the first days of February of this year, Mr. Gustavo Fernández, before leaving his position as Foreign Minister of Bolivia, issued a statement, noting that there were "a number of previously agreed upon guidelines between both countries", and specifically, that:

a) Chile and Bolivia were "willing to negotiate under the Inter-American System and the auspices of the President of Colombia, Belisario Betancur."

b) The matter was multilateral and of hemispheric interest.

c) There was no commitment to restore relations until "negotiations show signs that we are close to a solution favorable to Bolivian interests."

d) Negotiations will seek to build "lasting peace in the region," especially among the three countries (Bolivia, Chile, and Peru) involved in the war of the Pacific, after which Bolivia became a landlocked country.

e) "Lasting Peace in the region means that the interests of the three countries should be properly addressed in the solution."

f) The solution had to ensure a sovereign and useful maritime outlet in the Pacific Ocean coast to Bolivia. The coast must be geographically connected to Bolivia's territory.

g) Negotiations will not entail any territorial compensation on the part of Bolivia.

This statement, widely publicized, gave rise to a Communiqué announced by Minister del Valle where he indicated that the Government of Chile had not previously assumed any commitment to Bolivia regarding substantial aspects intended to fulfil the maritime aspiration of that country, and made it clear that Chile was not going to accept any conditions to attend to the meeting in Bogotá.

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Asimismo, el Ministro del Valle precisó el verdadero sentido que, luego de diversas conversaciones con su colega boliviano en las que se acordó avanzar sin apresuramientos, se convino en dar al programado encuentro de Bogotá.

- De esta forma y no habiendo dado Bolivia, en un plazo prudente, una respuesta categórica a los apsectos concretos planteados en el referido comunicado y luego de surgir nuevos elementos que en nada favorecían al diálogo, el Canciller del Valle amitió un segundo comunicado en el que indicó que al no existir las condiciones mínimas necesarias para un fructífero entendimiento con el país altiplánico, se veía en el imperativo de tener que declinar su asistencia a la reunión de Colombia.

- Por todo lo anterior y, teniendo en cuenta que en junio del año en curso se celebrarán en Bolivia elecciones generales y que el Canciller de Colombia señor Augusto Ramírez Ocampo dejará su cargo en fecha próxima, se hace aconsejable reiniciar nuevamente dicho diálogo una vez asuma el futuro Gobierno de La Paz.

Likewise, Minister del Valle specified the true sense which, after several conversations with his Bolivian colleague through which they agreed to patiently go forward, was meant to be given to the scheduled meeting in Bogotá.

In this way, and in the absence of a timely and categorical response from Bolivia to the concrete issues raised in the aforementioned release, and after new events occurred that did not favor dialogue at all, Foreign Minister del Valle issued a second communiqué where he stated that in the absence of the minimum conditions necessary for a fruitful understanding with Bolivia, he was forced to decline to attend the meeting in Colombia.

Consequently, and considering that next June, Bolivia will have general elections and that the Foreign Minister of Colombia, Mr. Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, will leave office soon, it seems advisable to resume dialogue once the new Government authorities take over in La Paz.

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PROYECTO DE COMUNICADO CONJUNTO
CHILENO - BOLIVIANO

Los Cancilleres de Chile y de Bolivia, Exmos Sres Jaime del Valle Alliende y Gustavo Fernández, respectivamente, se reunieron en Nueva York en la Delegación de Colombia ante la Organizacion de las Naciones Unidas y, culminando las diversas conversaciones sostenidas durante la 39a.Asamblea General en curso, llegaron a un acuerdo acerca de los aspectos fundamentales, de contexto y procedimiento, para llevar adelante la Resolución nº 686 aprobada en la XIII Asamblea General de la OEA el 18 de noviembre de 1983, que exhorta a ambos paises a iniciar un proceso de acercamiento orientado a normalizar sus relaciones bilaterales,tendiente a superar las dificultades que los separan, incluyendo en especial una formula que haga posible dar a Bolivia una salida soberana al Océano Pacífico, sobre bases que consulten las recíprocas conveniencias y los dereehos e intereses de las partes involucradas.

En esta forma, ambos Cancilleres estiman que se ha cumplido la fase preparatoria que les permitirá realizar la reunión de Bogotá a que fueron invitados por el Presidente Betancourt, la cual tendrá por objeto ultimar los detalles del procedimiento referido y se celebrará dentro de los próximos noventa dias.

Nueva York, de octubre de 1984

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF CHILE AND BOLIVIA

The Chilean and Bolivian Foreign Ministers, H.E. Mr. Jaime del Valle Allende and H.E. Mr. Gustavo Fernández, respectively, met in New York with the Delegation of Colombia at the United Nations Organization and, after several conversations in the context of the 39th General Assembly being held, they reached an agreement on the main aspects of context and procedure for carrying out Resolution No. 686 adopted at the XIII General Assembly of the OAS on 18 November 1983, in which the two countries were urged to initiate a process of rapprochement oriented towards normalizing their bilateral relations, with the aim of overcoming the difficulties that divide them, including in particular a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take into account mutual conveniences and the rights and interests of all parties involved.

In this manner, both Foreign Ministers consider the preparatory stage to be accomplished, thus making possible the Bogotá meeting, to which they were invited by President Betancur and which will be aimed at concluding the pending procedural details and will be held within the next ninety (90) days.

New York, October 1984.

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DECLARACION DEL

DR. HERNAN SILES SUAZO,

PRESIDENTE DE BOLIVIA

(Entrevista televisada en"Visión"
el 17 de abril de 1983).

Pregunta: "¿Qué perspectivas ve Ud. sobre el problema de la mediterraneidad de Bolivia, al no existir relaciones diplomáticas entre Bolivia y Chile ? "

Respuesta del Señor Presidente Siles Suazo:

" Sostenemos y seguimos sosteniendo permanentemente nuestro legítimo derecho de reivindicación de los territorios que perdimos y el consiguiente acceso al mar. Esta situación de injusticia no puede mantenerse indefinidamente en nuestra América, en un tiempo de aproximación de los pueblos y en muchos casos por encima de gobiernos, que no siempre son democráticos."

" Hemos leído en una información periodística, la posibilidad que señala el restablecimiento de negociaciones entre Bolivia y Chile. Pero, este es un problema de tres partes en que nosotros creemos, no puede estar ausente el Perú para una solución justa, legítima y que afiance la paz en nuestra América.".

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REPLICA DEL
EMBAJADOR DE CHILE
D. JOSE MIGUEL BARROS

(Declaración televisada en
"Visión" el 24 de abril 1983).

" Buenas noches.
Además de las palabras que acaban de oir, recordaré que el 23 de marzo último, el mismo Señor Presidente calificó de "indiferencia egoísta" la posición que el Perú y Chile mantienen en estas materias."

"Rechazo tal acusación por lo tocante a Chile. En cuanto a Perú, me entristece que se atribuya egoísmo al Gobierno de esta Nación, que admiro y respeto."

"Ahora replico."

"Conforme a los acuerdos que se suscribieron en 1904 y en los cuales se determinó definitivamente el límite chileno-boliviano, mi país ha desembolsado en favor de Bolivia ingentes sumas de dinero, ha construído ferrocarriles para vincular el Altiplano con el litoral; y, aún, ha cancelado diversas obligaciones financieras bolivianas. "

"No ha habido, pues, cesiones territoriales gratuitas sino contraprestaciones mutuas."

"Por otra parte, de acuerdo con esos mismos tratados, Bolivia goza del más amplio y libre derecho de tránsito a través del territorio chileno y por todos los puertos de Chile".

"En consecuencia, Bolivia, ya tiene pleno y libre acceso al Pacífico, derecho que ejerce día a día, sin trabas ni limitaciones."

"A pesar de ello, hasta hace poco Bolivia seguía hablando de su "mediterraneidad", expresando reiteradamente en foros y organismos internacionales su aspiración a "un acceso libre y soberano al Océano Pacífico".



"Según lo que hemos oído al Señor Presidente Siles Suazo, ahora se pretendería ir aún más lejos. Además del acceso al mar, se invoca un presunto derecho a reivindicar territorios que son chilenos y están poblados por chilenos. "

"Serenamente, afirmo que tal derecho no existe".

"No podría existir, en presencia de los acuerdos chileno-bolivianos de 1904, que reconocieron como del dominio absoluto y perpetuo de Chile los territorios al sur del río Loa."

"Semejante reivindicación territorial constituiría un atentado contra un instrumento internacional en que están comprometidas la palabra y la buena fe de Bolivia."

"El respeto de la palabra empeñada constituye una base principal de la concordia de América. Casi todas las fronteras de nuestros países están determinadas por tratados, protocolos o laudos arbitrales. Quien pretenda burlar esos instrumentos arriesga comprometer una paz que mucho ha costado conseguir."

"El tiempo que me resta me permite tan solo resumir la posición actual."

- "Chile cumple fielmente sus tratados con Bolivia."
  "Esa conducta no será modificada."
- "Chile no tiene deudas territoriales."
- "En el pasado Chile ha sostenido conversaciones con Bolivia - y, aún, ha considerado la posibilidad de concederle un acceso soberano al mar - porque el Gobierno

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de La Paz revelaba el ánimo de buscar amistosamente, con realismo, seriedad y buena fe, entendimientos de conveniencia mutua. Hoy no se percibe ese ánimo que, por supuesto, es indispensable para cualquier diálogo."

- "La hermana República del Altiplano debe saber que la ruta de cualquier entendimiento con Chile no pasa por los organismos internacionales ni se abrirá jamás mediante presiones o amenazas."

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COMENTARIO DE
CESAR HILDEBRANDT,
DESPUES DE LA REPLICA
DEL EMBAJADOR BARROS

("Visión", 24 abril 1983)

El Sr. Hildebrandt dió lectura al artículo 1ro. del Tratado de 1929 y agregó:

"De acuerdo con el mismo tratado y su protocolo complementario, el Perú goza en ese territorio de derechos reales y específicos que deben ser mantenidos".

En seguida, mostrando una revista, dijo:

"Sería excelente que el Embajador de Chile aclarara ..... a la Revista "X" que sale mañana con esta carátula: "Chile nos amenaza con porta-aviones inglés". Según fuentes de la revista "Equis" sería inminente una cesión de la Armada Británica a la Armada Chilena, una cesión muy importante porque estamos hablando del porta-aviones Hermes que tuvo participación protagónica en la Guerra de Las Malvinas y cuya adquisición por parte de la Marina chilena significaría un desequilibrio muy grande en El Pacífico."

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PALABRAS ADICIONALES DEL
EMBAJADOR DE CHILE, DON
JOSÉ MIGUEL BARROS.

(Leídas por César Hildebrandt,
en "Visión", el 24 abril 1983).

" Chile respeta y respetará siempre el Tratado de 1929 con el Perú. En el pasado, cuando Chile negoció con Bolivia sobre un corredor que pasaba por Arica, el Gobierno de Chile consultó de inmediato con el Perú para solicitar el acuerdo previo a que se refiere el Tratado de 1929".

"No voy a seguir el consejo de replicar a la revista "Equis". La noticia de la adquisición del Hermes ha sido desmentida en Chile; pero creo que el problema de la adquisición de armamentos en todo el Continente es muy serio y merecería un informe en el que figurasen las compras de todos los países americanos."

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Annex 262

Report of Jorge Gumucio Granier, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations, regarding the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Chile, 1 October 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 178 to its Memorial

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PERMANENTE DE BOLIVIA
ANTE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

CONFIDENCIAL

NOTA PARA ARCHIVO

El señor José Ortiz Mercado, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Bolivia sostuvo entrevista informal con el Canciller de Chile señor Miguel Schweitzer, en presencia del Ministro de Relaciones de Colombia señor Lloreda Caicedo y los Embajadores Alban de Colombia, Trucco de Chile, Fernando Salazar Paredes y Jorge Gumucio de Bolivia, el día 1º de octubre de 1983 a horas 11 a.m. en la Residencia del Embajador de Colombia.

Inició la conversación el Canciller de Colombia destacando que era un encuentro completamente informal a iniciativa del Presidente Betancur de Colombia con el deseo de que estas conversaciones pudieran culminar con la solución de los problemas existentes entre ambos países. Destacó que su país no deseaba jugar un papel protagónico sino simplemente el de anfitrión al encuentro de ambos países con quienes Colombia no tenia fronteras pero sí guardaba para ambos una gran amistad y aprecio.

Luego se escucho las palabras del Canciller de Chile quien agradeció, a nombre de su Gobierno la invitación ymencionó que desde que se hizo cargo de su Cancillería tenía el deseo de mejorar el clima de opinión entre ambos países a fin de tratar de solucionar,posteriormente los grandes problemas que separaban a Chile y Bolivia, recordó también haber expresado el mismo comentario en varias oportunidades, entre ellas en Cartagena, Colombia, al Canciller Lloreda Caicedo.

A su vez, el Canciller Ortiz Mercado agradeció la iniciativa de Colombia y reiteró la buena disposición del Gobierno Constitucional para buscar soluciones constructivas a los diferendos existentes entre Bolivia y Chile. Se refirió al hecho de la existencia de claras diferencias ideológicas entre ambos gobiernos lo que constituía un desafio que podría contribuir al diálogo franco.

....

Permanent [...] of Bolivia

[...] the United Nations CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Mr. José Ortiz Mercado, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, held an informal interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Miguel Schweitzer, in the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Mr. Lloreda Caicedo, and Ambassadors Alban of Colombia, Trucco of Chile, and Fernando Salazar Paredes and Jorge Gumucio of Bolivia, on 1 October 1983 at 11 a.m. at the residence of the Ambassador of Colombia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia started the conversation, stressing that the meeting was totally informal, and that it was being held on at the initiative of President Betancur of Colombia, in the hope that these talks might lead to a solution to the problems existing between both countries. The Minister noted that his country did not wish to play a leading role, but simply to act as a host, in the meeting between both countries, with which Colombia shared no borders but did maintain a strong friendship with and deeply appreciated both.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile spoke next. He appreciated the invitation on behalf of his Government, and mentioned that since he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had the wish to improve the climate of opinion between both countries in order to try to subsequently resolve the serious problems that separated Chile and Bolivia. He also recalled having made the same comment many times to, among others, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloreda Caicedo in Cartagena, Colombia.

In turn, Foreign Minister Ortiz Mercado appreciated the Colombian initiative and reiterated the Constitutional Government's willingness to search for constructive solutions to the disputes existing between Bolivia and Chile. The existence of clear ideological differences between both governments was referred to, which constituted a challenge that might contribute to candid discussions.

Remarcó que debía usarse esa franqueza desde un principio, que todo acercamiento entre Bolivia y Chile debía basarse en la decisión de ese país de otorgar una salida al mar aBolivia, de lo contrario sería repetir experiencias pasadas que fueron desde todo punto de vista negativas. Recordó que ambos países negociaron en nueve oportunidades, en diferentes épocas, sin haber podido llegar a ningún acuerdo. Esta experiencia frustró al pueblo boliviano, y lo llevó a desconfiar totalmente de toda negociación con la diplomacia chilena.

Dijo que consideraba que la base de todo arreglo radicaba en la buena fe chilena y en la decisión de conceder a Bolivia una salida soberana y útil al Océano Pacífico, hecho que era también de interes hemisférico determinado por la O.E.A. y otros foros internacionales entre ellos el Grupo No Alineado,

El Canciller de Chile por su parte agradeció la franqueza del planteamiento de su colega y acotó que con la misma franqueza debía mencionar que la opinión pública chilena era muy dura para con Bolivia por la campaña, que a nivel internacional se llevaba adelante en contra de Chile.

Pidió que para preparar ambas opiniones públicas a un reencuentro, debían cesar las declaraciones de personeros de ambos gobiernos, las que iban en detrimento de un posible reencuentro.

Chile aspira a tener relaciones normales con Bolivia dijo y acotó que para ello había que acudir a un diálogo constructivo e imaginativo. Chile no podría comprometerse a resolver el problema marítimo sin previo restablecimiento de relaciones, sin embargo,remarcó que era obvio que cualquier tema a discutirse entre Bolivia y Chile con las relaciones formalizadas comprendía la solución del problema marítimo.

Remarcó, asimismo, que no había podido tener conocimiento profundo de la problemática internacional de Chile antes de ser Canciller, pero que lo primero que hizo al asumir sus funciones fué estudiar el problema del Beagle con Argentina y el problema con Bolivia, enfatizando nuevamente que cualquier relación entre ambos países involucraba, necesariamente el tratar el problema marítimo.

A su vez, el Canciller de Bolivia,expresó su acuerdo en que había que usar imaginación y nuevas formas de diálogo para rei-

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He stressed that such frankness should be used from the start, that all rapprochement between Bolivia and Chile should be based on a decision of that country to grant Bolivia an outlet to the sea. Otherwise, it would be repeating past experiences that were negative from every point of view. He recalled that both countries held negotiations on nine occasions, at different points in time, without reaching any agreement. Such experience frustrated the Bolivian people, who became totally distrustful of any negotiations with Chilean diplomats.

He said that he considered that the basis of any agreement lay on Chilean good faith and on the decision to grant Bolivia a sovereign and useful outlet to the Pacific Ocean, which was also of hemispheric interest as determined by the O.A.S. and other international forums, such as the Non-Aligned Movement.

For his part, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile thanked his counterpart for the frankness of his approach, and pointed out that he had to mention with the same frankness that the Chilean public opinion of Bolivia was very harsh as a result of the campaign conducted internationally against Chile.

He requested that, to prepare the opinion of both publics for a reconciliation, statements from officials of both governments which were detrimental to a potential reconciliation had to cease.

Chile, aspiring to have normal relations with Bolivia, stated and outlined that, to achieve this, it had to resort to a constructive and imaginative dialogue. Chile could not undertake to resolve the maritime problem without restoring relations, however, it remarked that it was obvious that whatever subject to be discussed between Bolivia and Chile in formalized relations included a solution to the maritime problem.

He further stressed that he had not been able to gain deep insight into Chile's international problems before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the first thing he did upon taking office was to analyze the Beagle problem with Argentina and the problem with Bolivia. He again stressed that any relationship between both countries necessarily involved addressing the maritime problem.

In turn, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia expressed his agreement on the need for imagination and new forms of discussion in order to

niciar las negociaciones sobre el problema marítimo, sin embargo recalcó que no podían ponerse condiciones previas debido a que si bien estas impedían posiblemente el diálogo, una normalización de relaciones no sería bien recibida por la opinión pública boliviana por la desconfianza que se tenía. Sin embargo expresó que la Asamblea General de la O.E.A. podría brindar una oportunidad para comenzar el deshielo en las relaciones entre ambos países.

Mencionó que el problema marítimo era unilateral en sus comienzos pues significaba una decisión de Bolivia para buscar una solución a su enclaustramiento, era bilateral porque necesariamente Bolivia y Chile debían tratar de encontrar una solución satisfactoria; en su momento trilateral debido a que cualquier solución tendría que ser de conocimiento del Perú en cumplimiento al Tratado de 1929, por el cúal toda negociación que involucre territorios de la antigua provincia peruana de Arica debían ser consultados; este Tratado acotó, tuvo como único fin el de obstruir cualquier negociación que pudiera favorecer a Bolivia. Añadió que el mismo se hizo a espaldas y sin participación de Bolivia.

Adicionalmente indicó que el problema también era multilateral porque los países del hemisferio, en varias oportunidades así lo determinaron en las diferentes Asambleas de la O.E.A., a la existencia de pronunciamientos en otros foros internacionales y a innumerables declaraciones conjuntas suscritas por Bolivia con varios países.

Al referirse a la próxima Asamblea General de la O.E.A a reunirse en noviembre próximo, expresó que Bolivia estaba dispuesta a no buscar otra Resolución que confirme las anteriores, sino simplemente a presentar un Informe Técnico que no contenga párrafos controversiales enfatizando las dificultades y perjuicios que la falta de una salida propia al mar le ocasionaban. Propuso, al respecto, que un tercer país amigo, en esta caso Colombia, solo o con el respaldo de algunos otros países a definirse, presenten una Declaración invitando a las partes involucradas a implementar las anteriores resoluciones de O.E.A., mediante el inicio de un diálogo franco y constructivo destinado a encontrar soluciones satisfactorias.

Sería importante expresó que ante este llamado Bolivia y Chile respondieran favorablemente a la invitación, dejando es-

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resume negotiations over the maritime problem. However, he highlighted that no previous conditions could be set, for although these might possibly preclude discussions, a normalization of relations would not be well received by the Bolivian public opinion on account of the prevailing distrust it has. However, he pointed out that the General Assembly of the O.A.S. might provide an opportunity to begin a thaw in the relationships between both countries.

He mentioned that the maritime problem had been unilateral at the beginning, for it involved a decision by Bolivia to seek a solution to its confinement; it was bilateral because Bolivia and Chile necessarily had to endeavor to find a satisfactory solution; at one point it was trilateral because any solution had to be communicated to Peru, as provided in the Treaty of 1929, whereby any negotiation involving territories of the former Peruvian province of Arica had to be consulted with Peru. This Treaty, he pointed out, was only intended to obstruct any negotiation that might favor Bolivia. He added that such Treaty was hammered out behind the back and without the involvement of Bolivia.

He further pointed out that the problem was also multilateral because such had been determined by hemispheric countries on several occasions at the different O.A.S. Assemblies, because of decisions made at other international forums, and because of countless joint declarations signed by Bolivia with several countries.

In referring to the next O.A.S. General Assembly to be convened next November, he expressed that Bolivia was willing not to seek another Resolution confirming the previous ones, but to simply submit a Technical Report that did not contain controversial paragraphs, emphasizing the difficulties and damages caused to Bolivia by the lack of an outlet to the sea. In that respect, he proposed that a friendly third country, in this case, Colombia, on its own or with the support of some other countries to be defined, submit a Declaration inviting all parties involved to implement the previous O.A.S. resolutions through frank and constructive discussions aimed at finding satisfactory solutions.

It would be important, he stated, that before this call Bolivia and Chile reply favorably to this invitation, solemnly

tablecido en forma solemne su compromiso de buscar soluciones.

Sobre el particular, recordó que ya Chile habia mostrado buena disposición en las consultas informales que realizaron los Embajadores Salazar y Daza, cuando el Consejo de O.E.A. se reunió para analizar la inclusión de temas, entre ellos el problema marítimo. (calendario para la XIII Asamblea General)

Al referirse a la posible Declaración, sugirió que el citado Proyecto se elabore de inmediato y en forma conjunta entre los Embajadores de ambos países en OEA y contando para ello con la cooperación del Embajador de Colombia ante ese organismo.

Al concluir, el Canciller Ortiz recordó las frases del poeta español "caminante no hay camino, hagamos camino al andar", frases estas que podrían aplicarse a la Declaración de OEA, para fijar la meta de una solución, dejando flexibilidad a los países para ir en forma conjunta definiendo los medios y el trazo mismo para alcanzar la ansiada meta.

El Canciller de Chile expresó en principio, su acuerdo con los planteamientos bolivianos en cuanto a la estrategia de buscar una armoniosa transición del campo multilateral al bilateral bajo los auspicios del Presidente y Canciller colombianos. Asimismo en que ambos países buscarian acuerdos sobre los grandes principios y sin condiciones previas explorarian soluciones satisfactorias para ambos países en relación a la cuestión marítima.

Por todo lo expuesto, ambos Cancilleres coincidieron en:

Mantener la más absoluta reserva por lo delicado del tema tratado.

Hacer conocer oportunamente al Perú los propósitos y planteamientos acordados.

Decidir con posterioridad los nombres de los países que podrian coopatrocinar la Declaración, junto a Colombia.

Mantener diálogos informales entre las misiones permanentes de ambos países tanto en el seno de la OEA como en Naciones Unidas Nueva York y Ginebra, sobre temas de interes común.

Ambos Cancilleres acordaron transmitir esta conversación a sus respectivos Jefes de Estado.

Se hace notar que en el transcurso de la entrevista los Embajadores Salazar Paredes y Gumucio Granier de Bolivia, Trucco de

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affirming their commitment to seek solutions.

Regarding this issue, he recalled that Chile had already shown its willingness during the informal consultations conducted by Ambassadors Salazar and Daza when the Council of the O.A.S. met to analyze the issues to be included in its agenda, among them the maritime problem (Calendar of events for the 13th General Assembly).

In referring to the possible Declaration, he suggested that the aforementioned Draft Declaration be prepared immediately and jointly between both countries' ambassadors to the OAS, with the cooperation of the Ambassador of Colombia to this institution.

To conclude, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ortiz recalled the following phrases by a Spanish poet: "Wayfarer, there are no roads; let's make our roads as we walk". These phrases could be applied to the OAS Declaration, as a way of setting the goal of reaching a solution, leaving flexibility for the countries to jointly define the means and the road map to reach the much sought-after goal.

In principle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile expressed his agreement with the Bolivian approach as regards a strategy to seek a harmonious transition from the multilateral field to the bilateral field under the auspices of the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. He also agreed that both countries would seek agreements on general principles and explore solutions satisfactory to both countries in relation to the maritime issue without previous conditions.

Wherefore, both Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to:

Keep the strictest confidence because of the sensitivity of the issues involved.

Make it known to Peru in due course of the purposes and approaches agreed upon.

Subsequently decide the names of the countries that might sponsor the Declaration jointly with Colombia.

Hold informal discussions between the permanent missions of both countries both at the OAS and the UN in New York and Geneva about matters of common interest.

Both Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to relay this conversation to their respective Heads of State.

It should be noted that during the interview, Ambassadors Salazar Paredes and Gumucio Granier of Bolivia, Trucco of



5.-

Chile y Alban de Colombia participaron con sugerencias y clarificaciones complementarias a los planteamientos de los Cancilleres.

La Reunión concluyó a las 12:30.

JORGE GUMUCIO GRANIER
Embajador, Representante Permanente
de Bolivia ante Naciones Unidas.

Chile, and Alban of Colombia provided suggestions and clarifications supplementary to the approaches put forward by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

This Meeting concluded at 12:30 P.M.

[Signature]

Jorge Gumucio Granier
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of Bolivia to the United Nations.

Annex 263

Official Message from the Directorate for Multilateral Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Chilean Delegation to the Organization of American States, No 270/271, 27 October 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile



REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA 8 OCT 83 — HORA DESPACHO 271948 — FIRMA OPERADOR

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PAGINA — DE

MENSAJE OFICIAL — Nº 832529

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	270/271	271952	OCTUBRE	1983

DE: DIMULTI

A: DELCHILE O.E.A.

COMINF

TRANSCRIBO US. CONSIDERACIONES EN TORNO TRATAMIENTO TEMA MEDITERRANEIDAD BOLIVIA EN O.E.A.:

" "

(FAVOR CLAVE TRANSCRIBIR TEXTO ADJUNTO).

REFERENCIA

TEMA MEDITERRANEIDAD BOLIVIA EN XIII ASAMBLEA GENERAL O.E.A.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES — Dirección Político Multilateral

AUTORIDAD ORIGEN

HORA RECEPCION

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES — Depto. Técnico IECE

OFFICIAL NOTE No. 832529

Classification	Number	Time Origin	Month	Year
CONFIDENTIAL	270/271	271952	OCTOBER	1983

From: DIMULTI [Directorate for Multilateral Policy]
To: DELCHILE O.E.A. [Chilean Delegation, OAS]

INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE (COMINF)

I TRANSCRIBE BELOW THE CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE OF BOLIVIA'S LANDLOCKED STATUS BEFORE THE OAS:

(PLEASE TRANSCRIBE THE ATTACHED TEXT)

De acuerdo con las conversaciones sostenidas con los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia y Bolivia, el tratamiento del tema "Informe sobre el problema marítimo de Bolivia" en la próxima Asamblea General de la O.E.A., se haría en la siguiente forma:

1.- Bolivia haría una presentación del tema, resaltando los elementos económicos del mismo. Chile podría responder a esta intervención en los términos que estimare conveniente.

Estos dos elementos se convendrían - en Washington - por los Embajadores ante la O.E.A..

2.- En esta oportunidad, Bolivia ha señalado que no busca la adopción de una Resolución de la Asamblea General y se conformaría con que Colombia sugiriera el acercamiento entre los dos países a través del reestablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas.

3.- No obstante esa afirmación Boliviana, es necesario precisar la forma en que Chile podría aceptar el llamado a reestablecimiento de relaciones y los elementos del mismo que debería Rechazar:

A) Chile no puede aceptar ningún llamado que esté condicionado a una negociación territorial, ni que implique una ingerencia colectiva de la O.E.A. en tal acto soberano.

B) En tal virtud, no podemos permitir ninguna Resolución del Organismo respecto de la materia.

C) Podemos aceptar un llamado de uno o varios países miembros efectuados en forma individual, sin que ello implique ninguna participación posterior de esos Estados en el proceso que siguiera a la reapertura de relaciones (o a las alternativas que ellas experimenten).

D) El no condicionamiento del reestablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas a una negociación sobre la aspiración territorial de Bolivia no implica que ésta se excluya, sino que deben encausarse en la amplia gama de asuntos que interesen a los dos países y a medida que las relaciones diplomáticas permitan un cambio en la situación de las opiniones públicas de Chile y

Pursuant to the conversations held with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Colombia and Bolivia, the matter of the "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" will be addressed in the upcoming General Assembly of the OAS as follows:

1.- Bolivia will make a presentation on the matter, underscoring its economic elements. Chile may respond to this action in the terms it may deem convenient.

These two elements will be agreed upon in Washington by the Ambassadors before the OAS.

2.- This time, Bolivia has stated that it does not seek the adoption of a Resolution by the General Assembly, but would rather be satisfied with having Colombia suggest the rapprochement of the two countries through the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

3.- Notwithstanding this Bolivian statement, it is necessary to specify how Chile would be able to accept this invitation to resume relations and which elements of it that it should reject:

A) Chile cannot accept any invitation conditioned upon a negotiation of territory or implying the collective involvement of the OAS in this sovereign act.

B) Therefore, we cannot allow any Resolution from the Organization on this matter.

C) We can accept an invitation from one or several member countries extended individually, without entailing any subsequent involvement of those States in the process following the resumption of relations (or any alternatives implemented).

D) The requirement not to condition the re-establishment of diplomatic relations upon a negotiation of Bolivia's territorial aspirations does not entail the exclusion of such aspiration, but rather that negotiations must be directed towards the wide array of matters relevant to the two countries and as diplomatic relations would allow for a change in Chile's and



REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 2 -

Bolivia, de manera que sea posible la presentación y apoyo a un tema de tanta sensibilidad.

Además, debe quedar [redacted] en claro que el Gobierno de Santiago no pueda comprometerse en una negociación sin considerar los compromisos que emanan del Tratado de 1929 con la República del Perú.

4.- En el evento de que los bolivianos modifiquen la posición que han aceptado con Colombia, debe rechazarse cualquier proyecto de Resolución que se proponga, a menos que se tratara de un texto redactado en los términos que tuvo el aprobado en la Asamblea de 1980.

Bolivia's public opinions, so that it is possible to raise and support such a sensitive matter.

It should also be made clear that the Government of Santiago cannot commit to negotiations without considering the compromises arising from the 1929 Treaty entered into with the Republic of Peru.

4.- In the event that the Bolivians modify the position agreed upon with Colombia, all draft Resolutions submitted by it must be rejected, unless the wording is drafted in the terms approved at the 1980 Assembly.

Annex 264

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the General Committee of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 18 November 1983

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Thirteenth Regular Session, 1983, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XIII.O.2 (1984), pp 348 and 364-376

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GENERAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING

Date: Friday 18 November 1983
Time: 11:15 a.m.
Place: Hall of the Americas

President: Mr. Fidel Chávez Mena
Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador

Present: Messrs.

Roberto Martínez Ordóñez	(Honduras)
Donastus St. Aimee	(Saint Lucia)
Alvar Antillón Salazar	(Costa Rica)
Michael I. King	(Barbados)
Luis Fernando Roca García	(Bolivia)
Francisco Bustillo del Campo	(Uruguay)
Hector Denis	(Haiti)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Alejandro Bendaña	(Nicaragua)
Raúl Falconí	(Ecuador)
Samuel Fernández	(Chile)
María Teresa Butler	(Bahamas)
Thomas J. Dunnigan	(United States)
Carlos A. Saldívar	(Paraguay)
George W. McKenzie	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Francisco Posada de la Peña	(Colombia)
Dário M. de Castro Alves	(Brazil)
Hernán Hurtado Prem	(Guatemala)
Joel J. Toney	(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
Elías Vargas B.	(Panama)
Marino Villanueva Callot	(Dominican Republic)
Edith Márquez	(Venezuela)
Oscar Castro Araujo	(El Salvador)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua and Barbuda)
Cherrie J. Orr	(Jamaica)
Raúl A. Quijano	(Argentina)
Marcella H. Mukasa	(Dominica)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[...]

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2. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1620/83) (item 9 on the agenda)

The PRESIDENT: The next item is about the maritime problem of Bolivia [AG/doc.1620/83]. It is my pleasure to give the floor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia.

The MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Ortiz): Thank you, Mr. President. Distinguished Foreign Ministers, Representatives, and Heads of Delegation:

I have the honor of presenting to this distinguished Assembly the report on the maritime problem of Bolivia, item 9 on our agenda.

In the last four sessions, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States has approved resolutions to find a just solution to the forced geographic confinement that has affected Bolivia since the War of the Pacific in 1879. The first resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-0/79), approved at the ninth session, declared it to be a matter of "continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia will obtain useful sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean."

The significant predecessors of such resolution were the Declaration of Ayacucho, signed by a group of Presidents or their representatives who had gathered to commemorate the sesquicentennial of the battle that defined the liberty of America; the declaration of the Permanent Council of the OAS of 1975, on the occasion of the session of honor to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Bolivia's declaration of independence; and the Resolution also reflects the international solidarity manifested in various international forums,

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such as the movement of Non-Aligned Countries, sub-regional groups, and numerous manifestations by friendly countries. In the tenth and eleventh regular sessions, held in Washington, in 1980, and in Saint Lucia, in 1981, and in the twelfth regular session also held in Washington, in 1982, the General Assembly reiterated that concern.

In the last resolution adopted, AG/RES. 602 (XII-0/82), it was resolved:

1. To reaffirm resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-0/79) approved on 31 October 1979, and resolutions AG/RES. 481 (X-0/80) approved on 27 November 1980 and AG/RES. 560 (XI-0/81), approved on 10 December 1981.

2. To urge, once again, the parties directly involved in this problem to resume negotiations in an effort to give Bolivia a free and sovereign territorial connection to the Pacific Ocean.

3. Either of the parties may request that the item "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" be included on the agenda for the next regular session of the General Assembly.

Based on these resolutions, the Delegation of Bolivia asked that this session of the General Assembly continue to consider this topic. In this regard, Bolivia deplores the fact that it must state for the record in this report that in spite of its willingness, no progress has been made in the course of the past year towards meeting the objectives prescribed by those resolutions.

Bolivia, concerned with this situation, reiterates its willingness to seek appropriate dialogue mechanisms to commence negotiations to give Bolivia a free, useful, and sovereign connection to the Pacific Ocean. The people of Bolivia reiterate their confidence in hemispheric solidarity and believe that the Inter-American community can face this problem, so that with understanding and friendship these sister nations can find a just and equitable solution for the parties involved. It is in this spirit of American brotherhood that my Delegation submits this report to this Assembly.

Mr. President, distinguished Foreign Ministers, Heads of Delegation, allow me to make some comments that I hope will facilitate a better understanding of the reasons why my country has insisted on including this topic in the present session of this Assembly. We Bolivians believe that Bolivia's maritime problem should be focused on a view to the future. We have come before this forum once again because we hope that this opinion will resonate with other countries, without intending to revive any longstanding quarrels or to reiterate any criticisms, but rather to find constructive solutions

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to the age-old problem of our forced geographic confinement. We would like for it to be understood that for Bolivia, access to the sea is not a mere aspiration, but a vital question for its future. The world is on the threshold of the 21st century, and astounding changes to the lives of nations are already on the horizon. To cite just one example, I will mention communications, which have reduced the size of the planet such that literally instantaneous contacts can be made between peoples who are geographically very far apart. The technological revolution caused by space

satellites is eliminating the political borders created by humans, those borders that André Malraux called the scars of history, which are destined to disappear from the face of the globe sooner or later. Along these lines, we have already seen the appearance and development of regional units such as the European Economic Community or COMECON, entities in which the seeds of great future political units may be hidden. As a theorist of international relations who argued in favor of regionalism as the political formula of the future once put it: "With the nation, beyond the nation".

Our America cannot avoid this dynamic process of history. Why should we not think that in the future, the countries in the Andean Group or the Rio de la Plata Basin might form political-economic entities similar to those that will presumably arise on other continents?

Mr. President, distinguished Representatives, it is not an exaggeration to situate Bolivia's maritime problem squarely within a hemispheric scheme. Convinced that our Continent has a promising future in store for it, my country desires to participate in it with its own identity and the economic potential and the political gravitas that would make such participation with our sister nations in Latin America significant.

To this end, why is it necessary for Bolivia to recover its access to the Pacific Ocean? The answer can be found in the words of a famous Argentine and citizen of the Americas, who wrote.

> Bolivia lives isolated and without any ports, to the detriment of itself, of America and to the world of trade; paths for communication are all that this privileged country needs in order to rise into the world of wealth. It is in the best interest of all of America for Bolivia to resume its nature as an eastern and littoral State, in order to avoid the conflicts of the Pacific that weaken its united action and give Bolivia a guarantee of South American equilibrium.

Such adamant words will become even more important in the future. Let us not forget, distinguished Representatives, that in the same way that the Mediterranean Sea was the focus of the great demographic and economic currents of Antiquity, and was then replaced by the Atlantic Ocean

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after the discovery of America, history now seems to have moved to the Pacific Ocean, which is the likely venue of the great events of the future.

It is known that this Ocean bears considerable food and mineral resources, and this fact alone is enough to highlight the importance to the nations of the region of having a direct, appropriate access to it. If there are nations with thousands of

kilometers of coastline along the Pacific, it is difficult to argue that this should be denied to a country that, we must repeat, once possessed sovereign access to that ocean and was deprived of it in an unjust war and an imposed treaty. Moreover, for Bolivia, achieving access to the sea means satisfying the deepest longing of Bolivians: to open a means of communication between the Atlantic region of the Continent and the Pacific Ocean.

Due to its position as the central-most country in South America, Bolivia has been called a land of contacts and a country of multiple gravitations. Because of this situation caused by its geographic location, it plays a role of bringing our continent together, which makes it important in the processes of regional and sub-regional integration, since it belongs to three hydrographic systems: the Amazon, the Rio de la Plata and the Pacific. We state without fear of being mistaken or making presumptuous exaggerations, that without the economic development of Bolivia it will be nearly impossible to move towards effective integration of the countries on the Atlantic and the countries in the Andean Group.

Regional and/or bilateral agreements to establish physical connections with ports on the Pacific that include energy interests, industrial development, agriculture and ground transportation, may constitute in the medium term the most strategic group of projects in the entire process of Latin American regional integration. These projects, and particularly those involving physical infrastructure, will substantially reduce the distances between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The situation of Bolivian territory gives it an international importance that was seen by Bolivar himself, the Liberator of America and the Father of our Country, who at the time of Latin American independence, highlighted this importance in a letter sent to Marshal Sucre: "I would not attempt to march to Upper Peru if the interests at stake there were not so great. The Potosí is the axis of an immense sphere; all of southern American has a part of its fate implicated in that territory."

Mr. President, my Delegation believes that the time has come for the General Assembly to consider the means necessary to enforce its resolutions within a spirit of continental harmony,

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faithful to the spirit of the Charter and in order to put an end to the state of things that hinders the friendship that must reign among the nations in our Hemisphere. In insisting on this call, Bolivia does so with the good-faith purpose of reaching a free, friendly understanding, without an attempt to undermine the sovereignty of any State, but on the contrary, in an effort to create a spirit of understanding that if the respective interests are taken into account, will allow us to reach just, equitable solutions for all the parties affected by this problem. This is why my Delegation is willing to listen and to examine with an open mind any suggestion or initiative that that Assembly deems appropriate to make. We hope and desire that this frank and open attitude of my country will find an echo, as it deserves.

Finally, Mr. President, distinguished Representatives, Bolivia asks that the report on item 9 of the agenda and the discussion of it at this session of the General Assembly be recorded completely and expressly in the relevant minutes. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile has the floor.

The MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE (Mr. Schweitzer): Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, distinguished Representatives:

The presentation of the "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" moves my Delegation to make some necessary clarifications. The first relates to the definition of my country's border with Bolivia. In this regard, I want to be very emphatic: the boundaries between Chile and Bolivia were fixed once and for all by an international treaty that was freely signed by both countries in 1904. Consequently, we do not have any pending legal problems with Bolivia and this Organization of American States has no jurisdiction whatsoever to issue pronouncements on territorial matters of the Member States.

Any negotiations with Bolivia aimed at satisfying Bolivia's longing for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory is a matter for solution directly between Bolivia and Chile, and might possibly require the participation of Peru, if it involves the territories included in the Treaty of 1929, which Chile signed with Peru. Any negotiations of this type must also be the result of a process; a process that involves improving and normalizing the relations between our two countries and that permits us to create the positive political environment that facilitates an action of this nature. My country is and has always been willing to make a contribution to the beginning of this process.

Another aspect is related to regional cooperation and the purposes of integration that Bolivia mentions.

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Chile has been a strong proponent of Latin American integration. We have supported it from a general standpoint and we have repeatedly informed Bolivia of our desire to promote it with them in the bilateral and the regional context.

We do not purport to attribute responsibility for what has not been done in this respect. Nevertheless, Chile has not had and does not have any concerns about initiating a process of rapprochement with Bolivia to realize the vast possibilities of integration between the two sister nations called by history and geography to live together harmoniously under a framework of mutual cooperation.

The Foreign Minister of Bolivia has referred to the integration that has made so much progress in Europe, and without any doubt, the old continent has set an example for us of how countries with an enormous history of rivalry have set aside their past antagonism for the benefit of their people, in broad processes of integration and cooperation.

For integration is a means of overcoming the differences of the past, with a view toward the future, and with modern ideas that allow nations to overcome their historical anachronism, whereby two neighboring countries live distanced from each other and absorbed in futile quarrels.

Another aspect that needs to be clarified is the facilities to access the sea that Bolivia has through Chilean territory. In this regard, suffice it to say that, as we have said before, there is not another country in the world that enjoys greater advantages of communication with the ocean than those offered by Chile to Bolivia. Even so, we have always aimed to improve and perfect the free transit regime.

The Representative of Bolivia mentioned in his declaration that he regretted having to note that, despite his willingness, no progress had been made in meeting the objectives prescribed in the resolutions approved by this Assembly in the past four years.

As far as I am concerned, I would also like the record to reflect that the resolutions approved by this Assembly and rejected by my country could not have given rise to any progress at all. We have stated that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Assembly and that a process of negotiations with Bolivia regarding Chilean territories can only find an interlocutor when it is done directly with Chile.

We also affirm right from the start that an attempt to have an international organization participate in a matter that is outside its jurisdiction and relates to Chile's exclusive sovereignty was a wrong, improper path. We repeat that the only appropriate way is to engage in dialogue with Chile to seek a rapprochement between the two countries and a recovery of the bonds of friendship in a climate of mutual respect.

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Mr. President, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Bolivia has expressed the intention of his Government to approach this problem with a vision towards the future and in a constructive spirit. We cannot fail to be glad of such positive intentions. Chile firmly believes in a policy of good neighborliness, which has become one the guiding principles driving its foreign policy. As we have already said, borders should be points of union, and become dynamic elements of cooperation. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia has the floor.

The MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF COLOMBIA (Mr. Lloreda): Mr. President, distinguished Foreign Ministers, Representatives, ladies and gentlemen:

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile on the dignity, responsibility, and truly American-minded language that has characterized their speeches when they discussed this topic that has occupied the Organization of American States for so many years, and I want to tell them with sincerity that in the minds and wills of each and every country represented here, their words have opened the way for reestablishing a constructive dialogue about the topics that interest both countries.

For several months now, Colombia, and its President Belisario Betancur personally, have been interested in finding these paths. But it was the will of Bolivia and Chile that in this process of rapprochement, here in the Organization of American States, in the presence of the representatives of all the countries in this Hemisphere, could take their first step towards rapprochement between these two sister nations.

With this in mind, I have submitted to the Assembly, through the office of the Secretary, a draft resolution that attempts to reflect this mindset, and which I will ask you to read aloud when I have finished speaking. In other words, it seeks to pick back up the thread of a more positive relationship between the two countries, with that the terms in which this draft resolution is worded, aimed at recording the speeches of the two Foreign Ministers (with respect to everything that constitutes the respective position of their countries, and also as expression of good will), this draft also encourages the two countries to start a process of rapprochement that could lead them to normalize their relations and overcome their mutual difficulties, including a formula that makes it possible for Bolivia to have a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, an issue that both of them have already addressed.

We have all understood that these matters have begun to be addressed and this beginning could allow progress towards the goal of a closer understanding

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between Bolivia and Chile. I also want to indicate that if this initiative, and it is the hope that all of us have, could receive the simultaneous support of both countries and in general, from the entire community in the Americas, my Government, and in particular President Betancur, could quickly arrange for the invitation that has always been open to the two governments represented by their Foreign Ministers, so that in the near future, in Bogota or another location that they may select, they

can commence conversations and dialogues to achieve the purposes set forth in this resolution. In other words, the beginning of a rapprochement process searching to normalize relations, overcome difficulties, and search for a formula that makes possible the desires and the expectations of these two sister nations.

I do not want to outwear my welcome, Mr. President. There has only been one last-minute change to the draft resolution being considered by the distinguished members of the Assembly, in point 2 of the resolution, in the last sentence where it says "the rights and interests of all the parties involved," the amendment is to delete the word all. The rest of the terms of the resolution remain as set forth in the draft that is being distributed.

I want to reiterate my congratulations to the distinguished Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile for the intellectual dignity and the constructive spirit of their presentations, and naturally, we are all looking forward to finding out whether at least the fundamental points of this resolution will receive the support of the two countries, which would ensure that within the OAS, with the presence of all the countries in the Americas, two sister nations can begin the long, difficult but necessary process of rapprochement. Thank you, Mr. President.

[…]

The FOREIGN MINISTER OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Ortiz): Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Foreign Minister of Colombia, as I stated earlier, Bolivia is attending this meeting of the General Assembly animated, as always, by a high sprit of Latin American fraternity, because we want and desire to find long-lasting, equitable solutions to our century-old "maritime problem," because the justice of our cause has been widely recognized by the vast majority of the countries in Latin America, whose will has been reflected in the four OAS resolutions signifying their support to Bolivia's right to recover its outlet to the sea.

Finally, because the generous and lucid sponsorship of a country with the moral hierarchy of Colombia, which has been kind enough to act as an *amiable compositeur*, guarantees us impartiality and efficiency in the hemispheric context.

For these reasons, Foreign Ministers, Heads of Delegation, Bolivia supports the resolution that was just submitted to us by the

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talented Foreign Minister of Colombia, and hopes that the other delegations, without exception, will also support it with their vote.

In accepting this initial solution, my country is aware that there is still a long way to go and this is only a first step, but a first step in the right direction, which is mutual understanding among the countries in the Americas.

Mr. President, we consider it an auspicious coincidence that this event which with time will perhaps acquire historic projection is occurring on the second centennial of the birth of the Liberator Simón Bolívar. The nations of America are showing their faithfulness to the legacy of our immortal hero, who dreamed of a united America that is supportive of its destiny. It is in that sense and with that inspiration that Bolivia's support for the resolution submitted by the Foreign Minister of Colombia, under the noble auspices of Colombian President Betancur, should be interpreted. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile has the floor.

The MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE (Mr. Schweitzer): Mr. President, I would like to begin my remarks by reiterating what has always been my country's position with regard to the constructive spirit with which it has always approached its participation in these Assemblies and its cooperation with this Organization, based on a full desire for Latin American unity. In this connection, the proposed resolution submitted to us by our distinguished friend, the Foreign Minister of Colombia, has the support of my Government, although we must state our objection to the preamble, because of the principles that we have repeated in these Assemblies, as we find that it alludes to resolutions that my Government has never accepted.

We believe that today more than ever, Mr. President, the Organization needs clear signs, concrete gestures, that show the true unity of our Latin American brotherhood. The situations that we are all familiar with and that we have noted with heartrending realism in these meetings, the unexpected early resignation of the Secretary General, Ambassador Orfila; in the midst of a widespread economic crisis, the solution to which not only is not simple but also not clear. We could, distinguished Representatives, continue listing the problems but we would still not be able to enumerate the solutions to them.

That is why my Delegation, faced with Bolivia's aspiration and our position, in order to replace eloquence and rhetoric, so common among us, would like to replace it with tangible demonstrations of good will, good neighborliness, and we welcome the Colombian suggestion set forth in this resolution, with the objection mentioned earlier.

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It was high time for this Assembly, outside the Pan-American Union, to practice what was not a novelty, but what in our region appeared to be utopian.

As we said at the beginning of our meetings, it is sufficient for us to give in a little bit in order for all of us to gain a lot.

Finally, Mr. President, I cannot fail to express my admiration and thanks to our friend, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Colombia, who along with His Excellency the President of the Republic, Belisario Betancur, are an example that all of Latin America can be proud of. With their spirit of integration and desire for justice, they have again contributed to cooperation among the peoples of American so that they can find their common identity.

My friend the Foreign Minister has shown, once again, his attributes and gifts, and for having used them, I would like to send him my personal thanks, and the thanks of my Government and my Delegation. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. I ask the Secretary to read aloud the draft resolution.

The SECRETARY: [Reads:]

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED:

Resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-0/79) of 31 October 1979, AG/RES. 481 (X-0/80) of 27 November 1980, AG/RES. 560 (XI-0/81) of 10 December 1981 and AG/RES. 602 (XII-0/82), which respectively declared and reiterated it to be a matter of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and

WHEREAS:

There is still a need to achieve the objective indicated in the previous declaration, in a spirit of American fraternity and integration, and to consolidate a climate of peace and harmony that will promote the economic and social progress in the area of the Americas directly affected by Bolivia's lack of its own access to the sea,

RESOLVES:

1. To take note of the report of the Bolivian Government on its port problem, the comments made by the Governments of Chile and Bolivia on the decisions adopted in this regard by this Organization, as well as the constructive mindset of both countries.

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2. To urge Bolivia and Chile, for the sake of American brotherhood, to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of friendship between the Bolivian and Chilean peoples, aimed at normalizing their relations and overcoming the difficulties that separate them, especially including a formula for giving Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean on bases that take into account mutual conveniences and the rights and interests of the parties involved.

3. Either Party may request that the item "Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia" be included on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

[…]

The PRESIDENT: The Representative of Argentina has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (Mr. Quijano): Thank you very much, Mr. President. The presentations we have heard from the distinguished Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile this morning are a reason for special satisfaction as they presented their positions and specifically accepted the very appropriate conciliatory proposal prepared by the Foreign Minister of Colombia. Obviously extraordinary progress has been made with respect to the debate on this same topic just a year ago, when the tone was different and it was impossible to reach an agreement.

Bolivia's confinement problem is a cause of major concern to Argentina, and this concern has been reflected over the years in numerous instruments and declarations in which we have expressed our confidence that

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our neighbor Republic, with bonds born of our shared history, will achieve its sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean.

Our Organization has joined in this aspiration in resolutions approved in recent years and there is a general Latin American interest in the solution to this problem. Logically the Organization must limit itself to an exhortation and call on the parties to seek points of contact. The main effect of our presentation must be persuasion. Fortunately, in this case, persuasion has already been achieved. The agreement expressed in the proposed resolution presented by the distinguished Delegation of Colombia is the happy fact of this meeting and we think that on this basis we can give an adequate solution to the problem, trusting that the parties will continue their talks with increasing activity.

I would like to say that our position is very clear in this matter; we trust that Bolivia will solve its problem and will have a coastline on the Pacific Ocean, and we also trust that this solution will be reached in broad, free negotiations between the parties directly involved, both of which are sister nations of Argentina. This must logically occur within the framework of full compliance with existing treaties and in the understanding that the parties have the full right to sovereignly determine everything concerning the negotiations recommended here. Once again, we trust that this process that has begun with a resolution will have a very happy ending in the very near future. Thank you.

[…]

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The PRESIDENT: The Representative of Peru has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU (Mr. Marchand): Thank you very much, Mr. President. In the first place, I would like to indicate that we have listed with great attention to the lofty, cordial, and very fraternal statements by the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile. Also, Mr. President, we have listened with great attention to the significant proposal submitted by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Colombia, Lloreda Caicedo, and as was said a moment ago, words are not enough to praise his very constructive and humble labor for the Inter-American and Latin American cause.

Mr. President, Peru has consistently supported Bolivia's maritime aspiration and also fully understands it. It has given concrete evidence of its political will to contribute to the solving of this issue. As we did on previous occasions, Mr. President, I would like to end by making a statement that is consistent with our position here, i.e., that the Delegation of Peru, inspired by the purposes of harmony behind the resolution to be approved wishes to place on the record that, as on other occasions, the recommendation made today by this Assembly can only be understood in the context of respect for the sovereignty, rights and interests of the parties it concerns and in accordance with the legal framework applicable between them.

I repeat, Mr. President, that on this occasion, as we have always done, we will support this resolution just as we have been supporting our sister Republic of Bolivia. Thank you very much.

Annex 265

Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 18 November 1983

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Thirteenth Regular Session, 1983, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XIII.O.2 (1984), pp 206 and 268

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MINUTES OF THE SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Date: 18 November 1983
Time: 4:45 p.m.
Place: Hall of the Americas

President: Mr. Fidel Chávez Mena
Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador

Present: Messrs.

Mario Carías Zapata	(Honduras)
Donatus St. Aimee	(Saint Lucia)
Luis E. Guardia	(Costa Rica)
Michael I. King	(Barbados)
Gustavo Aliaga	(Bolivia)
Rolando Visconti	(Uruguay)
Héctor Denis	(Haiti)
Luis Marchand Stens	(Peru)
Andrés Valencia	(Mexico)
Edgard F. Parrales	(Nicaragua)
Galo Larrea	(Ecuador)
Pedro Daza	(Chile)
María Teresa Butler	(Bahamas)
J. William Middendorf II	(United States)
Juan Alberto Llanes	(Paraguay)
George W. McKenzie	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Henricus A. F. Heidweiller	(Suriname)
María Emma Ardila	(Colombia)
Marco Cesar Meira Naslausky	(Brazil)
Hernán Hurtado Prem	(Guatemala)
Joel G. Toney	(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
Roberto Leyton	(Panama)
Josefina Vega-Batlle	(Dominican Republic)
Víctor Giménez Landínez	(Venezuela)
Sara Ventura de Nosiglia	(El Salvador)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua and Barbuda)
Evadne Coye	(Jamaica)
Gerónimo Cortés Funes	(Argentina)
Marcella H. Mukasa	(Dominica)
Alejandro Orfila	(Secretary General of the OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[...]

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[…]

18. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1719/83)

The PRESIDENT: The Secretary informs me that, by error, we failed to consider the draft resolution on the report on the maritime problem of Bolivia [AG/doc.1719/83], also submitted by the General Committee. I apologize for this oversight and submit the draft to the Room for consideration. The Representative of Chile has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Daza): Thank you very much, Mr. President. Just as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile did when this item was discussed by the General Committee, I ask that the minutes of this session reflect my Delegation's reservation to the preamblular paragraphs of this resolution. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: The Representative of Bolivia has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA (Mr. Salazar): Mr. President, I understand that the resolution has been approved, and my Delegation would again like to thank Colombia, its President, its Foreign Minister and its Ambassador before the OAS for their effective contribution to the discussion of this issue and especially for submitting the resolution that obtained the unanimous support of this Assembly. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: If there are no other comments, this draft resolution is deemed approved. Approved.

We have thus completed the drafts submitted by the General Committee, and since there are no other points on our agenda, we will adjourn the meeting.

Annex 266

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 686 (XIII–O/83), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November 1983

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Thirteenth Regular Session, 1983, *Proceedings*, Vol. I, OEA/Ser.P/XII.O.2 (1983), pp 100 and 105



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OEA/Ser.P/XIII.0.2
14 December 1983
Volume I

THIRTEENTH REGULAR SESSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOVEMBER 14-18, 1983

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1983

AG

AG/RES. 686 (XIII-O/83)

REPORT ON THE MARITIME PROBLEM OF BOLIVIA

(Resolution adopted at the seventh plenary session,
held on November 18, 1983)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN:

Resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) of October 31, 1979, AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) of November 27, 1980, AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) of December 10, 1981, and AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82), of November 20, 1982, in which, respectively, it is declared and reiterated that it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found whereby Bolivia may obtain sovereign and useable access to the Pacific Ocean; and

CONSIDERING:

That in a spirit of fraternity and with a view toward American integration, it continues to be necessary to achieve the objective set forth in the preceding declaration and consolidate a climate of peace and harmony to stimulate economic and social progress in the area of the Americas directly affected by Bolivia's lack of its own access to the sea,

RESOLVES:

1. To take note of the report of the Government of Bolivia concerning the maritime problem of that country, of the observations made by the governments of Chile and Bolivia on the decisions adopted on the matter by this Organization, and of the constructive spirit that inspires the two countries.

2. To urge Bolivia and Chile, for the sake of American brotherhood, to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of friendship of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples, directed toward normalizing their relations and overcoming the difficulties that separate them--including, especially, a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take into account mutual conveniences and the rights and interests of all parties involved.

3. That either of the parties may request the inclusion of the topic "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" at the next regular session of the General Assembly.

355-I/1056c-45c

AG/RES. 686 (XIII-O/83)

RAPPORT SUR LE PROBLEME DE L'ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A LA MER

(Résolution adoptée à la septième séance plénière
tenue le 18 novembre 1983)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

VU

Les résolutions AG/Res. 426 (IX-O/79) en date du 31 octobre 1979, AG/Res.481 (X-O/80) en date du 27 novembre 1980; AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) en date du 10 décembre 1981 et AG/REs. 602 (XII-O/82) en date du 20 novembre 1982 dans lesquelles elle a déclaré et rappelé qu'il est de l'intérêt permanent du continent de trouver une solution équitable qui assure à la Bolivie un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique, et

CONSIDERANT:

Qu'il demeure nécessaire d'atteindre, dans un esprit de fraternité et d'intégration américaine, l'objectif signalé au paragraphe précédent et de consolider un climat de paix et d'harmonie propre à stimuler le progrès économique et social dans la région de l'Amérique qui est directement touchée par les conséquences de l'enclavement de la Bolivie,

DECIDE:

De prendre acte du rapport présenté par le Gouvernement de la Bolivie sur le problème de l'accès à la mer de ce pays, des observations formulées par les gouvernements du Chili et de la Bolivie sur les décisions prises à cet égard par l'Organisation, ainsi que de l'esprit constructif qui anime les deux pays.

2. D'exhorter la Bolivie et le Chili à entamer, dans un esprit de fraternité américaine, un processus de rapprochement des peuples bolivien et chilien, et de resserrement de leurs liens d'amitié, axé sur l'établissement de relations normales propres à leur permettre de surmonter les difficultés qui les séparent, et de trouver tout particulièrement une formule visant à assurer à la Bolivie une passerelle territoriale et souveraine vers l'Océan pacifique, sur des bases qui tiennent compte des avantages mutuels et des droits et intérêts des parties concernées.

3. Que chacune des parties peut demander l'inscription de la question "Rapport sur le problème de l'accès de la Bolivie à la mer" à l'ordre du jour de la prochaine session ordinaire de l'Assemblée générale.

355/83-F

Annex 267

Official Message from the General Directorate for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia, No 531/532, 21 November 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile



REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA | HORA DESPACHO | FIRMA OPERADOR | 143

PAGINA: DE
MINUTA:

MENSAJE OFICIAL Nº 839784

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
SECRETO	531/532	212040	NOVIEMBRE	1983

SECRETO
RESERVADO
ORDINARIO

DE: DIGEN

A: CONGECHILE LA PAZ, EMBACHILE COLOMBIA Y DELCHILE OEA, ONU , GINEBRA , EMBACHILE PERU

SIN PERJUICIO ENVIE MAS ADELANTE INFORMACION MAS DETALLADA, RESUMO PRINCIPALES CONSIDERACIONES RECIENTE NEGOCIACION CHILENO_BOLIVIANA, BAJO AUSPICIOS COLOMBIA, EN ULTIMA ASAMBLEA GENERAL OEA.

a. PROSIGUIENDO GESTIONES ACERCAMIENTO VENIA REALIZANDO DESDE HACE MESES COLOMBIA Y CONFORME LO ACORDADO EN ULTIMO ENCUENTRO CANCILLERES ORTIZ Y SCHWEITZER EN NUEVA YORK EN SEPTIEMBRE ULTIMO, AMBOS MINISTROS CON SUS ASESORES (POR PARTE BOLIVIANA, EMBAJADORES CRESPO, SALAZAR Y GUMUCIO; POR PARTE CHILENA; EMBAJADOR DAZA Y DIGEN LAGOS) SE REUNIERON EN WASHINGTON CON CANCILLER LLOREDA QUIEN ESTABA ACOMPAÑADO SUBSECRETARIO COLOMBIANO LUIS CARLOS VILLEGAS Y EMBAJADOR EN OEA, POSADA DE LA PEÑA.

b. EN ESA REUNION CANCILLER BOLIVIANO PUSO EN CONOCIMIENTO DE CHILE INFORME PRESENTARIA EN OEA SOBRE SITUACION MARITIMA BOLIVIANA ASI COMO PROYECTO RESOLUCION ESTABA DISPUESTO A PRESENTAR. INFORME ESTABA REDACTADO EN FORMA SERENA Y SIN MAYORES ELEMENTOS CONFLICTIVOS. EN CUANTO A RESOLUCION, PEDIA QUE SE REAFIRMARAN RESOLUCIONES ANTERIORES OEA, DABA CARACTER DE CONTROVERSIA A PROBLEMA MARITIMO Y PEDIA SE DESIGNARA COMISION BUENOS OFICIOS INTEGRADA POR COLOMBIA, URUGUAY Y PANAMA, COMO PROCEDIMIENTO OPERATIVO PARA ESTABLECIMIENTO RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS Y PARA UNA NEGOCIACION QUE CONDUZCA A SOLUCION DICHO PROBLEMA.

c. MINISTRO SCHWEITZER AGRADECIO ALTURA DE MIRAS DE INFORME PRESENTADO POR CANCILLER BOLIVIANO ASI COMO TONO MESURADO SU DISCURSO EN PLENARIO ASAMBLEA OEA, PERO MANIFESTO ABSOLUTO RECHAZO A RESOLUCION SUGERIDA QUE PRECISAMENTE BUSCABA INTERNACIONALIZAR PROBLEMA NO OBSTANTE QUE CHILE REITERADAMENTE HABIA MANIFESTADO QUE SOLO ESTABA DISPUESTO A CONSIDERARLO BILATERALMENTE Y EN FORMA DIRECTA CON BOLIVIA UNA VEZ QUE SE CREARA UN CLIMA PROPICIO Y DE RESPETO MUTUO.

d. MINISTRO LLOREDA COINCIDIO, EN LO GENERAL, CON PLANTEAMIEN

REFERENCIA: NEGOCIACION

AUTORIZA | Vº Bº CLAVE

CABINETE DEL MINISTRO

CORRELATIVO

OFFICIAL MESSAGE NO. 839784

Classification	Number	Local Time	Month	Year
SECRET	531/532	212040	NOVEMBER	1983

From: DIGEN [General Directorate for Foreign Policy]

To: CONSULATE GENERAL OF CHILE, LA PAZ; EMBASSY OF CHILE, COLOMBIA; CHILEAN DELEGATION TO THE OAS, THE UN, GENEVA; EMBASSY OF CHILE, PERU

NOTWITHSTANDING ANY FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION, I HEREBY SUMMARIZE THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS RESULTING FROM THE RECENT CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE LATEST GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE OAS, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF COLOMBIA.

A. CONTINUING WITH THE RAPPROCHEMENT DEALINGS THAT COLOMBIA HAD BEEN CONDUCTING OVER THE PAST MONTHS, AND AS AGREED BY MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ORTIZ AND SCHWEITZER IN THEIR LAST MEETING IN NEW YORK LAST SEPTEMBER, BOTH MINISTERS AND THEIR ADVISORS (AMBASSADORS CRESPO, SALAZAR AND GUMUCIO FOR BOLIVIA, AND AMBASSADORS DAZA AND DIGEN LAGOS FOR CHILE) MET IN WASHINGTON WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LLOREDA, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY COLOMBIAN UNDERSECRETARY LUIS CARLOS VILLEGAS AND THE AMBASSADOR TO THE OAS, POSADA DE LA PEÑA.

B. IN THAT MEETING, THE BOLIVIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INFORMED CHILE OF THE REPORT THAT HE WOULD SUBMIT TO THE OAS ON THE BOLIVIAN MARITIME SITUATION, AS WELL AS THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HE INTENDED TO PRESENT. THE TONE OF THE REPORT WAS CALM AND WITHOUT ANY MAJOR CONTENTIOUS ELEMENTS. AS REGARDS THE RESOLUTION, HE REQUESTED THAT THE PREVIOUS OAS RESOLUTIONS BE REAFFIRMED, CONSIDERED THE MARITIME PROBLEM TO BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DISPUTE, AND REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOOD OFFICES COMMISSION MADE UP BY COLOMBIA, URUGUAY AND PANAMA, AS AN OPERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A SOLUTION TO SUCH PROBLEM.

C. MINISTER SCHWEITZER APPRECIATED THE FORWARD-LOOKING APPROACH OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE BOLIVIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS THE MEASURED TONE OF HIS SPEECH AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE OAS ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED HIS OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE SUGGESTED RESOLUTION, WHICH SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE PROBLEM, NOTWITHSTANDING THE REPEATED STATEMENTS FROM CHILE THAT IT WAS ONLY WILLING TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM BILATERALLY AND DIRECTLY WITH BOLIVIA, ONCE A SUITABLE CLIMATE OF MUTUAL RESPECT WAS CREATED.

D. MINISTER LLOREDA AGREED, IN GENERAL, WITH THE



JBLICA DE CHILE
ERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA | HORA DESPACHO | FIRMA OPERADOR

PAGINA: DE:
MINUTA:

MENSAJE OFICIAL Nº 839888

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
SECRETO			NOVIEMBRE	1983

DE: DIGEN

A: CONGECHILE LA PAZ, EMBACHILE COLOMBIA Y DELCHILE OEA, ONU, GINEBRA, EMBACHILE PERU.

• DECRETO
• RESERVADO
• ORDINARIO

HOJA Nº 2

TO CHILENO Y LE SOLICITO A LOS EMBAJADORES DAZA Y CRESPO, EN PRESENCIA EMBAJADOR DE COLOMBIA POSADA DE LA PEÑA, QUE REDACTARAN UN NUEVO PROYECTO DE RESOLUCION.

e. COMO FRUTO DE ESAS GESTIONES, QUE MOTIVO DIVERSAS CONSULTAS A LOS CANCILLERES CON INTERVENCION MINISTRO LLOREDA, SE LLEGO A UN TEXTO ACEPTABLE PARA AMBAS PARTES QUE LUEGO FUE CONSULTADO AL PERU. CHILE DECLARO QUE HARIA RESERVA PARTE PREAMBULAR ESE PROYECTO POR CUANTO SE REFERIA A RESOLUCIONES OEA QUE HABIA ANTERIORMENTE RECHAZADO. SIN EMBARGO, MANIFESTAMOS DISPOSICION ACEPTAR PARTE RESOLUTIVA PUESTO QUE TENIA EN CUENTA NUESTROS INTERESES, ESTO ES, NO REAFIRMABA VALIDEZ REFERIDAS RESOLUCIONES OEA QUE INTERNACIONALIZABAN EL PROBLEMA Y SOBRE TODO POR CUANTO SU PARRAFO OPERATIVO SEGUNDO, QUE ES EL PRINCIPAL, RESUME EN ESENCIA LA POSICION QUE HEMOS VENIDO SOSTENIENDO DESDE QUE BOLIVIA ROMPIO RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS CON CHILE EN 1978. DICHO PARRAFO, EN EFECTO, CONTEMPLA EL INICIO DE UN PROCESO DE ACERCAMIENTO Y REFORZAMIENTO DE LA AMISTAD CHILENO-BOLIVIANA ORIENTADO A NORMALIZAR SUS RELACIONES TENDIENTE A SUPERAR SUS DIFICULTADES, INCLUYENDO EN ESPECIAL UNA FORMULA QUE HAGA POSIBLE DAR A BOLIVIA UNA SALIDA SOBERANA AL OCEANO PACIFICO SOBRE BASES QUE CONSULTEN LAS RECIPROCAS CONVENIENCIAS Y LOS DERECHOS E INTERESES DE LAS PARTES INVOLUCRADAS. EN OTRAS PALABRAS, EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS DEBE PRECEDER A LA NEGOCIACION MARITIMA. INCLUSO, EN UN MOMENTO, SE RECHAZO UNA FORMULA BOLIVIANA QUE PRETENDIA ESTABLECER UNA SIMULTANEIDAD ENTRE AMBAS ACCIONES,

f. CABE SEÑALAR QUE ESTA RESOLUCION, CON LA ANTEDICHA RESERVA DE CHILE, FUE ACEPTADA POR ACLAMACION Y DE PIE POR TODOS LOS CANCILLERES AMERICANOS, MERECIENDO LOS MAS DIVERSOS ELOGIOS Y CARACTERIZANDOSE COMO UNO DE LOS HECHOS MAS TRASCENDENTALES NO SOLO DE ESTA ASAMBLEA DE LA OEA SINO QUE DE LAS RELACIONES HEMISFERICAS DE LOS ULTIMOS AÑOS.

REFERENCIA

RELACIONES EXTERIORES CABINET

AUTORIDAD ORIGEN Vº Bº CLAVE

HORA RECEPCION CORRELATIVO

CHILEAN PROPOSAL, AND REQUESTED, IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR OF COLOMBIA POSADA DE LA PEÑA, THAT AMBASSADORS DAZA AND CRESPO PREPARE A NEW DRAFT RESOLUTION.

E. AS A RESULT OF SUCH DEALINGS, WHICH LED TO SEVERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WITH THE INVOLVEMENT OF MINISTER LLOREDA, A TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES WAS FORMULATED AND LATER SUBMITTED TO PERU FOR CONSULTATION. CHILE DECLARED THAT IT WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE PREAMBLE TO SUCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, FOR IT REFERRED TO OAS RESOLUTIONS THAT CHILE HAD REJECTED BEFORE. HOWEVER, WE SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ITS OPERATIVE SECTION, FOR IT TOOK ACCOUNT OF OUR INTERESTS, *I.E.* IT DID NOT REAFFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE REFERENCED OAS RESOLUTIONS THAT INTERNATIONALIZED THE PROBLEM, OR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH NO. 2, WHICH, ABOVE ALL, IS THE MOST RELEVANT OF ALL AND SUMMARIZES THE STANCE THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED SINCE BOLIVIA BROKE OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE IN 1978. INDEED, SUCH PARAGRAPH PROVIDES FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF A RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA, TO NORMALIZE THEIR RELATIONS, OVERCOME THEIR DIFFICULTIES, ESPECIALLY INCLUDING A FORMULA THAT MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO GIVE BOLIVIA A SOVEREIGN OUTLET TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN, ON THE BASIS OF THE RECIPROCAL INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MUST PRECEDE THE MARITIME NEGOTIATIONS. AT ONE POINT, WE EVEN REJECTED A BOLIVIAN APPROACH THAT SOUGHT TO ADDRESS BOTH ISSUES SIMULTANEOUSLY.

F. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS RESOLUTION, DESPITE THE ABOVE RESERVATION BY CHILE, WAS ACCEPTED WITH A STANDING OVATION BY ALL AMERICAN MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND WAS HIGHLY PRAISED AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS, NOT ONLY IN THIS OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT IN THE HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS.



PUBLICA DE CHILE
TERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA | HORA DESPACHO | FIRMA OPERADOR

PAGINA: DE
MINUTA:

MENSAJE OFICIAL Nº 839893

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
SECRETO			NOVIEMBRE	1983

DE: DIGEN

A: CONGECHILE LA PAZ, EMBAC HILE COLOMBIA Y DELCHILE OEA, ONY, GINEBRA Y EMBACHILE PERU.

HOJA Nº 3

g. AL TERMINO DE SU APROBACION, EL CANCILLER LLOREDA DE COLOMBIA SEÑALO QUE EL PRESIDENTE BETANCUR INVITARIA A LOS CANCILLERES DE BOLIVIA Y DE CHILE A MATERIALIZAR LOS PROPOSITOS ALLI ENUNCIADOS. A ESTE EFECTO, EL PRESIDENTE BETANCUR YA DIRIGIO UN MENSAJE A LOS PRESIDENTES DE AMBOS PAISES.

h. PARA SU EXCLUSIVO CONOCIMIENTO, INFORMOLE QUE CANCILLER LLOREDA MANIFESTO A MINISTRO SCHWEITZER QUE ENCUENTRO EN BOGOTA ESTARIA UNICAMENTE ENCAMINADO A RESTABLECIMIENTO RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS Y QUE REALIZADO LO ANTERIOR CONCLUIRIA LA INTERVENCION COLOMBIANA.

i. AGRADECERE A US. MANTENERME INFORMADO REACCIONES SE HAYAN PRODUCIDO EN ESA SOBRE EL PARTICULAR. EN CHILE YA SE PUBLICO UN FAVORABLE COMENTARIO EDITORIAL DIARIO "LA TERCERA".Y MINISTRO INFORMARA CURSO ESTA SEMANA, MEDIOS PRENSA Y SECTORES INTERESADOS TEMAS INTERNACIONALES SIGNIFICADO ESTE ACUERDO.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
Depto. Americas
Nº 1739
DIA 22 NOV 1983
TRAMITE
RELEVA

DESPACHADO
DEPTO. COMUNICACIONES

REFERENCIA

AUTORIDAD ORIGEN | Vº Bº CLAVE
HORA RECEPCION | CORRELATIVO

G. UPON GIVING HIS APPROVAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF COLOMBIA LLOREDA POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT BETANCUR WOULD INVITE THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA AND CHILE TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSES SET FORTH THEREIN. IN THAT REGARD, PRESIDENT BETANCUR HAS ALREADY DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

H. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, I INFORM YOU THAT MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LLOREDA TOLD MINISTER SCHWEITZER THAT THE MEETING IN BOGOTÁ WOULD BE INTENDED TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ONLY, AND THAT, ONCE THE FORMER HAD BEEN REALIZED HE WOULD CONCLUDE THE COLOMBIAN INTERVENTION.

I. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD KEEP ME INFORMED ON ANY REACTIONS THAT MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ISSUE. A FAVORABLE EDITORIAL HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN CHILE, IN *"LA TERCERA"* NEWSPAPER. DURING THIS WEEK, THE MINISTER WILL INFORM MEDIA OUTLETS AND SECTORS INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF THE MEANING OF THIS AGREEMENT.

Annex 268

Cable from General Augusto Pinochet to President Belisario Betancur of Colombia, 30 November 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

U. Figueroa, *The Bolivian maritime demand in international fora* (2007), p 501

Uldaricio Figueroa

La demanda marítima boliviana en los foros internacionales

RIL editores

Anexo 27

Cablegrama del Presidente de Chile, Augusto Pinochet, al Presidente Belisario Betancur, aceptando la invitación para que Chile concurra a Bogotá a un encuentro con Bolivia

Santiago, 30 de noviembre de 1983

Excelentísimo señor
Belisario Betancur,
Presidente de Colombia,
Colombia

Excelentísimo señor:

Acuso recibo de su atento telegrama fechado en Bogotá el 18 de noviembre recién pasado, mediante el cual Vuestra Excelencia se refiere a la resolución aprobada en la reciente Asamblea General de la OEA por la cual se exhorta a Chile y Bolivia, en aras de la fraternidad americana, para que inicien un proceso de acercamiento y de reforzamiento de la amistad de los pueblos boliviano y chileno, orientado a una normalidad de sus relaciones.

Con el fin de avanzar en los propósitos enunciados, Vuestra Excelencia ha tenido la gentileza de ofrecer que Colombia sirva de sede de un encuentro de los dos Gobiernos, representados por sus Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. He instruido al Canciller Miguel Schweitzer para que concurra en la fecha que se estime más adecuada.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterarle las seguridades de mi más alta consideración y estima.

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Capitán General
Presidente de la República de Chile

Annex 27

Telegram from the President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, to the President of Colombia, Belisario Betancur, accepting the invitation for Chile to meet with Bolivia in Bogotá.

Santiago, 30 November 1983

Your Excellency,
Belisario Betancur,
President of Colombia,
Colombia

Your Excellency,

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM DATED the 18th of last November, in BOGOTÁ, through which Your Excellency refers to the resolution recently approved at the recent OAS General Assembly, whereby, in the pursuit of unity of the Americas, Chile and Bolivia are encouraged to undergo a process of rapprochement and reinforcement of the amity of the Bolivian and Chilean people, geared towards a normalization of their relations.

In furtherance of the above, Your Excellence has kindly suggested that a meeting between Chile and Bolivia, represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, be held in Colombia. I have instructed the Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel Schweitzer, to attend said meeting at such date as may be deemed convenient.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Captain General of the Army
President of the Republic of Chile

Annex 269

Official Message from the Embassy of Chile in Colombia to the General Directorate for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 267/268, 22 December 1983

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR 1 PAGINA 1

MINUTA POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL 0335091

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	267/268	221645	DICIEMBRE	1983

DE : EMBACHILE COLOMBIA

A : DIGEN

COMINF
RESUTELEX CIRC. 694.-

1.- ANTE AUSENCIA CANCILLER LLOREDA (REGRESA HOY REUNION CONTADORA PANAMA Y VIAJA ESTA NOCHE CALI) Y ATENDIDA URGENCIA SU OF. SEC. NRO. 12892 PARA ENTREGA CARTA EXMINISTRO SCHWEITZER, HICE LLEGAR LUNES PASADO DICHO DOCUMENTO POR MANO TRAVES SU JEFE GABINETE. VISTO INSTRUCCIONES ADICIONALES SU TELEX REFERENCIA, ME ENTREVISTE ESTA MANANA CON SECGRAL. CANCILLERIA VILLEGAS, QUIEN MEJOR DOMINA TEMA CHILE-BOLIVIA Y CONOCE TENOR CARTA ALUDIDA.
2.- LE EXPUSE DETALLE A SECGRAL. INQUIETUD NUESTRO GOBIERNO ANTE INTERPRETACIONES PARCIALES SOBRE GESTION COLOMBIANA EN AUSENCIA DE CHILE, SIENDO NECESARIO Y URGENTE HACER LAS ACLARACIONES DEL CASO. ESTO ES: OBJETIVO CENTRAL ES ACERCAMIENTO Y NORMALIZACION DIPLOMATICA ENTRE CHILE Y BOLIVIA, MOMENTO EN EL CUAL CULMINA GESTION COLOMBIA, Y QUE EXPRESIONES "DERECHOS DE LAS PARTES CONCERNIDAS" EN DECLARACION PRESIDENCIAL BOYACA SON INCORRECTAS POR LAS RAZONES US. CONOCE Y QUE SOLO CABE HACER REFERENCIAS A "DERECHOS E INTERESES O ASPIRACIONES DE LAS PARTES INVOLUCRADAS".
3.- EMBAJADOR VILLEGAS ME SENALO ENFATICAMENTE QUE COLOMBIA SOLO BUSCABA ACERCAR DOS PAISES LE ERAN AMIGOS Y QUE MANTIENE POSICION POR COMPLETO IMPARCIAL ENTRE ELLOS. AGREGO COINCIDIA PLENAMENTE CON NUESTRA INTERPRETACION, SIENDO ESTA EL VERDADERO COMPROMISO ASUMIDO POR CANCILLERES EN OEA. RECONOCIO, SIN EMBARGO, COMO HABIA SIDO EL CASO DE SU EMBAJADOR EN LA PAZ, "QUE COMETIO UN GAFFE POR EL CUAL RECIBIO LLAMADO ATENCION". NO SE REFIRIO DIRECTAMENTE A "ENTUSIASMO" DEL PDTE. BETANCUR EN SUS ULTIMAS DECLARACIONES, NI AL TEXTO DECLARACION DE BOYACA, PERO ME INSISTIO EN QUE A TRAVES MENSAJE FIN DE ANO CANCILLER LLOREDA A SUS COLEGAS CHILE Y BOLIVIA SE HARIAN ACLARACIONES PERTINENTES.

CONTINUO MITELEX 268.....

SALAZAR

REFERENCIA ENTREVISTA SECGRAL. RELACION BOLIVIA.

PROHIBIDO FOTOCOPIAR SIN AUTORIZACION O REPRODUCIR SIN PARAFRASEAR

OPERADOR J. S. J. VºBº CLAVE

FECHA 22/12/83 HORA LLEGADA 221952 HORA PROCES 20:16:57 CORRELATI 20009

FORM. 29 FOLIO Nº

AMF A. MOLINA FLORES S.A. OP 15.346

OFFICIAL MESSAGE NO. 0335091

Classification	Number	Local Time	Month	Year
CONFIDENTIAL	267/268	221645	DECEMBER	1983
From: Embassy of Chile, Colombia				
To: DIGEN [General Directorate for Foreign Policy]				

COMINF [Inter-ministerial Committee on Infrastructure].
RE: YOUR TELEX NO. 694.

1. IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LLOREDA (HE RETURNS TODAY FROM A CONTADORA MEETING IN PANAMA AND IS TRAVELING TONIGHT TO CALI) AND YOUR URGENT REQUEST IN YOUR CONFIDENTIAL NOTICE NO. 12892 FOR THE LETTER TO BE DELIVERED TO FORMER MINISTER SCHWEITZER, I HAD SAID DOCUMENT DELIVERED BY HAND LAST MONDAY THROUGH YOUR CABINET CHIEF. IN VIEW OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELEX ABOVE, I MET THIS MORNING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VILLEGAS, WHO KNOWS THE CHILE-BOLIVIA ISSUE BEST AS WELL AS THE CONTENT OF THE REFERRED LETTER.
2. I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT BIASED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COLOMBIAN MANAGEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF CHILE, WHICH WARRANT URGENT AND NECESSARY CLARIFICATION. THAT IS: THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS THE RAPPROCHEMENT AND DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA, AT WHICH POINT THE COLOMBIAN EFFORTS WILL CEASE. ALSO, EXPRESSIONS SUCH AS "RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED" IN THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT DELIVERED IN BOYACA ARE INCORRECT FOR THE REASONS YOU KNOW. REFERENCES SHOULD ONLY BE MADE TO "RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OR ASPIRATIONS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED".
3. AMBASSADOR VILLEGAS TOLD ME EMPHATICALLY THAT COLOMBIA ONLY SOUGHT TO BRING TOGETHER TWO COUNTRIES THAT WERE FRIENDS, AND THAT IT REMAINS IMPARTIAL BETWEEN THEM. HE ADDED THAT HE FULLY CONCURRED WITH OUR INTERPRETATION, WHICH WAS THE GENUINE COMMITMENT ASSUMED BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE OAS. HOWEVER, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE WITH HIS AMBASSADOR IN LA PAZ, "THAT HE COMMITTED A *GAFFE* FOR WHICH HE RECEIVED A WARNING." HE DID NOT REFER DIRECTLY TO THE "ENTHUSIASM" OF PRESIDENT BETANCUR IN HIS LATEST STATEMENTS, OR TO THE TEXT OF THE BOYACA DECLARATION. HOWEVER, HE INSISTED THAT PERTINENT CLARIFICATIONS WOULD BE MADE BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LLOREDA IN HIS NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO HIS CHILEAN AND BOLIVIAN COUNTERPARTS.
I CONTINUE IN MY TELEX NO. 268…….
SALAZAR
…

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

EJEMPLAR: 1 PAGINA: 1

MINUTA POLITICA

MENSAJE OFICIAL 0335076

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	268	221655	DICIEMBRE	1983

DE: EMBACHILE COLOMBIA

A: DIGEN

CONTINUACION MI TELEX 267....

4.- ANTE MI PEDIDO AUDIENCIA CON MINISTRO LLOREDA PARA REITERAR IDENTICOS PLANTEAMIENTOS, SECGRAL. ME DIJO QUE SUSCRITO SERIA LLAMADO INICIOS PROXIMA SEMANA PARA ENTREGA REFERIDO MENSAJE, OCASION EN LA QUE VOLVERE SOBRE ASUNTO.

5.- LUEGO ENTREVISTA Y TENIENDO PRESENTE ANTECEDENTES APORTADOS POR VILLEGAS, TENGO SIGUIENTE IMPRESION: AL MOMENTO OFRECER GESTION, COLOMBIA TENIA INTERES GLOBAL DE AYUDAR A SOLUCIONAR MEDITERRANEIDAD BOLIVIANA (IDEA TAL VEZ SUGERIDA ORIGIANLMENTE POR LA PROPIA BOLIVIA). EN UNA SEGUNDA ETAPA, QUE CULMINA CON CONVERSACIONES CANCILLERES OEA, GOBIERNO COLOMBIANO ADVIERTE CON MAS CLARIDAD ALCANCES REALES SU GESTION Y, POR LO TANTO, DIFICULTADES ELLA ENVUELVE. AHORA, Y LUEGO VARIOS MALENTENDIDOS QUE HAN SIDO REPRESENTADOS POR NUESTRA PARTE, HABRIAN COMPRENDIDO EXACTOS PARAMETROS DEL ASUNTO. EN CONCLUSION, HAY QUE ESPERAR TENOR CARTA LLOREDA FIN CONFIRMAR AMPLIAS SEGURIDADES HA DADO COLOMBIA RESPECTO NUESTRA POSICION.

6.- AGRAUS. DISPONER ESTE TELEX SEA PUESTO CONOCIMIENTO EMBAJADOR MORALES (FONO 498106).

F I N A L

SALAZAR

REFERENCIA

ENTREVISTA SECGRAL. RELACION BOLIVIA.

PROHIBIDO FOTOCOPIAR SIN AUTORIZACION O REPRODUCIR SIN PARAFRASEAR

OPERADOR J. P. C. VºBº CLAVE

FECHA 22/12/83 HORA LLEGADA 221953 HORA PROCES 20: 15: 18 CORRELATI 20010

AMF A MOLINA FLORES S.A. - OF. 15.346

CONTINUATION OF MY TELEX NO. 267….

4. REGARDING MY REQUEST FOR AN AUDIENCE WITH MINISTER LLOREDA TO REITERATE IDENTICAL DEMANDS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD SUMMON ME EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR ME TO DELIVER THE REFERRED MESSAGE, ON WHICH OCCASION I WILL BRING UP THE SUBJECT AGAIN.

5. AFTER THE MEETING, AND CONSIDERING THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY VILLEGAS, I HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSION: UPON OFFERING ITS GOOD OFFICES, COLOMBIA HAD A GLOBAL INTEREST IN HELP IN FINDING A SOLUTION FOR BOLIVIA'S LANDLOCKED STATUS (PERHAPS SUCH IDEA WAS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY BOLIVIA ITSELF). AT A SECOND STAGE, WHICH ENDED WITH THE CONVERSATIONS HELD BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE OAS, THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT NOTICED MORE CLEARLY THE ACTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITS EFFORTS, AND, THEREFORE, THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. NOW, AND AFTER SEVERAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS BROUGHT UP ON OUR END, THEY MAY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE PRECISE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUE. IN SUM, WE MUST WAIT FOR LLOREDA'S LETTER IN ORDER TO RATIFY THE FULL ASSURANCES GIVEN BY COLOMBIA WITH RESPECT TO OUR POSITION.
6. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD HAVE THIS TELEX BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR MORALES (PHONE NO. 498106).

END

SALAZAR

REFERENCE: MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL. BOLIVIAN RELATIONS.

Annex 270

Statement by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
22 December 1983 (extract)

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile



DIMULTI-O.E.A

ACERCAMIENTO BOLIVIA

1983

ECLARACIONES ALTOS PERSONEROS

SANTIAGO, ENERO 1984

RESPECTO_A : ACERCAMIENTO BOLIVIA 1983
FECHA : 83 12 22
FUENTE : SUBSECRETARIO SR HUMBERTO JULIO
PAIS_FUENTE : CHILE
EMITIDA_EN : SANTIAGO
KARDEX : 1
SECCION : A
CARPETA : 113
REGISTRO :
CONTINUA_REG:

"DE SER EFECTIVAS LAS DECLARACIONES DEL PRESIDENTE SILES, HAY UNA DIFERENCIA. DIRIA YO, DE ENFOQUE. ENTRE LO QUE ES EL PRODUCTO DE LA ULTIMA RESOLUCION DE LA OEA Y NUESTRA POSICION SOBRE LA MATERIA. LA POSICION DE CHILE ES QUE PRIMERO DEBE HABER UN PROCESO DE ACERCAMIENTO QUE OJALA LLEVE A UN RESTABLECIMIENTO DE RELACIONES BILATERALES, Y LUEGO, EN UNA TERCERA ETAPA, HABRA QUE CONVERSAR SOBRE LAS DIFERENCIAS QUE EXISTEN Y ESO INCLUYE CUALQUIER ASPECTO QUE AMBOS PAISES QUIERAN PLANTEAR".

EL SUBSECRETARIO HUMBERTO JULIO AGREGO QUE CHILE MANTIENE SU DISPOSICION AL DIALOGO PERO QUE LA ACTITUD FRENTE A BOLIVIA HOY ES "PRODUCTO DE UNA AMIGABLE INICIATIVA DE COLOMBIA, PERO, NATURALMENTE, NO ESTAMOS DISPUESTOS A MODIFICAR NUESTRA POLITICA; ES DECIR, NO PUEDE HABER RELACIONES CONDICIONADAS".

EL SUBSECRETARIO REAFIRMO QUE LA RESOLUCION DE OEA ES UNA EXHORTACION A QUE LOS PAISES VAYAN A UN PROGRESIVO RESTABLECIMIENTO DE SUS RELACIONES, QUE PERMITA LLEGAR A UN ACUERDO EN TODAS LAS MATERIAS QUE SON DE MUTUO INTERES.

INTERROGADO SOBRE LAS DIFICULTADES QUE PRESENTA LA SITUACION, ASI TANTO CHILE COMO BOLIVIA ESTAN PARTIENDO DE SUPUESTOS DIFERENTES, INDICO : " ESTAMOS REFIRIENDONOS A INFORMACIONES DEL CABLE, ESTAMOS PLANTEANDO UN SUPUESTO DE QUE ESO SEA EFECTIVO. SI ES ASI, NATURALMENTE QUE LA SITUACION ES DIFICIL".

AGREGO EL SUBSECRETARIO QUE "ES TAXATIVO" PARA LA CANCILLERIA EL HECHO DE NO ACEPTAR CONDICIONES PARA EL RESTABLECIMIENTO DE RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS CON BOLIVIA, Y ADMITIO TAMBIEN LA POSIBILIDAD DE QUE FRACASE LA GESTION COLOMBIANA. AL RESPECTO MANIFESTO:

"EVENTUALMENTE FRACASARIA SI HUBIERA ESA INTERPRETACION DISTINTA, QUE DIFIERE MUCHO DE LO QUE SE CONVERSO EN LA OEA Y DE LO QUE BIEN CONOCE NUESTRO AMIGABLE COMPONEDOR. NATURALMENTE SERIA MUY DIFICIL CONVERSAR EN ESOS TERMINOS".

"EXISTE UN PROCESO DE ACERCAMIENTO CON BOLIVIA PERO SIN PLAZO NI VINCULADO A NEGOCIACIONES SOBRE PROBLEMA MARITIMO DE ESE PAIS. EL PROCESO INICIADO EN LA OEA, ES UN ACERCAMIENTO, NO ES, LISA Y LLANAMENTE, UNA NEGOCIACION...HAY QUE ACERCARSE Y TENER BUENAS RELACIONES CON LOS VECINOS. EN ESO (DEL ACERCAMIENTO) ES DONDE COLOMBIA HA HECHO DE AMIGABLE COMPONEDOR. ESTO HAY QUE HACERLO SIN PRISA Y SIN FALSAS EXPECTATIVAS. NO HAY PLAZO INMEDIATO NI ESTAMOS HABLANDO DE SALIDA AL MAR".

(NOTA: ESTE ULTIMO PARRAFO FUE PUBLICADO POR LA PRENSA PACENA).

SUBJECT	:	1983 BOLIVIA RAPPROCHEMENT
DATE	:	83 12 22
SOURCE	:	UNDERSECRETARY MR. HUMBERTO JULIO
SOURCE COUNTRY	:	CHILE
ISSUED IN	:	SANTIAGO
KARDEX	:	1
SECTION	:	A
BINDER	:	113
RECORD	:	
CONTINUED FROM RECORD	:	

"Should the statements from President Siles be true, there is, in my opinion, a difference in the approach between the result of the outcome of the latest OAS Resolution and our position on the issue. The position of Chile is that a process of rapprochement must first exist, which hopefully leads to the resumption of bilateral relations, and, subsequently, at a third stage, the existing differences should be addressed, which include any aspects both countries wish to raise".

The Undersecretary, Humberto Julio, added that Chile maintains its willingness to dialogue, but the attitude towards Bolivia today is the "result of the amicable initiative of Colombia. However, we are naturally not willing to modify our policy; that is to say, relations cannot be subject to conditions".

The Undersecretary confirmed that the OAS Resolution is an exhortation for both countries to progress toward the gradual resumption of their relations, so that they can reach an agreement on every issue of mutual interest between them.

Upon being asked about the difficult aspects of the situation, about whether Chile and Bolivia rely on different assumptions as a starting point, he stated: "We refer to information in the cablegram, we are based on the assumption that this is true. If it is, naturally the situation is difficult".

The Undersecretary added that "it is a requirement" of the Foreign Ministry that no conditions are imposed for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Bolivia. He also admitted that there is a possibility the Colombian initiative may fail. In that regard, he said:

"Eventually, it would fail if such different interpretations existed, which differ greatly from the conversations held at the OAS and what our *amiable compositeur* is fully aware of".

"There exists a process of rapprochement with Bolivia, but it has no deadlines and it is not tied to negotiations about that country's maritime problem. The process initiated at the OAS involves rapprochement, but it is not, plainly, a negotiation... It is necessary to approach and maintain good relations with neighbors. It is at that point (on the rapprochement issue) that Colombia acted as *amiable compositeur*. This must be accomplished in no rush and without false expectations. There is no immediate deadline and we are not talking about the outlet to the sea".

(Note: This last paragraph was published by the press of La Paz).

Annex 271

Minutes of the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly, 17 November 1984

(English translation only)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Fourteenth Regular Session, 1984, *Proceedings*, Vol. II, Part 1, OEA/Ser.P/XIV.O.2 (1985), pp 240 and 246-248

[p 240]

MINUTES OF THE EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Date: Saturday, 17 November 1984
Time: 3:45 p.m.
Place: Itamaraty Palace – Plenary Room

President: Mr. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil

Present: Messrs.

Edilberto Moreno	(Venezuela)
Sonia M. Johnny	(Saint Lucia)
Edmund H. Lake	(Antigua and Barbuda)
John J. Crowley Jr.	(United States)
Gaston de Prat Gay	(Argentina)
Rafael A. Bolaños	(El Salvador)
Rafael de la Colina	(Mexico)
Reynold Leroy	(Haiti)
Mónica Madariaga	(Chile)
Harry Beleván McBride	(Peru)
Leonel Morales	(Costa Rica)
Fernando Salazar Paredes	(Bolivia)
Joshua Sears	(Bahamas)
Edgard F. Parrales	(Nicaragua)
Alvaro Alvarez	(Uruguay)
Juan Guillermo Franco	(Dominican Republic)
Roberto Leyton	(Panama)
Marcos Martínez Mendieta	(Paraguay)
Oswaldo G. Harding	(Jamaica)
Hernán Hurtado Prem	(Guatemala)
Dário M. de Castro Alves	(Brazil)
Luis Carlos Villegas	(Colombia)
Albert O. Xavier	(Grenada)
James O'Neil Lewis	(Trinidad and Tobago)
Franklin A. Baron	(Dominica)
Donald A. McLeod	(Suriname)
Rafael García Velasco	(Ecuador)
Roberto Martínez Ordóñez	(Honduras)
Peter D. Laurie	(Barbados)

João Clemente Baena Soares	(Secretary General OAS)
Val T. McComie	(Assistant Secretary General)

[…]

[p 246]

c. Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia (AG/doc.1858/84)

The PRESIDENT: The next draft is entitled "Report on the maritime problem of Bolivia" [AG/doc.1858/84]. The Representative of Chile. The Representative of Chile has the floor.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Figueroa): Thank you, Mr. President. As we did in the General Committee, I would ask that a roll-call vote be taken on this resolution as well. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: A roll-call vote has been requested, and therefore we must hold the lottery to determine which delegation will start the voting. [He draws a paper]. The Delegation of Guatemala will start the roll-call vote.

[The roll-call vote was held with the following vote]:

Guatemala	Yes
Brazil	Yes
Colombia	Yes
Grenada	Abstention
Trinidad and Tobago	Abstention
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	[Absent]
Dominica	-
Suriname	-
Ecuador	Yes
Honduras	Yes
Barbados	Abstention
Venezuela	Yes
Saint Lucia	Abstention
Antigua and Barbuda	Yes
United States	Yes
Argentina	-
El Salvador	-
Mexico	Yes
Haiti	Abstention
Chile	No
Peru	Yes
Costa Rica	Yes
Bolivia	Yes
Bahamas	Abstention
Nicaragua	Yes
Uruguay	Yes

[p 247]

St. Kitts and Nevis	[Absent]
Dominican Republic	Yes
Panama	Yes
Paraguay	Yes
Jamaica	Yes

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is as follows: 19 in favor, 1 against, and 6 abstentions. Consequently, the draft was approved. I now give the floor to the Representative of Antigua and Barbuda for an explanation of the vote.

[…]

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU (Mr. Beleván): Thank you, Mr. President. The Delegation of Peru reiterates its support and understanding of Bolivia's maritime problem, which was expressed, on other occasions, when we supported the resolutions that have been adopted on this subject by this Organization in the past. The recommendation contained in the resolution that was just approved to continue the dialogue initiated between the Governments of Bolivia and Chile should be understood within the respect for the sovereignty, rights, and interests of the parties directly concerned and within the current legal framework. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Representative. The Representative of Paraguay has the floor for an explanation of the vote.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF PARAGUAY (Mr. Martínez): Thank you, Mr. President. As we stated in the General Committee, the Republic of Paraguay, faithful to its American desire and as the only other landlocked country in the Americas, has given its support for this resolution, but we should understand it as an exhortation to the parties involved

[p 248]

to find a solution to the problem through peaceful negotiation. As on previous occasions, Paraguay would also like the record to reflect its dedication to and respect for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Mr. Representative of Chile has the floor for an explanation of the vote.

The REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE (Mr. Figueroa): Thank you, Mr. President. In the General Committee, my Delegation had an opportunity to state its position on this issue.

In accordance with the procedures at previous Assemblies, I would ask you, Mr. President, that this explanation of vote be included in the minutes of this meeting. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Annex 272

Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution AG/RES. 701 (XIV–O/84), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 17 November 1984

(Original in English and French)

Organization of American States, General Assembly, Fourteenth Regular Session, 1984, *Proceedings*, Vol. I, OEA/Ser.P/XIV.O.2 (1985), p 20



ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OAS/Ser.P/XIV.0.2
12 February 1985
Volume I

FOURTEENTH REGULAR SESSION
BRASILIA, BRAZIL
NOVEMBER 12-17, 1984

PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME I

AG/RES. 688 (XIV-0/84) — AG/RES. 747 (XIV-0/84)

CERTIFIED TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
1985

AG

AG/RES. 701 (XIV-0/84)

REPORT ON THE MARITIME PROBLEM OF BOLIVIA

(Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session,
held on November 17, 1984)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN:

Resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-0/79) of October 31, 1979; AG/RES. 481 (X-0/80) of November 27, 1980; AG/RES. 560 (XI-0/81) of December 10, 1981; AG/RES. 602 (XII-0/82) of November 20, 1982; and AG/RES. 686 (XIII-0/83) of November 18, 1983, which repeatedly declared that it is of continuing hemispheric interest to find an equitable solution whereby Bolivia may obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean; and

The report presented by the Delegation of Bolivia; and

CONSIDERING:

That, under the sponsorship of Colombia, Bolivia and Chile held meetings to determine the procedure whereby and the context within which the process of rapprochement and negotiation described in resolution AG/RES. 686 (XIII-0/83) of November 18, 1983, would be advanced,

RESOLVES:

1. To express its satisfaction with the fact that the governments of Bolivia and Chile have accepted the invitation extended by the Government of Colombia to meet next January in Bogotá to start conversations to settle their differences, and particularly to agree upon a formula that will give Bolivia a free and sovereign territorial outlet to the Pacific Ocean, in a process of rapprochement that would contribute to the dialogue and to normalizing their relations, on bases taking into account the rights and interests of all parties involved.

2. To reiterate its interest in the success of the negotiations aimed at solving the maritime problem of Bolivia, with the participation of the states this matter directly concerns.

3. To declare that either of the parties may request inclusion of the topic "Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia" on the draft agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

AG/RES. 701 (XIV-O/84)

RAPPORT SUR LE PROBLEME DE L'ACCES DE LA BOLIVIE A LA MER

(résolution adoptée à la huitième séance
plénière tenue le 17 novembre 1984)

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE,

VU:

Les résolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79) du 31 octobre 1979, AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80) du 27 novembre 1980, AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) du 10 décembre 1981, AG/RES. 602 (XII-O/82) du 20 novembre 1982 et AG/RES. 686 (XIII-O/83) du 18 novembre 1983 par lesquelles elle a déclaré à plusieurs reprises l'intérêt permanent que porte l'hémisphère à une solution équitable qui permettrait à la Bolivie d'avoir un accès souverain et utile à l'Océan pacifique, et

Le rapport présenté par la délégation de la Bolivie;

CONSIDERANT

Que la Bolivie et le Chili ont tenu, sous les auspices de la Colombie, des réunions visant à fixer les modalités requises et à créer le climat nécessaire à la mise en route du processus de rapprochement et de négociation dont fait état la résolution AG/RES. 686 (XIII-O/83) en date du 18 novembre 1983,

DECIDE:

1. D'exprimer sa satisfaction aux gouvernements bolivien et chilien d'avoir accepté l'invitation du gouvernement colombien de se réunir en janvier prochain à Bogota afin d'engager des conversations en vue de résoudre les difficultés qui les séparent et, en particulier, à trouver une formule donnant à la Bolivie un accès territorial libre et souverain à l'Océan pacifique, dans le cadre d'un processus de rapprochement qui facilite le dialogue et la normalisation des relations sur des bases tenant compte des droits et des intérêts de toutes les parties.

2. De réitérer l'intérêt qu'elle porte au succès des négociations destinées à résoudre le problème de l'accès de la Bolivie à la mer avec la participation des Etats que cette question touche directement.

3. D'arrêter que tous les pays qui le souhaitent peuvent demander l'inscription du point intitulé "Rapport sur le problème de l'accès de la Bolivie à la mer" à l'ordre du jour de la prochaine session de l'Assemblée générale.

Annex 273

Official Message from the Directorate of Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Embassy of Chile in Colombia, No 9, 11 January 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA | HORA DESPACHO | FIRMA OPERADOR

PAGINA: DE:

DESPACHADO 0532 ENE 85 11 1723 MINUTA:

MENSAJE OFICIAL

Nº 1034722

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	009	111742	ENERO	1985

DE DIBILAT

A EMBACHILE COLOMBIA

CLASIFICACION: SECRETO RESERVADO ORDINARIO

U R G E N T E

C O M I N F

1. COMUNICO US. DESPACHO AP FECHADO DIA 10 DESDE LA PAZ INFORMA QUE CANCILLER FERNANDEZ, POCO ANTES DEJAR CARGO ACLARO A LA PRENSA QUE EXISTIAN SIGUIENTES BASES ACORDADAS CON CHILE PARA ORIENTAR NEGOCIACIONES Y REUNION BOGOTA:

A. QUE CHILE Y BOLIVIA ESTAN "DISPUESTOS A NEGOCIACIONES EN EL MARCO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO Y BAJO EL AUSPICIO DEL PRESIDENTE DE COLOMBIA, BELISARIO BETANCUR".

B. EL ASUNTO TIENE CARACTER MULTILATERAL Y ES DE INTERES HEMISFERICO.

C. NO EXISTE COMPROMISO PARA LA REANUDACION DE RELACIONES, HASTA QUE "LA NEGOCIACION MUESTRE INDICIOS SUFICIENTES DE QUE ESTAMOS PROXIMOS A UNA SOLUCION FAVORABLE A LOS INTERESES BOLIVIANOS".

D. LAS NEGOCIACIONES BUSCARAN CONSOLIDAR UNA "PAZ PERMANENTE" EN LA REGION, ESPECIALMENTE ENTRE LOS TRES PAISES (BOLIVIA, CHILE Y PERU) QUE INTERVINIERON EN LA GUERRA DEL PACIFICO, Y QUE ORIGINO LA MEDITERRANEIDAD BOLIVIANA.

E. "LA PAZ PERMANENTE EN LA REGION SIGNIFICA QUE LOS INTERESES DE LOS TRES PAISES DEBEN ESTAR APROPIADAMENTE REFLEJADOS EN LA SOLUCION", DIJO FERNANDEZ.

F LA SOLUCION DEBE IMPLICAR UNA SALIDA PROPIA, SOBERANA Y UTIL DE BOLIVIA EN LA COSTA DEL OCEANO PACIFICO. ESA COSTA DEBE ESTAR VINCULADA GEOGRAFICAMENTE A BOLIVIA.

G. LA NEGOCIACION NO INCLUIRA COMPENSACION TERRITORIAL DE NINGUNA NATURALEZA POR PARTE DE BOLIVIA.

REFERENCIA

AUTORIDAD ORIGEN V° B° CLAVE

HORA RECEPCION CORRELATIVO

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Date	Time of Dispatch	Operators signature
Illegible	111811	signature

PAGE: AREA:

OFFICIAL MESSAGE

No. 1034722

Classification	Number	Time of delivery	Month	Year
CLASSIFIED	009	111742	JANUARY	1985

From: Bilateral Affairs Office (DIBILAT)

To: Embassy of Chile in Colombia (EMBACHILE COLOMBIA)

U R G E N T

INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE (COMINF)

1. THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE NOTE DATED 10 JANUARY 1985, FROM LA PAZ NOTIFIES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER FERNANDEZ, SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING OFFICE, EXPLAINED TO THE PRESS THAT THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN AGREED UPON WITH CHILE TO ORIENT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BOGOTA REUNION:

A. THAT CHILE AND BOLIVIA ARE "WILLING TO NEGOTIATE UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE AUSPICES OF THE PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA, BELISARIO BETANCUR".

B. THIS IS A MULTILATERAL ISSUE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND HEMISPHERIC INTEREST.

C. THERE IS NO COMMITMENT TO RESTORE RELATIONS UNTIL "NEGOTIATIONS SHOW SUFFICIENT SIGNS THAT WE ARE CLOSE TO A SOLUTION FAVORABLE TO BOLIVIA."

D. NEGOTIATIONS WILL SEEK TO BUILD "LASTING PEACE" IN THE REGION, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES (BOLIVIA, CHILE, AND PERU) INVOLVED IN THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, AFTER WHICH BOLIVIA BECAME A LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY.

E. "LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION MEANS THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PROPERLY ADDRESSED IN THE SOLUTION," SAID FERNANDEZ.

F. THE SOLUTION MUST ENSURE THE GRANTING TO BOLIVIA OF A SOVEREIGN AND USEFUL OUTLET TO THE COAST OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN. THIS COAST MUST BE GEOGRAPHICALLY CONNECTED TO BOLIVIA'S TERRITORY.

G. NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT INCLUDE ANY TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION ON THE PART OF BOLIVIA.

JBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

FECHA | HORA DESPACHO | FIRMA OPERADOR

PAGINA | DE

MINUTA

MENSAJE OFICIAL

Nº 1034732

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
	009	111742		

DE

A

ORDINARIO

CONTINUA MI TELEX

2. MINISTERIO ESTUDIA ATENTAMENTE CONTENIDO DICHA DECLARACION FIN ADOPTAR UNA POSICION ACERCA DE LA CUAL INFORMARE A US. TAN PRONTO SEÑOR MINISTRO REASUMA FUNCIONES PROXIMO LUNES.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Director de Política Bilateral

REFERENCIA
ACLARACION DESPACHO DESDE LA PAZ.

AUTORIDAD ORIGEN

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DEPTO. TECNICO JEFE

V° B° CLAVE

HORA RECEPCION

CORRELATIVO

MY TELEX CONTINUES

2. THE MINISTRY IS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH STUDY OF THE CONTENT OF SAID DECLARATION TO TAKE A POSITION, AS WILL BE INFORMED TO YOU AS SOON AS THE MINISTER RESUMES HIS DUTIES NEXT MONDAY.

Annex 274

Communiqué of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
14 January 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

20

COMUNICADO

Santiago, 14 de enero de 1985

Como Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores no puedo evitar referirme a las declaraciones formuladas por el Señor Gustavo Fernández antes de dejar su cargo de Canciller de Bolivia.

Respecto de ellas, debo precisar a la opinión pública que el Gobierno de Chile no ha asumido compromiso alguno con Bolivia sobre aspectos sustantivos que tiendan a satisfacer la aspiración marítima de ese país.

En este sentido, reitero -una vez más- que Chile no tiene asuntos o problemas territoriales pendientes con la República de Bolivia; el Tratado de Paz, Amistad y Comercio, suscrito en 1904, solucionó definitivamente dicho aspecto.

Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, dado el espíritu americanista que inspira nuestra política exterior, el Gobierno acogió el amistoso ofrecimiento formulado por el Presidente de Colombia, Excelentísimo señor Belisario Betancur, para que los Cancilleres de Chile y de Bolivia se reuniesen en Bogotá a fin de acordar fórmulas que facilitasen el cumplimiento de la Resolución 686, aprobada en la XIII Asamblea General de la OEA, en 1983 (que Chile suscribió con las reservas correspondientes).

Ese ánimo permitió concretar, durante el año 1984, diversos contactos preparatorios tendientes a convenir los alcances del programado encuentro. En dichas gestiones, se determinó que en Bogotá se fijarían los procedimientos y etapas para llevar adelante conversaciones chileno-bolivianas tendientes a / lograr la concreción de los objetivos referidos en el párrafo precedente. Entre ellos, se contemplaba -con posterioridad a Bogotá- una rueda de trabajo, con sede en Buenos Aires.

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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

COMMUNIQUÉ

Santiago, 14 January 1985

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I cannot help referring to the statements made by Mr. Gustavo Fernández when he left his position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia.

In that regard, I should point out to the public that the Government of Chile has not assumed any commitment with Bolivia on substantive aspects aimed at satisfying the maritime aspiration of this country.

In that sense, I reiterate once again that Chile has no outstanding territorial issues or problems with the Republic of Bolivia; this aspect was finally settled by the Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce entered into in 1904.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, given the American spirit which informs our foreign policy, the Government accepted the friendly offer made by the President of Colombia, His Excellency Belisario Betancur, that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia meet in Bogotá in order to agree on a formula that would facilitate compliance with Resolution No. 686, adopted by the 13th General Assembly of the OAS in 1983, which Chile signed with reservations.

That spirit allowed making, in 1984, a number of preparatory contacts with a view to reaching an agreement on the scope and extent of the planned meeting. In such efforts, it was decided that the parties in Bogotá would establish the procedures and steps for conducting Chilean-Bolivian conversations aimed at attaining the goals specified in the above paragraph. Those steps included a work session in Buenos Aires following the Bogotá meeting.

Por lo tanto, la interpretación y condicionamientos dados a conocer por el personero boliviano, merecen los siguientes alcances:

1.- Cualquier negociación que pudiere efectuarse en torno a la aspiración marítima de Bolivia, tendrá un carácter estrictamente bilateral, rechazando Chile todo intento de multilateralizarlo.

2.- La alusión contenida en la citada declaración del ex Canciller Fernández en cuanto a que "la negociación busca consolidar una paz permanente en la región" constituye, en lo que se refiere a Chile, una afirmación innecesaria ya que nos anima una voluntad inquebrantable de atenernos al estricto cumplimiento de los tratados y al derecho internacional.

3.- El Gobierno de Chile no acepta ningún tipo de condicionamientos previos para iniciar conversaciones con Bolivia, como pretende el Señor Fernández al señalar eventuales resultados preestablecidos.

4.- De la misma manera, el Gobierno de Chile rechaza considerar la cesión de parte alguna de su territorio sin una compensación equitativa, debidamente acordada por las partes.

5.- En consecuencia, concurriré a Bogotá en tanto las nuevas autoridades bolivianas manifiesten inequívocamente una posición constructiva y de respeto a lo convenido en Nueva York y Brasilia, acerca del real objetivo del proyectado encuentro. Sólo así, se podrá iniciar un diálogo viable.

6.- Por último, deseo manifestar -nuevamente- el reconocimiento del pueblo y Gobierno de Chile al Gobierno de Colombia por el interés demostrado al auspiciar un acercamiento entre dos naciones hermanas, ofreciendo su capital como sede para la señalada reunión.

JAIME DEL VALLE ALLIENDE
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Thus, the interpretation and conditions communicated by the Bolivian representative deserve the following remarks:

1. Any negotiation that could occur concerning Bolivia's maritime aspiration shall be strictly bilateral. Chile hereby rejects any attempt to make it multilateral.

2. The allusion in the above-mentioned Statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernández that "the negotiation seeks to consolidate permanent peace in the region" constitutes, in so far as Chile is concerned, an unnecessary reassertion, since Chile is driven by a strong willingness to strictly comply with the Treaties and International Law.

3. The Government of Chile will not accept any prior conditions to initiate discussions with Bolivia such as those required by Mr Fernández in pointing out potential pre-established outcomes.

4. Similarly, the Government of Chile rejects considering the cession of any of its territory without an equitable compensation duly agreed upon by the Parties.

5. Therefore, I will travel to Bogotá as long as the new Bolivian authorities unequivocally express a constructive position which respects what has been agreed to in New York and Brasilia regarding the actual objective of the planned meeting. Only thus will it be possible to initiate viable discussions.

6. Finally, I wish to restate the gratitude of the Chilean people and Government of Chile to the Government of Colombia for its interest in sponsoring a rapprochement between two sister nations, offering its capital city as a venue for the meeting.

Jaime del Valle Alliende
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Annex 275

Official Message from the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia to the Directorate of Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 37, 16 January 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

RCLAP037 EJEMPLAR 1 PAGINA 1

MINUTA POLITICA 0033882

MENSAJE OFICIAL

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
ORDINARIO	037	161000	ENERO	1985

DE CONGECHILE LA PAZ

A DIBILAT

COMINF

AYER TARDE SENADO APROBO POR UNANIMIDAD RESOLUCION SUGIERE SUSPENDER CONVERSACIONES CON CHILE, CUYO TEXTO ES EL SIGUIENTE:

"PRIMERO. - AL EXPRESAR SU RECONOCIMIENTO, POR LA INICIATIVA DEL GOBIERNO DEMOCRATICO DE COLOMBIA, Y POR RESOLUCION APROBADA POR LA ORGANIZACION DE ESTADOS AMERICANOS Y ANTE LA MANIFIESTA FALTA DE VOLUNTAD DEL GOBIERNO DE CHILE PARA RESOLVER EL PROBLE - MA DEL ENCLAUSTRAMIENTO BOLIVIANO EN EL MARCO DE LAS RESOLUCIONES DE LA OEA EL H. SENADO NACIONAL VE POR CONVENIENTE LA NECESIDAD DE SUGERIR AL PODER EJECUTIVO, QUE SUSPENDA LAS CONVERSACIONES CONVENIDAS.

SEGUNDO. - REITERAR QUE LA RECUPERACION DE UNA SALIDA SOBERANA Y UTIL AL OCEANO PACIFICO, SUPERANDO EL INJUSTO ENCIERRO QUE SUFRE BOLIVIA, INTERESA UNANIMEMENTE A SU PUEBLO POR ENCIMA DE TODA DIFERENCIA POLITICA, ECONOMICA O REGIONAL, DENTRO DE UN PLANTEAMIEN- TO CONSTRUCTIVO DE PAZ, INTEGRACION Y DESARROLLO QUE AFECTA A LA COMUNIDAD CONTINENTAL E INTERESA DIRECTAMENTE A LA CONVIVENCIA DEMOCRATICA Y PACIFICA DE LOS PUEBLOS HERMANOS DE BOLIVIA, PERU Y CHILE.

ES DADO EN LA SALA DE SESIONES DEL H. SENADO NACIONAL A LOS QUINCE DIAS DEL MES DE ENERO DE MIL NOVECIENTOS OCHENTA Y CINCO ANOS.

H. MARIO ROLON ANAYA, SENADOR DE LA REPUBLICA., H. LUIS ANEZ ALVAREZ, SENADOR DE LA REPUBLICA., H. HEBERTO CATEDO LLADO, SENA- DOR DE LA REPUBLICA" .

RODRIGUEZ

REFERENCIA RESOLUCION SENADO BOLIVIANO.

OPERADOR G.M.S. VºBº CLAVE

FECHA 16/01/85 HORA LLEGADA 161118 HORA PROCESO 11:22:35 CORRELATIVO 00818

OFFICIAL MESSAGE

Classification	Number	Local Time	Month	Year
ORDINARY	037	161000	JANUARY	1985
From: Consulate General of Chile, La Paz				
To: DIBILAT [Directorate of Bilateral Affairs]				

Inter-ministerial Committee on Infrastructure (COMINF)

Yesterday afternoon, the Senate unanimously adopted the resolution that suggests suspending conversations with Chile, the text of which is transcribed below:

"ONE. Expressing its appreciation for the Democratic Government of Colombia's initiative, and by resolution adopted by the Organization of American States, and in light of the lack of willingness of Chile to resolve Bolivia's landlocked situation in the framework of the resolutions adopted by the OAS, the National Senate considers it convenient to suggest to the Executive Power that it suspend the conversations planned.

TWO. Reiterating that the recovery of a sovereign, useful outlet to the Pacific Ocean, overcoming the unjust enclosure suffered by Bolivia, it is of unanimous interest to the Bolivian people above any political, economic, or regional difference, within a constructive approach to peace, integration, and development affecting the continental community and it is of direct interest to the democratic, peaceful coexistence of the sister nations of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile.

Passed in the chamber of the National Senate on this 15th day of January, 1985.

H. Mario Rolón Anaya, Senator of the Republic, H. Luis Anez Álvarez, Senator of the Republic, H. Heberto Catedo Llado, Senator of the Republic."

Rodríguez.

Reference: Bolivian Senate Resolution.

Annex 276

Communiqué from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
18 January 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

C O M U N I C A D O

PARA LOS DIAS 4 Y 5 DE FEBRERO PROXIMO, ATENDIENDO UNA MISTICA INICIATIVA DEL PRESIDENTE DE COLOMBIA, EXCMO. SENOR BELISARIO BETANCUR, SE HABIA PROGRAMADO UNA REUNION ENTRE LOS CANCILLERES DE CHILE Y BOLIVIA, LA CUAL TENDRIA COMO SEDE LA CIUDAD DE BOGOTA.

A TRAVES DEL COMUNICADO EMITIDO EL DIA 14 DE ENERO EN CURSO, EL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE RECTIFICO LAS AFIRMACIONES FORMULADAS POR EL CANCILLER DE BOLIVIA SENOR GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ; PRECISANDO - ADEMAS - EL VERDADERO SENTIDO QUE, LUEGO DE DIVERSAS CONVERSACIONES CON SU COLEGA BOLIVIANO, SE CONVINO EN DAR AL PROGRAMADO ENCUENTRO DE BOGOTA. ASIMISMO, REQUIRIO DE LAS AUTORIDADES DEL GOBIERNO DE LA PAZ UN PRONUNCIAMIENTO EN CUANTO A LA NATURALEZA Y ALCANCE QUE OTORGABAN A LA SENALADA REUNION.

EL GOBIERNO DE BOLIVIA NO HA DADO RESPUESTA CATEGORICA A LOS ASPECTOS CONCRETOS PLANTEADOS EN DICHO COMUNICADO Y, EN EL INTERTANTO, SURGEN NUEVOS ELEMENTOS QUE EN NADA FAVORECEN AL DIALOGO.

EN EFECTO, LA ULTIMA EXPRESION OFICIAL DEL PALACIO QUEMADO PERSISTE EN SUS INTENTOS DE MULTILATERALIZAR LA NEGOCIACION DE SU ASPIRACION MARITIMA INVOCANDO UNA RESOLUCION DE LA OEA, QUE CHILE HA VOTADO EN CONTRA. ASIMISMO, EL SENADO DE BOLIVIA SOLICITO - POR UNANIMIDAD - AL PODER EJECUTIVO QUE SUSPENDA LAS CONVERSACIONES CONVENIDAS CON CHILE, DEJANDO DE MANIFIESTO LA FALTA DE RESPALDO A CUALQUIER RESULTADO QUE SE PUDIERA ALCANZAR EN LA CITA DE BOGOTA. ESTA RESOLUCION PARLAMENTARIA, APOYADA TANTO POR LAS FUERZAS POLITICAS DE GOBIERNO COMO DE OPOSICION, DESMIENTE EL SUPUESTO CONSENSO NACIONAL EXISTENTE EN DICHO PAIS PARA LLEVAR ADELANTE LAS CONVERSACIONES PROGRAMADAS.

CONSECUENTEMENTE, EXISTEN DIFERENCIAS FUNDAMENTALES QUE OBSTACULIZAN CUALQUIER APROXIMACION QUE RESPONDA AL AUTENTICO ESPIRITU DE BUENA VECINDAD Y CONCORDIA QUE EL GOBIERNO DE CHILE HA DEMOSTRADO - TRADICIONALMENTE - EN SUS RELACIONES CON EL ALTIPLANO.

COMMUNIQUÉ

A meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia had been scheduled to take place in the city of Bogotá on the 4th and 5th of next February, pursuant to a friendly initiative of the President of Colombia, Mr Belisario Betancur.

In a Press Release issued on 14 January of this year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile corrected the statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Gustavo Fernández, and specified the true spirit that had been agreed after a series of talks with his Bolivian colleague in order to plan the meeting in Bogotá. In addition, he requested that the authorities of the Government of La Paz issue a statement regarding the nature and scope that had been ascribed to the scheduled meeting.

The Government of Bolivia has categorically given no response to the concrete issues put forward in said Press Release, and meanwhile, new elements have arisen which do nothing to encourage the negotiations.

Indeed, the latest official statement from the Palacio Quemado insists on multilateralizing negotiations over its maritime aspiration, relying on an OAS resolution which Chile had voted against. Additionally, the Senate of Bolivia unanimously requested the Executive to suspend the talks agreed upon with Chile, evidencing the lack of support for any eventual outcome that could be reached at the meeting in Bogotá. This parliamentary resolution, supported by political forces of the government and the opposition alike, disproves the alleged national consensus prevailing in that country to carry out the planned negotiations.

Therefore, fundamental differences exist which hamper any approach that might reflect the true spirit of good-neighborliness and friendship traditionally embraced by the Government of Chile in its relationships with the Altiplano.



REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

-2-

EN LAS PRESENTES CIRCUNSTANCIAS, Y NO EXISTIENDO CONDICIONES MINIMAS NECESARIAS PARA UN FRUCTIFERO ENTENDIMIENTO CON BOLIVIA, EL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE SE VE EN EL IMPERATIVO DE TENER QUE DECLINAR SU ASISTENCIA A LA YA REFERIDA REUNION DE BOGOTA.

SANTIAGO, 18 DE ENERO DE 1985.

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

In the present circumstances, given that the minimum conditions are not met for a fruitful understanding with Bolivia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile considers it imperative to refuse to attend the meeting in Bogotá.

Santiago, 18 January 1985

Annex 277

Official Press Release from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 7 February 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

COMUNICADO OFICIAL DE LA CANCILLERIA — Bolivia

EN LA NOCHE DEL MIERCOLES 6 DE FEBRERO - LUEGO DE LA CENA DE BIENVENIDA OFRECIDA POR EL CANCILLER DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA EN HONOR DE LOS DELEGADOS ASISTENTES A LA ''CONFERENCIA SOBRE EL CONSENSO DE CARTAGENA''- ATENDIENDO A LA INICIATIVA DEL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE COLOMBIA, EXCELENTISIMO SENOR AUGUSTO RAMIREZ OCAMPO, ME REUNI, EN LA EMBAJADA DE DICHO PAIS EN ESTA, CON EL CANCILLER BOLIVIANO, EXCELENTISIMO SENOR EDGAR CAMACHO OMISTE.-

EL ENCUENTRO POSIBILITO UN DETALLADO ANALISIS DE LAS ALTERNATIVAS EXPERIMENTADAS POR EL PROCESO DE CONVERSACIONES QUE SOSTUVE CON EL EX-CANCILLER BOLIVIANO, SENOR FERNANDEZ, COMO ASIMISMO ACERCA DE LOS ELEMENTOS QUE FRUSTRARON LA PROGRAMADA REUNION MINISTERIAL DE BOGOTA Y EL COMUNICADO CONJUNTO PREPARADO EN NUEVA YORK, CON LOS QUE SE INICIARIA UN PROCESO DE ACERCAMIENTO BILATERAL.

LUEGO DE EXTENSAS CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE EL TEMA, EN LAS QUE TAMBIEN PARTICIPO EL MINISTRO ANFITRION, EXPRESE QUE -SIN PERJUICIO DE LAS APROXIMACIONES QUE ACTUALMENTE SE PUEDEN ALCANZAR A TRAVES DEL CANAL CONSULAR EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS GOBIERNOS DE SANTIAGO Y LA PAZ- CHILE RESTABLECERIA OFICIALMENTE DICHOS CONTACTOS FORMALES CUANDO SURJAN CONDICIONES PROPICIAS Y OPORTUNAS, QUE HAGAN FACTIBLE ALCANZAR RESULTADOS POSITIVOS Y CONSECUENTES CON LOS ALTOS FINES QUE TUVO EN CUENTA EL ILUSTRE PRESIDEDNTE DE COLOMBIA AL AUSPICIAR EL REFERIDO DIALOGO.

SANTO DOMINGO, 7 DE FEBRERO DE 1985.-

(F I R M A D O)
JAIME DEL VALLE ALLIENDE
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE

MINREL

OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the evening of Wednesday, 6 February – after the welcome dinner offered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic in honor of the delegates attending the "Cartagena Consensus Conference" – in keeping with the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, His Excellency Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, I met, at the Embassy of that country in this [sic], with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, His Excellency Edgar Camacho Omiste.

This meeting allowed a detailed analysis of the alternatives experienced over the course of the conversations I held with the former Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fernández, as well as of the elements that prevented the scheduled meeting of ministers in Bogotá from taking place and the joint release prepared in New York, which would set in motion a bilateral rapprochement process.

Following extensive discussions on the subject, in which the host minister also took part, I stated that -- without prejudice to any approaches that may be currently achieved through consular channels between the Governments of Santiago and La Paz -- Chile will officially re-establish such formal contacts once suitable and timely conditions emerge that render it practicable to achieve positive results in line with the lofty goals that the illustrious President of Colombia took into account when sponsoring said dialogue.

Santo Domingo, 7 February 1985.

(Signed)

Jaime del Valle Alliende

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile

Annex 278

Official Message from the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia to the Directorate of Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 78, 13 February 1985

(Original in Spanish, English translation)

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile

REPUBLICA DE CHILE
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

RCLAP078 EJEMPLAR: 1 PAGINA: 1 331

MINUTA . POLITIC 0009775

MENSAJE OFICIAL

CLASIFICACION	NUMERO	HORA ORIGEN	MES	AÑO
RESERVADO	078	131040	FEBRERO	1985

DE. CONGECHILE LA PAZ

A . DIBILAT INFO DIMULTI

COMINF

1.- DIA AYER REGRESO CANCILLER EDGAR CAMACHO EN CUYA OCASION DECLARO QUE CIRCUNSTANCIAS ' NO PERMITEN AUN UN ACERCAMIENTO MAS PROFUNDO CON CHILE. POR LO TANTO SE HA RESUELTO ESPERAR OTRA OPORTUNIDAD PARA VOLVER A ESTABLECER UN DIALOGO INFORMAL CON ESE PAIS' .

2.- AGREGO QUE EN SANTO DOMINGO SE HIZO ' UN EXAMEN LARGO Y DETALLADO SOBRE LOS PASOS ANTERIORMENTE REALIZADOS PARA ACERCARNOS A UN DIALOGO DIRECTO Y A FUTURAS NEGOCIACIONES SOBRE LOS TEMAS QUE NOS PREOCUPAN, COMO EN EL DE LA MEDITERRANEIDAD, PERO ENCONTRAMOS QUE LAS CIRCUNSTANCIAS TODAVIA NO PERMITEN UN ACERCAMIENTO MAS PROFUNDO EN ESTA MATERIA, POR LO TANTO HEMOS RESUELTO ESPERAR OTRA OPORTUNIDAD PARA VOLVER A ESTABLECER DIALOGO' . AGREGO QUE ALGUNOS PROBLEMAS SE REFIEREN A VECES, A DIFERENCIAS TERMINOLOGICAS: ' HAY PUNTOS DE VISTA DE LA OPINION PUBLICA O DE LOS SECTORES GUBERNAMENTALES. ES NECESARIO ALCANZAR CONSENSOS INTERNOS DENTRO DE CADA UNO DE LOS PAISES, DE MODO DE IR ESPERANDO LAS CONDICIONES Y AL MISMO TIEMPO, RESOLVIENDO OTROS PROBLEMAS DE DISTINTA NATURALEZA, EN MATERIA DE TRANSPORTES, PUERTOS Y OTROS QUE EN LA MEDIDA EN QUE SE SOLUCIONEN, PERMITAN UN AMBIENTE FAVORABLE PARA LAS CONVERSACIONES DE FONDO, QUE SON LAS QUE NOS INTERESA' .

3.- FINALMENTE ACLARO QUE LOS ENFOQUES DE CADA UNO DE LOS PAISES NO AFECTAN LOS AVANCES QUE SE REALIZAN EN MATERIA DE LA MEDITERRANEIDAD.

4.- TELEVISION ESTATAL NOCHE AYER, LUEGO DECLARACIONES CAMACHO, PROYECTO TITULARES APARECIDOS ' AQUI' Y ' MERIDIANO' (MIS TELEX 075 Y 076) POR TIEMPO CONSIDERABLE, EFECTUANDO SIMILARES COMENTARIOS APARECIDOS EN TALES PERIODICOS.

VIAL

FORM 29

FOLIO Nº

REFERENCIA DECLARACIONES CAMACHO.

PROHIBIDO FOTOCOPIAR SIN AUTORIZACION O REPRODUCIR SIN PARAFRASEAR

OPERADOR J.F.T. Vº Bº CLAVE

FECHA 13/02/85 HORA LLEGADA 131216 HORA PROCESO 12:31:26 CORRELATIVO 02501

AMF A. MOLINA SORIS S.A.

OFFICIAL MESSAGE

Classification	Number	Local Time	Month	Year
CONFIDENTIAL	078	131040	FEBRUARY	1985
From: Consulate General of Chile, La Paz				
To: DIBILAT [Directorate of Bilateral Affairs]				
cc DIMULTI [Directorate for Multilateral Policy]				

Inter-ministerial Committee on Infrastructure (COMINF)

1. Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgar Camacho returned yesterday, on which occasion he stated that the circumstances 'do not allow a closer rapprochement with Chile. Therefore, we have decided to wait for another opportunity to re-establish informal discussions with this country.'

2. He added that 'a lengthy, detailed assessment has been conducted in Santo Domingo of the steps previously taken toward direct discussions and future negotiations over the issues that concern us, such as the landlocked situation. However, we find that the circumstances do not yet allow a closer rapprochement on this subject. Therefore, we have decided to wait for another opportunity to re-establish discussions.' He added that, at times, a number of problems refer to terminological differences: 'There are points of view from the public or from government sectors. It is necessary to reach a consensus internally within each one of the countries, so we can wait for appropriate conditions while we solve other problems of a different nature regarding transportation, ports, and others, which, insofar as they are resolved, would allow a favorable climate for the discussions on the substance, which are the ones that interest us.'

3. Finally, he stated that the approaches adopted by each one of the countries will not affect the progress made toward a solution to the landlocked situation.

4. Yesterday evening, following Camacho's statements, State-owned TV channels aired the headlines published in *Aquí* and *Meridiano* newspapers (My telexes Nos. 075 and 076) over a considerable period of time, making comments similar to those in such newspapers.

VIAL.

Reference: Camacho's Statements.