INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING
CERTAIN IRANIAN ASSETS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ANNEXES TO THE OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS ON THE U.S. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

01 SEPTEMBER 2017

IN THE NAME OF GOD

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Annex 1

U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Banking Committee's Investigation of the Atlanta Branch BNL, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress (1991-1992), 2 March 1992

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nese interests and their direct acquisitions of either direct interest or direct assets are about 50 percent of the British investment in our country. We do not hear much about that. That is something else that is in the jurisdiction of someone else.

Nevertheless, the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs has a responsibility of focusing on the needed legislation, trying to reach a level of consciousness among the majority of our fellow 434 Members to the importance of it and try to draft such legislation as is possible under our sort of compromise procedures as will be as near adequate as it is humanly possible to construct.

The committee's investigation of BNL participation in United States credit programs has led to a broader look at the United States policy toward Iraq because of the magnitude of the BNL scandal and the fact that it touched upon nearly all the elements of the United States policy toward Iraq. The BNL scandal sheds a revealing light on United States-Iraq relations.

I also want to remind my colleagues of what I said last week, that such banks as BNL, such banks as most of those that are involved in international interests and transactions in our country are government owned. BNL is owned by the Italian Government. So we have very delicate additional questions about national policy, not only our Nation's national policy but that other country's national policy and how these institutions fit in or did not into those policies.

During last week's special order I discussed the Eximbank program for Iraq.

I showed how the Eximbank was continually pressed by the State Department and even President Bush, at the time Vice President, but as I will indicate later, even after he took his oath of office as President in 1989, he was still pushing for Iraq's aid.

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This is true, even though Eximbank is charged by law, and we have jurisdiction of the Eximbank that will be a reasonable assurance of repaying those debts. Therefore, I have asked the GAO to determine if the Eximbank violated its charter by granting credit to Iraq.

Today I will discuss the Commodity Credit Corporation's export promotion program for Iraq. I will illustrate how the Bush administration placed inordinate importance on the CCC program for Iraq and how the BNL scandal affected United States policy toward Iraq.

An October 1989 meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz illustrates that point. The main focus of that point turned out to be the BNL scandal.

During the early 1980's the United States policy toward Iraq was motivated by the fear of Iranian dominance of the Middle East.

There is another thing that is lost sight of, and I think is very little appreciated in our country. Iran is a non-Arabic country. It is not an Arabic country. Iraq is. We must remember the distinction, because apparently those that have gotten all the notoriety, from President Reagan to Colonel North and Security Adviser McFarlane, do not seem to realize that. They played into the hands of people and nations that have been at war, and still continue in a state of war, and have been in a state of war since 1949; this is, Israel and Iraq.

Unless we know that this Middle East is complex, complicated, but like any other section of the country, Middle Europe, or as they say in Germany, Mitteleuropa, or the Far East, we seem to be totally either averse or unaware or unwilling to be aware of the tremendous corpus of history that is there, so our perception cannot be a correct one.

I have always said, even since then, that had we had the correct perception of the country we would not have lost 54,000 soldiers in Korea and 58,000 in Vietnam. But that is neither here nor there. The only connection there is that we continue with these misperceptions in the Middle East.

If we think that we are looked upon as the saviors, let me assure the Members that in the Middle East the fixed, rooted perception, whether it is true or not is immaterial, the rooted perception is that we have stepped into the shoes of the two departed colonial powers, France and England. Be that whatever it is.

The logic that I report here is best spelled out in a 1984 memorandum to then Vice President Bush related to his efforts to have the Eximbank finance the Iraqi Aqaba pipeline project. I am not going to read from it, and I have a copy of the memorandum which I will place, together with all the documents, at the end of my discourse this morning.

I quote:

The war between Iraq and Iran directly affects our vital interests in the Middle East, and particularly in the Persian Gulf.

This is Vice President Bush.

Our objective is to bring the war to a negotiated end in which neither belligerent is dominant and the sovereignty of both is preserved.

Now, he is Vice President of a regime that in the meanwhile is also dealing through the so-called client states, even though sometimes client states become masters, such as Israel, with Iran, and therefore the big scandal that later erupted, and only a portion of that has been seen, of the aid of arms to Iran.

So we were foolish enough to think that we could be helping each one of the combatants without the other realizing it. It is absurd. Of course they knew. Therefore, no respect.

I will continue, and I quote:

We believe victory by either side would have a serious destabilizing effect on the region.

I am going to repeat that:

We believe victory by either side would have a serious destabilizing effect on the region. At this point Iran is the intransigent party, unwilling to negotiate in part because it believes it can win in the war of attrition. We must therefore seek means to bolster Iraq's ability and resolve to withstand Iranian attacks as well as to convince Iran that continuing hostilities is useless.

Have we learned anything? No. Today we have been involved in negotiations mostly to pay back some of the money that I spoke of that had gone out of Iran and led to the release of the last hostages.

If the Members think the release of the last hostages was just accidental, let me assure them that it was connected with our payment of something that had been demanded, and coincidental with that, also there is good reason to know that right now Iran is also being enabled to get some help through other countries for arms procurement.

Why is Iran building to such a tremendous point of arms ability? What is its goal in the Middle East, now that we have conquered Iraq and consider it a continuing enemy? Why is Iran being pumped up like these messages indicate we were doing with the case of Iraq on that occasion?

With that broad policy and strategy that I have just quoted in mind, the policymakers sought out a path to achieve those goals. Since the administration had a stated policy of prohibiting the sale of United States military hardware directly to Iraq, the options available to assist Iraq were limited. The administration chose to assist Iraq by providing financial assistance.

In determining how to assist Iraq financially, a March 16, 1983, internal State Department memo to Secretary of State George Shultz states, and I quote:

There are two possibilities for the official credit for Iraq: (a) Eximbank program; (b) CCC blended credits or guarantees for agricultural exports.

An October 31, 1983, State Department cable shows the benefits of such a strategy, and I quote:

In considering ways to build international confidence in Iraq's economic and financial future, we should give serious thought to offering Eximbank credits. New U.S. credits, in combination with our CCC credits, will demonstrate U.S. confidence in the Iraqi economy. This in turn could encourage other countries to provide similar assistance. Such concrete demonstrations of support could ease pressure on Iraq.

Increasing Iraq's access to credit allowed it to feed its people on borrowed money, thus freeing scarce foreign exchange, to purchase military hardware to fight the war against Iran.

As I said last week, the Eximbank was repeatedly pressured by the State Department to open its program to Iraq. On three separate occasions

Annex 2

Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Title IX of Public Law 106 387 (28 October 2000)

TITLE IX—TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT

SEC. 901. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000".

SEC. 902. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term "agricultural commodity" has the meaning given the term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(2) AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM.—The term "agricultural program" means—

(A) any program administered under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.);

(B) any program administered under section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 U.S.C. 1431);

(C) any program administered under the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.);

(D) the dairy export incentive program administered under section 153 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (15 U.S.C. 713a–14);

(E) any commercial export sale of agricultural commodities; or

(F) any export financing (including credits or credit guarantees) provided by the United States Government for agricultural commodities.

(3) JOINT RESOLUTION.—The term "joint resolution" means—

(A) in the case of section 903(a)(1), only a joint resolution introduced within 10 session days of Congress after the date on which the report of the President under section 903(a)(1) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress approves the report of the President pursuant to section 903(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, transmitted on _____.", with the blank completed with the appropriate date; and

(B) in the case of section 906(1), only a joint resolution introduced within 10 session days of Congress after the date on which the report of the President under section 906(2) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress approves the report of the President pursuant to section 906(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, transmitted on _____.", with the blank completed with the appropriate date.

(4) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term "medical device" has the meaning given the term "device" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(5) MEDICINE.—The term "medicine" has the meaning given the term "drug" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(6) UNILATERAL AGRICULTURAL SANCTION.—The term "unilateral agricultural sanction" means any prohibition, restriction,

or condition on carrying out an agricultural program with respect to a foreign country or foreign entity that is imposed by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security, except in a case in which the United States imposes the measure pursuant to—

(A) a multilateral regime and the other member countries of that regime have agreed to impose substantially equivalent measures; or

(B) a mandatory decision of the United Nations Security Council.

(7) UNILATERAL MEDICAL SANCTION.—The term "unilateral medical sanction" means any prohibition, restriction, or condition on exports of, or the provision of assistance consisting of, medicine or a medical device with respect to a foreign country or foreign entity that is imposed by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security, except in a case in which the United States imposes the measure pursuant to—

(A) a multilateral regime and the other member countries of that regime have agreed to impose substantially equivalent measures; or

(B) a mandatory decision of the United Nations Security Council.

SEC. 903. RESTRICTION.

(a) NEW SANCTIONS.—Except as provided in sections 904 and 905 and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not impose a unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction against a foreign country or foreign entity, unless—

(1) not later than 60 days before the sanction is proposed to be imposed, the President submits a report to Congress that—

(A) describes the activity proposed to be prohibited, restricted, or conditioned; and

(B) describes the actions by the foreign country or foreign entity that justify the sanction; and

(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution stating the approval of Congress for the report submitted under paragraph (1).

(b) EXISTING SANCTIONS.—The President shall terminate any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction that is in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 904. EXCEPTIONS.

Section 903 shall not affect any authority or requirement to impose (or continue to impose) a sanction referred to in section 903—

(1) against a foreign country or foreign entity—

(A) pursuant to a declaration of war against the country or entity;

(B) pursuant to specific statutory authorization for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States against the country or entity;

(C) against which the Armed Forces of the United States are involved in hostilities; or

(D) where imminent involvement by the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities against the country or entity is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or

(2) to the extent that the sanction would prohibit, restrict, or condition the provision or use of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device that is—

(A) controlled on the United States Munitions List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778);

(B) controlled on any control list established under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or any successor statute (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.); or

(C) used to facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction.

SEC. 905. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

Any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction that is imposed pursuant to the procedures described in section 903(a) shall terminate not later than 2 years after the date on which the sanction became effective unless—

(1) not later than 60 days before the date of termination of the sanction, the President submits to Congress a report containing—

(A) the recommendation of the President for the continuation of the sanction for an additional period of not to exceed 2 years; and

(B) the request of the President for approval by Congress of the recommendation; and

(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution stating the approval of Congress for the report submitted under paragraph (1).

SEC. 906. STATE SPONSORS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

(a) REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this title (other than section 904), the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Cuba or to the government of a country that has been determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), or to any other entity in such a country, shall only be made pursuant to 1-year licenses issued by the United States Government for contracts entered into during the 1-year period of the license and shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract, except that the requirements of such 1-year licenses shall be no more restrictive than license exceptions administered by the Department of Commerce or general licenses administered by the Department of the Treasury, except that procedures shall be in place to deny licenses for exports to any entity within such country promoting international terrorism.

(2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical

devices to the Government of Syria or to the Government of North Korea.

(b) QUARTERLY REPORTS.—The applicable department or agency of the Federal Government shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis a report on any activities undertaken under subsection (a)(1) during the preceding calendar quarter.

(c) BIENNIAL REPORTS.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the applicable department or agency of the Federal Government shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the operation of the licensing system under this section for the preceding 2-year period, including—

(1) the number and types of licenses applied for;

(2) the number and types of licenses approved;

(3) the average amount of time elapsed from the date of filing of a license application until the date of its approval;

(4) the extent to which the licensing procedures were effectively implemented; and

(5) a description of comments received from interested parties about the extent to which the licensing procedures were effective, after the applicable department or agency holds a public 30-day comment period.

SEC. 907. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES.

(a) REFERRAL OF REPORT.—A report described in section 903(a)(1) or 905(1) shall be referred to the appropriate committee or committees of the House of Representatives and to the appropriate committee or committees of the Senate.

(b) REFERRAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A joint resolution introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and a joint resolution introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations.

(2) REPORTING DATE.—A joint resolution referred to in paragraph (1) may not be reported before the eighth session day of Congress after the introduction of the joint resolution.

SEC. 908. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE AND FINANCING.

(a) PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States Government assistance, including United States foreign assistance, United States export assistance, and any United States credit or guarantees shall be available for exports to Cuba or for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, North Korea, or Sudan.

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to alter, modify, or otherwise affect the provisions of section 109 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6039) or any other provision of law relating to Cuba in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) with respect to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan to the degree the President determines that it is in

the national security interest of the United States to do so, or for humanitarian reasons.

(b) PROHIBITION ON FINANCING OF AGRICULTURAL SALES TO CUBA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No United States person may provide payment or financing terms for sales of agricultural commodities or products to Cuba or any person in Cuba, except in accordance with the following terms (notwithstanding part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or any other provision of law):

(A) Payment of cash in advance.

(B) Financing by third country financial institutions (excluding United States persons or Government of Cuba entities), except that such financing may be confirmed or advised by a United States financial institution.

Nothing in this paragraph authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving a debit or credit to an account of a person located in Cuba or of the Government of Cuba maintained on the books of a United States depository institution.

(2) PENALTIES.—Any private person or entity that violates paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties provided in the Trading With the Enemy Act for violations under that Act.

(3) ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT.—The President shall issue such regulations as are necessary to carry out this section, except that the President, in lieu of issuing new regulations, may apply any regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act, with respect to the conduct prohibited in paragraph (1).

(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

(A) the term "financing" includes any loan or extension of credit;

(B) the term "United States depository institution" means any entity (including its foreign branches or subsidiaries) organized under the laws of any jurisdiction within the United States, or any agency, office or branch located in the United States of a foreign entity, that is engaged primarily in the business of banking (including a bank, savings bank, savings association, credit union, trust company, or United States bank holding company); and

(C) the term "United States person" means the Federal Government, any State or local government, or any private person or entity of the United States.

SEC. 909. PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONAL IMPORTS FROM CUBA.

Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, modify, or otherwise affect the provisions of section 515.204 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, relating to the prohibition on the entry into the United States of merchandise that: (1) is of Cuban origin; (2) is or has been located in or transported from or through Cuba; or (3) is made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba.

SEC. 910. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CERTAIN TRAVEL-RELATED TRANSACTIONS WITH CUBA.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF TRAVEL RELATING TO COMMERCIAL SALE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.—The Secretary of the Treasury

shall promulgate regulations under which the travel-related transactions listed in subsection (c) of section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, may be authorized on a case-by-case basis by a specific license for travel to, from, or within Cuba for the commercial export sale of agricultural commodities pursuant to the provisions of this title.

(b) PROHIBITION ON TRAVEL RELATING TO TOURIST ACTIVITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other Federal official, may not authorize the travel-related transactions listed in subsection (c) of section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, either by a general license or on a case-by-case basis by a specific license for travel to, from, or within Cuba for tourist activities.

(2) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term "tourist activities" means any activity with respect to travel to, from, or within Cuba that is not expressly authorized in subsection (a) of this section, in any of paragraphs (1) through (12) of section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or in any section referred to in any of such paragraphs (1) through (12) (as such sections were in effect on June 1, 2000).

SEC. 911. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), this title shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and shall apply thereafter in any fiscal year.

(b) EXISTING SANCTIONS.—In the case of any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction that is in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act, this title shall take effect 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and shall apply thereafter in any fiscal year.

TITLE X—CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET

SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000".

SEC. 1002. FINDINGS OF CONGRESS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Consistent with the rights of the United States under the World Trade Organization, injurious dumping is to be condemned and actionable subsidies which cause injury to domestic industries must be effectively neutralized.

(2) United States unfair trade laws have as their purpose the restoration of conditions of fair trade so that jobs and investment that should be in the United States are not lost through the false market signals.

(3) The continued dumping or subsidization of imported products after the issuance of antidumping orders or findings or countervailing duty orders can frustrate the remedial purpose of the laws by preventing market prices from returning to fair levels.

(4) Where dumping or subsidization continues, domestic producers will be reluctant to reinvest or rehire and may be unable to maintain pension and health care benefits that conditions of fair trade would permit. Similarly, small businesses and American farmers and ranchers may be unable to pay

Annex 3

OFAC General License D (authorizing the exportation and reexportation to persons in Iran of certain services, software, and hardware incident to the exchange of personal communication, subject to certain limitations), effective on 30 May 2013

Muhriz); DOB 17 Jan 1967; Passport 003308607 (Syria) (individual) [SYRIA]

On December 11, 2012, the Director of OFAC identified two (2) entities as falling within the definition of the Government of Syria set forth in section 8(d) of Executive Order 13582. On July 13, 2013, the Director of OFAC supplemented the identification information for JAYSH AL–SHA'BI.

The listings on OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons for the entities, whose property and interests in property are blocked, are as follows.

Entities

1. JAYSH AL–SHA'BI (a.k.a. AL–SHA'BI COMMITTEES; a.k.a. JAYSH AL–SHAAB; a.k.a. JISH SHAABI; a.k.a. SHA'BI COMMITTEES; a.k.a. SHA'BI FORCE; a.k.a. SYRIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE; a.k.a. SYRIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES; a.k.a. ''ARMY OF THE PEOPLE''; a.k.a. ''PEOPLE'S ARMY''; a.k.a. ''POPULAR COMMITTEES''; a.k.a. ''POPULAR FORCES''; a.k.a. ''SHA'BI''; a.k.a. ''THE POPULAR ARMY'') [SYRIA].

2. SHABIHA (a.k.a. AL–SHABBIHAH; a.k.a. SHABBIHA; a.k.a. SHABBIHAH; a.k.a. SHABEEHA), Syria [SYRIA].

Dated: July 11, 2013.

Adam Szubin,

Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

[FR Doc. 2013–17135 Filed 7–18–13; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control

Publication of Iran General License D

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice, publication of general license.

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (''OFAC'') is publishing General License D issued under the Iranian transactions sanctions program on May 30, 2013. General License D authorizes the exportation and reexportation to persons in Iran of certain services, software, and hardware incident to the exchange of personal communications, subject to certain limitations.

DATES: *Effective Date:* May 30, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202–622–2490, Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202–622–2480, Assistant Director for Policy, tel.: 202–622–2746, Assistant Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202–622–4855, Office of Foreign Assets Control, or Chief Counsel (Foreign Assets Control), tel.: 202–622–2410, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20220 (not toll free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic and Facsimile Availability

This document and additional information concerning OFAC are available from OFAC's Web site (*www.treasury.gov/ofac*). Certain general information pertaining to OFAC's sanctions programs also is available via facsimile through a 24-hour fax-on-demand service, tel.: 202/622–0077.

Background

On May 30, 2013, OFAC issued General License D under the Iranian transactions sanctions program. At the time of its issuance on May 30, 2013, OFAC made General License D available on the OFAC Web site (*www.treasury.gov/ofac*). With this notice, OFAC is publishing General License D in the **Federal Register.**

GENERAL LICENSE D

General License With Respect to the Exportation and Reexportation of Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to the Exchange of Personal Communications

(a) Effective May 30, 2013, to the extent that such transactions are not exempt from the prohibitions of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (''ITSR''), and subject to the restrictions set forth in paragraph (b), the following transactions are authorized:

(1) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of fee-based services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.

(2) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of fee-based software subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (the ''EAR''), that is necessary to enable the services described in paragraph (a)(1), provided that such software is designated as EAR99 under the EAR, or is classified by the U.S. Department of Commerce on the Commerce Control List, 15 CFR part 774, supplement No. 1 (''CCL'') under export control classification number (''ECCN'') 5D992.c.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPHS (a)(1) AND (a)(2): *See* 31 CFR § 560.540 for provisions relating to the exportation to persons in Iran of publicly available, no-cost services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet and publicly available, no-cost software necessary to enable such services.

(3) To the extent not authorized by paragraph (a)(2), the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of certain software and hardware that are subject to the EAR and incident to personal communications, as well as related services, as specified in the Annex to this general license.

(4) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of consumer-grade Internet connectivity services and the provision, sale, or leasing of capacity on telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite or terrestrial network connectivity) incident to personal communications.

Note to Paragraph (a): The authorization set forth in paragraph (a) of this general license extends to entities owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States subject to the conditions set forth in 31 CFR § 560.556. Nothing in this general license relieves the exporter from compliance with the export license application requirements of another Federal agency.

(b) This general license does not authorize:

(1) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of the services, software, or hardware specified in paragraph (a) of this general license with knowledge or reason to know that such services, software, or hardware are intended for the Government of Iran.

(2) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of the services, software, and hardware specified in paragraph (a) of this general license to any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V.

(3) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of commercial-grade Internet connectivity services or telecommunications transmission facilities (such as dedicated satellite links or dedicated lines that include quality of service guarantees).

(4) The exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of web-hosting services that are for purposes other than personal communications (e.g., web-hosting services for commercial

endeavors) or of domain name registration services.

(c) Effective May 30, 2013, transfers of funds from Iran or for or on behalf of a person in Iran in furtherance of an underlying transaction authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license may be processed by U.S. depository institutions and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities so long as they are consistent with 31 CFR § 560.516.[1]

(d) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for the exportation and reexportation of services, software, and hardware incident to personal communications not specified in paragraph (a) or the Annex to this general license.

Issued: May 30, 2013.

ANNEX—SERVICES, SOFTWARE, AND HARDWARE INCIDENT TO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR EXPORTATION AND REEXPORTATION TO IRAN BY PARAGRAPH (a) OF ITSR GENERAL LICENSE D

1.) ...	Mobile phones (including but not limited to smartphones), Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards designated EAR99 or classified on the CCL under ECCN 5A992.c; drivers and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
2.) ...	Satellite phones and Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5A992.c; demand drivers and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
3.) ...	Modems, network interface cards, radio equipment (including antennaes), routers, switches, and WiFi access points, designed for 50 or fewer concurrent users, designated EAR99 or classified under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991.b.2, or 5A991.b.4; drivers, communications, and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
4.) ...	Residential consumer satellite receive-only terminals, receiver equipment (including but not limited to antennaes, receivers, set-top boxes and video decoders) designated EAR99 or classified under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991.b.2 or 5A991.b.4; drivers, communications, and connectivity software for such hardware designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
5.) ...	Laptops, tablets, and personal computing devices, disk drives, data storage devices, computer peripherals, keyboards, and mice designated EAR99 or classified on the CCL under ECCNs 5A992.c, 5A991.b.2, 5A991.b.4 or 4A994.b; computer operating systems, and software required for effective consumer use of such hardware, including software updates and patches, designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c; and services necessary for the operation of such hardware and software.
6.) ...	Anti-virus and anti-malware software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
7.) ...	Anti-tracking software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
8.) ...	Mobile operating systems, online app stores, and related software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
9.) ...	Anti-censorship tools and related software designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
10.)	Virtual Private Networks, proxy tools, and fee-based personal communications tools including voice, text, video, voice-over-IP telephony, video chat, and successor technologies, and communications and connectivity software required for effective consumer use designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.
11.)	Secure Sockets Layers (SSLs) designated EAR99 or classified under ECCN 5D992.c, and services necessary for the operation of such software.

Dated: July 10, 2013.

Adam J. Szubin,

Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

[FR Doc. 2013–17359 Filed 7–18–13; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P

[1] The authorization set forth in paragraph (c) of this general license does not authorize any transaction prohibited by any part of chapter V of 31 CFR other than part 560. Accordingly, the transfer of funds may not be by, to, or through any of the following: (1) A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 544, or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594; or (2) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, or any Executive order, except an Iranian financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to 31 CFR part 560.

Annex 4

OFAC Final Rule (adding to the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations general licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets and related transactions), effective 21 January 2016

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Foreign Assets Control

31 CFR Part 560 and Appendix A to Chapter V

Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) to implement certain United States Government (USG) commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached on July 14, 2015 between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran. In particular, OFAC is adding to the ITSR general licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets and related transactions to implement the USG commitment set out in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. In addition, to reflect the USG's implementation of its commitment set out in section 4 of Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA to terminate Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, OFAC is removing regulatory provisions that implemented the blocking sanctions in sections 5 and 6 of Executive Order 13622. OFAC is also making certain technical and conforming changes to its regulations to reflect the implementation of the USG commitment set out in section 4.8.1 of Annex II and section 17.3 of Annex V of the JCPOA to remove the individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA from OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, as appropriate, on Implementation Day of the JCPOA.

DATES: *Effective:* January 21, 2016

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control: Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202–622–2480, Assistant Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202–622–4855, Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202–622–2490; or the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Chief Counsel (Foreign Assets Control), Office of the General Counsel, tel.: 202–622–2410.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic and Facsimile Availability

This document and additional information concerning OFAC are available from OFAC's Web site (*www.treasury.gov/ofac*). Certain general information pertaining to OFAC's sanctions programs also is available via facsimile through a 24-hour fax-on-demand service, tel.: 202–622–0077.

Background

On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The JCPOA provides that the United States Government (USG) will undertake the sanctions-related commitments described in sections 17.1 to 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related commitments described in the JCPOA. The date for this sanctions lifting is referred to as ''Implementation Day'' in the JCPOA. In addition, the JCPOA provides that, on Implementation Day, the USG will license certain activities involving Iran as described in section 5 of Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA. OFAC is now amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), to implement the USG's commitment pursuant to the JCPOA to license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar, and to make certain technical and conforming changes to reflect the implementation of other USG JCPOA commitments on Implementation Day, as set forth below.

Importation of Certain Foodstuffs and Carpets

To implement the USG commitment set out in section 5.1.3 of Annex II and section 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA to license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar, OFAC is adding § 560.534 to the ITSR to authorize by general license the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets from Iran or a third country. OFAC's publication of this general license as an amendment to the ITSR fulfills the requirements of section 103(d)(2)(A) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended, (Pub. L. 111–195) (22 U.S.C. 8501–8551) (CISADA). In addition, to fulfill the requirements of section 103(d)(2)(B) of CISADA, the Secretary of State is submitting to the appropriate congressional committees a certification in writing that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide an exception to the prohibition on the importation of Iranian-origin goods to the extent required to implement the sanctions commitment described in section 5.1.3 of Annex II of the JCPOA and a report describing the reasons for this exception.

Section 560.534(a) authorizes the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin foodstuffs intended for human consumption that are classified under chapters 2–23 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS). Items that are classified in chapters 2–23 of the HTS that are not foodstuffs intended for human consumption are not authorized for importation into the United States by this section. This section also authorizes the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and other textile floor coverings and carpets used as wall hangings that are classified under chapter 57 or heading 9706.00.0060 of the HTS. Items that are classified under heading 9706.00.0060 (''Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years/Other'') that are not carpets and other textile wall coverings or carpets used as wall hangings are not authorized for importation into the United States by this section.

Section 560.534(b) authorizes U.S. persons, wherever located, to engage in transactions or dealings in or related to such Iranian-origin foodstuffs and carpets, provided that such transactions or dealings do not involve or relate to goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran, the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 of the ITSR, other than services described in § 560.405 (''Transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction authorized'') and transfers of funds described in § 560.516 (''Transfers of funds involving Iran''). Section 560.534(c) clarifies that § 560.534(a)–(b) does not authorize the importation into the United States of goods that are under seizure or detention by the Department of Homeland Security, or of goods for which forfeiture proceedings have commenced or of goods that have been forfeited to the U.S. Government.

Section 560.534(d) clarifies that nothing in § 560.534 authorizes the debiting or crediting of Iranian accounts, as defined in § 560.320.

Transactions ordinarily incident to the transactions authorized in § 560.534 and necessary to give effect thereto also are authorized as set forth in § 560.405. OFAC is amending § 560.405 by inserting new paragraph (f), which clarifies that the scope of authorized incidental transactions does not include letter of credit services relating to transactions authorized in § 560.534. Those letter of credit services that are authorized are set forth separately in paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 560.535, which OFAC is also adding to the ITSR. Please see §§ 560.405(b) and 560.516 regarding transfers of funds in connection with licensed activities. Brokering services relating to transactions authorized by this final rule also are authorized. See § 560.535(c).

Executive Order 13622

On July 30, 2012, the President, invoking the authority of, *inter alia,* the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) (IEEPA), issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13622. Section 5 of E.O. 13622 blocked ''all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of'' any U.S. person, including any foreign branch, of any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran. Section 6 of E.O. 13622 provided that subsection 5(a) of E.O. 13622, among other specified provisions, shall not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a natural gas development and pipeline project initiated prior to July 31, 2012, to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or license awarded by a sovereign government other than the Government of Iran. On December 26, 2012, OFAC published a final rule in the **Federal Register** (77 FR 75845) that, *inter alia,* implemented sections 5 and 6 of E.O. 13622 by amending § 560.211 of the ITSR to add paragraph (c)(2) and a corresponding note.

Pursuant to its Implementation Day commitment set out in section 4 of Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the United States Government has revoked E.O. 13622. Accordingly, OFAC is amending § 560.211 of the ITSR by removing paragraph (c)(2) and the Note to paragraph (c)(2), which implemented sections 5 and 6 of E.O. 13622, respectively.

Technical and Conforming Changes

OFAC is also making certain technical and conforming changes to 31 CFR chapter V to reflect the implementation of the USG commitment set out in section 4.8.1 of Annex II and section 17.3 of Annex V of the JCPOA. Pursuant to that commitment, on Implementation Day, OFAC is removing individuals and entities identified in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, as appropriate. The individuals and entities being removed from the SDN List include persons that OFAC has previously identified as blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 of February 5, 2012 (''Blocking Property of the Government Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions'') because they meet the definition of the terms ''Government of Iran'' or ''Iranian financial institution.'' These individuals and entities are marked with an asterisk in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA. Non-U.S. persons will no longer be subject to secondary sanctions, including under relevant provisions of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and other applicable authorities, for engaging in transactions or activities with these individuals and entities, provided that the transactions do not include conduct that remains sanctionable or individuals or entities that remain on the SDN List. However, these individuals and entities being removed from the SDN List remain persons whose property and interests in property that are in the U.S., or that are or come within the possession or control of any U.S. person, are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599. While OFAC is removing these persons from the SDN List on Implementation Day, they will now be included on a ''List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599'' (E.O. 13599 List), which OFAC is making available on its Web site: *www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599_list.aspx.* To reflect these changes, OFAC is revising notes in §§ 560.211 and 560.304 of the ITSR, adding a new note to § 560.324 of the ITSR, and revising a note to appendix A to 31 CFR chapter V.

Public Participation

Because the amendment of the ITSR involves a foreign affairs function, the provisions of Executive Order 12866 and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, opportunity for public participation, and delay in effective date are inapplicable. Because no notice of proposed rulemaking is required for this rule, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601–612) does not apply.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The collections of information related to the ITSR are contained in 31 CFR part 501 (the ''Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations''). Pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507), those collections of information have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1505–0164. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid control number.

List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 560 and Appendix A to Chapter V

Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Carpet, Foodstuffs, Iran, Letters of credit.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control amends 31 CFR chapter V as follows:

PART 560—IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS

■ 1. The authority citation for part 560 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 18 U.S.C. 2339B, 2332d; 22 U.S.C. 2349aa–9; 22 U.S.C. 7201–7211; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); 50 U.S.C. 1601–1651, 1701–1706; Public Law 101–410, 104 Stat. 890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Public Law 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011 (50 U.S.C. 1705 note); Public Law 111–195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501–8551); Public Law 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); Public Law 112–158, 126 Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701–8795); E.O. 12613, 52 FR 41940, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 256; E.O. 12957, 60 FR 14615, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 332; E.O. 12959, 60 FR 24757, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 356; E.O. 13059, 62 FR 44531, 3 CFR, 1997 Comp., p. 217; E.O. 13599, 77 FR 6659, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 215; E.O. 13628, 77 FR 62139, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 314.

Subpart B—Prohibitions

■ 2. Amend § 560.211 by removing the word ''or'' from the end of paragraph (c)(1), removing and reserving paragraph (c)(2), removing the note to paragraph (c)(2), and revising notes 1 and 2 to paragraphs (a) through (c) to read as follows:

§ 560.211 Prohibited transactions involving blocked property.

* * * * *

Note 1 to paragraphs (a) through (c) of § 560.211: The names of persons identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 (''Blocking Property of the Government Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions'') (E.O. 13599) because they meet the definition of the terms ''Government of Iran'' or ''Iranian financial institution,'' whose property and interests in property therefore are blocked pursuant to this section, are published in the **Federal Register** and incorporated into the ''List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599'') (E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the following page on OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599_list.aspx.* The names of persons identified as blocked or designated for blocking pursuant to both this part and one or more other parts of this chapter are published in the **Federal Register** and incorporated into OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier ''[IRAN]'' as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the persons' property and interests in property are blocked. The SDN List is accessible through the following page on OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/sdn.* Additional information pertaining to the E.O. 13599 List and the SDN List can be found in appendix A to this chapter. *See* § 560.425 concerning entities that may not be listed on the E.O. 13599 List or on the SDN List but whose property and interests in property are nevertheless blocked pursuant to this section. E.O. 13599 blocks the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions as defined in §§ 560.304 and 560.324, respectively. The property and interests in property of persons falling within the definition of the terms *Government of Iran* and *Iranian financial institution* are blocked pursuant to this section regardless of whether the names of such persons are published in the **Federal Register** or incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.

Note 2 to paragraphs (a) through (c) of § 560.211: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706), in section 203 (50 U.S.C. 1702), authorizes the blocking of property and interests in property of a person during the pendency of an investigation. The names of persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pending investigation pursuant to this section also are published in the **Federal Register** and incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List, as appropriate, with the identifier ''[BPI–IRAN].''

* * * * *

Subpart C—General Definitions

■ 3. Amend § 560.304 by revising Note 1 to § 560.304 to read as follows:

§ 560.304 Government of Iran.

* * * * *

Note 1 to § 560.304: The names of persons that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has determined fall within this definition are published in the **Federal Register** and incorporated into one of two lists maintained by OFAC. First, the names of persons identified as blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 (''Blocking Property of the Government Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions'') (E.O. 13599) and § 560.211 because they meet the definition of the term ''Government of Iran'' are incorporated into the ''List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599'') (E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the following page on OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599_list.aspx.* Second, the names of persons identified as blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 and § 560.211 who are also blocked pursuant to one or more other parts of this chapter are incorporated into OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier ''[IRAN]'' as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the persons' property and interests in property are blocked. The SDN List is accessible through the following page on the OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/sdn.* However, the property and interests in property of persons falling within the definition of the term *Government of Iran* are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of whether the names of such persons are published in the **Federal Register** or incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.

* * * * *

■ 4. Section 560.324 is amended by adding Notes 1 and 2 to § 560.324 to read as follows:

§ 560.324 Iranian financial institution.

* * * * *

Note 1 to § 560.324: The names of persons that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has determined fall within this definition are published in the **Federal Register** and incorporated into one of two lists maintained by the OFAC. First, the names of persons identified as blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 (''Blocking Property of the Government Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions'') (E.O. 13599) and § 560.211 because they meet the definition of the term ''Iranian financial institution'' are incorporated into the ''List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599'') (E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the following page on OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599_list.aspx.* Second, the names of persons identified as blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 and § 560.211 who are also blocked pursuant to one or more other parts of this chapter are incorporated into OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier ''[IRAN]'' as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the persons' property and interests in property are blocked. The SDN List is accessible through the following page on the OFAC's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/sdn.* However, the property and interests in property of persons falling within the definition of the term *Iranian financial institution* are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of whether the names of such persons are published in the **Federal Register** or incorporated into the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.

Note 2 to § 560.324: Section 501.807 of this chapter describes the procedures to be followed by persons seeking administrative reconsideration of OFAC's determination that they fall within the definition of the term *Iranian financial institution.*

Subpart D—Interpretations

■ 5. Amend § 560.405 by removing the word ''and'' at the end of paragraph (d), removing the period at the end of paragraph (e) and adding ''; and'' in its place, and adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:

§ 560.405 Transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction authorized.

* * * * *

(f) Letter of credit services relating to transactions authorized in § 560.534. See § 560.535(a).

Subpart E—Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy

■ 6. Add § 560.534 to subpart E to read as follows:

§ 560.534 Importation into the United States of, and dealings in, certain foodstuffs and carpets authorized.

(a) The importation into the United States, from Iran or a third country, of the following goods of Iranian origin is authorized:

(1) Foodstuffs intended for human consumption that are classified under chapters 2–23 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States;

(2) Carpets and other textile floor coverings and carpets used as wall hangings that are classified under chapter 57 or heading 9706.00.0060 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

(b) United States persons, wherever located, are authorized to engage in transactions or dealings in or related to the categories of Iranian-origin goods described in paragraph (a) of this section, provided that the transaction or dealing does not involve or relate to goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran, the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211, other than services described in § 560.405 (''Transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction authorized'') and transfers of funds described in § 560.516 (''Transfers of funds involving Iran'').

(c) This general license does not authorize the importation into the United States of goods that are under seizure or detention by the Department of Homeland Security, as of January 21, 2016, pursuant to Customs regulations or other applicable provisions of law, until any applicable penalties, charges, duties, or other conditions are satisfied. This general license does not authorize the importation into the United States of goods for which forfeiture proceedings have commenced or of goods that have been forfeited to the U.S. Government, other than through U.S. Customs and Border Protection disposition, including by selling at auction.

(d) *Iranian accounts.* Nothing in this section authorizes debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in § 560.320.

■ 7. Add § 560.535 to subpart E to read as follows:

§ 560.535 Letters of credit and brokering services relating to certain foodstuffs and carpets.

(a) *Purchases from Iran or the Government of Iran or certain other blocked persons.* United States depository institutions are authorized to issue letters of credit in favor of a beneficiary in Iran, the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 to pay for purchases from Iran or the Government of Iran of the categories of Iranian-origin goods described in § 560.534(a), provided that such letters of credit are not advised, negotiated, paid, or confirmed by the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211.

(b) *Transactions or dealings in Iranian-origin goods located in third countries, other than purchases from the Government of Iran or certain other blocked persons.* United States depository institutions are authorized to issue, advise, negotiate, or confirm letters of credit to pay for transactions in or related to Iranian-origin goods described in § 560.534(a) and located in a third-country, other than purchases from the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211, provided that such letters of credit are not issued, advised, negotiated, paid, or confirmed by the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211.

(c) *Brokering.* United States persons, wherever located, are authorized to act as brokers for the purchase or sale of the categories of Iranian-origin goods described in § 560.534(a), provided that the goods are not for exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran, the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211.

(d) *Iranian accounts.* Nothing in this section authorizes debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in § 560.320.

Note to § 560.535: See §§ 560.304 and 560.313 for information relating to individuals and entities that are included within the definition of the term *Government of Iran* and § 560.324 regarding entities included within the definition of the term *Iranian financial institution.* See § 560.516 for information relating to authorized transfers to Iran by U.S. depository institutions relating to licensed transactions.

Appendix A to Chapter V—[Amended]

■ 8. The authority citation for appendix A to chapter V is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 8 U.S.C. 1182, 1189; 18 U.S.C. 2339 B; 21 U.S.C. 1901–1908; 22 U.S.C. 287 c; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); 50 U.S.C. App. 1–44; Public Law 110–286, 122 Stat. 2632 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); Public Law 111–195, 124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501–8551); Public Law 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); Public Law 112–158, 126 Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701–8795); Public Law 112–208, 126 Stat. 1502; Public Law 113–278, 128 Stat. 3011 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

■ 9. Revise note 8 to appendix A to chapter V to read as follows:

Appendix A to Chapter V—Information Pertaining to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List

* * * * *

8. The SDN List includes the names of persons determined to be the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), only when the property and interests in property of such persons are also blocked pursuant to one or more other parts of this chapter. The SDN List entries for such persons include the identifier ''[IRAN]'' as well as the relevant identifier(s) for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the persons' property and interests in property are blocked. The names of persons identified as blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 (''Blocking Property of the Government Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions'') (E.O. 13599) and § 560.211 of the ITSR because they meet the definition of the terms *Government of Iran* or *Iranian financial institution* under the ITSR are incorporated into the ''List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599'' (E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599 List is accessible through the following page on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Web site: *www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/13599_list.aspx.* U.S. persons are advised to review 31 CFR part 560 prior to engaging in transactions involving persons included on the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List with the identifier ''[IRAN].'' Moreover, the prohibitions set forth in the ITSR, and the compliance obligations, with respect to persons who fall within the definition of the terms *Government of Iran* or *Iranian financial institution* set forth in §§ 560.304 and 560.324 of the ITSR, respectively, apply regardless of whether such persons are identified on the E.O. 13599 List or the SDN List.

* * * * *

John E. Smith,

Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

[FR Doc. 2016–01227 Filed 1–19–16; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket No. USCG–2016–0019]

Security Zones; Annual Events in the Captain of the Port Detroit Zone–North American International Auto Show, Detroit River, Detroit MI

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of enforcement of regulation.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce a security zone associated with the North American International Auto

Annex 5

OFAC General License I (authorizing certain transactions related to the negotiation of, and entry into, contingent contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the statement of licensing policy for activities related to the export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services), dated 24 March 2016

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
31 C.F.R. Part 560

GENERAL LICENSE I

Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Negotiation of, and Entry into, Contingent Contracts for Activities Eligible for Authorization Under the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services

(a) U.S. persons are authorized to enter into, and to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident to the negotiation of and entry into, contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the *Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services*, provided that the performance of any such contract is made expressly contingent upon the issuance of a specific license by the Office of Foreign Assets Control authorizing the activities to be performed ("contingent contracts").

Note to paragraph (a) of General License I: For purposes of this general license, the term "contingent contracts" includes executory contracts, executory pro forma invoices, agreements in principle, executory offers capable of acceptance such as bids or proposals in response to public tenders, binding memoranda of understanding, or any other similar agreement.

(b) This general license does not authorize any transactions or dealings with any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V other than part 560.

Andrea Gacki
Acting Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control

Dated: March 24, 2016

Annex 6

31 CFR, Section 560.530 (as of 01 July 2016)

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behalf of a person in Iran, or in circumstances in which the benefit is otherwise received in Iran, other than those described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section, are authorized, except that nothing in this section authorizes the debiting of any blocked account or the transfer of any blocked property.

(e) This section does not authorize any transaction by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States otherwise prohibited by § 560.215 if the transaction would be prohibited by any other part of this chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.

[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77 FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012]

§ 560.526 [Reserved]

§ 560.527 Rescheduling existing loans.

Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for rescheduling loans or otherwise extending the maturities of existing loans, and for charging fees or interest at commercially reasonable rates, in connection therewith, provided that no new funds or credits are thereby transferred or extended to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211.

§ 560.528 Aircraft safety.

Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for the exportation or reexportation of goods, services, and technology to insure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft.

§ 560.529 Bunkering and emergency repairs.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, goods or services provided in the United States to a non-Iranian carrier transporting passengers or goods to or from Iran are permissible if they are:

(1) Bunkers or bunkering services;

(2) Supplied or performed in the course of emergency repairs; or

(3) Supplied or performed under circumstances which could not be anticipated prior to the carrier's departure for the United States.

(b) This section does not authorize the provision of goods or services in connection with the transport of any goods to or from the Government of Iran, an Iranian financial institution, or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 560.211.

§ 560.530 Commercial sales, exportation, and reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.

(a)(1) *One-year license requirement.* (i) The exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section (as set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, shall only be made pursuant to a one-year specific license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (''OFAC'') for contracts entered into during the one year period of the license and shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract. No specific license will be granted for the exportation or reexportation of the items set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section to any entity or individual in Iran promoting international terrorism, to any individual or entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947 (60 FR 5079, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 356), Executive Order 13224 (66 FR 49079, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 786), or Public Law 104–132, to any narcotics trafficking entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995 (60 FR 54579, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 415) or the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901–1908), or to any foreign organization, group, or persons subject to any restriction for its or their involvement in weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation. Executory contracts entered into pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section prior to the issuance of a one-year license described in this paragraph shall be deemed to have been signed on the

date of issuance of that one-year license (and, therefore, the exporter is authorized to make shipments under that contract within the 12-month period beginning on the date of issuance of the one-year license).

(ii) For the purposes of this part, ''agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section'' are:

(A) The excluded agricultural commodities specified in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section;

(B) The excluded medicines specified in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section;

(C) Medical devices (as defined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) other than medical supplies (as defined in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section); and

(D) Agricultural commodities (as defined in paragraph (e)(1) of this section), medicine (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this section), and medical supplies (as defined in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section) to military or law enforcement purchasers or importers.

(2)(i) *General license for the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities.* Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) of agricultural commodities (as defined in paragraph (e)(1) of this section) (including bulk agricultural commodities listed in appendix B to this part) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, and the conduct of related transactions, including, but not limited to, the making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements, the obtaining of insurance, the arrangement of financing and payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of payment, and the entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereby authorized, provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by § 560.532 of this part; and further provided that all such exports and reexports are shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract for export or reexport.

(ii) *Excluded agricultural commodities.* Paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of the following items: castor beans, castor bean seeds, certified pathogen-free eggs (unfertilized or fertilized), dried egg albumin, live animals (excluding live cattle), embryos (excluding cattle embryos), Rosary/Jequirity peas, non-food-grade gelatin powder, peptones and their derivatives, super absorbent polymers, western red cedar, or all fertilizers.

(iii) *Excluded persons.* Paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities to military or law enforcement purchasers or importers.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(2) OF § 560.530: Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license will remain in effect.

(3)(i) *General license for the exportation or reexportation of medicine and medical supplies.* Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(iii) and (iv) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) of medicine (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this section) and medical supplies (as defined in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, and the conduct of related transactions, including, but not limited to, the making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements, the obtaining of insurance, the arrangement of financing and payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of payment, and the entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereby authorized, provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by

§560.532 of this part; and further provided that all such exports or reexports are shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract for export or reexport.

(ii) *Definition of medical supplies.* For purposes of this general license, the term *medical supplies* means those medical devices, as defined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section, that are included on the List of Medical Supplies on OFAC's Web site (*www.treasury.gov/ofac*) on the Iran Sanctions page.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(3)(ii) OF §560.530: The List of Medical Supplies is maintained on OFAC's Web site (*www.treasury.gov/ofac*) on the Iran Sanctions page. The list also will be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER, as will any changes to the list. The List of Medical Supplies contains those medical devices for which OFAC previously did not require an Official Commodity Classification of EAR99 issued by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security to be submitted with a specific license application and which are now generally licensed.

(iii) *Excluded medicines.* Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of the following medicines: non-NSAID analgesics, cholinergics, anticholinergics, opioids, narcotics, benzodiazapenes, and bioactive peptides.

(iv) *Excluded persons.* Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of medicine or medical supplies to military or law enforcement purchasers or importers.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(3) OF §560.530: Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year, OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license will remain in effect.

(4) *General license for the exportation or reexportation of replacement parts for certain medical devices.* (i) The exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) of replacement parts for medical devices (as defined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) exported or reexported pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(3)(i) of this section to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, and the conduct of related transactions, including, but not limited to, the making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements, the obtaining of insurance, the arrangement of financing and payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of payment, and the entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereby authorized, provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by §560.532 of this part; provided that such replacement parts are designated as EAR99, or, in the case of replacement parts that are not subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 *et seq.* (''EAR''), would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States; and further provided that such replacement parts are limited to a one-for-one export or reexport basis (*i.e.*, only one replacement part can be exported or reexported to replace a broken or non-operational component).

(ii) *Excluded persons.* Paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of replacement parts for medical devices to military or law enforcement purchasers or importers.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(4) OF §560.530: Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year, OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license will remain in effect.

(b) *General license for arrangement of exportation and reexportation of covered products that require a specific license.* (1) With respect to sales authorized pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the making of shipping arrangements, cargo inspections, obtaining of insurance, and arrangement of financing (consistent with §560.532) for the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section (as set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any

individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, are authorized.

(2) Entry into executory contracts (including executory pro forma invoices, agreements in principle, or executory offers capable of acceptance such as bids in response to public tenders) for the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section (as set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, is authorized, provided that the performance of an executory contract is expressly made contingent upon the prior issuance of a one-year specific license described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.

(c) *Instructions for obtaining one-year licenses.* In order to obtain the one-year specific license described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the exporter must provide to OFAC:

(1) The applicant's full legal name (and, if the applicant is a business entity, the state or jurisdiction of incorporation and principal place of business);

(2) The applicant's mailing and street address (and, so that OFAC may reach a responsible point of contact, the applicant should also include the name of the individual(s) responsible for the application and related commercial transactions, along with their telephone and fax numbers and, if available, email addresses);

(3) The names, mailing addresses, and, if available, fax and telephone numbers and email addresses of all parties with an interest in the transaction. If the goods are being exported or reexported to a purchasing agent in Iran, the exporter must identify the agent's principals at the wholesale level for whom the purchase is being made. If the goods are being exported or reexported to an individual, the exporter must identify any organizations or entities with which the individual is affiliated that have an interest in the transaction;

(4) A description of all items to be exported or reexported pursuant to the requested one-year license, including a statement that the items are designated as EAR99, or would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States, and, if necessary, documentation sufficient to verify that the items to be exported or reexported are designated as EAR99, or would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States, and do not fall within any of the limitations contained in paragraph (d) of this section; and

(5) For items subject to the EAR, an Official Commodity Classification of EAR99 issued by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (''BIS''), certifying that the product is designated as EAR99, is required to be submitted to OFAC with the request for a license authorizing the exportation or reexportation of all fertilizers, live horses, western red cedar, or medical devices other than medical supplies (as defined in §560.530(a)(3)(ii)). *See* 15 CFR 745.3 for instructions for obtaining an Official Commodity Classification of EAR99 from BIS.

(d) *Limitations.* (1) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section relieves the exporter from compliance with the export license application requirements of another Federal agency.

(2) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section authorizes the exportation or reexportation of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device controlled on the United States Munitions List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); controlled on any control list established under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or any successor statute (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 *et seq.*); or used to facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction.

(3) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section affects prohibitions on the

sale or supply of U.S. technology or software used to manufacture agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices, such as technology to design or produce biotechnological items or medical devices.

(4) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section affects U.S. nonproliferation export controls, including the end-user and end-use controls maintained under part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR part 744.

(5) Nothing in this section authorizes any transaction or dealing with a person whose property and interests in property are blocked under, or who is designated or otherwise subject to any sanctions under, the terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or narcotics trafficking programs administered by OFAC, 31 CFR parts 536, 544, 594, 595, 597, and 598, or with any foreign organization, group, or person subject to any restriction for its involvement in weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation, or involving property blocked pursuant to this chapter or any other activity prohibited by this chapter not otherwise authorized in or pursuant to this part.

(6) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section authorizes the exportation or reexportation of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device that is not designated as EAR99 or, in the case of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device not subject to the EAR, would not be designated as EAR99 if it were located in the United States.

(e) *Covered items.* For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined below.

(1) *Agricultural commodities.* For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities are:

(i) In the case of products subject to the EAR, 15 CFR part 774, products that are designated as EAR99, and, in the case of products not subject to the EAR, products that would be designated as EAR99 under the EAR if they were located in the United States, in each case that fall within the term "agricultural commodity" as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and

(ii) In the case of products subject to the EAR, products that are designated as EAR99, and in the case of products not subject to the EAR, products that would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States, in each case that are intended for ultimate use in Iran as:

(A) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);

(B) Seeds for food crops;

(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or

(D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.

(2) *Medicine.* For the purposes of this part, *medicine* is an item that falls within the definition of the term "drug" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an item subject to the EAR, is designated as EAR99 or, in the case of an item not subject to the EAR, that would be designated as EAR99, if it were located in the United States.

NOTE TO §560.530(e)(2): The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security provides a list on its Web site of medicines that are not designated as EAR99 and therefore not eligible for any general or specific license under this section.

(3) *Medical device.* For the purposes of this part, a *medical device* is an item that falls within the definition of "device" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an item subject to the EAR, is designated as EAR99, or in the case of an item not subject to the EAR, that would be designated as EAR99 if it were located in the United States.

(4) *Covered person.* For purposes of this part, a *covered person* is, with respect to the exportation or reexportation of items subject to the EAR, a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person, and for purposes of items not subject to the EAR, a U.S. person, wherever located,

or an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States.

(f) *Excluded items.* (1) For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities do not include furniture made from wood; clothing manufactured from plant or animal materials; agricultural equipment (whether hand tools or motorized equipment); pesticides, insecticides, or herbicides; or cosmetics (unless derived entirely from plant materials).

(2) For the purposes of this part, the term *medicine* does not include cosmetics.

(g) *Excluded transactions by U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities.* Nothing in this section or in any general license set forth in or issued pursuant to this section authorizes any transaction by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States otherwise prohibited by § 560.215 if the transaction would be prohibited by any other part of this chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.

[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77 FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012; 79 FR 18993, Apr. 7, 2014]

§ 560.531 [Reserved]

§ 560.532 Payment for and financing of exports and reexports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.

(a) *General license for payment terms.* The following payment terms are authorized for sales pursuant to § 560.530(a):

(1) Payment of cash in advance;

(2) Sales on open account, provided that the account receivable may not be transferred by the person extending the credit;

(3) Financing by third-country financial institutions that are not United States persons, entities owned or controlled by United States persons and established or maintained outside the United States, Iranian financial institutions, or the Government of Iran. Such financing may be confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions and by financial institutions that are entities owned or controlled by United States persons and established or maintained outside the United States; or

(4) Letter of credit issued by an Iranian financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to this part. Such letter of credit must be initially advised, confirmed, or otherwise dealt in by a third-country financial institution that is not a United States person, an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States, an Iranian financial institution, or the Government of Iran before it is advised, confirmed, or dealt in by a U.S. financial institution or a financial institution that is an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States.

(b) *Specific licenses for alternate payment terms.* Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for payment terms and trade financing not authorized by the general license in paragraph (a) of this section for sales pursuant to § 560.530(a).

(c)(1) *No debits to blocked accounts.* Nothing in this section authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving a debit to an account blocked pursuant to this part.

(2) *No debits or credits to Iranian accounts on the books of U.S. depository institutions.* Nothing in this section authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in § 560.320.

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, no commercial exportation to Iran may be made with United States Government assistance, including United States foreign assistance, United States export assistance, and any United States credit or guarantees absent a Presidential waiver.

(e) Nothing in this section authorizes any transaction by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States otherwise prohibited by § 560.215 if the transaction would be prohibited by any other part of this chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.

[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77 FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012]

Annex 7

***United States of America v. Yousef et al.*, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 4 April 2003, 327 F.3d 56**

Excerpts: p. 1 & pp. 38-53

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2001

(Argued: May 3, 2002 Decided: April 4, 2003)

Docket Nos. 98-1041 L
98-1197
98-1355
99-1544
99-1554

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF, EYAD ISMOIL, also known as EYAD ISMAIL, and ABDUL HAKIM MURAD, also known as SAEED AHMED,

Defendants-Appellants,

MOHAMMED A. SALAMEH, NIDAL AYYAD, MAHMUD ABOUHALIMA, also known as Mahmoud Abu Halima, BILAL ALKAISI, also known as Bilal Elqisi, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ, also know as Khurram Khan, ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN, also know as Aboud, and WALI KHAN AMIN SHAH, also known as Grabi Ibrahim Hahsen,

Defendants.

Before: WALKER, *Chief Judge*, WINTER, CABRANES, *Circuit Judges.*

Appeal by Ramzi Yousef, Eyad Ismoil, and Abdul Hakim Murad from judgments of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kevin Thomas Duffy, *Judge*) on April 13, June 2, and June 15, 1998, respectively. Judge Duffy presided over two separate jury trials. In the first trial, Yousef, Murad, and another defendant were tried on

crews and that were destined for cities in the United States. Moreover, assertion of jurisdiction is appropriate under the "objective territorial principle" because the purpose of the attack was to influence United States foreign policy and the defendants intended their actions to have an effect—in this case, a devastating effect—on and within the United States. Finally, there is no doubt that jurisdiction is proper under the "protective principle" because the planned attacks were intended to affect the United States and to alter its foreign policy.

3. Jurisdiction over Count Nineteen

a. The District Court's Holding and Yousef's Challenges on Appeal

Count Nineteen, the bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434, appears to present a less straight-forward jurisdictional issue because the airplane that was bombed was not a United States-flag aircraft, it was flying between two destinations outside of the United States, and there is no evidence that any United States citizens were aboard the flight or were targets of the bombing. The District Court nevertheless concluded that jurisdiction over Yousef for the offenses charged in Count Nineteen was proper, *inter alia*, under the principle of "universal jurisdiction." *Yousef*, 927 F.Supp. at 681-82.

Yousef makes a two-part argument on appeal challenging the District Court's holding with respect to the Court's jurisdiction over Count Nineteen. First, he claims that the District Court erred in holding that the universality principle provides jurisdiction over Count Nineteen. He bases this claim on the argument that, if his placing the bomb on the Philippine Airlines plane constituted terrorism, then jurisdiction under the universality principle is improper because terrorism is not universally condemned by the community of States and, therefore, is not subject to universal jurisdiction under customary international law. Yousef Br. at 143-48. Second, he argues that because customary international law does not provide for the punishment of terrorist acts under the

universality principle, such failure precludes or invalidates United States laws that provide for the prosecution of such acts that occur extraterritorially. *See id.* at 139-141, 148 (arguing that jurisdiction over Count Nineteen cannot exist apart from a jurisdictional basis supplied by customary international law).

In light of the District Court's conclusion that Yousef's prosecution for the acts charged in Count Nineteen was proper under the universality principle, and in light of Yousef's arguments both that the universality principle does not provide jurisdiction over terrorist acts[30] and that this failure precludes United States law from proscribing such acts, we (i) first present the District Court's holding as to its jurisdiction over this count, (ii) examine whether the District Court correctly concluded that the universality principle provides for jurisdiction over the acts charged in Count Nineteen, and (iii) examine whether the universality principle provides for jurisdiction over "terrorist" acts. We hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law in relying upon the universality principle as a basis for jurisdiction over the acts charged in Count Nineteen and further hold that customary international law currently does not provide for the prosecution of "terrorist" acts under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of States to achieve anything like consensus on the definition of terrorism. However, as discussed in full below in Discussion Section I.B.3(b), we hold that Yousef's conduct charged in Count Nineteen—regardless of whether it is termed "terrorist"—constitutes the core conduct proscribed by the Montreal Convention and its implementing legislation. Accordingly, Yousef's prosecution and conviction on this Count is both consistent with and required by the United States' treaty obligations and domestic laws. We therefore reject Yousef's claim that jurisdiction over Count Nineteen was lacking and affirm the substance of the District Court's ruling.

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[30] We take no position on whether the acts charged in Count Nineteen constitute "terrorist acts" or "terrorism."

i. The District Court's Opinion

In holding that it could exercise universal jurisdiction over Yousef for Count Nineteen, the District Court stated:

> The issue of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution based on universal jurisdiction was also discussed in *United States v. Yunis,* [924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991)] . . . .
>
> The *Yunis* court did not decide that universal jurisdiction was insufficient as the sole basis for jurisdiction under the Antihijacking Act. . . .
>
> Endorsing the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the prosecution of an aircraft-related crime, the [*Yunis*] court stated that "aircraft hijacking may well be one of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved." *Id.* [at 1092.]
>
> The court in *Yunis* cited to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law to support exercise of universal jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution related to crimes involving aircraft. Section 404 [of the Restatement (Third)] states, "[a] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the other bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present." Restatement (Third) § 404 (1987).

Yousef, 927 F.Supp. at 681 (additional internal citations omitted) (emphasis removed).

The District Court then added:

> The disregard for human life which would accompany the placing of a bomb aboard an airplane with the intent for that bomb to explode while the airplane is in flight and fully occupied with people, or otherwise sabotaging that plane, is at least as heinous a crime of international concern as hijacking a plane.

Id. at 682.

The District Court thus held, relying on *Yunis*, the Restatement (Third), and its own analogy between "the placing of a bomb aboard an airplane" and other "heinous" crimes that support universal jurisdiction, that the United States on this ground alone could exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute "aircraft-related crime." *Id.* at 681-82. Like the court in *Yunis*, the District

Court relied on the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that a "state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern," including "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, . . . [and] *perhaps* certain acts of terrorism." *Yousef*, 927 F.Supp. at 681 (quoting Restatement (Third) § 404) (alteration omitted; emphasis added). Drawing an analogy between aircraft hijacking and Yousef's act of placing a bomb aboard an aircraft, the District Court concluded that the acts charged in Count Nineteen are considered "by the United States and the international community to be 'Offenses against the Law of Nations'" that support the exercise of universal jurisdiction over Yousef. *Id.* (internal citation omitted in original).

In relying primarily on the Restatement (Third) (and its incorporation into *Yunis*) and in expanding the scope of universal jurisdiction to new offenses by judicial analogy to its traditional subjects, the District Court erred, first, in its use of the sources of authority from which a court may discern the content of customary international law and, second, in its conclusion that universal jurisdiction may be expanded by judicial analogy to the crimes that currently are subject to jurisdiction under the universality principle. We address these points in turn.

ii. The Use of Authority in Determining Customary International Law

The District Court anchored its finding of universal jurisdiction over Yousef in the relevant provisions of the Restatement (Third). It erred in doing so because such treatises are not primary sources of international law. While a discussion of the sources of authority from which a court may discover the content of customary international law may seem rarefied, we address this subject here at some length because the incorrect use of such sources can easily lead to an incorrect conclusion about the content of customary international law. In the instant case, misplaced reliance on a

treatise as a primary source of the customary international law of universal jurisdiction led to the erroneous conclusion that such jurisdiction existed over the acts charged in Count Nineteen.

The Restatement (Third), a kind of treatise or commentary, is not a *primary* source of authority upon which, standing alone, courts may rely for propositions of customary international law. Such works at most provide evidence of the practice of States, and then only insofar as they rest on factual and accurate descriptions of the past practices of states, not on projections of future trends or the advocacy of the "better rule." *See* note 31, *post*. Moreover, while a treatise never may serve as a primary source of law, reliance on this section of the Restatement (Third) in particular is error because it advocates the expansion of universal jurisdiction beyond the scope presently recognized by the community of States, as reflected in the primary sources of international law.[31]

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[31] For a discussion of the departures of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States from the content of the Restatement (Second), see Stephen C. McCaffrey, *The Restatement's Treatment of Sources and Evidence of International Law*, 25 Int'l Lawyer 311 (1991).

The American Law Institute ("ALI") began its project of preparing comprehensive "restatements" of the laws of the United States in order "'to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs.'" The American Law Institute, *Capturing the Voice of the American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters* 1 (2001) (quoting the ALI's 1923 Certificate of Incorporation)); *see also* Harvey S. Perlman, *The Restatement Process*, 10-Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 2, 2-3 (2000). Accordingly, the Restatements do not merely (or necessarily) "restate" the law as it is; the ALI handbook for reporters instructs that reporters are "not compelled to adhere to . . . a preponderating balance of authority but [are] instead expected to *propose the better rule* and provide the rationale for choosing it." *Id.* at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

The ALI published its first Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States in 1965—although this volume was entitled the Restatement (Second) because it comprised part of the second series of restatements issued by the ALI. *Id*; *see also* Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) ("Restatement (Second)"). The Restatement (Third) is a "comprehensive revision" of the Restatement (Second). Restatement (Third) at 3. The Director of the ALI notes in the foreward to the Restatement (Third) that it is "in no sense an official document of the United States," and that "[i]n a number of particulars the formulations in this Restatement are at variance with positions that have been taken by the United States Government." *Id.* at IX. These variations presumably are intentional because, although the ALI extended the Restatement (Third) project by a year to consider "communications received . . . from the Department of State and from the Justice Department," it did not fully conform the Restatement to the positions expressed in those communications. American Law Institute, Proceedings, 63d Annual Meeting, 1986, at 90 (1987). The Restatement (Third) addresses for the first time the central subject of the sources of international law, which the Restatement (Second) had relegated to the comments of section 1. McCaffrey, *ante*, at 312.

The Restatement (Third)'s innovations on the subject of customary international law have been controversial. For example, the Restatement (Third) suggests that customary international law might trump prior inconsistent statutory law, binding the executive branch. *See* Restatement (Third) at § 115(2) & cmt. d & Reporters' Note 4. This proposition is without foundation or merit. Indeed, other commentators have called the Restatement (Third)'s view that customary

The District Court's reliance on *Yunis* for the proposition that it could exercise universal jurisdiction over Yousef similarly was misplaced because the holding in *Yunis* was grounded in the text of the Restatement (Third).

* * *

The "sources" of international law is a subject of much continuing scholarship. The Statute of the International Court of Justice sets forth in its Article 38 the sources of authority that the ICJ relies upon to determine international law. Article 38 provides in relevant part:

> 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
>
> a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
>
> b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
>
> c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
>
> d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,[32] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists [*i.e.*, scholars or

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international law could supersede federal statutory law "pure bootstrapping," noting that the only authority cited for that proposition in the Restatement (Third) is a single article by the Restatement (Third)'s own Reporter—that is, the citation is without external authority. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, *Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position*, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 835-36 & nn. 142-143 (1997). Even the current President of the ALI notes that this rule was "much debated when the Restatement Third was under discussion in the Institute . . . [and is] not completely free from controversy now." Michael Traynor, "That's Debatable: The ALI as a Public Policy Forum, Part II," 25 *The* ALI Reporter 1, 2 (2002).

Inasmuch as the Restatement (Third) notes that certain of its positions are "at variance" with the practice and customs followed by the United States in its international relations, and incorrectly asserts that customary international law may trump United States statutory law, courts must be vigilant and careful in adopting the statements of the Restatement (Third) as evidence of the customs, practices, or laws of the United States and/or evidence of customary international law. *See* note 33, *post*.

[32] Article 59 provides in full: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." *Id.* at art. 59.

> "jurists"][33] of the various nations, *as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.*

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993 (emphasis added).

Scholarly commentators themselves recapitulate the Article's schema—namely, that the acts and decisions of States are sources of law, while scholarly works are not:

> The origins of the rules of international law, which may also be called '*the sources*' of that law . . . are the opinions, decisions or acts constituting the starting-point from which their more or less gradual establishment can be traced.
>
> . . . . The records or *evidence* of international law are the documents or acts proving the consent of States to its rules. Among such records or *evidence*, treaties and *practice* play an essential part, though recourse must also be had to unilateral declarations, instructions to diplomatic agents, laws and ordinances, and *in a lesser degree*, to the writings of authoritative jurists.

Clive Parry, *The Sources and Evidences of International Law* 2 (1965) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (final emphasis added).

Thus, according to the Statute of the International Court of Justice[34] and the writings of leading publicists themselves, publicists' writings are not true "sources" of international law, though they may be useful in explicating or clarifying an established legal principle or body of law. Nor do the writings of any particular publicists necessarily constitute strong evidence of a proposition of international law or of any State's consent thereto. Rather, as Professor Parry of Cambridge University observed, the writings of publicists are an acceptable additional source to shed light on a

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[33] "Publicists" is an antique word used in the parlance of international law as a synonym for writers who, in other areas of scholarship, are called "scholars" or "jurists." "Jurist," for its part, means "[a] legal scholar," though its use may introduce ambiguity because a secondary meaning of this term is "judge." *Black's Law Dictionary* 767 (5th ed. 1979); *see* note 36, *post*. "*Publicis*" is a term used for the writings of "publicists."

[34] According to the Charter of the United Nations, "[a]ll Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945), Art. 93. The United States Senate ratified the Charter of the United Nations on July 28, 1945. 91 Cong. Rec. 8185, 8190 (1945).

particular question of international law only when "*recourse must also be had*" beyond the "opinions," "decisions," and "acts" of States, and only then "to a lesser degree" than to more authoritative evidence, such as the State's own "declarations," "laws," and "instructions" to its agents. *Id.*

Some contemporary international law scholars assert that they themselves are an authentic source of customary international law, perhaps even more relevant than the practices and acts of States. The most candid and aggressive formulation of the unfounded claim to legal suzerainty by the international law professoriate has been made by the eminent Louis B. Sohn, the emeritus Bemis Professor of International Law at the Harvard Law School, who stated,

> I submit that states really never make international law on the subject of human rights. *It is made by the people that care*; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in the leading international law journals . . . . This is the way international law is made, *not by states, but by 'silly' professors writing books*[.]

Louis B. Sohn, *Sources of International Law*, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 399, 399, 401 (1996).[35] This notion that professors of international law enjoy a special competence to prescribe the nature of customary international law wholly unmoored from legitimating territorial or national responsibilities, the interests and practices of States, or (in countries such as ours) the processes of

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[35] Some scholars promulgate the view that the opinions of scholars should be *preferred* as a source of authority over the output of States' lawmaking bodies and States' practices, based on the argument that scholars are more independent of narrowly national concerns than elected lawmakers and therefore better embody the disinterested "*conscience juridique*." *See, e.g.*, Oscar Schachter, *The Invisible College of International Lawyers*, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 217, 225 (1977). This seemingly idealistic position has been rejected by other scholars, who note that it is "obvious" that "subjective factors" and "national and other prejudices" freely may enter into the writings of publicists, particularly those who "see themselves to be propagating new and better views." Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* 24 (5th ed. 1999). The claim of scholars to speak for "the international community," loosely so called, however commonplace in our time, should be regarded with skepticism. *See* note 36, *post*.

Not all international law scholars adopt the position that scholars' views are more constitutive of customary international law than States' practices. *See, e.g.*, Ernest A. Young, *Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law*, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 365, 391 (2002) (stating, "It is hard not to see delusions of grandeur in statements like [Sohn's]. . . . Law professors defending the modern position are, at least to some extent, asserting their own power.")

democratic consent—may not be unique,[36] but it is certainly without merit.

Put simply, and despite protestations to the contrary by scholars (or "publicists" or "jurists") themselves, a statement by the most highly qualified scholars that international law is *x* cannot trump evidence that the treaty practice or customary practices of States is otherwise, much less trump a statute or constitutional provision of the United States at variance with *x*. This is only to emphasize the point that scholars do not *make* law, and that it would be profoundly inconsistent with the law-making processes within and between States for courts to permit scholars to do so by relying upon their statements, standing alone, as sources of international law. In a system governed by the rule of law, no private person—or group of men and women such as comprise the body of international law scholars—*creates* the law. Accordingly, instead of relying primarily on the works of scholars for a statement of customary international law, we look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the established practice of States.[37]

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[36] *See, e.g.*, *Statement Amicus Curiae of International Law Professors*, *Paraguay v. Gilmore*, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (No. 97-1390) (stating, more subtly than Professor Sohn, that the "views of jurists on points of international law [should be] taken into account when such questions arise in U.S. courts"; further stating that *amici*, "through scholarship[,] . . . have contributed to the development of jurisprudence on various questions related to the pending matter, *id.* at 1-2) (note that there is no record on Supreme Court docket sheet of any action on the motion to file this amicus brief). On the term "jurist" generally, and the possibilities for confusion in the use of this term, see note 33, *ante*.

For a survey of statements by international law scholars attributing to themselves law-making authority in the area of customary international law, see Daniel W. Drezner, *On the Balance Between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty*, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 321, 324-25 & nn.12-14 (2001) (stating that "[r]evisionist scholars of international law claim that unelected, unrepresentative groups advocate the use of customary international law as a means of bypassing democratic sovereignty," and citing extensively to relevant examples). *See also* Curtis A. Bradley, *The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation*, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 457, 468 (2001) (discussing the "substantial pride" of some "international law scholars" who believe they "are engaged in a form of law creation").

[37] Our view of the matter is entirely consistent with our understanding of the customary international law set forth in two notable cases, *Kadic v. Karadzic*, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), and *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), arising under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. In those cases, we considered the character and sources of customary international law, *see, e.g.*, *Kadic*, 70 F.3d at 238-39; *Filartiga*, 630 F.2d at 880 n.7, and we nowhere suggested that the views of international scholars, standing alone and unconnected to accurate descriptions of past state practice, could be a basis for the determination of the applicable law. These cases did not address jurisdiction under the universality principle because jurisdiction in both cases arose under the Alien Tort Claims Act.

iii. The Universality Principle Provides for Jurisdiction over Only a Limited Set of Acts Violating the Law of Nations

The District Court erred in holding that the universality principle provides a basis for jurisdiction over Yousef for the acts charged in Count Nineteen because the universality principle permits jurisdiction over only a limited set of crimes that cannot be expanded judicially, as discussed in full below. The District Court's reliance on the qualified language in *Yunis* that aircraft-related crime "*may well be*" one of the few crimes supporting universal jurisdiction, *Yousef*, 927 F.Supp. at 681 (quoting *Yunis*, 924 F.2d at 1092) (emphasis added), is facially at odds with this requirement because such language reflects that these crimes are not unequivocally condemned by all States.

Yousef argues that the District Court erred in finding that he was subject to universal jurisdiction because terrorist acts like his own are not universally condemned by the community of States and therefore not subject to jurisdiction under the universality principle. Yousef Br. at 144-45. Although we are doubtful that the District Court's finding of universal jurisdiction relies on the notion that all acts of terrorism are universally condemned, we emphasize that the indefinite category of "terrorism" is not subject to universal jurisdiction.

* * *

The universality principle permits a State to prosecute an offender of any nationality for an offense committed outside of that State and without contacts to that State, but only for the few, near-unique offenses uniformly recognized by the "civilized nations" as an offense against the "Law of Nations."[38] The strictly limited set of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction cannot be expanded

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[38] The phrases "international law" and the "law of nations" frequently are used interchangeably, *see, e.g.*, Restatement (Third) 41 (stating, in the introductory note to Chapter 2, that "the law of nations later [was] referred to as international law"), but these terms are not entirely synonymous. "International law" is of a far more recent vintage than "law of nations." "Law of nations" derives from the Latin *jus gentium*, meaning literally "law of nations" (the root of *gentium* being *gens*, meaning a race, clan or people), and was used to refer to the law applied by Roman magistrates in foreign lands. The *jus gentium* is closely related to the concepts of natural law and natural reason, *jus naturale* and *naturale ratio*. By contrast, Jeremy Bentham first coined the phrase "international law" in 1789. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction*

by drawing an analogy between some new crime such as placing a bomb on board an airplane and universal jurisdiction's traditional subjects. Nor, as discussed above in our consideration of the use of sources in international law, can universal jurisdiction be created by reliance on treatises or other scholarly works consisting of aspirational propositions that are not themselves good evidence of customary international law, much less primary sources of customary international law. *See Yousef*, 927 F.Supp. at 681.

The class of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction traditionally included only piracy. *See, e.g.*, Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000, 41 I.L.M. at 559 ¶ 5 (separate opinion of ICJ President Guillaume) (stating that "universal jurisdiction is accepted in cases of piracy because piracy is carried out on the high seas, outside all State territory"); *see also* Oppenheim's International Law 753 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1996) (discussing universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy); Scharf, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. at 369 (same). In modern times, the class of crimes over which States can exercise universal jurisdiction has been extended to include war crimes and acts identified after

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to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 326 n.1 (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1948) (1789) (stating that "[t]he word *international*, it must be acknowledged, is a new one . . . calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the *law of nations*." (emphasis in original)). Bentham's writings on "international law," however, significantly expanded the scope of what previously had been known as the "law of nations" to sweep within it any area of lawmaking in which States might join for their mutual advancement. Jeremy Bentham, *Principles of International Law*, *in* 2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 535-40 (John Bowring, ed., New York, Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1786-89) (stating that "international laws [should] be made upon all points which remain unascertained" among nations, particularly areas in which nations "are capable of collusion" in the furtherance of aligned interests. *Id.* at 540). Thus while Benthamite "international law" and its progeny are concerned with lawmaking in any area that could improve the condition of, and relations between, States, the "law of nations" historically consisted of a finite set of principles believed by commentators (primarily Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui) to be derived from the divine order, or from abstract reason and natural law. Stewart Jay, *The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law*, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819, 823 (1989). According to William Blackstone, the eighteenth-century British legal scholar and judge, the "law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world"; it is founded on the principle "that different nations ought in time of peace do to one another all the good they can; and, in time of war, as little harm as possible, without prejudice to their own real interests." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *66.

In a notable opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly, himself a practitioner of international law for many years before his appointment to our Court, we held that "a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or dealings *inter se*." *IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.*, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

the Second World War as "crimes against humanity." *See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky*, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985), *vacated on other grounds*, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).

The concept of universal jurisdiction has its origins in prosecutions of piracy, which States and legal scholars have acknowledged for at least 500 years as a crime against all nations both because of the threat that piracy poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations and because the crime occurs statelessly on the high seas. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Smith*, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 163 n.h (1820) (Story, J.) (extensively quoting the writings of, among others, the seventeenth-century Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius to define piracy as prohibited by the "law of nations" and subject to universal jurisdiction; upholding the defendant's conviction, however, not based upon universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy but under the statute at issue in the case, Act Cong. March 3, 1819, c. 76, *id.* at 153-54, which provided for the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over those committing acts of piracy, as provided for in the Constitution, which states that Congress may legislate to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and offences against the Law of Nations," U.S. Const. Art. § I, 8, cl. 10); *cf.* Oscar Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice* 267 (1991) (recounting that Britain during the nineteenth century subjected slave traders apprehended at sea to universal jurisdiction on the view that they were pirates).

Universal jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war was not suggested until the Second World War. *See* Theodor Meron, *International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities*, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 554, 572 (1995) (citing Hersch Lauterpacht, *The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes*, 2 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 58, 65 (1944), as the first to propose universal jurisdiction over war criminals).

Following the Second World War, the United States and other nations recognized "war crimes"[39] and "crimes against humanity," including "genocide,"[40] as crimes for which international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction. *Demjanjuk*, 776 F.2d at 582.

A commentator of the time explained that war crimes are "similar to piratical acts" because "[i]n both situations there is . . . a lack of any adequate judicial system operating on the spot where the crime takes place—in the case of piracy it is because the acts are on the high seas and in the case of war crimes because of a chaotic condition or irresponsible leadership in time of war." Willard B. Cowles, *Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes*, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177, 194 (1945).

The historical restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under customary international law only where crimes (1) are universally condemned by the community of nations, and (2) by their nature occur either outside of a State or where there is no State capable of punishing, or competent to punish, the crime (as in a time of war).

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[39] The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which tried war criminals of the Second World War, defined war crimes as:

> violations of the laws or customs of war ... includ[ing], but not ... limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity[.]

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6(b), *in* 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 11 (1947).

[40] The Charter describes "crimes against humanity" as:

> murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6(c), *in* 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 11 (1947).

Unlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under customary international law—that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—that now have fairly precise definitions and that have achieved universal condemnation, "terrorism" is a term as loosely deployed as it is powerfully charged. Judge Harry T. Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit stated eighteen years ago in *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), that "[w]hile this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorist acts, that sentiment is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus." *Id.* at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring). Similarly, Judge Robert H. Bork stated in his opinion in *Tel-Oren* that the claim that a defendant "violated customary principles of international law against terrorism[] concerns an area of international law in which there is little or no consensus and in which the disagreements concern politically sensitive issues . . . . [N]o consensus has developed on how properly to define 'terrorism' generally." *Id.* at 806-07 (Bork, J., concurring).

Finally, in a third concurring opinion, Judge Roger Robb found the question of assigning culpability for terrorist acts to be "non-justiciable" and outside of the competency of the courts as inextricably linked with "political question[s]." *Id.* at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Robb stated that

> [I]nternational "law", or the absence thereof, renders even the search for the least common denominators of civilized conduct in this area [defining and punishing acts of terrorism] an impossible-to-accomplish judicial task. Courts ought not to engage in it when that search takes us towards a consideration of terrorism's place in the international order. Indeed, when such a review forces us to dignify by judicial notice the most outrageous of the diplomatic charades that attempt to dignify the violence of terrorist atrocities, we corrupt our own understanding of evil.

Id.

We regrettably are no closer now than eighteen years ago to an international consensus on

the definition of terrorism or even its proscription;[41] the mere existence of the phrase "state-sponsored terrorism" proves the absence of agreement on basic terms among a large number of States that terrorism violates public international law. Moreover, there continues to be strenuous disagreement between States about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, nor have we shaken ourselves free of the cliché that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."[42] We

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[41] For example, each side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict charges the other with "terrorism," sentiments echoed by their allies. *See, e.g.*, Todd S. Purdum, *What Do You Mean, 'Terrorist'?*, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2002, at Week in Review 1 ("If Israel sees its military campaign in the West Bank as a justifiable echo of Mr. Bush's assault on Al Qaeda, Palestinians claim affinity with the American colonists' revolt against an occupying power."). The Organization of the Islamic Conference met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in April 2002, to define terrorism; the host of the conference, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, proposed a definition of terrorism as "all attacks on civilians"; the conference's final declaration, however, stated that terrorism consists only of attacks on civilians perpetrated by non-Palestinians, stating that the Conference "'rejects any attempt to link terrorism to the struggle of the Palestinian people in the exercise of their inalienable right to establish their independent state.'" *Id.* (quoting statements by Mohamad and contained in the conference's final declaration). Sentiments at the conference were far from uniform, however: The deputy foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated that "if a person kills or harms a civilian . . . he is a terrorist" irrespective of the "race or religion" of the perpetrator and the victims. Kevin M. Cherry, on-line commentary, *Defining Terrorism Down: What Muslim Nations Really Think*, The Nat'l Rev., Apr. 4, 2002 (quoting statements of Bosnian-Herzegovinian delegate to conference).

[42] Confusion on the definition of "terrorism" abounds. *See, e.g.*, Craig S. Smith, *Debate Over Iraq Raises Fears of a Shrinking Role for NATO*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2003, at L 26 (quoting Celeste A. Wallander, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as stating that even among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance ("NATO") there is no consensus "on how to define transnational terrorism").

Terrorism is defined variously by the perpetrators' motives, methods, targets, and victims. Motive-based definitions suffer from confusion because of the attempt to carve out an exception for assertedly legitimate armed struggle in pursuit of self-determination. For example, under one of the various United Nations resolutions addressing terrorism, armed and violent acts do not constitute "terrorism" if committed by peoples seeking self-determination in opposition to a violently enforced occupation. *See, e.g.*, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 Int'l Legis. Mat. 1292 (1970). This attempt to distinguish "terrorists" from "freedom fighters" potentially could legitimate as non-terrorist certain groups nearly universally recognized as terrorist, including the Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, and Hamas. *See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.*, 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing Hamas); *Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp.*, 89 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing Hezbollah); *Matter of Requested Extradition of Smyth*, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1139-40 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing the Irish Republican Army).

By contrast, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism defines terrorism solely based on the methods of violence the perpetrator employs, and explicitly removes political judgment of the acts by defining most violent acts as "non-political" (regardless of the perpetrator's claimed motive). European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No. 90. Thus, in Article I, the Convention defines as terrorism any offenses, *inter alia*, "involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons," a definition that may fail to circumscribe the offense adequately.

The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Cairo, Apr. 22, 1998), *reprinted in* International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, 152-73 (United Nations 2001), while

thus conclude that the statements of Judges Edwards, Bork, and Robb remain true today, and that terrorism—unlike piracy and war crimes—does not provide a basis of universal jurisdiction.

b. Jurisdiction Is Proper Under United States Laws Giving Effect to Its Obligations Under the Montreal Convention

While it is true, as Yousef asserts, that the District Court erred in concluding that the universality principle conferred jurisdiction over the crimes charged in Count Nineteen, Yousef's claim that principles of customary international law constrain Congress's power to enact laws that proscribe extraterritorial conduct is simply wrong.

In Count Nineteen, Yousef was charged with, and convicted of, violating 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3). Title 18 U.S.C. § 32 was enacted as part of the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, (§ 2013) 98 Stat. 1837, 2187-88, which, as discussed above, implements the Montreal

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condemning terrorism, takes a uniquely restrictive approach to defining it, stating that offenses committed against the interests of Arab states are "terrorist offenses," while offenses committed elsewhere or against other peoples or interests are not. *Id.* at Art. I.3 (defining "terrorist offence" as any of several defined violent actions that occur "in any of the Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests"). The Convention further defines as legitimate (non-terrorist) "[a]ll cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle," unless such struggles "prejudic[e] the territorial integrity of any Arab State." *Id.* at Art. II(a).

United States legislation has adopted several approaches to defining terrorism, demonstrating that, even within nations, no single definition of "terrorism" or "terrorist act" prevails. Among numerous statutes defining "terrorism" or "acts of terrorism," *see, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (defining terrorism by motive, stating that "international terrorism" as certain acts that "appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (substantially the same); 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(B) (defining terrorism by its effect on United States interests, stating that "acts of terrorism" are any acts that are "unlawful" and that cause damage to any "person, property, or entity" in the United States, or to any United States-flag craft or air carrier); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (in the context of what acts cause an alien to be excludable based on participation in "terrorist activity," defining "terrorist activity" apart from any nexus to United States interests, as "any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State)" and that involves, *inter alia*, attacks on third parties to influence the policy of any government, attacks on aircraft and other vessels, or the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons).

Still other definitions of "terrorism" may focus on the victims of the attacks or the relationship between the perpetrators and the victims. *See, e.g.*, Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism 1-2 (1988) ("Terrorism is a method of combat in which . . . symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror).").

Annex 8

Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Fifty-second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 22 September 1997

Text of the Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi

Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Before the Fifty - Second Session
of the United Nations
General Assembly

New York, 22 September 1997

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Introduction: The Collapse of Bi-Polar Approach

Our world is a constellation of interdependent human units. As a result of the ever-expanding international communications, our interdependence has been increasing on a steady basis; a reiteration of the concept of "global village". These human units or countries have become closely interconnected within regions, while simultaneously, regions draw closer to each other -- an imperative of the on-going trend of globalization.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the bi-polar world, a new order characterized by multiple powers has emerged. The world is no longer monopolized by two super-powers; rather it is rendered propitious for the presence and participation of a multitude of powers. The new world provides a historic opportunity for various powers to engage in collective cooperation towards common objectives, based on human solidarity, active, equitable and transparent participation.

1. The Doctrine of Global Civil Society

At the threshold of the third millennium and under the circumstances of unfolding interplay among not one or two but various powers in the shaping of new global decisions, international relations need a new doctrine, commensurate with the evolving conditions and emerging needs. The new doctrine, drawing upon historical hindsight and relying on reason and objectivity, should shape a new order in international relations.

The main objective of this doctrine is the gradual realization of a "global civil society"; a society where liberty and salvation harmoniously coincide to meet the spiritual and material needs of humanity in an institutionalized manner; and where comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development lies at the foundation of universal cooperation and participation.

1.1. The Foundations of Global Civil Society

The doctrine of "global civil society" is predicated on two major principles:

1.1.1. Institutionalization of the Rule of Law in Domestic and International Relations

The most significant foundation and feature of civil society is the rule of law, which prevents despotism and anarchy at the domestic level and hegemony and war at the international level. Rule of law constitutes the only proper setting for the participation of all individuals and nations in shaping their own destiny and building a better and more prosperous tomorrow for their national societies and the global community.

The international community today, like its constituent member-states, simply cannot provide a peaceful and prosperous life for the people through coercion, autocratic decisions and culture of domination and hegemony. Therefore, the rule of law, as the very foundation of order and the relations among individuals and states, should be institutionalized.

Undoubtedly, for the rule of law to be institutionalized in international relations, it is imperative to commit ourselves collectively to the scrupulous and non-discriminatory implementation of the existing body of international law, coupled with its progressive reform and development through equitable universal participation and with due consideration for the values of all constituent units of the global community in its entirety. This would not only serve making the law truly universal and globally acceptable, but it would indeed facilitate its implementation.

1.1.2. Empowerment and Participation

General participation coupled with the requisite

empowerment constitute the undeniable foundation for the realization and stability of civil society. Similar to the process of participation at the national level – where all individuals, regardless of color, race, opinion, wealth or social status have an inalienable right to determine their own destiny, countries and regions with differing cultures and resources should enjoy the right and be empowered to participate at all stages of decision-making and policy implementation at the global scale.

Today, North and South constitute two complimentary domains in a single global arena. The South, with its historical depth, rich cultural heritage, and abundant natural and human resources, has in its totality played a great and pivotal role in the development of human civilization. At the beginning of the third millennium, the South's active participation in and meaningful contribution to the process of formation of the emerging pluralistic world is of paramount importance. Equilibrium and stability of the future world order depends, in large measure, on the South's contribution to the shaping of the norms governing future international relations.

Yet, the share of the South in the existing world equations, notwithstanding its sheer size and varied merits, is neither fair nor proportionate. During the final years of the second millennium, the South is still suffering from injustice, discrimination and double standards. This unjust situation needs to be rectified and the countries of the South, individually as well as collectively, should actively assert a more equitable share and a more secure standing in the global order. The realization of this lofty objective requires assertive initiatives and measures at two levels: at national and regional settings within the South to ensure effective presence and involvement, and simultaneously at the international level to provide the necessary milieu and conditions for such a participation.

The effective presence and participation by the South in the global system necessitates the promotion of a culture of

self-confidence within the South as the corner-stone of comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development at the national level, coupled with the drive towards conflict resolution and confidence building among the countries of the South. Undoubtedly, promotion and institutionalization of a culture of cooperation and establishment of mechanisms to enhance the existing level of cooperation in various fields among the countries of the South would facilitate effective and constructive international participation. The governments and the political elite of the South should not be found failing in this daunting task ahead of us all.

And at the international level, the world community should generate resolute political will to ensure in practice respect for the plurality of differing views and values in political, social and cultural dimensions, and simultaneously withstand the institutionalization of the dangerous trend of unilateralism -- as the embodiment of a new form of international despotism.

1.2. Norms of Conduct in Global Civil Society

In our view, we can move towards the gradual realization of a global civil society through institutionalization of the rule of law and universal participation as well as collective observance of the following norms in our interactions:

1.2.1 Pluralism and Acceptance of Variety

The world community, quite like its constituent national societies, is composed of varieties and pluralities. In fact, it is the mosaic of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, traditions and values that have given rise to culture and civilization. All along history, this variety and plurality has been the very source of inspiration and innovation and the blossoming of human creativity -- whether individual or collective -- in various societies, thus contributing to the advancement and enrichment of humanity. Progress towards a truly pluralistic world community is only possible through

genuine respect for freedom and democratic values as well as through understanding and acceptance of pluralism in all its national and global dimensions.

1.2.2. Promotion of Tolerance and Moderation

Preservation and more importantly, progress, of a pluralistic world with a great and ever-increasing variety of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, traditions and values depends, as a matter of principle, on the promotion of tolerance and moderation. In the modern world, it is only through forbearance and moderation that various cultures, ideas and schools of thought would find the opportunity to flourish and come to fruition. The idea of the preponderance and hegemony of one particular culture and value system over all others is not but subjugation to dogmatism and blind prejudice and, in the final analysis, enslavement of the mind. Humanity today should, on the basis of the principle of liberty and also drawing upon democratic traditions, be in a position to provide the necessary milieu and opportunity for different outlooks and schools of thought to present themselves. The relationship among ideas and points of view, founded on reason and logic, cannot be one of domination and coercion; no culture or value system should be allowed to force others into subjugation and oblivion. In a pluralistic world, the relationship among ideas and thoughts is by nature and definition one of coexistence, exchange and interchange. Therefore, through the promotion of tolerance and moderation, the seeds of a humane coexistence should be planted and cherished in such a manner that would ensure the growth and blossoming of a flower field of ideas and thoughts.

1.2.3. Dialogue Among Civilizations

Dialogue among civilizations lies at the very foundation of a truly "global civil society" and finds its roots in the principle of tolerance and moderation. Civilizations are the product and manifestation of the thinking and reflections of humanity, which despite differences, emanate from a common fountain -and

orientation. The theory of "clash of civilizations" is contradictory in essence and inconsistent with history. How could rational manifestations of human thinking, which in turn embody the striving and reflection of great men of culture and reasoning, be conceived in a state of clash and conflict?

Various human civilizations can and should -- cognizant of their intrinsic commonalities as well as outward differences and varieties -- engage in constructive dialogue, mutual understanding and fruitful cooperation. Active and continuous, albeit critical, interchange among civilizations makes them all the more creative, opens the possibilities for evolution and understanding, and contributes to a higher state of well-being and prosperity for the whole humanity. This is a fact borne out by the long history of civilizational exchange leading to mutual enrichment. In the course of this process of exchange, civilizations rooted in religious and divine thinking and values can help the Western societies in responding to the serious problems in human relations, and simultaneously, benefit from the fruits of scientific and industrial advances in the West.

1.2.4. Promotion of Human Rights

The collective campaign of the world community to define, promote and protect human rights across the globe does indeed represent a great achievement of humanity at large. The promotion of respect for and compliance with the universal norms of human rights constitutes a basic necessity for the development of the "global civil society". It is evident that priority must be accorded to the most fundamental human rights such as the right to life, the right to self-determination and the right to development, and special attention must be given to addressing their massive and systematic violation. Furthermore, fundamental human rights are of such high standing that they should not be manipulated as a lever for pressure or fall victim to politically-motivated discrimination and selectivity.

Promotion and protection of human rights in an institutionalized manner depends, first and foremost, on a correct and realistic understanding of the concept. Human rights do not constitute abstract concepts. Approaches and policies emanating from "extremist individualism" -- defining the human person in abstraction, disconnected from spirituality and religious and historical roots, and divorced from social and cultural background -- have indeed done more harm than good to the real cause of human rights.

Moreover, human rights, as concepts of universal nature, cannot be claimed to be the monopoly of any single culture or society. They belong to the entire humanity. Their correct and comprehensive definition hinges on their liberation from the restrictive bounds and monopolistic claims of a particular culture and ideology. They can be promoted in a meaningful and effective manner only through genuine respect for the plurality of beliefs, religions, traditions, value systems and modes of thinking. Broad-based participation of various cultures in the on-going process of defining and interpreting human rights as well as in formulating new norms and rules not only would prevent the monopolistic hegemony of a particular culture, but would contribute to the universal acceptance of new standards.

1.2.5. Comprehensive, Balanced and Sustainable Development

For development to foster progress and change for the better and consolidate the foundations of civil society, it needs to be comprehensive, balanced and sustainable. Comprehensive development encompasses all political, economic, social, cultural and ethical realms and dimensions of human beings and the society. Balanced development creates a harmonious interaction among them so that none is given undue prominence over the others or neglected in favor of another. The very concept of sustainable development is a practical reiteration of the now established wisdom that development is a gradual and continuous

process. It cannot, and in fact, should not be conceived, planned and pursued with short-term and transient interests or concerns or even exigencies of a certain segment of the population, a single generation or one society to the detriment of other segments, generations or societies. Most importantly, human being must be recognized as the center, core and beneficiary of development; all aspects of development as well as its fruits should serve the elevation of the human state.

1.2.6. Justice and Equality of Opportunities

Justice can be established and institutionalized in the modern world, ensuring stability and sustainability on a global scale only if individuals and nations were to enjoy equal, non-discriminatory and non-selective access to opportunities. It is an undeniable fact that along the historical continuum, all societies, with varying stock of natural and human resources and scientific and technological capabilities, have participated in the common human endeavor and have contributed, though in different forms and to different degrees, to human advances and achievements. Therefore, all individuals and nations should have the opportunity, within a rule-based framework, to have access to the existing possibilities, and should not be deprived through artificial barriers from scientific and technological advances which constitute the common heritage of humanity.

2. Post-Election Iran and the Global Civil Society

The political philosophy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is in full accord with these fundamental foundations of the prospective "global civil society". The presidential elections in Iran on May 23, 1997 was indeed a true reflection of the universal outlook just defined. The elections, held in freedom and security with the participation of about 30 million men and women -- nearly 90% of all those eligible to vote, were a clear manifestation of a genuinely popular, democratic and dynamic participation of the Iranian people, particularly women and youth, in determining

their own destiny.

2.1. Strengthening the Foundations of Civil Society

The domestic program of the new government is geared towards strengthening the foundations of civil society, based on freedom, rule of law, pluralism, respect for and protection of the rights of people, tolerance, moderation, popular participation, national harmony and social justice. These fundamental principles are rooted in the teachings and values of Islam, the principles and ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic political philosophy of the late Imam Khomeini -- the great leader of the Revolution and the architect of the Islamic Republic.

2.2. Expansion of Law-Based Global Dialogue and Cooperation

On the basis of the same world outlook and political philosophy, the main features and priorities of the new administration's foreign policy -- which I presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly during my confirmation hearing, and which received the overwhelming support of the Parliament — are the following:

- Expansion of relations with all countries on the basis of mutual respect, common interest and non-interference in internal affairs of others;
- Rejection of imposition of or submission to domination and hegemony;
- Emphasis on the institutionalization of international law as the foundation of global order and as the final arbiter among states;
- Establishment and strengthening of mechanisms of mutual confidence building and security through regional cooperation and negation of presence and influence of foreign powers;
- Striving towards reduction of tension at regional and

international levels and active participation in regional conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-keeping;

- Protection of all human rights and rejection of attempts for selective and discriminatory abuse of human rights as instruments of policy;
- Emphasis on the fundamental rights of oppressed individuals and nations, particularly the Palestinian people;
- Arresting of arms race at the regional and global levels, elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and control of conventional weapons;
- Strengthening the bonds of amity and solidarity among Islamic and non-aligned countries;
- Active presence and constructive participation in the United Nations and other international organizations, with effective contribution in international efforts on global issues, such as arms control and disarmament, comprehensive and sustainable development, human rights, peace-keeping, combating terrorism and illicit drugs, and reversal of unjust international arrangements; and
- Defending the rights of Iranian citizens all over the world.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted concrete measures at the regional and international levels in pursuit of these principled policies, and is fully prepared to cooperate with all countries towards achieving common objectives in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

3. Towards Global Civil Society: Global Cooperation to Overcome Global Problems

In our view, building the future global civil society is an attainable and realistic objective, which requires, nevertheless, energetic participation of all member states. Thus, collective cooperation at a global scale to strengthen the foundation and remove the impediments to the realization of this lofty human goal

is an inescapable imperative. The major hurdles in this common endeavor can be analyzed and addressed in two categories:

- New and persistent regional conflicts caused by lack of respect for international law and violation of fundamental human rights;
- Emergence and continuation of tendencies antithetical to the rule of law and general participation.

3.1. Law-Based Approach to the Root Causes of Regional Conflicts

3.1.1. The Middle East Crisis and the Question of Palestine

The question of Palestine, which lies at the very heart of the Middle East Crisis, represents the most vivid and persistent case of disregard for international law and systematic violation of fundamental human rights of individuals and peoples. The occupation of foreign territory, widespread and massive violation of the right to self-determination and other basic human rights, forceful imposition of the will of one political group over the entire region through coercion, intimidation and official state terrorism, disruption of regional security and stability, arms race, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rejection of the demands of the international community and even violation of willfully undertaken commitments under the so-called peace process constitute the main causes of the Middle East crisis. Regrettably, certain powerful supporters of Israel tend to ignore or even attempt to disguise these self-evident realities through a campaign of sensationalism and demagoguery.

The failed attack against Southern Lebanon earlier this month exposed official Israeli terrorism and kidnaping one more time. Construction of settlements in East Jerusalem in spite of the undertakings by Israel under the so-called peace process and in contravention of various United Nations resolutions -- including two resolutions adopted by the Tenth Emergency Session of the

General Assembly -- illustrated that Israel considers itself above and beyond international law, is not even committed to its own undertakings, and continuously seeks to consolidate its occupation through demographic and geographic changes in the occupied territories, particularly in Al-Quds Al-Sharif. Unjustified detention, suppression and torture of Palestinian people, destruction and confiscation of Palestinian homes and property and desecration of Islamic holy places, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque, exemplify repressive policies of Israel and its systematic and flagrant violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

The Middle East crisis can only be solved through the full realization of the rights of the Palestinian people, in particular their right to self-determination, return of refugees and the liberation of all occupied territories, including the Al-Quds Al-Sharif, southern Lebanon and the Syrian Golan. The experience of the past few years has made it abundantly clear that any scheme or proposal which fails to take full account of the realities in the region or the infamous Israeli patterns of behavior is bound to fail.

It is indeed unfortunate that some outside powers deliberately misconstrue or misrepresent Iran's frank, open and objective expose of the realities as support for terrorism and opposition to peace and security in the region. I reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran also seeks peace and stability in the Middle East; a just and lasting peace that would receive regional consensus and would cure this chronic crisis once and for all.

3.1.2. Afghanistan

Nearly two decades have elapsed since the crisis in Afghanistan -- caused by disrespect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as violation of the basic rights of an entire nation -- has turned into a vicious cycle of violence and fratricide. The prolongation of the painful and disastrous war in Afghanistan has inflicted enormous damage and hardship on the

terrorized people of this country. Severe social restrictions and flagrant violations of human rights, particularly against women and children -- imposed unfortunately in the name of Islam -- have tarnished the image of this proud country. Discrimination against religious and ethnic groups and intransigence and inflexibility of some warring factions have further exacerbated the crisis.

There is, undoubtedly, no military solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. It is indeed regrettable to note that some of the warring factions have yet to realize this evident truth. Only through the establishment of a cease-fire, negotiations between all Afghan groups and formation of a broad-based government representing all Afghans can the crisis in Afghanistan find a lasting solution. A number of considerations in this regard are essential and must be kept in mind:

- Intra-Afghan dialogue as the key to the solution of the crisis must form the basis and the priority of any international endeavor;
- Foreign intervention in Afghanistan must cease immediately; and
- Participation of all ethnic and religious groups in governing Afghanistan must be the foundation of any solution, so as to preclude even harboring of the idea of domination of one group over Afghanistan.

As a fraternal neighboring country, the Islamic Republic of Iran has hosted millions of Afghan immigrants and refugees during the past two decades, and -- in keeping with Islamic humanitarian tradition -- has used all at its disposal to meet their needs. In the same vein, my Government is determined to continue its humanitarian and peace-making endeavors in Afghanistan in tandem with the United Nations Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. I must draw the attention of the international community to the dire need and the urgency of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

3.1.3. Tajikistan

In Tajikistan, we are witnessing promising and positive developments following the signing of the final peace agreement in Tehran and Moscow, which was made possible through the efforts of the United Nations, support of a number of regional states and indeed the strong determination and good faith of the government and the opposition. The people and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran are satisfied with the successful outcome of these efforts. We believe that the peace and security in Tajikistan need care, patience, restraint and continuous cooperation between different groups and currents in that country. It is expected that the international community support the outcome of the peace process and its consolidation in Tajikistan through augmenting reconstruction and development assistance to this country. We hope that the valuable efforts leading to the establishment of peace in Tajikistan can provide a useful model for the settlement of other similar disputes.

3.1.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents yet another example of flouting international law, where the fundamental rights of an entire people have been so blatantly violated and obstacles continue to be created in the path of the implementation of the peace agreements, whose full implementation constitute the pre-requisite for peace and stability in the Balkans. But the Serbs continue to create obstacles regarding some key provisions of their commitments. Free movement of people and goods have not yet been materialized and refugees have not been able to return to their homes. War criminals -- who have committed horrifying crimes against humanity and have the blood of thousands of innocent people on their hands -- continue to remain at large and disrupt political affairs of that country.

While emphasizing the imperative of respect for

independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic Republic of Iran considers the following to be essential:

- Utilization of all possible means to promote and strengthen the reintegration process in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country;
- Formation of central government's institutions and prevention of delays and obstacles in the process of reintegration and institution-building of the central government;
- Guaranteeing freedom of movement of people and goods in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Safe return of refugees to their homes;
- Arrest of indicted war criminals and their surrender to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague;
- Provision of the necessary resources for reconstruction of Bosnia by the international community and expeditious fulfillment of commitments by countries. In this context, high priority should be accorded to equipping and training of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to consolidate peace and security in that country.

3.2. Reversal of Cold War Mentality

Concurrent with our joint efforts to resolve and prevent regional crises, we need -- and indeed cannot avoid -- unreserved cooperation among all members of the human family to overcome problems of global character. The Cold War generated a tendency in internal and external relations, which required the existence of real or imagined enemy. Escaping this state of mind and building a new world based on cooperation and the rule of law not only requires political will, but in fact careful planning in order to foster confidence and mitigate security, economic and social concerns at national and regional levels.

Confidence building at national, regional and international levels -- as an essential strategy to transform human relations -- will not succeed in the absence of transparency in decision-making and participation of all concerned. Transparency minimizes the concerns of various players over ulterior motives of others, whereas active participation of the widest possible range of players in decision-making facilitates acceptance of decisions and their implementation.

The antithesis of universal participation in decision-making and law-based cooperation at the international level is unilateralism. This phenomenon finds its manifestations in various areas including arms control, development, international trade, environment and codification of new human rights norms. A frank and honest review points to the conclusion that the most important reason for resorting to unilateral measures lies in a misperception and an erroneous analysis of the post Cold War international situation and the illusion of the emergence of one country or belief system as the paramount power or culture in the "New World Order".

Unilateral decisions are often made when internal pressure groups in powerful countries -- in pursuit of their own interests -- impose policies on their national governments that cannot attract international consensus or agreement. Therefore, adoption of unilateral measures clearly indicates dominance of domestic considerations coupled with a perception of superior role in international affairs. Consequently, accusations leveled against others to justify these decisions are but disguises to conceal the true nature of unilateral measures before the world public opinion.

3.3. Allaying Security Concerns

One of the main purposes of the United Nations is the creation of an appropriate foundation for allaying security concerns of states. The first and most effective step towards building confidence is the elimination of weapons of mass

destruction, reduction of conventional weapons, transparency in the field of armaments and establishment of security and cooperation schemes in various regions of the globe. This endeavor requires full and non-discriminatory implementation of existing undertakings in the area of disarmament and security and development of new rules to address universally-accepted priorities as well as security requirements of the international community and its members.

3.3.1. Total Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The most important priority of humanity, essential for the survival of human civilization, is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. With the Biological Weapons Convention in place and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, two categories of weapons of mass destruction have been banned by the international community. The entry into force of CWC is undoubtedly the greatest achievements of humanity in the area of disarmament after the end of the Cold War. As a country whose civilians and military personnel have suffered, both physically and emotionally, from this inhuman weapon, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that every effort should be made to fully implement the commitments stipulated in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and make them truly universal in order to save the humanity from the threat posed by these two inhuman weapons.

Developments in the course of last two years have also created favorable conditions for nuclear disarmament. The indefinite extension of NPT on the basis of commitments stipulated in the documents of the Review and Extension Conference, as well as the historical decision of the International Court of Justice that there exists a commitment under international law to undertake good-faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament have demonstrated the firm determination of the international community to end the nightmare of nuclear war.

3.3.1.1. Obligations of Nuclear Powers

Despite the commitments and legal obligations, the efforts of nuclear-weapon-states to maintain and develop these weapons is a clear indication of the persistence of Cold War mentality, which has paralyzed confidence building activities of the Conference on Disarmaments and other inter-governmental bodies dealing with the subject.

With the insistence of nuclear powers to limit the scope of CTBT to nuclear explosions, this treaty has in practice lost its comprehensive character and has not prevented further development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear powers, utilizing advanced technology, are able to further develop their nuclear stockpiles and produce new and more complex types of nuclear weapons through non-explosive tests.

3.3.1.2. Transparent Transfer of Technology for Peaceful Use

Application of double standards in the field of non-proliferation and employing non-transparent and exclusive export control mechanisms in the area of nuclear, chemical and biological technology for peaceful use are most destructive of inter-governmental confidence and security. It is evident that any verification and control of movement of these materials among concerned parties should be in accordance with the provisions of these treaties and verification mechanism outside these treaties should be negotiated among all concerned. All state-parties of the relevant treaties should be able, without exception, to participate in these negotiations.

3.3.1.3. Cessation of Unsubstantiated Allegations

Resorting to unfounded and irresponsible allegations against other countries for ulterior motives, as well as selective and self-serving approaches towards international institutions responsible for verification of compliance with non-proliferation

regimes would definitely undermine public acceptance of the rule of law in international affairs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of Islamic beliefs, considers weapons of mass destruction inhumane and illegitimate. Going beyond its commitments under the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreements, Iran has allowed repeated IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities in a transparent manner. Several officials of the IAEA -- the sole body responsible for verification of peaceful nature of nuclear activities of member-states -- have repeatedly confirmed the fact that Iran's nuclear activities are performed within the framework of Agency's regulations and follow peaceful objectives. Despite these clear facts, some governments -- infamous for their illegal and provocative proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East -- have embarked upon a barrage of false and baseless accusations against Iran during the past few years. The only objective and consequence of this mendacity is to escalate tension, mistrust and arms race in the region. Therefore, the international community -- not only in the interest of supporting the truth but also of maintaining peace and security around the globe -- should encounter this provocative and irresponsible propaganda.

Propaganda campaigns of public deception will certainly not change regional realities on the ground. It is self-evident that insecurity in the Middle east is rooted in Israeli militarism and its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, which have thwarted all disarmament initiatives and mechanisms in this region. Some regional countries -- motivated by their security concerns arising from Israeli nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons -- have been reluctant to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and do not even find it possible to participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Yet, unabated political and practical support for Israeli acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is being rendered by one or few states. This in itself underlines the bitter reality that policies and practices of extra-regional powers have not led the region to security or stability, but

to further mistrust, tension, and arms race, providing lucrative markets for weapon manufacturers.

3.3.1.4. Zones Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the establishment of zones free from weapons of mass destruction in various regions, as a step towards achievement of a world free of these weapons. In 1974, Iran suggested the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which has since received the support of various sessions of the General Assembly. However, Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards continue to be *the* obstacle to the realization of this common objective.

The realization of the goal of establishment of free zones in the Southern Hemisphere and other regions has indeed enhanced regional and global peace and security. The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that nuclear powers must respect international agreements establishing these zones and sign the relevant protocols and support the initiatives of NPT state-parties to establish such zones particularly in the Middle East. This requires exerting pressure on Israel to join NPT and accept IAEA safeguards in line with Security Council Resolution 487.

3.3.2. Transparency and Reduction of Conventional Weapons

The unabated race for the acquisition of conventional weapons not only wastes huge quantities of the limited resources of Third World countries -- so desperately needed for development, but also exacerbates an atmosphere of anxiety and mistrust. As a first step, transparency in the transfer of armaments can play an instrumental role in building confidence, arresting arms race in various regions and enhancing regional and global peace and stability. This would be particularly so if such transparency curbed the actual sale and transfer of sophisticated

yet unnecessary weapon systems to volatile regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, devising realistic measures to ban anti-personnel land mines and control the acquisition and transfer of light arms to areas where such weaponry can exacerbate civil conflicts are among other constructive and useful steps. However, in our collective efforts to achieve transparency or prohibit specific types of weapons, we must never loose sight of the ultimate objective in the area of conventional weapons, that is the reduction of all categories of weapons and curbing of military expenditures world-wide.

The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on peace, self-restraint, confidence-building and reduction and elimination of tension, particularly within our region. I wish to inform this August assembly frankly and sincerely that throughout the Middle East, Iran allocates the lowest budget to its military. In 1995 and 96, only 3.3% of our GDP was spent on defense. We continue to be ready for any regionally acceptable understanding for further reductions in defense budgets in a manner that security concerns of large and small countries are fully addressed.

3.3.3. Regional Security and Cooperation Schemes

Confidence-building starts from the neighborhood. In our interdependent world, security is indivisible. Thus, the end of Cold War and the universal rejection of cold-war mentality must open the way for arresting and dismantling of rival block formations and emergence of regional arrangements for security and cooperation.

The highest foreign policy priority of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to make every effort to strengthen trust and confidence and build peace in our immediate neighborhood, which in cases such as Tajikistan have had encouraging achievements.

In our region, the Economic Cooperation Organization

(E.C.O.) has contributed to the expansion and consolidation of relations among its member-states through adoption of common positions and playing an active role in the field of economic and technical cooperation. The important role of ECO in promoting trust and confidence and providing and expanding the grounds for participation and coordination among ten regional countries was recognized on the part of the international community as a result of the decision of the 48th Session of the General Assembly, granting it observer status. Moreover, ECO has undertaken serious and concrete measures with a view to establish relations with other regional organizations and fora, and hopes that the specialized agencies and funds and programs of the United Nations will expand their relations with it in various fields and contribute to the realization of its objectives.

In the Persian Gulf area, only cooperation and collective participation can bring about security and stability for all countries in the region. Taking full advantage of historical affinities, cultural ties and religious bonds and sparing no effort for the efficient and coordinated utilization of human and natural potentials and resources of the region constitute the single best long-term guarantee for security and tranquility. Iran -- as the biggest country in the region enjoying historical depth of several millennia combined with the richness of Islamic civilization -- does not need to engage in any arms build-up or competition. Our message to our neighbors is one of friendship and fraternity, and we shall warmly welcome any initiative to strengthen the foundations of confidence and cooperation in this region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which will be hosting the Eighth Islamic Summit in December, is of the view that on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the primary task of this Summit is to foster mutual confidence and establish mechanisms for cooperation and coordination in various fields among Islamic countries. This will undoubtedly contribute to the further strengthening of the foundations of lasting international security and stability.

3.3.4. Uprooting Terrorism

Terrorism is the wicked result of widespread lawlessness and violent obstruction of public participation, which -- in its various forms and manifestations -- threatens human societies at national, regional and international levels. This dangerous phenomenon affects not a particular country or region, but it is a ruthless international problem that threatens the security and tranquility of the international community as a whole, tramples upon the most basic principles of human rights, and endangers territorial integrity of states. Political exploitation of this international problem through hurling unfounded allegations in order to advance certain ulterior motives or cover up deficiencies in domestic or external policy is no less dangerous than terrorism itself. They concurrently diminish trust, stability and security at regional and international levels.

Resolution of this destructive problem requires a determined avoidance of sensationalism and demagoguery on the one hand, and a concerted international attempt at finding practical measures that are reasonable, objective and realistic in combating terrorism, on the other. More importantly, our collective success requires the non-selective, universal and law-based application of agreed measures by relevant international organizations.

As a country that has suffered immensely from the inhuman phenomenon of terrorism in the post-revolution years, the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to take an active part in any international effort to combat this problem in a serious, comprehensive and principled manner.

3.4. Arresting the Global Social Crisis

Complex and deep-rooted social problems pose a threat to human society at large. Poverty and unemployment, *inter alia*, have presented formidable challenges to social cohesion, prosperity and well-being of the global community. They render --

in these final years of the current century -- concerted actions by states and supported by international organizations indispensable. Poverty induces many social and cultural anomalies and thus its eradication must become vigorously pursued by the international community.

3.4.1. Narcotic Drugs

Narcotic drug abuse and trafficking is perhaps the most disastrous social crisis of our time, and because of its geographic location, the Islamic Republic of Iran is faced with this crisis in a serious manner. Strengthening comprehensive and well-coordinated international action in the fight against illicit drug trafficking has become the undeniably critical and urgent requisite for saving the succeeding generations from the scourge of this evil social menace, and thereby halting the fratricidal wars whose root causes are in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. The Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on narcotic drugs next year is a first step for reinvigorating international cooperation to develop a comprehensive strategy that aims to resolve this social problem.

It is important to take note of the need to strike a balance in strategies to bring both the supply of and demand for illicit drugs under control in this otherwise incomprehensive war against drug. Implementation of international undertakings, particularly those under the 1988 Convention, with a view to providing support and assistance to states in order to maintain the course of the fight against illicit plantation, production and transit of narcotic drugs constitute an absolutely essential factor in international initiatives and programs for drug control. In this context, we strongly support the recent initiatives in combating organized transnational crime including the elaboration of an international convention on the subject.

3.4.2. The Youth

The youth are a significant and large section of the human society. They are the principal assets and the future-builders of our communities. They play an important role in the efforts to achieve national objectives and to draw the social and economic picture of the future. In light of this important role and the particular spirit of the youth, a comprehensive and thorough planning, responsive to the needs and concerns of the youth, is required. Only under such circumstances, one can hope that not only our youth may not succumb to social crises, but also they be an innovating and generating social force serving and benefitting from comprehensive human development.

3.4.3. Status of Women

As one-half of the body of humanity, women have historically been subjected to discrimination, oppression and unfair treatment. Regrettably, the efforts of the international community for defining, codifying and protecting human rights of women have not lead to the rectification of this historical injustice. This is, in part, due to a lack of full appreciation for the lofty and central role of women in the family and the society. This in turn has lead to an increased commercialization of and violence against women.

The mixed outcome of various past international efforts has made it abundantly clear that a new vision for elaboration of principles and strategies geared to protecting the rights of women through enhanced collective efforts -- drawing from the richness of global cultural diversity and enlightened interpretation of divine teachings – is an indispensable imperative for our time. This new vision embodies a common objective of the international community, to create a climate where women fully enjoy their human rights, have access to equal opportunity in all spheres of life including in political and economic arenas, and where women and men alike can responsibly participate in social development

and the overall growth of human society.

Active, enthusiastic and meaningful participation of Iranian women in the family and society found an outstanding climax in their determining participation in the recent presidential election. Benefitting from such enlightened presence and participation of women, Iran is keenly prepared to engage in cooperation and exchange of views with other members of the international community to achieve this human objective.

3.4.4. The Family

As the primary social unit and the very foundation of development and growth of the human society, the institution of family needs to be respected, nourished and maintained in order to enable the society at large to curb social ills and crises. Therefore, we view the family as the very pillar of development in all its aspects, and will spare no effort to advance the special status of this sacrosanct institution. In this context, we are of the view that the international community would be best served to take stock of the experiences of different cultures relative to family, increase international efforts aimed at strengthening the foundation of the family and avoid approaches and practices which have lead to incapacitation of the family in some societies.

3.5. Overcoming Obstacles to Comprehensive Development

Economic and social development buttressed by a supportive and cooperative international environment helps to bring about coherence and integration in the global economy which would, in and of itself, become a catalyst for international solidarity, law-based conduct and above all peace and security at national and international levels. In this context, the process of liberalization and globalization of economy and trade, and the free flow of capital, as well as the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round and subsequently the establishment of the World

Trade Organization can play a fundamental role in regularization of international economy and trade. In practice, however, liberalization and globalization of economy has had serious adverse effects on sustainable and comprehensive development of the states of the South and has further marginalized them.

3.5.1. Rejecting Unilateral Extra-Territorial Measures

Undoubtedly, any unilateral measure with extra-territorial effect robs some countries of the benefits of these processes, prevents the extension of international investment and unhindered commerce, impedes the transfer of technology and results in undermining a full and effective participation by members of the international community in international economic order, and as such violates international law, causes instability and uncertainty in global economy, and consequently ends up further widening the gap between the countries of the North and the South.

The most evident examples of unilateral coercive economic measures are the laws known as D'Amato and Helms-Burton, which were promulgated in the United States for truly baseless reasons against the Islamic Republic of Iran and some other countries. These unilateral measures have been countered with a stem, serious and principled reaction from the international community-- for such unilateral and hostile economic measures are bound to have negative impact on the international efforts for peace, security and development.

Trade relations must be insulated from any influence peddling and self-serving unilateral measure. The international community should take practical steps to overcoming this obstacle, as it invariably impedes a comprehensive and sustainable development.

3.5.2. Protection of the Environment

Environmental pollution and degradation which are

largely attributable to industrial activities of the past few decades constitute an important obstacle to realization and maintenance of global civil society. Countering environmental crises like depletion of ozone layers, air and water pollution, deforestation, climate change and threats against bio-diversity are all contingent upon the fulfilment of legal and historical responsibilities of states.

The responsibility of states for protection of the environment is not equal. Accepted and sound principles like: "common but differentiated responsibility" and "polluters must pay" indicate that industrial countries, which have had the largest share in polluting the environment, must consequently shoulder the principal responsibility for the cleaning up of the prevailing pollution.

It is evident that to expect the countries of the South to take the initiative for protection of the environment without provision of financial resources and transfer of technology is unrealistic and unfair. The Nineteenth Special Session of the General Assembly for the Purpose of an Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of Agenda 21 bears witness to the wide gap that still prevails after five years between the commitments undertaken by the industrial countries in Rio and the degree to which they were implemented .

Believing in the indivisibility of environment and development, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a party to all existing legal instruments and agreements on the environment, and has made a great deal of efforts to carry out the commitments arising from them. Since Iran is faced with one of the most fragile conditions of the environment on the earth, it has allocated, despite limited resources, a considerable degree of human and financial resources to the protection of the environment, and has taken full note of environmental considerations in the development plan of the country.

4. The Role of the United Nations

Resolution of complex international problems, and realization of post-cold war opportunities require participation of all members of the international community, on the basis of the rules and principles of international law, in the decision-making process. The United Nations is the institutional embodiment of both universal participation and the rule of law in a global scale. It is the only universal organization which -- with the help of an efficient and capable system -- can move towards finding solutions to the problems of human society and responding to post-cold war challenges. The magnitude of this task clearly points to the need for improving the efficiency and enhancing the role of the Organization by embarking on transformation and reform in the major bodies, programs and modes of operation of the Organization.

4.1. Secretary-General's Report on Renewing the Organization

I should like to express appreciation for the Secretary-General's efforts to reinvigorate the Organization, and to assure him our earnest desire to cooperate with him in the process of restructuring of the United Nations into a more efficient, capable and reliable institution responsive to the needs and views of all its members. The Secretary-General's report of 16 July of this year, submitted for the consideration of the global community at large, represents the milestone of his valuable efforts concerning the question of reform. This report which is the result of months of intense expert work deserve to be thoroughly studied from different angles. In our opinion, the extensive scope and implications of the measures envisaged in the report make it imperative for the General Assembly to establish working groups to examine the report thoroughly and in detail so as the views of all member states are identified and taken into account.

4.2. Reform of the Security Council

After four years of deliberation, the Open-Ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council has yet to achieve tangible results. There is no doubt that the current composition of the Security Council is far from today's state of international affairs and is not acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the international community. In our opinion, any increase in the membership of the Security Council or reform of its working methods will have to take the true share and concerns of the developing countries into account. At present, these countries do not have an equitable representation in the Council -- a problem and deficiency which needs to be addressed within the framework of equitable representation for all geographical groups in the Security Council. Therefore, proposals that disregard the role and equitable representation of the developing world in the Security Council will not be acceptable to us.

We are fully committed to the decisions of the last Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi, and believe that in order to adapt the Security Council to the realities of our time, its membership should be increased to 26. Under the current circumstances, when there is extensive divergence of views on the expansion of permanent membership -- issues which understandably require further deliberation, it may be prudent to address the increase in the number of non-permanent members as a first step.

By the same token, the reform of the working methods of the Security Council should not be contingent upon conclusion of the question of the increase in the membership of the Council; they are two distinct subjects and thus require two separate decisions. Major shortcomings in the working methods of the Security Council and its decision-making procedures including lack of transparency, and absence of the concerned parties in the relevant deliberations of the Council are issues that need to be seriously considered and appropriately remedied. The veto power is an

unfair and anachronistic privilege, one that is inconsistent with the rule of law or even common sense and with many purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Open-Ended Working Group on the Reform of the Security Council should seriously consider ways to curtail this discriminatory and unreasonable privilege as a first step towards its final elimination.

4.3. Enhancing the Role of the General Assembly

Conclusion of the work of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System is a positive development, and I should like to pay tribute to the former President of the General Assembly and the Bureau of the Working Group. The General Assembly is undoubtedly the highest and most representative organ of the United Nations, where all members of the Organization enjoy equal right to participate. On the basis of this very unique status, the role of the General Assembly in all areas – including international peace and security – must be strengthened. The Assembly should take serious interest in addressing important international issues, putting in place effective mechanisms for implementation of its decisions. The body which comprises the entire membership does certainly have the right and indeed the responsibility to address each and every issue of global concern including in particular international peace and security. The General Assembly ought to avail itself of the right to review and critique the work of other organs and present practical proposals to the Security Council and the Secretary-General. Therefore, in the process of restructuring the United Nations, we need to put into motion strategies which help to achieve this goal. In this context, close contact between the Secretary-General and the Security Council with the General Assembly are necessary. In the final analysis, the United Nations System in its entirety is duty-bound to fully and completely carry out the decisions of the General Assembly.

4.4. Reform of the Secretariat

We share the view of the Secretary-General and that of many member-states about the imperative of reforming the Secretariat. Order and discipline in the Secretariat, avoiding duplication of work and undue bureaucracy and cost-efficiency are necessary in an effective and efficient Secretariat. However, reduction in the number of United Nations employees, particularly as executed in recent years, does not necessarily result in savings or increase efficiency. The restructuring and reform of the Secretariat must take place in a non-discriminatory process, and based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution so as to ensure fair representation of the developing countries in the Secretariat.

4.5. Reform in Economic and Social Fields

The report of the Secretary-General has paid particular attention to the reform of the divisions dealing with economic and social issues. Any kind of change in these divisions will, first and foremost, impact developing countries. Elimination or integration of certain economic institutions of the United Nations would be commendable when and if it aims to avoid duplication. But, no change should take place under pressure from certain industrialized countries, or at the expense of eliminating or undermining the programs and activities concerning development. In fact, restructuring and revitalization should remain fully loyal to the contents of the programs, and no substantive change should be made in them without prior agreement of the member-states. We are convinced that Secretary-General's proposals will embrace success if a balanced approach is struck between economic and social fields on the basis of the interests and views of all countries. Otherwise, were the interests of a group of countries be given priority over that of the rest of the membership, all hopes and interests that the report has engendered would be dashed.

Conclusion: United Nations and Global Civil Society

Expansion and widening of the participatory base of the future global order on the basis of norms acceptable to all cultures and peoples is most conducive for building a better tomorrow, and ensuring freedom, security, stability and sustainable development at national, regional and international levels. The General Assembly, providing all member-states with the opportunity for full and equal participation in decision-making is the most appropriate venue for dialogue, understanding and adoption of coordinated international measures to build a better and a more equitable tomorrow. As the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran assumes its responsibilities, I reiterate the disposition and full preparedness of my Government to take constructive part in this collective endeavor through promoting dialogue, understanding, trust and solidarity.

Annex 9

Statement by H.E. Seyed Mohammad Khatami, Former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the 53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 1998

Statement by H.E. Mohammad Khatami
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
before the 53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
New York, September 21, 1998

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful

The light of human existence has been kindled with man's longing for salvation. The essence of the message of Divine Prophets and the content of the teachings of prominent sages have been primarily aimed at human salvation. Painful in the observable arena of human history is the deprivation and abject misery of human beings; the deprivation of women, men and children enslaved by the whims of the ruling powers; and the ill- fate of rulers, themselves deprived of compassion and sympathy with their own nation. Hence, virtuous rule and good governance has but been evanescent in human history.

Ironically, much too often will and freedom of thought have been frustrated and liberty suffocated in the name of salvation, and much too often salvation has been portrayed as disposing of any and all restraints on the insatiable human desires. Reason and love have thus been sacrificed at the altar of the whim. At times, liberty have been trampled in the name of justice, and yet at other times justice has been obliterated in the name of freedom. The result has been the age old deprivation of humanity from both justice in liberty and liberty in justice.

It is only a few centuries since genuine knowledge was construed as the source of power, rather than an agent of its control. Ever since, knowledge has, instead of serving human salvation and instead of exalting human character, been used as an instrument in the hands of those whose only object was to advance their narrow utilitarian self-interest.

Despite its magnificent progress, humanity has suffered massively over these centuries from discrimination and anguish. Survivors are still among us who testify to the incalculable destruction caused by the two World Wars ... and ... despite the birth of the United Nations - a positive achievement for mankind - true peace based on justice still remains a scarcity.

Particularly desperate is the situation of the countries in the underdeveloped world, where so many still suffer from famine, illiteracy and disease and some remain at the mercy of rulers who do not even take the trouble of pretending respect for democratic standards or enjoying popular support. So often do they attempt to fill the absence of popular support by dependence on powers, whose sole purpose is the pursuit of domination and self interest.

Oppressive and dependent governments deny their people the opportunity to experience democracy. By perpetuating intimidation and terror in the society, they promote a culture of violence, which inadvertently leads their opponents to resort to the same. Powers that breed and nurture such regimes could therefore not escape blame. Primarily responsible here, are those powers whose intelligence services take pride in their dark record of overthrowing popular governments and supporting unpopular ones.

This image of our world is indeed grim and repulsive. Until the day that the wise and the learned wrest the reins of power from the unwise and the capricious, this image can not, all at once, be transformed.

Nonetheless, in my opinion, beyond the darkness and doom, genuine beauty can still be discerned in the deeper layers of history. And, I can assert with certitude that, on the whole, human life has blossomed spiritually and materially.

Anti-colonial struggles and independence movements of many nations in this century exemplify this blossoming and progress. The collapse of the bipolar world order in the final decade of this century, and the swift march of the world towards diversity coupled with renewed assertion of identity in the international arena by nations demanding equality are other significant achievements in this direction.

The fantasy of a unipolar world ruled by a single super-power is but an illusion, indicating the failure of its holders to keep pace with history. And, I am confident, that powerful nations, such as the American people, will not accept that their good name, potentials and national prestige be exploited for the advancement of the dream of a uni-polar world by the politicians, motivated by the short-sighted material and factional interests of a few. The evolution of public opinion in the West in support of peaceful relations on the basis of mutual respect testifies to this assertion.
And now, Mr. President and Distinguished Participants,

Allow me to speak here as a man from the East, the origin of brilliant civilizations and the birth place of Divine Prophets - - Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammad (peace be upon them all).
I come from the noble land of Iran, representing a great and renowned nation, famous for its age old civilization as well as its distinguished contribution to the founding and expansion of the Islamic civilization; a nation that has survived the strong winds of despotism, reactionism and submission, relying on its cultural and human wealth; a nation which pioneered in the East the establishment of civil society and constitutional government in the course of its contemporary history, even though as a result of foreign interference and domestic deficiencies, at times it may have faltered in its course; a nation which has been at the forefront of the struggle for independence and against colonialism, though its national movement was subverted by a foreign- orchestrated coup. And, a nation which carries the torch of its popular revolution, not won by force of arms or a coup, but by dethroning of the regime of coup d'etat through the power of "word" and "enlightenment". In the course of its new experience, our nation has endured eight years of an imposed war, pressure, sanctions and various allegations. It has also fallen victim to terrorism, this ominous and sinister phenomenon of the twentieth century.

And today, the Iranian nation draws on its past to contemplate a better tomorrow while defying reactionary tendencies and, backed by principles and ideals rooted in its religious, national, historical and revolutionary heritage, and benefitting from positive achievements of contemporary civilization, marches, through trial and error, towards a promising future.

The Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people was a revolt of reason against coercion and suppression. Certainly, a revolution which resorted to logic in the phase of destruction is much better disposed to resort to dialogue and reason in the phase of construction. Hence, it calls for a dialogue among civilizations and cultures instead of a clash between them.

From this rostrum and the pulpit of the United Nations, I announce that humanity, despite all calamities and hardship, is heading towards emancipation and liberty. This is the unalterable Devine providence and human destiny. And the malice and depravity of no individual can ever violate Divine providence and the course of history.

Mr. President,

The word "history" predates "philosophy" and man is the pillar of history. History itself is the reflection of the light of Being upon various facets and dimensions of human existence. Thus, it is a unique and universal entity, albeit diverse in nature. Whenever, this unique entity takes on a new guise, a new era is ushered. Our assessment of history indeed emanates from our perception of humanity - its pivot and pillar.

Human beings, who in Saadi's eloquent description borrowed from a saying of the holy Prophet of Islam, are various organs of the same body, are outside the reach of biology or psychology. Understanding human beings requires a philosophical and reflective view of man and its history.

Since "God created man with His Own Hand," and in "His Own Image," and since He breathed into him of "His Own Spirit," humanity is but a single entity, and so is human history. The "Hand of God" granted humankind history, will and freedom of choice; the "image of God" provided him culture, spirituality and liberty; and the spirit of God bestowed upon him life and vitality. And thus, human beings have come to posses history, culture and liberty.

Not only do all human beings originate from the one and the same origin and share a continuous and integrated history, but also one may further postulate a single end or telos: the telos of history is none other than spiritual culture and its requisite of genuine human liberty.

Whether or not one subscribes to the view that man is doomed to whirl in iterative historical cycles, or to grapple with historical moments or epochs; and whether or not one holds history to be self-driven, or driven by human urges, or by modes of production, or by superhuman heroes, all can agree that it is only the ever-inspiring fountain of faith that breaks every old and new shackle from humanity and arrests the iterative eternal cycle, and eventually emancipates humankind from the bounds of historical determination; just as it is only the vivifying breeze of liberty that can offer faith and spirituality to humanity. It is thus that he can serenade that "the universe I shall not abide if not abiding me," or that "...whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass.."

Through such an understanding of freedom, the tenets of human dignity can be upheld in the face of political domination and virtue and hope against baneful blasts of despair and nihilism. Here, one can discern the trajectory of history towards liberty.

The history of humankind is the history of liberty. Only that interpretation which describes history as the arena for manifestation of liberty can provide an opening of the past for the benefit of mankind. Regardless of all philosophical systems that have attempted to attribute meanings, directions and laws of evolution to history, we can realize that because human history is intertwined with the history of liberty, when human beings are liberated from imposed constraints of exploitation and social enslavement as well as from unrefined animal instincts as violence and savagery, they will then side with truth and justice in line with their human nature. Thence, human history shall become the glorious history of Truth and realization of justice. And this could be another expression of the famous religious doctrine of Messianism.

Whether we embark on an empirical and inductive study of history or an intuitive one, most thinkers would agree that the essence of humanity has flourished and that more veils of ignorance have been removed from the minds of human beings.

I have deliberately used the word "flourish" instead of the more common terms, such as "historical progress", in order to emphasize that regardless of any school of philosophy of history we may follow, we can still share an understanding of this general and universal conception of history.

The establishment and continued functioning of the United Nations is a testament to the progressive path of the world and of human society. The fact that today it does not require much argument to establish that instead of war and bloodshed, one could, and indeed ought to, resort to discourse and dialogue, has not been achieved easily. As if the blood-stained history of humanity forms an antecedent to this seemingly simple proposition.

Yet, so long as imprudent potentates can obliterate flowers and trees, laughter and hope from the face of the earth with a quick stroke of their folly and cruelty, it is premature to celebrate the ultimate triumph of the Logos over the sword.

The twentieth century did not only witness the manifestations of violence and human sufferings at the hands of old colonialists and the unprecedented injustice of their modern inheritors, but it was also the century of the rise and fall of totalitarian regimes. Let us hope that in the coming century resort to force and violence shall not be glorified, and the essence of political power be compassion and justice, externally manifested in dialogue between civilizations.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The question is how the United Nations may undertake the necessary measures to respond to this evolving global climate, and what impact it will have on the changing course of the life of mankind longing for salvation.

I would like to propose, in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that the United Nations, as a first step, designate the year 2001 as the "Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations," with the earnest hope that through such a dialogue, the realization of universal justice and liberty may be initiated.

Among the worthiest achievements of this century is the acceptance of the necessity and significance of dialogue and rejection of force, promotion of understanding in cultural, economic and political fields, and strengthening of the foundations of liberty, justice and human rights. Establishment and enhancement of civility, whether at national or international level, is contingent upon dialogue among societies and civilizations representing various views, inclinations and approaches. If humanity at the threshold of the new century and millennium devotes all efforts to institutionalize dialogue, replacing hostility and confrontation with discourse and understanding, it would leave an invaluable legacy for the benefit of the future generations.

Similarly, it is necessary that as members of the United Nations, we revisit the history of the formation of this Organization with a view to reforming and improving the institution through a rational exchange of views.

The United Nations took shape in a dark era of human history, when many of its current members were still experiencing the bitter and abominable conditions of colonial rule. As a consequence, the new Organization reflected the domination of the powerful few. Things have changed now, and the opportunity has presented itself to restructure this Organization, particularly its Security Council. Here, I would like to refer to the wise words of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his inaugural address to the Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference in Tehran that the Islamic countries representing one billion and several hundred million people should acquire a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council with the same privileges as long as they are enjoyed by current Permanent Members.

The time has come to reject, through understanding, the discriminatory veto privilege, and in so doing take another step towards the recognition of fair and equal rights of all member states.

Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates,

Let us all join hands in solidarity against genocide, aggression and the humiliation of mankind in various corners of the world. Let us prevent the continuation of shameful tragedies which have tarnished the face of this century in Palestine, Afghanistan, Kosovo and in many other parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Peace and security in the Middle East, imperative as they are, will be established only through the recognition of the right of all Palestinians to exercise sovereignty over their ancestral homeland. The presently occupied Al-Quds Al-Sharif ought to be the house of dialogue and understanding. Resonating from the depth of history, its voice speaks intrinsically against racism and Zionism. Great monotheistic religions can live peacefully together in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, but it is the very Israeli rule that has made such a co-existence impossible. Palestine is the home of all Palestinians - Muslims, Christians and Jews - and not the laboratory for the violent whims of Zionists.

In Afghanistan, there is no military solution to that country's predicament. Universal outrage at massacre and genocide being perpetrated there, particularly the tragic killing of Iranian diplomats and journalist as well as at the continued captivity of the Iranian aid workers in the hands of the Taliban, call for sober analysis and expeditious action to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice.

Afghanistan, the land of people of dignity and culture, has now been turned into a haven for violence, terrorism and production and trafficking in narcotics. The Afghan people, as other peoples in the world, have the inalienable right to determine their own destiny, and have the right to enjoy a broad-based government representing all ethnic groups, communities and tendencies in that country. This is the only way to restore tranquility in Afghanistan. This requires resolute international cooperation in order to inhibit the lucrative and deadly business of production and smuggling of narcotics, illicit trafficking in

weapons and cultivation of terrorism. The United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and concerned states, should bring all the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table, paving the way for the tyrannized and destitute Afghan people to freely determine their own destiny, and backed by solemn global support, bring the rogue elements into compliance with the will of the international community. It should simultaneously engage in planning for the mobilization of requisite international assistance for reconstruction of Afghanistan once the necessary political conditions are in place.

In Kosovo, the legitimate rights of the embattled people in this province should be recognized and the Yugoslav Government should be made to respect these rights.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Honest and sincere efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism, constitute another important priority for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Terrorism is a product of desperation and nihilism. In a world swirling in the orbit of violence and oppression, serious combat against terrorism will not advance beyond the realm of words and slogans. Eradication of terrorism must be concurrent with a global search for justice. This assertion should in no way be interpreted as a justification for any form of terrorism. We unequivocally oppose, as required by our religious, moral and cultural values and norms, all forms and manifestations of terrorism and we shall combat it vigorously and earnestly. In our view, in order to eradicate this menace, we should engage in a serious and transparent international cooperation to combat terrorism, and at the same time redouble our efforts to attain the objective of global justice.

At the threshold of the third millennium, the world also needs to be liberated from the nightmare of nuclear war and weapons of mass destruction. Recent nuclear tests in our region, which have led to further complications, make such a necessity all the more imperative. We should all realize that the idea of attaining security through the acquisition of such armaments is nothing but an illusion. The manifestation of a resolute global determination to eliminate all existing arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, within an agreed time frame, would render clarity of objective, lend credence and add dynamism to the international efforts against the production and proliferation of these deadly weapons. The establishment of zones free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, constitutes an appropriate first step in alleviating tension and mistrust emanating from these weapons. We, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the victims of the use of weapons of mass destruction, are cognizant, more than anybody else, of their horrifying impact. We shall thus stay in the forefront of international efforts to establish and strengthen universal arrangements for their destruction.

Security, development and prosperity in the Third World require the promotion of cooperation and the utilization of proven arrangements and mechanisms for confidence-building. In this regard, it is encouraging that the Eighth Islamic Summit Conference in Tehran, cognizant of this necessity, established an appropriate mechanism to foster confidence through dialogue among Islamic countries.

As a first step in this direction, I invite our neighbors in the Persian Gulf region - who have witnessed two destructive wars in the span of one decade - to establish a security and cooperation system in the area.

In short, confidence and peace cannot be attained without a sober revision of the mentality of the Cold War. The advancement and promotion of culture of peace is contingent upon the recognition of the constructive role of nations coupled with avoidance of domination, unilateralism, confrontation and exclusion.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, in keeping with its fundamental beliefs and deep-rooted civilizational heritage, seeks a world blessed with peace and tranquility based on human dignity. It has accorded removal of tension the highest priority in its foreign policy. In line with the principles of the Islamic Revolution, Iran is determined to follow its balanced policy of expansion of relations with its neighbors and other countries on the basis of respect for independence and equality of rights.

Comprehensive peace, over and above peace among human beings, also calls for peace between mankind and nature, which in turn, requires that mankind brings to a halt the systematic devouring of nature and instead emphasizes the coordination of man and nature. The preservation of the environment, as the common natural heritage of mankind, constitutes a most important priority of the coming century.

Before concluding, I would like to emphasize the paramount role of the family, women and youth in the making of a better tomorrow and the consolidation of the foundations of the civil society throughout the globe.

The family is the unique setting for human progress and development of personal and social identity of individuals. Regrettably today, specially in the industrialized countries, the foundations of home and family have been undermined, threatening the emotional, material and spiritual health of human life. A global effort is required to confront this danger, lest the flames of this center of warmth, affection and education be gradually dimmed by the cold and vicious winds of luring facades, lust and material gain.

Efforts at the global level geared to the promotion and strengthening of respect for women and their rights require a critical reassessment of the traditional and inappropriate views about women. The traditional outlook, based on the erroneous notion of superiority of men over women, does injustice to men, women and humanity as a whole; equally nefarious is the view that disregards the differences between men and women. We should recognize that both men and women are valuable components of humanity that equally possess the potential for intellectual, social, cultural and political development, and that comprehensive and sustainable development is only possible through the active participation of both men and women in social life.

At the threshold of the new millennium, the United Nations should have faith in the new generation, to whom the next century belongs. It should thus be prepared to accept and embrace the requirements of believing in the youth. Let us bring ourselves to accept that we are not custodians of the youth and that the young do have the right to enjoy the social process of growth and development; a right they should exercise consciously and willfully.

With such a new perspective, and drawing upon the dynamic ability and intellectual capability of the new generation, we, together, can chart a much better and brighter future for the next century.

I thank you for your attention.

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Annex 10

Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rohani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Sixty-Eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2013

Islamic Republic of
I R A N
Permanent Mission to the United Nations

(Please check against delivery)

Statement by

H. E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani

President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

at the

Sixty-eight Session of the
United Nations General Assembly

(New York, 24 September 2013)

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds. Blessing and Peace be upon our Prophet Mohammad and his kin and companions.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the outset, I would like to offer my most sincere felicitations on your deserved election to the presidency of the General Assembly and seize the moment to express appreciation for the valuable efforts of our distinguished Secretary-General.

Our world today is replete with fear and hope; fear of war and hostile regional and global relations; fear of deadly confrontation of religious, ethnic and national identities; fear of institutionalization of violence and extremism; fear of poverty and destructive discrimination; fear of decay and destruction of life-sustaining resources; fear of disregard for human dignity and rights; and fear of neglect of morality. Alongside these fears, however, there are new hopes; the hope of universal acceptance by the people and the elite all across the globe of "yes to peace and no to war"; and the hope of preference of dialogue over conflict, and moderation over extremism.

The recent elections in Iran represent a clear, living example of the wise choice of hope, rationality and moderation by the great people of Iran. The realization of democracy consistent with religion and the peaceful transfer of executive power manifested that Iran is the anchor of stability in an otherwise ocean of regional instabilities. The firm belief of our people and government in enduring peace, stability, tranquility, peaceful resolution of disputes and reliance on the ballot box as the basis of power, public acceptance and legitimacy, has indeed played a key role in creating such a safe environment.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The current critical period of transition in international relations is replete with dangers, albeit with unique opportunities. Any miscalculation of one's position, and of course, of others, will bear historic damages; a mistake by one actor will have negative impact on all others. Vulnerability is now a global and indivisible phenomenon.

At this sensitive juncture in the history global relations, the age of zero-sum games is

over, even though a few actors still tend to rely on archaic and deeply ineffective ways and means to preserve their old superiority and domination. Militarism and the recourse to violent and military means to subjugate others are failed examples of the perpetuation of old ways in new circumstances.

Coercive economic and military policies and practices geared to the maintenance and preservation of old superiorities and dominations have been pursued in a conceptual mindset that negates peace, security, human dignity, and exalted human ideals. Ignoring differences between societies and globalizing Western values as universal ones represent another manifestation of this conceptual mindset. Yet another reflection of the same cognitive model is the persistence of Cold War mentality and bi-polar division of the world into "superior us" and "inferior others." Fanning fear and phobia around the emergence of new actors on the world scene is another.

In such an environment, governmental and non-governmental, religious, ethnic, and even racial violence has increased, and there is no guarantee that the era of quiet among big powers will remain immune from such violent discourses, practices and actions. The catastrophic impact of violent and extremist narratives should not – in fact, must not – be underestimated.

In this context, the strategic violence, which is manifested in the efforts to deprive regional players from their natural domain of action, containment policies, regime change from outside, and the efforts towards redrawing of political borders and frontiers, is extremely dangerous and provocative.

The prevalent international political discourse depicts a civilized center surrounded by un-civilized peripheries. In this picture, the relation between the center of world power and the peripheries is hegemonic. The discourse assigning the North the center stage and relegating the South to the periphery has led to the establishment of a monologue at the level of international relations. The creation of illusory identity distinctions and the current prevalent violent forms of xenophobia are the inevitable outcome of such a discourse. Propagandistic and unfounded faith-phobic, Islamo-phobic, Shia-phobic, and Iran-phobic discourses do indeed represent serious threats against world peace and human security.

This propagandistic discourse has assumed dangerous proportions through portrayal and inculcation of presumed imaginary threats. One such imaginary threat is the so-called "Iranian threat" –which has been employed as an excuse to justify a long catalogue of crimes and catastrophic practices over the past three decades. The arming of the Saddam Hussein regime with chemical weapons and supporting the Taliban and Al-Qaida are just two examples of such catastrophes. Let me say this in all sincerity before this august world assembly, that based on irrefutable evidence, those who harp on the so-called threat of Iran are either a threat against international peace and security themselves or promote such a threat. Iran poses absolutely no threat to the world or the region. In Fact, in ideals as well as in actual practice, my country has been a harbinger of just peace and comprehensive security.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Nowhere in the world has violence been so deadly and destructive as in North Africa and West Asia. Military intervention in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein's imposed war against Iran, occupation of Kuwait, military interventions against Iraq, brutal repression of the Palestinian people, assassination of common people and political figures in Iran, and terrorist bombings in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon are examples of violence in this region in the last three decades.

What has been – and continues to be – practiced against the innocent people of Palestine is nothing less than structural violence. Palestine is under occupation; the basic rights of the Palestinians are tragically violated, and they are deprived of the right of return and access to their homes, birthplace and homeland. Apartheid as a concept can hardly describe the crimes and the institutionalized aggression against the innocent Palestinian people.

The human tragedy in Syria represents a painful example of catastrophic spread of violence and extremism in our region. From the very outset of the crisis and when some regional and international actors helped to militarize the situation through infusion of arms and intelligence into the country and active support of extremist groups, we emphasized that there was no military solution to the Syrian crisis. Pursuit of expansionist strategies and objectives and attempts to change the regional balance through proxies cannot be camouflaged behind humanitarian rhetoric. The common objective of the international community should be a quick end to the killing of the innocent. While condemning any use of chemical weapons, we welcome Syria's acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and believe that the access by extremist terrorist groups to such weapons is the greatest danger to the region that must be considered in any disarmament plan. Simultaneously, I should underline that illegitimate and ineffective threat to use or the actual use of force will only lead to further exacerbation of violence and crisis in the region.

Terrorism and the killing of innocent people represent the ultimate inhumanity of extremism and violence. Terrorism is a violent scourge and knows no country or national borders. But, the violence and extreme actions such as the use of drones against innocent people in the name of combating terrorism should also be condemned. Here, I should also say a word about the criminal assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. For what crimes have they been assassinated? The United Nations and the Security Council should answer the question: have the perpetrators been condemned?

Unjust sanctions, as manifestation of structural violence, are intrinsically inhumane and against peace. And contrary to the claims of those who pursue and impose them, it is not the states and the political elite that are targeted, but rather, it is the common people who are victimized by these sanctions. Let us not forget millions of Iraqis who, as a result of sanctions covered in international legal jargon, suffered and lost their lives, and many more who continue

to suffer all through their lives. These sanctions are violent, pure and simple; whether called smart or otherwise, unilateral or multilateral. These sanctions violate inalienable human rights, inter alia, the right to peace, right to development, right to access to health and education, and above all, the right to life. Sanctions, beyond any and all rhetoric, cause belligerence, warmongering and human suffering. It should be borne in mind, however, that the negative impact is not merely limited to the intended victims of sanctions; it also affects the economy and livelihood of other countries and societies, including the countries imposing sanctions.

Mr. President, Excellencies,

Violence and extremism nowadays have gone beyond the physical realm and have unfortunately afflicted and tarnished the mental and spiritual dimensions of life in human societies. Violence and extremism leave no space for understanding and moderation as the necessary foundations of collective life of human beings and the modern society. Intolerance is the predicament of our time. We need to promote and reinforce tolerance in light of the religious teachings and appropriate cultural and political approaches. The human society should be elevated from a state of mere tolerance to that of collective collaboration. We should not just tolerate others. We should rise above mere tolerance and dare to work together.

People all over the world are tired of war, violence and extremism. They hope for a change in the status quo. And this is a unique opportunity – for us all. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all challenges can be managed – successfully - through a smart, judicious blend of hope and moderation. Warmongers are bent on extinguishing all hope. But hope for change for the better is an innate, religious, widespread, and universal concept.

Hope is founded on the belief in the universal will of the people across the globe to combat violence and extremism, to cherish change, to oppose imposed structures, to value choice, and to act in accordance with human responsibility. Hope is no doubt one of the greatest gifts bestowed upon human beings by their All-Loving Creator. And moderation is to think and move in a wise, judicious manner, conscious of the time and the space, and to align exalted ideals with choice of effective strategies and policies, while cognizant of objective realities.

The Iranian people, in a judiciously sober choice in the recent elections, voted for the discourse of hope, foresight and prudent moderation – both at home and abroad. In foreign policy, the combination of these elements means that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regional power, will act responsibly with regard to regional and international security, and is willing and prepared to cooperate in these fields, bilaterally as well as multilaterally, with other responsible actors. We defend peace based on democracy and the ballot box everywhere, including in Syria, Bahrain, and other countries in the region, and believe that there are no violent solutions to world crises. The bitter and ugly realities of the human society can only be overcome through recourse to and reliance on human wisdom, interaction and moderation. Securing peace and democracy and ensuring the legitimate rights of all countries in the world, including in the Middle East,

cannot – and will not – be realized through militarism.

Iran seeks to resolve problems, not to create them. There is no issue or dossier that cannot be resolved through reliance on hope and prudent moderation, mutual respect, and rejection of violence and extremism. Iran's nuclear dossier is a case in point. As clearly stated by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, acceptance of the inalienable right of Iran constitutes the best and the easiest way of resolving this issue. This is not political rhetoric. Rather, it is based on a profound recognition of the state of technology in Iran, global political environment, the end of the era of zero-sum games, and the imperative of seeking common objectives and interests towards reaching common understanding and shared security. Put otherwise, Iran and other actors should pursue two common objectives as two mutually inseparable parts of a political solution for the nuclear dossier of Iran.

1- Iran's nuclear program – and for that matter, that of all other countries – must pursue exclusively peaceful purposes. I declare here, openly and unambiguously, that, notwithstanding the positions of others, this has been, and will always be, the objective of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear weapon and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's security and defense doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions. Our national interests make it imperative that we remove any and all reasonable concerns about Iran's peaceful nuclear program.

2- The second objective, that is, acceptance of and respect for the implementation of the right to enrichment inside Iran and enjoyment of other related nuclear rights, provides the only path towards achieving the first objective. Nuclear knowledge in Iran has been domesticated now and the nuclear technology, inclusive of enrichment, has already reached industrial scale. It is, therefore, an illusion, and extremely unrealistic, to presume that the peaceful nature of the nuclear program of Iran could be ensured through impeding the program via illegitimate pressures.

In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran, insisting on the implementation of its rights and the imperative of international respect and cooperation in this exercise, is prepared to engage immediately in time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and removal of mutual uncertainties with full transparency.

Iran seeks constructive engagement with other countries based on mutual respect and common interest, and within the same framework does not seek to increase tensions with the United States. I listened carefully to the statement made by President Obama today at the General Assembly. Commensurate with the political will of the leadership in the United States and hoping that they will refrain from following the short-sighted interest of warmongering pressure groups, we can arrive at a framework to manage our differences. To this end, equal

footing, mutual respect, and the recognized principles of international law should govern the interactions. Of course, we expect to hear a consistent voice from Washington.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In recent years, a dominant voice has been repeatedly heard: "The military option is on the table." Against the backdrop of this illegal and ineffective contention, let me say loud and clear that "peace is within reach." So, in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran I propose, as a starting step, the consideration by the United Nations of the project: "the World Against Violence and Extremism." (WAVE) Let us all join this "WAVE." I invite all states, international organizations and civil institutions to undertake a new effort to guide the world in this direction. We should start thinking about "Coalition for Enduing Peace" all across the globe instead of the ineffective "Coalitions for War" in various parts of the world.

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran invites you and the entire world community to take a step forward; an invitation to join the WAVE: World Against Violence and Extremism. We should accept and be able to open a new horizon in which peace will prevail over war, tolerance over violence, progress over bloodletting, justice over discrimination, prosperity over poverty, and freedom over despotism. As beautifully said by Ferdowsi, the renowned Iranian epic poet:

Be relentless in striving for the cause of Good
Bring the spring, you must, Banish the winter, you should.

Notwithstanding all difficulties and challenges, I am deeply optimistic about the future. I have no doubt that the future will be bright with the entire world solidly rejecting violence and extremism. Prudent moderation will ensure a bright future for the world. My hope, aside from personal and national experience, emanates from the belief shared by all divine religions that a good and bright future awaits the world. As stated in the Holy Qur'an:

> And We proclaimed in the Psalms, after We had proclaimed in the Torah, that My virtuous servants will inherit the earth. (21:105)

Thank you Mr. President

Annex 11

K. Timmerman, "Europe's Arms Pipeline to Iran", *The Nation*, Vol. 245, 18 July 1987

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InterNation is an international consortium of publications, drawing on a global network of journalists, which will on a regular, simultaneous basis publish investigative stones on subjects that cross national boundaries. (This is the second InterNation article to appear in The Nation; the first, "The Heritage Foundation Goes Abroad," appeared in the June 6 issue.)

Kenneth R. **Timmerman** is associate editor in Paris for the Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, and is completing a book about arms sales to **Iran** and Iraq.

The war in the Persian Gulf has produced the biggest arms bazaar in the history of the world. Some thirty-three countries currently sell arms to Iraq and **Iran,** most of them to both belligerents at once. Over the past year, discreet investigations in several European countries have turned up evidence of complicity between government officials and defense contractors to break arms export laws and defy parliamentary controls in an effort to maintain the clandestine arms pipeline. Says Karl-Erik Schmitz, a Swede who runs the Scandinavia Commodities Corporation and who has become a major player in the international black market, "There are only two big consumers of munitions in the world today: **Iran** and Iraq."

Part of this multibillion-dollar underground trade has been orchestrated by an international cartel involving at least thirteen manufacturers who pooled their resources and jointly fixed prices on munitions and military explosives, making immense profits from keeping the gulf war alive. In another case, missiles from NATO storehouses in West Germany were diverted to Belgium for sale to **Iran.**

The major offenders are France and Britain. Beyond the lure of windfall profits and the need for new arms-export markets, those two nations are hoping to step into a power vacuum created by the weakened U.S. strategic position in the region, and they have used arms sales to both belligerents as a means of creating influence for years to come.

But it is on sales to **Iran** that profits have been the highest-with markups of up to ten times the normal price. This is an unexpected side effect of the U.S. embargo on arms sales to **Iran,** first imposed during the 1979 hostage crisis and reconfirmed by the incoming Reagan Administration in January 1981.

To evade the embargo, **Iran** sent hordes of agents around the world in search of new weapons and vital spare parts for U.S.-made arms. Their search was particularly fruitful in Israel, which, for strategic reasons, to assure the safety of Iranian Jews and to bolster its own arms industry, has sold **Iran** as much as $ 500 million worth of modern weapons per year. **Iran** was also successful in Europe, where many countries produce U.S. weapons under license.

It was to halt that illicit flow of U.S. arms to **Iran** that Operation Staunch, as it has come to be known, was launched by the Reagan Administration in 1983. Ambassador at Large Richard Fairbanks made the rounds of U.S. friends and allies abroad, cajoling them to stop arms sales to **Iran,** at times obliquely threatening to terminate licensing agreements that permitted them to manufacture U.S. arms if they refused.

With a few notable exceptions, Fairbanks's attempts to prevent high-technology weapons systems and spare parts from reaching **Iran** produced results. In 1984, for example, Fairbanks succeeded in convincing the Italian firm Agusta Bell not to supply **Iran** with Chinook helicopters it made under U.S. license. "It might not have been a 100 percent success," Fairbanks acknowledged"but we definitely managed to stop most major weapons systems from reaching **Iran** from U.S. allies. By the time I returned toprivate law practice in September 1985, **Iran's** major suppliers were almost all Soviet bloc countries."

But Fairbanks and his team encountered difficulties when they tried to tackle the black market. Those difficulties turned into a stone wall when allied governments were themselves involved. "There are ways of keeping these things so quiet they never come out," explained Hamilton Spence, managing director for the privately owned British firm Interarms. "There are very few private individuals acting on their own account. It is nearly all down to governments." Britain, for example, still hosts an official Iranian weapons-purchasing mission in London-the Islamic Air Force Logistics Office and has never ceased direct export of "nonlethal" war materiel to **Iran,** such as tank engines, spare parts and even naval assault landing craft.

Spain and Portugal were among the biggest problems for Fairbanks, and they remained impervious to Operation Staunch as long as Washington lacked the political will to back up Fairbanks's threats. Helping Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez through the difficult referendum on Spain's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was of greater strategic importance to the United States than stopping the $ 280 million in Spanish arms deliveries to **Iran** that occurred between 1983 and 1985. Besides, most of the Spanish and Portuguese deliveries involved the day-today hardware of war and, as Fairbanks explained, "We figured there was no way in the world to stop **Iran** from getting artillery shells, bullets, bombs and weapons like that." The Portuguese, meanwhile, were already beginning to assist the National Security Council's contra supply operation-through various proprietary companies run by retired Maj. Gen. Richard Secord-and continued to sell arms to **Iran.**

After Fairbanks's resignation in August 1985, the Western arms embargo of **Iran** collapsed: Operation Staunch was relegated to the diplomatic cupboard and the White House authorized the first deliveries of U.S. arms from Israel to **Iran,** which left Israel on August 30 and September 14. "It might have started as I was clearing out my desk," Fairbanks said, "but I didn't know about it."

Today all the NATO countries, as well as Sweden and Switzerland, are selling arms to **Iran** or are lubricating the deals through shipping or financing. Although Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Marion Creekmore said recently in Paris that Operation Staunch is being reinvigorated in the wake of the **Iran/**contra scandal, all indications are that the arms bonanza will continue well into the future.

Karl-Erik Schmitz, one of **Iran's** most capable arms brokers, has masterminded deals for **Iran** worth an estimated $ 600 million from his base in southern Sweden. Schmitz had conducted business with the Shah for more than twenty years, and **Iran's** Defense Minister turned to him for help in 1983. Swedish investigators, who interrogated Schmitz at length, agreed that he seemed an unlikely figure to be running a sophisticated black market arms operation. "He was handsome, a family man, extremely polite," they said"Certainly, not the type of person you would imagine dealing in weapons. " When asked by a Swedish reporter whether he had any regrets about selling arms to be used in the gulf war, Schmitz replied blandly: "The powder factories must be kept going. What else would the workers do?"

But Schmitz is also cunning and cynical, and according to Swedish customs investigators he has used every trick in the black marketeer's book. To help his Danish-registered freighters loaded with gunpowder for **Iran** to avoid the scrutiny of Egyptian authorities while passing through the Suez Canal, he produced fake documents showing the ships were bound for Kenya. He sold gunpowder from Sweden, Holland and West Germany to Yugoslavia, then bought it back and resold it to **Iran.** He faked end-use certificates from Pakistan and bills of lading. He shipped gunpowder across national borders to be packed into shells and bombs,which obscured the origin and ultimate destination of the shipment. One of Schmitz's munitions deals, for which this reporter saw pro forma invoices and other documents, was worth a whopping $ 150 million. And Schmitz was involved in dozens of deals. Although Scandinavia Commodities Corporation was based in the port of Malmo, he was a world-class operator.

To meet **Iran's** voracious demand for artillery shells, Schmitz first turned to South Africa, whose munitions plants supplied him with the equivalent of 3,700 tons of gunpowder. But in June 1984 Pretoria cut off the supply without explanation. In fact, South Africa's state-owned Armaments Corporation had just signed a top-secret $ 400 million contract to supply Iraq with long-range artillery pieces. One of Iraq's conditions for the deal was an immediate end to South Africa's munitions deliveries to **Iran.**

To make up the shortfall, Schmitz appealed to a little-known cartel of European munitions makers that had grown out of an innocent-seeming trade organization, the European Association for the Study of Safety Problems in the Production of Propellant Powder (EASSP), which was formed in Brussels in 1975. According to a representative of the society based in Paris, the group was intended to be a forum to share information on safety problems in chemical plants and international customs and transportation regulations on explosives.

When the gulf war broke out, EASSP became a convenient cover for a cartel whose sole purpose became supplying **Iran** and Iraq with munitions. The cartel's core group of thirteen companies included Europe's largest producers of military gunpowder: Nobel Chemie in Sweden, PRB in Belgium, SNPE in France, Nobel Explosives in Scotland, Muiden Chemie in Holland, Forcit and Kemira in Finland, Rio Tinto in Italy, SniaBPD in Italy, Vinnis in Switzerland and Vass A.G. in West Germany.

"Cartel members in Sweden, France, Holland and Belgium would meet regularly to eat and drink together and plan how they would keep **Iran** and Iraq supplied with munitions," a Swedish customs official explained. "They knew that no single company would produce enough gunpowder to meet the enormous demand, without raising production quotas and attracting attention. So they decided to spread the work around."

During those long business lunches in Paris, Madrid, Geneva and Belgium, cartel members would sit down and divide the monthly gunpowder requirements of **Iran** and Iraq among themselves. Western intelligence specialists estimate that during the months of intense fighting, Iraq and **Iran** each fired nearly a half-million heavy artillery shells. That's more than ten times the yearly consumption of most major European armies. And EASSP members were supplying all of it.

The cartel was first cracked in November 1984, when Swedish customs agents raided the headquarters of Nobel Chemie after getting wind of a suspicious gunpowder shipment that had crossed West Germany on its way to Syria and **Iran** the previous month. "We found lots of correspondence between Nobel and **Iran,**" one investigator said. "So we made another raid, and discovered a real mess." The association was next surprised in action in December 1985, when Swedish customs officials intercepted a twenty-six-ton shipment of Nobel Chemie gunpowder en route from the port of Trelleborg to East Germany and **Iran.**

The customs investigators were not empowered to stop the cartel's agent, Schmitz, from engaging in black market arms smuggling. Indeed, once Swedish customs officials quietly put a stop to Swedish gunpowder deliveries to **Iran** in 1986, "Schmitz went to every corner of Europe and elsewhere desperately seeking new suppliers," one investigator said.

"He went to Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece and especially Israel. He had to continue those deals to avoid financial ruin, because he had posted performance bonds for 5 to 10 percent of the total value of his contracts."

Schmitz himself remains unperturbed by the customs investigations, even though he faces criminal prosecution. In a recent interview with the Stockholm daily Expressen, Schmitz declared his intention to continue doing business. "After all," he explained, "there are so many things you can sell to the Iranians."

Schmitz's sentiment was shared by Sweden's largest arms manufacturer, Bofors, a subsidiary of Nobel Industries Sweden A.B., maker of the RBS-70, a highly sophisticated ground-to-air missile. The RBS-70 contributed to Iraqi losses of forty-five aircraft during the Iranian offensives of January and February. Sources in Washington said the Iranians had become so confident in handling the Swedish missile that they brought i"right up to the front lines."

Although neutral Sweden forbids arms sales to countries at war or in "zones of conflict," since 1978 the largest Swedish arms exporters have used fake end-use certificates and falsified shipping documents to sell weapons to Middle Eastern countries, particularly **Iran.** And the firms claim they did so with the explicit approval of the K.M.I., the government office responsible for granting arms export licenses. Bofors's then-managing director Martan Ardbo explained, "We thought we lived under a system of double morality. They the government and the K.M.I.) wanted us to do it like this."

Bofors routinely falsified its order books, listing sales of artillery shells, 40-mm naval guns, 155-mm field howitzers and at least 714 RBS-70 laser-guided antiaircraft missiles to Singapore, which re-exported them to **Iran** and to other blacklisted countries through the state-owned trading company Unicorn International. By 1985, Swedish foreign trade statistics show, Singapore had become the second largest buyer of Swedish weapons, accounting for 14.4 percent of all Swedish arms exports. Other Swedish firms are currently under investigation for similar violations.

One of the primary loopholes used by Bofors was in continuing to produce weapons at its overseas subsidiaries or under manufacturing licenses granted abroad. Although Sweden stopped granting new licenses as of 1983, Under Secretary for Foreign Trade Carl-Johan Aberg admitted that current licensees could sell Bofors weapons anywhere in the world, "and we have no control over that."

Sweden's basic dilemma has long been to balance its standards of public morality against the requirements of its neutrality. The late Prime Minister Olof Palme and others in government realized that the political price of Sweden's neutrality was a healthy arms industry, which could only be maintained through extensive weapons exports. Without export earnings, the RBS-70-vital to Sweden's air defense might never have been developed, since by the mid-1970s government funding for such projects had declined sharply.

Some of the more unusual arms deals with **Iran** have originated in Belgium, whose lax customs regulations have turned it into one of the major transshipment points for Iranian arms purchases. The port of Zeebrugge has been used for years to transfer weapons from Sweden and France to **Iran.** And recently evidence has emerged that a major smuggling operation involving TOW missiles from NATO stockpiles in the United States and Europe was carried on inside the sealed customs zone of Brussels's Zaventem International Airport.

According to intelligence sources in France and West Germany, Gen.

Bernard Rogers, then NATO's Commander in Chief/U.S.-European Command, ordered an internal investigation late in 1986 of reports that TOW missiles - and perhaps other military equipment-from NATO warehouses in West Germany had been diverted to **Iran** in 1985 and 1986. A spokesman for Supreme Headquarters-Allied Powers in Europe, in Belgium, said the investigation was "a political issue" and "the Pentagon has ordered us

not to comment on it." The intelligence sources said General Rogers was "furious to learn that NATO weapons were being sold to **Iran** without his knowledge." The Reagan Administration recently relieved Rogers of his NATO command, which he had held for eight years.

Belgian customs documents show that "at least 3,000 TOW missiles" were involved in a shell-game assembly operation. Chartered cargo planes arriving from military bases in the United States brought in the TOW warheads. Shortly after they taxied to a stop in the customs area, additional planes, carrying missile fuselages and motors from NATO storehouses in Bavaria, would pull up alongside them. Since the warheads were never offloaded -and thus technically not imported into Belgium-no customs documents were required. The German planes' cargoes were labeled "industrial parts" and "motors," and did not arouse the suspicion of Belgian customs officials. The missile parts were simply loaded onto the U.S. charter aircraft for the final leg of the journey to **Iran.**

It is as yet unclear whether those deliveries were part of the Secord-North **Iran** supply network, although the Belgian daily Le Soir, which reviewed Belgian customs documents, declared that the whole operation "had the benediction of the Pentagon."

The recent disclosures of arms-smuggling operations in Belgium and Sweden have led to calls for stricter arms "port controls in both countries. But even ironclad laws cannot work where there is no political wit to stop illicit sales.

Despite extremely tight controls, as the French press revealed shortly before the country's parliamentary elections last year, the French company Luchaire shipped more than $ 100 million worth of heavy artillery shells to Teheran, using fake end-use certificates showing their destinations as Brazil, Portugal and Thailand. An official investigation into the illegal deliveries was quietly buried by incoming Defense Minister Andre Giraud, and Luchaire's president, far from being disgraced, was awarded the Legion of Honor. In the meantime, according to shipping documents reviewed by this reporter, the French electronics giant Thomson-CSF has delivered ground-surveillance radars to **Iran** through a subsidiary in Argentina.

And French intelligence sources say that an American colonel formerly attached to the U.S. ,Embassy in Paris has been seen "on several occasions" supervising delivery of NATO weapons to Iranian aircraft at a French military airport near Chateauroux. That airport has for years been used on a daily basis for loading arms bound for Iraq.

What the French have done on the sly, the British have chosen to call policy. Although Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Parliament in November that Britain would "not supply any military equipment that would prolong or exacerbate the war," the government had dropped all pretense of enforcing an arms embargo against **Iran.** A month after Thatcher's speech, the government approved the sale of six Plessy Ad 3-D static air-defense radars to **Iran** worth $ 343 million. Ostensibly the radars were intended to protect **Iran's** borders with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan but, as opposition MPs pointed out, there was nothing to prevent their use at the front to direct Iranian air force operations against Iraq. In December The Observer reported that an official British government sales office, International Military Services, was concluding arms-supply contracts with **Iran's** purchasing office in London. A month earlier, Britain had sent $ 50 million worth of Chieftain tank engines and spare parts to **Iran** justified as "resupply under prewar contracts"), and since 1984 the British subsidiary of the Swiss firm Oerlikon-Buhrle had been training Iranian antiaircraft gunners on British soil.

The **Iran/**contra scandal has shed some light on the internal workings of the international arms trade, and helped expose the complicity of European arms companies and governments in this illicit traffic. But given the nature of Europe's strategic interests in the gulf, it is doubtful that ' **Iran** wit have to begin looking for new arms suppliers even if laws are tightened.

For years Europeans had been irritated by U.S. domination of **Iran's** vast and lucrative arms market; many countries hoped that the Iranian revolution would bring them new

contracts. Europe's arms industries are also major employers: In France, for example, weapons production accounts directly for 300,000 jobs, and another 700,000 are weapons-related. Many European countries, particularly France and Britain, are positioning themselves for the post-Khomeini era, and their primary means of convincing **Iran's** leaders of their future friendship is by selling them arms today.

Probably most important of all is the structure of the European arms industry, which, unlike that of the United States, must export to survive. Sweden, for example, exports more than 50 percent of the arms it produces each year. In France, more than 40 percent of all weapons produced each year are shipped abroad-and in the other NATO countries the figure is roughly the same. Those exports, in turn, help sustain domestic defense programs, which are critical to European independence. As one official at Thomson-CSF admitted, "We can't allow ourselves to support embargoes without jeopardizing the French armaments industry. What if Iraq and **Iran** suddenly made peace? We would lose Teheran as a customer forever. And that is simply not possible."

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Annex 12

***Mojahed, MKO Bulletin*, Exclusive Issue, Autumn 1991**

Excerpts

Exclusive issue
Autumn 1991

Chaiman of the Mojahedin Foreign Affairs addressing in the U.S.Congress

From right to left: Mohammad Mohaddessin, Ali-Reza Jafar-Zadeh, Mr.Michael van Dussan, staff diretor of Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East and one of the Congress assisstants, Mr.Benjamin Gillman, senior member of the Republican whip in Congress subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East.



Annex 13

M. Waas & D. Frantz, "Abuses in US Aid to Iraqis Ignored", *Los Angeles Times*, 22 March 1992

Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1992

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SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; National Desk

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HEADLINE: ABUSES IN U.S. AID TO IRAQIS IGNORED;
MIDEAST: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PUSHED THROUGH $1 BILLION MORE IN ASSISTANCE DESPITE REPORTS OF KICKBACKS AND EVIDENCE THAT FOOD MAY HAVE BEEN TRADED FOR ARMS.

BYLINE: By MURRAY WAAS and DOUGLAS FRANTZ, SPECIAL TO THE TIMES; Waas is a special correspondent and Frantz is a Times staff writer.

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

The Bush Administration ignored evidence that a $5-billion American aid program for Iraq was riddled with bribery and that food intended for hungry Iraqis may have been traded for weapons, according to classified government documents and interviews.

Beginning in 1989, Administration officials learned that Saddam Hussein's regime had demanded millions of dollars in bribes from American exporters of commodities, the documents indicate. The commodities had been sent to Iraq as part of a food aid program underwritten by the U.S. government.

Senior Administration officials, including Secretary of State James A. Baker III, were warned of such **abuses** in the fall of 1989, but still pushed through $1 billion in new government loan guarantees to allow Iraq to buy more agricultural products, classified documents show.

Two Administration officials said the warnings culminated in a highly classified intelligence report in July, 1990 -- a month before Hussein's troops overran Kuwait. The report said a Jordanian entrepreneur heavily involved in the U.S. aid program also was assisting Iraq's covert arms-procurement network, according to the officials who read the report.

At the same time, Iraq threatened to stop making payments on $2 billion it owed on previous loans guaranteed by the United States unless new aid was approved, according to classified records.

While the intelligence report did not directly link arms deals to food aid, an Administration official said the Jordanian businessman's dual role as arms trafficker and food middleman should have been "sufficient evidence" that aid was being traded for weapons.

Despite the intelligence findings and the Iraqi threat, documents show that the State Department and the White House National Security Council continued to seek the release of a final $500 million in aid for Baghdad.

The disclosures represent the first suggestion that American food aid may have been bartered by Iraq to buy weapons, and they provide new details on the extent of the warnings about widespread irregularities in the aid program. They also illustrate the determination within the Administration to continue assistance to Iraq in the face of

evidence of **abuses.**

That determination continued even after an Agriculture Department investigation completed in April, 1990, was unable to conclude that millions of dollars of commodities shipped through the Jordanian port of Aqaba were ever delivered to Iraq. The department's Commodity Credit Corp. had financed the food purchases for Baghdad.

The Administration maintains publicly and privately that it has no evidence that U.S. food aid was diverted for arms by Iraq.

In an interview, however, another Jordanian businessman, who was involved in the CCC program, said he has firsthand knowledge that aid had been diverted by Iraq as early as 1988.

The businessman, who asked that his name be withheld, said Iraqi officials had bartered U.S. food aid to the Soviet Union in exchange for a shipment of Soviet tanks in 1988. The food was shipped first to Aqaba and then to the Soviet Union instead of being taken overland to Iraq, he said.

Until Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, the CCC program remained an integral part of President Bush's policy of assisting Saddam Hussein in hopes of softening the Iraqi dictator's threats to his neighbors.

The first allegations that Iraq was demanding bribes surfaced in November, 1988, according to a report detailing an Agriculture Department investigation of the charges in 1990.

"USDA had been informed that at least one Iraqi state trading enterprise had been routinely requesting that exporters provide either cash rebates or goods, either in the form of additional commodities or non-agricultural items, as so-called 'after-sales' service in the form of trucks and truck parts," said the report.

Despite an Iraqi pledge to end such practices in 1988, Iraq continued to demand kickbacks. U.S. exporters complained repeatedly to the Agriculture Department that they were forced to give Iraq spare parts with military uses, such as armored trucks, and other bribes in order to sell goods to the Gulf state under the CCC program.

For instance, in a Sept. 7, 1989, letter to the department, a lumber exporter complained of increasing pressure by Iraq to provide free trucks, trailers and tires as the price of continued business.

"The recent telex requests (from Baghdad) have exhibited extraordinarily threatening language, where the future business relations are being judged by our response to requests for free goods," said the letter.

Later court records show that Iraq also was demanding cash from U.S. exporters. Six U.S. tobacco companies pleaded guilty in 1990 to paying more than $1.5 million in kickbacks to Iraq. The funds were transferred to foreign bank accounts, some of which were in countries that had supplied Iraq with arms, such as Bulgaria, France, Germany and Italy.

About the same time that concerns were rising over the kickbacks in 1989, federal agents raided the Atlanta branch of Italy's Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. They seized evidence that the branch had made $4 billion in fraudulent loans to Iraq and firms doing business with Iraq. About $900 million of the loans was guaranteed by the U.S. government through the CCC program.

Allegations of wrongdoing in the program became so disturbing that the Agriculture Department and three other federal agencies recommended sharply curtailing or even halting the loan guarantees to Iraq.

Secretary of State Baker was personally warned in a classified memo that officials at the

Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve "find it hard to believe" that Iraqi government officials "were not aware of kickbacks and other gross irregularities" in the CCC program.

But the Administration, led by Baker, fought off any cuts and pushed through another $1 billion in aid.

The only caveat was that the new aid would be divided into two $500-million payments. The second payment would be released as long as no substantial Iraqi government involvement was uncovered in the Banca Nazionale investigation in Atlanta, according to documents.

At that point, the National Security Council was monitoring the progress of the Banca Nazionale investigation, according to documents and interviews. Other records show that plans by the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta to indict top Iraqi officials and officers of two government-owned banks in the fraud scheme were delayed for more than a year.

The NSC also was keeping an eye on the internal Agriculture investigation into possible diversion of CCC food by Iraq.

When a draft of the Agriculture Department's report was completed in the spring of 1990, documents show that it was sent to Timothy Deal, a senior director at the NSC, as well as to Undersecretary of State Richard T. McCormack. A cover letter said the draft was provided to the other agencies "for your review and clearance."

A copy of the draft obtained by The Times shows that Agriculture Department investigators concluded that Iraq continued to demand kickbacks. But the most explosive allegation addressed by the investigators was that agricultural commodities were diverted and sold before they ever reached Iraq.

The report noted that "geographically, Iraq is almost entirely landlocked," and that during the Iran-Iraq War, its only large port city was closed to international shipping because of the fighting. As a result, Iraq had the commodities shipped to Aqaba as well as to Turkish ports, from which they were transported overland to Iraq.

The investigators had inspected shipping records for CCC goods at the foreign ports, but they found the trail ended there.

"In almost every case, the records document shipments as far as the ocean port but contained little or no record of the overland portion of the shipments to Iraq," said the report.

The department asked Iraqi officials to provide documents on a handful of the thousands of CCC transactions so they could be translated and reviewed. Even those few records were not scrutinized, said the report, because they were in Arabic and Turkish and were not translated.

The final report sent to Congress, after having been reviewed by the NSC, concluded that there was no evidence that foodstuffs and commodities sent to Iraq under the CCC program were diverted or did not end up in Iraq.

One Administration official said in an interview that he disagreed with the findings. "The facts that our own investigators uncovered did not square with the conclusion," he said. The official added that his superiors did not want to acknowledge that they "had sent $5 billion of commodities to Iraq, and they had no system in place to confirm their rightful delivery."

The official said that if the report had concluded there had been a massive diversion of food aid, it almost certainly would have caused the cancellation of the CCC program.

On May 21, 1990, the Agriculture Department drafted a press release and prepared to

brief members of Congress that it planned to suspend the last $500 million in food aid for Iraq. But NSC intervened. A classified memo said that on May 28, NSC staff members called a meeting "because they want to prevent the (loan program) from being canceled, as it would exacerbate the already strained foreign policy relations with Iraq."

Evidence that a prominent middleman in the CCC food program was involved in Iraqi arms trafficking soon surfaced in a widely circulated, highly classified intelligence report.

The July, 1990, report said that Jordanian businessman Wafai Dajani and a company he heads, Amman Resources, had covertly purchased arms for Hussein's regime, according to two officials who read the report. It also said Dajani had served as a middleman in arranging arms purchases for Iraq from private brokers in Portugal and Cyprus, the officials said.

Dajani's company received shipments of CCC-guaranteed commodities in Aqaba, stored them and was responsible for sending them on to Iraq. Federal investigators say Dajani was one of the most prominent middlemen involved in the CCC program.

Because of the high classification of the intelligence report, the two Administration officials declined to discuss its details. But they said it did not directly link Dajani's arms deals to exchanges of CCC aid.

Even so, one of the officials said that Dajani's prominent involvement with the CCC program and his alleged role as an arms trafficker should have set off alarm bells within the Administration, where the intelligence report was circulated widely.

Dajani has not been charged with any wrongdoing. Attempts to reach him in Jordan were unsuccessful.

A classified State Department report identifies Dajani as a confidant of Jordan's King Hussein and the brother of a former Jordanian interior minister. Other records show that he served as a middleman on many of the loans made to Iraq by the Banca Nazionale branch in Atlanta.

As indictments were being finalized in the Banca Nazionale case, the Justice Department queried the State Department about the foreign policy implications of possibly charging Dajani.

The State Department, while warning that an indictment of Dajani would be "seen as a further U.S. attempt to punish Jordan" for siding with Iraq in the Gulf War, also noted in its memo that an indictment "would serve legitimate law enforcement interests."

But when the U.S. attorney general finally announced the Banca Nazionale indictment on Feb. 28, 1991, Dajani was not among those charged. He has since been identified in federal court records as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Banca Nazionale case.

Dajani remains a target of the inquiry, according to law enforcement officials.

The Treasury Department said Dajani has been involved in continuing efforts by Iraq to ship goods to Baghdad through Jordan and evade the United Nations embargo imposed in August, 1990.

Administration officials acknowledged that some illicit goods are still passing through Jordan for Iraq despite the U.N. sanctions.

"There has been an active discussion involving the overall sanctions regime and Jordan, from the President down to (CIA Director) Bob Gates," said an Administration official. "But a very small portion of the discussion focused on arms. Since August, 1990, no significant arms shipments have gone to Iraq."

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Annex 14

***Mojahed, MKO Bulletin*, issue No. 294, December 1992**

Excerpts

Mojahed journal, No. 294, page 6, December 1992

Meeting between a delegation from Iran's resistance movement and the US president elect Mr. Bill Clinton, his VP Mr. Al Gore, a number of senior Senators and Congressmen, as well as members of the new administration

On Tuesday, Azar 17, a delegation from Iran's resistance movement, headed by brother Seyed ol-Mohadessin, head of Mojahedin's international relations department met with US president elect, Mr. Bill Clinton. This meeting took place on the sidelines of the Democratic party's leadership council meeting in Washington DC, which was also attended by the resistance movement's delegation.

The function which lasted for well over five hours, had been organized in honor of the US president elect Mr. Bill Clinton and his VP, Mr. Al Gore. It was attended by US senators and congressmen, leaders of the Democratic party, prominent US politicians and candidates for the various portfolios in the new administration.

Mr Richard Gephart , Congress majority leader, when meeting the head of Mojahedin's international relations department, said: we are all proud of your resistance. Your heroic acts and your struggles are commendable, and I am proud of this meeting. He shared the hope that the new US congress and administration will take new measures against the regime that rules over Iran.

نشریه مجاهد شماره ۲۹۴ صفحه ۶ مورخ آذر ۱۳۷۱ (دسامبر ۱۹۹۲) :

دیدار هیات مقاومت ایران با آقای بیل کلینتون رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکاو معاون وی آقای ال گور وشماری ازرهبران عالیرتبه سنا ومجلس نمایندگان و مقامات دولت آینده آمریکا

روزسه شنبه ۱۷ آذر هیاتی ازمقاومت ایران به سرپرستی برادر مجاهد محمد سید المحدثین مسئول روابط بین المللی مجاهدین با آقای بیل کلینتون رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا دیدار و گفتگو نمود. این دیدار درجریان شرکت هیات مقاومت در اجلاس مشترک شورای رهبری حزب دموکرات آمریکادر واشنگتن صورت گرفت .

دراین اجلاس که به افتخار رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا آقای بیل کلینتون و معاون وی آقای آلبرت گور ترتیب داده شده بود و پنج ساعت ادامه داشت ، رهبران عالیرتبه سنا و مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا، رهبران حزب دموکرات آمریکا و شخصیتهای برجسته سیاسی این کشور و کاندیدهای مقامات دولت آینده شرکت داشتند.

.... آقای ریچارد گیهارد رهبر اکثریت مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا دردیدار با مسئول روابط بین المللی مجاهدین تاکید کرد که وجود مقاومت شما باعث افتخارماست. قهرمانی و مبارزات شما ستایش انگیز است و من به این ملاقات مباهات می کنم. وی تاکید کرد که امیدوارم دولت و کنگره جدید آمریکا اقدامات جدیدتری علیه رژیم حاکم برایران اعمال کند.

دیدار هیات مقاومت ایران با آقای بیل کلینتون رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا و معاون وی آقای ال گور و شماری از رهبران عالیرتبهٔ سنا و مجلس نمایندگان و مقامات دولت آیندهٔ آمریکا



روز شنبه ۱۲ آذر هیاتی از مقاومت ایران به سرپرستی برادر مجاهد محمد سیدالمحدثین مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین با آقای بیل کلینتون رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا دیدار و گفتگو نمود. این دیدار در جریان شرکت هیات مقاومت در اجلاس مشترک شورای رهبری حزب دموکرات آمریکا در واشنگتن صورت گرفت.

در این اجلاس که به افتخار رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا آقای بیل کلینتون و معاون وی آقای آلبرت گور ترتیب داده شده بود و پنج ساعت ادامه داشت، رهبران عالیرتبه سنا و مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا، رهبران حزب دموکرات آمریکا و شخصیتهای برجسته سیاسی این کشور و کاندیداهای مقامات دولت آینده شرکت داشتند.

در جریان دیدار با رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین با استناد به مدارک انکارناپذیر نقض مستمر و شدید حقوق بشر در ایران توسط رژیم خمینی خصوص و بدون مواضع مقاومت عادلانه مردم ایران برای صلح و آزادی تحت رهبری برادر مجاهد مسعود رجوی را تشریح کرد.

رئیس جمهور آمریکا ضمن ابراز تشکر، بر پایبندی دولت جدید آمریکا به دفاع از حقوق بشر و دموکراسی تاکید کرد.

هیات مقاومت ایران همچنین با معاون رئیس جمهور آمریکا آقای آلبرت گور دیدار نمود. مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین با ناسم فیلاری کلینتون و [illegible] گور دیدار و گفتگو نمود و از سوی خواهر مجاهد مریم رجوی مسئول اول سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران به آنان تبریک گفت و آنان را در جریان اوضاع وخامتبار حقوق بشر در ایران بویژه سرکوب زنان توسط آخوندهای جنایتکار قرار داد. آنان ضمن تشکر از خواهر مجاهد مریم رجوی برای استقرار آزادی و دموکراسی و حقوق بشر در ایران آرزوی موفقیت نمودند.


برادر مجاهد محمد سیدالمحدثین در دیدار با آقای توماس فولی سخنگو و رئیس مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا درباره تحولات جهانی و منطقه‌ای گفتگو نمود.

آقای رجارد گپهارد رهبر اکثریت منتخب نمایندگان آمریکا در دیدار با مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین تاکید کرد که "تحول مقاومت شما باعث افتخار این قهرمانی و پایداری شما ستایش‌انگیز است، و من به این تلاشات مباهات میکنم." وی تاکید کرد که امیدوارم دولت و کنگره جدید آمریکا اقدامات جدیتری علیه رژیم حاکم بر ایران اعمال کند.

سناتور سم نان رئیس کمیته دفاع ملی آمریکا ضمن تلاشات با هیات مقاومت ایران گفت: «تلاشات شما موجب افتخار من است». وی تصریح نمود ضمانت بین المللی مقاومت مردم ایران به رهبری آقای رجوی کمترین کاری است که بایستی دو آمریکا برای دموکراسی و حقوق بشر در ایران انجام دهیم. وی افزود با بایستی از مقاومتی مثل مقاومت شما چمپرهای ریادی [illegible]

مسئول روابط بین‌المللی

دیدار هیات مقاومت ایران با آقای بیل کلینتون رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا و معاون وی آقای ال گور و شماری از رهبران عالیرتبه سنا و مجلس نمایندگان و...



با آقای ورنون جوردن رئیس شرکت انرژی ... قدیم به دولت جدید، و آقای استنلی هوبر رئیس گروه دموکرات در مجلس نمایندگان دیدار نمود.

هم‌چنین در این دیدارها آقای ادمیرال ویلیام‌کرو رئیس سابق ستاد مشترک نیروهای مسلح آمریکا و مشاور سیاسی آقای کلینتون آقای دموبه مکنیکردی رئیس کمیته اطلاعات مجلس نمایندگان آمریکا برای مقاومت عادلانهٔ مردم ایران برای صلح و آزادی، آرزوی موفقیت نمودند.

سناتور لیبرمن سپس گفتگو با نمایندگان مجاهدین و آمرار خوشحالی از حضور آنان در این اجلاس گفت.


مجاهدین قهرمانان مبارزه برای آزادی هستند و ما همواره از حقوق‌بشر و دموکراسی در ایران حمایت خواهیم کرد.

مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین با آقای الفروم پروفیسور شورای رهبری حزب دموکرات و بسیاری دیگر از شخصیتهای سیاسی حاضر در این اجلاس ملاقات و تبادل نظر نمود.

اجلاس مشترک شورای رهبری حزب دموکرات و اعضای سیاست خارجه‌خواه آمریکا با سخنرانی آقای گور معاون رئیس‌جمهوری آمریکا و سپس سخنرانی آقای کلینتون رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا در ساعت ۱۱:۳۰ شنبه شب به وقت واشنگتن خاتمه یافت.

* * *

دیدار مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین با نامزد معاونت ریاست جمهوری آمریکا



برادر مجاهد محمد عبدالمحدثین مسئول روابط بین‌المللی سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران با سناتور البرت گور نامزد معاونت ریاست جمهوری آمریکا از حزب دموکرات دیدار و گفتگو نمود.

طی این دیدار که روز پنجشنبه ۱۶مهر در شهر والی (ایالت کارولینای شمالی) صورت گرفت، مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین ضرورت اعتلا یابندهٔ مقاومت، ایثار و اقتدار آن در عرصهٔ داخلی و بین‌المللی و هم‌چنین بحرانهای حاد رژیم خمینی و تشدید خفقان بیشتر در ایران را تشریح نمود آل گور معاون بیل کلینتون نیز ضمن ابراز خوشحالی و استقبال از این دیدار، بر حمایت و دفاع از حقوق بشر تاکید کرد

تلگراف آقای ال گور به مسئول روابط بین‌المللی مجاهدین

آقای آل گور معاون مبارزات انتخاباتش در ریاست‌جمهوری جدید آمریکا دیدار با برادر مجاهد محمد عبدالمحدثین را طی تلگرامی به تاریخ دادن خطاب به مسئول روابط بین‌المللی سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران از این که در اثنای معاونت ایران مطلع شده است، تشکر نمود

issue no . 294
Nov . Dec , 1993

Massoud Rajavi - National Council of Resistance
Dear Massoud,

... U.S foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principles most Americans share. We cannot disregard how other governments treat their own people.

Democracies are more reliable trading partners than dictatorships. They are more likely to protect the environment and to abide by international law.

We should regard increased funding for democratic assistance as a legitimate part of our national security budget .... we welcome your ideas.

· parts or Presiden - elect Bill
Clinton's letter to Massoud Rajavi

۲۹۲

نامه رئیس جمهور آمریکا در پاسخ به پیام تبریک رهبر مقاومت ایران

نامه رئیس جمهور منتخب آمریکا

مسعود رجوی
شورای ملی مقاومت
مسعود عزیز،

سیاست خارجی ایالات متحده نمی‌تواند از اصول اخلاقی مورد اشتراک اکثر مردم آمریکا جدا باشد. ما نمی‌توانیم نحوه رفتار سایر دولتها با مردم خودشان را نادیده بگیریم. دمکراسیها طرف حسابهای قابل اتکاتری در قیاس با دیکتاتورها هستند. آنها به حفاظت از محیط‌زیست و تمیت از حقوق بین‌الملل علاقمندتر هستند. ما باید به اعتصامی کمک بیشتر برای یاری دمکراتیک بعنوان بخش مشروعی از بودجه امنیت ملی خود بنگریم. من بعنوان رئیس‌جمهور به مردم امریکا وری شوروی مایل کمک خواهم کرد تا از نظامی‌گرایی خارج شده و نهادهای آزاد سیاسی و اقتصادی بنا کند.

نهایتاً من از تشکیل یک "شبکه" دمکراسی برای اعزام هواران دموکراسی با استعداد آمریکایی به کشورهایی که نیاز به تخصص‌های حقوقی، مالی و سیاسی داشته باشند، حمایت می‌نمایم.

از علاقه شما نسبت به طرح‌هایم برای توسعه دادن به مردم و به جلو راندن کشورمان قدردانی می‌کنم. در حالی که من و تولگور برای رویاروئی با چالشهایی که پیش‌رو داریم اقدام می‌نمایم، از نظرات شما استقبال می‌کنم. از نامه شریف شما تشکر می‌کنم.

ارادتمند
بیل کلینتون

Annex 15

***Mojahed, MKO Bulletin*, Issue No. 295, February-March 1993**

Excerpts

issue no . 295
Feb - Mar . 1993

The Iranian Resistance in the International arena
An Iranian Resistance Delegation meets with a number of U.S. Secretaries and officials

An Iranian Resistance Delegation headed by Monammad Mohaddessin , Chairman of the Mojahedin Foreign Affairs took part in inauguration ceremony. The Iranian Resistance Delegation was among special foreign guests and U.S political personalities.

The Resistance Delegation also took part in events held in honor of Mr.Bill Clinton presidency and met with a number of U.S. Secretaries and officials of new administration , and members of Congress , as well as political figures including Mr. Walter Mondail and Mr. Michael Dukokiss both Democrat nominees for U.S. presidential elections in1988. During the talks with Mr. Wernor Jordan , head of transitional team of new administration , he requested the Iranian Resistance delegation to offer his warm greetings to Massoud Rajavi , Chairman of the National Council of Resistance .



مقاومت ایران در عرصهٔ بین المللی

دیدار هیات مقاومت ایران با شمارزی از وزرا و مقامات دولت امریکا

دیدار با رئیس کنگره و

و اکثر دیگر از نمایندگان کنگره سنای آمریکا

Annex 16

Henry Kissinger, "Clinton and the World," *News Week,* 1 February 1993

1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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February 1, 1993 , UNITED STATES EDITION

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HEADLINE: Clinton and the World

BYLINE: BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

HIGHLIGHT:
He must find a role for an America that can neither dominate nor retreat

BODY:

When President Clinton spoke to The New York Times a week before his Inauguration about how to deal with Saddam Hussein, he said that he was a Baptist, and he believed in the possibility of conversion. This comment was widely criticized as evidence that the new president might not possess the diplomatic acumen required to function effectively on the world scale.

In fact, Clinton's attitude was not very different from that of Franklin Roosevelt, who, in the 10th year of his presidency, after Stalin killed as many Russians as the Germans had, proclaimed that the Soviet leader was a reasonable person "possessed of stalwart good humor." At the Teheran summit, Roosevelt went a step further by referring to Stalin as Uncle Joe and reporting afterward that "the ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers."

Clinton's remarks reflected an old American nostalgia for the conversion of adversaries as the key to peace. As the only nation explicitly created to vindicate the idea of liberty, America has always believed that her values were relevant to the rest of mankind. That conviction has been reflected in two somewhat contradictory impulses. One is that these values can best be served by concentrating on their perfection at home -- this was the basis of isolationism. The other is a sense of missionary obligation to crusade to transform the world in our image.

The belief in conversion explains why President Reagan, who began by talking about the Soviet Union as an evil empire, later came to pride himself on having brought Gorbachev to an appreciation of democratic values. At various stages of the postwar period, a number of other opponents have been similarly described as either having almost converted to the American viewpoint or as having realized that economic cooperation and democratic progress were more important than political gain. It was a replay of the fantasy often found in American movies, where a villain finds sudden illumination due to some dramatic event and, from one day to the next, turns benign.

President Clinton seems to believe in both strands of this tradition -- the belief that America should focus on affairs at home, and that she should promote democracy when she ventures abroad. And he is far from unique in that respect. Therefore, the real issue is not what he may or may not know about the fine points of diplomacy, something he is in any case sure to learn on the job. His challenge as president will be to understand that, for the first time in her

history, America now finds herself in a world which she cannot dominate, but from which she also cannot simply withdraw.

The cold-war period was dominated by two superpowers. The so-called new world order contains five or six power centers of nearly equal strength. Even the nuclear equation is beginning to edge toward parity as START II reduces the arsenals of the erstwhile superpowers into the numerical range of such nuclear countries as France, Britain and even China. A multipolar world must seek stability through balance of power -- a concept to which America has been traditionally hostile, preferring to treat all nations as more or less interchangeable and hence subject to salvation by domestic transformation.

Take, for instance, the U.S. attitude toward the Persian Gulf. After the fall of the Shah of Iran, the moderate regimes in the gulf faced two preponderant threats, neither of which they could handle by themselves: radical, secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. When these two nations started fighting each other in 1980, after Iraq sought to annex Iranian territory, a balance-of-power approach would have dictated support for the weaker country, which was Iraq -- but only so long as it was weaker. Then, as soon as Iraq won the war, that support should have been withdrawn.

The Reagan and Bush administrations supported Iraq against Iran out of an appreciation for the balance of power, but failed to carry that policy to its logical conclusion. They chose to believe that Saddam had learned the virtues of moderation and that continuing to support him after the war ended was not only expedient but just. By extending assistance after Iraq became the strongest power in the gulf, they contributed to its later aggressiveness, which culminated in the annexation of Kuwait. Today, the basic geopolitical challenge in the gulf remains how to organize some outside force to balance Iraq's continued ambitions as well as the growing strength of Iran. And we can no longer hope to create that balance by conciliating Iraq.

Problems of equilibrium are emerging in other parts of the world as well. In the former Soviet Union, the growth of democracy and market economics is widely seen as the solution to historic foreign-policy problems. I favor economic assistance to Russia and the encouragement of its nascent democracy. But prudent policymakers must prepare for the fact that a Russia made stronger by economic reform will no doubt lead to far more complicated relations with its neighbors. Most Russian leadership groups still find the disintegration of the old empire difficult to accept. A stronger Russia is likely to challenge its neighbors with respect to the treatment of Russian minorities, borders and alleged common security concerns, creating the premise for renewed domination. We may also see the emergence of a kind of promarket authoritarian government like that of Pinochet in Chile. The Clinton administration would then have to weigh the traditional American impulse to insist on democracy against both the danger of conflict among the republics and the political future of Russia itself.

Balancing agent: A strategy is urgently required for promoting Russian progress but also -- paradoxically -- for the potential impact of that evolution on relations with Russia's neighbors. Similarly, Japan will not rest content during the Clinton presidency with being an economic superpower while remaining politically inactive and militarily weak. And a more autonomous Japan will rattle Asia's equilibrium. As for China, it has the highest sustained economic growth rate in the world, which will be increasingly translated into military

strength. Finally, Korea will begin to rival the stature of European nations. America must seek to promote a healthy evolution in its relationships, but her role will have to be more like Britain's traditional approach to Europe, as a balancing agent rather than as a dominant force.

President Clinton wisely pointed out that there are now also forces in the world that do not fall into traditional categories, such as environment, population, nuclear proliferation and catastrophic diseases. And the drive toward popular participation in government will surely remain a dominant theme. Unfortunately, the importance of a challenge does not automatically guarantee that American action can resolve it. The so-called global problems continue to be filtered through the prism of national perspectives. Commitment to the spread of democracy does not ensure our understanding how to make it relevant to other societies, how to buttress our convictions with appropriate policies or how to keep these slogans from being exploited by essentially anti-democratic groups. What are slogans in domestic politics, foreign policy must transpose into international strategy.

President Clinton's biggest challenge is therefore conceptual: to impart to his impatient people goals and strategies for an era whose turmoils reflect the painful initiation into a new international order. He will, moreover, have to do so while being inundated by daily cables alleged to require immediate answers, and by the pleading of bureaucracies that subtly -- or not so subtly -- will try to push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders will descend on him in the hope of establishing a personal relationship or extracting statements that they can use to their advantage later on. If Clinton permits himself to be engulfed by the minutiae of diplomacy, he risks losing, or never establishing, a sense of direction. Foreign leaders may not understand this, but they would do themselves a favor by waiting until Clinton has had time to organize his administration and think through what he must do.

Clinton would be wise to resist the pressures to conduct too much personal diplomacy, despite his considerable charm. The latitude for real concessions is defined by the national interest. It can be marginally extended by personal contact but not fundamentally altered. Moreover, when heads of government negotiate on details, there are two risks. One is a genuine potential for misunderstanding, when each thinks he has convinced the other, but in fact neither has. The other is that they may make their disagreements too explicit. For world leaders tend to achieve their eminence with the aid of highly developed egos, and they do not like to be perceived as backing down from well-publicized positions.

When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations in which the president would meet a foreign leader without knowing what the foreign leader was going to say ahead of time. I also made every effort to tell foreign leaders what the president would have to say to them. When heads of government meet, surprise should be reduced to a minimum and major emphasis should be placed on conceptual understanding.

For a new president, it is important to be wary of certain conventional wisdoms regarding negotiations. One is that if two sides disagree, a compromise should be sought somewhere in the middle. If the other party knows in advance that this is the operating principle, it will have every incentive to stake out an extreme position so that the "compromise" comes as close to its real position as possible. There is also the belief that deadlocks must always be broken by

new American proposals as a demonstration of our flexibility. The practical result is often to promote the very deadlock one seeks to avoid. In my view, the best negotiating tactic is to stake out a moderate, reasonable position and then stick to it. Salami tactics of making little concessions one at a time please the bureaucracy but confuse the other party.

President Clinton has said that he wants foreign policy made in the White House and implemented in the State Department. This was certainly the operating style in my early years in the Nixon White House. But it was due to emergency circumstances not applicable to current events. The Vietnam negotiations, while exhausting, concerned a few relatively simple issues. The opening to China was a spectacular but singular event. Economic issues were not then as crucial as they are now. In any event, it is not a pattern to be repeated when the challenge is to devise a new concept of foreign policy and to implement it across the entire spectrum of our nation's endeavors.

Primary voice: Given this need, it would be a mistake for a president, particularly one with little international experience, to try to run all aspects of foreign policy from the White House. The range and complexity of issues facing the United States today are so great that a secretary of state needs to be involved with the development of concepts from the start in order to convey the necessary sense of nuance to the apparatus that must implement policy decisions. Though the National Security Council staff should frame policy options, it is the secretary of state who must have a primary voice in the final selection.

Some conflict of views within the new foreign-policy team is inevitable, and should not be discouraged by the president. It is much better to be presented with clear-cut alternatives than to insist on recommendations in the form of predigested compromises. Usually, that has the effect of shifting the field of the bureaucratic battle from phraseology to interpretation. For the foreign-policy bureaucracy has a truly remarkable skill in hearing only what supports its preconceptions. The president may think that he has approved a pre-negotiated compromise, but each department will interpret the decision in the way that suits its own purposes.

Ironically, President Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that America should place her top priority on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of great international turmoil. Yet this also presents him with an opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he became responsible for designing the architecture for a generation of successful foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course under different circumstances. If he can teach America to reconcile her twin impulses of missionary zeal and isolationism to her interests, he will have laid a groundwork for a lasting peace. History will then little care how well he understood the world when he entered office.

LES ASPIN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Developed expertise as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Rejects the Pentagon's "all or nothing" approach to the use of force; believes new technology enables precision responses. Keen instincts for what the public will tolerate.

SAMUEL (SANDY) BERGER
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

A deputy to Anthony Lake in the Carter era, during the campaign he coordinated foreign-policy advice for Clinton. Cares about human rights, but believes that "diplomacy disengaged from force isn't much diplomacy."

WARREN CHRISTOPHER
SECRETARY OF STATE

Old enough to be Clinton's father, the corporate lawyer is careful, deliberate, judicious. Not known for his vision or identified with any particular school of foreign policy or ideology. He is a lawyer who (deftly) carries out the wishes of his client.

ANTHONY LAKE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

He split with Kissinger over the invasion of Cambodia. But he's no dove: he sees America as an internationalist power pushing free markets and democracy globewide. Seen as the foreign-policy team's intellectual powerhouse.

WINSTON LORD
ASSISTANCE SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

The GOP Yalie is, like Lake, a former Kissinger protege. Ambassador to China during the democracy movement, he will be tougher on Beijing than Bush. But he's too realistic to cut the Chinese off.

PETER TARNOFF
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Will move to restore State's career experts to the policy-making role that Jim Baker's people usurped. "Process Man" is more a facilitator than thinker; may be better at setting up the seminar than answering the question.

TIMOTHY WIRTH
UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Former senator bargained hard for a job at State with clout. New post recognizes that environmental degradation, population growth, drug trafficking and refugees pose real threats to U.S. security.

STROBE TALBOTT
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

Another Yale smoothie, the longtime Time editor and Russian expert is a Friend of Bill. New post focusing on free markets and democracy for former U.S.S.R. signals a Clinton priority. Talbott has many friends among the old East bloc's reformers.

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, The American will to convert foes to the cause of peace: U.S. Marines at a Somali military base on the eve of their arrival into Baidoa, WESLEY BOXCE -- JB PICTURES; Pictures 2 through 9, no caption, DAVID BURNETT

-- CONTACT, IRA WYMAN FOR NEWSWEEK, LARRY DOWNING -- NEWSWEEK, JEFF MITCHELL -- REUTERS-BETTMANN, JOHN HARRINGTON -- BLACK STAR, JACQUES CHENET -- NEWSWEEK, ROB CRANDALL -- PICTURE GROUP, MARIO RUIZ -- TIME MAGAZINE

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Annex 17

***Mojahed, MKO Bulletin*, Issue No. 297, April 1993**

Excerpts

issue no.297
Apr.3, 1993

Congressman Robert Andrews News Release Bipartisan Congressional Dinner Calls on Clinton Administration to adopt a tougher policy on Iranian Regime, support Iraninan Resistance.

Congressmen Robert Anderws (D-NJ), Ronald Dellums (D-CD), James Traficant (D-OH) and Dan Burton (R-IN) sponsored a dinner reception on Wednesday, April 21 at House of Representatives in honor of Mr.Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR), a coalition of democratic organizations and personalities striving for democracy in Iran. Mr.Mohaddessin is visting the United States at the special envoy of Mr.Massoud Rajavi, Leader of the Iranian Resistance. In their remarks, representatives Andersws,member of the Foreign Subcommittee on Europe and Middle-East; senior House Relations Committee members Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) and Dan Burton, and Congressman Charles Taylor (R-NC) condemned the flagrant violations of human rights, export of fundamentalism and terrorism. They declared their support for the Iranian Resistance, and called for a tougher policy by the Clinton administration....



Annex 18

***Mojahed, MKO Bulletin,* Issue No. 298, May 1993**

Excerpts


issue no.298
May 10, 1993

Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance meets with senator George McGovern

On Thursday April 29, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of NCR, Mohammad Mohaddessin met with Senator George McGovern.

During this meeting Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of NCR elaborated on blatant violation of human rights by illegitimate regime of Khomeini, and the routine practice of torture and execution in prisons. He emphasized on overwhelming support of Iranian people from the National Council of Resistance and ultimate downfall of terrorist dictatorship of Mullahs. He explained the latest development in Iranian just resistance for peace and freedom in the international, internal arena, and the viewpoints and programmes of the National Council of Resistance for a free and democratic Iran after Khomeini regime downfall. The two sides discussed about the plots and plans of ruling terrorist dictatorship in Iran, and exchanged views on its policy of exporting terrorism and religious fundamentalism....

۲۹۸



ملاقات مسئول کمیسیون خارجی شورای ملی مقاومت با سناتور جرج مك گاورن

■ روز پنجشنبه ۹ اردیبهشت مسئول کمیسیون خارجی شورای ملی مقاومت برادر محمد محمد سیدالحسینی با سناتور جرج مك گاورن دیدار و گفتگو کرد.

سناتور مك گاورن یکی از سیاستمداران برجسته ایالات متحده و از سرشناسترین وخیراه حزب دمکرات آمریکا است و در انتخابات سال ۱۹۷۲ کاندیدای حزب دمکرات برای ریاست جمهوری بود.

طی این دیدار مسئول کمیسیون خارجی شورای ملی مقاومت، به شرور مشروح دربوده نقض شدید حقوق بشر توسط رژیم ثاشیوری خمینی و اعتراضات و شکنجه ها...

(23)

Annex 19

G. A. Nader, "Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani", *Middle East Insight,* July-August 1995, Vol. XI, No.5

Interview with
President
Ali Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani

By George A. Nader

Editor's Note: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 64, is the son of a cleric and pistachio farmer. After attending a traditional primary school in his home village near Rafsanjan in the Kerman province, he went to Qom at 14 to study theology. He studied under the late Ayatollah Khomeini and rose to power as one of his devoted disciples. When Khomeini was exiled in 1964, he relied on Rafsanjani for fund raising and organizing the underground movement in Iran. Rafsanjani's activities led to his arrest in 1965 and 1971. In 1975 he was arrested again and jailed for three years. After the Shah's overthrow in 1979, Rafsanjani helped found the Islamic Republican party, served on the Revolutionary Council, and was Undersecretary of the Interior of the provisional government. He was elected as a deputy from Tehran to the first post-revolution Majlis, was immediately elected speaker, and held that post until he was elected President in 1989, a few weeks after Khomeini's death. As Khomeini's representative on the Supreme Defense Council and later as Commander-in-Chief during the Iran-Iraq War, Rafsanjani became a major architect of Iran's strategy. He was also a key figure in convincing Khomeini to accept a United Nations cease-fire resolution. Helping to rebuild the country following a war that cost $350 billion and countless lives, Rafsanjani has led Iran's transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy. In the following two-hour candid interview at his Presidential offices in Tehran, President Rafsanjani discusses the many internal and external challenges facing his country with George A. Nader, president and editor of Middle East Insight.

MEI: Mr. President, during the six years that you have been in office, you have overseen Iran's transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy and its simultaneous transition, due the death of the leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeini, to a post-Khomeini era. Which of the accomplishments in this period are you most satisfied about, and what objectives do you hope to accomplish during the remainder of your tenure in office?

Rafsanjani: In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. It is very natural that after the end of the war our most important goal should be the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. Many of the infrastructural facilities and structures of the country had been destroyed during [the Iraqi] war, and even before the war we were a little backward in the infrastructure field. That's why we have designated the ten years [after the war] as the "Construction Decade" in a bid to carry out infrastructural works. So far we have proceeded according to the plan. Almost all war ruins have been renovated. Many infrastructural works have been done, such as control of water, construction of dams, power plants, development of communications, roads and railways, transportation, agriculture, steel industry, copper, lead, zinc, and machine industries. We have expanded our defense industries, activating the mines which were idle; expanded universities for training of manpower; and paid attention to deprived areas—

Transformation . . . of a country from a war-economy, particularly an imposed war of eight long years, to an economy of growth and development, requires a lot of sacrifices. . . . I am happy to shoulder all the burdens and difficulties that are inevitable for the period of reconstruction



a major part of which had been delayed—fisheries, ports, etc. All this was included in the plan, and we could turn the bad situation at that time to a good condition at the present. Fortunately we have been successful in achieving these objectives today.

In the oil and gas sector, which was greatly damaged [during the war], we made great achievements and today we've supplied gas to most of our towns. The petrochemicals in Iran were almost nothing. We worked hard on them to the extent that today the petrochemical capacity is about 12 million tons. We also made huge investments in the consumer industries to meet the domestic requirements. Altogether, we spent $100 billion both from our own sources and [the money] we have borrowed from abroad. We also have the second development plan in front of us. It's a five-year plan, and we hope to achieve our goals at the end of the plan.

MEI: Mr. President, with the many accomplishments you spoke about, how currently would you characterize the state of the Iranian economy? Some experts have described it as being in an extremely fragile state, with the falling value of the rial, high inflation and unemployment, and some foreign debts. How did your reform program fare, and how do you intend to address Iran's current economic challenges?

Rafsanjani: Before launching the [development] plan, the economy had difficulties and was fragile. But today the foundations of the economy in this country are solid. The fundamentals are there. I'll give you an example. In the beginning of the development plan, we spent $30 billion [on investment], but this year we are only spending $10 billion and the country's reconstruction is continuing at the same speed. That means we have reduced our economic dependence on the outside. Many of the things we had to import are now produced inside. For instance, [non-ferrous] metals [industries] are done all inside the country. Or chemicals—perhaps 5,000-6,000 factories are receiving their material from inside the country. We have supplied natural gas to everywhere and all the industries can use natural gas. With the investment that we have made, we can also meet the requirements in meat, poultry, and eggs. Large projects, like the construction of dams, are designed and constructed in this country. I can say that most of our needs in Iran from the designing to engineering and production are done inside the country. Our foreign debts as compared to other countries of course is less, is not that much, is $18 billion, but we have used this foreign debt in order to strengthen the economy; we have invested in infrastructure and other things. They are points of strength for our economy and we do not have any difficulty in repayment of our foreign debts. They are paid in installments with five or six years and it will not be a heavy burden on us. And it will be amortized by the year 2000. And it is a guarantee for the sale of our oil if the US wants to prevent the selling of our oil. Our foreign debt is guaranteed. I do not believe that we have much economic difficulty in front of us. Or course, we have inflation in this country because we have spent much money in industry on projects that are not yet finished, but compared with other countries in the region, our inflation is low and life is less expensive. If you look at the countries around us—and products from Iran go to those countries—it is very profitable for them to trade.

MEI: It is understood that many of the surgical, painful measures you have taken will bear fruit long after you leave office. And you have guided and shaped a new mentality among the people here to depend less on the government and to be more involved in the free market economy. How do you feel about this?

Rafsanjani: Transformation of the economy of a country from a war-economy, particularly an imposed war of eight long years, to an economy of

growth and development, requires a lot of sacrifices. Growth and economic development of our country is possible with patience and increasing efforts of all segments of the population. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted such policies to secure economic growth in Iran. My ultimate objective, as the President, is to achieve prosperity for the nation and progress for the country, and in this connection, I am happy to shoulder all the burdens and difficulties that are inevitable for the period of reconstruction. The prospect for Iran is bright and promising, and an overwhelming majority of Iranian people realize the wisdom of the Government policies and support them.

MEI: Mr. President, there have recently been reports of riots and domestic disturbances over declining living conditions in some Iranian cities. How does your government view these occurrences?

Rafsanjani: These are usually small incidents that are blown way out of proportion by the opposition media. For example, if you compare this incident to the incidents that took place in California, the USA, this is a very small incident compared to them. For instance, the incidents in France by the farmers. You have such things in Turkey and Pakistan much larger in proportion than what we have in Iran. For example, most of these incidents relate to the municipality administration office. They wanted to stop them from the construction of buildings without a license, and they may resort to riots. Maybe, for example, bus tickets were made more expensive and such things happened. The people are with the government in this country and socially speaking we do not have big problems. If you come with the leaders of the country to one of the trips that we make to one of the cities, you will see how good relations exist between the people and the leaders.

MEI: There were times during your presidency when the most outstanding and challenging foreign issue of all, the US-Iranian relationship, seemed on the verge of some improvement. Yet now, it hits an all-time low, with President Clinton issuing an executive order on May 8 prohibiting trade with and investment in Iran. What went wrong after some initial hopeful signs? Why do you think the Clinton Administration has toughened its policy toward Iran at this time?

Rafsanjani: This new measure we feel is partly because of the pressure that is exerted by the Zionist circles. But generally speaking, from the very beginning of the revolution, American administrations have shown hostility towards the revolution. They have never shown good intentions. The internal conditions of the United States, the rivalries between the two parties, and the other internal problems that the US has, has made it necessary to pick up an enemy outside. In the past the Soviet Union was considered the enemy; now it is our country, Iran. They want Iran to be a scapegoat. When their peace plan in the Middle East has failed, they cannot openly say that they planned it poorly themselves. They have to put the blame on somebody else.

MEI: Has Iran thought of coming up with some creative strategy to defuse this current tension?

Rafsanjani: It is doomed to fail; the United States cannot do much against us. What can possibly happen? They said they should not buy our oil; we can shift and sell to others. If they ban trade with us, it is the United States that is going to lose. The things that we are used to buying from the United States we'll get from other countries. We have been the target of such bans—even worse and more severe bans—at a time when we had a war. These bans have had no impact on our economy, and they will not affect this country.

MEI: The United States has long insisted that it was willing to engage in a dialogue with authoritative Iranians, in the open and without any preconditions. Wouldn't it be reasonable to test US sincerity on this issue, especially now, and designate an official person to have any discussions without preconditions about many of the outstanding matters that your country is concerned about?

Rafsanjani: Unfortunately, because of the behavior of the United States,

Unfortunately . . . there is not much trust in this country for the United States. . . . That is why we have said that the United States should, for once at least, prove its good intentions, so the road can be paved





Practically speaking, we do not take any action against the peace plan. . . . In our view, [it] is not going to work out . . . But if the content is just, the substance is just, we shall go along with it

there is not much trust in this country for the United States. It may be presumed in Iran that the United States has ulterior motives for this proposal. That is why we have said that the United States should, for once at least, prove its good intentions, so the road can be paved. I told them, for example, that as a show of good will, they can free our assets that have been illegally frozen in the United States.

MEI: With regard to this issue, you have frequently mentioned the Iranian assets frozen by the US. Most Americans believe that, after signing the Algiers Accord in 1981, the tribunal at the Hague has been settling Iranian and American claims and counter-claims. Will you please define what you mean by Iranian assets?

Rafsanjani: Before the Revolution we had a special account for foreign military sales, it was called the FMS account. Our oil was sold and the money was deposited into this account for selling of US arms to Iran, and we have substantial amounts of money in that account, still outstanding. The weapons systems and armor that the United States was supposed to deliver were not given to us. But they have taken our money and the money is there, and no weapons are coming. We had also bought at that time substantial amounts of weapons in the United States that were never delivered and also some logistical military provisions that are still there and are confiscated by the United States.

MEI: We realize that Iran morally supports and inspires many Islamic groups in the region. However, the United States has alleged that Iran gives financial support and trains groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad to carry out military and terroristic activities that subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. They point, for example, to the Beit Lid bombing, among others. Could you clarify what is the nature of Iran's support and assistance to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for example?

Rafsanjani: These are baseless allegations that have been leveled against us on numerous occasions and they keep being repeated and we have given our replies and answers to those allegations. We have stated very clearly that we do not support any terrorist groups and we condemn all forms of terrorist acts. In Lebanon, we do help, but our help goes to the Shi'a population. They are the targets of the atrocities of the occupying forces.

Their country, the southern part of Lebanon, is occupied, and the victims of this occupation are helped by Iran. We also help these people to expel, push back, the occupation forces. Regarding the Palestinian question, the peace plan that is now under way, we say that, in our view, the peace plan is not going to work out, and it is not a just plan. We do nothing else; it is just a statement. We don't see any good intention on the part of Israel in these talks, and we don't even see good intentions on the part of the United States, either. We do not see the United States as a neutral mediator in this case. And the reasons have shown themselves in the occupation of the new lands by the Israelis in Jerusalem. And the United States, instead of giving a reward to the Arab countries—you saw what happened at the UN Security Council—it vetoed the resolution [condemning Israeli land seizures in Jerusalem] and trampled upon the vote of 14 members of the council in favor of Israel. We ask them what have you done for four million Palestinian refugees? What will their destiny be as a result of this peace plan? Is this peace practical and durable when there still exist 4 million refugees?


MEI: You have raised many questions in my mind about the peace process. What is your assessment of the Syrian-Iranian relationship, and assuming a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, how will that affect Iran's relationship with Syria?

Rafsanjani: At the present time, we have excellent relations with the Syrians, and we do not believe that Syria will submit to an unjust peace.

MEI: What if a real peace agreement that satisfies Syria's needs and aspirations is reached? What will your position be?

Rafsanjani: We shall wait and see for that day to come. Then we shall state our view.

MEI: Assuming a treaty between Israel and Lebanon, it will have to involve Hezbollah. How will Hezbollah's acquiescence to a peace treaty affect an Iran-Hezbollah relationship?



George A. Nader, President of *Middle East Insight* (right), speaks candidly with President Rafsanjani

Rafsanjani: The objective of Hezbollah, in the first place, is to put an end to the occupation of their country by Zionists. Were the government of Lebanon to achieve such an objective, both Hezbollah and we will be pleased and happy; but, the Zionist regime is essentially expansionist.

MEI: Has Iran calculated the cost that is accruing from its opposition to the peace process between Arabs and Israelis?

Rafsanjani: Of course. We have to pay a price when you defend your principles. If you want to be free-minded and defend your principles, you should be willing to pay the price. We are revolutionary and Muslims, and we are prepared to invest and pay the price for the principles that we believe. I think any free-minded person is willing to pay the price in order to defend his principles of freedom.

MEI: Mr. President, if I could add to this . . . following your own principles of noninterference in other peoples' and countries' affairs, and the use in many instances, of your good offices, to facilitate conflict resolution and defuse tension in instances like in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and many other places, could Iran clearly see itself at the point where it can declare its impartiality toward the peace process and the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Rafsanjani: Practically speaking, we do not take any action against the peace plan. When we see this whole process is unjust, we state our opposition as a matter of principle. But if the content of the peace plan is just, the substance is just, we shall go along with it.

MEI: Mr. President, a great many people, who otherwise wish to see improved relations between Iran and the West, are greatly discouraged by Iran's human rights record, specifically the continuing threat to the life of Salman Rushdie. It has become a symbol in the West, a symbol that is being effectively used by your opponents to cause unnecessary problems for you and delay progress with other countries. How could Iran plan to deal with this issue and get out of this vicious circle?

Rafsanjani: Of course we have to separate the two issues, human rights and the Salman Rushdie case. I think human rights are used as an instrument to exert pressure and also to achieve some goals that particularly the United States pursues. For example, you see in the US an incident takes place—the mass killing of the Davidian sect, the followers of David Koresh—but very soon without wasting much time, they just stifle the matter as if nothing has happened. But if a small incident takes place in Iran, it is blown way out of pro-

portion and is publicized for years. The scene of mass killing of that sect was very tragic. I heard on BBC yesterday that in the US, the prisoners, who are disproportionately black, are moved around and taken to work with chains on their feet. This is very tragic. Nothing like that happens in Iran. In Iran prisoners visit with their families. They are treated with dignity and they are paid for their work.

Regarding Salman Rushdie, I think this whole affair is created by the arrogant powers in order to use it as a time bomb, in case it is needed for the relations between Iran and the West. The issue is that the writer has insulted the Prophet of Islam, and the fatwa of all religious scholars in this case is capital punishment for such a person. We have this in our religious texts. Even if Imam Khomeini had not issued the same fatwa, we had the same verdict in our religious books that go as far back as 1000 years. This is in the book, fiqh [Islamic law], and religious teachings. It is called Sab-al-Nabi, meaning swearing the Prophet.

MEI: Speaking of scenes of killings, and knowing that your country has had its share of bombings and terroristic activities, how did you feel when you first heard and saw the bombing in Oklahoma?

Rafsanjani: At that time I was visiting Georgia, and in a press interview I stated that we condemn such terrorist acts and are appalled by them. We consider these acts to be criminal, but that incident show the threat and dangers that exist insi[illegible] American society as a result of the injustices there.

MEI: It is said that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program, and Iran is accused of trying to build a nuclear bomb. What is Iran's policy toward nuclear proliferation? And how do you respond to those who say Iran does not need nuclear power because of its natural resources?

Rafsanjani: These claims are only raised by Mr. Clinton, Christopher and the Israelis. Have any other people made such claims against us? Are there any other groups or people making such a claim?

MEI: They seem to feel very, very strongly about this.

We believe the littoral states in the Persian Gulf are the true owners of this area . . . Half of the coastline belongs to Iran, so Iran alone has the same amount of rights and responsibilities as all those countries put together

Rafsanjani: In the region that I used to live, Rafsanjan, we have a proverb; people say that if lie had a piece of bone, the liar would have chocked on the bone because of lying so much. And I say that if lie had a bone, you would have had new elections for your president now, because he would have choked by now. We have expressed our clear hatred and abhorrence for these weapons of mass destruction that kill innocent and guilty together.

In response to one of your questions, I stated that we are ready to pay a high price for expressing our views on justice. What greater cruelty than the one the Americans committed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Anyone who has knowledge of that incident would not wish to have nuclear weapons. The American people should rest assured that we are not pursuing, nor on the path of acquiring, nuclear weapons. The benefits of nuclear technology, of course, are numerous, and we cannot forego other uses of peaceful nuclear technology.

MEI: Mr. President, Islamic resurgence seems to be on the rise. Many neighboring countries are struggling with this issue. What is Iran's view on the widespread Islamic resurgence?

Rafsanjani: People today look at Islam as a religion that can also govern —a complete way of life. It is only natural for the people to seek to participate in political decision-makings. Before, it was publicized that religion is concerned only with the relation between an individual and God, and it has nothing to do with social matters. This was a secular way of thinking, of mostly Christians, particularly the Catholic Church. But this kind of mentality has changed among the Muslims after the victory of the Islamic Republic in Iran.

MEI: Some people have accused Iran of being involved in recent disturbances in Bahrain. Others have accused Iran of assisting Sudan militarily and of having links to FIS in Algeria and Islamic groups in Egypt. How do you respond to these accusations and could you tell us about the nature of your relationship with Sudan and the FIS in Algeria?

Rafsanjani: It is our principal policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and we insist on this policy. Neither in Bahrain, nor Algeria, nor in Egypt, have we had any relations or given any assistance to these groups and the events that have taken place in those countries. With respect to Sudan, we have good relations and we give them some aid from time to time, but that has nothing to do with tensions. It is a government-to-government formal relationship.

MEI: Some assume that continuing US pressure on Iran might lead to an improved relationship with Iraq, or even to an alliance with Iraq, even with Saddam still in power. What is the current condition of state between the two countries; and, considering the circumstances and the experiences you have had before with Saddam's Iraq, how do you foresee the development of the relationship between the two countries?

Rafsanjani: Naturally we are not happy with the past experience we've had with Saddam. We suffered very much in the war Saddam initiated against us. We are opposed to the pressures and coercive actions of Saddam's government against his people. It is a dictatorship. We also opposed and faced our opposition, especially with the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. But if there is going to be a legitimate government in Iraq, we have to have some sort of relationship, because Iraq is our neighbor after all. Right now, we are acting according to the limits of the United Nations. In the future, different conditions may arise. We cannot predict the future.

MEI: Do you think it is time for the UN to lift sanctions against Iraq?

Rafsanjani: The people of Iraq are helplessly bearing a great deal of suffering. There are innocent people who suffer very much as a result of the sanctions. Before they were the target of oppression by their own government, but now they are suffering from the outside world as well. But as we are not sure if the Iraqi government would abandon its adventurist policies, we have to think about a solution to these two problems.

MEI: Some have suggested that Turkey's recent invasion of northern Iraq was done with the tacit approval of Tehran, even though your government publicly expressed strong reservations about the move. Furthermore, Turkey has called recently for border changes and adjustments with Iraq. How do you assess this situation, and what is your position toward the Kurdish problem, and how would you solve it?

Rafsanjani: We had no prior information that Turkey planned to enter Iraqi territory. Mr. Demirel called me and told me about it after they had entered Iraq. When there was a concentration of Turkish forces along the Iraqi border, I asked Mr. Demirel the reason for this, and he told me it was because of the problem they had with the Kurds inside Iraq. After they entered, he promised me that they would suppress the terrorists and withdraw within a short period of time. Of course, that lasted more than what we thought, and they advanced further, but now they say they have withdrawn. Of course we do oppose any change in the borders between Iraq and Turkey or annexation of any cities to Turkey [from Iraq], unless the people of the two countries vote for such changes of border in both countries.

We think that the rights of the Kurds, whether in Iran or Turkey, or Iraq, should be given to them and they should not feel separated, alienated. They should feel they are part of the country and be treated on an equal footing. This is our policy toward our Kurds in Iran.

The differences of views in Iran find their synthesis within the framework of our Constitution. . . . These differences are, in and of themselves, a clear indication of [the] political stability and maturity of our system

MEI: How do you view Iran's role and responsibility as a regional power in the Persian Gulf?

Rafsanjani: We believe the littoral states in the Persian Gulf are the true owners of this area, and they have the responsibility to maintain security and peace there. Half of the coastline belongs to Iran, so Iran alone has the same amount of rights and responsibility as all those countries put together.

MEI: The Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands disputes with the UAE seem to impede improved relations between Iran and the GCC states. Mr. President, why did this dispute flare up in the first place?

Rafsanjani: We think the reason is foreign instigation, coming mainly from the US. They want to use this as a pretext to assert their military presence in the Persian Gulf. This issue had been resolved before the Islamic Revolution, but all of a sudden it was raised two years ago, and it has been inflamed.

MEI: What is the exact nature and magnitude of the military buildup on the islands?

Rafsanjani: It is nothing new. We had the same situation during the war, and we have checked the situation during the war. We have defensive military postures on some islands.

MEI: What steps can be taken to resolve this problem?

Rafsanjani: We believe in the 1971 treaty between Iran and the UAE. It's a good document for the two countries to sit down and resolve their differences.

MEI: How would you characterize your relationship with Saudi Arabia?

Rafsanjani: It's not very good. An average relationship—even less than average—but we would like to see an improvement.

MEI: Why is that, and what more can be done to improve the relationship?

Rafsanjani: I think there too, there are foreign instigations. The US does not want Iran and Saudi Arabia to get together, to work and cooperate with each other. They cannot do anything through us, and they use the Saudis to create problems. The United States knows that if Iran and Saudia Arabia maintained good, friendly relations, then we could resolve many matters relating to oil, OPEC, and regional security problems, and there would be no need for the U.S. to have its military bases in the Persian Gulf. And perhaps they want to impose the peace plan on the Arab countries and present Iran as an enemy to be scared of—as a threat against them—so that they could receive extortion from them.

MEI: Another neighboring country is Russia. Could you please assess Iran's relations with Russia today, including areas of cooperation and areas of conflict?

Rafsanjani: At present, our relations with Russia are good. Our relations during the Gorbachev time when I visited Russia improved a lot—a trend that still continues. Russia is a large country in our region with vast potential and specific circumstances. Promotion of Iran-Russia relations serves the interests of both nations. Fortunately, the authorities of both countries realize the importance of this issue and that is why the friendly relation between the two countries is not affected by adverse international political tides. In addition to mutual cooperation aimed at finding political solutions to regional conflicts, Iran and Russia cooperate in the field of trade, culture, science, industry, and try to coordinate their policies about oil and gas.

MEI: Iran seems to have a number of competing and even conflicting political factions. Could you give an explanation of the complexities of Iranian politics for those outside the country who do not understand it?

Rafsanjani: Like any other country where there are free elections, in Iran, too, political group rivalry is serious business. These differences are nothing new in Iran. I am aware that certain western quarters attempt to present the differences in Iran as a point of instability in or perhaps even threat against the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, these differences are, in and of themselves, a clear indication of political stability and maturity of our system. That our Majlis [Parliament] meticulously considers the policies and practices of the executive branch of the Government and pronounces its acceptance or opposition to them is quite necessary and, in final analysis, is helping the Government in the long run. The differences of views in Iran find their synthesis within the framework of our Constitution; and after public debate on the point of difference in the media, the predominant view usually emerges. We do not intend to prevent exchange of views or to deny that conflicting views exist in Iran. I believe, as long as these differences are within the framework of the Constitution, they will be a vehicle for growth and progress in the country and ensure the interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, as the President, I would like the Majlis [Parliament] to be more in line with and supportive of the policies and decisions of my Government, but as an individual who has served and shouldered a great deal of burden for the Islamic revolution for many years, I am happier to see that the system of the Islamic Republic has been institutionalized and that all its organs fulfill their constitutionally delineated tasks well. In other words, separation of powers and the system of checks and balances for review of policy formulation and policy implementation which have been designed in our system function well and render it as an Islamic, popular, democratic and efficacious system.

MEI: Women have repeatedly made some important strides in the Islamic Republic. Please explain the Islamic Republic's view of the role of women in a Muslim society?

Rafsanjani: During the former regime, our women who were religious did not participate in social activities very much because of the corruption in and opposition to the regime. There was a distance between women and social affairs of the country. After the revolution, we invited the people to encourage their daughters to play a more active role in the society. And we encourage them very much to send their children to higher institutes of learning and research centers. Now, about 35 percent of our university students are women. And over 40 percent of school teachers are women. We do not have many women at the level of high management, but their number is increasing in the parliament and top management. We think the status of women has been enhanced and their future is even better in this country.

MEI: Mr. President, what is your vision of Iran's future? Where do you see Iran heading politically and economically? In what ways do you expect the Islamic Republic to respond and adapt in the future?

Rafsanjani: From an economic point of view, I see Iran to be very strong in the future, because of the rich resources. We have the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. From the human resources perspective, we are also in a good position. We are training very good human resource pools with bright futures. And priority in investment goes to infrastructure projects. From the political point of view, and internationally, we try to defuse the negative propaganda being waged against Iran. Since our policy is based on having friendly and cooperative relations with all the countries of the world, it is only natural to have good international relations. ■

Annex 20

CRS Report for Congress, "Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors", 9 August 1995

Excerpts: p. 1 & p. 21

CRS Report for Congress

Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

August 9, 1995



Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

sending agents outside Iraq to track regime opponents. Iraq was reportedly responsible for attacks in 1994 against a prominent oppositionist in Beirut (Lebanon subsequently broke relations with Iraq) and against members of the family of the late Iraqi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi.

Iraq provides safehaven and assistance to some non-Islamist Palestinian groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, including the Abu Nidal Organization, and Abu Abbas' faction of the PLF (Abbas reportedly enjoys sanctuary in Baghdad). Terrorist bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim also is based in Iraq. However, disrupting the peace process appears to be a secondary concern for Iraq. On many occasions, Iraqi officials, including Saddam, have said that any peace deal acceptable to the PLO would be acceptable to Iraq, and Saddam has traditionally had good relations with Arafat. Despite denials from both Israel and Iraq, there have been repeated reports since 1993 of some unofficial contacts between the two.

Iraq continues to provide backing for the Iranian opposition PMOI, and the PMOI's army, the National Liberation Army (NLA) has bases in Iraq, near the border with Iran. Iraq appears to maintain a degree of control over PMOI activities in Iraq, unleashing the organization when Iraq's relations with Iran deteriorate, and reining in the group when it wants to signal an improvement in ties with Tehran. Iraq suffers from severe shortages of hard currency as a result of international sanctions, and it is unclear to what degree Iraq can financially assist the PMOI. However, since the war with Iran, Iraq apparently has given the NLA a significant amount of surplus or captured military equipment.

Iraq was placed on the terrorism list when that list was started on Dec. 29, 1979. In March 1982, Iraq became the only country ever to be formally removed from the terrorism list.[43] It was restored to the list on Sept. 13, 1990 following its invasion of Kuwait and reports that Iraq was planning terrorist operations against the nascent allied coalition. The United States has blocked $1.66 billion in Iraqi assets in the United States, mostly bank deposits.

SUDAN

Many observers view Sudan as a passive sponsor of terrorism or, according to some, as a surrogate for Iran. The State Department's 1994 terrorism report notes that there was no evidence that Sudan conducted or sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994. The report says Sudan allows Iran to use Sudan as a transit point for weapons shipments to Islamic extremist groups and as a meeting site for Iranian-backed groups. There are a reported several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Sudan helping in the government's war against

[43] After it merged with North Yemen in 1990, South Yemen was no longer on the terrorism list, on the grounds that South Yemen no longer existed.

Annex 21

R. Smith and T. Lippman, "White House Agrees to Bill Allowing Covert Action Against Iran", *The Washington Post,* 22 December 1995

WHITE HOUSE AGREES TO BILL ALLOWING COVERT ACTION AGAINST IRAN

www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/12/22/white-house-agrees-to-bill-allowing-covert-action-against-iran/d74b535e-0c62-49f6-9893-7a83f4f91f99/

By R. Jeffrey Smith; Thomas W. Lippman By R. Jeffrey Smith; Thomas W. Lippman December 22, 1995

Bowing to pressure from House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), the Clinton administration has agreed to accept a House bill authorizing a small-scale covert action program aimed at moderating the radical Islamic regime in Iran, including cultivating new opponents to the regime, according to administration and congressional sources.

Gingrich has described Iran as "the most dangerous country in the world" and for weeks had been quietly holding up House approval of a $28 billion intelligence community spending bill in an effort to force the administration to accept a covert program that targets the Iranian government.

With support from Senate lawmakers, the administration resisted providing funding for any program aimed at overthrowing the Iranian regime, as CIA officials said it was unlikely to succeed. But House and Senate negotiators, acting with the consent of key administration officials, hammered out a deal on Tuesday that authorizes secret spending of up to $20 million for a covert anti-Iran program.

Instead of trying to overthrow the regime, however, the program would have the less ambitious aim of trying to blunt Iran's extremist policies and encourage it to move -- even slowly -- toward becoming a democracy, several sources said. The bill does not authorize any spending for lethal military aid to anti-Iran forces, such as the assistance the Reagan administration provided to the contra rebels in Nicaragua to try to destabilize the government there, several sources said.

The House passed the intelligence bill containing this secret provision on Iran yesterday, sources said. Congressional sources said the Senate was expected to approve it as well, possibly by today, and sources in Congress and the administration predicted President Clinton will sign the legislation shortly after he receives it. Two sources said the administration has agreed to spend some of the anti-Iran funds.

"For the most part, Gingrich is satisfied with the bill," a spokesman for the House speaker said, while declining to discuss what the bill said.

The funding plan is one of several recent U.S. initiatives that target the policies of Iran's leadership. The government has angered U.S. officials, who say it has tried to undermine the Middle East peace process, supported terrorism in the Middle East and other regions and allegedly tried to create a nuclear arsenal.

The Senate approved a bill yesterday that would tighten existing U.S. trade sanctions against Iran by punishing foreign companies that invest in the country's oil industry -- a bill the administration also has said it will accept. Earlier this week, U.S. officials formally agreed with representatives of 27 other nations to create a multilateral organization dedicated to stopping Iran and three other nations from obtaining armaments and militarily sensitive dual-use goods.

In approving the new sanctions against Iran, the Senate agreed to apply the same penalties against foreign companies that invest in Libya's oil business.

Sens. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) went after Libya, another oil-dependent economy, to mark the seventh anniversary of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya has refused to hand over two suspects in the bombing, which killed 270 people.

The measure probably would have less effect on Libya than on Iran because Libya, unlike Iran, is already under United Nations sanctions prohibiting some investment in the oil industry there.

Clinton, in remarks this week to a Saudi-owned London newspaper, Asharq al-Awsat, said "our problem is not with the people of Iran; it is with the unacceptable behavior of the Iranian government." He said the trade embargo was meant to "demonstrate our resolve to compel Tehran to pay a price for continuing its threatening activities."

The president said Washington could begin a direct dialogue with the Iranian regime only after these activities stop, according to a transcript of the interview released by the White House.

CIA Director John M. Deutch and other U.S. intelligence officers have told lawmakers in recent months that Iran's leadership faces no serious domestic opposition for at least the next three years, and they outlined various difficulties the CIA would face in trying to destabilize the government.

One major problem is that key Iranian opposition leaders operate from the territory of Iraq, a U.S. enemy, or receive Iraqi funding. The Clinton administration has refused to have any dealings with the principal opposition group, known as the Mujaheddin, but several members of Congress have urged the administration to reconsider its position.

On the other hand, U.S. intelligence officials say the Iranian regime has been under growing economic pressure resulting from widespread corruption and a mountain of unpaid foreign debt. A senior U.S. defense official predicted two weeks ago that "Iran will moderate" in the coming decade, even though it is unlikely to abandon its ambition to become the dominant regional power.

The campaign against Iran has been strongly supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the chief pro-Israel lobbying organization. AIPAC has aggressively lobbied for the new sanctions legislation, which would impose penalties on foreign corporations, banks and lending institutions that make major investments in Iran's oil and gas industries, the country's principal source of revenue.

Clinton already has banned U.S.-based firms from doing business with Iran. Congress cannot prohibit foreign corporations from investing there, but the Senate bill is intended to force foreign organizations to choose between doing business with Iran and doing business with the United States.

The Senate bill was put on a fast legislative track because its chief sponsors, including D'Amato, want to set the Iranian economy back further by heading off several large new petroleum development projects for which Iran has been seeking foreign partners.

Similar measures are under consideration in the House, where staff members of both parties predicted adoption of a bill stronger than the Senate bill, probably including a ban on exports to the United States by foreign corporations investing in Iran.

Gingrich has been raising alarms about Iran periodically for at least the past year. He has called it a "terroristic state . . . committed to defeating the West in any way it can" and said Iranian-backed terrorism poses "a permanent, long-term threat to civilized life on this planet." He has further warned that Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction could enable it "to annihilate Tel Aviv and in the long run to annihilate Chicago or Atlanta."

Gingrich told a Jewish group in October that he favored making "Iran a real project," after earlier likening the idea to a "a serious, sophisticated campaign plan" or a battlefield effort "that applies all sorts of indirect pressures." He has only vaguely described what this plan should consist of but said in February that its aim should be to replace the regime in Iran.

In April, however, he spelled out two other potential goals: "moderating" the regime, or merely guaranteeing that it "never gets nuclear weapons." Both are comparable to what the administration states it is trying to do already, by supporting the trade embargo and pressuring U.S. allies not to export sensitive equipment to Iran.

The Iranian government, for its part, has attacked Gingrich for his "parochial ignorance" and "lack of mental equilibrium." The Iranian parliamentary speaker, Ali Akbar Nategh Nuri, has called Gingrich an "imbecile." Last autumn, the country also said his criticism amounted to "state terrorism."

Annex 22

S. Robinson, "Gingrich in call to arms against Iran terror bases", *The Daily Telegraph*, 5 August 1996

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HEADLINE: Gingrich in call to arms against Iran terror bases

BYLINE: By Stephen Robinson

BODY:

PRESIDENT Clinton must take whatever action is **necessary,** including military force, to close terrorist training camps in Iran identified by **United States** intelligence, the Republican leadership said yesterday. **Newt Gingrich,** the House Speaker, called it "intolerable" that America could only wait while up to 5,000 terrorists were being trained for attacks on Americans. He said that the Republican leadership in Congress would back military action Mr Clinton deemed **necessary,** even if it helped his re-election effort. "We have every right as a nation to defend ourselves by saying to the **Iranian** government either you close those camps down or we will," **Mr Gingrich** said. "We do know that international terrorism is almost entirely subsidised by Iran, and that means that Iran is engaged surreptitiously in acts of war against the **United States." Mr Gingrich** spoke as if offering Mr Clinton the support of the opposition, but his comments could also be read as a challenge. If evidence mounts of Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism, and especially in regard to the TWA Flight 800 crash, Mr Clinton could find himself forced to act by the weight of public opinion. William Perry, US Defence Secretary, said that the detonator and type of explosive used to bomb a US barracks in Saudi Arabia last month were from military stocks, which suggested a foreign government's involvement. It was well known that Iran was at the forefront of attacks on American interests, he said, and promised "strong action" if **Teheran** is found to be behind the bombing that killed 19 American servicemen. However, he played down the likelihood of an imminent military US operation against Iran. Michael Portillo, the Defence Secretary, said Britain would need clear evidence of a state's involvement before it backed US military action. Iran yesterday told Washington to stop sabre-rattling, and asked the United Nations to intervene before the rhetoric got out of control.

Annex 23

"Transcript of interview with Mohammad Khatami, Former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran", *CNN*, 7 January 1998

Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami

January 7, 1998
Web posted at: 7:06 p.m. EST (0006 GMT)

AMANPOUR: Mr. President, a month ago you announced that you had a historic message to deliver to the people of America. I understand that message will take the form of a short address and then we'll discuss the issues.

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. At the outset, I would like to congratulate all free and noble women and men especially the followers of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), on the occasion of the New Year. I take as a good omen the concurrence of the Christian New Year with the Islamic month of Ramadan, the month of edification and self-restraint that has been the goal of all divine prophets.

We are at the close of the 20th century, leaving behind a century full of inequality, violence, and conflict. We pray to the Almighty to enable us to begin a new century of humanity, understanding, and durable peace, so that all humanity would enjoy the blessings of life. Once again I would like to present my felicitations to all the followers of Jesus Christ, to all human beings, and particularly to the American people.

I have said earlier that I respect the great American people. In this short span of time, I wish to briefly present my analysis of the American civilization so that my remarks would not be taken as political nicety or a mere play on words.

The American civilization is worthy of respect. When we appreciate the roots of this civilization, its significance becomes even more apparent. As you know, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, there is a rock which is respected and revered by all Americans. The secret of American civilization lies in this rock. In early 17th century, those 125 men, women, and children who left England in search of a virgin land to establish a superior civilization finally landed on this rock. The reason why the American people respect this rock is that it was the place where the Puritan pilgrims first landed. From then on, the Americans celebrate the last Thursday of November as Thanksgiving Day, thanking God for this success bestowed upon them.

The American civilization is founded upon the vision,

thinking, and manners of the Puritans. Certainly, others such as adventurers, those searching for gold, and even sea pirates, also arrived in the U.S. But the American nation has never celebrated their arrival and never considered it to be the beginning of their civilization. The Puritans constituted a religious sect whose vision and characteristics, in addition to worshipping God, was in harmony with republicanism, democracy, and freedom. They found the European climate too restrictive for the implementation of their ideas and thoughts.

Unfortunately, in the 16th, 17th, and even 18th centuries, there was a serious clash between religion and liberty. In my opinion, one of the biggest tragedies in human history is this confrontation between religion and liberty which is to the detriment of religion, liberty, and the human beings who deserve to have both. The Puritans desired a system which combined the worship of God and human dignity and freedom.

This civilization was founded in New England and gradually spread to the entire America and it even clashed with certain evil trends which has caused slavery in certain states and ultimately succeeded in abolishing slavery. There were numerous martyrs who gave their lives for this cause, the most famous of which was Abraham Lincoln, the strong and fair-minded American president.

This civilization is best described by the renowned French sociologist Alexi de Toqueville who spent some two years in the U.S. in the 19th century and wrote the valuable book entitled Democracy in America, which I am sure most Americans have read. This book reflects the virtuous and human side of this civilization. In his view, the significance of this civilization is in the fact that liberty found religion as a cradle for its growth, and religion found protection of liberty as its divine calling. Therefore, liberty and faith never clashed. And as we see, even today Americans are a religious people. Therefore, the Anglo-American approach to religion relies on the principle that religion and liberty are consistent and compatible. I believe that if humanity is looking for happiness, it should combine religious spirituality with the virtues of liberty.

And it is for this reason that I say I respect the American nation because of their great civilization. This respect is due to two reasons: the essence and pillars of the Anglo-American civilization and the dialogue among the civilizations.

You are cognizant of the great heritage of the Iranian nation with its glorious civilization and culture. Irans glorious civilization was concurrent with the Greek city states and the Roman Empire. After the advent of Islam, the Iranians ardently embraced it. The blend of Iranian talents and the sublime Islamic teachings was a miracle. Without intending to deny the share of other nations in the formation of the Islamic civilization, I believe the great Iranian civilization had a major role in developing and promoting the Islamic system.

Over the past two centuries, the Iranian nation has striven to establish liberty, independence and a noble way of life. The Constitutional Movement colonialism. Ultimately, the Islamic Revolution had-and should have-two directions: First, an interpretation of religion which couples religiosity with liberty. Of course, now that four centuries have passed since the beginning of the American civilization, human experience has taught us that prosperous life should hinge on three pillars: religiosity, liberty, and justice. These are the assets and aspirations of the Islamic Revolution as it enters the 21st century.

In terms of the dialogue of civilizations, we intend to benefit from the achievements and experiences of all civilizations, Western and non-Western, and to hold dialogue with them. The closer the pillars and essences of these two civilizations are, the easier the dialogue would become. With our revolution, we are experiencing a new phase of reconstruction of civilization. We feel that what we seek is what the founders of the American civilization were also pursuing four centuries ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the essence of the American civilization.

Second, there is the issue of the independence. The American nation was the harbinger of independence struggles, the initiator of efforts to establish independence, for whose cause it has offered many sacrifices, leading ultimately to the Declaration of Independence which is an important document on human dignity and rights.

Finally, I should refer to the struggles of the Iranian people over the last two centuries which culminated in the quest for independence during the Islamic Revolution launched by Imam Khomeini. When Imam Khomeini launched the revolution, Iran was in a terrible condition. In other words, the Iranian nation had been humiliated and its fate was decided by others. You know that a remarkable feature of Imam Khomeinis struggle was his fight against capitulation which the Shah was forced to ratify making the American advisors immune from prosecution in Iran. This was the worst humiliation for our people. They rose up, fought for independence, and emerged victorious. Of course, the war of the revolution was one of words not weapons. We, therefore, endeavored to obtain a novel experience of religion and to gain independence. Both these features are salient in the American civilization and we feel close to them.

But here I have to express pity over a tragedy which has occurred. Unfortunately, policies pursued by American politicians outside the United States over the past half a century since World War II are incompatible with the American civilization which is founded on democracy, freedom and human dignity. We ardently wished that those who enforced this foreign policy were representatives of the prominent American civilization; a civilization which was achieved at a heavy cost, and not the representatives of those adventurers who were defeated by the American people themselves.

This flawed policy of domination had three setbacks: One was

severe damages that it incurred upon the deprived and oppressed nations, including our own. The other setback was that it dashed the hopes of the people of the colonized world, who had placed their trust in the U.S. tradition of struggle for independence. When the policies for domination were implemented in the name of the American people, the nations lost their trust in the Americans. This represents a grave damage done by the U.S. policies on the American nation. The Third and most important of these setbacks is that what was implemented was done in name of a great people that had risen for freedom. I feel that the American politicians should realize this fact and adjust themselves with the standards of Anglo-American and American civilization and at least apologize to their own people because of the approach they have adopted.

AMANPOUR: You said that you wanted to use this interview to deliver a message to the American people. I've lived in America, and I know the concerns of the average American when it comes to Iran. And its the message that has come out of Iran for the last twenty years, the message; hostage taking, the message of death to America, the message of burning the American flag, the message that almost looks like Islam has declared a war against America and the west. Let me ask you first about the hostage crisis which is emblazoned in every American's mind. As you know, in all revolutions, the communist revolution in Russia, the French revolution, perhaps even the American revolution, the early years contain many excesses. Would you say that taking the American hostages, at the beginning of the Iranian Islamic revolution falls into the category of early revolutionary excesses?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: Thank you for your question. I believe that first we have to analyze events within their proper context and with circumspection. The image of Islam which has been presented, and I dont want to accuse anyone here, has been an erroneous one. Islam is a religion which calls all humanity, irrespective of religion or belief, to rationality and logic. Islam invites followers of all divine religions to unite around God worship and all Muslims to fraternity. The Islam which we know and practice and founded our revolution on recognized the right of all human beings to determine their own destiny. It declares that relations among nations must be based on logic and mutual respect. Such Islam is enemy to no nation, enemy to no religion. It seeks dialogue, understanding and peace with all nations. One of the major flaws in the U.S. foreign policy, which I recently construed as being behind times, is that they continue to live with cold war mentality and try to create a perceived enemy. Here I dont wish to insult anyone. I know that there are quite a few wise and fair-minded statesmen in the United States, but the outcome of the interplay with the U.S. policy has shaped the U.S. policy in a manner that continues to be a prisoner of cold war mentality. After the collapse of communism, there has been an attempt by certain circles to portray Islam as the new enemy, and regrettably they are targeting progressive Islam rather than certain regressive interpretations of Islam. They attack an Islam which seeks democracy, progress and development; an Islam which calls for utilization of achievements of human civilization including that of the west.

With regard to the hostage issue which you raised, I do know that the feelings of the great American people have been hurt, and of course I regret it. Yet, these same feelings were also hurt when bodies of young Americans were brought back from Vietnam, but the American people never blamed the Vietnamese people, but rather blamed their own politicians for dragging their country and its youth into the Vietnam quagmire. The pressure by the American people terminated that senseless and inhuman war. In fact the American people themselves brought that war to an end.

The feelings of our people were seriously hurt by U.S. policies. And as you said, in the heat of the revolutionary fervor, things happen which cannot be fully contained or judged according to usual norms. This was the crying out of the people against humiliations and inequities imposed upon them by the policies of the U.S. and others, particularly in the early days of the revolution. With the grace of God, today our new society has been institutionalized and we have a popularly elected powerful government, and there is no need for unconventional methods of expression of concerns and anxieties. And I believe when there is logic, especially when there are receptive ears, there is no need other than discourse, debate and dialogue.

AMANPOUR: So, are you saying that despite the grievances that you talk about, with hindsight, if you had to do this all again, would Iran have done it differently at that time?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: As I said, everything must be analyzed within its own context. The events of those days must be viewed within the context of revolutionary fervor and the pressures to which the Iranian nation was subjected, causing it to seek a way to express its anxieties and concerns. Today we are in the period of stability, and fully adhere to all norms of conduct regulating relations between nations and governments.

With the grace of God, today all the affairs of country are being conducted within the framework of law. And as I have stated, both in domestic and foreign affairs, we shall endeavor to strengthen the rule of law in every respect.

AMANPOUR: Mr. President, Americans, the average American, is familiar with one image of Iran, death to America, the burning of the American flag, and as we talked about, the hostages. You talk about a new chapter in relations between the peoples of the world. What can you say to the Americans listening tonight, to show that person that your Iran is a new Iran or a different Iran?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: I say that these issues should be examined with due consideration to their root causes and various dimensions. There are slogans being changed in Iran. But, you as a journalist can ask all those chanting the slogans whether they are targeting the American people. And they would all say no. Not only we do not harbor any ill wishes for the American people, but in fact we consider them to be great nation. Our aim is not even to destroy or undermine the

American government. These slogans symbolize a desire to terminate a mode of relations which existed between Iran and the United States. This is a response to that grave affront by a former U.S. defense secretary who said the Iranian nation must be rooted out. It is also a response to the downing of the Iranian airliner that killed about 300 innocent people, mostly women and children. Even if we accept that the shooting was accidental, the decoration of the commander of the American naval vessel responsible for the tragedy was indeed adding insult to injury. There is also the recent allocation $20 million by the U.S. Congress to topple the Iranian government. Our people consider U.S. foreign policy to be aimed at undermining and confrontation with itself. And, in fact, they want the death of this relationship. No one has the intention of insulting the American nation and we even consider the U.S. government as the legitimate and lawful representative American flag, which represents its nationhood, and which hurts the collective feelings of the nation. As far as I know, the Leader of the Revolution and other authorities are also not happy with this practice. There might be actions taking place that might not meet with your approval. Yet I am sure that those doing such actions do not intend to insult the American people. And we hope that actions which might be interpreted as anti-American people and nation would not take place.

AMANPOUR: You say that you want to talk to the American people. Are you prepared to sit down eventually and talk to the American government about the issues that you have just mentioned tonight that separate and divide you?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: Firstly, nothing should prevent dialogue and understanding between two nations, especially between their scholars and thinkers. Right now, I recommend the exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and tourists. A large number of educated and noble Iranians now reside in the U.S. as representatives of the Iranian nation. This shows that there is no hostility between the two nations. But the dialogue between civilizations and nations is different from political relations. In regard to political relations, we have to consider the factors which lead to the severance of relations. If some day another situation is to emerge, we must definitely consider the roots and relevant factors and try to eliminate them.

Firstly, I have to state that U.S. foreign policy behavior toward Iran has inflicted damages upon us. But is also had a positive effect. It caused us to mainly focus on our domestic capabilities and resources to advance our objectives. Now, too, we feel no need for ties with the U.S., especially as the modern world is so diverse and plural that we can reach our objectives without U.S. assistance. I especially feel that many progressive countries-including the Europeans- are far more advanced in their foreign policies than the U.S.. We are carrying out our own activities and have no need for political ties with the United States.

But the point is that the political behavior of governments should not deprive nations from enjoying the opportunities provided by each side. There is a bulky wall of mistrust between us and the U.S. Administration, a mistrust rooted in

improper behaviors of the American governments. As an example of this type of U.S. behavior, I should refer to admitted involvement of the U.S. Government in the 1953 coup detat which toppled Mosaddeqs national government, immediately followed by a $45 million loan to strengthen unpopular foreign installed Government. I should also refer to the Capitulation Law imposed by the U.S. on Iran.

The attitude of the U.S. after the victory of the revolution has not been a civilized one. They have adopted a hostile policy against Iran. They have tried to inflict economic damage upon us, a clear example of which is the DAmato act which represents a continuation of cold war mentality and the lack of appreciation of realities to the point that they even want to impose their will upon other countries such as European countries and Japan or the allocation of the already mentioned $20 million to topple the Iranian government.

The success of our revolution has come at a great cost to our nation. And the U.S. has a major share in the cost imposed upon the Iranian nation. There is a grave mistrust between us. If negotiations are not based on mutual respect, they will never lead to positive results. The condition is that American foreign policy should abandon its instrumental rationality and stop considering adopt an approach based on communicative rationality which is inherent in the American civilization.

There must first be a crack in this wall of mistrust to prepare for a change and create an opportunity to study a new situation. Unfortunately, the behavior of American Government in the past up to this date has always exacerbated the climate of mistrust and we do not detect any sign of change of behavior.

We are looking for a world in which misunderstandings can be overcome, nations can understand one another and mutual respect and logic govern relations among states. It is the right of every nation to stand on its principles and values and have the expectation of respect and dignity from others.

AMANPOUR: Then where does this dialogue, this message to the people of the United States lead?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: When I speak of dialogue, I intend dialogue between civilizations and cultures. Such discourse should be centered around thinkers and intellectuals. I believe that all doors should now be opened for such dialogue and understanding and possibilities for contact even between American understanding between our two nations, a better future for both countries and nations may be forged.

AMANPOUR: Let me ask you some specific issues that concern the people of the United States. As you know, many U.S experts say that the evidence is overwhelming, that elements of the Iranian authorities, Iranian officials, provide not only political and moral, but financial support to organizations that commit acts of terrorism, and result in the deaths of innocent women and children. If you were presented with proof and with evidence that any kind of Iranian was

involved in that kind of financial support or act, what would you do about it?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: You see, this is another example of the sort of problem that exists between us and the United States. They first level unfair and unsubstantiated accusations against you. And when they propose to hold talks, they say that they want to have a dialogue with you about these very unfounded accusations. They are in fact trying to put the other side on triai.

Well, let me tell you this. We believe in the holy Quran that says: slaying of one innocent person is tantamount to the slaying of all humanity. How could such a religion, and those who claim to be its followers get involved in the assassination of innocent individuals and the slaughter of innocent human beings. We categorically reject all these allegations.

Secondly, the logic of history has proven that violence is not the way to achieve desired end. I personally believe that only those who lack logic resort to violence. Terrorism should be condemned in all its forms and manifestations; assassins must be condemned. Terrorism is useless anyway and we condemn it categorically. Those who level these charges against us are best advised to provide accurate and objective evidence, which indeed does not exist.

AMANPOUR: If you were provided with the proof that an Iranian official had used any kind of Iranian funds to reward or finance any group or individual that was involved in an act of terrorism, would you punish that person or that organization?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: Certainly if I learn of any instance of such assistance to terrorism, I shall deal with it, so will our Leader, and so will our entire system. At the same time, supporting peoples who fight for the liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism. It is, in fact, supporting those who are engaged in combating state terrorism. AMANPOUR: Regardless of the motive, do you believe that killing innocent women and children is terrorism, as for instance what happens on the streets of Israel?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: It is definitely so. Any form of killing of innocent men and women who are not involved in confrontations is terrorism; it must be condemned, and we, in our term, condemn every form of it in the world.

AMANPOUR: Americans say that they have reports that Iranian officials abroad regularly engage in acts of surveillance against Americans, the sort of surveillance that could be interpreted as preceeding an attack. Do you think that is appropriate?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: I deny this categorically. On our part there has been no new move, no special measures with regard to the United States in external fields; this is another false rumor spread by those who bear a grudge against us.

AMANPOUR: Iran has said that it doesn't agree with the Middle East peace process. Yasser Arafat was elected as a representative of the Palestinian legitimate aims. And he has entered into a peace process. Do you think that it is appropriate for any foreign power to engage in supporting the groups that are fighting against Yasser Arafat -- the groups such as Hamas and others?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: First of all, we have declared our opposition to the Middle East peace process because we believe it will not succeed. At the same time, we have clearly said that we dont intend to impose our views on others or to stand in their way. In our view all Palestinians have the right to express their views about their land, including the millions of Palestinians in Diaspora. They too have a right to self determination. Only then can there be a lasting peace. We seek a peace through which Jews, Muslims and Christians, and indeed each and every Palestinian, could freely determine their own destiny. And we are prepared to contribute towards the realization of that peace.

But let me elaborate a little for the American people on my views about U.S. Middle East policy. Anti-semitism is indeed a western phenomenon. It has no precedence in Islam or in the east. Jews and Muslims have lived harmoniously together for centuries. In the east, we have had despotism and dictatorship, but never had fascism or nazism. These, too, are also western phenomena, and the west has paid dearly to combat them. What concerns me is that, first, this western anti-semitism has turned into a tool for the imposition of a whole range of improper policies and practices on the people of the Middle East and Muslims in general. Secondly, I am concerned that this western dilemma may be projected elsewhere, that is fascism and nazism are suppressed in the west, they may resurface in another form in western policies elsewhere.

Obviously, Washington is the U.S. capital where policy decision on U.S. national interests must be made. However, the impression of the people of the Middle East and Muslims in general is that certain foreign policy decisions of the U.S. are in fact made in Tel Aviv and not in Washington. And I regret to say that the improper American policy of unbridled support for the aggressions of a racist terrorist regime does not serve U.S. interests, nor does it even serve that of the Jewish people. Zionists constitute a small portion of the Jewish people and have openly declared and proven in practice that they are expansionist. The Israeli intransigence in the course of the current peace process, and its failure to honor its own undertakings has enraged even U.S. allies in the region. In my view, peace can come to the Middle East when all Palestinians, Jews and Muslims alike, can determine the future of the land. That should include those living in Palestine as well as those refugees living elsewhere. Only then can a stable and lasting peace be established. Many in the world might share our view, and many may differ with us. We simply present our opinion, and have the greatest respect for all Palestinians who are concerned about the future of Palestine. Meanwhile, we believe the United States should not risk the substantial prestige and credibility of the American people on supporting a racist regime which does not even have the

backing of the Jewish people.

The subject of Middle East peace is one that needs a sober and pragmatic analysis. We believe that it will not succeed, because it is not just and it does not address the rights of all parties in an equitable manner. We are prepared to contribute to an international effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

AMANPOUR: Mr. President, you know another concern of the west is Iran's nuclear program. Would you consider entering a special agreement, a special sort of situation with the atomic energy agency, for special monitoring, if that would lessen the fears of the people you say you want to have a better dialogue with?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: We are a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The official representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency have inspected our facilities in Iran several times, and have publicly declined that we are not planning on building nuclear weapons and only aim to employ nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is ironic that those who are so concerned about saving humanity from nuclear weapons, fully support Israel which is a nuclear power and is unwilling to join the NPT or accept IAEA safeguards, while leveling allegations against Iran which has not even been able to complete its first nuclear power plant which began before the revolution. These are all pretexts for imposing certain policies on Iran and the region and to create panic and mistrust. We are not a nuclear power and do not intend to become one. We have accepted IAEA safeguards and our facilities are routinely inspected by that agency.

AMANPOUR: Mr. President, you are the president of Iran. You have made certain promises to the people of Iran, and now you have said certain things about dialogue with other countries. Can you implement your promises to the people of Iran? Do you have the authority and the room to maneuver? And in foreign policy, are you able to implement foreign policy?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: Surely, after being elected, one should abide by ones promises and not to retract on them. I am determined to fulfill my promises and I believe the atmosphere is conducive and would improve day by day. Each person will carry out his tasks in his legal capacity. The President shoulders the important task of enforcing the Constitution. I have set up a Constitution Monitoring Group for the first time ever and this group is actively working to locate instances of violations or incorrect enforcement of the Constitution. We will be seriously address any shortcoming in the implementation or violation of the Constitution. And we shall succeed. Iran has one government which makes decisions on domestic and foreign policies within the framework of its duties. Of course, there are many issues that should be approved by the Parliament. The overall policies are determined by the eminent Leadership. But it is the government that has to enforce them. I feel there is no barrier along the way of the government authority and the government accepts it own responsibility. We will surely

implement any policy that we formulate. It is possible that preliminary steps in certain areas might need time. But when we arrive at a policy, we will definitely carry it out. The government is responsible to carry out duties associated with its sovereign responsibilities in the society.

AMANPOUR: There is quite a lot of opposition from the conservative faction. How are you able to operate within this climate?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: When we speak of democratic government, or government of the people, it means that we accept opposition. We cannot possibly have a society with no opposition at all. Such differences of opinion are natural and they are to be found in all societies. We should learn not to allow such differences to turn into confrontation, but to direct them into their legal channels. Certainly there are elements who are opposing our government, but so long as their opposition is practiced within the provisions of the Constitution, we certainly respect them. But those wishing to impose their will against the law will naturally be dealt with through the proper legal channels. We accept both internal differences as well as any opposition that accepts the Constitutional framework, even if they openly oppose the government.

AMANPOUR: On the one hand, a lot of people want more openess, more freedom for all the things that you have even talked about. You are also appointing reform-minded ministers. On the other hand, there are still, if I could call them thugs, who are on the streets, interfering with women who they don't like their appearance, preventing certain professors from going to school. There is a confrontation. Where can you lead this confrontation?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: I do not consider this a serious conflict. Of course, there are various tendencies, which were present during the elections as well. The people have made their decision. What I have said and continue to insist on is that rule of law should be paramount, and no one should consider himself above the law and try to impose his views on others. Some of these frictions are quite natural in a democratic society. Our objective is to bring everything within the framework of the law. There may be occasional irregularities and actions outside the legal framework. But we will spare no effort to institutionalize the rule of law. Of course, to begin with, we have to create understanding amongst ourselves and learn to tolerate each other. You cannot bring about understanding and tolerance in the society by force. We are determined that there should only be one government in the society by force. We are determined that there should only be one government in the society and every one must submit to the law. I think that it is universally accepted that law is the basis of social order. Fortunately, our leader fully subscribes to this view. I hope that we can take more and more practical steps for the realization of the rule of law in our society.

AMANPOUR: Nonetheless there are two factions that seem to

have been identified in Iran right now. The more conservative and the one that you lead, the reform minded, the more moderate. Where do you think that Iran will be one year from now? Will there be the freedoms and openess that you have talked about?

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: Let these divisions find their meanings within their own context. Terms such as conservative, moderate and the like are more often meaningful in the West. Of course we have differences of opinion in Iran too, and one political tendency firmly believes in the prevalence of logic and the rule of law while there might be another tendency that believes it is entitled to go beyond the law. Anyway, such issues need tolerance and we must try to bring about such an understanding as to enable us to stay together while having differences of view but not let things become chaotic. Should we carefully prepare the ground for the implementation of the law in our society, there shall be no problem vis-a-vis such oppositions. I consider them natural and we need not worry about it. Of course reaching an ideal society with all its affairs in proper order needs time. We have the necessary patience, so do our people and we shall all try to move towards an orderly society where logic and law reign supreme.

AMANPOUR: Mr. President, thank you very much for joining us.

PRESIDENT KHATAMI: I thank you very much and I thank all dear viewers for their patience.

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Annex 24

R. Wright, "Some See Hypocrisy in U.S. Stand on Iraq Arms Mideast: Officials say American intelligence aided Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Iran in 80s", *Los Angeles Times*, 16 February 1998

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Some See Hypocrisy in U.S. Stand on Iraq Arms

Mideast: Officials say American intelligence aided Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Iran in '80s.

February 16, 1998 | ROBIN WRIGHT | TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON — A decade before the current showdown over weapons of mass destruction, the United States turned a blind eye when Iraq used American intelligence for operations against Iran that made rampant use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, according to senior Clinton administration and former intelligence officials.

The attacks against civilian and military targets during the Iran-Iraq War included some of the most pervasive uses of chemical weapons anywhere since World War I.

The combination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and American intelligence eventually helped turn the tide of the eight-year war in Baghdad's favor. The collaboration reached a peak shortly after a secret U.S. estimate projected for the first time that Iran could win one of the century's bloodiest wars.

"We knew [the Iraqis] used chemicals in any major campaign," said a former U.S. intelligence official familiar with the American role. "Although we publicly opposed the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, we knew the intelligence we gave the Iraqis would be used to develop their own operational plans for chemical weapons."

Now, 10 years later, the United States is trying to rally world support for the use of military strikes to destroy the same kinds of Iraqi weapons--on the grounds that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to use them in the future.

As the U.S. struggles to assemble a new coalition to force Iraq to give up such weapons, administration officials acknowledge the apparent hypocrisy in U.S. policy. The United States, under President Reagan, "virtually encouraged" the use of chemical weapons a decade ago, noted a frustrated senior Clinton administration official.

But the shift also reflects changes in the political landscape, U.S. officials now argue. In the 1980s, "Saddam Hussein was the great white hope" holding back what was then viewed as a militant Islamic tide from Iran, the administration official said. "They built this guy up and let him do whatever it took to win. And that included the use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles."

The climax of the relationship was the 1988 Iraqi counterattack at the Faw Peninsula, a swampy but strategic southern oil port captured by Iran in 1986. Iraq lost the peninsula in part because U.S. intelligence misread an Iranian military buildup.

To help regain the peninsula, U.S. intelligence sources provided data on Iran's equipment and troop strength that guided the Iraqi military in designing and staging a dress rehearsal of the offensive, the sources say. Washington had an "additional incentive" to provide detailed data because of its role in the loss of Faw, a former U.S. diplomat said.

Iraq's 1988 counterattack was a rapid success. And the casualties were among the grisliest of the war. Thousands of Iranian troops were killed, many because gas masks did not fit snugly enough over their beards and thus allowed seepage of lethal toxins. Empty syringes, some of which had contained a faulty antidote, were found beside hundreds of bodies, the sources said.

The Reagan administration never actively encouraged Iraq's use of chemical weapons or missiles. And officially, it was neutral in the Iran-Iraq War.

But Washington was well aware that Iraq began using chemical weapons in 1983 and intensified their use in 1986, creating a pattern that made it virtually impossible not to know that Iraq intended to use chemical weapons on the Faw Peninsula, former intelligence officials said.

"By 1986, Iraq had proven itself better at the use of chemical weapons than any fighting force in the world," said a former senior U.S. diplomat involved in Iraq. By 1988, Iraq's use of gases had also repeatedly been documented by U.N. specialists.

"It was all done with a wink and a nod," said a former U.S. intelligence official. "We knew exactly where this stuff was going, although we bent over backwards to look the other way." Washington knew Iraq was "dumping boatloads" of chemical weapons on Iranian positions, he added.

Missiles were also pivotal in turning the war in Iraq's favor, especially when Iraq fired Russian-made Scuds on Iranian civilian areas and major cities, including Tehran. The "war of the cities," during which Iran also targeted Iraq, eventually gave better-equipped Iraq a strong psychological edge in the conflict.

Today, Reagan administration officials contend that they could not have prevented Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction.

"Get real. We couldn't have stopped him," said a former National Security Council staffer. "The Iraqis were fighting for survival."

Policy at the time, said another former Reagan official, recognized that "Hussein is a bastard. But at the time, he was our bastard."

Ironically, the most difficult task initially was persuading the Iraqis to believe U.S. intelligence data.

"We gave them so much help with intelligence in the conduct of overall campaigns--showing them where Iran was moving troops, where it was most vulnerable, and projecting how to exploit both to their advantage," the former intelligence official said.

At first, Iraq ignored or discarded much of the American data. "It took a long time for them to trust us and listen to us," the official said. "Eventually, it sunk in that we were telling them what they needed to know."

The Faw operation was the high point of a blooming relationship between Baghdad and Washington that was founded on a common fear of and deep enmity toward Iran. It overcame more fundamental differences over Israel that led Iraq to sever relations with the U.S. in 1967.

After relations resumed in 1984, U.S. intelligence agents began to provide data about Iran's military operations, largely from satellite photography. The goal at

one stage was to provide a counterweight to the supply of arms and intelligence the Reagan administration was providing to Iran as part of the 1985-86 arms-for-hostages swap, according to Reagan administration officials.

But in 1986, as the Iran-Iraq War began to turn decisively in Iran's favor, the pace of U.S. intelligence information escalated as part of a bid to at least restore Iraq's edge.

The United States was not alone. In advance of the Faw counteroffensive, France, Egypt and Jordan provided help in reorganizing and retraining the weary Iraqi military, Reagan administration officials point out.

And the very countries now most threatened by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction helped pay for them, according to U.S. officials. Of the $100 billion Iraq spent on arms during the 1980s, up to $40 billion was provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, either in cash or in free oil.

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Annex 25

"Riyadh accepts for first time that bombers of US base were Saudi", *Agence France Press*, 21 May 1998

(1) 21 05 1998 RIYADH ACCEPTS FOR FIRST TIME THAT BOMBERS OF US BASE WERE SAUDI
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE World Reporter (67:Q1)

A Saudi official for the first time Thursday acknowledged that only Saudi nationals were behind the June 1996 bombing that killed 19 US airmen at a base in the eastern city of Dhahran.
The bombing of Dhahran "was carried out by Saudi hands," Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef ibn Abdel Aziz said in an interview to be published Friday by the Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai Al-Am.
"No foreign party had a role" in the bombing which cost the lives of 19 US servicemen, Prince Nayef told the paper.
It is the first time that a Saudi official has so clearly ruled out any foreign participation in the bombing.
In the past the Saudi authorities have sought to play down suggestions that it faces any internal opposition organized enough to carry out an attack of the sophistication of the 1996 lorry-bomb attack against the US base.
Prince Nayaf hinted that the Saudi security services were currently holding and questioning suspects in connection with the attack.
"The authorities are not obtaining statements through recourse to torture," he said.
The Washington Post reported not long after the attack that the testimony of some of those arrested as well as other evidence implicated Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly denied any involvement in the bombing.
Last year Riyadh requested the extradition from the United States of a Saudi national, Hani Abdel Rahim al-Sayegh, 28.
Sayegh was extradited to the United States in June 1997 from Canada where he had sought politcal asylum in March.
Canadian and US authorities say that Sayegh helped to plan the attack and gave the signal for it and admitted belonging to a Saudi group using the name Hezbollah.
The implication of Hezbollah in the bombing again puts Tehran in the firing line, but Riyadh has refrained from pointing the finger at Tehran this time.
The government of Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a recent rapprochement with the government of President Mohammad Khatami, the moderate cleric who came to power twelve months ago.
In November 1996 the Iranian ambassador in Riyadh congratulated the Saudi authorities on the objectivity of their inquiries into the bombing.
In March 1997 Iran denied a report in the US daily Newsday that it was sheltering the presumed mastermind of the attack.
The Canadian intelligence services named the suspect as Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad Mughassil.
After the bombing he fled to Syria and then on to Iran, where he is living under the protection of the Iranian government, according to a US terrorism expert cited by Newsday.
Both Iran and Syria have formally denied any involvement in the bombing.
In late 1996 reports that the Saudi authorities had detained two Kuwaiti nationals in connection with the attack prompted a denial from Kuwait.
Western diplomats in Riyadh told AFP at the time that the Saudis had arrested six suspects - three Saudi nationals and three Shiite Moslems, two of them Kuwaiti and one Lebanese.
The diplomats said that the six were part of a Shiite network linking Saudis with nationals of other Gulf states and Arab veterans of the war against the then Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority in its eastern province near Dhahran as well as in the southwest on its border with Yemen.
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World Reporter (Trade Mark)

Annex 26

S. Galster, "Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War – Afghanistan: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990", *The National Security Archive,* 9 October 2001

The National Security Archive

The September 11th Sourcebooks

Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War

AFGHANISTAN: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1973-1990

by Steve Galster

October 9, 2001

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On an August afternoon in a city thousands of miles from home, a U.S. diplomat sat within the secure confines of his Embassy office preparing to write up his weekly summary report, while sounds of sporadic gunfire reverberated from the surrounding mountains into the bustling streets and bazaars outside. It was a typical scene, except this time the diplomat decided to include in his communiqué, a rather provocative idea that would capture more attention than usual back in Washington, D.C. It would, in fact, help push his obscure, low-level assignment all the way to the forefront of the Cold War. The overthrow of the country's communist leadership, he wrote, "could well have positive repercussions for the U.S. throughout the Third World by demonstrating that our adversaries' view of the 'inevitable course' of history is not necessarily accurate."(1)

The year was 1979. The country, of course, was Afghanistan. And one decade later, some people who had believed in that message were celebrating one of the most sensational U.S. victories in the history of the Cold War: the withdrawal of 100,000 demoralized Soviet troops from Afghanistan, marking the first time that the Red Army had withdrawn under fire from a nation it had occupied since World War II. The Afghan socialist revolution, it seemed, had failed.

At the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director William Webster and his euphoric "Afghan Team" toasted ten years of effort and a multi-billion dollar project to support the anti-communist, Muslim Afghan rebels, in what had become the CIA's largest and "most successful" covert operation ever. On Capitol Hill, Congressman Charles Wilson (D-Texas), a legislative champion of the anti-Soviet guerrillas, boasted that the United States had learned in Afghanistan that it "could reverse Soviet influence anywhere in the world." And at the White House, President George Bush hailed the withdrawal as a "watershed" in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Six thousand miles away from the celebrations, however, the war in Afghanistan raged on. Washington and Moscow's clients, using U.S. and Soviet-supplied weapons, continued their internecine struggle for power, adding more civilian casualties to the 1 million who had already died. Although peace had broken out between the superpowers, the legacy of their long and bitter rivalry lived on in the rocket-prone city of Kabul, Pakistan's crowded refugee camps and the war-ravaged villages in the Hindu Kush mountains.

The Relevance of Afghanistan

How is it that this underdeveloped, tribal-based country, tucked deep inside the rugged crossroads of Asia and deemed strategically insignificant by the United States for decades,

became a battleground for the bloodiest superpower proxy war of the 1980s?

What stimulated the United States to develop a sophisticated insurgency support operation for a rebellion led by Islamic religious leaders and fought by mountain tribesmen? What was the nature of the debate among U.S. officials and congressmen as to what the rebels, beset with ethnic, tribal and personal rivalries, could accomplish against the armed forces of the Soviet Union? What effect did this war have on Pakistan, the most important U.S. ally in South Asia, which played a crucial role in the war by providing sanctuary for the rebels and 3 million Afghan refugees? And what lessons have the U.S. intelligence and defense communities drawn from the Afghan conflict and applied to the emerging U.S. strategic doctrine of "Low-Intensity Warfare"?

Why did the Soviet Union spend ten years, billions of dollars and 15-20,000 lives trying to prop up a government that seemed constantly on the verge of collapse? Was Moscow's intervention, as some have claimed, originally part of a grand design to seize oil fields and warm water ports in the Persian Gulf region, or merely a move to protect a new socialist government in a country contiguous to its sensitive southern border? Why did Mikhail Gorbachev eventually call the Red Army home, leaving the Afghan government to fend for itself against formidable odds? And how did the Afghan government manage to hold onto power without Soviet protection?

No student, professor or journalist trying to answer these and the many other questions related to the Afghan war can do justice to their research without reviewing some of the thousands of pages of State Department cables from Kabul, Peshawar, Islamabad and Washington; intelligence reports from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); correspondence between Congress and the executive branch; field reports from Agency for International Development (AID) officials in Pakistan; and other previously classified materials found in this document set.

An overview of U.S. policy during Afghanistan's last 17 turbulent years both provides some context for approaching these questions and demonstrates the usefulness of these materials to those trying to answer them.

The Tenets of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan

Although Afghanistan experienced massive changes between 1973 and 1990--four coups, the intervention and withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces, the exile of one-third of its population as a result of the war, and one million deaths—U.S. policy toward Afghanistan throughout this period actually remained the same: to prevent "excessive" Soviet influence. Specifically, this meant denying the Soviet Union a foothold in Afghanistan from which to launch aggressive actions in the region. Afghanistan by itself was of little importance to the United States. But the area around it—the Persian Gulf and the sea lines and ports of the Indian Ocean—was deemed critical, and U.S. policy toward Afghanistan consistently reflected a regional policy that sought strong and friendly ties with Iran and Pakistan. Hence, the two factors shaping U.S. policy in Afghanistan also remained consistent: the U.S. perception of Soviet goals in Afghanistan, and the balance of power in the region.

Until the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the United States was able to project its power into South Asia and protect its interests there with confidence. In exchange for massive military assistance, the Shah provided the United States with access to military bases and intelligence facilities, helping to safeguard the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the "free world" while preventing potential Soviet advances toward the Gulf or Indian Ocean.

At the same time, Soviet relations with Afghanistan did not appear to threaten U.S. interests. Since the USSR shared a long border with Afghanistan and because the United States enjoyed friendly ties with the other states in the region, U.S. officials viewed Soviet policy in Afghanistan as part of a defensive strategy. A National Intelligence Estimate written in 1954--one year after the United States helped restore the Shah to his throne in Iran—stated that "Soviet attention to Afghanistan is part of a general effort to counter recent Western (particularly US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area."(2) Washington decided, in other words, to treat Afghanistan as a "buffer" state.

Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, relations between Moscow and Kabul grew stronger, as the USSR became one of Afghanistan's largest sources of foreign aid. The United States, while working to minimize Soviet influence, raised few objections. In 1962, the State Department reasoned that "US fostering of active hostility toward the USSR [could] only serve to weaken Afghanistan's ability to survive."(3) In 1976, the annual State Department Policy Review stated that Afghanistan was "a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the Soviet Union." Still, it concluded that the United States "is not, nor should it become, committed to, or responsible for the 'protection' of Afghanistan in any respect."(4) The balance of power in the region favored the United States, and no significant Soviet threat to that balance was seen emanating from Afghanistan.

This set of circumstances—which in U.S. policy parlance is described as "regional stability"—changed dramatically in 1979. The Shah of Iran abdicated his throne in January, allowing an anti-American, Islamic government to take power. Ten months later, the Soviet Union deployed 100,000 troops to Afghanistan, putting the Red Army within striking distance of both Pakistan and a potentially vulnerable Iran. The balance in the region had shifted. Soviet policy in Afghanistan, which was previously perceived as benign, was suddenly described by the White House as "the gravest threat to world peace since World War II."

The Early Years: 1973-1978

To gain a full understanding of these changes, one needs to go back to the early 1970s when the power of Afghanistan's monarchy was waning. Afghanistan at this time was one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. In 1974, the World Bank estimated Afghanistan's per capita GNP to be $70, ranking it 73rd among a list of 83 underdeveloped countries.(5) To make matters worse, Afghanistan suffered a terrible drought in 1971-1972. Foreign aid, from such countries as West Germany, Iran, the United States, and especially from the USSR, helped alleviate the country's economic woes.

Foreign aid alone, however, could not resolve Afghanistan's emerging political conflicts. Many Afghans, particularly the progressive urban elite, had grown impatient with the country's leader, King Zahir Shah. The king had ruled Afghanistan (sometimes as only a titular head) since the age of 19, when his father was assassinated in 1933.

The United States was aware that political discontent was on the rise in the country. In 1971, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported that "[t]here has been increased leftist activity which can be attributed to increased disillusionment and frustration with the existing social/economic conditions and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the leadership to tackle boldly the nation's problems."(6) Perhaps the most disgruntled and organized of the country's leftist groups was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The PDPA had been founded in 1965 by a group of 30 Afghans in Kabul. Its political orientation was Marxist, with many of its members looking to Moscow for guidance and

inspiration. Many PDPA members, in fact, had studied or received military training in the USSR.

During its early years, the PDPA was torn by quarrels and plots between its two leaders, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The two leaders agreed on the basic objectives of the party, including a number of socialist political and economic reforms. They both also complained of Afghanistan's backward nature, pointing not only to its underdeveloped infrastructure but also to a maldistribution of wealth and land which, they claimed, was perpetuated by traditional tribal and religious customs. Taraki and Karmal disagreed, however, over how to remedy these problems. Taraki and his followers argued for radical socialist reforms using whatever means necessary to implement them; Karmal and his supporters advocated the gradual introduction of socialist change, working within the state system, incorporating along the way different elements of Afghan society. Karmal and several colleagues had even served as parliamentary members during the king's rule, earning themselves the nickname "royal communists."

In 1967, Karmal split with the party and formed his own faction, also called the PDPA, but usually identified by the name of its newspaper, Parcham (banner). Parcham continued to strive for the same kinds of socialist reforms pursued by Taraki's rival PDPA faction, Khalq (masses), also named for its newspaper, but the two competed for power nevertheless.

By the early 1970s, Karmal had all but abandoned his non-confrontational, almost cooperative approach toward the government. The Zahir Administration had shut down the Parcham newspaper, quashed Parcham demonstrations, and arrested party members and put them in jail. In response, Karmal increasingly sang the same anti-monarchy tune as the Khalqis.

Parcham and Khalq were not the only groups opposed to the Zahir Shah Administration. The king's cousin and former prime minister, Mohammad Daud, had his eyes on the royal palace, as did several other former officials and relatives of the king. Realizing that a race was on to replace Zahir Shah, Daud, along with members of the military and Parcham, coordinated a takeover attempt. On July 17, 1973, while the king was vacationing in Italy, Daud, along with key military officers and the minister of interior, who was a Parcham sympathizer, launched a successful, nearly bloodless coup, declaring an end to the monarchy and the beginning of a republican government.

The exact nature of Daud's relations with Parcham during this time is still not clear. Did the two agree on political objectives for Afghanistan, or did they merely create a marriage of convenience? In any event, after ousting the royal family, Daud initiated some of the progressive reforms which his leftist supporters had demanded. His commitment to a reformist program and to his early backers was shortlived, however. Over time, Daud consolidated his personal power by purging the government of leftists, replacing them with members of his own powerful Mohammadzai clan. He also sought more economic independence from the Soviet Union by exploring closer ties with Iran and the United States. He was careful, however, never completely to shun the Soviet Union. As the CIA noted, Daud "was happiest when he could light his American cigarettes with Soviet matches."(7)

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul observed that Daud, in his changes, was leaning neither left nor right, but "Daudward." In pursuit of personal power and a more independent foreign policy, Daud managed to alienate Afghanistan's socialists, moderates and religious fundamentalists. It was the latter which initially proved to be Daud's most militant opponents.

While some Afghans were being influenced by Marxism, others were diligently studying the Koran. Many of these Afghans entered Kabul University's faculty of Islamic law, while others pursued their Islamic studies in Egypt where they came into contact with and were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization which seeks the imposition of strictly Islamic governments in all Muslim countries. Some of those Afghans who studied in Cairo, such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Abdul Rabb-ur-Rasul Sayyaf, came back to Kabul determined to galvanize opposition first to Zahir Shah and then Mohammad Daud, both of whose governments they criticized as corrupt and un-Islamic. This group of Afghans wanted to integrate modernization and Islam to counter the "disruptive" influence of both capitalism and communism.

Rabbani recruited from Afghanistan's Muslim Youth Organization and helped form the Islamic Society party, Jamiat-i Islami. Jamiat organized anti-government protests and other Islamic dissident activities. When Daud cracked down on Jamiat activists, Rabbani and other Muslim leaders fled for the Afghan countryside and eventually to Pakistan where they received arms to fight the Daud government. U.S. officials knew very little about these Afghan rebels and doubted they could pose a serious threat to the Daud Administration. Some of the names listed in State Department cables were those of people who, years later, would receive covert aid from the United States in their jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet Union.

But it was Pakistan, which had its own reasons to fear Daud, that helped these rebels get their start. Especially alarming to the Pakistanis was Daud's pursuit of a popular cause called Pashtunistan. Roughly half of Afghanistan's population are ethnic Pashtuns, including Daud and practically every other leader in Afghanistan's history. Millions of Pashtuns also lived on the other side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, an artificial line drawn by the British during the height of their colonial rule in India. These Pashtuns, living in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), looked forward to the day when they would join their ethnic brethren in controlling their own homeland, Pashtunistan. Since Pashtuns dominated Afghan politics, they could only gain from pursuing such a goal, and Afghan leaders, in turn, won favor among Afghan Pashtuns for pursuing it.

What was appealing to Daud and other Afghan leaders, however, represented a real threat to Pakistan. Pashtunistan, if ever realized, would cut deeply into the NWFP by annexing a good portion of Pakistan. Even if the border with Afghanistan remained intact, calls in Kabul for Pashtunistan always had the potential for stirring unrest in Peshawar and other parts of Pakistan's frontier. Expatriate leaders such as Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, and Hekmatyar, an Islamist who sought to unite Afghans belonging to all ethnic groups through Islam, provided Pakistan with a minor tool for keeping Daud off balance if he chose to pursue an aggressive Pashtunistan policy.

Meanwhile, as Islamic fundamentalists rebelled against Daud's "atheistic" reforms, Daud continued to purge more leftists from the government, banned political opposition in 1975, and strengthened ties with Iran and the United States. The United States welcomed and encouraged Daud's new foreign policy moves. In 1977, the State Department, remarking on Daud's closer ties to Iran, stated that he had "made significant contributions to the improvement of regional stability—thereby helping to fulfill another principal U.S. objective."(8)

The Saur Revolution

Despite U.S. approval, Daud's authoritarian rule had alienated too many at home. In particular, PDPA members, Parchamis and Khalqis alike, had grown impatient with Daud

and were anxious to see him removed from power. Khalq members criticized their Parcham rivals for having deluded themselves into thinking that the PDPA could have worked with Daud after supporting his takeover. By 1977, Khalq and Parcham formally agreed to bury their differences and united to form one People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; Soviet pressure reportedly played a role in the unification. Further PDPA infiltration of the military, especially by Khalqis, put the party in a good position to influence events if and when Daud lost his grip on power.

That day came on April 17, 1978, when Mir Akbar Khaibar, a member of the PDPA and a vocal critic of Daud, was assassinated, possibly by Daud's minister of interior. Thousands of mourners turned Khaibar's funeral into an anti-government rally which prompted Daud to clamp down further on the PDPA, arresting numerous party members. His response provoked PDPA supporters in the military to take action. On April 27, the military in collaboration with the PDPA overthrew Daud, executed him, and replaced his republican government with a socialist one, which proclaimed the coup as the beginning of the "Saur [April] Revolution."

Prelude to Intervention

The socialist and pro-Soviet bent of the new government caused U.S. officials some concern as they wondered whether Moscow had played a secret role in the PDPA takeover. U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul, however, detected no Soviet hand in the coup and suggested a cautious approach to the new government. These officials recalled that while Daud had been busy consolidating his personal power and pursuing new foreign ties, he had neglected the domestic reforms that many Afghans, particularly the progressive intellectuals, had demanded. Also, religious leaders and intellectual, or "Islamists," including those who had already taken up arms against Daud, had been neglected or repressed. The PDPA was in a better position than the Islamicists to seize power because of its stronger influence over the military and within the capital city, Kabul.

The Khalq-Parcham unity was apparently not very solid. The new government, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), was dominated by Khalqis, due mostly to Khalq control of the military. Soon after the April takeover, Khalq's two main leaders, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, quickly consolidated Khalq rule by imprisoning a number of their Parcham rivals while sending others off to foreign diplomatic posts. Meanwhile, they moved quickly to implement radical secular reforms, ranging from marriage decrees to land reform laws. A treaty of "friendship" between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was signed in December 1978, which brought more Soviet aid and advisors to Kabul.

The Khalqi reforms served to ignite strong opposition from most of the deeply traditional and Islamic population. The security of rural women, for example, often depended on a sizable dowry, which was significantly reduced under new marriage laws. The land reforms, which were meant to help small farmers, were opposed by many for having alienated them from their former landowners, on whom they had always relied for help in growing and selling their crops. A number of disenfranchised landowners along with many religious leaders either took up arms against the Taraki-Amin government or left the country.

Some Afghans fled to Pakistan to join the Islamic Afghan dissidents such as Rabbani and Hekmatyar. Some of the more prominent new rebels included: Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, who came from a well-known family of Sufi leaders, had ties to the royal family, was related to a prominent PDPA official (a valuable connection for most rebels), and formerly taught Islamic law in Kabul; Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, who was also tied to the royal family, was a Pir, or spiritual leader, and who until his departure from Kabul owned a Peugeot car dealership; Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, who came from a prominent religious family and served in

parliament in the 1960s where he criticized secular influence in Afghanistan, physically attacking, at one point, another member of parliament, Babrak Karmal. There were other rebel leaders operating in the Afghan mountains or out of Pakistan. An important one, Yunus Khales had escaped from Afghanistan in 1974 after writing a book that criticized the Daud Administration. Unlike some other rebel leaders, Khales depended more on his genuine tribal support than his religious aura to galvanize Afghans in his home province of Nangarhar to oppose the new government in Kabul.

These leaders, along with Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and another who joined in 1980, Abdul Rabb-ur-Rasul Sayyaf, formed their own parties and would eventually unite to form the Sunni Islamic Afghan rebel alliance, or the "Peshawar Seven" as they would later become collectively known as. These party leaders called for a jihad, or holy war, against the PDPA.

Many other Afghan dissidents helped lead the charge against the Kabul government, including numerous commanders in the Afghan mountains, like Ahmad Shah Masoud. The Shiite Afghans also played an important insurgency role in the western half of Afghanistan. Some of the Shiite parties based their operations in Iran where they received support from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's government. It was the Peshawar Seven, however, who would grab the world's attention, partly because the government of Pakistan, the host to most rebels and refugees and the foreign journalists writing about them, chose to recognize their parties as the only legitimate ones in Pakistan.

The United States, in the meantime, had found itself facing a policy dilemma with the PDPA's ascension to power in Afghanistan. This dilemma was summed up in a secret memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance following the April takeover: "We need to take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish...."

Yet the memo also pointed out various factors favoring a hard-line approach to the new government:

> [A]nti-regime elements in Afghanistan will be watching us carefully to see if we acquiesce in or accept the communist takeover....Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others of our friends in the area will see the situation clearly as a Soviet coup. On the domestic front, many Americans will see this as an extension of Soviet power and draw the parallel with Angola, Ethiopia, etc.(9)

As a result, the United States compromised, maintaining "correct" relations with the government while keeping channels open to the opposition. As dissatisfaction with the PDPA mounted within Afghanistan, however, the United States grew increasingly uncomfortable with the new government and its radical reforms. To make matters worse, in February 1979, the U.S. ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage by anti-government Shiite Muslims who demanded the release of a political prisoner. Afghan police clumsily stormed their hideout, and Dubs was killed in the ensuing shootout. Afghan authorities stonewalled U.S. requests for an independent investigation of the killing. Congress in turn refused to replace Dubs with another ambassador and threatened to cut aid to the DRA.

In March 1979, Afghans in the western city of Herat responded to rebel calls for a jihad by massacring hundreds of DRA officials and Soviet advisors who were in charge of introducing the women's literacy program there. Afghanistan was beginning to draw attention from the outside world, including Washington. At the White House, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned President Carter that the Soviet Union, with its hundreds of advisors in Afghanistan to assist in reforms and counterinsurgency operations, had territorial

designs on Afghanistan and possibly the whole South Asia region. Brzezinski and others worried that the USSR might take advantage of its presence in Afghanistan in order to influence events in neighboring Iran or Pakistan, two traditionally pro-American countries that for years had helped safeguard U.S. interests in the region, namely access to oil and the containment of the Soviet Union.

If the DRA were able to consolidate its power, Brzezinski argued, then the Soviet Union might turn Afghanistan into a launching pad for aggression in the region. Weeks after the Herat uprising and while President Carter was absorbed by the Iran hostage crisis, Brzezinski pushed a decision through the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council (NSC) to be, as he put it, "more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country's independence."(10)

Although deliberately vague as to what this meant, the evidence indicates that Brzezinski called for moderate covert support for Afghan dissident groups which had set up headquarters in Pakistan. Some, such as forces under the command of Rabbani and Hekmatyar, had been operating out of Pakistan without much outside aid for years. According to a former Pakistani military official who was interviewed in 1988, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad had asked Pakistani military officials in April 1979 to recommend a rebel organization that would make the best use of U.S. aid. The following month, the Pakistani source claimed, he personally introduced a CIA official to Hekmatyar who, while more radically Islamic and anti-American than most Afghans, headed what the Pakistani government considered the most militant and organized rebel group, the Hizb-i Islami (Hekmatyar).(11)

Freedom of Information Act requests for records describing these meetings have been denied. But CIA and State Department documents seized by Iranian students during the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, reveal that, starting in April 1979, eight months before the Soviet intervention and immediately following Brzezinski's SCC decision, the United States had, in fact, begun quietly meeting rebel representatives. Although most of the cables and memoranda released to date show that U.S. officials politely turned down rebel requests for U.S. assistance, others reveal CIA support for anti-DRA demonstrations and close monitoring of Pakistani military aid for rebel parties based in Pakistan's NWFP.

Brzezinski's decision to help the rebels was curious in light of Soviet activities in Afghanistan at the time. According to declassified documents and this author's interviews, Soviet officials thought the Khalqi leadership was moving too fast with its reforms and urged Taraki and Amin to moderate the pace of change and broaden their political base by including non-communists in the government. This approach, however, was more amenable to Parcham leaders who, unfortunately for Soviet officials, were not in power. When Khalq leaders sidestepped Soviet advice, Moscow sought other means to induce political change, meeting with former members of the monarchy and other non-communists to seek their participation in the DRA government. Soviet and other East bloc diplomats in Kabul kept the U.S. Embassy informed of their efforts.

The ruling Khalqis, particularly Hafizullah Amin, had little use for Soviet counsel. The government responded to the growing opposition with increasing brutality, and the PDPA's base continued to narrow. Amin, who as the defense minister was in charge of the failed counterinsurgency operations, became the focus of Soviet frustrations. State Department intelligence learned that, in August 1979, Moscow had decided there was no practical alternative in Afghanistan to the rule of Taraki and Amin but that Soviet officials had

resolved to support the more moderate Taraki against Amin.

In the same month, a high-ranking Soviet military official, General Ivan Pavlovskiy, led a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan to assess the stability of the government. In September, Taraki, on his way home from a Nonaligned Movement conference in Cuba, stopped in Moscow where he and Soviet officials reportedly discussed Amin's future. Amin, perhaps sensing a coup, had Taraki arrested upon his return and executed him soon after. In October, General Pavlovskiy returned to Moscow and presented the Politburo with a grim picture of the situation below their border. The Khalqi government had lost control of 23 of Afghanistan's 28 provinces to various rebel forces. Left with Amin, the Soviets drew up plans for military action.

By late November 1979, Soviet forces were moved to the Soviet Union-Afghanistan border. Warsaw Pact forces were also placed on an advanced state of readiness. Two Soviet battalions were quietly flown into an airbase near Kabul during the first week of December, laying the groundwork for what was to follow. On Christmas Eve 1979, tens of thousands of Soviet troops riding in tanks and armored personnel carriers stormed across the Amudarya River into the rugged Afghan countryside, while thousands more flew into the Kabul, Bagram and Shindand air bases, bringing with them exiled Parcham leaders, including Babrak Karmal, who had been hiding in Moscow. Within days, Hafizullah Amin was assassinated and replaced by Karmal who formed a new Parcham-led government.

Superpowers and Doctrines of Hegemony

The Soviet invasion symbolized, ironically, the limits of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Unable to stabilize the government through political means, Moscow attempted to do so with military force, much the same as the United States had done years before in Vietnam. To many observers in Washington, D.C., however, Afghanistan was beginning to look like another pawn on the Kremlin's chessboard. The invasion coincided with the decline of U.S. influence in Iran and other Third World countries such as Angola and Mozambique in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977 and Nicaragua in 1979 where "pro-Soviet" governments had seized power. It also coincided with an election year in which President Carter was coming under attack from conservatives for failing to prevent these "Soviet gains."

Many of these U.S. observers argued that the global balance of power, particularly the geostrategic balance in South Asia, had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The new dominant U.S. perception of Soviet foreign policy, as "evidenced" by Afghanistan, was that it was expansionist in nature: the Brezhnev Doctrine of protecting socialist allies, U.S. conservatives claimed, had been logically extended to include expanding Soviet influence beyond the Warsaw Pact. This view was best summed up in a Defense Intelligence Agency report issued days after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan: "The key motivation that propelled Moscow's move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals closer within reach. Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and to domination of the Asian sub-continent."(12)

Reasoning that "aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease," President Carter warned the Soviet Union on January 23rd, 1980, that "[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [would] be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and [would] be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."(13) Journalists labeled this powerful warning the Carter Doctrine. Since, however, the United States was neither interested in nor prepared for a war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf, Carter looked for alternative ways to slow down a potential Soviet drive and make Moscow pay a heavy price for its intervention. He called for international

economic sanctions against the USSR and a boycott of the Olympic games being held in Moscow, sought military access agreements with several South and Southwest Asian countries, and provided more covert aid to the mujahidin.

Not all U.S. officials believed that the Soviet intervention was part of an expansionist drive. While no declassified documents reveal any criticism of rebel military aid, some officials subsequently recalled in this author's interviews that they had advocated quiet diplomacy with the Soviet Union in order to provide the Kremlin with a way out of what they believed was a political and military miscalculation.(14) Moscow had its own critics as well. According to interviews with Soviet officials, days after the intervention, Soviet foreign affairs advisors pleaded with the Kremlin leadership to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. These advisors did not believe the intervention was worth ruining d,tente with the United States, Europe and China. What is more, the deeply traditional and Islamic Afghans, in their opinion, were not yet prepared for socialism.(15) Cold War attitudes, however, prevailed in both Moscow and Washington.

A combination of fear, pride and superpower obligations caused the leader of the "free world" and the "vanguard of socialism" to struggle violently over a destitute country the size of Texas for the next ten years.

Political vs. Military Solution

Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion received widespread approval among policy-makers. Hard-liners, including Carter's opponent in the 1980 presidential elections, Ronald Reagan, had warned numerous times that the Soviet Union was "on a roll" in the Third World and had to be "rolled back." Moderates thought the intervention, regardless of its purpose, was an egregious act for which the USSR should pay a price. All agreed that the Soviet Union should withdraw from Afghanistan. The question was how to convince Moscow.

Congressional conservatives opposed negotiations, distrusting the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate in good faith. According to their view, the USSR would not withdraw unless and until it felt the costs of its occupation. Most U.S. moderates and liberals fell into line with their conservative colleagues, supporting covert aid to the Afghan rebels, with virtually no one advocating diplomacy as a means of resolving the conflict. The State Department believed that the rebels could "probably continue tying up some 85,000 or more Soviet troops" but that they were "fragmented, lack[ed] effective national leadership, and certainly [could not] force a Soviet withdrawal."(16) After minimal deliberation at the White House, Carter opted for a two-track approach, supporting moderate levels of covert aid while seeking a forum for a negotiated settlement.

Carter's loss to Reagan in the 1980 presidential election signalled the end of the negotiation track. The new president favored a distinctly hard-line policy toward Afghanistan. Reagan sought to make the Afghan rebels and other anti-communist insurgencies the centerpiece of the "Reagan Doctrine," an aggressive initiative designed to increase the cost of Soviet support for Third World socialist governments. While few believed that the Afghan rebels could force a Soviet withdrawal, Reagan and his advisors hoped to tie Soviet troops down in Afghanistan's Hindu Kush mountains until the cost of occupation became unsustainable.

The key to this objective was Pakistan. Since the overthrow of Mohammad Daud, Pakistan had played host to thousands (and eventually millions) of Afghan refugees and rebels who had fled their war-torn country for make-shift tent villages in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Without the cooperation of Pakistan's military government, led

since 1977 by Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the rebels would have had no sanctuary from which to launch their operations.

The Carter Administration had cut aid to Pakistan in 1977 because of concerns about its nuclear program and General Zia's disdain for human rights and democracy. There was ample evidence to suggest that Pakistan was actively developing an atomic bomb. In addition, the Carter White House, with its public emphasis on respect for human rights as a precondition for foreign aid, was forced to respond to Zia's well-known history of brutal and dictatorial actions. The general had originally attained power by overthrowing Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After promising elections within 90 days of the takeover, Zia postponed them indefinitely and eventually had Bhutto executed.

To the United States, however, Zia's record of human rights abuses paled in significance when compared to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Literally days after the Soviet invasion, Carter was on the telephone with Zia offering him hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid in exchange for cooperation in helping the rebels. Zia accepted this quid pro quo, but his government remained wary of Washington's stated commitment to protect Pakistan from possible Soviet strikes across its border.

The Reagan Administration was able to gain Pakistan's confidence by offering a huge, six-year economic and military aid package which elevated Pakistan to the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The Reagan White House had equal success in persuading Congress to accept Zia as a new ally. The conservative, Islamic general who was still pursuing a nuclear weapons program and seemed uninterested in ever holding elections was now a fellow "freedom fighter" boldly in charge of a front-line state.

Although Zia spoke in concert with U.S. objectives of supporting Afghan "self-determination" and opposing the Afghan "puppet" government, he and his military had their own agenda in Afghanistan. Zia chose to favor the more radically Islamic rebel groups who, in some cases, were no more popular or representative than the PDPA. He was able to divert a disproportionately large share of U.S.-supplied weapons to these groups, especially the most radical one, Hizb-i Islami (Hekmatyar). Later in the war, this would cause significant problems for the rebel movement.

Whether the United States blindly yielded to Zia's favoritism of the fundamentalists or was in connivance with it is still in question. The relationship between the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the arm of the military responsible for distributing CIA-purchased weapons to the rebels, is not well-documented. This author's interviews with Pakistani officials indicate that U.S. officials in Pakistan were continually advised by ISI officials that Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami was the most effective rebel organization, although some officials from Pakistan's Foreign Ministry apparently differed with that assessment. Many secular Pakistanis outside of the government worried that foreign aid for Afghan fundamentalists such as Hekmatyar also served to bolster the conservative Islamic forces in Pakistan, including the military. Available documents and chronology show that during the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, U.S. officials developed a stronger relationship with Pakistan's generals than with either the foreign ministry or the civilian opposition.

Congress and Covert Aid

Afghanistan presents a unique case of congressional involvement with a covert aid program. Whereas a divided Congress often impeded the Reagan Administration's efforts to aid the contras in Nicaragua, congressional hard-liners, riding a wave of bipartisan support,

consistently and successfully pushed for more covert funding for the Afghan rebels than the White House ever requested.

Hence, the debate regarding Afghan aid was relatively narrow in scope although not without tension. While everyone seemed to support "Afghan self-determination" and a Soviet-free Afghanistan, several members of Congress, backed by conservative lobbying groups, criticized the administration for not pursuing vigorously enough a mujahidin military victory over the PDPA. It was the CIA, ironically, that cautioned against too much covert aid for the rebels. Officials from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, including Deputy Director John McMahon, warned Congress that too large a military support operation for the rebels might provoke Soviet retaliation against Pakistan and would certainly be subject to "leakages" and corruption.

The CIA was especially resistant to calls for providing the mujahidin with U.S.-made weaponry. Traditionally, the Agency purchased foreign, usually Soviet-styled, weaponry in order to "plausibly deny" U.S. involvement if the need arose. Throughout the Afghan war, the CIA purchased Soviet-designed weapons from Egypt, China and elsewhere and transported them to Pakistan. Cables reveal that Chinese and Egyptian AK-47 rifles and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles arrived in Pakistan as early as 1980. This covert purchasing process not only covered U.S. tracks, but ensured the availability of weapons that were compatible with the kind captured by the rebels from their Soviet-supplied enemies.

In 1984, Congress passed a resolution, introduced by Senator Paul Tsongas (D-Massachusetts) and Congressman Don Ritter (R-Pennsylvania), which called for "effective" U.S. material aid for the rebels "in their fight for freedom from foreign domination." Several legislators, particularly Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-Texas) and Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire), tried to use the Tsongas-Ritter resolution to increase the size and quality of the rebel covert aid program.

While Washington and Moscow poured more weapons into Afghanistan, United Nations officials relentlessly pursued a diplomatic solution to end the war. In 1982, the U.N. Secretary-General, Javier P,rez de Cuellar tasked Diego Cordovez to find a way for the United Nations to mediate a political settlement in Afghanistan. For the next six years, Cordovez shuttled back and forth from New York to South Asia to the Soviet Union and to Geneva. He tried to convince the numerous parties to the conflict—the Afghan government, the various rebel groups, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, the United States and Iran—to narrow their differences so that they could agree on a set of principles or conditions under which the Soviet military would withdraw from Afghanistan. Cordovez and his U.N. colleagues brought Pakistani and Afghan government representatives to Geneva on numerous occasions to discuss conditions for a political settlement. Since Pakistan did not recognize the Afghan government as legitimate, Cordovez literally had to move back and forth between hotel rooms because Pakistani officials refused to sit at the same table with the DRA representatives.

Compounding Cordovez's difficulties was a strong sense of mistrust between the superpowers. On a number of occasions it appeared that Pakistan and Afghanistan were ready to sign an agreement that would prohibit Pakistan from allowing material aid for the rebels to pass through its territory in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal. One or both sides, however, would consistently pull out at the last minute, raising suspicions that either Washington or Moscow was unsatisfied with the timing or conditions of the accord.

To most U.S. officials, these U.N.-sponsored "proximity talks" looked hopeless or even frightening. In March 1983, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence

Eagleburger reportedly expressed alarm at the prospect that the following round of Geneva negotiations might result in a settlement. About the same time, Charles Cogan, then the CIA's official in charge of covert operations in Afghanistan, told a journalist that Pakistan was not about to sign Cordovez's proposed "Geneva Accords" at the next round "or ever." He added that President Zia accepted the U.S. view that "Pakistan's security is best assured by keeping the Russians tied down [in Afghanistan]."(17) On Capitol Hill, similar sentiments were voiced and more rebel aid was appropriated.

Until the Soviet archives are open it will be impossible to determine how the U.S. hard-line approach affected Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. Was Moscow supporting U.N. efforts as a smokescreen for its strategy of subjugating the mujahidin, as Wilson, Humphrey and others argued? Or did increased U.S. aid for the rebels cause the USSR to dig in deeper, suspecting that the United States was not interested in a political solution?

Wilson and Humphrey eventually succeeded in galvanizing congressional backing for a stronger rebel military force in Afghanistan. Despite signs of corruption in both the military and humanitarian aid programs as early as 1982, Congress ultimately provided nearly $3 billion in covert aid for the mujahidin, more than all other CIA covert operations in the 1980s combined. By 1987, the United States was providing the rebels with nearly $700 million in military assistance a year, more than what Pakistan itself was receiving from Washington.

In 1984, Wilson used his powerful position on the House Intelligence Committee to tack on an additional $50 million for Afghan covert aid and convinced the CIA to purchase high-quality, Swiss-designed Oerlikon anti-aircraft missiles, which could pierce the heavy armor of the USSR's most formidable counterinsurgency machine, the Hind Mi-24 helicopter. The CIA went even further in 1985, purchasing the sophisticated British-made Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles. And in 1986, due to pressure from several congressmen and a number of bureaucrats at the State and Defense departments, the CIA provided the mujahidin with U.S.-made Stinger missiles, the most effective shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapon in the world. It was the first time the CIA had provided U.S.-made weaponry as part of a covert insurgency support operation, and the legislative branch was largely responsible. As a congressional staffer later put it: "We finally broke the Agency's virginity."

Refugees and U.S. Policy

The dislocation of 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan—one of the most tragic results of the war—was something Congress, the White House and the international community could all agree on: they needed massive assistance. Ultimately one-third of Afghanistan's pre-war population fled the country, testifying to the destruction and chaos caused largely by heavy Soviet/Afghan government aerial bombing.

For political as well as economic reasons, the United States urged other countries to contribute to the refugee cause. In 1981, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad asserted that if funding for the refugees were too visible, it "would damage the credibility of the mujahidin by focusing attention on U.S. influence in the Afghan insurgency."(18) Dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were willing to help the refugees and rebels as long as they were provided with the necessary resources to do so. The United States channeled a significant amount of aid through favored NGOs and urged other countries to either aid the same organizations or to contribute to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the end, no matter who distributed the aid, much of it ended up in the hands of rebel parties, providing them with significant political leverage over the millions of Afghan exiles.

In addition to the humanitarian grounds for providing aid to the refugees in Pakistan, the United States also sought to alleviate political and economic pressure on Islamabad and to help maintain a support structure for the rebels. In 1982, the CIA predicted that the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan would help "generate political unrest and retard economic development until the end of the century."(19) While many Pakistanis demonstrated great hospitality and tolerance for the refugees, others despised their presence. Cables from Pakistan reveal violent clashes between Pakistani border tribes and Afghan refugees over scarce resources and political, religious and personal differences. Some disgruntled tribes even took weapons and money from the Afghan government to disrupt rebel supply lines into Afghanistan.

In fact, the Afghan government's infiltration of Pakistan and the rebel parties was extensive and proved key to its survival. The government's ministry of state security, known as KHAD, sought to buy or rent the loyalty of Pashtun tribes who inhabited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area (the tribes often inhabited both sides of the border). Weapons and money were doled out to tribal militia who in turn interdicted rebel supply operations based in Pakistan. Some tribal leaders responded to Kabul's material aid with political support, attending government jirgahs (assemblies) and other PDPA-sponsored activities. President Zia tried to undercut the Pakistan-based tribes' support for the Afghan government by, among other means, conducting selective anti-narcotics sweeps through their home areas. Kabul's strategy, however, continued to be successful, and ultimately contributed to the rise of Najibullah, the KHAD's director and the man responsible for this counterinsurgency campaign, to the leader of the DRA in 1986.

Other kinds of counterinsurgency operations, including Soviet/Afghan government aerial search-and-destroy missions, as well as insurgency tactics, such as the mujahidin's hit-and-run attacks on government-held garrisons and cities, were some of the principal causes of the refugee flow into Pakistan. But it was the aerial bombing that inflicted the most damage. Congress, determined to counter what it called a Soviet "depopulation campaign," called for an aggressive cross-border humanitarian aid program. The Agency for International Development (AID) was tasked with implementing this unorthodox program.

The objective of AID's Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA) was to provide Afghans inside Afghanistan—civilians and rebels alike—with the means to survive without having to flee to Pakistan. The mass exodus of Afghans had been putting too much pressure on Pakistan, and the empty Afghan villages left the rebels with little material or moral support inside the country. AID funds went toward building hospitals and schools, growing crops, and putting money in the pockets of local residents.

The AID reports are actually some of the richest documents in the collection, describing the situation inside the normally inaccessible parts of war-torn Afghanistan and illustrating some of the bizarre politics of the mujahidin. As part of a pro-insurgency operation, the program was unique and controversial. AID was being used to maintain and build up the rebels' infrastructure. As one U.S. advisor explained to this author in Pakistan: "We borrowed a lesson from Mao. The Soviets were trying to drain the sea to kill the fish [rebels], so we're trying to keep the sea filled."(20)

Public Diplomacy and the First Casualty of War

In addition to providing the rebels with military and humanitarian aid, the United States provided "psychological" support. In 1983, a unique National Security Decision Directive, number 77, was signed into action to coordinate U.S. government agencies to enhance U.S. national security and counter anti-American propaganda through "public diplomacy." U.S.

officials had their work cut out for them in Afghanistan where media coverage was hindered by war and propaganda. To overcome these obstacles, the National Security Council, in keeping with NSDD 77, formed the inter-agency Afghan Working Group, which met twice a month to discuss ways of increasing media coverage of the war and generating sympathy and support for the mujahidin.

News coverage of the war was indeed limited, especially when one considers that this was the longest war in Soviet history, the largest CIA paramilitary operation since Vietnam, and, with 1 million dead Afghans, the bloodiest regional conflict in the world at the time. Nevertheless, no major American newspaper saw fit to station a reporter in Peshawar, Pakistan, the base of rebel political and military operations, and American television crews rarely ventured up to the Khyber Pass for a glimpse of the war. A major reason for this, of course, was the risk involved in reporting a guerrilla war, especially this one. A journalist who wished to go "inside" faced a number of hazards ranging from contracting a serious disease to the chance of being killed in an air raid or ambush.

What coverage there was tended to be biased toward the mujahidin. Several factors explain this. Foreign correspondents and stringers who did go to Peshawar or managed to go "inside" with the rebels encountered thousands of uprooted Afghans who all had horrific stories to tell about losing homes and relatives to Soviet/Afghan government counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, craters from Soviet bombs marked the landscape, villages were often emptied of their inhabitants, and many Afghans who found their way to Pakistan walked the streets with artificial limbs, victims of land mines.

In addition, the Afghan government often proved to be an unreliable source of information, causing Western journalists to rely heavily on U.S. officials for details of the war. The DRA in 1980, for example, reported how "Walter Cronkite" (apparently confusing him with Dan Rather) on a visit into Afghanistan had ordered the execution of two Afghans —"Islamic style." That same year the DRA expelled 18 Western journalists for "biased" coverage. When the government allowed journalists to return to the country in 1986, the journalists discovered in Kabul another side to the story: victims of rebel land mines and indiscriminate mujahidin rocket attacks on the capital.

Thus, for much of the war most reporters found it physically and journalistically safer to rely on "Western diplomatic sources in Pakistan," the cover for U.S. officials at the Consulate in Peshawar or the Embassy in Islamabad.

Despite the pro-mujahidin slant of Western news coverage, however, U.S. officials still complained of its limited nature. In 1985, Senator Humphrey sought to remedy that problem. He pushed legislation through Congress that tasked the United States Information Agency (USIA) to teach Afghan rebels how to film and write about their jihad. The USIA subcontracted Boston University's School of Communications to train Afghans in Peshawar to become television and newsprint journalists. This program stirred controversy, drawing criticism from professors at the university and several American journalists who called the exercise in "public diplomacy" a government propaganda operation. Documents on the project, which went forth despite the criticism, show how the United States worked with rebel parties, Pakistan, a CBS cameraman and several private organizations to increase and "improve" coverage of the war.

The United States was also able to influence coverage by taking advantage of Western journalists' inability to cover the war extensively first-hand. Once a week, a USIA officer in Islamabad would read to foreign journalists portions of a Situation Report originating from the Embassy in Kabul. These "Sitreps" were to serve two purposes. They provided U.S.

officials at home and abroad with detailed information on the political and military situation in Afghanistan. They also formed part of the Afghan Working Group's press and public information strategy to "punch holes in the Soviet news blackout." The press, however, was usually allowed to hear only the first several pages of the Sitrep, which gave a relatively simplistic overview of the situation in the country, paying special attention to government human rights abuses and mujahidin military gains. The following 20-25 detail-filled pages of the many now declassified Sitreps depicted a much more complicated and bizarre war being fought on more levels than just that of Soviet-backed communists against freedom-fighting Muslims.

The Real War

Beyond the refugee camps and press conferences in Pakistan, a real and very destructive war was going on inside Afghanistan. Cables from Kabul, AID cross-border reports, DIA summaries and journal articles by the few reporters who bravely ventured into war zones reveal how pockets of mountain tribesmen, toting Chinese automatic rifles and U.S. Stinger missiles, went up against well-armed Soviet and Afghan government forces. Rebel hit-and-run attacks, assassinations of PDPA members, car bombs, rocket attacks on government-held garrisons and cities and other guerrilla tactics were met with massive aerial bombardments, mine-sowing operations, bribes and civic action campaigns from Kabul. Places like Paghman, Khost, the Panjshir Valley, Sarobi, and Jalalabad, where the mujahidin continually bogged Soviet forces down, became familiar names to observers of this war just as Hue and Khe Sanh had in Vietnam, where for years Viet Cong rebels tied down U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.

But as fierce as they were, the "Muj" were not the Viet Cong. It is true that U.S. military aid improved the rebels' battlefield performance. One Pentagon report claimed that Stingers forced "more tactical and air support changes in the last quarter of 1986 and the first quarter of 1987 than in the previous 7 years of the conflict."(21) Also, more and better land mines allowed the rebels to disrupt Soviet supply lines and ground communications, which were already hampered by the lack of railways and good roads. No matter how much military, humanitarian, or psychological support the United States provided them, however, the mujahidin remained fractious. It was not uncommon for one rebel group to turn its guns on another.

The United States was well aware of rebel infighting even before the Soviet intervention. In 1979, rebel leaders confided to U.S. officials that they likened the idea of a dissident provisional government to "putting five different animals in the same cage."(22) Saudi Arabia managed to stimulate some rebel unity by withholding aid from the various mujahidin parties until they agreed to coalesce and form a united opposition front. Yet foreign aid often did more to divide the rebels than to unite them. The Saudi government, which deposited many of its contributions into a CIA Swiss bank account, also gave direct support to several fundamentalist groups. Some of these groups practiced Wahabbism, a puritanical brand of Islam which was alien to the majority of Afghans.

Iran supported the Shiite rebels, who played an important military role in the western part of the country but were left out of power-sharing arrangements made by the Sunni alliance in Peshawar. For its part, the Pakistani military doled out a disproportionate amount of CIA-purchased weapons to Hekmatyar's radical Hizb-i Islami party, which often used the arms against rival rebel groups.

The lack of unity impeded rebel attempts to overthrow the PDPA. The more moderate, or "traditionalist," rebel groups, such as those led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Sayyid

Ahmad Gailani, proposed finding a unifying leader, and they had a candidate: former king Zahir Shah. In July 1987, a poll conducted among Afghan refugees by the independent Afghan Information Center indicated popular support for Zahir Shah as an alternative head of state for Afghanistan. Hekmatyar and other leaders denounced the poll as propaganda by the "monarchists." But U.S. officials had evidence from their own observations and conversations that many Afghans might unite around the former king for an interim period if only to help find a more expedient way to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal and an end to the war. Many Afghans also believed that the king, who they conceded could have been a stronger leader during his 40-year reign, was someone they could rally around to oppose the unpopular, but powerful, Hekmatyar. Diego Cordovez and his U.N. team also recognized the king as a potential key to a settlement and kept in regular contact with Zahir Shah's representatives at his Rome residence.

Pakistan, however, refused to grant Zahir Shah a visa and kept a close eye on pro-Zahir activities. Pakistan's President Zia and his supporters in the military were determined to put a conservative Islamic ally in power in Kabul. U.S. officials and private experts yielded to the Pakistani military's objective, some supporting it, others rationalizing that the king's return would do little good.

Some of these officials argued that as a result of the war, Afghanistan had experienced a social change: political power, they claimed, had shifted away from the tribal leaders, the maliks, and the king's Mohammadzai clan and toward the mujahidin commanders and their political/religious leaders in Peshawar. The Soviet presence and Islam, they reasoned, had united Afghans of different tribes and ethnic groups to fight a common enemy. That unity was soon put to a test.

On February 8, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev surprised the world by announcing that the Soviet Union would withdraw its 100,000 troops from Afghanistan. Three days later, in the midst of celebrations in Peshawar, Professor Sayyid Majruh, the man responsible for conducting the controversial Afghan Information Center poll that had shown substantial support for Zahir Shah, was assassinated in his office. His death, still a mystery, was soon followed by a string of assassinations and acts of intimidation against other Afghan intellectuals who shared one basic sentiment: they were almost as opposed to a fundamentalist government in Afghanistan as they were a communist one. Divisions among anti-government Afghans would only widen further.

The Geneva Accords and the Soviet Withdrawal

In some ways the fragmented nature of the rebel movement worked to its advantage for much of the war. The USSR could find no central rebel base of operations to bomb, no one strategy planning meeting to infiltrate, no single popular leader to negotiate with—or eliminate. The mujahidin's steady harassment came from all directions in this war without borders. Gen. Boris Gromov, the last commander of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, boasted on his last day in the country that "[n]o Soviet garrison or major outpost was ever overrun."(23) In this guerrilla war, however, that proved irrelevant.

By late 1986, the Kremlin decided that the war had become too costly. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet men had rotated in and out of service in Afghanistan and brought home all the signs of a losing, unpopular struggle: low morale, criticism of the government's Afghan policy, drug and alcohol abuse, and more. The war also hit home in other ways. Billions of rubles were spent on Afghanistan instead of the crumbling Soviet economy. In the troubled Central Asian republics, Soviet Muslims had come into contact with the Afghan jihad when, at various points during the war, rebel bands crossed the sensitive Soviet border

to foment unrest among the Islamic population. The impact of the Afghan war on Soviet Muslims' later demands for independence remains unclear.

The Soviet Union was also changing its approach toward the Third World. Gorbachev and his advisors, faced with staggering economic problems, thought that previous Soviet administrations had given too much unconditional support to Third World governments, some of which seemed to rely more on Soviet aid than broadly based domestic support. Gorbachev decided to tie future foreign assistance to certain understandings, one being that the recipient government had to concentrate on building a broad base of support before implementing social and economic reforms.

Afghanistan, which enjoyed a special position in Moscow's strategy to protect the Soviets Union's sensitive southern border, was no exception to Gorbachev's new Third World policy. In December 1986, Gorbachev informed Afghan President Najibullah in Moscow that the Soviet military commitment to his government was "limited."(24) Najibullah returned to Kabul and immediately launched a policy called "national reconciliation," an effort to broaden the government's political support base. He announced a cease-fire and an amnesty for armed oppositionists.(25) But the war went on.

Documents show that some U.S. officials in Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Kabul remained unconvinced of Soviet intentions to withdraw for quite some time. In some cases, suspicions of Moscow's ultimate objectives lingered until the very end of the Soviet pull-out. In November 1988, three months before the withdrawal was to be completed, a top official in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul claimed that the Soviet leadership might cancel their pull-out to prevent Najibullah's government from unraveling. Although most of his colleagues disagreed, the diplomat's suspicion illustrates a point: U.S. policy toward Afghanistan right up to the end of the Soviet occupation was based on a deep mistrust of Moscow's goals, a mistrust which continued well after the withdrawal. Policy-makers argued that if Moscow succeeded in keeping the PDPA in power, then "excessive" Soviet influence in Afghanistan would continue. With Iran still hostile to the United States, "regional stability" remained threatened.

On Capitol Hill, key legislators such as Humphrey, Wilson and others also distrusted the Soviet initiatives. Months before the U.N.-sponsored Geneva Accords were to be signed in April 1988, they galvanized enough congressional support to stop the White House from guaranteeing the agreement until President Reagan had promised to continue arming the mujahidin even after the USSR had withdrawn. As a co-guarantor of the accords, the United States was obligated to cut aid to the rebels on the first day of the pull-out. Humphrey and others protested that this would leave the rebels at a military disadvantage since Kabul would continue receiving aid from Moscow. Secretary of State George Shultz took this matter up with Soviet officials suggesting that both sides cease supplying their respective clients when the withdrawal began, a proposal he called "negative restraint."

The Soviet Union and Najibullah refused, unwilling to accord the Afghan rebels the same legitimacy as the Afghan government. Soviet and Afghan officials, however, fearing a possible rebel onslaught following the Soviet withdrawal, tried desperately to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the mujahidin leaders. The rebels refused, calling the offer a ploy to keep the PDPA in power. Due to congressional pressure and over Soviet objections, the United States created a separate, unwritten "clause" to the Geneva Accords which stipulated that Washington could aid the rebels as long as the Soviet Union aided Kabul. The United States called this stipulation "positive symmetry."

Other complications almost prevented the signing of the accords. At the last minute, after

the United Nations had convinced the Soviet Union to drop its demand for a coalition government as a precondition to signing, Pakistan insisted on the formation of a rebel-dominated interim government, made up largely of rebel and other non-PDPA elements, before it would sign. President Reagan called President Zia and assured him that the United States would stand by the rebels until they seized power, and that since the USSR was probably going to withdraw with or without an agreement, Pakistan ought to sign. Besides, the White House had been advised that the PDPA would fall to the rebels shortly after Soviet troops had gone.

On April 14, 1988, the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed—with the USSR and the United States acting as their co-guarantors—to refrain from any form of interference in each other's territory, and to give all Afghan refugees the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland. For their part, the superpowers pledged to stop interfering in Afghanistan, with the USSR agreeing to withdraw its troops. Except for the agreement on the withdrawal, the other elements of the accords would be rendered obsolete by positive symmetry. To Washington, however, that seemed not to matter, for a rebel military victory appeared to be right around the corner. On May 15, 1988, Soviet troops began their ten month withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Part 1. The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs

Part 2. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified

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Annex 27

R. Erlich, "U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power", *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 28 November 2007

U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power

fpif.org/us_tells_iran_become_a_nuclear_power/

By Reese Erlich . Edited by Erik Leaver , November 28, 2007


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Editors note: The following is an excerpt from The Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and The Middle East Crisis (PoliPointPress, 2007).

Top Democratic and Republican leaders absolutely believe that Iran is planning to develop nuclear weapons. And one of their seemingly strongest arguments involves a process of deduction. Since Iran has so much oil, they argue, why develop nuclear power?

In an op-ed commentary former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote that "for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources," a position later cited approvingly by the Bush administration.

But U.S. leaders are engaging in a massive case of collective amnesia, or perhaps more accurately, intentional misdirection. In the 1970s the United States encouraged Iran to develop nuclear power precisely because Iran will eventually run out of oil.



A declassified document from President Gerald Ford's administration, for which Kissinger was Secretary of State, supported Iran's push for nuclear power. The document noted that Tehran should "prepare against the time–about 15 years in the future–when Iranian oil production is expected to decline sharply." The United States ultimately planned to sell billions of dollars worth of nuclear reactors, spare parts and nuclear fuel to Iran.

The Shah even periodically hinted that he wanted Iran to build nuclear weapons. In June 1974, the Shah proclaimed that Iran would have nuclear weapons "without a doubt and sooner than one would think." Iranian embassy officials in France later denied the Shah made those remarks, and the Shah disowned them. But a few months later the Shah noted that Iran "has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy."

If an Iranian leader made such statements today, the United States and Israel would denounce them as proof of nefarious intent. They might well threaten military action if Iran didn't immediately halt its nuclear buildup. At the time, however, the comments caused no ripples in Washington or Tel Aviv because the Shah was a staunch ally of both.

Nukes and Party-Mad Dictators

In the 1970s, successive U.S. administrations were tickled pink with the Shah's regime. As far as the United States was concerned, the Shah had a stable government that was modernizing an economically and religiously backward society. True, he ran a brutal dictatorship unconstrained by elections or an independent judiciary. The National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK), his secret police, was infamous for torturing and murdering political dissidents. But the Shah made sure that Iran provided a steady supply of petroleum to U.S. and other western oil companies. He had his own regional ambitions and also acted as a gendarme for the United States.

But beginning in the late 1960s, the Shah began to worry about Iran's long-term electric energy supplies. Iran had less than 500,000 electricity consumers in 1963, but those numbers swelled to over 2 million in 1976. The Shah worried that Iran's oil deposits would eventually run out, and that burning petroleum for electricity would

waste an important resource. He could earn far more exporting oil than using it for power generation.

Successive Republican and Democratic administrations in the United States backed the Shah's elaborate plans to make nuclear power an integral part of Iran's electrical grid, in no small part because he would buy a lot of his nuclear equipment from the USA.

The United States established Iran's first research reactor in 1967 at Tehran University. In November of that year, the U.S. corporation United Nuclear provided Iran with 5.85kg of 93 percent enriched uranium.

General Electric and Westinghouse ultimately won contracts to build eight reactors in Iran. By the time of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Shah had plans to buy a total of eighteen nuclear power reactors from the United States, France, and Germany.

Evidence has emerged since the 1979 Iranian revolution that the Shah did more than make embarrassing public references to building nuclear weapons. Documents show that Israel and Iran had discussed modification of Israel's Jericho missiles, which could have been fitted with a nuclear warhead. A research report from The Nuclear Threat Initiative, an organization founded by conservative Democrat and former Senator Sam Nunn, explained that the Shah was suspected of experimenting with nuclear weapons design, plutonium extraction and laser-enrichment research.

Nuclear expert Sahimi argued that presidents Nixon and Ford "would not have minded if the Shah developed the bomb because the Shah was a close ally of the United States. Remember Iran had a long border with the Soviet Union. If the Shah did make a nuclear bomb, that would have been a big deterrent against the USSR."

Since the United States wasn't terribly concerned about an Iranian Bomb in the 1970s, it also wasn't worried about Iran enriching its own uranium. The United States gave approval when Shah bought a 25 percent stake in a French company making enriched uranium. But the Shah wanted to build enrichment facilities inside Iran as well. No country wants to be reliant on others for fuel that could shut down a portion of its electricity grid. The United States actually encouraged Iran to enrich its own uranium.

Today when Iran demands that it be able to enrich uranium for nuclear power purposes, under strict international supervision, the United States says that's proof Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons.

Is Nuclear Power Islamic?

Shortly after coming to power, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini scrapped the Shah's nuclear power programs as un-Islamic. In fact, he called nuclear power "the work of the devil."

Not coincidentally, the United States and Europeans had completely halted their devil's work in Iran. Germany had stopped construction on the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The United States, Germans and French cut off supplies of equipment and nuclear material. All three governments refused to refund any money already paid, despite cancellation of the nuclear contracts. So while Koranic scholars might disagree on whether nuclear power was consistent with Islam, as a practical matter, Iran wasn't getting any.

Starting in 1980, Iran fought a bloody war with Iraq. Each side feared the other might develop nuclear weapons. Iraq repeatedly bombed Iran's unfinished nuclear facilities, further setting back any possibility of completing them.

By the end of the war in 1988 Iran was in the midst of a population explosion. Iran's population grew from 39.2 million in 1980 to 68.7 million in 2006. Iran's energy planners could see that demand would far outstrip supply. Continuing to extract oil and natural gas at the projected levels wouldn't be enough to guarantee a steady supply of electricity. An analysis by a National Academy of Sciences scientist predicted Iran could run out of oil to export by 2015.

So nuclear power was back on the table. In 1989 Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani signed a ten-point agreement with the USSR to provide nuclear materials and related equipment. The Soviets were to finish the Bushehr reactor started by the Germans in the 1970s. In 1990 Iran signed a ten-year nuclear cooperation

agreement with China.

Although it was kept secret at the time, Iran also bought parts and technology from A.Q. Khan, Pakistan's so-called father of the atomic bomb, who also had nuclear dealings with Libya and North Korea. Iran built a secret nuclear facility in the central Iranian city of Natanz. Later, after three years of inspections, the IAEA also determined that Iran had used lasers to purify uranium starting in 1991 and had researched a rare element called polonium 210, which could be used in a nuclear bomb trigger.

The Iranians argued they engaged in the secret activity to prevent the United States from stopping their plans for nuclear power development, and had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.

In 2003 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa, an official religious ruling, that declared Islam forbids the building or stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Before dismissing such a ruling as propaganda, it's worth noting that similar religious reasoning stopped Iran from using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, despite Saddam Hussein's numerous chemical assaults against Iranian troops and civilians.

Iran Is Just 5-10 Years from Making a Bomb, Really

Every few years U.S. intelligence officials estimate Iran is just years from making a bomb. In 1995, a "senior U.S. official" estimated Iran was five years from making The Bomb. A 2005 National Security Estimate, representing a consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, predicted Iran could have The Bomb somewhere around 2015.

In early 2006 Israeli intelligence, on the other hand, argued that Iran is much closer to having a bomb, perhaps one to three years away. In citing such estimates, the U.S. media don't provide any corroboration, nor explain why the Israeli assessment differs so widely from the CIA and IAEA. Indeed, Israel keeps postponing its estimates of when Iran will have the bomb. At the end of 2006 Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad intelligence agency, claimed Iran could have a bomb by 2009 or 2010.

Israel's estimates are clearly influenced by its political and military goals. Using Ahmadinejad's statements attacking Israel and questioning the existence of the Holocaust, Israel proclaims Iran an immediate military threat. In reality, Ahmadinejad poses no offensive nuclear threat to Israel. Iran would be insane to launch a first strike against the militarily far superior Israel, let alone a nuclear strike with an arsenal of one or two bombs. Such an action would give the United States and Israel a political excuse to wreck havoc on Iran and gain lots of international support.

But Israel does have a vested interest in creating anxiety around a possible Iranian Bomb. While Iran has no ability to wipe Israel off the map, it does support the Palestinian group Hamas and the Lebanese political party and guerrilla group Hezbollah. Iran gives them political, financial and military backing. Israel doesn't want to suffer another defeat like its 2006 war against Hizbollah. So rather than give up occupied territory and agree to establishing a Palestinian state, Israeli leaders blame outsiders. Israel seeks to weaken or, preferably, overthrow Iran's government.

Israeli officials, along with U.S. hawks, argue that Iran will soon reach "a point of no return," in which they have both the theoretical knowledge and practical ability to create weapon's grade plutonium. After that point, the hawks argue, Iran must be confronted militarily. The advantage of this argument, of course, is that it's all hypothetical. The Iranians cross this point of no return at whatever time the hawks allege. Who can prove otherwise?

In the spring of 2006 Bush seemed to echo those sentiments, justifying a military attack by setting an impossibly high bar for Iran to meet. "The world is united and concerned about their [Iranians] desire to have not only a nuclear weapon, but the capacity to make a nuclear weapon or *the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear weapon…,"* (emphasis added)Bush said in an April 2006 press conference. No one can possibly prove what knowledge scientists might have in their brains. But according to Bush's logic, Iran is a dangerous enemy so long as its scientists might, at some time in the future, think about building a bomb.

On July 31, 2006, the United States rounded up European powers, and got China and Russia to acquiesce, to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1696. The resolution demanded that Iran stop "all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities." (Reprocessing involves removing highly radioactive plutonium from nuclear waste products, a procedure that can lead to production of bomb-grade fuel.) A month later, in a report not released to the public, IAEA Director ElBaradei indicated that Iran was *not* reprocessing uranium.

ElBaradei criticized Iran, however, for continued attempts at uranium enrichment. "Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities…," wrote ElBaradei.

An IAEA official told the *New York Times* that "the qualitative and quantitative development of Iran's enrichment program continues to be fairly limited."

The IAEA report was hardly a smoking gun. But the Bush Administration huffed and puffed that Iran's failure to uphold the Security Council resolution meant the world should impose more sanctions. On March 24, 2007, the UN Security Council voted to impose another round of sanctions, prohibiting the sale of Iranian weapons to other countries and freezing the overseas assets of more Iranian individuals and organizations.

The United States failed to get any backing for military attacks on Iran to enforce the sanctions. The March resolution even restated the UN position that the Middle East region should be nuclear free, a criticism of Israel's large nuclear arsenal.

U.S. officials told the *New York Times* that the new sanctions went beyond the nuclear issue. "The new language was written to rein in what they [U.S. officials] see as Tehran's ambitions to become the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf and across the Middle East."

Apparently, no one can hold that job except the United States.

No Nukes? Not Enough

The real dispute between the United States and Iran has little to do with Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons. The Bush administration declared Iran to be part of the "axis of evil" and has been pursuing a policy of "regime change," a euphemism for the U.S. overthrow of an internationally recognized government. The United States has adopted different tactical positions, sometimes calling for tightening sanctions, other times threatening military strikes. But the long-term goal is installing a friendly regime.

Let's say Iran stopped all nuclear programs tomorrow, which was verified by international inspectors. The United States could start a new campaign based on its current claim that Iran is "the most active sponsor of state terrorism" in the world. Iran could give terrorist groups chemical weapons. Iran has missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv and U.S. military bases in the Middle East. Iran presents an immediate danger because of its support for terrorism. Time for regime change.

Is Iran currently developing nuclear weapons? No. Could it do so sometime in the future? Sure. According to the ElBaradei, some 49 countries "now know how to make nuclear arms," including Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. allies. Neither the United States nor the UN Security Council can militarily prevent each of those countries from making a bomb, said ElBaradei. "We are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries, intentions which are in turn based on their sense of security…."

The only way to insure Iran doesn't make nuclear weapons is to devise a political, not a military solution. If the people of Iran have a government that truly represents them, and the United States ceases its hostility and negotiates in good faith, Iran won't see a need to develop nuclear weapons.

So What Would You Do?

First, no more demonizing Iran. I would apologize for years of U.S. aggression against Iran. I would offer to return the billions of dollars in illegally frozen Iranian assets now held by the United States, lift all existing

sanctions against Iran and offer to restore full diplomatic relations. That would get Iran's attention. More importantly, it would set the basis for easing tensions on issues such as nuclear weapons.

I would announce plans to reduce the unconscionable number of nuclear weapons maintained by the United States in violation of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Most Americans have no idea that the Non Proliferation Treaty not only limits other states from obtaining nuclear weapons but also requires disarmament by the existing nuclear states, including the United States.

Then I would do something neither side expects. I would tell them we will phase out our nuclear power reactors for safety reasons and because we can't safely store nuclear waste. Nuclear power plants in the United States aren't even hardened against an airplane crash, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission refuses to require it.

Then I would suggest that Iran not develop nuclear power. Nuclear reactors and their tons of radioactive waste are disasters waiting to happen. Iran is already planning to have 20 percent of its electricity supplied by hydro power by 2021. Iran has the potential to develop a lot more wind and geo thermal power as well. In the meantime Iran could harness its tremendous natural gas resources as a relatively efficient source of electricity generation.

I don't know how Iranian leaders would react. These suggestions would certainly spark a lot of discussion among Iranians, a debate now largely nonexistent. Journalist and opposition leader Akbar Ganji is one of the few Iranians I met concerned about the safety of nuclear plants. "I am very worried that something like Chernobyl will happen to Iran," he told me. "If that happens, the Iranian people will pay the heaviest price."

I would like to see Ganji's views prevail. But if after a genuine debate, Iranians decided they wanted nuclear power, so be it.

The IAEA has procedures that allow countries to develop nuclear power, subject to strict international inspection. On March 23, 2005, Iran offered a plan to Britain, France, and Germany that would have allowed Iran to develop nuclear power and engage in uranium enrichment. Iran agreed not to reprocess nuclear fuel, produce only low-enriched uranium, limit the number of centrifuges and guarantee on-site inspections by the IAEA. That proposal could serve as the basis for honest negotiations.

Should the world simply trust Iran's leaders? No. We don't have to assume good faith. The IAEA is quite capable of detecting NPT violations because radioactive particles inevitably show up in water and soil. Over a period of time, and allowed full access, the IAEA can detect illegal nuclear activity. Since even U.S. intelligence agencies agree Iran is many years from having a capability of building a bomb, why not allow the IAEA to do its job?

In the long run, the people of Iran must change their government and revisit the nuclear power issue. I hope they choose to develop safer forms of energy. But that's a decision to be made by the people of Iran, not rulers in Washington.

Annex 28

"Obama says on Iran all options on the table", *Reuters*, 21 April 2009

Obama says on Iran all options on the table

www.reuters.com /article/idUSWAT011302

in 8 years

Obama says on Iran all options on the table

April 21, 2009 / 4:08 PM / in 8 years

WASHINGTON, April 21 (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama said on Tuesday he wanted direct diplomacy with long-time foe Iran but without taking other options off the table.

Obama also condemned as "appalling and objectionable" Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's denunciation of Israel as a racist state at a U.N. conference on Monday.

(Reporting by Matt Spetalnick; Editing by Doina Chiacu)

Annex 29

J. Becker, "U.S. Approved Business with Blacklisted Nations", *New York Times,* 23 December 2010

U.S. Approved Business With Blacklisted Nations

www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/world/24sanctions.html

By JO BECKER

Despite sanctions and trade embargoes, over the past decade the United States government has allowed American companies to do billions of dollars in business with Iran and other countries blacklisted as state sponsors of terrorism, an examination by The New York Times has found.

At the behest of a host of companies — from Kraft Food and Pepsi to some of the nation's largest banks — a little-known office of the Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 licenses for deals involving countries that have been cast into economic purgatory, beyond the reach of American business.

Most of the licenses were approved under a decade-old law mandating that agricultural and medical humanitarian aid be exempted from sanctions. But the law, pushed by the farm lobby and other industry groups, was written so broadly that allowable humanitarian aid has included cigarettes, Wrigley's gum, Louisiana hot sauce, weight-loss remedies, body-building supplements and sports rehabilitation equipment sold to the institute that trains Iran's Olympic athletes.

Hundreds of other licenses were approved because they passed a litmus test: They were deemed to serve American foreign policy goals. And many clearly do, among them deals to provide famine relief in North Korea or to improve Internet connections — and nurture democracy — in Iran. But the examination also found cases in which the foreign-policy benefits were considerably less clear.

In one instance, an American company was permitted to bid on a pipeline job that would have helped Iran sell natural gas to Europe, even though the United States opposes such projects. Several other American businesses were permitted to deal with foreign companies believed to be involved in terrorism or weapons proliferation. In one such case, involving equipment bought by a medical waste disposal plant in Hawaii, the government was preparing to deny the license until an influential politician intervened.

In an interview, the Obama administration's point man on sanctions, Stuart A. Levey, said that focusing on the exceptions "misses the forest for the trees." Indeed, the exceptions represent only a small counterweight to the overall force of America's trade sanctions, which are among the toughest in the world. Now they are particularly focused on Iran, where on top of a broad embargo that prohibits most trade, the United States and its allies this year adopted a new round of sanctions that have effectively shut Iran off from much of the international financial system.

"No one can doubt that we are serious about this," Mr. Levey said.

But as the administration tries to press Iran even harder to abandon its nuclear program — officials this week announced several new sanctions measures — some diplomats and foreign affairs experts worry that by allowing the sale of even small-ticket items with no military application, the United States muddies its moral and diplomatic authority.

"It's not a bad thing to grant exceptions if it represents a conscious policy decision to give countries an incentive," said Stuart Eizenstat, who oversaw sanctions policy for the Clinton administration when the humanitarian-aid law was passed. "But when you create loopholes like this that you can drive a Mack truck through, you are giving countries something for nothing, and they just laugh in their teeth. I think there have been abuses."

What's more, in countries like Iran where elements of the government have assumed control over large portions of the economy, it is increasingly difficult to separate exceptions that help the people from those that enrich the state. Indeed, records show that the United States has approved the sale of luxury food items to chain stores owned by

blacklisted banks, despite requirements that potential purchasers be scrutinized for just such connections.

Enforcement of America's sanctions rests with Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which can make exceptions with guidance from the State Department. The Treasury office resisted disclosing information about the licenses, but after The Times filed a federal Freedom of Information lawsuit, the government agreed to turn over a list of companies granted exceptions and, in a little more than 100 cases, underlying files explaining the nature and details of the deals. The process took three years, and the government heavily redacted many documents, saying they contained trade secrets and personal information. Still, the files offer a snapshot — albeit a piecemeal one — of a system that at times appears out of sync with its own licensing policies and America's goals abroad.

In some cases, licensing rules failed to keep pace with changing diplomatic circumstances. For instance, American companies were able to import cheap blouses and raw material for steel from North Korea because restrictions loosened when that government promised to renounce its nuclear weapons program and were not recalibrated after the agreement fell apart.

Mr. Levey, a Treasury under secretary who held the same job in the Bush administration, pointed out that the United States did far less business with Iran than did China or Europe; in the first quarter of this year, 0.02 percent of American exports went to Iran. And while it is "a fair policy question" to ask whether Congress's definition of humanitarian aid is overly broad, he said, the exception has helped the United States argue that it opposes Iran's government, not its people. That, in turn, has helped build international support for the tightly focused financial sanctions.

Beyond that, he and the licensing office's director, Adam Szubin, said the agency's other, case-by-case, determinations often reflected a desire to balance sanctions policy against the realities of the business world, where companies may unwittingly find themselves in transactions involving blacklisted entities.

"I haven't seen any licenses that I thought we should have done differently," Mr. Szubin said.

Behind a 2000 Law

For all the speechifying about humanitarian aid that attended its passage, the 2000 law allowing agricultural and medical exceptions to sanctions was ultimately the product of economic stress and political pressure. American farmers, facing sharp declines in commodity prices and exports, hoped to offset their losses with sales to blacklisted countries.

The law defined allowable agricultural exports as any product on a list maintained by the Agriculture Department, which went beyond traditional humanitarian aid like seed and grain and included products like beer, soda, utility poles and more loosely defined categories of "food commodities" and "food additives."

Even before the law's final passage, companies and their lobbyists inundated the licensing office with claims that their products fit the bill.

Take, for instance, chewing gum, sold in a number of blacklisted countries by Mars Inc., which owns Wrigley's. "We debated that one for a month. Was it food? Did it have nutritional value? We concluded it did," Hal Eren, a former senior sanctions adviser at the licensing office, recalled before pausing and conceding, "We were probably rolled on that issue by outside forces."

While Cuba was the primary focus of the initial legislative push, Iran, with its relative wealth and large population, was also a promising prospect. American exports, virtually nonexistent before the law's passage, have totaled more than $1.7 billion since.

In response to questions for this article, companies argued that they were operating in full accordance with American law.



An Iranian man shopping at a store in Tehran, where products from Dole, which has a sanctions exemptions, are sold. Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Henry Lapidos, export manager for the American Pop Corn Company, acknowledged that calling the Jolly Time popcorn he sold in Sudan and Iran a humanitarian good was “pushing the envelope,” though he did give it a try. “It depends on how you look at it — popcorn has fibers, which are helpful to the digestive system,” he explained, before switching to a different tack. “What’s the harm?” he asked, adding that he didn’t think Iranian soldiers “would be taking microwavable popcorn” to war.

Even the sale of benign goods can benefit bad actors, though, which is why the licensing office and State Department are required to check the purchasers of humanitarian aid products for links to terrorism. But that does not always happen.

In its application to sell salt substitutes, marinades, food colorings and cake sprinkles in Iran, McCormick & Co. listed a number of chain stores that planned to buy its products. A quick check of the Web site of one store, Refah, revealed that its major investors were banks on an American blacklist. The government of Tehran owns Shahrvand, another store listed in the license. A third chain store, Ghods, draws many top officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which the United States considers a terrorist organization.

The licensing office’s director, Mr. Szubin, said that given his limited resources, they were better spent on stopping weapons technology from reaching Iran. Even if the connections in the McCormick case had come to light, he said, he still might have had to approve the license: the law requires him to do so unless he can prove that the investors engaged in terrorist activities own more than half of a company.

“Are we checking end users? Yes,” he said. “But are we doing corporate due diligence on every Iranian importer? No.”

A McCormick spokesman, Jim Lynn, said, “We were not aware of the information you shared with us and are looking

into it.”

Political Influence

Beyond the humanitarian umbrella, the agency has wide discretion to make case-by-case exceptions. Sometimes, political influence plays a role in those deliberations, as in a case involving Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii and a medical-waste disposal plant in Honolulu.

On July 28, 2003, the plant’s owner, Samuel Liu, ordered 200 graphite electrodes from a Chinese government-owned company, China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. In an interview, Mr. Liu said he had chosen the company because the electrodes available in the United States were harder to find and more expensive. Two days later, the Bush administration barred American citizens from doing business with the Chinese company, which had already been penalized repeatedly for providing missile technology to Pakistan and Iran.

By the time Customs seized the electrodes on Nov. 5, waste was piling up in the sun. Nor did prospects look good for Mr. Liu’s application to the licensing office seeking to do an end run around the sanctions. On Nov. 21, a State Department official, Ralph Palmiero, recommended that the agency deny the request since the sanctions explicitly mandated the “termination of existing contracts” like Mr. Liu’s.

That is when Senator Inouye’s office stepped in. While his electrodes were at sea, Mr. Liu had made his first ever political contribution, giving the senator’s campaign $2,000. Mr. Liu says the timing was coincidental, that he was simply feeling more politically inclined. Records show that an Inouye aide called the licensing office on Mr. Liu’s behalf the same day that Mr. Palmiero recommended denying the application. The senator himself wrote two days later.

Mr. Inouye’s spokesman, Peter Boylan, said the contribution had “no impact whatsoever” on the senator’s actions, which he said were motivated solely by concern for the community’s health and welfare.

The pressure appears to have worked. The following day, the licensing office’s director at the time asked the State Department to reconsider in an e-mail that prominently noted the senator’s interest. A few days later, the State Department found that the purchase qualified for a special “medical and humanitarian” exception.

The license was issued Dec. 10. Two months later, Mr. Liu sent the senator another $2,000 contribution, the maximum allowable. Mr. Levey said he could not comment on the details of a decision predating his tenure. But he noted that sanctions against the Chinese company had since been toughened, and added, “Certainly this transaction wouldn’t be authorized today.”

Curious Exemptions

Mr. Liu’s license is hardly the only one to raise questions about how the government determines that a license serves American foreign policy.

There is also, for instance, the case of Irisl, an Iranian government-owned shipping line that the United States blacklisted in 2008, charging that because it routinely used front companies and misleading terms to shroud shipments of banned arms and other technology with military uses, it was impossible to tell whether its shipments were “licit or illicit.”

Less than nine months earlier, the licensing office had permitted a Japanese subsidiary of Citibank to carry out the very type of transaction it was now warning against. Records show that the bank had agreed to confirm a letter of credit guaranteeing payment to a Malaysian exporter upon delivery of what were described as split-system air-conditioners to a Turkish importer. Though the government had yet to blacklist Irisl, sanctions rules already prohibited dealings with Iranian companies. So when the bank learned that the goods were to be shipped aboard the Irisl-owned Iran Ilam, it sought a license.

The license was granted, even though the Treasury Department's investigation of Irisl was well under way and the United States had reason to be suspicious of the Iran Ilam in particular; that summer, the ship had attracted the attention of the intelligence community when it delivered a lathe used to make nuclear centrifuge parts from China to Iran, according to government officials who requested anonymity to speak about a previously unpublicized intelligence matter.

Mr. Szubin said that since the blacklisting of Irisl, his agency had forced banks to extricate themselves from such transactions. But at the time the Citibank license was issued, his agency regularly issued licenses in cases like this one, where at the time of the transaction, the bank had no way of knowing that Irisl was involved and where the shipping line would be paid by a foreign third party anyway. To depart from the norm, he said, risked facing a lawsuit charging unfair treatment and tipping Irisl off that it was under investigation.

But if the government has sometimes been willing to grant American businesses a break, some companies have recently decided that the cost to their reputations outweighs the potential profit.

General Electric, which has been one of the leading recipients of licenses, says it has stopped all but humanitarian business in countries listed as sponsors of terrorism and has promised to donate its profits from Iran to charity.

As Joshua Kamens, the head of a company called Anndorll, put it, he knew from almost the minute he applied for a license to sell sugar in Iran that "it would come back to haunt me." Although he received the go-ahead, he decided to back out of the deal.

"I'm an American," he said. "Even though it's legal to sell that type of product, I didn't want to have any trade with a country like Iran."

Annex 30

J. Becker, "Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut", *New York Times*, 24 December 2010

Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html

By JO BECKER

- **Examples of Licenses** *Details from more than 100 cases where exemptions were granted.*
- **Top Licensees** *Nearly 300 companies received five or more exemptions.*

Company	Exemption
3M Company	Jacqueline Berry, a spokeswoman for 3M, said the company received this license to sell certain medical and dental products to civilian populations in Iran. It separately received another license to sell specialized window film to a United Nations building in Sudan.
540 Sports and Entertainment	This license authorized 540 Sports and Entertainment to place American basketball players on Iranian teams. When 540's owner, John Spencer, first received a phone call from an Iranian sports agent inquiring about such placements, he thought that the man was joking. But since then, he said, he has placed a number of professional players on teams in Iran. On average, the men were paid $7,000 to $40,000 per month, Mr. Spencer said. The United States has long supported such "sports diplomacy," and while relations between the United States and Iran are testy, Mr. Spencer said he found that everyday Iranians "are fascinated with our culture, just as we should be fascinated with theirs."
Afghan American Trading Company Inc.	Abdul Akbarzai, who answered the phone and identified himself as the owner of this company, said he was not in charge when this license granting an exception to America's sanctions against the Taliban was issued. Before hanging up, he said that it was a registered foreign company and that the man who was in charge had been transferred back to Afghanistan.
AirSep Corporation	Helen Ying and Larry Hughes, who head AirSep's medical and industrial divisions, said the company had received licenses to sell products like an oxygen machine that effectively turns a room into an oxygen tent and central oxygen systems that supply entire hospitals. The company uses a middleman in Iran, whom Mr. Hughes declined to name for competitive reasons, to make the sales, and another company to do the installations. "It's a hard way to do business," he said.
Albemarle Corporation	This license authorized the sale of ibuprofin in Iran.
Alcoa Inc.	"U.S. government officials with intelligence and border security responsibilities" contacted Alcoa in January 2006 to advise the company of a continuing investigation stemming from the belief that one of its customers in Turkey was acting as a purchasing agent on behalf of the government of Iran, records show. The investigation was never publicly reported, but as a result of this notification, Libby Archell, an Alcoa spokeswoman, said scheduled deliveries to that customer were halted and the customer was notified that no additional shipments would be forthcoming. A license was needed, however, so that Alcoa could refund the customer for goods that had been paid for but not yet shipped "in order to avoid litigation and attendant 'discovery,' " the license application states. It is unclear what product Alcoa had been shipping to the Turkish customer; OFAC redacted that information, and Ms. Archell declined to say. She said that Alcoa was "completely unaware" and had no way of knowing that its customer was acting as a front for the Iranian government until the United States government informed the company of its investigation. The company uses an "extremely thorough due dilligence process" to vet potential customers, she said, adding that the customer in question was not at the time on the government's blacklist of sanctioned parties.
Alltech Inc.	This license allowed Alltech to sell animal feed to Iran.

Alpha International Trading Company	Senator Elizabeth Dole, Republican of North Carolina, wrote in 2008 on behalf of this company, which wanted to sell fluff pulp, a product that can be used in products like diapers, to Sarve Caspian Hygienic Paper Industry in Tehran. In a letter to Mrs. Dole, Alpha's vice president complained that he had been advised six weeks earlier that the State Department had approved the license and that it would be issued pending some paperwork completion. "We have now been advised by the OFAC that there is a hold on the issuance of licenses to do business into Iran from the United States due to 'governmental policy matters.' We realize that foreign diplomacy and policy making are complicated. We are simply a business making an effort to export a qualified U.S. product to an overseas market." He added, "Our potential customers will have to go to other supply options if we cannot supply U.S. product." The license was issued the following month.
American Ingredients Company	Senator Christopher S. Bond, Republican of Missouri, wrote to OFAC in 2004 on this company's behalf, asking that it expedite its review. The company was seeking to export Vitamin and Mineral Premix and a volumetric feeder to the Ministry of Health in Iran and said it was under a "strict time schedule to receive our license from OFAC or we will not be able to participate in this important project." The license was issued the following month.
American Life Inc.	American Life received a license to process funds from EB-5 Iranian visa applicants. The EB-5 visa program authorizes the United States to grant up to 10,000 immigrant visas per year establishing permanent residence in the country to foreign citizens who make an investment of $500,000 or more in a new business in the United States that creates at least 10 full-time jobs for American workers. "American Life believes that the receipt and investment of funds in the U.S. does serve the sanctions policy goal of depriving Iran and the Iranian banks of economic resources and reducing the amount of funds at their disposal," the company wrote.
American Pop Corn Company	The American Pop Corn Company, which makes Jolly Time microwavable popcorn, received licenses to sell its product in Iran and the Sudan under a humanitarian exception for food and medical aid. Henry Lapidos, the company's food products export manager, said he had no problem selling to countries like these because it was good to "show the American flag" by placing products like American Pop Corn's on supermarket shelves in places where anti-American sentiment runs strong. "I don't see us supporting the ayatollahs. I don't think the Revolutionary Guard - that soliders would take microwavable popcorn in their backpacks when they go to war," he said. Asked whether popcorn should be considered a humanitarian good eligible for export exceptions, Mr. Lapidos answered this way: "Hairbrushes are not; iPods are not. But popcorn? It depends on how you look at it," he said. "Popcorn has fibers, which are helpful to the digestive system. So it could be considered humanitarian, though it's pushing the envelope."
American Pulp and Paper	This license authorized American Pulp and Paper to export wood pulp used for diapers to an Iranian company. According to the license, wood pulp was added by the United States Department of Agriculture to the list of allowable exportable agricultural commodities in 2001.
Anndorll Corporation	Joshua Kamens, who heads Anndorll, said he knew his application to sell sugar in Iran "would come back to haunt me." An employee talked him into it at a time when "Iran was not as big of an enemy to the U.S. as it is today," Mr. Kamens explained, "but it was getting there." Upon reflection, he decided to back out of the transaction before it was completed. "I'm an American," he said. "Even though it's legal to sell that type of product, I didn't want to have any trade with countries like Iran."
Archer Daniels Midland Company	This license authorized Archer Daniels Midland Company to fulfill a contractual obligation it had in connection with a "string transaction." Companies enter into such transactions when they sell goods on a commodities market. Often, they have no way of knowing where the goods will end up. In this case, Archer Daniels Midland found out that its goods were destined for Iran after it entered into the transaction, according to its application. OFAC said it generally grants licenses in this type of situation because failing to do so could bring American commodities trading to a halt.

Ardess International	On its Web site, Ardess International boasted of its ability to do business "with any country in the Middle East notwithstanding any trade sanctions." Ardess handles a number of companies that sell weight-lifting products like Anabolic Rush, which promises to help bodybuilders "train with a ferocity that radiates from every corner of the gym." Kenny Flores is a customer of Ardess whose company, MRM, sells sports performance-enhancing supplements like Driven, a high-performance workout concoction for "serious athletes that truly want to reach peak performance, while annihilating their competition." Mr. Flores said getting approval from the Iranian Ministry of Health to sell his products there was harder than getting approval from OFAC, but that it was well worth the effort. "Iran is a young country - close to 60 percent of the population is under 45 years of age, and they are very health conscious," he said, noting that his company had done hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of business there since obtaining the necessary approvals. Mr. Flores said Iran's nuclear ambitions are "scary" and something that "I'm definitely concerned about." But, he added, "as long as the government says it is O.K. to trade with them, we will trade with them."
Aria Loghman Company	Carol Covert said she applied for a license because her husband needed to get copies of his law school transcripts from the University of Tehran, and the couple, who live in the United States, had to pay someone to retrieve them. Aria Loghman was the middleman she paid, she said.
Baghdad Oil Training Institute	This license authorized the company to export drilling equipment for use in Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food Program. The program, notwithstanding international sanctions at that time, established a mechanism whereby Iraqi oil exports were supposed to finance humanitarian aid to the country. The program was later widely criticized, amid accusations that some of its profits unlawfully wound up in the coffers of the government of Iraq and in the pockets of United Nations officials.
Banca Intesa	On Aug. 21, 2003, Banca Intessa blocked a transaction for an unknown amount from China Precision Machinery Import Export to a second party. But a few months later, the bank was given an OFAC license to release China Precision Machinery's funds to the other party in the transaction. This, despite the fact that the Chinese government-owned company had been sanctioned multiple times for providing sensitive technology to Iran and other countries under the Treasury Department's weapons of mass destruction sanctions program. OFAC declined to say how much money was released back to a company the United States has called a "serial proliferator," citing the objections of a different party to the transaction, presumably Banca Intesa. Within months of granting the license, OFAC again penalized China Precision Machinery under its weapons of mass destruction program, this time based on "credible information" that it and other companies had been transferring goods to Iran that could be used to "make a 'material contribution' to weapons of mass destruction or cruise missile or ballistic missile systems." OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, said that at the time the license was granted to Banca Intesa, the agency did not have the authority to keep the funds blocked; firms sanctioned under the weapons of mass destruction sanctions regime face narrower penalties, such as losing United States government contracts and losing the ability to export their products into the United States. He said the amount in this case was small - under $10,000. And he noted that it was not until several years later, with the levying of additional, tougher sanctions against the Chinese company, that OFAC received the authority to order its funds frozen.
Bank of America	OFAC redacted so much of this license file that it is impossible to tell what exactly it authorized, though what is clear is that it was related to another license, granted to BNP Paribas, involving the acquisition of equipment that was of Iranian origin. Bank of America, which was financing the deal, contended that the sale should be licensed because the goods had already been exported to another country.

Bank of New York Mellon	This 2009 license was issued after OFAC required the Bank of New York Mellon to extricate itself from an import-export deal after the bank learned that the goods in question were to be shipped aboard a vessel owned by Irisl, an Iranian government-owned shipping line that the United States had blacklisted because of its involvement in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. For complex legal reasons, the bank, which had agreed to confirm a letter of credit, required a license in order to return trade documents.
BearingPoint	BearingPoint, previously known as KPMG Consulting, was authorized to buy payroll software from Iran in order to complete its work developing a finance and budgeting system for Afghanistan's government. Iran and Afghanistan share a common language, and BearingPoint said software purchased elsewhere would require substantial modification.
Bechtel Aircraft Operations	This license authorized the company to fly a United States-owned aircraft into Libya so that executives could meet with representatives of the Libyan government.
Becton, Dickinson & Company	This medical device company and its French subsidiary were licensed to export goods, the precise nature of which OFAC redacted, to Iran.
Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.	The documents relating to this license have been so heavily redacted by OFAC that it is impossible to tell what was authorized. A company spokeswoman, Karen Gordon Quintal, said Bell Helicopter had received this and another license because it needed "to store property of Iran and Iraq that Bell had possession of in the United States on the dates, respectively, when the assets of those countries were frozen. These licenses were required to enable Bell to store the assets, consisting principally of spare parts, in Bell's U.S-based warehouse facility. Bell continues to store that property."
Bell-Carter Olive Company	Judy Rowcliffe, a spokeswoman for Bell-Carter Olive Company, said the company had a contract broker representative who attended a food show in Singapore sometime around 2005 and spoke with a potential customer about selling the company's products in Iran. She said the company, the largest olive manufacturer in the United States, received the license, but never pursued any sales there. The company then let the license expire.
Bernabei & Wachtel P.L.L.C.	This license authorized Bernabei & Wachtel to be paid for representing KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development. The Ohio-based charity's accounts had been blocked after the United States designated it as a progeny of groups accused of supporting terrorist activities. The group is challenging that designation in court. OFAC has an established policy of licensing lawyers' fees in such cases, and the law firm also received a license for representing the Holy Land Foundation, a charity that was sanctioned on suspicion of providing support to a terrorist organization.
Bonyad Shipping Company	This license allows Michael Mitchell, P.C., to represent Bonyad Shipping Company of Tehran in civil litigation proceedings.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation	Brown and Williamson Tobacco received a license to export cigarettes under the agricultural exemption to the United States trade embargo against Iran. OFAC redacted the names of the businesses in Iran that would be buying the cigarettes. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to Iranian customs officials.
Bruce Foods Corporation	This license authorized Bruce Foods to export Louisiana Hot Sauce brand products under the agricultural exemption to the United States trade embargo against Iran. The products were to be exported to Hall Kish on Kish Island, Iran, and Javaheri Company in Tehran.
CNA Insurance Companies	CNA's British subsidiary was allowed to make good on certain contracts involving North Korea and, among other things, "payment of claims into blocked accounts where necessary, and receipt of premiums related thereto." OFAC redactions make it unclear exactly those claims and premiums were at issue.

Cabot Specialty Chemicals Inc.	Cabot received this license after it assisted in a sales transaction of silicon dioxidebetween two non-U.S. parties. The company applied for the exception after learning that the goods would be shipped via the Iranian government-owned shipping line known as Irisl. "The items in question are already loaded onto containers at the dock and ready to be loaded onto the vessel, which is due to depart the port of Antwerp, Belgium, on Monday," the company's lawyers, in the firm of Baker & McKenzie, wrote to OFAC on May 11, 2001. OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, stressed that the approval came seven years before Irisl was blacklisted by the United States for aiding Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Up until then, he said, the agency made case-by-case exceptions to a broad prohibition against dealing with Iranian companies in situations like this one in which the company had no prior knowledge that an Iranian entity was involved in the transaction and granting the license did not involve a direct payment from a United States person or company to an Iranian entity.
Cargill	Cargill, a leading agricultural and industrial company,contracted with North Korea to deliver raw agricultural products during the well publicized famine, according to spokeswoman Lori Johnson.
Castle & Cooke Worldwide Limited	This license authorized the export of canned fruit and vegetables to entities in Iran whose names OFAC redacted. The company's products include Dole Pineapple.
Chevron/Exxon Mobil	This license file is heavily redacted, but it authorized Chevron/Exxon Mobil to engage in "all transactions necessary to deliver crude oil payments to [a redacted entity] in which the government of Iran has an interest." In a statement, Chevron said that the license authorized it to deliver crude oil to a company called Tengizchevroil (TCO), which was established in 1993 as a joint venture between Chevron and the government of Kazakhstan. Because Kazakhstan could elect to receive its royalty payments from TCO in the form of “in-kind” oil deliveries, and because it could then sell that oil to Iran, Chevron said it contacted OFAC to receive assurances that the arrangement would not be deemed a violation of sanctions. Since the license was awarded, Kazakhstan has not elected to take oil in lieu of cash payments, though it has the right to do so, according to Chevron.
Chiquita Brands International Inc.	This license was one of many given to Chiquita Brands, the banana grower, authorizing it to sell its produce in Iran; the purchasers' names have all been redacted by OFAC. The company was also authorized to sell its products in Libya while that country was still under sanction by the United States.
Cisco Systems Inc.	This license authorizes the company to help the New Zealand Embassy in Iran with a computer project.
Citigroup Inc.	This license authorized Citigroup to return money to the Chinese government-owned China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. Citigroup had blocked a payment by the Chinese company to one of its customers because the United States had sanctioned the company for providing missile technology to Iran. Although Citigroup had asked for authority to complete the transaction, OFAC determined that the money had to be sent back, leaving the Chinese company to find a bank outside of United States jurisdiction to make its payment. OFAC issued several similar licenses to other banks involving wire transfers to or from China Precision. While OFAC could have ordered the banks to seize the money, it chose not to do so because it knew that could subject the banks to litigation, given that China was unlikely to uphold a United States seizure order.

Citigroup Inc.	OFAC granted a license on Dec. 27, 2007, to Citibank authorizing it to make good on an agreement its Japanese subsidiary had entered into in October. The bank had agreed to confirm that certain conditions in a letter of credit had been meet, after which a Malaysian exporter of split-system air conditioners to Turkey would be paid. Then the bank discovered that the goods were to be shipped aboard a vessel called the Iran Ilam that was owned by the Iranian government-run shipping line known as Irisl, thus requiring that the transaction be licensed. The license was issued even though the Treasury Department and OFAC suspected that Irisl was being used to smuggle goods into Iran in contravention of various embargoes, including banned technology the government needed for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Moreover, at the time the license was issued, the United States had evidence that five months earlier, the Iran Ilam itself had delivered a lathe that could be used to make precise metal parts needed for nuclear centrifuges from China to Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, according to government officials who requested anonymity to speak about an intelligence matter. Indeed, within months of issuing the license, OFAC announced at a news conference that the United States was adding Irisl to a special blacklist, after an investigation found that Irisl had falsified cargo records, relied on front companies and used other trickery to mask the true nature and destination of shipments. At the September 2008 news conference announcing the decision, OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, warned that banks and companies worldwide should be aware that they could be unwittingly aiding Iran's quest for banned technology by doing business with Irisl: "Irisl's deceptive practices make it nearly impossible to determine whether its shipments are licit or illicit," he said. Mr. Szubin acknowledged in an interview that he was under no obligation to issue the license to Citigroup, given that banks were already prohibited generally from doing business with Iranian entities. But he said that OFAC had issued licenses in cases like this in the past in which the bank had no way of knowing that Irisl was involved and Irisl would have been paid by a foreign third party anyway. To depart from that norm in this case, he added, risked opening up his agency charges of unfair treatment and litigation, and tipping off Irisl that it was under investigation.
Citigroup Inc.	This license had to do with a letter of credit guaranteeing a shipment of goods that Citibank later found out involved a North Korean vessel.
Citigroup Inc.	This license is one of at least three that OFAC issued involving the China Great Wall Industry Corporation. The licenses were issued after the Chinese company was added to the United States' special blacklist for supplying components to Iran's ballistic missile development program and before it was removed from the list on June 19, 2008. In one case, the agency licensed the Chinese company's lawyers, who were challenging the blacklisting, to receive legal fees. Two other cases involved wire transactions to or from China Great Wall. OFAC could have forced Citigroup to seize the funds, but said it chose instead to authorize the bank to return the money because China was unlikely to agree that the funds should be seized and therefore the bank would have almost certainly lost a legal battle to keep the funds blocked.
Coca-Cola Company	Coca-Cola does business in Iran through an Irish subsidiary, which sells concentrate to a bottling company called Khoshgovar based in Mashhad, according to a spokeswoman. The company has also received licenses to sell its products in Sudan.

Cometals (Commercial Metals Company)	This license authorized the company to complete the sale and delivery of Mexican-origin goods, the precise nature of which OFAC redacted, to China, even though the goods had been shipped via the Iranian government-owned shipping line known as Irisl. Irisl has since been designated as an entity involved in helping the Iranian regime obtain technology it needs for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. The license also allowed the bank that issued the letter of credit for the sale, HSBC, to make good on its obligations. In granting the license, OFAC wrote that Cometals had advised the agency that it was subject to large daily fees for every day that the vessel was not unloaded as well as possible financial claims from the Chinese customer for failing to deliver the goods. OFAC granted the license "in order to enable Cometals to avoid significant financial loss," it said. While OFAC was under no obligation to grant this license given that it involved an Iranian entity, OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, stressed that Irisl was not added to a special United States blacklist of proliferators until five years after this license was issued. Up until then, he said case-by-case exceptions were made in cases like this one in which the company did not know that an Iranian entity was involved when it entered into the transaction, and in which granting the license did not involve a direct payment from a United States person or company to an Iranian entity.
Computer Sports Medicine Inc.	This license was issued after Senator Edward M. Kennedy's office called OFAC on behalf of this Massachusetts-based company on July 12, 2006, then wrote a follow-up letter on Nov. 29, 2006. The license authorized the sale of the HUMAC NORM Multi-Joint Evaluation and Exercise System to Sepehran Company for resale in Iran to, among other entities, the National Olympic Academy of Iran, which trains Iran's athletes. The product, which was deemed to be an allowable medical device export, is an exercise machine used in sports rehabilitation. Rob Potash, the vice president of Computer Sports Medicine, said he believed that the sale of American products to Iranians helped to improve the United States' image there.
ConocoPhillips	This license authorized ConocoPhillips to engage in dealings involving "refinery activities" potentially affected by United States sanctions against Sudan. The precise nature of what was authorized was redacted by OFAC.
Cooperative Resouces International	Representative Steve Kagen, a Wisconsin Democrat, wrote to OFAC regarding a license for this Wisconsin-based livestock cooperative on Sept. 17, 2007. The license was issued on Nov. 8, 2007.
Cuvax Inc.	This license authorizes Cuvax to sell some sort of nutritional supplements, the precise nature of which OFAC has redacted, to an entity in Iran that has also been redacted.

David Ross Group Inc. and Tyco Electronics	This license was heavily redacted, but relates to a telecommunications project called Gulf Bridge, whose investors included the Qatari and Kuwaiti investment authorities. The idea of the project was to create a new undersea cable linking the countries of the Persian Gulf to one another and to India and Europe. Tyco Electronics won the contract to build the link, and the David Ross Group, which specializes in undersea telecommunication cables, was hired to manage the project. A spokeswoman for Tyco, Sheri Woodruff, said in an interview that both the David Ross Group and Tyco Electronics requested licenses because materials needed for the project would traverse Iranian waters. In requesting expedited handling of its application, the law firm for both companies pointed out its political connections, noting that the firm's name, Wiltshire & Grannis, had recently changed because one of its partners had just been named by the Obama administration as general counsel of the Department of Energy. David Ross, in correspondence with OFAC, asked for an answer by June 2009, which came and went. Tyco Electronics was warned that if OFAC did not move quickly to approve the license, the Gulf Bridge project was in danger of losing its funding, Ms. Woodruff said. So the Tyco Electronics vice president for global and government affairs, Joann Piccolo, pressed OFAC for a decision, e-mails show. That pressure resulted in extremely high-level concern at OFAC -- and action at an agency that is not widely viewed as quick-moving. On Sept. 2, 2009, Ms. Piccolo wrote to someone at OFAC, whose name is redacted: "Sorry to interrupt your travels - attached is the one-pager on the issue I called you about. Anything you can do to help would be most welcome and/or help us get a meeting with the right person. As I understand it — the holdup is only because of the number of applications, not because of any problem with the application. ..." That was followed by a flurry of e-mails about the case addressed to the very top of OFAC's management, including the director, Adam J. Szubin. Just before the close of business, an e-mail to Mr. Szubin and others reported that the licenses were ready to go. The team that had been working on the matter all day received a note of thanks from John Smith, the associate director of OFAC. "I talked with Adam, and he's fine with this: Great work [name redacted] and company!!" Ms. Piccolo was also pleased: "She was very grateful for their attention to it, particularly recognizing that she was bothering someone over a holiday," Ms. Woodruff said.
Dell Computer Corporation	This license authorized a shipment of computers to an embassy in Tehran.
Delta Corporate Identity Inc., The NutraSweet Company	This license authorized the company to make payments to the Libyan government while that country was still under sanction, in order to protect its intellectual property. OFAC generally licenses such payments.
Denso Manufacturing Tennessee Inc.	This license allowed the company to import, from Japan, a chemical mixture that contains material of North Korean origin. State Department records said that the mixture would be used in catalytic converters and noted that Denso would not be buying the mixture directly from companies in North Korea. At the time the license was issued, North Korea was on a United States list of state sponsors of terrorism, and sanctions prevented the country from receiving American economic aid, banned arms-related exports and sales to the North, controlled exports of dual-use items, and prohibited economic assistance. But on June 19, 2000, during a brief thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations were amended to permit the licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they met certain criteria. Importers had to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to be imported were not made by producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities, an activity of the North Korean government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology, or an activity of the North Korean government affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft. OFAC officials acknowledged the difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, state-controlled economy like North Korea's, where anything going in and out of the country potentially indirectly benefits the government. But they said they were confident that exporters directly involved in that country's missile and proliferation activities were being flagged.

Dresser Inc.	This license is so heavily redacted that all that can be said is that Dresser, an oil services company, received a license. It appears to have involved Dresser's pressure valve relief division, but even the company's explanation of why granting a license would be in the United States' foreign policy interest is redacted. Dresser did not return calls requesting comment.
Duke Energy Corporation	Duke Energy received a license exempting it from the Treasury Department's uranium enrichment sanctions regime, allowing the company to take delivery of a good or service from O.A.O. Techsnabexport Company Limited. OFAC redactions make it impossible to tell what type of good or service was at issue, or precisely why Duke would need an OFAC license. Thomas Williams, a Duke spokesman, did not respond to a request for comment on the license. The sanctions regime at issue relates to a Clinton-era agreement, known as the H.E.U. Purchase Agreement. The agreement provided that 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons would be blended to proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium by 2013. The material would be sold to the United States for resale as fuel for commercial nuclear power plants.
DynCorp International L.L.C.	This license authorized DynCorp, a United States contractor in Afghanistan, to ship supplies through Iran to Afghanistan for Afghanistan's Central Poppy Eradication Force.
Eastman Kodak Company	This license allowed the company to sell the Kodak DryView 81 SO Laser Imager in Sudan, where it was to be used in medical clinics and hospitals for medical radiology diagnostic purposes.
Ekman & Company	This license authorized Ekman & Company, which manufactures a paper product used in goods like diapers and sanitary napkins, to sell its products in Iran.
Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc.	This license allowed the oil company Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. to take part in a single flight on a Libyan airline while Libya was still under sanction by the United States.
Eveready Battery Company	This license allowed Eveready to make payments to Libya for copyright protections, a practice that is generally allowed so that companies can protect their intellectual property rights.
FMC Technologies Inc.	This license involved the settlement of a legal dispute. Before the imposition of the sanctions against Iran, FMC had a trade contract with Daewoo UK to provide equipment and perform installation and warranty work at a facility on Kharg Island in Iran. The ultimate contracting authority for the project was the National Iranian Oil Company. After sanctions were imposed, FMC ceased all work on the project. Daewoo then initiated a legal claim against FMC. For complex legal reasons, the payment of a $710,000 settlement by FMC to Daewoo required a license from OFAC.
Fruit of the Loom Inc.	This allowed the company to make payments to Libya for copyright protections, which are generally allowed.
Gish Biomedical Inc.	Representative Gary G. Miller, Republican of California, wrote on behalf of Gish on Aug. 29, 2006, and Gish received a license several months later to sell devices used in cardiopulmonary bypass operations.
Halliburton	This license authorized the company to engage in transactions that ultimately would allow it to withdraw from Iran. The withdrawal came after the company was criticized for doing business in Iran's lucrative energy sector through a loophole that allows foreign subsidiaries of United States companies to do business in sanctioned countries or with sanctioned entities, activities that would be forbidden for the American parent.

Hawaii Medical Vitrification	This license involved a medical-waste disposal plant in Honolulu called Hawaii Medical Vitrification. On July 28, 2003, the plant's owner, Samuel Liu, ordered 200 graphite electrodes from a Chinese government-owned company, China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation. In an interview, Mr. Liu said he had chosen the company because the electrodes available in the United States were harder to find and more expensive. Two days later, the Bush administration barred American citizens from doing business with the Chinese company, which had already been penalized repeatedly for providing missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. By the time Customs seized the electrodes on Nov. 5, waste was piling up in the sun. Nor did prospects look good for Mr. Liu's application to the licensing office seeking to do an end run around the sanctions. On Nov. 21, a State Department official, Ralph Palmiero, recommended that the agency deny the request since the sanctions explicitly mandated the "termination of existing contracts" like Mr. Liu's. "The penalties are clear in this case," Mr. Palmiero wrote, "and the responsibility rests with OFAC to implement the import ban." That is when Senator Daniel K. Inouye's office stepped in. While his electrodes were at sea, Mr. Liu had made his first political contribution ever, giving the senator's campaign $2,000. Mr. Liu says the timing was coincidental, that he was simply feeling more politically inclined. Records show that an Inouye aide called the licensing office on Mr. Liu's behalf the same day that Mr. Palmiero recommended denying the application. The senator himself wrote two days later. Mr. Inouye's spokesman, Peter Boylan, said the contribution had "no impact whatsoever" on the senator's actions, which he said were motivated solely by concern for the community's health and welfare. The pressure appears to have worked. The following day, the licensing office's director at the time asked the State Department to reconsider in an e-mail that prominently noted the senator's interest. A few days later, the State Department found that the purchase qualified for a special "medical and humanitarian" exception. The license was issued Dec. 10. Two months later, Mr. Liu sent the senator another $2,000 contribution, the maximum allowable. Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey said he could not comment on the details of a decision predating his tenure. But he noted that sanctions against the Chinese company had since been toughened, and added, "Certainly this transaction wouldn't be authorized today."
Hollywood USA Brands Inc.	This license is to sell a Hollywood USA weight loss supplement called NatureFit. "Iranians absolutely love American products," said the company's owner, Rocky Hadzovic, adding that he had no compunction against selling his products in Iran. "If we don't sell to them, someobody else will - they're going to get product from Canada, Europe, or China."
Hughes Network Systems	This license file was almost completely redacted by OFAC. The file says only that it is in the national interest to allow a redacted product or technology to be exported because it is for use in monitoring some unknown activity, and that it will not be used or accessed by any Iranians.
ImEx Gulf	This license authorized the sale of medical products to Iran.
Intelsat Global Service Corporation	This license application is so heavily redacted by OFAC that one cannot say what type of activity it authorized. In records released by the State Department, however, it says that the license would allow Intelsat to respond to a request for a proposal for the provision of public international telecommunications service to Iran, and that granting such a license would be consistent with the United States policy goal of promoting the free flow of information to and from Iran.
J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation	This license involves J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy, which had recently won Federal Reserve approval to engage in energy-related physical commodity training, including oil and gas. The files are heavily redacted, revealing only that the company was seeking a blanket license to engage in some redacted type of activity to cover some situation that the company said could arise. The company refused to explain what it was doing that required a license.

JPMorgan Chase	This license involves a request by JP Morgan to open an account on behalf of an entity, the name of which OFAC has redacted, that was opening a news bureau in New York. It is not clear why a license was needed because OFAC heavily redacted the file. An e-mail between two OFAC officials whose names are redacted states: "We should really meet before [name is redacted] returns. ... State's input is definitely needed with regard to the identity of the principal's name. If he's the same one we think he is, the question remains about running 'company' business through a private account." The State Department in the end said it would be consistent with American foreign policy to allow JP Morgan to proceed.
JPMorgan Chase	This license was so heavily redacted by OFAC at the request of JPMorgan Chase that it is impossible to say exactly what was authorized other than the fact that it involved a letter of credit that somehow ran afoul of the sanctions against Iran.
Kalitta Air	The Boeing Company was authorized to export parts, equipment and emergency flight instruction data and to provide personnel, in connection with the repair of a Boeing-manufactured 747 aircraft operated by Kalitta Air that had sustained damage to its spoiler panel, in order to enable the Kalitta aircraft to depart from Libya, records show. At the time, the United States maintained broad sanctions against Libya. The Kalitta aircraft was in Libya in connection with the work of the weapons of mass destruction survey and elimination teams, according to the license file. The federal government was a regular customer of Kalitta, a cargo company, which became the subject of headlines when British officials denounced their American counterparts for using Kalitta to fly military hardware through Scotland to Israel during the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict.
Kraft Foods International Inc.	This license allowed Kraft to sell the following products to Iran: biscuits, cereal, confectionery, coffee, cheese, powdered beverages, mayonnaise, desserts, cooking ingredients, cake premixes, dressings and cakes. OFAC redacted the names of the Iranian importers. The company also received a license to sell its products in Sudan.
Lane Limited	This license authorized Lane Limited, a tobacco company, to export smoking tobacco and little cigars to companies that would ultimately re-export those products to the following Iranian entities: the Lariana Trading Company in Tehran for resale to BAT Pars Company in Tehran. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officials.
Lasersight	Former Representative Ric Keller, a Florida Republican, wrote to OFAC on Nov. 17, 2006, on behalf of his constituent Laserlite, which manufactures medical devices to treat vision impairment; the license was issued on March 1, 2007.
Louis Dreyfus Corporation	The company was licensed to export “poultry, meat, cotton” and bulk agricultural commodities to both Sudan and Iran. The bulk commodities ranged from kidney beans and lentils to sunflower oil and beet sugar.

Mapssy International	This license authorized Mapssy to import men's, ladies' and children's apparel from North Korea. Sung Choi, the owner of Mapssy, said in an interview that he jumped at the chance to import North Korean goods because garments made there were much cheaper than could be found elsewhere. At the time the license was issued, North Korea was on a United States list of state sponsors of terrorism, and sanctions against the country included a ban on American economic aid, arms-related exports and sales, and certain dual-use items. But in June 2000, during a brief thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations had been amended to permit the licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they met certain criteria. Importers like Mr. Choi had to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to be imported were not made by producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities, an activity of the North Korean government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology, or an activity of the North's government affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft. OFAC officials acknowledged the difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, state-controlled economy like North Korea's, where anything going in and out of the country potentially indirectly benefits the government. Indeed, in the interview, Mr. Choi acknowledged he had "no idea" who really owned the North Korean company with whom he did business. "It's a Communist country so it must be government-owned," he said. But OFAC officials said they were confident that exporters directly involved in North Korea's missile and proliferation activities were being flagged. Mr. Choi said his last OFAC license expired in 2005; by that time, he said, it was no longer worth it to him to do business in a country that was so "hostile to the United States."
Marathon Oil Company	This license allowed Marathon Oil Company to withdraw from an oil development agreement that it had with Total E&P, thus getting out of Sudan altogether. While that outcome was clearly in the United States' foreign policy interest, the license also makes clear that OFAC had earlier helped Marathon protect its interest in that country. Marathon first invested in Sudan in 1980, before the United States imposed sanctions. In 2004, the company stated that it was informed by Total that it had to sign a revised agreement or forfeit its investment. The reason for the revised agreement was that the Sudanese government was threatening to seize the companies' property. "The economic loss to Marathon of not signing the revised PSC [agreement] will be tremendous, while the political effect on the Sudanese government of not signing will be nonexistent. It is important for OFAC to recognize that by signing the revised agreement, Marathon is only protecting its substantial investment and exploration rights in Sudan." Any further activity, the company added, would be subject to OFAC approval. In a statement, the company said that from the time the sanctions went into place to the time it got out of the country, Marathon never paid the Sudanese government any money. OFAC said it has granted such "stand-still" licenses - allowing oil companies to preserve interests acquired before the imposition of sanctions - because to do otherwise might result in the sanctioned government receiving a windfall by seizing the property.
Mars Inc.	This license allowed the company to export confectionery, ice cream, packaged consumer food products and pet care products to Iran. OFAC redacted the actual brand names and the names of the ultimate buyers. A company spokeswoman, Kelly McGrail, said: "Mars Incorporated and its subsidiaries, including Wrigley, operate in full compliance of all state, federal and international regulations. We provide our products to consumers all over the world. At this time, Mars and Wrigley sell products to consumers in Sudan, Iran and Libya in full compliance with all U.S. regulations, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control licensing regime. We will, of course, continue to monitor the actions of the U.S. government on this matter and comply with any changes in regulation."

McCormick & Company	McCormick & Company was licensed to sell a range of products, including spices, seasonings, salt substitutes, dips, marinades, food colorings, edible cake decorations, icings, imitation vanilla extract and salad toppings, to a number of stores in Iran under the broadly written exemption for agricultural products. Though OFAC and the State Department are required by law to vet the companies that are buying even benign products to make sure they are not involved in international terrorism, The New York Times found that a number of the Iranian companies listed on the application as the end purchasers of McCormick's goods were in fact connected to entities that the United States has blacklisted for their involvement in Iran's nuclear and ballistic weapons programs and connection to terrorist activities. Take Refah, the largest supermarket chain in Iran. Its shareholders, according to Refah's website, include the Iranian Bank of Saderat, and Bank of Sepah, the Bank of Melli and Bank Tejarat. The Bank of Saderat was blacklisted by OFAC for serving as a conduit between the Iranian government and various terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas. The Bank of Sepah was blacklisted for serving as "the financial linchpin" of Iran's efforts to procure a "missile capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction." The Bank of Melli and Bank Tejarat were blacklisted for similar activities. Shahrvand, another of the chain stores listed in the McCormick license application, is owned by the government of Tehran. Both Refah and Shahrvand were once run by Ali-Akbar Mehrabian, according to the Iranian press. Mr. Mehrabian is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's minister for industries and mines, and a close adviser believed to be instrumental in smoothing the way for the sale of government-owned assets to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, an arm of the Iranian military that the United States has also blacklisted for its involvement in the Iranian nuclear program. And a third chain store, Ghods, is closely linked with the Guards; many top officials in the organizations are former Guards officers. A McCormick spokesman, Jim Lynn, said that the company has held this license for several years, but that "we were not aware of the information you shared with us, and we are looking into it." OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, acknowledged that it did not appear as though background checks had been done in this case. But, he said, given his limited resources, they were better spent on stopping weapons technology from reaching Iran. "Are we checking end users? Yes. But are we doing corporate due diligence on every Iranian importer? No," Mr. Szubin said. "I don't think that would be the best use of our Farsi speakers and our Iranian intelligence analysts." He added that even if the links had come to light, he still might not have had the authority to deny the license. That's because Congress drafted the law mandating that licenses be issued for agricultural products in such a way that they can be denied only if it can be shown that the purchasers are more than 50 percent owned by entities engaged in terrorism.
McDermott Caspian Contractors International	This 2005 license allowed McDermott Caspian Contractors International (M.C.C.I.) to ship oil development supplies through Iran to Kazakhstan for an oil development project it was bidding on in Kazakhstan. In its application, the company said that it planned to procure equipment in the United Arab Emirates and that it was extremely costly to ship its supplies via a route that did not involve Iran. The State Department ended up agreeing to the request. But in its correspondence with OFAC it offered a cautionary note: While it is consistent with United States foreign policy to authorize authorize M.C.C.I. to transship certain items through Iran to Kazakhstan, "we note, however, that transshipment issues remain sensitive and that this case should not be construed as providing broader foreign policy guidance." That followed a back-and-forth between OFAC and John Marshall Klein at the State Department in which OFAC pressed State as to when it was going to get a decision in the case. Mr. Klein responded by saying that the situation was "complicated" because a deputy assistant secretary of state, David Nelson, wanted "raise this case at a high-level Iran policy group to get clarity on a broader issue."
Metso Minerals Industries	Metso Minerals Industries discovered that it had been importing possible Iranian-origin manganese castings. This license authorized Metso to send the suspect Iranian-origin manganese castings back.
Nabors Drilling International Limited	Nabors Drilling International wanted to buy two drilling rigs from a Danish company. Because the rigs had been operating in Iranian waters, the company needed a license to buy Iranian-origin goods. OFAC granted the license with the condition that Nabors not take possession of the rigs until they were removed from Iranian waters.

New Century Tobacco Group L.L.C.	This license authorized New Century, a tobacco manufacturer, to enter into a transaction in which Yara Tech Company of Tehran would buy cigarette tax banderoles from the Iranian government tobacco monopoly, forward those to New Century, which would then deliver them to a cigarette factory where they would be applied to cigarette packs to be sold in Iran. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officials.
Noble Energy Inc.	The license was authorized after the State Department found it would be consistent with United States foreign policy to permit Noble and its subsidiaries to engage in certain transactions involving the investment in and supply of natural gas to an electricity-generating power plant in Israel. The license was needed because an Iranian entity had a stake (inactive since the 1979 revolution) in one of the Israeli companies that planned to invest in the plant. A company spokesman, David Larson, said the deal ultimately fell apart.
NutraSweet Company	This license authorizes NutraSweet to export its artificial sweetener to Iran. The company contended that NutraSweet's products qualify as agricultural commodities for which a license should be granted under the agriculture and medical humanitarian sections because its sweeteners are "food additives for humans," one of the definitions listed in the regulations. The company, which received licenses in other years as well, was authorized to sell to the following entities in Iran: Zam Zam Iran Company, Pars Minoo Ind. Co., Choco Parstoo Co., Iran Zak, the Sasan Company and the Nooshab Company, all in Tehran; the Farabi Pharmaceutical Company in Isfahan; and the Dadash Barador Company and the Shirin Asal Food Ind. Co. in Tabriz.
Oasis Second Parties (Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips and Marthon Oil Companies)	On Dec. 18, 2003, Libya announced that it would give up its unconventional weapons programs after several years of back-channel negotiations. A few months earlier Oasis, anticipating warmer United States-Libya relations, applied for a license to export computers, software, computer models and other technology to Libya and to "negotiate terms for the resumption of operations" at oil fields it had been forced to quit when the United States had imposed sanctions against the country. On Feb. 13, 2004, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Paul Simons sent OFAC a note recommending approval, which was granted 11 days later. The license gave Oasis a head start of several months in re-entering the lucrative Libyan oil market; at the time, sanctions were still in place and would not be lifted for another three months. On Dec. 29, 2005, the partners of the Oasis group "entered into an agreement with the National Oil Corporation of Libya on the terms under which the companies would return to their oil and natural gas exploration and production operations in the Waha concessions in Libya," according to one of those partners, Marathon Oil.
Occidental Petroleum Corporation	This license authorized travel to and from Libya on a corporate aircraft.
PSL Energy Services	This license authorized the company's United States personnel to engage in transactions relating to PSL Energy Service's oil drilling equipment. In response to questions from The New York Times, OFAC said that PSL Energy Services, a Scottish oil services company, had removed the equipment from Iran after completing a project there. It was in negotiations for the sale of a majority of its stock to Halliburton. Because the equipment was among the PSL's assets and had been used in Iran, it was deemed "Iranian-origin goods" under American regulations, and thus a license was needed to allow Halliburton to deal with the equipment in the future. Shortly after OFAC issued the license, Halliburton completed the deal to acquire PSL Energy Services and announced it, records show.
PepsiCo Inc.	This license authorized Pepsi to sell its products in Iran. The company has also been licensed to sell its products in Sudan. A company spokesperson said that the company was abiding by United States law: "When it comes to politically sensitive markets, we rely on rules set by the U.S. Government, and we're committed to adhering to those rules, however they may evolve."
Philip Morris	This license authorized Philip Morris to sell cigarettes in Iran. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officials.

Philips Electronics	Philips Electronics received a license to sell some sort of medical devices to Iran, the exact nature of which was redacted by OFAC. The division of the company mentioned in the paperwork suggested that the product sold was some sort of ultrasound equipment. OFAC also redacted the names of the Iranian buyers.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company	This license authorizes R.J. Reynolds Tobacco to sell its cigarettes in Iran. OFAC redacted the names of the Iranian purchasers. Iran charges an import tax of more than 7 percent on cigarettes, according to customs officials.
Raytheon Company	After the United States invasion of Iraq, Raytheon Company was awarded a competitive contract in January 2004 worth upward of $13 million to supply turnkey air traffic management systems for airports in that country. The State Department found it would be consistent with American foreign policy to issue a license to Raytheon to sell encrypted software to Iraq for a civilian air traffic system in Baghdad International Airport.
Remitter: C. Transport Panamax Limited; Beneficiary: ACS Austrian Chartering Service GmbH	An unknown bank blocked a wire transfer between C. Transport Panamax Limited and ACS Austrian Chartering because the instructions mentioned the involvement of a ship owned by Irisl, an Iranian government-owned shipping line that the United States had blacklisted for its involvement in Iran's nuclear and ballistic weapons programs. The bank could have been forced to seize the funds, but instead this license authorized it to return the money to C. Transport Panamax.
Samco Global Arms Inc.	This license authorized the company to buy nearly 5.7 million rounds of ammunition (cal. 7.9 Ball MFG.) that were subject to sanctions because they had been manufactured in Tehran between 1950 and 1968. The Pakistani government, which had acquired the ammunition in the years since, had offered it for sale, and Samco had jumped at the chance to buy it; at the time, there was a shortage of ammunition in the United States, making it very expensive to buy new ammunition, and according to the company the caliber in question is quite popular with collectors and war re-enactors. By the time Samco discovered that the ammunition was of Iranian origin, it had already invested "time and resources toward proceeding with the transaction," and losing the deal "would have been a hardship," a company representative said. The high-profile gun-rights lawyer who handled the license application for Samco, Mark Barnes, argued that Samco met a criterion that has been used by OFAC in the past to grant exceptions, namely that because the goods the company wanted to import no longer had a substantive connection to the sanctioned country, Iran would not benefit financially from the transaction. When OFAC did not respond immediately, Mr. Barnes increased the pressure: "We would like to stress to OFAC that Samco is a small company and this is a rather large transaction relative to Samco's general import business," he wrote. "Accordingly, delays in the application process result in a disproportionate financial impact upon Samco than a delay might impose upon a larger importer." OFAC soon granted the license.
Schlumberger	Schlumberger Technology Corporation was authorized to import sealed chemical radiocative sources from Libya, for diposal by the United States Department of Energy. The goods in question were brought into Libya by Schlumberger before the embargo to facilitate petroleum exploration and extraction activities, according to the company, and had been held there for 17 years because of a lack of viable disposal options, and were now obsolete. According to Schlumberger, both the Department of Energy and the State Department's Office for Nuclear Safety had expressed an interest in recovering the goods.
Sechrist Industries Inc.	Gary G. Miller, a California Republican, wrote on June 1, 2007, on behalf of this company's application to sell medical equipment to a company in Iran called Jarf Kherad Company Limited, which would distribute the equipment to hospitals under the control of the Iranian Ministry of Health. OFAC explained to Mr. Miller on July 12, 2007, that the company had been informed that its paperwork was incomplete. The application was ultimately approved.

Siemens	This license authorized the company to export ultrasound equipment to Iran; the names of the purchasers were redacted by OFAC.
Solar Turbines Incorporated	Solar Turbines, a division of Caterpillar, requested this license because it wanted to bid on a project to build a natural mixing station needed by the Turkish government-owned pipeline company, Botas. In its application, Solar Turbines acknowledged that the mixing station in Sivas, Turkey, would serve a pipeline that carried Iranian gas through Turkey and into Western Europe. The United States has a clear-cut policy that it does not support pipelines that deliver Iranian gas to customers outside that country's borders, for the simple reason that Iran's huge natural gas resources prop up its economy and help finance pursuits like its nuclear program. But in this case, the company argued, the station would primarily serve a different, United States-supported pipeline called the Shah Deniz, which pipes gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey, and thus would reduce reliance on Iranian gas. In fact, according to Botas and Turkish Embassy officials, the opposite was true. A Turkish diplomat, Tuncay Babali, said that back in 2005, when this license was issued, "the Sivas station was primarily for Iran gas, actually." And that is still the case today, according to Oguz Zimamoglu, the head of Botas's central gas control unit. "Primarily the gas flowing from Sivas is Iranian gas," he said. A Caterpillar spokesman, Jim Dugan, said the company relied on the best information it had in making its application, while OFAC said in a statement that its decision was the product of an interagency review that found that "notwithstanding an Iranian nexus," granting the license was in America's foreign policy interest. In the end, another company won the right to build the station. But Elliott Abrams, who at the time served as the deputy national security adviser and should have been involved in any interagency review, said the fact that Solar Turbines was allowed to bid raises questions about the government's vetting process. He did not recall any debate on the issue, which he called "surprising" because "the issues are significant."
Sportika Export	This license was to export food supplements for building muscles, like protein powder, to Iran. Richard White, Sportika Export's chief executive, said Iran is a very good market for companies like his. "It appears there must be an upper class there because these items are fairly high priced by the time you import then and pay all the duty there," he said, adding that he is comfortable selling his products in Iran "because the government is comfortable with our doing it."
T. H. Anderson Pump Company	T. Anderson, of T.H. Anderson Pump Company, an oil field equipment supplier, said this license authorized him to sell supplies used in Iraqi drilling rigs.
TME Enterprises	This license authorized the company to export a variety of its vitamin products to Iran. The names of the Iranian importers have been redacted by OFAC.
Telenor Satellite Services AS/S.S. Sampliner & Company Inc.	Sampliner was authorized to collect debts in Libya on behalf of a redacted client, presumably the satellite company mentioned.
The Berliner Law Firm	The Berliner Law firm received this license to legally represent companies affilated with Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, which had been sanctioned by the United States government for its involvement in Iran's ballistic missile program. The licensing documents were released over the law firm's objection, with OFAC determining that the law firm lacked "sufficient justification for competitive harm," except for the potential for embarrassment for representing a sanctioned entity.
The Boeing Company	This license authorized Boeing to cooperate with Sudan in connection with a crash of a Sudan Airways Boeing aircraft.

The Boeing Company	In January 2004, the nose-wheel of an Iran Air Boeing 747 passenger airplane collapsed on landing in Beijing. Iran Air and the Civil Aviation Administration of China agreed to use the French civil aviation agency to conduct the accident investigation. This license authorized Boeing to export an electronic data map that was needed by investigators to gain access to the information on the flight data recorder.
The Louis Berger Group Inc.	In September 2006, the United States Agency for International Development gave $1.4 billion to the Louis Berger Group for reconstruction work in Afghanistan. This OFAC license allowed the company to route supplies and equipment through Iran to Afghanistan, saving both money and time, in order to fulfill its development contract for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project.
Trencor Inc.	This license allowed the company to pay a court-ordered judgment to a now defunct Iranian entity whose interests now rest with a Swiss entity.
Tyson Foods Inc.	This license authorized the export of chicken and beef and chicked-based products and beef products to Royal Meat Industry L.L.C. for resale to the Sham Sham Shiraz Protein Industry Complex in Shiraz, Iran.
Union Carbide Corporation	This license authorizes Union Carbide to enter into transactions necessary to dissolve its Iranian branch, which the company says has conducted no business since the imposition of sanctions.
Vesuvius USA Corporation	This license authorized Vesuvius USA Corporation to import dead-burned magnesite, a raw material needed by the United States steel industry, into the United States from the North Korean company Korea Magnesia Clinker Industry Group. Both the State Department and the Department of Defense recommended the approval of this application. The Korea General Magnesia Clinker Industry Group is a corporation that holds the rights to the production and export of magnesite in North Korea, which is a major source of foreign currency for the country. But on June 19, 2000, during a brief thaw in United States-North Korea relations, the regulations had been amended to permit the licensed importation of goods from North Korea provided they met certain criteria. Importers had to provide OFAC with information showing that the goods to be imported were not made by producers engaged in missile technology proliferation activities, any activity of the North Korean government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology, or any activity of the North Korean government affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, or military aircraft. OFAC officials acknowledged the difficulty of making such distinctions in an opaque, state-controlled economy such as North Korea's, where anything going in and out of the country potentially indirectly benefits the government. But they said that they were confident that exporters directly involved in that country's missile and proliferation activities were being flagged.
W.R. Grace	This authorized the company to protect, though not profit from, its holdings in Libya. According the application, Grace had been authorized under a previous license to "continue its ownership of the Libyan concessions," but with the condition that the company "end our Libyan connections as soon as practicable by selling our interests." The company, in arguing for this license, said that it should not be compelled to sell because "we were, for all intents and purposes" limited to selling to the Libyan National Oil Company or the Libyan government. OFAC bought that argument, granting the license. It appears from the records that one way the company protected its interests was to ask OFAC for a license to transfer all its assets to European subsidiaries that, unlike unlike its American parent company, could make good on all of its financial and other obligations to the Libyan government. That is because United States sanctions cover only American companies, not their foreign subsidiaries. OFAC said it generally grants such "stand-still" licenses - allowing oil companies to preserve interests acquired before the imposition of sanctions - because to do otherwise might result in the sanctioned government receiving a windfall by seizing the property.

WILD Flavors Inc.	This license authorized Wild Flavors, which describes itself on its Web site as one of the largest privately-held ingredient suppliers to the food and beverage industry, to export cream powder and cheese powder to Iran under a humanitarian exception for agricultural and medical products.
Weatherford International	In July 2007, this Houston-based oil-drilling and oil field services company announced in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission that it had been notified that the Bureau of Industry and Security and Department of Justice were investigating allegations of improper sales of products and services in sanctioned countries. Weatherford subsequently announced plans to get out of Iran, as well as Sudan, Syria and Cuba. This license authorized the company to enter into dealings to make good on that promise. A similar license was issued enabling the company to withdraw from Sudan.
Willis North America Inc.	This license authorized the company and its intemational affiliates to "solicit and accept participation in the KEDO light water reactor project in North Korea." The joint United States-South Korean-Japanese project, which was to provide power to North Korea, was agreed upon after North Korea signed a deal to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program. The North has since reneged on that deal.
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company	The chewing gum manufacturer, owned by Mars Inc., was licensed to export its products to Iran and Sudan. OFAC redacted the names of the entities buying the products. A company spokeswoman, Kelly McGrail said: "Mars Incorporated and its subsidiaries, including Wrigley, operate in full compliance of all state, federal and international regulations. We provide our products to consumers all over the world. At this time, Mars and Wrigley sell products to consumers in Sudan, Iran and Libya in full compliance with all U.S. regulations, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control licensing regime. We will, of course, continue to monitor the actions of the U.S. government on this matter and comply with any changes in regulation."
World Fuel Services Corporation	This license authorizes the company to make air overflight payments to Sudan, which are generally allowed.
World Wide Sires	World Wide Sires, an artificial insemination cattle embryo and semen cooperative, received multiple licenses to sell bull semen and other products in Iran and Sudan. This license authorized the company to receive payment under a letter from the Iranian Bank of Mellat and its subsidiary Persia Bank. This, even though the United States government had placed the banks on a special sanctions blacklist for facilitating the movement of millions of dollars for Iran's nuclear program. The company argued that the transaction should be allowed to proceed because the letter of credit was signed before the Oct. 25, 2007, blacklisting of the banks. OFAC said it granted the license because it authorized funds to be removed from Iran for the benefit of a United States exporter, which otherwise would not have been compensated for an authorized export to Iran, an outcome the agency said it believed was unjust.
WorldCom Inc.	This license authorized WorldCom to strike a deal by which the state-owned Telecommunications Company of Iran would pay the American telecommunications company a rental fee in return for a direct link to WorldCom's United States Internet backbone. OFAC said the application was approved because it would have provided increased and more consistent Internet access for Iranians, and it is the policy of the United States to encourage such access.

Annex 31

Z. Goldfarb, "Firms licensed to do business in countries on U.S. terror list", *The Washington Post,* 24 December 2010

Firms licensed to do business in countries on U.S. terror list

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305890.html

An obscure Treasury Department office has granted licenses to major U.S. companies to do business with companies in Iran and other nations deemed state sponsors of terrorism, under a federal law that allows certain products to be exported to those countries, Treasury officials said Thursday.

The officials' remarks came after the New York Times Web site reported that the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control had granted nearly 10,000 licenses to companies to sell goods as varied as popcorn, chewing gum, cigarettes and body-building supplements.

Under federal law, U.S. companies can trade with blacklisted countries if the Treasury approves the transactions as medical or humanitarian necessities, especially in relieving famine.

In the past, the Treasury has also let U.S. companies do business with foreign firms accused of selling banned technology to blacklisted nations - sometimes as a result of political pressure.

A Treasury official said Thursday evening, after the publication of the Times article, that "the great majority of the authorized exports" are mandated under federal law, which requires that Treasury allow exports of agricultural commodities, medicine and medical goods to Iran, Cuba and Sudan.

"Because the U.S. has the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions against Iran, allowing for the exportation of food, medicine and medical devices is consistent with our objective of not hurting the Iranian people," the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

The official added that all licenses granted "advance our national security and foreign policy goals."

According to the Times report, the recipients of these licenses included Kraft Foods, Pepsi and a subsidiary of Citigroup, as well as lesser-known firms.

The definition of a humanitarian or medical necessity under the federal law is so broad that companies have been able to sell products that seem not to meet those criteria. For example, the Treasury approved sales of luxury food products to chain stores in Iran owned by blacklisted Iranian banks, according to The Times.

Stuart Levey, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in a statement Thursday night that allowing "the export to Iran of food items like hot sauce or salad dressing from the U.S. is required by statute and, in any event, is trivial in the context of our Iran policy."

The transactions have not been free of political interference.

In 2003, long before Levey took his post, the Treasury had planned to deny a medical waste plant exemption requested by a Honolulu firm seeking to buy parts from a Chinese company that had been accused of selling missile technology to Iran and Pakistan.

But Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) intervened on behalf of the Honolulu firm, whose owner was a political supporter and financial contributor. A Treasury official confirmed the account.

An Inouye spokesman, Peter Boylan, told the Times that the senator's advocacy on behalf of the firm had nothing to do with the political contribution.

Boylan told the Post in a statement Thursday that the firm "committed to the transaction prior to implementation of the ban and without the [parts] his business would have failed immediately and more than 90,000 pounds of

untreated medical waste would have been left unattended on the docks of an Oahu port."

Annex 32

S. M. Hersh, "Our Men in Iran", *The New Yorker,* 5 April 2012

Our Men in Iran?

www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/our-men-in-iran

From the air, the terrain of the Department of Energy's Nevada National Security Site, with its arid high plains and remote mountain peaks, has the look of northwest Iran. The site, some sixty-five miles northwest of Las Vegas, was once used for nuclear testing, and now includes a counterintelligence training facility and a private airport capable of handling Boeing 737 aircraft. It's a restricted area, and inhospitable—in certain sections, the curious are warned that the site's security personnel are authorized to use deadly force, if necessary, against intruders.

It was here that the Joint Special Operations Command (*JSOC*) conducted training, beginning in 2005, for members of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a dissident Iranian opposition group known in the West as the M.E.K. The M.E.K. had its beginnings as a Marxist-Islamist student-led group and, in the nineteen-seventies, it was linked to the assassination of six American citizens. It was initially part of the broad-based revolution that led to the 1979 overthrow of the Shah of Iran. But, within a few years, the group was waging a bloody internal war with the ruling clerics, and, in 1997, it was listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. In 2002, the M.E.K. earned some international credibility by publicly revealing—accurately—that Iran had begun enriching uranium at a secret underground location. Mohamed ElBaradei, who at the time was the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring agency, told me later that he had been informed that the information was supplied by the Mossad. The M.E.K.'s ties with Western intelligence deepened after the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, and *JSOC* began operating inside Iran in an effort to substantiate the Bush Administration's fears that Iran was building the bomb at one or more secret underground locations. Funds were covertly passed to a number of dissident organizations, for intelligence collection and, ultimately, for anti-regime terrorist activities. Directly, or indirectly, the M.E.K. ended up with resources like arms and intelligence. Some American-supported covert operations continue in Iran today, according to past and present intelligence officials and military consultants.

Despite the growing ties, and a much-intensified lobbying effort organized by its advocates, M.E.K. has remained on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations—which meant that secrecy was essential in the Nevada training. "We did train them here, and washed them through the Energy Department because the D.O.E. owns all this land in southern Nevada," a former senior American intelligence official told me. "We were deploying them over long distances in the desert and mountains, and building their capacity in communications—coördinating commo is a big deal." (A spokesman for J.S.O.C. said that "U.S. Special Operations Forces were neither aware of nor involved in the training of M.E.K. members.")

The training ended sometime before President Obama took office, the former official said. In a separate interview, a retired four-star general, who has advised the Bush and Obama Administrations on national-security issues, said that he had been privately briefed in 2005 about the training of Iranians associated with the M.E.K. in Nevada by an American involved in the program. They got "the standard training," he said, "in commo, crypto [cryptography], small-unit tactics, and weaponry—that went on for six months," the retired general said. "They were kept in little pods." He also was told, he said, that the men doing the training were from *JSOC*, which, by 2005, had become a major instrument in the Bush Administration's global war on terror. "The *JSOC* trainers were not front-line guys who had been in the field, but second- and third-tier guys—trainers and the like—and they started going off the reservation. 'If we're going to teach you tactics, let me show you some really sexy stuff…' "

It was the ad-hoc training that provoked the worried telephone calls to him, the former general said. "I told one of the guys who called me that they were all in over their heads, and all of them could end up trouble unless they got something in writing. The Iranians are very, very good at counterintelligence, and stuff like this is just too hard to contain." The site in Nevada was being utilized at the same time, he said, for advanced training of élite Iraqi combat units. (The retired general said he only knew of the one M.E.K.-affiliated group that went though the training course; the former senior intelligence official said that he was aware of training that went on through 2007.)

Allan Gerson, a Washington attorney for the M.E.K., notes that the M.E.K. has publicly and repeatedly renounced terror. Gerson said he would not comment on the alleged training in Nevada. But such training, if true, he said, would be “especially incongruent with the State Department’s decision to continue to maintain the M.E.K. on the terrorist list. How can the U.S. train those on State’s foreign terrorist list, when others face criminal penalties for providing a nickel to the same organization?”

Robert Baer, a retired C.I.A. agent who is fluent in Arabic and had worked under cover in Kurdistan and throughout the Middle East in his career, initially had told me in early 2004 of being recruited by a private American company—working, so he believed, on behalf of the Bush Administration—to return to Iraq. “They wanted me to help the M.E.K. collect intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program,” Baer recalled. “They thought I knew Farsi, which I did not. I said I’d get back to them, but never did.” Baer, now living in California, recalled that it was made clear to him at the time that the operation was “a long-term thing—not just a one-shot deal.”

Massoud Khodabandeh, an I.T. expert now living in England who consults for the Iraqi government, was an official with the M.E.K. before defecting in 1996. In a telephone interview, he acknowledged that he is an avowed enemy of the M.E.K., and has advocated against the group. Khodabandeh said that he had been with the group since before the fall of the Shah and, as a computer expert, was deeply involved in intelligence activities as well as providing security for the M.E.K. leadership. For the past decade, he and his English wife have run a support program for other defectors. Khodabandeh told me that he had heard from more recent defectors about the training in Nevada. He was told that the communications training in Nevada involved more than teaching how to keep in contact during attacks—it also involved communication intercepts. The United States, he said, at one point found a way to penetrate some major Iranian communications systems. At the time, he said, the U.S. provided M.E.K. operatives with the ability to intercept telephone calls and text messages inside Iran—which M.E.K. operatives translated and shared with American signals intelligence experts. He does not know whether this activity is ongoing.

Five Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated since 2007. M.E.K. spokesmen have denied any involvement in the killings, but early last month NBC News quoted two senior Obama Administration officials as confirming that the attacks were carried out by M.E.K. units that were financed and trained by Mossad, the Israeli secret service. NBC further quoted the Administration officials as denying any American involvement in the M.E.K. activities. The former senior intelligence official I spoke with seconded the NBC report that the Israelis were working with the M.E.K., adding that the operations benefitted from American intelligence. He said that the targets were not “Einsteins”; “The goal is to affect Iranian psychology and morale,” he said, and to “demoralize the whole system—nuclear delivery vehicles, nuclear enrichment facilities, power plants.” Attacks have also been carried out on pipelines. He added that the operations are “primarily being done by M.E.K. through liaison with the Israelis, but the United States is now providing the intelligence.” An adviser to the special-operations community told me that the links between the United States and M.E.K. activities inside Iran had been long-standing. “Everything being done inside Iran now is being done with surrogates,” he said.

The sources I spoke to were unable to say whether the people trained in Nevada were now involved in operations in Iran or elsewhere. But they pointed to the general benefit of American support. “The M.E.K. was a total joke,” the senior Pentagon consultant said, “and now it’s a real network inside Iran. How did the M.E.K. get so much more efficient?” he asked rhetorically. “Part of it is the training in Nevada. Part of it is logistical support in Kurdistan, and part of it is inside Iran. M.E.K. now has a capacity for efficient operations that it never had before.”

In mid-January, a few days after an assassination by car bomb of an Iranian nuclear scientist in Tehran, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, at a town-hall meeting of soldiers at Fort Bliss, Texas, acknowledged that the U.S. government has “some ideas as to who might be involved, but we don’t know exactly who was involved.” He added, “But I can tell you one thing: the United States was not involved in that kind of effort. That’s not what the United States does.”

Annex 33

D. Rohde, "The Iraq Takeaway: American Ground Invasions Destabilize the Middle East", *The Atlantic,* 20 March 2013

The Iraq Takeaway: American Ground Invasions Destabilize the Middle East

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/-the-iraq-takeaway-american-ground-invasions-destabilize-the-middle-east/274190/



U.S. soldiers stand near the Swords of Qadisiyah monument in Baghdad on March 13, 2008. (Ceerwan Aziz/Reuters)

American households will be blanketed this week by a torrent of coverage, commentary and regret about the 10th anniversary of the Iraq war. Liberals claim that Twitter - if it had existed - could have stopped the invasion. Conservatives argue that the links between Saddam Hussein and terrorism have, in fact, been underplayed.

The glaring lesson of the war is that American ground invasions destabilize the Middle East, instead of stabilizing it. The 100,000 Iraqis who perished, the 4,500 American soldiers killed and the $1 trillion spent should have halted what Tufts University professor Daniel W. Drezner has called the "creeping militarization of American foreign policy." Instead, the civilian American institutions that failed us before Iraq have grown even weaker.

The State Department is the first example. Drezner correctly argues that as the Pentagon's budget has ballooned in the post-9/11 decade, so has its influence over American foreign policy. Too many former generals, he contends, have occupied foreign policy important positions.

That trend has slowed in the second Obama administration, but the budget, planning capabilities and training programs of the State Department are still laughably small compared with those of the U.S. military. Money equals power, influence and a seat at the table in Washington. As one former national security reporter put it to me, weak civilian institutions leads to fewer potential civilian responses to crises.

In his first major speech as secretary of state, John Kerry tried to put the size of the American civilian effort in perspective. He cited a recent poll that found most Americans believe the State Department and U.S. foreign aid programs consume 25 percent of federal spending. In fact, they receive 1 percent. (The military gets roughly 20 percent.)

Kerry's speech got virtually no press coverage. Just as it did a decade ago, the news media - a second vital

American civilian institution - is failing us. This week the media is being correctlyexcoriated for its failure to be more skeptical of the Bush administration's central justification for the Iraq war: weapons of mass destruction that turned out not to exist.

In the months before the invasion, the *New York Times* published a series of exaggerated WMD stories by reporter Judith Miller on its front page. At the same time, editors at the *Times* and other mainstream outlets largely ignored intrepid reports by Knight-Ridder newspapers that questioned the administration's WMD claims.

Ten years later, Miller is a Fox News contributor, and the Knight-Ridder chain no longer exists. Aharrowing report released by the Pew Research Center on Monday found that the full-time professional editorial staff at newspapers has declined by 24 percent since 1989. A separate analysis found that the ratio of public-relations workers to reporters grew from 1.2 to 1 in 1980 to 3.6 to 1 in 2008.

The rise of social media and citizen journalism arguably fill the void created by dwindling newspaper resources. Eric Boehlert of Media Matters argued this week that Twitter could have forced mainstream reporters to do a better job before the Iraq invasion. He cited recent cases of mainstream newspapers columnists being forced to respond to a torrent of criticism on Twitter about pieces they wrote.

Jonathan Landay , one of the Knight-Ridder reporters whose pre-invasion work questioning the WMD evidence received little attention, said social media might have made a difference. But he hesitated to say Twitter would have silenced the White House.

"Had the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and the networks done the kind of reporting that we had, could the administration have been able to take the country to war? I don't know," Landay said in an email message. "But social media would have brought far more attention to our work, and perhaps more journalists would have followed our lead."

Looking back, Landay, a former colleague and longtime friend who now reports for McClatchy, blamed the news media and American intelligence agencies. "The mainstream news media was as egregious in its failure to do its job," he said, "as the U.S. intelligence community was in its failure to produce accurate intelligence on Iraq's non-existent WMD."

Today, fears of "another Iraq" dominate America's foreign policy debate. The choice is binary. The United States can respond to a foreign policy threat by carrying out a risky ground invasion. Or it can do nothing at all. Diplomatic, economic and other non-military attempts to influence events overseas are given short shrift. Any American involvement will make the situation worse, the argument goes, and create another quagmire.

The United States, of course, should not launch another ground invasion in the Middle East. But that does not mean it should not interact in the region at all. The Arab Spring showed that people in the Middle East, in fact, desire democracy. Young Arabs, in particular, want self-determination, jobs and modernity. Washington has an interest in helping them but no inclination - and few non-military tools -- to do so.

A decade after Iraq, the State Department remains the Pentagon's Mini Me. The news media is one-third the size of the public-relations industry. And we continue to view military force as our principal means of addressing foreign policy challenges. In post-Iraq America, our foreign policy debate has devolved into an "invade or not invade" dichotomy. Far more options are available. Every country is not Iraq.

This post also appears at Reuters.com, an Atlantic *partner site.*

Annex 34

***National Security Archive*, "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup", 19 August 2013**



The Shah's order (known as a *firman*) naming Zahedi the new prime minister. Coup operatives made copies of the document and circulated it around Tehran to help regenerate momentum following the collapse of the original plan. (Courtesy of Ted Hotchkiss)

CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup

Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath

National Security Archive Calls for Release of Remaining Classified Record

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435

Posted – August 19, 2013

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Washington, D.C., August 19, 2013 – Marking the sixtieth anniversary of the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, the National Security Archive is today posting recently declassified CIA documents on the United States' role in the controversial operation. American and British involvement in Mosaddeq's ouster has long been public knowledge, but today's posting includes what is believed to be the CIA's first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the coup.

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Have the British Been Meddling with the FRUS Retrospective Volume on 1953?

Foreign Office Worried over Very Embarrassing Revelations, Documents Show

The United Kingdom sought to expunge "very embarrassing" information about its role in the 1953 coup in Iran from the official U.S. history of the period, British documents confirm. The Foreign Office feared that a planned State Department publication would undermine U.K. standing in Iran, according to declassified records posted on the National Security Archive's Web site today.

The British censorship attempt happened in 1978, but London's concerns may play a role even today in holding up the State Department's long-awaited history - even though U.S. law required its publication years ago.

The declassified documents, from the Foreign Office (Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1968), shed light on a protracted controversy over crucial gaps in the State Department's authoritative *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. The blank spots on Iran involve the CIA- and MI6-backed plot to overthrow the country's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. Six decades after his ouster, some signs point to the CIA as the culprit for refusing to allow basic details about the event to be incorporated into the FRUS compilation.[1]

Recently, the CIA has declassified a number of records relating to the 1953 coup, including a version of an internal history that specifically states the agency planned and helped implement the coup. (The National Security Archive obtained the documents through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.) This suggests that ongoing CIA inflexibility over the FRUS volume is not so much a function of the agency's worries about its own role being exposed as a function of its desire to protect lingering British sensitivities about 1953 - especially regarding the activities of U.K. intelligence services. There is also evidence that State Department officials have been just as anxious to shield British interests over the years.


Regardless of the reasons for this continued secrecy, an unfortunate consequence of withholding these materials is to guarantee that American (and world) public understanding of this pivotal episode will remain distorted. Another effect is to keep the issue alive in the political arena, where it is regularly exploited by circles in Iran opposed to constructive ties with the United States.

Background on FRUS and the Mosaddeq Period

By statute, the FRUS series is required to present "a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record" of American foreign policy.[2] That law came about partly as a consequence of the failure of the original volume covering the Mosaddeq period (published in 1989) to mention the U.S. role in his overthrow. The reaction of the scholarly community and interested public was outrage. Prominent historian Bruce Kuniholm, a former member of State's Policy Planning Staff, called the volume "a fraud."[3]

The full story of the scandal has been detailed elsewhere,[4] but most observers blamed the omission on the intelligence community (IC) for refusing to open its relevant files. In fact, the IC was not alone. Senior Department officials joined in opposing requests for access to particular classified records by the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), the group of independent scholars charged with advising the Department's own Office of the Historian.[5] The head of the HAC, Warren Cohen, resigned in protest in 1990 citing his inability to ensure the integrity of the FRUS series. Congress became involved and, in a display of bipartisanship that would be stunning today (Democratic Senator Daniel P. Moynihan getting Republican Jesse Helms to collaborate), lawmakers passed a bill to prevent similar historical distortions. As Cohen and others pointed out, while Moscow was disgorging its scandalous Cold War secrets, Washington was taking a distinctly Soviet approach to its own history.[6]

By 1998, State's historians and the HAC had decided to produce a "retrospective" volume on the Iran coup that would help to correct the record. They planned other volumes to cover additional previously airbrushed covert activities (in Guatemala, the Congo, etc.). It was a promising step, yet 15 years later, while a couple of publications have materialized, several others have not - including the Iran volume.[7]



Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
By Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, May 1, 2004

Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
June 22, 2004

The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953
November 29, 2000

CIA Secrecy Claims Are "Facially Incredible," Says Lawsuit
August 2, 2000

The 1953 Coup 60 Years On: A Symposium
July 24, 2013



This map shows the disposition of bands of "ruffians," paid to demonstrate by coup organizers, early on August 19, 1953. The bands gathered in the bazaar and other sections of southern Tehran, then moved north through the capital. Thug leaders' names appear at left, along with the estimated size of their groups, and their targets. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming *Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days*.)

The explicit reference to the CIA's role appears in a copy of an internal history, *The Battle for Iran*, dating from the mid-1970s. The agency released a heavily excised version of the account in 1981 in response to an ACLU lawsuit, but it blacked out all references to TPAJAX, the code name for the U.S.-led operation. Those references appear in the latest release. Additional CIA materials posted today include working files from Kermit Roosevelt, the senior CIA officer on the ground in Iran during the coup. They provide new specifics as well as insights into the intelligence agency's actions before and after the operation.

The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions — who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it



Kermit Roosevelt, chief of CIA's Near East operations division, and on-the-ground manager of the U.S.-U.K. coup plan.



Donald N. Wilber, an archeologist and authority on ancient Persia, served as lead U.S. planner of TPAJAX (along with British SIS officer Norman Darbyshire). He wrote the first CIA history of the operation (Document 1).



Tanks guard a downtown thoroughfare in Tehran during the coup. (National Security Archive collections)



The house of ousted Prime Minister Mosaddeq lies in ruins after a prolonged assault by coup forces, including several tanks. (Stephen Langlie, courtesy of Mark Gasiorowski)

inside Iran, and how did it succeed — are in dispute.[1]


The issue is more than academic. Political partisans on all sides, including the Iranian government, regularly invoke the coup to argue whether Iran or foreign powers are primarily responsible for the country's historical trajectory, whether the United States can be trusted to respect Iran's sovereignty, or whether Washington needs to apologize for its prior interference before better relations can occur.



Pro-Shah police, military units and undercover agents became engaged in the coup starting mid-morning August 19. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming *Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days*.)

Also, the public release of these materials is noteworthy because CIA documents about 1953 are rare. First of all, agency officials have stated that most of the records on the coup were either lost or destroyed in the early 1960s, allegedly because the record-holders' "safes were too full."[2]

Regarding public access to any remaining files (reportedly about one cubic foot of material), the intelligence community's standard procedure for decades has been to assert a blanket denial. This is in spite of commitments made two decades ago by three separate CIA directors. Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey, and John M. Deutch each vowed to open up agency historical files on a number of Cold War-era covert operations, including Iran, as a sign of the CIA's purported new policy of openness after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.[3]



Tanks played a critical role on August 19, with pro-Shah forces gaining control of some 24 of them from the military during the course of the day. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming *Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days*.)

A clear sign that their pledge would not be honored in practice came after the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit in 1999 for a well-known internal CIA narrative about the coup. One of the operation's planners, Donald N. Wilber, prepared the account less than a year later. The CIA agreed to release just a single sentence out of the 200-page report.

Despite the appearance of countless published accounts about the operation over the years - including Kermit Roosevelt's own detailed memoir, and the subsequent leak to *The New York Times* of the 200-page CIA narrative history[4] — intelligence agencies typically refused to budge. They have insisted on making a distinction between clandestine operations have been named in more than 20 other FRUS publications.[13] One of these was the retrospective volume on PBSUCCESS, the controversial overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Furthermore, the agency has released troubling materials such as assassination manuals that demonstrate how to murder political opponents using anything from "edge weapons" to "bare hands." In 2007, in response to a 15-year-old National Security Archive FOIA request, the CIA finally released its file of "family jewels" detailing an assortment of infamous activities. from planning to poison foreign leaders to conducting illegal surveillance on American journalists.

If the agency felt it could part with such high-profile sources and methods information, along with deeply embarrassing revelations about itself, why not in the Iran case? Perhaps the British are just saying no, and their American counterparts are quietly going along.

State Department Early Warning - 1978

The FCO documents in this posting (Documents 22-35) strongly support this conclusion. Theytell a fascinating story of transatlantic cooperation and diplomatic concern at a turbulent time. It was a State Department official who first alerted the FCO to plans by the Department's historians to publish an official account of the 1953 coup period. The Department's Iran expert warned that the records could have "possibly damaging consequences" not only for London but for the Shah of Iran, who was fighting for survival as he had 25 years earlier (Document 22). Two days later, FCO officials began to pass the message up the line that "very embarrassing things about the British" were likely to be in the upcoming FRUS compilation (Document 23). FCO officials reported that officers on both the Iran and Britain desks at State were prepared to help keep those materials out of the public domain, at least for the time being (Document 33). Almost 35 years later, those records are still inaccessible.

The British government's apparent unwillingness to acknowledge what the world already knows is difficult for most outsiders to understand. It becomes positively baffling when senior public figures who are fully aware of the history have already acknowledged London's role. In 2009, former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw publicly remarked on Britain's part in toppling Mosaddeq, which he categorized as one of many outside "interferences" in Iranian affairs in the last century.[14] Yet, present indications are that the U.K. government is not prepared to release either its own files or evidently to approve the opening of American records that might help bring some degree of closure to this protracted historic - and historiographical - episode.

(Jump to the British documents)

NOTES

[1] A recent article drawing attention to the controversy is Stephen R. Weissman, "Why is U.S. Withholding Old Documents on Covert Ops in Congo, Iran?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 25, 2011. (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0325/Why-is-US-withholding-old-documents-on-covert-ops-in-Congo-Iran)

[2] Section 198, Public Law 102-138.

[3] Bruce Kuniholm, "Foreign Relations, Public Relations, Accountability, and Understanding," American Historical Association, *Perspectives*, May-June 1990.

[4] In addition to the Kuniholm and Weissman items cited above, see also Stephen R. Weissman, "Censoring American Diplomatic History," American Historical Association, *Perspectives on History*, September 2011.

[5] Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "'A Burden for the Department'?: To The 1991 *FRUS* Statute," February 6, 2012, http://history.state.gov/frus150/research/to-the-1991-frus-statute.

Institutional Delays

A review of the available minutes of HAC meetings makes it apparent that over the past decade multiple policy, bureaucratic, and logistical hurdles have interfered with progress. Some of these are routine, even inevitable - from the complications of multi-agency coordination to frequent personnel changes. Others are more specific to the realm of intelligence, notably a deep-seated uneasiness in parts of the CIA over the notion of unveiling putative secrets.

In the Fall of 2001, an ominous development for the HO gave a sense of where much of the power lay in its relationship with the CIA. According to notes of a public HAC meeting in October 2001, the CIA, on instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence, decided unilaterally "that there could be no new business" regarding FRUS until the two sides signed an MOU. Agency officials said the document would address legitimate IC concerns; HAC members worried it would mainly boost CIA control over the series. The agency specifically held up action on four volumes to make its point, while HAC historians countered that the volumes were being "held hostage" and the HO was being forced to work "under the threat of 'blackmail'."[8]

The CIA held firm and an agreement emerged in May 2002 that, at least from available information, appears to bend over backwards to give the IC extraordinary safeguards without offering much reassurance about key HO interests. For instance, the MOU states that the CIA must "meet HO's statutory requirement" - hardly something that seems necessary to spell out. At the same time, it allows the CIA to review materials not once, but again even after a manuscript has passed through formal declassification, and once more after it is otherwise in final form and ready for printing. In the context of the disputed Iran volume, HAC members worried about the "random" nature of these provisions which gave the agency "a second bite at the apple."[9] The implication is that the CIA will feel little obligation to help meet the HO's legal requirement if it believes its own "equities" are at stake. (This of course may still affect the Iran volume, currently scheduled for 2014 publication.)

Is It the British?

As mentioned, the CIA has begun to release documentation in recent years making explicit its connection to the Mosaddeq overthrow. Even earlier, by 2002, the State Department and CIA jointly began compiling an Iran retrospective volume. These are not signs of a fundamental institutional unwillingness to publish American materials on the coup (although parts of the CIA continued to resist the notion). The HO even tried at least twice previously to organize a joint project with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Iran, but the idea evidently went nowhere.[10]

In 2004, two years later, the State Department's designated historian finished compiling the volume. According to that historian, he included a number of records obtained from research at the then-Public Record Office in London. Among his findings was "material that documents the British role." He added that he had also located State Department records "that illustrate the British role."[11] By no later than June 2006, the Iran volume had entered the declassification queue. At the June 2006 HAC session, CIA representatives said "they believed the committee would be satisfied with the [declassification] reviews."

Up to that point, the agency's signals seemed generally positive about the prospects of making public previously closed materials. But in the six years since, no Iran volume has emerged. Even State's committee of historians apparently has never gotten a satisfactory explanation as to why.[12]

When the IC withholds records, "sources and methods" are often the excuse. The CIA is loath to release anything it believes would reveal how the agency conducts its activities. (For many years, the CIA kept secret the fact that it used balloons to drop leaflets over Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and would not confirm or deny whether it compiled biographical sketches of Communist leaders.) On the other hand,




General Zahedi (right) emerging from a safehouse on the afternoon of August 19. By this time, the coup's outcome has been determined. (Courtesy of Ted Hotchkiss)



Zahedi (center, wearing white shirt) atop a tank on his way to the Radio Transmission Station to address the nation. (Courtesy of Ted Hotchkiss)

publicly available information on U.S. activities from non-government sources and official acknowledgement of those activities, even several decades after the fact.



Anti-Mosaddeq armed forces converged on his house (left side of map) beginning around 4:00 pm, eventually forcing him to escape over a garden wall before his house was destroyed. By then, Zahedi had already addressed the nation from the Radio Transmission Station. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming *Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days*.)

[6] Editorial, "History Bleached at State," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1990.

[7] Retrospective compilations on Guatemala (2003) and the intelligence community (2007) during the 1950s have appeared; collections on the Congo and Chile are among those that have not.

[8] HAC minutes, October 15-16, 2001, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/october-2001.

[9] HAC minutes, July 22-23, 2002, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/july-2002; and December 14-15, 2009, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/december-2009.

[10] HAC minutes, July 22-23, 2002, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/july-2002.

[11]HAC minutes, March 6-7, 2006, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/march-2006.

[12] See HAC minutes for July 12-13, 2004, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/july-2004; September 20-21, 2004, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/september-2004; September 8-9, 2008, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/september-2008; for example.

[13] Comments of then-FRUS series editor Edward Keefer at the February 26-27, 2007, HAC meeting, http://history.state.gov/about/hac/february-2007.

[14] Quoted in Souren Melikian, "Show Ignores Essential Questions about Iranian King's Role," *The International Herald Tribune*, February 21, 2009.

While the National Security Archive applauds the CIA's decision to make these materials available, today's posting shows clearly that these materials could have been safely declassified many years ago without risk of damage to the national security. (See sidebar, "Why is the Coup Still a Secret?")

Archive Deputy Director Malcolm Byrne called for the U.S. intelligence community to make fully available the remaining records on the coup period. "There is no longer good reason to keep secrets about such a critical episode in our recent past. The basic facts are widely known to every school child in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the history, and feeds into myth-making on all sides."

To supplement the recent CIA release, the National Security Archive is including two other, previously available internal accounts of the coup. One is the narrative referred to above: a 1954 Clandestine Services History prepared by Donald N. Wilber, one of the operation's chief architects, which *The New York Times* obtained by a leak and first posted on its site in April 2000.

The other item is a heavily excised 1998 piece — "*Zendebad, Shah!*" — by an in-house CIA historian. (The Archive has asked the



After the overthrow, an uneasy alliance obtained between the Shah (right) and his new prime minister. (www.ilchs.org)



Several coup participants gather. Front row, from left: Ardeshir Zahedi (the prime minister's son, later ambassador to Washington), Abbas Farzanegan, Fazlollah Zahedi, Nader Batmanqelich, Hedayatollah Guilanshah. Nematollah Nassiri, who attempted to serve Mosaddeq with a firman from the Shah, is directly behind the prime minister. (www.ilchs.org)

CIA to re-review the document's excessive deletions for future release.)

The posting also features an earlier declassification of *The Battle for Iran* for purposes of comparison with the latest release. The earlier version includes portions that were withheld in the later release. As often happens, government classification officials had quite different — sometimes seemingly arbitrary — views about what could and could not be safely made public.

Read together, the three histories offer fascinating variations in perspective — from an agency operative to two in-house historians (the last being the most dispassionate). Unfortunately, they still leave wide gaps in the history, including on some fundamental questions which may never be satisfactorily answered — such as how to apportion responsibility for planning and carrying out the coup among all the Iranian and outside actors involved.

But all 21 of the CIA items posted today (in addition to 14 previously unpublished British documents — see Sidebar), reinforce the conclusion that the United States, and the CIA in particular, devoted extensive resources and high-level policy attention toward bringing about Mosaddeq's overthrow, and smoothing over the aftermath.

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DOCUMENTS

CIA Records

CIA Internal Histories

Document 1 (Cover Sheet, Summary, I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, Appendix E): CIA, Clandestine Services History, *Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 - August 1953*, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954

Source: *The New York Times*

Donald Wilber was a principal planner of the initial joint U.S.-U.K. coup attempt of August 1953. This 200-page account is one of the most valuable remaining records describing the event because Wilber wrote it within months of the overthrow and provided a great deal of detail. Like any historical document, it must be read with care, taking into account the author's personal perspective, purpose in writing it, and audience. The CIA routinely prepared histories of important operations for use by future operatives. They were not intended to be made public.

SHARE

Document 2: CIA, Summary, "Campaign to Install a Pro-Western Government in Iran," draft of internal history of the coup, undated

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This heavily excised summary was almost certainly prepared in connection with Donald Wilber's Clandestine Services History (Document 1). By all indications written not long after the coup (1953-54), it includes several of the phrases Wilber used — "quasi-legal," and "war of nerves," for example. The text clearly gives the impression that the author attributes the coup's eventual success to a combination of external and internal developments. Beginning by listing a number of specific steps taken by the U.S. under the heading "CIA ACTION," the document notes at the end (in a handwritten edit): "These actions resulted in literal revolt of the population, [1+ lines excised]. The military and security forces joined the populace, Radio Tehran was taken over, and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 [sic] Aug 53."

Document 3A & Document 3B: CIA, History, *The Battle for Iran*, author's name excised, undated (c. mid-1970s) - (Two versions - declassified in 1981 and 2011)

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This posting provides two separate releases of the same document, declassified 30 years apart (1981 and 2011). Each version contains portions excised in the other. Though no date is given, judging from citations in the footnotes *The Battle for Iran* was written in or after 1974. It is marked "Administrative - Working Paper" and contains a number of handwritten edits. The author was a member of the CIA's History Staff who acknowledges "the enthusiastic cooperation" of the agency's Directorate of Operations. The author provides confirmation that most of the relevant files were destroyed in 1962; therefore the account relies on the relatively few remaining records as well as on public sources. The vast majority of the covert action portion (Section III) remains classified, although the most recent declassification of the document leaves in some brief, but important, passages. An unexpected feature of the document (Appendix C) is the inclusion of a series of lengthy excerpts of published accounts of the overthrow designed, apparently, to underscore how poorly the public understood the episode at the time.

Document 4: CIA, History, *"Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953*, Scott A. Koch, June 1998

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

The most recent known internal history of the coup, "Zendebad, Shah!" was written by an in-house agency historian in 1998. It is

heavily excised (but currently undergoing re-review by the CIA), with virtually all paragraphs marked Confidential or higher omitted from the public version. Still, it is a useful account written by someone without a stake in the events and drawing on an array of U.S. government and published sources not available to the earlier CIA authors.

CIA Records Immediately Before and After the Coup

Document 5: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 14, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Kermit Roosevelt conveys information about rapidly unfolding events in Tehran, including Mosaddeq's idea for a referendum on his remaining in office, the prospect of his closing the Majles, and most importantly the impact President Eisenhower's recent letter has had in turning society against the prime minister. The U.S. government publicized Eisenhower's undiplomatic letter turning down Mosaddeq's request for financial aid. The move was one of the ways Washington hoped to weaken his political standing.

Document 6: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 15, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Responding to the resignation of Mosaddeq supporters from the Majles, Kermit Roosevelt fires off a plan to ensure that other Majles members keep the parliament functioning, the eventual goal being to engineer a no-confidence in Mosaddeq. The memo provides an interesting clue on the subject of whether CIA operatives ever bought votes in the Majles, about which other CIA sources are vague. Roosevelt urges that as many deputies as possible be "persuaded" to take *bast* in the parliament. "Recognize will be necessary expend money this purpose and determine precisely who does what." At the conclusion of the document he appears to tie this scheme into the previously elaborated — but clearly evolving — coup plan.

Document 7: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 16, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Roosevelt reports on developing plans involving Fazlollah Zahedi, the man who has been chosen to replace Mosaddeq. CIA sources, including the Wilber history, indicate that the military aspects of the plan were to be largely Zahedi's responsibility. This memo supports that (even though many details are excised), but also provides some insight into the differences in expectations between the Americans and Zahedi. With some skepticism ("Zahedi claims ..."), Roosevelt spells out a series of events Zahedi envisions that presumably would bring him to the premiership, albeit in a very round-about way. His thinking is clearly prompted by his declared unwillingness to commit "'political suicide' by extra-legal move."

Document 8: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 17, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

The CIA's Tehran station reports on the recent resignations of independent and opposition Majles members. The idea, an opposition deputy tells the station, was to avert Mosaddeq's planned public referendum. The memo gives a bit of insight into the fluidity and uncertainty of developments with each faction undoubtedly elaborating their own strategies and tactics to a certain degree.

Document 9: CIA, note to Mr. [John] Waller, July 22, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This brief note conveys much about both U.S. planning and hopes for Mosaddeq's overthrow. It is a request from Kermit Roosevelt to John Waller and Donald Wilber to make sure that a formal U.S. statement is ready in advance of "a 'successful' coup." (See Document 10)

Document 10: CIA, note forwarding proposed text of State Department release for after the coup, August 5, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This draft text from the State Department appears to be a result of Roosevelt's request (Document 9) to have an official statement available for use after completion of the operation. The draft predates Mosaddeq's ouster by two weeks, but its language — crediting "the Iranian people, under the leadership of their Shah," for the coup — tracks precisely with the neutral wording used by both the State Department and Foreign Office in their official paperwork after the fact.

Document 11: CIA, Memo, "Proposed Commendation for Communications Personnel who have serviced the TPAJAX Operation," Frank G. Wisner to The Acting Director of Central Intelligence, August 20, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Wisner recommends a special commendation for the work performed by the communications specialists who kept CIA headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup period. "I am sure that you are aware of the exceptionally heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated," Wisner writes — an unintentionally poignant remark given how little of that documentation has survived.

Document 12: CIA, Memo, "Commendation," Frank G. Wisner to CNEA Division, August 26, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Wisner also requests a commendation for John Waller, the coup overseer at CIA headquarters, "for his work in TPAJAX." Waller's conduct "in no small measure, contributed to the successful result."

Document 13: CIA, "Letter of Commendation [Excised]," author and recipient names excised, August 26, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Evidently after reflection, Frank Wisner concludes that there are troubling "security implications" involved in providing a letter of commendation for a covert operation.

Document 14: CIA, Memo, "Anti-Tudeh Activities of Zahedi Government," author's name excised, September 10, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

A priority of the Zahedi government after the coup was to go after the Tudeh Party, which had been a mainstay of support for Mosaddeq, even if the relationship was mostly one of mutual convenience. This is one of several memos reporting details on numbers of arrests, names of suspected Central Committee members, and planned fate of arrestees. The report claims with high specificity on Soviet assistance being provided to the Tudeh, including printing party newspapers at the embassy. Signs are

reportedly mixed as to whether the party and pro-Mosaddeq elements will try to combine forces again.

Document 15: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 21, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Roosevelt reports on an intense period of political maneuvering at high levels in the Zahedi government. Intrigues, patronage (including a report that the government has been giving financial support to Ayatollah Behbehani, and that the latter's son is angling for a Cabinet post), and corruption are all dealt with in this memo.

Document 16: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 24, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

A restless Zahedi is reported to be active on a number of fronts including trying to get a military tribunal to execute Mosaddeq and urging the Shah to fire several senior military officers including Chief of Staff Batmangelich. The Shah reportedly has not responded to Zahedi's previous five messages.

Document 17: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 2, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

According to this account, the Shah remained deeply worried about Mosaddeq's influence, even while incarcerated. Roosevelt reports the Shah is prepared to execute Mosaddeq (after a guilty verdict that is a foregone conclusion) if his followers and the Tudeh take any threatening action.

Document 18: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 9, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Iranian politics did not calm down entirely after the coup, as this memo indicates, reporting on "violent disagreements" between Zahedi and his own supporter, Hoseyn Makki, whom Zahedi threatened to shoot if he accosted any senators trying to attend a

Senate session. Roosevelt also notes two recent payments from Zahedi to Ayatollah Behbehani. The source for these provocative reports is unknown, but presumably is named in the excised portion at the top of the memo.

Document 19: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 20, 1953

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

Roosevelt notes a meeting between the new prime minister, Zahedi, and Ayatollah Kashani, a politically active cleric and once one of Mosaddeq's chief supporters. Kashani reportedly carps about some of his former National Front allies. Roosevelt concludes Zahedi wants "split" the front "by wooing Kashani away."

Document 20: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Our National Character," undated

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This appears to be an example of CIA propaganda aimed at undermining Mosaddeq's public standing, presumably prepared during Summer 1953. Like other examples in this posting, the CIA provided no description when it released the document. It certainly fits the pattern of what Donald Wilber and others after him have described about the nature of the CIA's efforts to plant damaging innuendo in local Iranian media. In this case, the authors extol the virtues of the Iranian character, particularly as admired by the outside world, then decry the descent into "hateful," "rough" and "rude" behavior Iranians have begun to exhibit "ever since the alliance between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party."

Document 21: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, "Mossadeq's Spy Service," undated

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release

This propaganda piece accuses the prime minister of pretending to be "the savior of Iran" and alleges that he has instead built up a vast spying apparatus which he has trained on virtually every sector of society, from the army to newspapers to political and religious leaders. Stirring up images of his purported alliance with "murderous Qashqai Khans" and the Bolsheviks, the authors charge: "Is this the way you save Iran, Mossadeq? We know what you want to save. You want to save Mossadeq's dictatorship in Iran!"

British Records

Document 22 : FCO, Summary Record, "British-American Planning Talks, Washington," October 10-11, 1978

Source: The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) FCO 8/3216, File No. P 333/2, Folder, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1978 (hereafter: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216)

In October 1978, a delegation of British FCO officials traveled to Washington for two days of discussions and comparing of notes on the world situation with their State Department counterparts. The director of the Department's Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake (later to serve as President Bill Clinton's national security advisor), led the American side. Other participants were experts from various geographical and functional bureaus, including Henry Precht, the head of the Iran Desk.

Beginning in paragraph 22, Precht gives a dour summary of events in Iran: "the worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years." In a fascinating back-and-forth about the Shah, Precht warns it is "difficult to see how the Shah could survive." The British politely disagree, voicing confidence that the monarchy will survive. Even his State Department colleagues "showed surprise at the depth of Mr. Precht's gloom."

In the course of his presentation (paragraph 23), Precht notes almost in passing that the State Department is reviewing its records from 1952-1954 for eventual release. A British representative immediately comments that "if that were the case, he hoped HMG [Her Majesty's Government] would be consulted."

Document 23: FCO, Minute, B.L. Crowe to R.S. Gorham, "Anglo-American Planning Talks: Iran," October 12, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

This memo recounts Precht's dramatic presentation on Iran two days earlier (see previous document). "His was essentially a policy of despair," the author writes. When the British follow up with the Americans about Precht's outlook of gloom, they find that State Department and National Security Council (NSC) staff were just as bewildered by his remarks. One NSC staff member calls them "bullshit." Policy Planning Director Lake laments the various "indiscreet and sensitive things" the Americans said at the meeting, and asks the British to "be very careful" how they handle them.

"On a completely different subject," the minute continues, "Precht let out … that he was having to go through the records of the 1952/53 Mossadeq period with a view to their release under the Freedom of Information Act [sic]. He said that if released, there would be some very embarrassing things about the British in them." (Much of this passage is underlined for emphasis.) The note goes on: "I made a strong pitch that we should be consulted," but the author adds, "I imagine that it is American documents about the British rather than documents on which HMG have any lien which are involved." (This is a point that may still be at issue today since the question of discussing American documents with foreign governments is very different from negotiating over the

use of foreign government records.)

Document 24: FCO, Letter, R.J. Carrick to B.L. Crowe, October 13, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

An FCO official reports that Precht recently approached another British diplomat to say that "he hoped we had not been too shocked" by his recent presentation. He says Precht acknowledged being "over-pessimistic" and that in any event he had not been offering anyone's view but his own.[5] According to the British, NSC staff members put more stock in the assessments of the U.K. ambassador to Tehran, Sir Anthony Parsons, than in Precht's. The writer adds that U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan also shares Parsons' judgment, and concludes, without indicating a source, that even "Henry Precht has now accepted Sullivan's view!"

Document 25: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to Mr. Cullimore, "Iran: The Ghotbi Pamphlet and the Mussadeq Period," October 17, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

This cover note (to Document 24) refers to Precht's revelation about the impending American publication of documents on the Mosaddeq period. The author suggests giving some consideration to the implications of this for "our own record of the time."

Document 26: FCO, Letter, B.L. Crowe to Sir A. Duff, "Anglo-American Planning Talks," October 19, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

FCO official Brian Crowe summarizes the October 10-11 joint U.S.-U.K. talks. The document is included here mainly for the sake of comprehensiveness, since it is part of the FCO folder on the FRUS matter. The writer repeats the remark from State's Anthony Lake that "some of the comments" from the U.S. side on Iran (among other topics) were "highly sensitive" and should not be disclosed - even to other American officials.

Document 27: FCO, Letter, J.O. Kerr to B.L. Crowe, "Talks with the US Planners: Iran," October 24, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

This brief note shows that word is moving up the line in the FCO about the forthcoming FRUS volume on Iran. The writer conveys a request to have the U.K. embassy in Washington check the risks involved in the potential release of U.S. documents, and "when the State Department propose to raise them formally with us."

Document 28: FCO, letter, G.G.H. Walden to B.L. Crowe, "Anglo-American Planning Talks: Iran," November 10, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

Still more interest in the possible State Department release is reflected in this short note, now a month after the joint U.S.-U.K. talks. Here and elsewhere, the British notes erroneously report that the release will come under the Freedom of Information Act (or the Public Information Act, as given here); they are actually slated for inclusion in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.

Document 29: FCO, R.S. Gorham cover note to Streams, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," attaching draft letter to Washington, November 14, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

This note and draft are included primarily because they are part of the FCO file on this topic. However, the draft letter does contain some different wording from the final version (Document 31).

Document 30: U.S. Embassy London, Letter, Ronald I. Spiers to Sir Thomas Brimelow, March 24, 1975

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

Three years before Precht's revelation to his British counterparts, the U.K. sought general guidance from the State Department about how the U.S. would handle "classified information received from Her Majesty's Government." The month before, robust amendments to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act had gone into effect. This letter from the number two official in London at the time, Ronald Spiers, offers a detailed response. Britain's awareness of the new amendments and anxiousness about their implications (including the fairly abstruse question of how secret documents would be handled in court cases) show how sensitive an issue the British considered protection of their information to be. The U.S. Chargé is equally anxious to provide the necessary

reassurances. (More than a decade later, Spiers would sharply oppose efforts by the State Department's Historical Advisory Committee to gain access to restricted documentation for the FRUS series.[6])

Document 31: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to R.J.S. Muir, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," November 16, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

The British embassy in Washington is alerted to the possibility of documents being released on the 1952-54 period. The FCO clearly expects that, as apparently has been the case in the past, "there should be no difficulty for the Americans in first removing … copies of any telegrams etc from us and US documents which record our views, even in the case of papers which are not strictly speaking 'official information furnished by a foreign government.'" (This raises important questions about how far U.S. officials typically go to accommodate allied sensibilities, including to the point of censoring U.S. documents.) "What is not clear," the letter continues, "is whether they could withhold American documents which referred to joint Anglo/US views about, say, the removal of Musaddiq in 1953."

Document 32: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran" Release of Confidential Records," December 14, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

This follow-up to Gorham's earlier request (Document 31) is another reflection of U.K. skittishness about the pending document release. The embassy officer reports that he has spoken to Henry Precht "several times" about it, and that the British Desk at the State Department is also looking into the matter on London's behalf. The objective is to persuade the Department to agree to withhold not only British documents but American ones, too.

Document 33: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, "Iran: Release of Confidential Records," December 22, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

The embassy updates the FCO on the status of the Iran records. Precht informs the embassy that he is prepared to "sit on the papers" to help postpone their publication. Precht's priority is the potential impact on current U.S. and U.K. policy toward Iran. Conversely, a historian at the State Department makes it clear that his office feels no obligation even to consult with the British

about any non-U.K. documents being considered. The historian goes on to say "that he had in the past resisted requests from other governments for joint consultation and would resist very strongly any such request from us." But the same historian admits that the embassy might "be successful" if it approached the policy side of the Department directly.

The embassy letter ends with a "footnote" noting that State Department historians "have read the 1952-54 papers and find them a 'marvelous compilation.'"

Interestingly, a handwritten comment on the letter from another FCO official gives a different view about the likely consequences of the upcoming document publication: "As the revolution [in Iran] is upon us, the problem is no longer Anglo-American: the first revelations will be from the **I**ranian side." In other words, the revolution will bring its own damaging results, and the revolutionaries will not need any further ammunition from the West.

Document 34: FCO, Cover Note, Cohen (?) to Lucas, circa December 22, 1978

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8/3216

In a handwritten remark at the bottom of this cover note, an unidentified FCO official voices much less anxiety than some of his colleagues about the possible repercussions of the disclosure of documents on Iran. Referring to a passage in paragraph 3 of the attached letter (see previous document), the writer asks: "why should we be concerned about 'any other documents'?" The writer agrees with the cover note author's suggestion to "let this matter rest for a while," then continues: "I think we ought positively to seek the agreement of others interested to Y." ("Y" identifies the relevant passage on the cover note.)

Document 35: FCO, Meeting Record, "Iran: Policy Review," December 20, 1978

Source : British National Archives, FCO 8/3351, File No. NB P 011/1 (Part A), Title "Internal Political Situation in Iran"

British Foreign Secretary David Owen chairs this FCO meeting on the unfolding crisis in Iran. It offers a window into London's assessment of the revolution and British concerns for the future (including giving "highest priority to getting paid for our major outstanding debts"). The document also shows that not everyone at the FCO believed significant harm would necessarily come to British interests from the FRUS revelations. Although he is speaking about events in 1978, I.T.M. Lucas' comment could apply just as forcefully to the impact of disclosing London's actions in 1953: "[I]t was commonly known in [the Iranian] Government who the British were talking to, and there was nothing we could do to disabuse public opinion of its notions about the British role in Iran." (p. 2)

NOTES

[1] Just in the last several years, books in English, French and Persian by Ervand Abrahamian, Gholam-Reza Afkhami, Mohammad Amini, Christopher de Bellaigue, Darioush Bayandor, Mark Gasiorowski (and this author), Stephen Kinzer, Abbas Milani, Ali Rahnema, and others have focused on, or at least dealt in depth with, Mosaddeq and the coup. They contain sometimes wide differences of view about who was behind planning for the overthrow and how it finally played out. More accounts are on the way (including an important English-language volume on Iranian domestic politics by Ali Rahnema of the American University of Paris).

[2] Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1997.

[3] Tim Weiner, "C.I.A.'s Openness Derided as a 'Snow Job'," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1997; Tim Weiner, *op. cit.*, May 29, 1997. (See also the link to the Archive's lawsuit, above.)

[4] Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979); *The New York Times*, April 16, 2000.

[5] Precht recalls that he was originally not slated to be at the meetings, which usually deputy assistant secretaries and above attended. But the Near East division representative for State was unavailable. "I was drafted," Precht said. Being forced to "sit through interminable and pointless talk" about extraneous topics "when my plate was already overflowing" on Iran contributed to a "sour mood," he remembered. (Henry Precht e-mail to author, June 2, 2011.)

[6] Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "'A Burden for the Department'?: To The 1991 *FRUS* Statute," February 6, 2012, http://history.state.gov/frus150/research/to-the-1991-frus-statute.

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Annex 35

"Iran, U.S. to open joint Chamber of Commerce: Report", *Agence France Presse*, 27 November 2013

BUSINESS

Iran, U.S. to open joint Chamber of Commerce: Report

e doing?



U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the United Nations Palais in Geneva Nov. 24, 2013. (File Photo: Reuters)

AFP, Tehran
Wednesday, 27 November 2013

Text size A A A



Iran and the United States are to establish a joint chamber of commerce within a month, with direct flights also planned, an Iranian official said Wednesday in a newspaper report.

"Iran-U.S. chamber of commerce will be launched in less than one month," Abolfazl Hejazi, a member of Iran's Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture, told the English-language Iran Daily.

In the wake of a historic accord on Sunday between Tehran and major powers on Iran's controversial nuclear program, Hejazi also said his country was ready to start direct flights to the United States.

After the 1979 revolution in Iran, Washington severed diplomatic relations with Tehran following the seizure of its embassy in Tehran, during which Islamist students held 52 U.S. diplomats hostage for 444 days.

According to Hejazi, the project which he said had already been registered in the United States would allow the two countries to work towards restoring ties.

Hejazi also said the government has authorized the private sector to launch joint activities and that Iran was ready to establish direct flights to the United States.

Flights would connect Kish Island in southwest Iran with New York, he said.

"This is because Kish Island is a free trade zone and Iranian passengers who have U.S. citizenship will not need to obtain visas to enter it," he said.

Hejazi said direct flights would "enable us to export domestic products to the US and import high-tech products and raw materials from the country."

On the sidelines of his visit to the U.N. General Assembly in late September, President Hassan Rowhani pledged to ease travel to Iran for the hundreds of thousands of Iranians living in the United States.

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Annex 36

I. Tharoor, "Iraq's Crisis: Don't Forget the 2003 U.S. Invasion", *The Washington Post,* 5 April 2014

Iraq’s crisis: Don’t forget the 2003 U.S. invasion

www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/16/iraqs-crisis-dont-forget-the-2003-u-s-invasion/

Members of Iraqi security forces patrol an area near the borders between Karbala Province and Anbar Province on June 16, 2014. (Mushtaq Muhammed/Reuters)

We're all watching the situation in Iraq with sadness and horror. ISIS, a loathsome jihadist group incubated in Syria, has carved out a large territory and plunged the wider region deeper into crisis. There are reports of shocking mass executions, while tens of thousands of Iraqis are fleeing their homes as ISIS pushes forward.

In Washington and elsewhere, pundits and politicos are indulging in the blame game. Some accuse the Obama administration of being too keen to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011; others harp on the provocative Shiite sectarianism of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which has created conditions for Sunni extremists like ISIS to flourish.

Curiously, quite a few of the most outspoken critics were prominently involved in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Rarely in their current diagnoses do they acknowledge the tumult unleashed after the toppling of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. In a lengthy piece posted to his personal Web site, former British prime minister Tony Blair went so far as to dismiss the legacy of the war he helped start. "We have to liberate ourselves from the notion that ‘we’ have caused [the current crisis]. We haven't," Blair wrote. He added: "The fundamental cause of the crisis lies within the region not outside it."

Blair has been widely criticized for his comments in the U.K., where there's a sharper conversation on the consequences of the Iraq war and the reasons invoked more than a decade ago to justify the invasion. Blair is right that the various tensions now smoldering in Iraq lie "within the region" -- but outside intervention had real effects. Here's why that should remain better in focus.

It opened a Pandora's box of sectarianism

Saddam Hussein was a nasty, murderous tyrant who brutalized much of his country and was guilty of war crimes. But Iraq under the rule of his nominally secular Ba'ath party was not the sectarian charnel house that it became in the years following Hussein's overthrow and eventual execution.

The Iraqi politicians who found traction in U.S.-occupied Iraq did little to build an inclusive, pluralist politics. Nor did they have much incentive. Traumatized by decades of authoritarianism and indulged by foreign partners, they sought to consolidate their own political fiefdoms to the detriment of the fragile Iraqi state.

The Sunni-Shiite bloodletting that followed scarred communities that for centuries had lived in relative peace alongside each other. The divisive politics of Maliki's government inflamed passions in Iraq's Sunni heartland, while violence in Baghdad saw the once cosmopolitan capital become heavily Shiite.

Meanwhile, the invasion's aftermath hollowed out the country's Christian population, with hundreds of thousands fleeing as refugees. They were once protected minorities in both Iraq and Syria, but the upheavals that followed the collapse of Ba'athist rule have made them vulnerable targets.

It spawned terror groups and redrew the geopolitical map

ISIS emerged as al-Qaeda splinter group operating in the wake of the invasion, a fringe, lethal faction within a larger Sunni insurgency. While beaten back by the U.S. surge in 2007, the elements that would reform as ISIS would find fertile ground amid Syria's civil war, where it began a campaign of conquest and slaughter that has yielded it a virtual mini-state.

Now, as ISIS's onslaught nears Baghdad, Shiite militias that had first risen up in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion

are once more mustering and joining the battle. Many of these factions didn't exist -- or were deep underground -- under Hussein. This is not to say that Saddam Hussein deserved to remain in power. But the security vacuum after his fall and the presence of foreign occupiers led to Iraq becoming a breeding ground for jihad and religious extremism. It also led to Iran developing significant influence in a neighboring country that was once ruled by a bitter foe.

It offers many cautionary tales

On Monday, the strategic northern city of Tal Afar fell to ISIS fighters. It's known for its sizable population of ethnic Turkmen, which has made the city vulnerable to assault in the past. But in 2006, as the Associated Press notes, Tal Afar was hailed by the U.S., then waging counterinsurgency, as a model of success. President George W. Bush said then that the city showed "the outlines of the Iraq that we and the Iraqi people have been fighting for: A free and secure people are getting back on their feet." Last week, ISIS seized Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city and another lapsed U.S. success story. In 2004, it was the petri dish for then-Gen. David Petraeus's much-vaunted tactics of pacification.

These were all fleeting victories that eventually serve, more than anything, as reminders of the limits of American power and Washington's ability to reshape facts on the ground. Petraeus's "Mosul model" is now just one more forgotten chapter in a long, bloody journey that began in 2003. The wishful thinking of U.S. leadership in Iraq was on display in the build-up to the war, when its main proponents showed little appreciation for the resources and troops the U.S. would have to deploy in a near-decade long occupation.

Now, the U.S. faces a hard set of choices, in a context shadowed by conflicting imperatives and the agendas of other regional powers. One can understand the caution shown by the administration -- at least as much as the zeal of those who want the U.S. to be embroiled in the region once more.

Annex 37

D. Hussain, "ISIS: The "Unintended Consequences" of the US-led War on Iraq", *Foreign Policy Journal*, 23 March 2015

ISIS: The "unintended consequences" of the US-led war on Iraq

www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/03/23/isis-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-us-led-war-on-iraq/

Dilly Hussain

Warnings against trying to defeat ISIS by doing more of the same of what led to its rise in the first place are falling on deaf ears.

In a recent interview with Shane Smith, the founder of VICE News, President Barack Obama said: "ISIL is a direct outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences." This admission is evidence of the general causality between Western military interventionism in the Muslim world, and the rise of reactionary armed militia groups. In this particular case, the US-led invasion of Iraq undoubtedly paved the way for the rise of the self-professed 'Islamic State', better known as ISIS. Depending on who highlights this "unintended consequence" when commenting on recent events in Iraq and Syria, it is usually given very little importance or completely dismissed. Understandably, the pro-war policymakers in Washington and London who orchestrated the invasion of a sovereign state based on false intelligence, would rather focus on how to "degrade and destroy" the monster they created, as opposed to acknowledging fault and accepting blame.

Furthermore, it appears from numerous public statements that President Obama conveniently deflects the decisions made by his predecessor, George W Bush, when questioned about ISIS, by disregarding America's problematic foreign policy in the Middle East, to shifting the attention exclusively to an extreme interpretation of Islam. This rhetoric is a pattern which has been overwhelmingly consistent with European leaders, some of whom were brothers-in-arms with the US when invading Iraq. Like President Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron also parrots the same narrative, ignoring the misdeeds of Tony Blair in failing to take the advice of the former head of MI5, Baroness Manningham-Buller, when she warned that the Iraq war would increase the domestic terror threat to the UK. Similarly, the Dutch and French governments amongst other European states, who have joined the 60 country coalition against ISIS, also prefer to blame "Islamic extremism", instead of introspectively learning from their bloody colonial history in the Muslim world.

Though President Obama's confession to VICE News qualifies as a substantive statement of US complicity in creating ISIS, whether it was an "unintended consequence" or intentional negligence is entirely a different matter.

Prior to the war in Afghanistan, there was no Taliban in Pakistan. The group known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) formed in 2007 as a response to NATO's presence in the region. Likewise, Al Shabaab did not exist before the Western backed African Union (AU) forces and the Kenyan army entered Somalia. Same can be said about the guerrilla groups that arose as a result of US interference in South America. Evidently, there seems to be a reoccurring pattern whenever Western states, namely the US, attempts to meddle in the affairs of other sovereign states, either through military intervention, regional proxies or subservient dictators. In most cases, American intrusion in other countries is to protect their economic interests or to make geopolitical advancements, and Iraq was no exception to this rule.

History and origin of ISIS

WMD's were not the only incriminating object that was unfounded prior to 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'; there were no Al Qaeda or ISIS either. The proto-ISIS group, Jam'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (TJ) led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was born out of the Iraq war, as part of a coalition of Sunni resistance groups fighting the occupying forces. TJ changed its name on multiple occasions during its evolution to becoming ISIS. In late 2004, TJ officially joined Al-Qaeda, after Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2006, AQI became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which later became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when it branched into the Syrian civil war.

TJ made a number of strategic errors which worsened as time progressed, and eventually became the hallmarks of the group we know as ISIS. Firstly, it was the adoption of the un-Islamic methodology of classifying civilians as acceptable targets in war. Secondly, TJ declared war on Iraqi Shias in response to many of their prominent leaders collaborating with US forces in attacking predominantly Sunni villages and towns, under the justification of fighting Al Qaeda. The US's relationship with Shia leaders, who were now the new stakeholders in post-Saddam Iraq, was arguably the sole factor which led to the "unintended consequences" that facilitated the emergence of ISIS.

TJ's sectarian war against Iraq's Shia population discredited the wider resistance against Western forces, and became so destructive that the general Sunni populous faced the brunt of the vengeful blowback that followed from the government of Nouri al-Maliki. The untold horror and misery that Iraqis faced from TJ and state-backed Shia death squads allowed the US to extend their occupation as they now portrayed themselves as the 'lesser of two evils', who were safeguarding the country from sectarian strife, and ensuring that Iraq would become a "beacon of democracy".

By 2006, ISI's (formerly TJ) relationship with other Sunni resistance groups also fell apart due to their inability to understand the nuances of Islamic laws pertaining to warfare and governance. The group considered themselves as a 'state', and the people residing in the areas they controlled as their citizens, who were forced to abide by their rigid interpretation of Shari'ah law. ISI perceived any genuine criticism from Iraqi Sunnis as an act of rebellion and apostasy, which led to the summary execution of numerous Sunni tribal chiefs, and assassinations of fellow resistance leaders.

US policymakers witnessed the besieged Sunnis of Iraq, who were suffocated between the harsh vigilante rule of ISI, the state sanctioned Shia militias, and the occupying military forces, until an opportunity arose.

The Sunni Awakening Council

Capitalizing on the desperation of Sunni tribal leaders and resistance groups, the US offered them money and weapons to redirect their efforts towards fighting ISI. Additionally, Sunnis were promised political inclusion, as well as positions within the Iraqi army, police force and security services. The same Sunni tribes that helped ISIS take Mosul in June 2014 had created their own 'Awakening Councils' to fight ISI. Thus, ISI had lost their Sunni allies en masse and the territories they controlled, forcing them to go underground.

However, after Nouri al-Maliki was selected by the US to replace Ibrahim al-Jaafari as the new prime minister of 'post-war' Iraq, the facilitation of ISI's return had begun before anyone could celebrate their demise. Al-Maliki's eight-year rule was infested with paranoia, corruption, the persecution of Iraq's Sunni population, and closer ties with Iran. The promises made to the Sunni tribes of Anbar province for repelling ISI were not delivered. Instead, Sunni politicians were harassed, threatened with prosecution, imprisoned, assassinated, or exiled. Most notably, Vice-president Tariq al Hashemi was accused of supporting terrorism and forced to flee to Turkey as he was sentenced to death in absentia.

When the democratic process had become seemingly fruitless for Iraqi Sunnis, thousands had taken to the streets of Ramadi, Hawija, and Fallujah to voice their political and socioeconomic frustration. The anti-government protests that took place between 2012-2014 were violently quelled by the Iraqi army and security services; according to some conservative estimations, this led to hundreds of deaths and arrests of peaceful Sunni protestors over a two-year period. In reality, al-Maliki was a prime minister as oppressive as any of Iraq's previous leaders – with one exception: the Iraqi army he commanded was armed and trained by the US Army. They were undisciplined, unprofessional, unreliable, and depended on US military support to conduct their operations.

Under Iraq's new democratic regime which was armed by the US and backed by Iran, the Sunnis of the north became increasingly aggrieved, and this provided the perfect opportunity for ISI to fill the power vacuum.

"Unintended consequences" or an inevitable outcome?

When ISIS declared the re-establishment of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014, the principle of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' became evidently clear for the powerbrokers involved in the region. The US and Iran had committed themselves to train and arm the Iraqi army. After taking Mosul, Fallujah, Hawija, Ramadi and Tikrit, ISIS advanced

towards the oil rich city of Erbil in Kurdistan, which was followed by US airstrikes under the guise of 'humanitarian intervention' in protecting the Yazidis. ISIS responded to the US airstrikes by beheading American journalist, James Foley, and ultimately that was the straw that broke the camel's back.

More importantly, what implications do the ongoing airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have on the US? If history is anything to go by, then there will now be an increased domestic terror threat. Clearly the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq were ignored, when the same policymakers who backed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 began beating the drums of war. As tempting as it may be for the US to 'fight terrorism' in every corner of the world, the 'ISIS crisis' was a problem for the people of Iraq and Syria to tackle themselves. However, when ISIS threatened US economic interests in Erbil, it became obligatory to intervene militarily. Furthermore, arming the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga to suppress a legitimate Sunni tribal uprising (which ISIS was loosely a part of) against the al-Maliki regime exacerbated the already volatile situation.

What the US tends to forget, or intentionally ignores, is that armed reactionary groups like ISIS are born out of the destabilization created by Western military intervention. As mentioned earlier in this article, hostile anti-American resistance groups gain momentum, sympathy and legitimacy from the actions carried out by Western forces. For four years the Assad regime has been murdering its own people by barrel bombing entire villages and using chemical weapons, whilst al-Maliki was indiscriminately killing Sunnis in Iraq, but that did not urge the Obama administration to intervene militarily. Yet, when the Sunni uprising gained momentum in Iraq and it threatened to shift the balance of power from the Kurds in the north, and the Shia-led government in Baghdad, the US reacted.

Since US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria began, more Muslims from around the world have flocked to ISIS. Nevertheless, the US is adamant in protecting its geopolitical and economic interests in the Middle East. At a time where China and Russia are making headway economically and militarily, perhaps this was the ideal opportunity for America to reassert its position as the commander-in-chief of the 'civilized world'. Additionally, if Obama succeeds in eradicating the self-professed Islamic State, it would also be an ideological victory over the genuine aspiration for a Caliphate in the future. But identical to the advice of Baroness Manningham-Buller to the Blair government, the words of the former head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, Jack Devine when he told Fox News, that "attacking ISIS increases terror threats to the US", has fallen on deaf ears.

Annex 38

R. LoBianco & E. Landers, "Trump: Clinton, Obama 'created ISIS'", *CNN*, 3 January 2016

Trump: Clinton, Obama 'created ISIS'

edition.cnn.com/2016/01/02/politics/donald-trump-barack-obama-hillary-clinton-created-isis/index.html

Donald Trump on Saturday said the policies of President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "created ISIS," the furthest the GOP front-runner has gone in tying the Obama administration's policies to the rise of the terror group.

Trump offered no evidence for his claim here at the Mississippi Coast Coliseum, in which he also said escalating tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia were signs that the Islamic Republic wanted to take over the longtime U.S. ally in the Middle East.

"They've created ISIS. Hillary Clinton created ISIS with Obama," Trump said.
He couched his hit in a brief discussion of the Iranian protests outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran, which erupted after Saudi Arabia executed 47 people, including a dissident Shiite cleric.
"In Tehran, they're burning down the Saudi embassy, you see that?" Trump said as he opened his remarks. "Now, what that is is Iran wants to take over Saudi Arabia. They always have. They want the oil, OK? They've always wanted that."
Trump has blamed both Democrats and former President George W. Bush when talking about unrest in the Middle East, particularly citing the 43rd president's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In recent weeks, he's been particularly aggressive in going after Clinton, the Democratic presidential front-runner, and her record leading the State Department.
Two of Trump's 2016 competitors, Carly Fiorina and Rick Santorum, said in November that Clinton and Obama were to blame for ISIS.

Annex 39

K. Ng, "Donald Trump says Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton 'created Isis'", *The Independent,* 3 January 2016

Donald Trump says Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton ‘created Isis’

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-says-barack-obama-and-hillary-clinton-created-isis-a6794406.html

Kate Ng

Donald Trump has claimed Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are to blame for the creation of Isis.

During his latest campaign rally in Mississippi, Mr Trump suggested the Obama administration has allowed the extremist group to flourish by ignoring his call for the US to seize oil assets now owned by Isis.

“I’ve predicted a lot of things, you have to say, including, ‘Get the oil, take the oil, keep the oil’. Right?” he said.

“I’ve been saying that for three years, and everybody said, ‘Oh I can’t do that. I mean, this is a sovereign country.’ There is no country!

“They’ve created Isis. Hillary Clinton created Isis with Obama,” he continued.

Mr Trump gave no evidence to support his claims, but used his address to accuse Iran of wanting to take over Saudi Arabia, a long-time US ally.

This comes during Iranian protests outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran, which erupted after the mass executions of 47 Sunni and Shia prisoners by Saudi Arabia.

“In Tehran, they’re burning down the Saudi embassy, you see that?” he said. “Now, what this is is Iran wants to take over Saudi Arabia. They always have. They want the oil, ok? They’ve always wanted that.”

After the rally, he retweeted a supporter who repeated his claims about Ms Clinton and Mr Obama. The supporter was responding to a critic calling Mr Trump a "retard" and a "douche".

> *@brandonstinney @realDonaldTrump How can you deny this fact.@HillaryClinton and @BarackObama are the two people who made #ISIS a big problem*
>
> *— Granite Hope (@Granite_Hope) January 3, 2016*

In November 2015, Mr Trump’s fellow Republican candidates Rick Santorum and Carly Fiorina both said that Ms Clinton and Mr Obama were to blame for the rise of Isis.

Mr Trump made no comment on the al-Shabaab recruitment video that was released on Friday, featuring footage of him calling for a ban on all Muslims entering the US.

Annex 40

"U.S. to buy heavy water from Iran's nuclear program", *Reuters*, 22 April 2016

U.S. to buy heavy water from Iran's nuclear program

www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN0XJ25G

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States will buy heavy water from Iran's nuclear program and expects it to be delivered within weeks, U.S. officials said on Friday, a move that Republican lawmakers quickly criticized.

The U.S. Department of Energy, or DOE, will buy 32 metric tonnes of heavy water from Iran worth $8.6 million, a department spokeswoman said. Heavy water is a component of making nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, that is not radioactive.

Under last year's landmark nuclear deal between Iran, the United States and five other world powers, Tehran is responsible for reducing its stock of heavy water, which it can sell, dilute or dispose of, under conditions.

Iran is permitted to keep up to 130 tonnes of heavy water at present and up to 90 tonnes once its redesigned and rebuilt Arak nuclear research reactor is commissioned.

"The United States will not be Iran's customer forever," the DOE spokeswoman said. U.S. officials hope the purchase will pave the way for other countries to buy the heavy water, which can be used in the development of semiconductors and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging.

Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Abbas Araqchi, who discussed the sale with U.S. officials in Vienna on Friday, told reporters that the 32 tonnes have been sold to an American company.

Araqchi estimated Iran has about 70 tonnes in excess of what it needs and said further sales are being negotiated with another company that is not based in the United States.

Iran, which is still under U.S. sanctions, has long had to go through third-country financial institutions for authorized transactions for items including medicine and food.

A U.S. Treasury Department official would not discuss details of the payment for the heavy water until after the purchase is complete, but said it would be completed under the same method.

"Regardless of whether or not this is in U.S. dollars, this licensed transaction is limited in scope," the Treasury official said on condition of anonymity.

Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal means that the heavy water was already removed from Iran, ensuring that it would not be used to support the development of a nuclear weapon, State Department spokesman John Kirby said.

"Our purchase of the heavy water means that it will instead be used for critically important research and non-nuclear industrial requirements," Kirby added.

The purchase, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, was slammed by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, a Republican. Ryan said in a statement it appeared to be part of the Democratic administration's efforts to sweeten the nuclear deal with Iran and would "directly subsidize Iran's nuclear program."

The DOE expects to resell the purchased heavy water to domestic commercial and research buyers, including a national lab.

Reporting by Timothy Gardner, Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed in Washington, Lesley Wroughton in New York and Kirsti Knolle in Vienna; Editing by David Gregorio and Cynthia Osterman

Annex 41

"Boeing seals $16,6 billion deal with Iran Air", *AP*, 11 December 2016

Boeing seals $16.6 billion deal with Iran Air

www.cbsnews.com/news/boeing-seals-16-billion-deal-iran-air/

AP December 11, 2016, 1:11 PM



An Iran Air Boeing 747 passenger plane sits on the tarmac of the domestic Mehrabad airport in the Iranian capital Tehran on January 15, 2013.

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran's flag carrier finalized a major deal with U.S. plane maker Boeing Co. to buy $16.6 billion worth of passenger planes Sunday in one of the most tangible benefits yet for the Islamic Republic from last year's landmark nuclear agreement.

Iran Air's deal for 80 jetliners is the biggest agreement Iran has struck with an American company since the 1979 revolution and U.S. Embassy takeover. It has the potential to transform Iran's creaking and accident-prone aviation industry, which has been hobbled by years of sanctions.

Those curbs have prevented the country from buying new planes from Chicago-based Boeing and European rival Airbus, and in many cases made it difficult for Iranian airlines to secure much-needed spare parts.

The deal covers 50 single-aisle 737 Max 8s, a soon-to-be-introduced version of Boeing's existing narrow-body 737 line.

It also includes 30 777s, a wide-body, twin-engine plane typically used on long-haul routes that is popular with other Persian Gulf carriers such as Dubai-based Emirates. Half of the order will cover the 777-300ER version, while the rest will be of the 777-9 model still under development.

Iran's state-run IRNA news agency said the planes would be delivered over the next decade. The first will start to arrive in 2018, Boeing said.

In September, Washington granted permission to Boeing and Toulouse, France-based Airbus to sell billions of dollars' worth of aircraft to Iran. Airbus needed U.S. approval because at least 10 percent of its planes' components are of American origin.

The U.S. and other world powers agreed last year to lift crippling sanctions on Iran in exchange for it curbing its nuclear activities. The U.S. still maintains extensive sanctions on Iran for activities unrelated to its nuclear program.

President-elect Donald Trump and several Republican lawmakers have criticized the nuclear deal, but it's unclear whether they would scrap the agreement, which was reached with Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China.

One year after Iran nuclear deal, uneasy feelings remain

Iranian Transport Minister Abbas Akhoundi, who attended the signing ceremony, said it was a "historic" day for Iranian aviation and that the deal would create 8,000 jobs for Iranians.

"The deal has a clear message for the world: we support peace and security as well as the growth of Iran based on a win-win policy," he was quoted as saying. "We hope that despite changes in the U.S. administration, the country will remain loyal to its commitments.

The Republican-led House of Representatives last month voted to bar commercial aircraft sales to Iran in a move that could block the Boeing deal. That legislation must still pass the Senate, where it will likely face opposition from Democrats. U.S. President Barack Obama has said he will veto the bill if it reaches his desk before he leaves office on Jan. 20.

Boeing made a point of saying it worked closely with the U.S. government throughout the deal-making process and will continue to "follow all license requirements." The Iran Air deal "will support tens of thousands of U.S. jobs" linked to the 777s alone, it said.

The plane maker said the deal value was based on list prices, though in practice customers typically negotiate discounts for bulk orders.

Most of Iran's aging fleet of 250 commercial planes was purchased before 1979, and as of June only 162 were operational, with the rest grounded because of a lack of spare parts. Iran Air, whose website lists a fleet of 43 planes, offers direct flights to over 30 international destinations, including London.

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Annex 42

"Iran Open to Business Ties with US", *Financial Tribune*, 19 January 2017

FINANCIAL TRIBUNE
FIRST IRANIAN ENGLISH ECONOMIC DAILY
SATURDAY
July, 15 2017
WWW.FINANCIALTRIBUNE.COM



National

National
Thursday, January 19, 2017
Iran Open to Business Ties With US

National
Thursday, January 19, 2017

Iran Open to Business Ties With US

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Tehran is open to economic relations with the US, despite differences between the two sides.

"China, Russia and India remain our important partners. They have been with us during difficult times. But we are interested in expanding our relations with the EU. We are interested in expanding our traditionally good relations with the rest of Asia, with Japan, with Korea," he said.

Zarif made the statements at a panel in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Wednesday, Tasnim News Agency reported.

"We are open to economic relations even with the United States. So while we have our political differences with the United States, we are not closed to economic relations, as the deal we signed with Boeing indicates," he added.

After the historic nuclear deal with major powers, which came into force in January last year, Iran signed a deal with the US planemaker to purchase 80 jetliners as part of a plan to revamp its aging aviation fleet.

Zarif also said US president-elect, Donald Trump, "will be surprised" if he tries to renegotiate the hard-won nuclear deal.

The top diplomat noted that he's taking a "wait-and-see" attitude about the Trump administration and "the jury is out."

Not End of World

Pressed by the AP afterward on Wednesday, Zarif said it "won't be the end of the world if he [Trump] tries to walk away from the deal [officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]".

"He wants to surprise people, so he will be surprised," if he does, Zarif said with a smile, without elaborating. Zarif also criticized the outgoing administration of Barack Obama, saying it "did not implement their side of the bargain in a full and complete way" notably about difficulties faced by Iranian banks.

In addition, he told the panel that Iran and Saudi Arabia should be able to work together to help end conflicts in Syria and Yemen, after successfully cooperating over Lebanon last year, Reuters reported.

"I do not see any reason why Iran and Saudi Arabia should have hostile policies toward each other. We can in fact work together to put an end to miserable conditions of the people in Syria and Yemen and Bahrain and elsewhere in the region," Zarif said.

"Iran and Saudi Arabia were able to actually stop impeding the process of the presidential election in Lebanon. We have a success story."

Michel Aoun, a Christian leader, was recently elected president of Lebanon and Iran welcomed Aoun's election as a victory for Hezbollah.

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Iran in the Region and the World

Annex 43

"Boeing Co. says it signed new $3 billion deal with Iranian airline", *AP*, 4 April 2017

Boeing Co. says it signed new $3 billion deal with Iranian airline

www.cnbc.com/2017/04/04/boeing-signs-new-3-billion-deal-with-iranian-airline.html

Transportation

Published 6:09 AM ET Tue, 4 April 2017 | Updated 6:30 AM ET Tue, 4 April 2017 The Associated Press



The first Boeing 737 MAX 9 airliner is pictured at the company's factory on March 7, 2017 in Renton, Washington.

Boeing Co. said on Tuesday it has signed a new, $3 billion deal with Iran's Aseman Airlines to supply 30 737 MAX aircraft to the carrier, the first major sale by a U.S. company to the Islamic Republic under new President Donald Trump.

The new agreement comes on top of the $16.6 billion sale Boeing previously made in Iran following the landmark nuclear deal struck with Tehran under the Obama administration. Trump long has criticized the atomic deal, though he toured a Boeing plant in February and touted the firm's work as proof of a coming American manufacturing renaissance.

Chicago-based Boeing said the deal also includes purchase rights for an additional 30 737 MAX aircraft for Tehran-based Aseman, which flies domestic and international routes. It said the first deliveries would start in 2022.

"According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, an aerospace sale of this magnitude creates or sustains approximately 18,000 jobs in the United States," Boeing said in a statement. "Boeing continues to follow the lead of the U.S. government with regards to working with Iran's airlines, and any and all contracts with Iran's airlines are contingent upon U.S. government approval."

Aseman spokesman Amir Reza Mostafavi told The Associated Press that the deal came following several round of talks over the past year between the airline and Boeing. He said the firms signed the deal March 18 and the first aircraft will be delivered in 2019, contradicting Boeing.

The European Union blacklisted Aseman from European skies in December because of safety concerns. The airline

did not operate flights to European destinations at the time.

Less than a week after that decision, the airline sealed a deal to lease seven planes made by European manufacturer Airbus. Those aircraft are expected to begin arriving next month.

The new Boeing deal comes as part of the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and world powers. After the atomic accord, Boeing struck a December deal with Iran Air, the country's flag carrier, for 80 passenger planes worth $16.6 billion.

A winning Boeing bet
6:57 PM ET Fri, 17 March 2017 | 03:13



In January, Iran Air signed agreements to buy 118 planes from Airbus, estimated to be worth some 22.8 billion euros ($25 billion). Asghar Fakhrieh Kashan, a deputy transportation minister, later said Iran would cut the number of Airbus planes to 112.

Washington granted permission for Boeing and Airbus to make the sales in September. Both manufacturers needed the approval of the U.S. Treasury for the deal because at least 10 percent of the airplanes' components are of American origin. The Treasury similarly would need to approve this latest deal.

Iran's nuclear deal with world powers, which limits its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the lifting of some international sanctions, specifically allowed for the purchase of aircraft and parts.

Iran represents one of the last untapped aviation markets in the world, home to 80 million people. However, Western analysts are skeptical that there is demand for so many jets or available financing for deals worth billions of dollars.

Annex 44

D. Chaitin, "Sen. John McCain meets with Iranian dissidents relocated to Albania", *Washington Examiner,* 15 April 2017

Sen. John McCain meets with Iranian dissidents relocated to Albania

www.washingtonexaminer.com/sen-john-mccain-meets-with-iranian-dissidents-relocated-to-albania/article/2620377

Daniel Chaitin

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., met with a group representing Iranian dissidents in Albania on Friday.

Speaking to members of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, the largest of five organizations in the National Council of Resistance of Iran, at their headquarters in Tirana, McCain spoke about his opposition to the Iranian regime. "Someday, Iran will be free. Someday, we will all gather in that square," McCain said.

He also congratulated members of the group for successfully relocating to Albania from Iraq where they had been subject to attacks from militias backed by Iran.

"There is no doubt that the people in this room have suffered," McCain told the gathering, also attended by Maryam Rajavi, the group's president-elect. "They have suffered not only themselves but in the loss of their loved ones because of the Iranian tyranny, and I express my condolences to everyone in this room who has lost a loved one as a result of the Iranian tyranny and terrorism."

After the event, McCain met separately with Rajavi, the group said.

McCain has spent the first week of the congressional recess traveling across Eastern Europe. He's made stops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro.

His office did not immediately return a request for comment on his visit to Albania.

The dissident group, also known as the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, has revealed information on Iran's nuclear and terror activities over the years.

The MEK says 140 MEK members were killed in seven attacks on Camps Ashraf and Liberty in Iraq by the Iranian regime, the Iraqi army and the pro-regime Iraqi terrorist militias.

In 2004, following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the MEK residing at Camp Asraf handed over their weapons and submitted to U.S. military protection. This was after the U.S. reportedly bombed the encampment as part of a deal with Iran, which promised to repatriate some members of al Qaeda if the U.S. attacked the MEK. The U.S. handed over responsibility to protect the dissidents to the Iraqi government in 2009, which moved the group to Camp Liberty in 2012.

After Camp Liberty was repeatedly attacked, the MEK appealed to the United Nations to allow them to return to Camp Asraf, which they said provided better protection. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the U.S. supported an effort to move Camp Liberty residents out of Iraq and Albania had offered to take the refugees in.

The last remaining members of the group departed Camp Liberty and were resettled in September.

The U.S. had listed the MEK as a terrorist organization for past alleged attacks on Americans, for which MEK has denied having any role. One senior official in the Clinton administration described the designation as a gesture of goodwill to then-Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. The MEK was removed from the list in 2012.

Editor's note: This story has been updated to better describe the structure of the MEK and to correct the original

version which incorrectly said the last remaining members of the group departed Camp Liberty and were resettled in August.

Annex 45

F. Zakaria, "How Saudi Arabia Played Donald Trump", *The Washington Post,* 25 May 2017

How Saudi Arabia played Donald Trump

www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/saudi-arabia-just-played-donald-trump/2017/05/25/d0932702-4184-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html

Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz presents President Trump with his nation's highest civilian honor. (Evan Vucci/Associated Press)

This week's bombing in Manchester, England, was another gruesome reminder that the threat from radical Islamist terrorism is ongoing. And President Trump's journey to the Middle East illustrated yet again how the country central to the spread of this terrorism, Saudi Arabia, has managed to evade and deflect any responsibility for it. In fact, Trump has given Saudi Arabia a free pass and a free hand in the region.

The facts are well-known. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has spread its narrow, puritanical and intolerant version of Islam — originally practiced almost nowhere else — across the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden was Saudi, as were 15 of the 19 9/11 terrorists.

And we know, via a leaked email from former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, in recent years the Saudi government, along with Qatar, has been "providing clandestine financial and logistic support to [the Islamic State] and other radical Sunni groups in the region." Saudi nationals make up the second-largest group of foreign fighters in the Islamic State and, by some accounts, the largest in the terrorist group's Iraqi operations. The kingdom is in a tacit alliance with al-Qaeda in Yemen.

The Islamic State draws its beliefs from Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi version of Islam. As the former imam of the kingdom's Grand Mosque said last year, the Islamic State "exploited our own principles, that can be found in our books. . . . We follow the same thought but apply it in a refined way." Until the Islamic State could write its own textbooks for its schools, it adopted the Saudi curriculum as its own.

Saudi money is now transforming European Islam. Leaked German intelligence reports show that charities "closely connected with government offices" of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait are funding mosques, schools and imams to disseminate a fundamentalist, intolerant version of Islam throughout Germany.

(Thomas Johnson/The Washington Post)

In Kosovo, the New York Times' Carlotta Gall describes the process by which a 500-year-old tradition of moderate Islam is being destroyed. "From their bases, the Saudi-trained imams propagated Wahhabism's tenets: the supremacy of Shariah law as well as ideas of violent jihad and takfirism, which authorizes the killing of Muslims considered heretics for not following its interpretation of Islam. . . . Charitable assistance often had conditions attached. Families were given monthly stipends on the condition that they attended sermons in the mosque and that women and girls wore the veil."

Saudi Arabia's government has begun to slow many of its most egregious practices. It is now being run, de facto, by a young, intelligent reformer, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who appears to be refreshingly pragmatic, in the style of Dubai's visionary leader, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum. But so far the Saudi reforms have mostly translated into better economic policy for the kingdom, not a break with its powerful religious establishment.

Trump's speech on Islam was nuanced and showed empathy for the Muslim victims of jihadist terrorism (who make up as much as 95 percent of the total, by one estimate). He seemed to zero in on the problem when he said, "No discussion of stamping out this threat would be complete without mentioning the government that gives terrorists . . . safe harbor, financial backing and the social standing needed for recruitment."

But Trump was talking not of his host, Saudi Arabia, but rather of Iran. Now, to be clear, Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle East and supports some very bad actors. But it is wildly inaccurate to describe it as the source of jihadist terror. According to an analysis of the Global Terrorism Database by Leif Wenar of King's College London, more than 94 percent of deaths caused by Islamic terrorism since 2001 were perpetrated by the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadists. Iran is fighting those groups, not fueling them. Almost every terrorist attack in the West has had some connection to Saudi Arabia. Virtually none has been linked to Iran.

Trump has adopted the Saudi line on terrorism, which deflects any blame from the kingdom and redirects it toward Iran. The Saudis showered Trump's inexperienced negotiators with attention, arms deals and donations to a World Bank fund that Ivanka Trump is championing. (Candidate Trump wrote in a Facebook post in 2016, "Saudi Arabia and many of the countries that gave vast amounts of money to the Clinton Foundation want women as slaves and to kill gays. Hillary must return all money from such countries!") In short, the Saudis played Trump. (Jamie Tarabay makes the same point.)

The United States has now signed up for Saudi Arabia's foreign policy — a relentless series of battles against Shiites and their allies throughout the Middle East. That will enmesh Washington in a never-ending sectarian struggle, fuel regional instability and complicate its ties with countries such as Iraq that want good relations with both sides. But most important, it will do nothing to address the direct and ongoing threat to Americans — jihadist terrorism. I thought that Trump's foreign policy was going to put America first, not Saudi Arabia.

Read more from Fareed Zakaria's archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.

Annex 46

J. Cook, "Trump Suggests Iran Brought Deadly Terrorist Attacks Upon Itself", *Huffingtonpost.com,* 7 June 2017

Trump Suggests Iran Brought Deadly Terrorist Attacks Upon Itself

www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-iran-terrorism-blame_us_59385f43e4b0c5a35c9b8698

By Jesselyn Cook

Hours after suicide bombers and gunmen launched deadly assaults against Iran's parliament and the tomb of its former supreme leader in Tehran on Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump extended seemingly backhanded condolences to the grieving nation.

"We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for the Iranian people, who are going through such challenging times," Trump said in a press release.

He didn't stop there.

"We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil that they promote," the president concluded.

The twin attacks, claimed by the so-called Islamic State terrorist group, killed at least 17 people and injured scores. The six known assailants were also killed, and five other suspects have been detained so far. Iran's Revolutionary Guards have blamed Saudi Arabia and vowed to seek revenge.

During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump criticized Iran for fueling "the fires of sectarian conflict and terror" and blamed the country for supporting militias and extremist groups that "spread destruction and chaos." He called on other nations to isolate Tehran and to stop prioritizing political correctness while addressing terrorism.

Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif slammed Trump's statement as "repugnant" on Twitter.

> *Repugnant WH statement & Senate sanctions as Iranians counter terror backed by US clients.Iranian people reject such US claims of friendship*
>
> *— Javad Zarif (@JZarif) June 8, 2017*

Trump had already faced a backlash over his response to foreign terrorism last weekend when he seized on carnage in London to promote his internationally condemned travel ban affecting several Muslim-majority nations, including Iran.

He tweeted his condolences to the British people Saturday, then swiftly attacked London Mayor Sadiq Khan as support and messages of solidarity flowed in from other leaders around the globe.

Members of the National Iranian American Council, a nonpartisan Washington-based organization, replied to Trump's remarks Wednesday with a statement of their own:

> *"We support the people of Iran who have repeatedly demonstrated their dedication to the values of tolerance and diplomacy, despite the hardships they face. We underscore that administrations that cannot empathize with human suffering risk losing their humanity, and presidents that cannot genuinely recognize victims of terrorism are incapable of leading the fight against terror."*

Annex 47

Z. Jilani & R. Grim, "Bucking Bernie Sanders, Democrats Move Forward on Iran Sanctions After Terror Attack in Tehran", *The Intercept,* 7 June 2017

Bucking Bernie Sanders, Democrats Move Forward On Iran Sanctions After Terror Attack in Tehran

theintercept.com /2017/06/07/bucking-bernie-sanders-democrats-move-forward-on-iran-sanctions-after-terror-attack-in-tehran/

Zaid Jilani Ryan Grim Zaid Jilani , Ryan Grim 2017-06-07T21:01:37+00:00

In the wake of an alleged ISIS terrorist attack on the Iranian parliament, the U.S. Senate is marking the tragedy with twin resolutions: one to express condolences, the second to move forward on a bill to hit the country with new sanctions.

By a vote of 92-7, the Senate opened debate on the sanctions resolution Wednesday. But the resolution expressing condolences is still being worked on, one senator said.

“On a day when Iran has been attacked by ISIS, by terrorism, now is not the time to go forward with legislation calling for sanctions against Iran,” Vermont’s Independent Sen. Bernie Sanders said on the floor before the Senate did just that. “Let us be aware and cognizant that earlier today the people of Iran suffered a horrific terror attack in their capital, Tehran.”

The vote also came in the face of warnings from former Secretary of State John Kerry that a new sanctions bill could imperil the nuclear deal.

Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said that it was still time to move forward. After all, it could be a chance to hit Russia. “I think we have an opportunity on the Iran sanctions bill to amend it to include strong Russia sanctions; I’m determined that we get that done. That’s foremost in my mind,” said Coons.

“I appreciate the fact that when the United States was attacked on 9/11, Iran expressed concern and solidarity with us. I do think it’s important for us to express our condolences to the Iranian people for their being victims of an ISIS and I believe that resolution will be adopted today. It seems a bit of a mixed message to me to try and combine those two.”

A number of Sanders’s Democratic caucus colleagues, including California’s Diane Feinstein and Delaware’s Tom Carper, joined him in arguing that the bill should be delayed in light of the terrorist attack. On her way into the vote, Sen. Tammy Baldwin, D-Wis., told The Intercept she agreed with Sanders that it should be delayed, but didn’t think it would be. She was correct, and cast her vote in favor.

South Dakota Sen. John Thune, a member of Republican leadership, disagreed. “I hope not,” he said of the possibility of a delay, his further thoughts being cut off by the closing of the door of an elevator taking him to vote on the measure.

Shortly before the vote to end debate on the bill, New York’s Sen. Chuck Schumer — who leads the Senate Democrats — came out and argued forcefully in favor of the sanctions, showing no concern about imperiling the nuclear deal or the terrorist attack.

“Democrats will vote to advance this bill to the floor because we support — most of us support the bill,” he assured the Senate.

Sixty votes are needed to achieve cloture and close debate; only seven senators opposed the cloture vote: Democrats Kirsten Gillibrand, Dick Durbin, Carper, Jeff Merkley, and Tom Udall as well as Republican Rand Paul and Sanders.

> *On a day when Iran has been attacked by ISIS now is not the time to go forward with legislation calling for sanctions against Iran. pic.twitter.com/tGNUDxI2n1*

> — Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders) June 7, 2017

President Donald Trump added insult to injury when the White House released its own statement on the Iranian terror attack on Wednesday. “We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for the Iranian people, who are going through such challenging times,” it read.

However, it then pivoted to blaming the victims. “We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote,” it concluded.

A spokesperson for Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., referred questions on the condolences resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A spokesperson there didn’t immediately reply to a request for comment.

Annex 48

I. Tharoor, "Terror in Iran reveals the hypocrisy of Trump and his allies", *The Washington Post,* 8 June 2017

Terror in Iran reveals the hypocrisy of Trump and his allies

www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/08/terror-in-iran-reveals-the-hypocrisy-of-trump-and-his-allies/

The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the June 7 attacks on Iran's parliament and a shrine for the nation's Islamic revolutionary leader. (The Washington Post)

Gunmen linked to the Islamic State launched a brazen assault in Tehran on Wednesday, attacking the country's parliament building and the shrine dedicated to revolutionary Iran's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. At least 17 people were killed and dozens more wounded.

It was the first time in more than a decade that Tehran was struck by militants. Thomas Erdbrink, the New York Times's correspondent in Tehran, reported the details: "The attacks started around 10:30 a.m., when men armed with assault rifles and suicide vests — some of them dressed as women — descended on the Parliament building, killing at least one guard and wounding and kidnapping other people. That standoff lasted until midafternoon."

Iranian policemen evacuate a child from the parliament building in Tehran on June 7. (Omid Vahabzadeh/Agence France-Presse via Getty Images)

Five assailants were killed. The Islamic State claimed responsibility through its online channels and released a graphic 24-minute video showing a bloody scene from Iran's parliament.

The implications of the attack "are huge," Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King's College in London, told my colleagues. For Sunni extremists, "attacking Iran is kind of like attacking the U.S. or Israel."

Iran sits at the vanguard of Shiite Islam. It is an ideological nemesis of jihadist groups such as the Islamic State and features prominently as a target in the propaganda of some Sunni fundamentalists. Iranian proxy militias in Iraq and Syria, to varying extents, have been locked in battles with the Islamic State and other extremist outfits.

In the wake of the assault on Tehran, condemnations and condolences poured in from around the world. The European Union's top foreign envoy, Federica Mogherini, expressed her sympathies for the victims and said it is "obviously a very sad day again for us anytime there is a terror attack anywhere in the world." French President Emmanuel Macron called his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, and apparently discussed expanding "cooperation in the fight against terrorism," according to an Iranian official. Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned "these crimes" and pledged Russia's "readiness for further joint actions" with Iran.

And then there was President Trump.

The White House has made a particular habit of commenting swiftly on Islamic State-related attacks elsewhere, be they in Paris, London, Manchester or even a phantom episode in the Philippines. But for many hours Wednesday, Trump was conspicuously quiet. The State Department's spokeswoman issued a pro forma condemnation, asserting that "the depravity of terrorism has no place in a peaceful, civilized world."

When Trump ultimately broke his silence, though, his message snuffed out whatever goodwill American diplomats may have wanted to convey.

"We grieve and pray for the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Iran, and for the Iranian people, who are going through such challenging times," began the statement, before concluding with a startling swipe at Tehran. "We underscore that states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote."

> *Imagine US media & elite reax if President of #Iran had said after 9/11: U did all these bad things & had it coming. pic.twitter.com/AAO7hXkNYX*
>
> *— Bahman Kalbasi (@BahmanKalbasi) June 7, 2017*

It's tacky and heartless in any context to try to score political points when lamenting the loss of innocent lives. But even given the pronounced tensions between Tehran and Washington — made all the more acute by the Trump administration putting Iran "on notice" — Trump's statement seemed to cross an unspoken line in world affairs. Iranian officials, after all, issue their own routine condemnations of terrorist attacks in the United States, such as last year's massacre at a nightclub in Orlando, without suggesting that the Great Satan was getting its comeuppance. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Iranians held candlelight vigils.

As we've written in this space before, the Trump administration's hostility to Iran is part of its wholesale embrace of the agenda and rhetoric of Iran's major rivals in the region — Saudi Arabia and Israel. The leaders of both those countries see Iran as an existential threat, a destabilizing actor that backs dangerous groups across the region. There is plenty of truth in this view, given the extent to which Iran's powerful and hard-line Revolutionary Guard Corps dominates the country's foreign policy and supports militancy elsewhere.

But Iran was not attacked by Hezbollah, the influential Lebanese Shiite organization it backs. It was hit by a terrorist group whose ideology is far closer to the creed preached by Saudi clerics than the theologians of Qom, a phenomenon conveniently ignored by the White House and its partners. To be sure, previous administrations have for decades acquiesced or turned a blind eye to the destabilizing effect that Saudi-backed fundamentalism has had on the Muslim world. Yet a Trump administration that is overtly opposed to "radical Islam" has chosen to embolden the Saudis like never before.

Just hours after the attack, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly to push forward a bill that would impose new sanctions on Iran. A few Democratic senators urged a postponement of the proceedings, given the timing. But they were overruled.

> *On a day when Iran has been attacked by ISIS now is not the time to go forward with legislation calling for sanctions against Iran. pic.twitter.com/tGNUDxI2n1*
>
> *— Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders) June 7, 2017*

Meanwhile, Iran's Revolutionary Guard pointed the finger at Washington and Riyadh, the usual suspects in its eyes. "The public opinion of the world, especially Iran, recognizes this terrorist attack — which took place a week after a joint meeting of the U.S. president and the head of one of the region's backward governments, which constantly supports fundamentalist terrorists — as very significant," it said in a statement, referring to Saudi Arabia.

Given the already intensifying standoff between feuding Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf, it seems the region's many fault lines are only deepening in the early months of the Trump presidency.

The National Iranian American Council, a Washington-based organization that seeks rapprochement between Iran and the United States, issued an angry response to the White House statement.

"We underscore that administrations that cannot empathize with human suffering risk losing their humanity," it read, "and presidents who cannot genuinely recognize victims of terrorism are incapable of leading the fight against terror."

Annex 49

D. Smith & S. Siddiqui, "Gulf crisis: Trump escalates row by accusing Qatar of sponsoring terror", *The Guardian*, 9 June 2017

Gulf crisis: Trump escalates row by accusing Qatar of sponsoring terror

www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/09/trump-qatar-sponsor-terrorism-middle-east

David Smith and Sabrina Siddiqui in Washington and Peter Beaumont in Doha

Donald Trump has accused Qatar of sponsoring terrorism at the highest levels, in an extraordinary escalation of the diplomatic row with one America's most important military partners in the Middle East.

Speaking in the White House rose garden on Friday, Trump said he had decided "the time had come to call on Qatar to end its funding … and its extremist ideology."

His comments marked his most forthright intervention in a crisis triggered on Monday when Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies launched a co-ordinated diplomatic and economic campaign to isolate Qatar.

Earlier this week, the US president appeared to take credit for the blockade in a string of tweets.

On Friday, Trump said that Arab leaders he met in Saudi Arabia last month had urged him to challenge Qatar, which they accuse of backing extremist groups and cosying up to Iran.

"So we had a decision to make: do we take the easy road, or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? We have to stop the funding of terrorism," he said. "The nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level."

Trump's intervention came after Saudi Arabia and its allies on Friday sanctioned a dozen organisations and 59 people it accused of links to Islamist militancy – a number of them Qataris or with links to Qatar.

The Qatari government said in a statement on Friday: "We do not, have not and will not support terrorist groups."

US relations with Qatar have long been complicated by Doha's promotion of a conservative form of Sunni Islam, but the tiny Gulf state is also a close military partner. More than 11,000 US and coalition forces are at al-Udeid air base outside Doha, which is the centre for US air operations over Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan.

US officials scramble to limit Donald Trump's diplomatic damage over Qatar tweets

Qatar had previously called on Trump to intervene decisively, saying he was "crucial" to resolving the crisis.

On Thursday, Meshal bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar's ambassador to the US, said: "We believe in his ability to calm this crisis down. We are courageous enough to acknowledge if things need to be amended."

But Trump's tone struck a marked contrast with comments by the US secretary of state, who just an hour earlier urged Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain to ease their blockade of Qatar.

In a brief statement to reporters, Rex Tillerson said that the blockade was hampering US military efforts against Islamic State and causing unintended humanitarian consequences.

Tillerson said the US would support efforts to mediate the row, but also said Qatar must do more to crack down on support for terror.

"The emir of Qatar has made progress in halting financial support and expelling terrorists from his country, but he must do more and he must do it more quickly."

The UAE's ambassador to Washington welcomed Trump's comments. "The UAE welcomes President Trump's

leadership in challenging Qatar's troubling support for extremism. The next step is for Qatar to acknowledge these concerns and commit to re-examine its regional policies," said Yousef Al Otaiba, according to Reuters.

Ben Rhodes, who served as Barack Obama's deputy national security adviser, said Trump's remarks on the crisis were especially confounding because there appeared to be no official US strategy.

"There's no explanation for why he's doing what he's doing," Rhodes said, warning that Trump's loose words threatened counter-terrorism operations against Isis, US troops stationed in the region, and risked the escalation of conflict with Iran.

"There's a short-term risk of increased danger to our national security objectives, and then there's a longer term risk of escalating conflicts on many fronts," Rhodes said. "In the Middle East, it's always a mistake to think that things can't get worse."

Qatar's foreign minister described the blockade as a violation of international law and said there was an attempt to mobilise international opinion against the Gulf emirate. "These procedures that were taken have clear violations of international law and international humanitarian law. They will not have a positive impact on the region but a negative one," Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani told reporters on Friday during a visit to Germany.

Included on the Saudi sanctions list – which was denounced as "baseless and without foundation in fact" by Qatar – are the Qatari-funded Qatar Charity and Eid Charity, and several prominent figures including businessmen, politicians and senior members of the ruling family, one a former interior minister.

The list also includes the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual leader, Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is based in Doha, and individuals in Libya as well as Shia groups in Bahrain seen by some Gulf Arab governments as linked to Iran.

The sanctions list further tightens the screws on Qatar, home to a key US military base and the host of the 2022 Fifa World Cup.

It's Qatar v Saudi Arabia. But the west can't afford to pick a side | Peter Salisbury

It also strongly suggests a widening of the aggressive Saudi-led campaign beyond Qatar itself – not least against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – where Youssef al-Qaradawi was tried and sentenced to death in absentia following the 2013 military overthrow of the elected president Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood member.

Although Qatar has long denied supporting or funding terror groups, western diplomats have accused it of allowing the funding of some Sunni extremists, such as al-Qaida's branch in Syria. The same accusations have been levelled against individuals in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

A leading diplomat from the UAE told the Guardian on Thursday that the Gulf states had lost all trust in Qatar.

Omar Saif Ghobas, the UAE's ambassador to Russia, said: "There is no trust, it has gone. So when the Qatari foreign minister says, 'Listen, we need to engage in dialogue,' we have done that for many years – that's just a statement for western consumption."

The crisis has provoked anxieties in Qatar, a leading gas exporter as well as an international travel hub, whose flagship carrier Qatar Airways has been forced to fly circuitous and expensive routes over Iran and Turkey after being blocked elsewhere in the Middle East.

Annex 50

"Iranian airline finalizes deal to purchase 60 Boeing planes", *AP,* 10 June 2017

Iranian airline finalizes deal to purchase 60 Boeing planes

nypost.com /2017/06/10/iranian-airline-finalizes-deal-to-purchase-60-boeing-planes/

By Associated Press
Modal Trigger

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran's official IRNA news agency is reporting that the country's Aseman Airlines has finalized a deal to purchase 60 planes from the American company Boeing.

The Saturday report said that the planes will be delivered in two batches and the first batch will consist of 30 737 passenger planes to be delivered in 2019.

This is the second deal between the Chicago-based Boeing and an Iranian airliner since a landmark nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers went into practice in 2016.

In December Iran Air, the country's flag carrier, finalized a $16.6 billion deal with Boeing to purchase 80 passenger planes.

In September, Washington granted permission to Boeing and its European competitor Airbus to sell billions of dollars worth of aircraft to Iran.

Annex 51

N. Gaouette, D. Merica & R. Browne, "Trump: Qatar must stop funding terrorism", *CNN*, 10 June 2017

Trump: Qatar must stop funding terrorism

edition.cnn.com/2017/06/09/politics/trump-qatar-saudi-gulf-crisis/index.html

President Donald Trump called on Qatar to stop funding terrorism, claiming credit for and endorsing the decision of Gulf nations to ostracize their neighbor, even as US Cabinet officials said their blockade is hurting the campaign against ISIS.

"We had a decision to make," Trump said, describing conversations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. "Do we take the easy road or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? We have to stop the funding of terrorism."

In doing so, the President's tone, if not his message, clashed with his most senior national security officials, highlighting the often mixed messages emerging from his administration since the Qatar crisis began Tuesday.

Hindering the ISIS campaign

The three Sunni Gulf countries -- Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE -- moved with Egypt to cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar, host to the one of the Pentagon's largest military bases in the Middle East and a linchpin in the fight against ISIS.
Read More
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, speaking to reporters shortly before Trump's remarks, said the Gulf countries' land and air blockade of Doha is hurting the campaign against ISIS, an assessment Pentagon officials only partially corroborated.
"The blockade is hindering US military actions in the region and the campaign against ISIS," Tillerson said, without providing details. The US' "expectation is that these countries will immediately take steps to resolve the situation," he added.
In a sharp contrast to Trump's tone and messaging, Tillerson called on Gulf nations to de-escalate the crisis with Qatar, citing humanitarian, economic and military costs.

"We ask that there be no further escalation by the parties in the region," Tillerson said Friday. He called on Qatar "to be responsive to the concerns of its neighbors."
Saudi Arabia and its counterparts accuse Qatar of supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region because of its ties to their Shiite rival, Iran, and its support for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Qatar acknowledges its links to these groups, but denies that it supports terrorism.
"The Emir of Qatar has made progress in halting" support for and financing of terrorist groups, Tillerson said, "but he must do more and do it quickly."
Trump, in contrast, was much more explicit in condemnation. "The nation of Qatar has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level," he said, speaking from the Rose Garden.

"I decided, along with secretary of state Rex Tillerson, our great generals and military people, the time had come to call on Qatar to end its funding, they have to end that funding and its extremist ideology," Trump said.
The President said he helped those countries make the decision to break off relations with Qatar during his trip to Saudi Arabia last month. "Nations came together and spoke to me about confronting Qatar over its behaviors," he said.
A White House official pushed back on the notion that Trump and Tillerson are not on the same page, saying of the President that "what he said was consistent with what secretary of state said."
While the official said that the president "believes that the issue can be "resolved on terms favorable to the United States and United States' interests," that official also added that, "I haven't heard him express concern about the issue of the base."
The official didn't address Tillerson's claims that the blockade was hurting the anti-ISIS campaign, according to pool reports distributed by the White House.
Despite Tillerson's assessment that the fight against ISIS had been impacted, Pentagon officials said there has

been no immediate disruption. They warned, however, that their ability to make longer-term plans was being affected.
Qatar is home to 11,000 US troops and the Al Udeid Air Base, the main regional center for air operations against the terrorist group.

The Gulf nations have cut air and land access to Qatar, with some moving to close their airspace to flights on the way to Qatar, but US military officials said their operations continue without interruption.
"Regular supplies are moving into the base there via air," said US Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman. Davis said the Defense Logistics Agency "is looking at a number of contingencies if the thing should come about, but at this point there's no impact on our operations."

"Qatar remains critical"

But Davis added that "while current operations from Al Udeid Air Base have not been interrupted or curtailed, the evolving situation is hindering our ability to plan for longer term military operations. Qatar remains critical for coalition air operations in the fight against ISIS and around the region."
Tillerson addressed criticism that the other Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia are also complicit when it comes to backing or fueling extremism. "Others must do more to eliminate support for violent extremists" within their own borders, Tillerson said, calling for "progress toward eliminating all forms of support for terrorism: military, financial, moral or ideological."

Tillerson also noted that the Gulf countries -- all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and all involved in the fight against ISIS -- have to stay unified for the sake of that effort. Calls to Gulf leaders over the past few days have left him convinced there's a resolution, he said.
"It's clear to me based on these conversation that the elements of a solution are available," Tillerson said. "We know you're stronger together."
Unlike Trump, Tillerson stressed the possibility of reconciliation and pointed to the human cost of the Saudi-led blockade, mentioning shortages of food, the way families had been separated and they way some children have been pulled out of school.

"Unintended consequences"

"We believe these are unintended consequences, especially during the holy month of Ramadan," Tillerson said, referring to the most important holiday on the Muslim calendar. "They can be addressed immediately," he said.
The White House official said that despite the fact that Trump didn't mention it, the President is, in fact, concerned about the humanitarian situation in Qatar, particularly the separation of families and food shortages. The official added, "easing those restrictions not the same as complete diplomatic relations."
The blockade is also impeding US and other international business activities in the region, Tillerson said, creating hardship for the people of Qatar and people whose livelihood depends on doing business with Qatar.
Tillerson said that the US will throw its weight behind efforts by the Emir of Kuwait to act as a mediator to bring about a resolution to the crisis, which was reportedly sparked by an interview with the Qatari leader that Qatar said was a false news story. CNN is reporting that US investigators believe Russian hackers may have been behind the effort, and the FBI has been sent to Qatar to help probe.

The US stance on Qatar has been roiled has by the mixed messages from the start. Tillerson and Defense Secretary James Mattis have emphasized the need for Gulf unity and the importance of the US partnership with Qatar, home to the Al Udeid Air Base, the main regional center for air missions against ISIS.
Trump has taken a starkly different tack, initially praising the move by Gulf nations to sever diplomatic relations with Doha before reversing course on Wednesday.
In a Wednesday phone call with the Qatari Emir, Trump extended an olive branch, offering to help the parties resolve their differences with a White House meeting if necessary, and offered the services of Tillerson as a mediator.
Qatar's ambassador to the United States, Meshal Hamad AlThani, tweeted that " Qatar's principles and foreign policy reject the false ideology of terrorism." Qatar has been working with the US on combating terrorism for

years, he said.
"We appeal to the US administration to rely on their own sources and not on countries with political agendas," he said.

CNN's Barbara Starr, Elise Labott, Elizabeth Landers and Laura Koran contributed to this report.

Annex 52

P. Beaumont, "US signs deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar after Trump terror claims", *The Guardian*, 15 June 2017

US signs deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar after Trump terror claims

www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/15/us-signs-deal-to-supply-f-15-jets-to-qatar-after-trump-terror-claims

Peter Beaumont

The US has signed a $12bn deal to supply dozens of F-15 jets to Qatar, despite recent high-profile claims by President Donald Trump alleging Qatar's "high-level funding" of terrorism.

The signing of the deal on Wednesday is the latest twist in the highly contradictory US diplomacy over the crisis around Qatar – now in its second week – with the emirate targeted by a Saudi-led embargo.

Hailed by Qatar, the deal underlines the reigning confusion inside the Trump administration as it handles one of its first big foreign policy crises, which was in large part triggered by Trump.

Qatar is facing a severe economic and diplomatic boycott by Saudi Arabia and its regional allies, who cut ties last week accusing it of funding terrorist groups, a charge Doha denies.

Qataris ponder 'the situation' as blockade against emirate bites

As well as severing economic and political ties, the four governments ordered Qataris out within 14 days and called home their own citizens. Bahrain and the UAE have also outlawed any expressions of sympathy for Qatar.

Trump has repeatedly echoed the accusations against Qatar, despite attempts by his defence secretary, James Mattis, and secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, to offer a more neutral and nuanced position.

He doubled-down on his accusations on Friday, saying: "The nation of Qatar has unfortunately been a funder of terrorism, and at a very high level," adding "the time has come to call on Qatar to end its funding."

Despite Trump's remarks, Pentagon and state department officials have moved to reassure the emirate, home to the largest US airbase in the Middle East and the command headquarters for US military operations in the region. Tillerson said last week that the rift was hindering the campaign against Islamic State and Mattis on Wednesday signed the previously approved warplane deal with the Qatari defence minister, Khalid al-Attiyah.

The Pentagon said the jets sale would increase security cooperation between the US and Qatar. It added Mattis and Attiyah had discussed current operations against Isis and the importance of de-escalating tensions in the Gulf.

"This is of course proof that US institutions are with us but we have never doubted that," a Qatari official in Doha said. "Our militaries are like brothers. America's support for Qatar is deep-rooted and not easily influenced by political changes."

The state department provisionally approved the deal at the end of the Obama administration in language sharply at odds with Trump's recent accusations.

In a November memorandum, the state Department said the sale would "enhance the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country and strengthening our strategically important relationship".

The memorandum described Qatar as "an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Persian Gulf region".

A European diplomat in the Gulf said the timing of the deal appeared coincidental. "Presumably, the US could

have delayed the deal if they'd wanted to, although I don't think there's a great connect between sales and foreign policy."

Annex 53

R. Browne, "Amid diplomatic crisis Pentagon agrees $12 billion jet deal with Qatar", *CNN*, 15 June 2017

Amid diplomatic crisis Pentagon agrees $12 billion jet deal with Qatar

edition.cnn.com/2017/06/14/politics/qatar-f35-trump-pentagon/index.html

Amid the ongoing diplomatic crisis between Qatar and a number of its Gulf neighbors, the US has agreed to sell $12 billion worth of American F-15 fighters to the country.

"Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis met today with Qatari Minister of State for Defense Affairs Dr. Khalid al-Attiyah to discuss concluding steps in finalizing the Foreign Military Sales purchase of US-manufactured F-15 fighter aircraft by the State of Qatar. The $12 billion sale will give Qatar a state of the art capability and increase security cooperation and interoperability between the United States and Qatar," Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Roger Cabiness told CNN in a statement.

"The secretary and the minister also discussed mutual security interests, including the current status of operations against ISIS, and the importance of de-escalating tensions so all partners in the Gulf region can focus on next steps in meeting common goals," Cabiness added.
The sale of US combat aircraft represents a major signal of US support for Qatar as it faces regional isolation and the severing of travel and trade links.

The announcement comes after a week of somewhat mixed messages from the Trump administration regarding the spat between Doha and number of Arab nations.
Read More
After three Sunni Gulf countries -- Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE -- along with Egypt moved to cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar, host to the one of the Pentagon's largest military bases in the Middle East and a linchpin in the fight against ISIS, President Donald Trump seemed to back the move, saying last week that Qatar had to do more to combat the funding of terrorism.
"The time had come to call on Qatar to end its funding," Trump said.
But other officials in the administration including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have called for the situation to be deescalated and on Wednesday while appearing before the House foreign affairs committee Tillerson played down any suggestion the President is on a different page stating: "there is no daylight between he and I" on the issue of Qatar.
Speaking to the House armed services committee Monday, Mattis called the diplomatic situation "very complex," acknowledging the large US military presence and close US-Qatar military relationship.

"We've obviously got shared interests with Qatar ... I will admit it's not tidy but it's something we've got to work together on," Mattis later added.
The Qatari defense ministry issued a statement Wednesday celebrating the F-15 deal.
"This agreement underscores the longstanding commitment of the State of Qatar in jointly working with our friends and allies in the United States," al-Attiyah said in the statement.
He also praised the US-Qatar relationship, saying the two countries had "solidified their military cooperation by having fought together side by side for many years now in an effort to eradicate terrorism."
Al-Attiyah called the deal "yet another step in advancing our strategic and cooperative defense relationship with the United States."

CNN's Laura Koran contributed to this report

Annex 54

***National Security Archive*, "Iran 1953: State Department Finally Releases Updated Official History of Mosaddeq Coup", 15 June 2017**

Iran 1953: State Department Finally Releases Updated Official History of Mosaddeq Coup

nsarchive2.gwu.edu /NSAEBB/NSAEBB598-State-Department-releases-documents-on-US-backed-1953-coup-in-Iran/



Pro-Shah crowds on streets of Tehran, August 1953.

Formerly Secret Documents from State, CIA Provide New Information about Covert Operations Planning and Implementation Plus Contemporaneous Analyses

New Insights into U.S. Fears of Tudeh Party, Questions about Influence of Ayatollah Kashani, Qualms about Character of Shah

Long-Awaited Volume Supplements Earlier Publication that Whitewashed U.S., British Roles

Posted June 15, 2017


National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 598

Edited by Malcolm Byrne

For further information, contact: Malcolm Byrne, 202/994–7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Washington, D.C., June 15, 2017 – The State Department today released a long-awaited "retrospective" volume of declassified U.S. government documents on the 1953 coup in Iran. The volume includes fascinating details on Iranian, American and British planning and implementation of the covert operation, as well as information about U.S. contacts with key figures such as Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, and insights into U.S. concerns about the growing influence of the communist Tudeh Party.

The publication is the culmination of decades of internal debates and public controversy after a previous official collection omitted all references to the role of American and British intelligence in the ouster of Iran's then-prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. The volume is part of the Department's venerable *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.



Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, (undated photo).

For decades, neither the U.S. nor the British governments would acknowledge their part in Mosaddeq's overthrow, even though a detailed account appeared as early as 1954 in *The Saturday Evening Post*, and since then CIA and MI6 veterans of the coup have published memoirs detailing their activities. Kermit Roosevelt's *Countercoup* is the best known and most detailed such account, although highly controversial because of its selective rendering of events. In 2000, *The New York Times* posted a 200-page classified internal CIA history of the operation.

In 1989, the State Department released what purported to be the official record of the coup period but it made not a single reference to American and British actions in connection with the event. The omission led to the resignation of the chief outside adviser on the series, and prompted Congress to pass legislation requiring "a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record" of U.S. foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, the CIA committed to open agency files on the Iran and other covert operations, and the State Department vowed to produce a "retrospective" volume righting the earlier decision.

But it took until 2011 for the CIA to – partially – fulfill its commitment, and even then it was only in the form of a previously classified segment of an internal account of the coup that for the first time included an officially released explicit reference to the agency's role in "TPAJAX," the U.S. acronym for the operation. Roughly two years later, after years of research by historian James C. Van Hook, as well as internal negotiations between State and CIA over access to the latter's records, the Office of the Historian at the Department produced a draft of the retrospective volume, which then had to await top-level clearance.

What explains the refusal by two governments to acknowledge their actions, and the inordinate delays in publishing this volume? Justifications given in the past include protecting intelligence sources and methods, bowing to British government requests and, more recently, avoiding stirring up Iranian hardline elements who might seek to undercut the nuclear deal Iran signed with the United States and other P5+1 members in 2015.


While the volume's contents still are being sifted through, here's a description from the Preface:

This *Foreign Relations* retrospective volume focuses on the use of covert operations by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations as an adjunct to their respective policies toward Iran, culminating in the overthrow of the Mosadeq government in August 1953. Moreover, the volume documents the involvement of the U.S. intelligence community in the policy formulation process and places it within the broader Cold War context. For a full appreciation of U.S. relations with Iran between 1951 and 1954, this volume should be read in conjunction with the volume published in 1989.

"This is going to be an important source for anyone interested in the tortured relationship between Washington and Tehran," said Malcolm Byrne, who runs the National Security Archive's Iran-U.S. Relations Project. "But the fact that it has taken over six decades to declassify and release these records about such a pivotal historical event is mind-boggling."

As Archive staff make their way through the hundreds of records in the volume, we will update this posting with highlights.

READ THE VOLUME



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Iran, 1951-1954 (2017)
Editor: James C. Van Hook

Annex 55

R. Shabad, "Senate passes measure to expand sanctions on Iran and Russia", *www.cbsnews.com*, 15 June 2017

Senate passes measure to expand sanctions on Iran and Russia

www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-eyes-irans-ballistic-missile-program-with-new-sanctions/

By Rebecca Shabad CBS News June 15, 2017, 10:00 AM

The Senate on Thursday overwhelmingly passed legislation that would impose new U.S. sanctions that would target Iran's ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism and human rights violations, and yet it would still comply with the Iranian nuclear deal.

Senators voted 98-2 in favor of the measure.

Bipartisan negotiations also led to the bill including expanded sanctions on Russia, in response to its intrusion into Ukraine, efforts to meddle in the 2016 election and its support for the Syrian regime.

Iran sanctions on ballistic missile program

The overarching part of the measure -- Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 -- would impose sanctions on any foreign person or foreign entity that does business with an entity already designated by the administration that has a connection to Iran's ballistic missile program. These sanctions, for example, could apply to any financial institution or any foreign company that provides key parts or components to Iran's missile program.

"It's a much more powerful sanctions measure than merely just designating Iranian entities that are involved in missile development," said Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the nonpartisan think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an expert on Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities.

This comes on the heels of two tranches of sanctions that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control rolled out in February and May in which the administration formally designated a slew of people and entities involved in procuring materials and technology for Iran's missile ballistic program. The sanctions in February followed Iran's late-January test of a medium-range ballistic missile , which other nations said violated a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

Richard Nephew, a lead negotiator of the nuclear deal, told CBS News that he's skeptical that the legislation, if passed by Congress, would be effective in limiting Iran's progress in advancing ballistic missile development. Nephew is currently a senior research scholar at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy and previously served as principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the State Department from 2013 to 2015.

Nephew said he has no problem closing loopholes in existing sanctions law, but he doubts that it would add to the U.S.'s already robust sanctions architecture. He said the measure wouldn't harm the nuclear deal, but added that it also probably wouldn't "affect Iran's ability to engage in missile proliferation."

"I wouldn't blow a trumpet here about how significant this is going to be in actually stopping missiles from being built in Iran," he said.

It's unclear if the legislation is even needed -- the Trump administration already has the authority to execute what is already covered under the bill, Nephew said. Instead, its purpose may be to send a message to Iran and other nations.

These secondary sanctions would comply with the nuclear deal because Iran's missile program is excluded from the agreement. Obama administration officials were unable to win that demand in the deal. While they are separate programs, Iran wants them to operate hand in hand.

"The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that if Iran were to deliver a nuclear device, the delivery vehicle for that nuclear device would be a missile -- a long-range ballistic missile or intercontinental ballistic missile," Dubowitz said.

But the missile itself is not the obstacle for Iran.

"They have a missile right now that could land a warhead in Tel Aviv," Nephew said. "The issue is whether or not they've perfected the kind of warhead that they would need for a nuclear weapon. The [nuclear deal] prohibits that activity...it doesn't help them develop a nuclear warhead."

Status of Iranian nuclear deal

After international inspectors determined that Iran had fulfilled obligations outlined by the deal, the U.S. and European nations relieved sanctions on Iran in January 2016. Inspectors have since been constantly monitoring declared nuclear facilities in Iran and a heavy water reactor to verify that its government is still abiding by the imposed limits.

Those limits, however, will expire over the next decade or so. The agreement says that over the next several years, the U.N. arms embargo will sunset, the U.N. missile embargo will expire, and then a number of nuclear restrictions will begin to expire and accelerate, with many restrictions set to be lifted in 2030.

There's some disagreement about Iran's compliance so far -- some experts say that Iran is obeying the parameters of the deal, while others say its government has violated it. On the same day the Trump administration last announced the ballistic missile sanctions last month, it also announced that it will continue to waive sanctions against Iran as it assesses U.S. policy on Iran.

Dubowitz worries that Iran's "game plan" all along was to give in to temporarily suspending certain nuclear technologies in order to work on more advanced technologies in exchange. He said he's concerned that once the agreement's provisions expire, Iran could emerge with an industrial size nuclear program, "which at that point will have near-zero breakout." "Breakout time" is the amount of time it would take for Iran to build a nuclear weapon -- "near-zero" means it would take Tehran no time at all to produce a nuclear weapon.

Russia sanctions

On Wednesday, the Senate overwhelmingly adopted an amendment in a 97-2 vote into the measure that maintains and expands sanctions against the Russian government. It would, for instance, require a congressional review for any lifting, suspension or termination of U.S. sanctions on Russia, impose mandatory sanctions on entities engage in Russian energy projects and require sanctions to be imposed on people undermining cybersecurity and secondary sanctions on people who contribute to malicious cyber activity. That congressional review is meant to make it far more difficult for the Trump administration to unilaterally lift the Russia sanctions.

It would expand energy sanctions on Russian projects in the Arctic or those that involve deepwater or shale and require the Treasury Department to provide Congress with a study on senior Russian government officials and the influence of Russian oligarch's influence on the U.S. economy.

Annex 56

U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism:* 1997, *Department of State Publication 10535*

Excerpts: Table of Contents and Introduction

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Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997

Department of State Publication 10535
Office of the Secretary of State
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Released April 1998

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Introduction

Although the number of international terrorist incidents has dropped in recent years and more terrorists are being arrested and tried for their crimes, international terrorism remains a serious, ongoing threat around the world. Individual bombings and armed attacks, while fewer in number than last year, continue to cause horrendous casualties. Moreover, domestic--rather than international--terrorism continues to beset countries such as Algeria, where numerous brutal massacres of ordinary citizens have been perpetrated by terrorists during the past five years.

During 1997 there were 304 acts of international terrorism worldwide, an increase of eight from the previous year. This figure is one of the lowest annual totals recorded since 1971. More than one-third of the year's attacks occurred in Colombia, 90 of which were low-level bombings of oil pipelines that caused damage but no casualties.

Countering the terrorist threat remains a high priority for the United States. We have developed a three-part counterterrorist policy that has served us well over the years:

First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.

The United States has learned over time that this policy works. We supported the Government of Peru for steadfastly refusing to give in to demands made by terrorists who held 72 hostages in the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima for four months last year. The government's unyielding refusal to release convicted terrorists from prison allowed it time to plan and execute a successful rescue of the hostages in April.

Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.

Continuing a positive trend of recent years, more terrorists are being apprehended, put on trial, and given severe prison terms for their crimes; several important trials and convictions of international terrorists occurred in 1997. The terrorists who planned and helped carry out the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing were convicted of the crime in New York. The terrorist who murdered two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees outside CIA Headquarters in January 1993 was found guilty by a jury in Virginia. A highly publicized judgment in Berlin demonstrated in open court that the Government of Iran follows a deliberate policy of "liquidating" its political opponents abroad. The notorious "Carlos the Jackal" was convicted in Paris of three murders that he committed there 23 years ago. A terrorist who attempted to bomb the US Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, by launching rockets into the complex in 1986 was found guilty by a jury in Washington, DC.

Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorism to force them to change their behavior.

The Secretary of State has designated seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. A range of bilateral and multilateral sanctions have been imposed and remain in place to discourage these countries from continuing their support for international terrorism.

In November, President Clinton signed an executive order imposing additional, comprehensive economic sanctions on Sudan for its sponsorship of international terrorism, its efforts to destabilize neighboring countries, and its abysmal human rights record. The new sanctions ban all US exports to Sudan, impose a total ban on imports from Sudan, and prohibit US investment there.

President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which deprives foreign companies of certain economic benefits in the United States if they invest in the development of Iran's and Libya's energy sectors. The Act's objective is to deny revenue to these state sponsors in advance of evidence that those states are prepared to change their behavior. We believe that sponsorship and support of international terrorist activities should be discouraged by the international community, not rewarded.

In March, July, and November, the United Nations Security Council reviewed Libyan compliance with resolutions that require Libya to surrender the two named suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing to US or UK authorities for trial; cooperate with the US, French, and British investigations into the attacks against Pan Am 103 and UTA Flight 772; pay appropriate compensation; and renounce and cease its support for international terrorism. The Security Council found that Libya was not in compliance. The sanctions that were imposed on Libya for its non-compliance remain in place, the November review marking the 17th time the sanctions have been reviewed and renewed for another 120 days.

In October, Secretary of State Albright formally designated 30 foreign terrorist organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which makes it illegal for US institutions and citizens to provide funds or other forms of material support to such groups. The law also makes members and representatives of those terrorist groups ineligible for US visas and subject to exclusion from the United States. Moreover, US financial institutions are required to block the funds of those groups and of their agents and to report the blocking action to the Department of the Treasury. A complete list of the designated foreign terrorist organizations is included in appendix B.

At the Denver Summit of the Eight held in June, leaders from the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom made significant progress in countering the terrorist threat:

- The Eight worked with other UN General Assembly members to complete the work on the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, a new counterterrorism instrument that was initiated by the Eight in December 1996. This Convention fills an important gap in international law by creating a framework for addressing terrorist bombing attacks anywhere in the world. (The United States signed the Convention on 12 January 1998.)
- The Eight have launched an international campaign to promote by the year 2000 the universal adoption and ratification of the existing international terrorism conventions.

- The Eight continue to promote improved international standards for airport security, explosives detection, and vehicle identification. Related experts' meetings, information exchanges, and multilateral diplomacy have sought to enhance the protection of public transportation against terrorism.
- Agreement among the Eight to promote stronger domestic laws and controls over the manufacture, trading, and transport of explosives will reduce the threat to our citizens from terrorist attacks.

The United States has trained more than 20,000 foreign law enforcement officials from more than 90 countries in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. We also conduct an active research and development program to use modern technology to defeat terrorists.

As President Clinton declared in November following the brutal terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt: "Once again, we are reminded of a painful truth: Terrorism is a global threat. No nation is immune. That is why all nations must redouble our commitment to fight this scourge together."

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.

In 1996 Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department of State is submitting this information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant(1) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

- The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
- The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.

Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this report. Nonetheless, the report also describes, but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism.

(1) For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: the 19 airmen killed in the 1996 bombing of the Khubar Towers housing facility in Saudi Arabia; Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as the bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Note

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those small groups--and their actions--which are the subject of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two is difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context, and to give a sense for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism.

Christopher W. S. Ross
Coordinator for Counterterrorism

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Patterns of Global Terrorism Contents || Department of State Home Page

This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S.

Annex 57

I.R. Iran Customs Administration, *Report on Commercial Transactions with the United States of America*, 2017

TRANSLATION FROM PERSIAN

[LOGO]

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION

REPORT ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

During the Periods:

FROM 21ST MARCH 2011 UP TO 18TH FEBRUARY 2017

[from 1390 to the end of the first eleven months of 1395 Iranian Calendar]

&

FROM 2009 UP TO THE END OF 2016

By: Statistics Analyses Group

Information Technology & Communications Office

Report ID

Report Title:

Report on Commercial Transactions with the United States of America

During the periods from 21st March 2011 up to 18th February 2017

[from 1390 to the end of the first eleven months of 1395 Iranian Calendar]

&

from 2009 up to the end of 2016

Group:

Statistics Analyses Group

Information Technology & Communications Office

Type of Report:

Analytic – Managerial

Report Contents:

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March 2017

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IMPORT, EXPORT & COMMERCIAL BALANCE

Importation trend from the United States of America [hereafter "US"] had regularly been witnessing as a whole incremental growth during the period from 21st March 2011 up to 18th February 2017 [the end of – Bahman – eleventh month of Iranian calendar], except for 81.86% decrease in the weight and 0.39% decrease in the US Dollar value thereof in 2013.[1] The weight of the goods imported from the US has reached to the figure of 179,000 tons in 2015 from the figure of 22,000 tons of the year 2011, and the value of the goods imported from the US has reached to the figure of MUSD167.00 from the figure of MUSD100.00 respectively. During the eleven months of the current year [Iranian Calendar], too, as compared to corresponding period of previous year, importation of goods from the US indicated 43.39% increase in the weight and 79.20% increase in USD value, reaching to the amount of 186,000 tons and MUSD251.00 respectively. During the eleven months of the current year [Iranian Calendar], the US rating, among the major transacting countries has promoted to 25th ranking and its share of total value of the country importation took only 0.6% of the total weight and value thereof.

Our country exportation to the US, after successive decreases in the years 2013 and 2014 witnessed growth and remarkably increased by 4,689% in weight and 1,982% in USD value, reached to the figures of 351 tons and MUSD10.00 in 2015. Nevertheless, the US share among the major countries destination of Iranian export has been very small (less than 0.03 of the export value), taking 69th rank on the table. During the eleven months of the current year, too, this increasing trend continued, having indicated a growth of 1,640% in the weight and 2,784% in the USD value.

The commercial balance with the said country, too, has always been negative during the years of report. Table No.1 indicates the amount of import, export, commercial balance, customs value average, and the amount of changes in commercial transactions with the US since 2011 to date.

[1] *The reason of 81.96% decrease in the weight of importation from the US in 2013, as compared to its previous year, was due to halt of importation of "hard wheat seed" from that country during 2013. In 2012, the amount of 126,000 tons of wheat with the value MUSD42.00 was imported from the US which declined to Zero in 2013.*

TABLE NO. 1

Import, Export & Commercial Balance with the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on the period from March 2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar]

	Importation				% Changes as compared to the corresponding period previous year		Portion of total import		Exportation				% Changes as compared to the corresponding period previous year		Portion of total export		Commercial Balance (Thousand USD)
Year	Value Ranking	Weight (tons)	Value (Thousand USD)	Average Customs Value of Each ton of Goods (USD)	Weight	Value	Weight	Value	Value Ranking	Weight (tons)	Value (Thousand USD)	Average Customs Value of Each ton of Goods (USD)	Weight	Value	Weight	Value	
2011	43	22,472	100,421	4,469	-	-	0.06	0.16	111	248	1,037	4,173	-	-	0.00	0.00	-99,384
2012	36	126,725	132,906	972	508.43	32.35	0.45	0.25	106	490	1,421	2,902	97.11	37.70	0.00	0.00	-131,485
2013	32	24,661	132,392	5,368	-81.96	-0.39	0.07	0.27	105	261	658	2,520	-46.66	-53.68	0.00	0.00	-131,738
2014	31	36,412	151,559	4,162	47.65	14.48	0.08	0.28	110	7	480	65,569	-97.20	-27.04	0.00	0.00	-151,079
2015	28	179,372	167,462	934	392.62	10.49	0.51	0.40	69	351	10,001	28,515	4,688.60	1,987.46	0.00	0.03	-157,462
2016	25	185,608	250,973	1,352	43.39	79.20	0.62	0.65	33	2,386	88,394	37,041	1,640.47	2,783.89	0.00	0.23	-162,579

Major Imported Items

The major items imported from the US during the years 2011-2015 and the eleven months of the current year consisted of wood paste, pharmaceutical and food complements, cow sperm, butter, vegetables seeds and medical equipment and in some years, the major part of the importation was allocated to the life necessity goods. For example, in 2012 around 92.04% of the weight and 31.72% of total import from the US were allocated to 'hard wheat seeds'. In 2015, 'rice' and 'animal corn' were allocating 34.21% and 31.22% of the total weight respectively imported from the US, and in the period from March 2016 to February 2017 [eleven months of 1395], too, 'Green Soya' took the first ranking by 75.92% of weight and 23.92% of value.

TABLE NO. 2

Major items imported from the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on the period from March 2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar]

Year	Rank	Tariff	Description of Tariff	Weight (kgs)	Value (USD)	Portion of Weight	Portion of Value
2011	1	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	18,242,464	20,281,572	81 18	20 20
2011	2	21069080	Pharmaceutical, food complement	952,059	18,012,883	4.24	17.94
2011	3	30049090	Other retailer medicines having no domestic production	84,342	12,079,237	0.38	12.03
2011	4	90213990	Body artificial limbs other than artificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products	2,638	4,196,373	0.01	4.18
2011	5	05111000	Cow sperm	363	3,840,171	0.00	3.82
2011	6	12099100	Vegetables seeds for cultivation	122,969	3,789,706	0.55	3.77
2011	7	04051020	Packed butter in form of packs with more than 500 grams weight	599,825	3,212,213	2.67	3.20
2011	8	90183929	Other needles, catheter and cannulas, similar, not mentioned other places	14,811	2,927,705	0.07	2.92
2011	9	90181990	Other electrical devices for diagnosis of disease, not mentioned other places	11,403	2,820,382	0.05	2.81
2011	10	90185010	Vitrectomy, Phacoe and Phacovitrectomy devices with the relevant evacuation cassette	8,533	2,242,461	0.04	2.23
			Total of the above items	**20,039,407**	**73,402,701**	**89.18**	**73.10**
			Grand Total	**22,471,646**	**100,420,740**	**100**	**100**
2012	1	10011100	Hard wheat seeds	125,841,352	42,160,960	92.04	31.72
2012	2	04041020	Packed butter in form of packs with more than 500 grams weight	5,536,150	29,804,827	4.05	22.43
2012	3	21069080	Food complement	656,081	14,506,662	0.48	10.91
2012	4	05111000	Cow sperm	445	6,742,942	0.00	5.07
2012	5	30049090	Other retailer medicine complements having no similar domestic products	7,311	6,573,566	0.01	4.95
2012	6	90189090	Tools and devices used in medical, surgery, animal husbandry sciences, not mentioned elsewhere	8,629	3,802,705	0.01	2.86
2012	7	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	2,900,414	3,129,159	2.12	2.35
2012	8	84551090	Other rolling machines for manufacturing tubes with a diameter more than 3 inches	1,800	3,013,108	0.00	2.27
2012	9	90213990	Body artificial limbs other than artificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products	1,653	1,585,032	0.00	1.19
2012	10	12099100	Vegetables seeds for cultivation	53,693	1,564,609	0.04	1.18
			Total of the above items	**135,007,527**	**112,883,569**	**98.74**	**84.93**
			Grand Total	**136,724,711**	**132,905,984**	**100**	**100**
2013	1	30049040	Medicine complements for human consume	1,513,007	39,506,639	6.14	29.84
2013	2	04051020	Packed butter in form of packs with more than 500 grams weight	7,664,525	37,001,513	31.08	27.95
2013	3	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	12,735,780	11,270,894	51.64	8.51
2013	4	30049090	Other retailer medicine complements having no similar domestic products	107,251	5,980,433	0.43	4.52
2013	5	05111000	Cow Sperm	652	3,672,461	0.00	2.77
2013	6	90213990	Body artificial limbs other than artificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products	3,388	3,124,773	0.01	2.36
2013	7	90215000	Heart muscles stimulating devices (except components, parts and accessories)	950	2,624,794	0.00	1.98
2013	8	12099100	Vegetables seeds for cultivation	90,566	2,594,819	0.37	1.96
2013	9	90189090	Tools and devices used in medical, surgery, animal husbandry sciences, not mentioned elsewhere	4,238	1,991,661	0.02	1.50
2013	10	21069080	Food complements	73,894	1,870,917	0.30	1.41
			Total of the above items	**22,194,251**	**109,638,904**	**90.00**	**82.81**
			Grand Total	**24,661,495**	**132,393,221**	**100**	**100**
2014	1	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	27,098,860	23,036,167	74.42	15.20
2014	2	30043990	Other medicines having no domestic products, and having hormones or 2937 products, lacking antibiotics, not mentioned	15,536	17,065,199	0.04	11.26
2014	3	30049030	Medicine complements for human consume	288,541	9,993,334	0.79	6.59
2014	4	30049090	Other retailer medicines having no domestic production	30,719	7,240,808	0.08	4.78
2014	5	39069070	Solid absorber powder and acrylic polymers	1,100,000	6,974,770	3.02	4.60
2014	6	88033000	Aircraft or helicopter parts and components, not mentioned elsewhere	10,533	6,768,235	0.03	4.47
2014	7	04051020	Packed butter in form of packs with more than 500 grams weight	1,511,000	6,760,757	4.15	4.46
2014	8	12099100	Vegetables seeds for cultivation	65,607	6,100,396	0.18	4.03
2014	9	21069080	Food complements	236,337	5,857,563	0.65	3.86
2014	10	05111000	Cow Sperm	1,111	5,554,735	0.00	3.67

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			Total of the above items	**30,358,243**	**95,351,964**	**83.38**	**62.91**
			Grand Total	**36,411,649**	**151,559,489**	**100**	**100**
2015	1	10063000	Semi-milled rice, wholly milled rice, smoothened and polished	61,371,500	34,714,871	34.21	20.73
2015	2	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	16,244,909	15,171,173	9.06	9.06
2015	3	10059010	Animal corn	56,000,000	13,203,687	31.22	7.88
2015	4	21069080	Food complements	329,816	10,917,246	0.18	6.52
2015	5	30043990	Other medicines having no domestic products, and having hormones or 2937 products, lacking antibiotics, not mentioned	17,510	8,021,475	0.01	4.79
2015	6	30049090	Other retailer medicines having no domestic production	13,919	5,854,617	0.01	3.50
2015	7	10039000	Barley except seeds	21,882,548	4,891,022	12.20	2.92
2015	8	05111000	Cow sperm	1,016	4,842,563	0.00	2.89
2015	9	90195010	Vitrectomy, Phacoe and Phacovitrectomy devices with the relevant evacuation cassette	17,508	4,794,847	0.01	2.86
2015	10	90181200	Ultrasonic scanners for diagnosis of diseases	5,823	4,351,204	0.00	2.60
			Total of the above items	**155,884,549**	**106,762,705**	**86.91**	**63.75**
			Grand Total	**179,372,762**	**167,462,305**	**100**	**100**
2016	1	12019000	Soya beans except seeds, even of grinded type	140,913,132	60,024,930	75.92	23.92
2016	2	21069080	Food complements	874,459	25,425,269	0.47	10.13
2016	3	30043990	Other medicines having no domestic products, and having hormones or 2937 products, lacking antibiotics, not mentioned	21,696	19,153,275	0.01	7.63
2016	4	47032100	Chemical wood paste, prepared with sodium or with sulphate, other than the pastes of soluble grades, semi-whitened, from the pine wood category	18,647,009	14,143,572	10.04	5.64

TABLE NO. 2 (... continued)

Major items imported from the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on the period from March 2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar]

Year	Rank	Tariff	Description of Tariff	Weight (kgs)	Value (USD)	Portion of Weight	Portion of Value
2016	5	12099100	Vegetables seeds for Cultivation	116,894	12,602,946	0.06	5.02
2016	6	30043910	Other medicines having hormones or 2937 products, lacking antibiotics, with similar domestic products	25,121	6,895,508	0.01	2.75
2016	7	90213990	Other body artificial limbs other than artificial joints and eye contact lenses of PMMA products	7,675	6,075,270	0.00	2.42
2016	8	87032319	Other motor vehicles with cylinder volume of 1500 cc up to 2000 cc except ambulance and hybrid motor vehicles	151,345	5,618,627	0.08	2.24
2016	9	90189090	Other tools and devices used in medical, surgery, animal husbandry sciences, not mentioned elsewhere	9,494	5,075,418	0.01	2.02
2016	10	90183925	Angiography and Angioplasty consuming materials (merely including arterial sheets, various types of catheter (heart, vascular, brain), balloon, stent, stent graft, guide wire, couple, occluder, high pressure connector, homeostasis valve, manifold)	8,280	5,068,315	0.00	2.02
			Total of the above items	**160,765,105**	**160,083,130**	**86.62**	**63.79**
			Grand Total	**185,608,295**	**250,972,611**	**100**	**100**

Major Exported Items

During the years of Report, major items, which were exported to the US, included "dried grape", "dates", "saffron", "carpet and other floor coverings whether hand or machine woven, Gabbah, Namad (felt carpet)", etc. The first ten items exported to the US exceed 90% of the total of the export.

TABLE NO. 3

Major items exported to the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on the period from March 2016 to February 2017 (the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar)

Year	Rank	Tariff	Description of Tariff	Weight (kgs)	Value (USD)	Portion of Weight	Portion of Value
2011	1	57011000	Carpet and other textile floor covering made of wool or animal soft hair (fluff), knot woven	2,286	399,924	0.92	38.57
2011	2	08062050	Sun-dried seed-free grape	101,000	206,100	40.65	19.88
2011	3	49019900	Printed book, brochure, pamphlet and press, not mentioned elsewhere	27,653	178,226	11.13	17.19
2011	4	08062030	Tizabi (nitrated) seed free grape (dried grape)	63,750	136,000	25.66	13.12
2011	5	08062020	Tizabi (nitrated) grape with seed (dried grape)	20,000	40,000	8.05	3.86
2011	6	08041010	Fresh or dried Estameran dates	25,000	22,500	10.06	2.17
2011	7	94036090	Other wooden furniture, other than handicrafts	4,850	18,090	1.95	1.74
2011	8	97011000	Painting tableau, black pencil painting, color pencil painting, all hand-drawn	820	10,500	0.33	1.01
2011	9	94032090	Metal furniture other than traditional blacksmith furniture	1,870	10,000	0.75	0.96
2011	10	30049010	Other retailer medicines, having similar domestic product	199	8,460	0.08	0.82
			Total of the above items	**247,428**	**1,029,800**	**99.58**	**99.33**
			Grand Total	**248,463**	**1,036,777**	**100**	**100**
2012	1	08062050	(Sun-dried) seed free grape	225,500	496,100	46.04	34.91
2012	2	08062030	Tizabi (nitrated-dried) seed free grape	213,625	469,975	43.62	33.07
2012	3	57011000	Carpet and other textile floor covering made of wool or animal soft hair (fluff), knit woven	1,048	234,020	0.21	16.47
2012	4	49019900	Printed book, brochure, pamphlet and press, not mentioned elsewhere	29,188	130,878	5.96	9.21
2012	5	90181990	Other electrical devices for diagnosis of disease, not mentioned elsewhere	150	56,975	0.03	4.01
2012	6	08041010	Fresh or dried Estameran dates	18,000	23,400	3.68	1.65
2012	7	97011000	Painting tableau, black pencil painting, color pencil painting, all hand-drawn	670	4,400	0.14	0.31
2012	8	09102011	Retailer ready made saffron in the packs less than 10 grams	1	2,137	0.00	0.15
2012	9	84381000	Machinery for bakery, pastry cooking, biscuit producing and machinery for producing macaroni, spaghetti, or similar products	100	1,500	0.02	0.11
2012	10	48191000	Carton, can, box made from paper, or wavy cardboard	1,100	924	0.22	0.07
			Total of the above items	**489,382**	**1,420,309**	**99.93**	**99.94**
			Grand Total	**489,742**	**1,421,139**	**100**	**100**
2013	1	08062050	(Sun-dried) seed free grape	159,500	350,900	61.06	53.31
2013	2	08062030	(Tizabi) Nitrated dried seed free grape	62,250	107,987	23.83	16.41
2013	3	08062060	Angouri dried seed free grape	24,500	85,750	9.38	13.03
2013	4	57011000	Carpet and other textile floor covering made of wool or animal soft hair (fluff), knit woven	170	51,272	0.07	7.79
2013	5	49019900	Printed book, brochure, pamphlet and press, not mentioned elsewhere	9,550	38,183	3.66	5.80
2013	6	49011000	Printed book, brochure, pamphlet and press, similar to separated sheets or folded sheets	2,350	9,400	0.90	1.43
2013	7	09102011	Retailer ready made saffron in the packs less than 10 grams	4	6,345	0.00	0.97
2013	8	57029200	Ready for use non-velvet floor covering made of synthetic or artificial textile	450	3,750	0.17	0.57
2013	9	94036090	Other wooden furniture than the handicrafts	2,000	1,998	0.77	0.30
2013	10	97019000	Collage and decorative plaques, similar	310	1,860	0.12	0.28
			Total of the above items	**261,084**	**657,454**	**99.94**	**99.89**
			Grand Total	**261,229**	**658,204**	**100**	**100**
2014	1	57011090	Other floor covering except Gabbah, made from wool or animal soft hair (fluff)	1,519	220,937	21	46
2014	2	44083900	Coating plates and layer plates for multilayer wood-board, with maximum thickness of 6 mm from tropical woods, mentioned	122	212,646	2	44
2014	3	68159990	Other things made of stone or other minerals not mentioned elsewhere	3,730	29,840	51	6
2014	4	94036090	Other wooden furniture except handicrafts	1,950	11,700	27	2
2014	5	09102011	Retailer ready made saffron in packs with less than 10 grams	3	5,106	0	1
			Grand Total	**7,324**	**480,229**	**100**	**100**
2015	1	57011090	Other floor covering except Gabbah, made from wool or animal soft hair (fluff)	262,630	8,960,703	74,88	89.60
2015	2	57021090	Soumak (non-needled), Karamanian Kilim, carpets (hand-woven similar not mentioned elsewhere)	4,378	356,471	1.25	3.56

TABLE NO. 3 (... continued)

Major items exported to the US during the years 2011-2015 and preliminary information on the period from March 2016 to February 2017 [the first eleven months of the year 1395 Iranian Calendar]

Year	Rank	Tariff	Description of Tariff	Weight (kgs)	Value (USD)	Portion of Weight	Portion of Value
2015	3	41139000	Leather mostly prepared after tanning or after crusting, also gazelle-like leather produced from other animals	1,100	137,500	0.31	1.37
2015	4	57011010	Gabbah of wool or animal soft hair (fluff)	2,436	100,010	0.69	1.00
2015	5	03061700	Other types of shrimp	22,008	99,036	6.28	0.99
2015	6	94038900	Other furniture, entertainment or decoration movable items for equipping the life or work places or public and private places	9,000	54,000	2.57	0.54
2015	7	49019900	Printed book, brochures, pamphlets, press, not mentioned elsewhere	10,880	43,720	3.10	0.44
2015	8	09102090	Saffron in packs of more than 30 grams	25	39,839	0.01	0.40
2015	9	56022100	Felt carpet (Namad) from the animal soft wool or hair (except those smeared, daubed, covered or stratified)	1,930	38,600	0.55	0.39
2015	10	94039000	Furniture parts and components subject to 9403	5,100	30,600	1.45	0.31
			Total of the above items	**319,487**	**9,860,479**	**91.10**	**98.60**
			Grand Total	**350.718**	**10,000,572**	**100**	**100**
2016	1	57011090	Other floor covering, except felt carpet (Gabbah) of animal soft wool or hair (fluff)	1,638,176	79,886,317	68.65	90.38
2016	2	57019000	Carpet and other texture floor covering, textured from textile materials, knit woven	76,406	3,594,314	3.20	4.07
2016	3	57021090	Soumak, Karamanian Kilim (non-needled), carpets (hand-woven similar not mentioned elsewhere)	14,240	780,180	0.60	0.88
2016	4	8025210	Fresh or dried pistachio nuts	38,000	578,000	1.59	0.65
2016	5	57011010	Felt Carpet (Gabbah) of wool or animal soft hair (fluff)	15,148	565,246	0.63	0.64
2016	6	57029300	Non-velvet floor covering, from synthetics or artificial textile materials, ready to use	48,730	515,926	2.04	0.58
2016	7	12099100	Vegetables seed for cultivation	1,000	264,000	0.04	0.20
2016	8	9102090	Saffron in packs of more than 30 grams	113	201,859	0.00	0.23
2016	9	9102010	Not-grinded and not-milled saffron	83	175,533	0.00	0.20
2016	10	56022100	Felt carpet (Namad) from the animal soft wool or hair (except those smeared, daubed, covered or stratified)	7,960	159,400	0.33	0.18
			Total of the above items	**1,839,856**	**86,720,775**	**77.10**	**98.11**
			Grand Total	**2,386,358**	**88,393,561**	**100**	**100**

Import, Export & Commercial Balance during the years 2009-2016

The following Table indicates the amount of import, export and commercial balance with the US during the years 2009-2016:

TABLE NO. 4

The amount of Import, Export & Commercial Balance with the US during the years 2009-2016

Year	Import		% Changes as compared to the corresponding period previous year		Export		% Changes as compared to the corresponding period previous year		Commercial Balance (Thousand USD)
	Weight (tons)	Value (Thousand USD)	Weight	Value	Weight (tons)	Value (Thousand USD)	Weight	Value	
2009	333,950	292,608	--	--	5,578	85,024	--	--	-207,584
2010	47,706	176,397	-85.71	-39.72	3,763	104,417	-32.54	22.81	-71,980
2011	31,941	141,347	-33.04	-19.87	176	766	-95.33	-99.27	-140,582
2012	137,983	127,561	331.70	-9.75	461	1,397	162.06	82.49	-126,164
2013	21,888	110,414	-84.13	-13.44	428	1,106	-7.17	-20.81	-109,308
2014	27,171	153,525	24.13	39.04	11	465	-97.54	-57.98	-153,060
2015	110,163	156,275	305.44	1.79	50	643	377.87	38.40	-155,632
2016	266,914	264,812	142.29	69.45	2,076	80,471	4,020.13	12,408.22	-184,341

گمرک جمهوری اسلامی ایران

بررسی مبادلات بازرگانی

با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»

از سال ۱۳۹۰ تا پایان یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

و

از سال ۲۰۰۹ تا پایان سال ۲۰۱۶ میلادی

گروه تحلیل‌های آماری

دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات

شناسنامهٔ گزارش

عنوان گزارش	بررسی مبادلات بازرگانی با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» از سال ۱۳۹۰ تا پایان یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵ و از سال ۲۰۰۹ تا پایان سال ۲۰۱۶ میلادی
نام گروه:	**گروه تحلیل‌های آماری** دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات گمرک ایران
نوع گزارش:	تحلیلی، مدیریتی
محتوای آمار:	کارشناسی‌شده □ کارشناسی‌نشده ■
نوع انتشار:	مکتوب عادی ■ چاپ □ لوح فشرده □ اینترنت □ ترکیبی □
تعداد نسخ:	تک نسخه □ چند نسخه ■
تاریخ تهیه:	اسفندماه ۱۳۹۵
شمارهٔ سریال:	۹۵۱۲۰۸۰۰۱
اجازهٔ انتشار و توزیع توسط کاربر:	غیرمجاز □ با ذکر منبع، مجاز ■ عادی■ محرمانه□

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واردات، صادرات و تراز بازرگانی

میزان واردات از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، از سال ۱۳۹۰ تا یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵، بجز کاهش ۸۱.۹۶ درصدی در وزن و ۰.۳۹ درصدی در ارزش دلاری که در سال ۱۳۹۲ رخ داده، در مجموع شاهد روندی رو به رشد بوده است[1]. وزن کالاهای وارد شده از این کشور، از رقم ۲۲ هزار تن در سال ۱۳۹۰، به رقم ۱۷۹ هزار تن در سال ۱۳۹۴ رسیده و ارزش کالاهای وارداتی از این کشور نیز از رقم ۱۰۰ میلیون دلار به ۱۶۷ میلیون دلار رسیده است. در یازده ماهه سال جاری نیز، میزان واردات از «ایالات متحده آمریکا» با افزایش ۴۳.۳۹ درصدی در وزن و ۷۹.۲۰ درصدی در ارزش دلاری در مقایسه با یازده ماهه سال گذشته، به ۱۸۶ هزار تن و ۲۵۱ میلیون دلار رسیده است. در یازده ماهه امسال، رتبه کشور آمریکا، در بین کشورهای عمده طرف معامله، به رتبه ۲۵ام ارتقاء یافته و سهم آن از کل واردات کشور، در حدود ۰.۶ درصد از کل وزن و ارزش بوده است.

میزان صادرات به کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، پس از کاهش‌های پیاپی در سال‌های ۱۳۹۲ و ۱۳۹۳، رو به رشد نهاده و با افزایش قابل توجه ۴,۶۸۹ درصدی در وزن و ۱,۹۸۲ درصدی در ارزش دلاری، به ارقام ۳۵۱ تن و ۱۰ میلیون دلار در سال ۱۳۹۴ رسیده است. با این وجود، در این سال، سهم این کشور در بین کشورهای عمده مقصد صادرات بسیار ناچیز بوده (کمتر از ۰.۰۳ از ارزش صادرات) و در جایگاه ۶۹ام جدول قرار داشته است. در یازده ماهه امسال نیز، با ادامه این روند رو به رشد، میزان صادرات به این کشور، به ۲ هزارتن و ۸۸ میلیون دلار رسیده است که در مقایسه با ارقام یازده ماهه سال گذشته، نشان دهنده رشدی بالغ بر ۱,۶۴۰ درصد در وزن و ۲,۷۸۴ درصد در ارزش دلاری است.

تراز بازرگانی با کشور مذکور نیز، طی سال‌های مورد بررسی همواره منفی بوده است. در جدول شمارهٔ ۱، میزان واردات، صادرات، تراز بازرگانی، متوسط ارزش گمرکی و میزان تغییرات مبادلات تجاری با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» از سال ۱۳۹۰ تا کنون، آورده شده است.

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[1] علت کاهش ۸۱.۹۶ درصد وزن واردات از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، در سال ۱۳۹۲ نسبت به سال پیش از آن، عدم واردات «دانه گندم سخت» از این کشور در سال ۱۳۹۲ بوده است. در سال ۱۳۹۱، بالغ بر ۱۲۶ هزار تن و به ارزش ۴۲ میلیون دلار گندم از کشور آمریکا وارد شده است که در سال ۱۳۹۲ به صفر رسیده است.

جدول ۱. میزان واردات، صادرات و تراز بازرگانی با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	واردات				درصد تغییرات نسبت به مدت مشابه سال گذشته		سهم از کل واردات		صادرات				درصد تغییرات نسبت به مدت مشابه سال گذشته		سهم از کل صادرات		تراز بازرگانی (هزار دلار)
	رتبه از نظر ارزش	وزن (تن)	ارزش (هزار دلار)	متوسط ارزش کمرکی هرتن کالا (دلار)	وزن	ارزش	وزن	ارزش	رتبه از نظر ارزش	وزن (تن)	ارزش (هزار دلار)	متوسط ارزش کمرکی هرتن کالا (دلار)	وزن	ارزش	وزن	ارزش	
۱۳۹۰	۴۲	۳۲,۴۷۲	۱۰۰,۴۲۱	۴,۴۶۹	—	—	۰.۰۶	۰.۱۶	۱۱۱	۲۴۸	۱,۰۳۷	۴,۱۷۳	—	—	۰.۰۰	۰.۰۰	-۹۹,۳۸۴
۱۳۹۱	۳۶	۱۳۶,۷۲۵	۱۳۲,۹۰۶	۹۷۲	۵۰۸.۴۳	۳۲.۳۵	۰.۳۵	۰.۲۵	۱۰۶	۴۹۰	۱,۴۲۱	۲,۹۰۲	۹۷.۱۱	۳۷.۰۷	۰.۰۰	۰.۰۰	-۱۳۱,۴۸۵
۱۳۹۲	۳۲	۲۴,۶۶۱	۱۳۲,۳۹۳	۵,۳۶۸	-۸۱.۹۶	-۰.۳۹	۰.۰۷	۰.۲۷	۱۰۵	۲۶۱	۶۵۸	۲,۵۲۰	-۴۶.۶۶	-۵۳.۶۸	۰.۰۰	۰.۰۰	-۱۳۱,۷۳۵
۱۳۹۳	۳۱	۳۶,۴۱۲	۱۵۱,۵۵۹	۴,۱۶۲	۴۷۶۵	۱۴.۴۸	۰.۰۸	۰.۲۸	۱۱۰	۷	۴۸۰	۶۵,۵۶۹	-۹۷.۲۰	-۲۷.۰۴	۰.۰۰	۰.۰۰	-۱۵۱,۰۷۹
۱۳۹۴	۲۸	۱۷۹,۳۷۳	۱۶۷,۴۶۲	۹۳۴	۳۹۲.۶۲	۱۰.۴۹	۰.۵۱	۰.۴۰	۶۹	۳۵۱	۱۰,۰۰۱	۲۸,۵۱۵	۴,۶۸۸.۶۰	۱,۹۸۲.۴۶	۰.۰۰	۰.۰۳	-۱۵۷,۴۶۲
۱۳۹۵	۲۵	۱۸۵,۶۰۸	۲۵۰,۹۷۳	۱,۳۵۲	۴۳.۳۹	۷۹.۲۰	۰.۶۲	۰.۶۵	۳۳	۲,۳۸۶	۸۸,۳۹۴	۳۷,۰۴۱	۱,۶۴۰.۴۷	۲,۷۸۳.۸۹	۰.۰۰	۰.۲۳	-۱۶۲,۵۷۹

اقلام عمده وارداتی

طی سال‌های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و یازده ماهه سال جاری، عمده‌ترین کالاهای وارد شده از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، شامل «خمیر چوب»، «مکمل‌های دارویی و غذایی»، «اسپرم گاو»، «کره»، «تخم سبزیجات» و «دستگاه‌های پزشکی» بوده و در برخی سال‌ها نیز، عمده واردات از این کشور، به کالاهای اساسی اختصاص داشته است. به طور مثال، در سال ۱۳۹۱، بالغ بر ۹۲.۰۴ درصد از وزن و ۳۱.۷۲ درصد از کل واردات از این کشور را «دانه گندم سخت» به خود اختصاص داده است. در سال ۱۳۹۴، «برنج» و «ذرت دامی» به ترتیب بالغ بر ۳۴.۲۱ و ۳۱.۲۲ درصد از وزن واردات از کشور مذکور را تشکیل داده و در یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵ نیز، «لوبیای سویا» با ۷۵.۹۲ درصد از وزن و ۲۳.۹۲ درصد از ارزش، در رتبه نخست قرار داشته است.

جدول ۲. اقلام عمده وارد شده از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	رتبه	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۰	۱	۰۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات. غیرا زخمیرها ا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۱۸,۲۴۲,۴۶۴	۲۰,۲۸۱,۵۷۲	۸۱.۱۸	۲۰.۲۰
۱۳۹۰	۲	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی ،دارویی	۹۵۲,۰۵۹	۱۸,۰۱۲,۸۸۳	۴.۲۴	۱۷.۹۴
۱۳۹۰	۳	۳۰۰۴۹۰۹۰	سایر دا روهای خرده فروشی که تولید دا خلی ندا رد	۸۴,۳۴۲	۱۲,۰۷۹,۲۳۷	۰.۳۸	۱۲.۰۳
۱۳۹۰	۴	۹۰۲۱۳۹۹۰	اعضای مصنوعی بدن غیر از مفصلهای مصنوعی و لنز داخل چشمی از جنس PMMA	۲,۶۳۸	۴,۱۹۶,۳۷۳	۰.۰۱	۴.۱۸
۱۳۹۰	۵	۰۵۱۱۱۰۰۰	ا سپرم گاوی	۳۶۳	۳,۸۴۰,۱۷۱	۰.۰۰	۳.۸۲
۱۳۹۰	۶	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۱۲۲,۹۶۹	۳,۷۸۹,۷۰۶	۰.۵۵	۳.۷۷

جدول ۲. اقلام عمده وارد شده از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	رتبه	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۰	۷	۰۴۰۵۱۰۲۰	کره بسته بند ی شده به صورت بسته های بیش ا ز ۵۰۰ گرم	۵۹۹,۸۲۵	۳,۲۱۲,۲۱۳	۲.۶۷	۳.۲۰
۱۳۹۰	۸	۹۰۱۸۳۹۲۹	سایر سوزنها کاتترها وکانول ها،همانند ،غیر مذکور درجای دیگر	۱۴,۸۱۱	۲,۹۲۷,۷۰۵	۰.۰۷	۲.۹۲
۱۳۹۰	۹	۹۰۱۸۱۹۹۰	سایر دستگاههای برقی تشخیص بیماری غیر مذکوردرجای دیگر	۱۱,۴۰۳	۲,۸۲۰,۳۸۲	۰.۰۵	۲.۸۱
۱۳۹۰	۱۰	۹۰۱۸۵۰۱۰	دستگاه ویترکتومی،فیکووفیکوویترکتومی و کاست تخلیه مربوط	۸,۵۳۳	۲,۲۴۲,۴۶۱	۰.۰۴	۲.۲۳
جمع اقلام فوق				۲۰,۰۳۹,۴۰۷	۷۳,۴۰۲,۷۰۱	۸۹.۱۸	۷۳.۱۰
جمع کل				۲۲,۴۷۱,۶۴۶	۱۰۰,۴۲۰,۷۴۰	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۱	۱	۱۰۰۱۱۱۰۰	دانه گندم سخت	۱۲۵,۸۴۱,۳۵۲	۴۲,۱۶۰,۹۶۰	۹۲.۰۴	۳۱.۷۲
۱۳۹۱	۲	۰۴۰۵۱۰۲۰	کره بسته بند ی شده به صورت بسته های بیش ا ز ۵۰۰ گرم	۵,۵۳۶,۱۵۰	۲۹,۸۰۴,۸۲۷	۴.۰۵	۲۲.۴۳
۱۳۹۱	۳	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی	۶۵۶,۰۸۱	۱۴,۵۰۶,۶۶۲	۰.۴۸	۱۰.۹۱
۱۳۹۱	۴	۰۵۱۱۱۰۰۰	اسپرم گاو	۴۴۵	۶,۷۴۲,۹۴۲	۰.۰۰	۵.۰۷
۱۳۹۱	۵	۳۰۰۴۹۰۹۰	سایر مکمل های دارویی برای خرده فروشی که تولید داخلی مشابه ندارند	۷,۳۱۱	۶,۵۷۳,۵۶۶	۰.۰۱	۴.۹۵
۱۳۹۱	۶	۹۰۱۸۹۰۹۰	آلات و وسایل مورد استفاده در علوم پزشکی،جراحی و دامپزشکی، غیر مذکور	۸,۶۲۹	۳,۸۰۲,۷۰۵	۰.۰۱	۲.۸۶
۱۳۹۱	۷	۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات، غیرا زخمیرهاا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۲,۹۰۰,۴۱۴	۳,۱۲۹,۱۵۹	۲.۱۲	۲.۳۵
۱۳۹۱	۸	۸۴۵۵۱۰۹۰	سایرماشینهای نوردبرا ی ساخت لوله به قطر بیش از ۳ اینچ	۱,۸۰۰	۳,۰۱۳,۱۰۸	۰.۰۰	۲.۲۷
۱۳۹۱	۹	۹۰۲۱۳۹۹۰	اعضای مصنوعی بدن غیر از مفصلهای مصنوعی و لنز داخل چشمی از جنس PMMA	۱,۶۵۳	۱,۵۸۵,۰۳۲	۰.۰۰	۱.۱۹
۱۳۹۱	۱۰	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۵۳,۶۹۳	۱,۵۶۴,۶۰۹	۰.۰۴	۱.۱۸
جمع اقلام فوق				۱۳۵,۰۰۷,۵۲۷	۱۱۲,۸۸۳,۵۶۹	۹۸.۷۴	۸۴.۹۳
جمع کل				۱۳۶,۷۲۴,۷۱۱	۱۳۲,۹۰۵,۹۸۴	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۲	۱	۳۰۰۴۹۰۴۰	مکملهای دارویی برای مصرف انسان	۱,۵۱۳,۰۰۷	۳۹,۵۰۶,۶۳۹	۶.۱۴	۲۹.۸۴
۱۳۹۲	۲	۰۴۰۵۱۰۲۰	کره بسته بند ی شده به صورت بسته های بیش ا ز ۵۰۰ گرم	۷,۶۶۴,۵۲۵	۳۷,۰۰۱,۵۱۳	۳۱.۰۸	۲۷.۹۵
۱۳۹۲	۳	۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات، غیرا زخمیرهاا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۱۲,۷۳۵,۷۸۰	۱۱,۲۷۰,۸۹۴	۵۱.۶۴	۸.۵۱
۱۳۹۲	۴	۳۰۰۴۹۰۹۰	سایر مکمل های دارویی برای خرده فروشی که تولید داخلی مشابه ندارند	۱۰۷,۲۵۱	۵,۹۸۰,۴۳۳	۰.۴۳	۴.۵۲
۱۳۹۲	۵	۰۵۱۱۱۰۰۰	اسپرم گاو	۶۵۲	۳,۶۷۲,۴۶۱	۰.۰۰	۲.۷۷
۱۳۹۲	۶	۹۰۲۱۳۹۹۰	اعضای مصنوعی بدن غیر از مفصلهای مصنوعی و لنز داخل چشمی از جنس PMMA	۳,۳۸۸	۳,۱۲۴,۷۷۳	۰.۰۱	۲.۳۶
۱۳۹۲	۷	۹۰۲۱۵۰۰۰	دستگاههای محرک ماهیچه قلب (باستثنای ا جزاء قطعات و متفرعات)	۹۵۰	۲,۶۲۴,۷۹۴	۰.۰۰	۱.۹۸
۱۳۹۲	۸	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۹۰,۵۶۶	۲,۵۹۴,۸۱۹	۰.۳۷	۱.۹۶
۱۳۹۲	۹	۹۰۱۸۹۰۹۰	لات و وسایل مورد ا ستفاده در علوم پزشکی ،جرا حی و دا مپزشکی ،غیرمذکور درجای دیگر	۴,۲۳۸	۱,۹۹۱,۶۶۱	۰.۰۲	۱.۵۰
۱۳۹۲	۱۰	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی	۷۳,۸۹۴	۱,۸۷۰,۹۱۷	۰.۳۰	۱.۴۱
جمع اقلام فوق				۲۲,۱۹۴,۲۵۱	۱۰۹,۶۳۸,۹۰۴	۹۰.۰۰	۸۲.۸۱
جمع کل				۲۴,۶۶۱,۴۹۵	۱۳۲,۳۹۳,۲۲۱	۱۰۰	۱۰۰

جدول ۲. اقلام عمده وارد شده از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	ردیف	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۳	۱	۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات، غیرا زخمیرهاا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۲۷,۰۹۸,۸۶۰	۲۳,۰۳۶,۱۶۷	۷۴.۴۲	۱۵.۲۰
۱۳۹۳	۲	۳۰۰۴۳۹۹۰	سایردا روهایی که تولید داخلی ندارند دارای هورمون یامحصولات ۲۹۳۷فاقد انتی بیوتیک غیرمذکور	۱۵,۵۳۶	۱۷,۰۶۵,۱۹۹	۰.۰۴	۱۱.۲۶
۱۳۹۳	۳	۳۰۰۴۹۰۴۰	مکملهای دارویی برای مصرف انسان	۲۸۸,۵۴۱	۹,۹۹۳,۳۳۴	۰.۷۹	۶.۵۹
۱۳۹۳	۴	۳۰۰۴۹۰۹۰	سایر مکمل های دارویی برای خرده فروشی که تولید داخلی مشابه ندارند	۳۰,۷۱۹	۷,۲۴۰,۸۰۸	۰.۰۸	۴.۷۸
۱۳۹۳	۵	۳۹۰۶۹۰۷۰	پودرجاذب وپلیمرهای اکریلیک جامد	۱,۱۰۰,۰۰۰	۶,۹۷۴,۷۷۰	۳.۰۲	۴.۶۰
۱۳۹۳	۶	۸۸۰۳۳۰۰۰	ا جزا ،وقطعات هوا پیمایاهلیکوپترغیر مذکور درجای دیگر	۱۰,۵۳۳	۶,۷۶۸,۲۳۵	۰.۰۳	۴.۴۷
۱۳۹۳	۷	۰۴۰۵۱۰۲۰	کره بسته بند ی شده به صورت بسته های بیش ا ز ۵۰۰ گرم	۱,۵۱۱,۰۰۰	۶,۷۶۰,۷۵۷	۴.۱۵	۴.۴۶
۱۳۹۳	۸	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۶۵,۶۰۷	۶,۱۰۰,۳۹۶	۰.۱۸	۴.۰۳
۱۳۹۳	۹	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی	۲۳۶,۳۳۷	۵,۸۵۷,۵۶۳	۰.۶۵	۳.۸۶
۱۳۹۳	۱۰	۰۵۱۱۱۰۰۰	اسپرم گاو	۱,۱۱۱	۵,۵۵۴,۷۳۵	۰.۰۰	۳.۶۷
جمع اقلام فوق				**۳۰,۳۵۸,۲۴۳**	**۹۵,۳۵۱,۹۶۴**	**۸۳.۳۸**	**۶۲.۹۱**
جمع کل				**۳۶,۴۱۱,۶۴۹**	**۱۵۱,۵۵۹,۴۸۹**	**۱۰۰**	**۱۰۰**
۱۳۹۴	۱	۱۰۰۶۳۰۰۰	برنج نیمه سفیدشده(Semi milled Rice) یا برنج کامل سفید شده(Wholly milled Rice) حتی صیقلی یا براق شده	۶۱,۳۷۱,۵۰۰	۳۴,۷۱۴,۸۷۱	۳۴.۲۱	۲۰.۷۳
۱۳۹۴	۲	۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات، غیرا زخمیرهاا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۱۶,۲۴۴,۹۰۹	۱۵,۱۷۱,۱۷۳	۹.۰۶	۹.۰۶
۱۳۹۴	۳	۱۰۰۵۹۰۱۰	ذرت دامی	۵۶,۰۰۰,۰۰۰	۱۳,۲۰۳,۶۸۷	۳۱.۲۲	۷.۸۸
۱۳۹۴	۴	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی	۳۲۹,۸۱۶	۱۰,۹۱۷,۲۴۶	۰.۱۸	۶.۵۲
۱۳۹۴	۵	۳۰۰۴۳۹۹۰	سایردا روهایی که تولید داخلی ندارند دارای هورمون یامحصولات ۲۹۳۷فاقد انتی بیوتیک غیرمذکور	۱۷,۵۱۰	۸,۰۲۱,۴۷۵	۰.۰۱	۴.۷۹
۱۳۹۴	۶	۳۰۰۴۹۰۹۰	سایر مکمل های دارویی برای خرده فروشی که تولید داخلی مشابه ندارند	۱۳,۹۱۹	۵,۸۵۴,۶۱۷	۰.۰۱	۳.۵۰
۱۳۹۴	۷	۱۰۰۳۹۰۰۰	جو باستثنای بذر	۲۱,۸۸۲,۵۴۸	۴,۸۹۱,۰۲۲	۱۲.۲۰	۲.۹۲
۱۳۹۴	۸	۰۵۱۱۱۰۰۰	اسپرم گاو	۱,۰۱۶	۴,۸۴۲,۵۶۳	۰.۰۰	۲.۸۹
۱۳۹۴	۹	۹۰۱۸۵۰۱۰	دستگاه ویترکتومی،فیکووفیکوویترکتومی و کاست تخلیه مربوط	۱۷,۵۰۸	۴,۷۹۴,۸۴۷	۰.۰۱	۲.۸۶
۱۳۹۴	۱۰	۹۰۱۸۱۲۰۰	دستگاههای ا ولترا سونیک (Scanners) تشخیص امراض	۵,۸۲۳	۴,۳۵۱,۲۰۴	۰.۰۰	۲.۶۰
جمع اقلام فوق				**۱۵۵,۸۸۴,۵۴۹**	**۱۰۶,۷۶۲,۷۰۵**	**۸۶.۹۱**	**۶۳.۷۵**
جمع کل				**۱۷۹,۳۷۲,۷۶۲**	**۱۶۷,۴۶۲,۳۰۵**	**۱۰۰**	**۱۰۰**
۱۳۹۵	۱	۱۲۰۱۹۰۰۰	لوبیای سویا به جز دانه حتی به صورت خرد شده	۱۴۰,۹۱۳,۱۳۲	۶۰,۰۲۴,۹۳۰	۷۵.۹۲	۲۳.۹۲
۱۳۹۵	۲	۲۱۰۶۹۰۸۰	مکمل غذایی	۸۷۴,۴۵۹	۲۵,۴۲۵,۲۶۹	۰.۴۷	۱۰.۱۳
۱۳۹۵	۳	۳۰۰۴۳۹۹۰	سایردا روهایی که تولید داخلی ندارند دارای هورمون یامحصولات ۲۹۳۷فاقد انتی بیوتیک غیرمذکور	۲۱,۶۹۶	۱۹,۱۵۳,۲۷۵	۰.۰۱	۷.۶۳
۱۳۹۵	۴	۴۷۰۳۲۱۰۰	خمیرچوب شیمیائی،آماده شده یاسودیاباسولفات، غیرا زخمیرهاا زدرجه حل شونده، نیمه سفیدشده تیره کاج	۱۸,۶۳۷,۰۰۹	۱۴,۱۴۳,۵۷۲	۱۰.۰۴	۵.۶۴

جدول ۲. اقلام عمده وارد شده از کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	رتبه	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۵	۵	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۱۱۶,۸۹۴	۱۲,۶۰۲,۹۴۶	۰.۰۶	۵.۰۲
۱۳۹۵	۶	۳۰۰۴۳۹۱۰	سایر داروهادارای هورمون یاسایر محصولات شماره ۲۹۳۷فاقد آنتی بیوتیک ها دا را ی تولید دا خلی مشابه	۲۵,۱۲۱	۶,۸۹۵,۵۰۸	۰.۰۱	۲.۷۵
۱۳۹۵	۷	۹۰۲۱۳۹۹۰	سایرا عضای مصنوعی بدن غیرا ز مفصل های مصنوعی و لنزدا خل چشمی ا ز جنسPMMA	۷,۶۷۵	۶,۰۷۵,۲۷۰	۰.۰۰	۲.۴۲
۱۳۹۵	۸	۸۷۰۳۲۳۱۹	سایر وسایل نقلیه موتوری با حجم سیلندر ۱۵۰۰ سی سی تا ۲۰۰۰ سی سی بجز امبولانس وهیبریدی	۱۵۱,۳۴۵	۵,۶۱۸,۶۲۷	۰.۰۸	۲.۲۴
۱۳۹۵	۹	۹۰۱۸۹۰۹۰	سایر آلات و وسایل مورد ا ستفاده در علوم پزشکی ،جرا حی و دا میزشکی ،غیرمذکور درجای دیگر	۹,۴۹۴	۵,۰۷۵,۴۱۸	۰.۰۱	۲.۰۲
۱۳۹۵	۱۰	۹۰۱۸۳۹۲۵	لوازم مصرفی آنژیوگرافی و آنژیوپلاستی (صرفا شامل شیت شریانی -انواع کاتتر (قلب، عروق ،مغز)-بالن - استنت - استنت گراف -گاید وایر - کویل- مسدود کننده (occeluder) - رابط فشار قوی-دریچه هموستاتیس -منیفولد)	۸,۲۸۰	۵,۰۶۸,۳۱۵	۰.۰۰	۲.۰۲
جمع اقلام فوق				۱۶۰,۷۶۵,۱۰۵	۱۶۰,۰۸۳,۱۳۰	۸۶.۶۲	۶۳.۷۹
جمع کل				۱۸۵,۶۰۸,۲۹۵	۲۵۰,۹۷۲,۶۱۱	۱۰۰	۱۰۰

اقلام عمده صادراتی

در سال‌های مورد بررسی، عمده‌ترین اقلام صادر شده به کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، شامل «انگور خشک کرده»، «خرما»، «زعفران»، «فرش و سایر کفپوش‌ها اعم از دستباف، ماشینی، گبه، نمد و...» بوده است. ده قلم نخست صادراتی به این کشور، بالغ بر ۹۰ درصد از کل صادرات را به خود اختصاص داده است.

جدول ۳. اقلام عمده صادر شده به کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	رتبه	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۰	۱	۵۷۰۱۱۰۰۰	فرش وسایرکف پوش های نسجی،ا زپشم یاا زموی نرم (کرک)حیوا ن، گره باف.	۲,۲۸۶	۳۹۹,۹۲۴	۰.۹۲	۳۸.۵۷
۱۳۹۰	۲	۰۸۰۶۲۰۵۰	آفتابی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۱۰۱,۰۰۰	۲۰۶,۱۰۰	۴۰.۶۵	۱۹.۸۸
۱۳۹۰	۳	۴۹۰۱۹۹۰۰	کتاب، بروشور،جزوه ومطبوعات چاپ شده که درجای دیگر گفته نشده	۲۷,۶۵۳	۱۷۸,۲۲۶	۱۱.۱۳	۱۷.۱۹
۱۳۹۰	۴	۰۸۰۶۲۰۳۰	تیزا بی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۶۳,۷۵۰	۱۳۶,۰۰۰	۲۵.۶۶	۱۳.۱۲
۱۳۹۰	۵	۰۸۰۶۲۰۲۰	تیزا بی دا نه دا ر(ا نگورخشک کرده)	۲۰,۰۰۰	۴۰,۰۰۰	۸.۰۵	۳.۸۶
۱۳۹۰	۶	۰۸۰۴۱۰۱۰	خرماا ستعمرا ن تازه یاخشک کرده	۲۵,۰۰۰	۲۲,۵۰۰	۱۰.۰۶	۲.۱۷
۱۳۹۰	۷	۹۴۰۳۶۰۹۰	سایر مبلهای چوبی بغیراز صنایع دستی	۴,۸۵۰	۱۸,۰۹۰	۱.۹۵	۱.۷۴
۱۳۹۰	۸	۹۷۰۱۱۰۰۰	تابلوی نقاشی،نقاشی سیاه قلم ونقاشی با مداد رنگی، تماماً با دست کشیده شده.	۸۲۰	۱۰,۵۰۰	۰.۳۳	۱.۰۱
۱۳۹۰	۹	۹۴۰۳۲۰۹۰	مبلهای فلزی غیر از مبلهای آهنگری سنتی	۱,۸۷۰	۱۰,۰۰۰	۰.۷۵	۰.۹۶
۱۳۹۰	۱۰	۳۰۰۴۹۰۱۰	سایر داروهای خرده فروشی دا را ی تولید دا خلی مشابه	۱۹۹	۸,۴۶۰	۰.۰۸	۰.۸۲

جدول ۳. اقلام عمده صادر شده به کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	ردیف	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
			جمع اقلام فوق	۲۴۷,۴۲۸	۱,۰۲۹,۸۰۰	۹۹.۵۸	۹۹.۳۳
			جمع کل	۲۴۸,۴۶۳	۱,۰۳۶,۷۷۷	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۱	۱	۰۸۰۶۲۰۵۰	آفتابی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۲۲۵,۵۰۰	۴۹۶,۱۰۰	۴۶.۰۴	۳۴.۹۱
۱۳۹۱	۲	۰۸۰۶۲۰۳۰	تیزا بی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۲۱۳,۶۲۵	۴۶۹,۹۷۵	۴۳.۶۲	۳۳.۰۷
۱۳۹۱	۳	۵۷۰۱۱۰۰۰	فرش وسایرکف پوش های نسجی،ا زپشم یاا زموی نرم (کرک)حیوا ن، گره باف.	۱,۰۴۸	۲۳۴,۰۲۰	۰.۲۱	۱۶.۴۷
۱۳۹۱	۴	۴۹۰۱۹۹۰۰	کتاب، بروشور،جزوه ومطبوعات چاپ شده که درجای دیگر گفته نشده	۲۹,۱۸۸	۱۳۰,۸۷۸	۵.۹۶	۹.۲۱
۱۳۹۱	۵	۹۰۱۸۱۹۹۰	سایر دستگاههای برقی تشخیص بیماری غیر مذکوردرجای دیگر	۱۵۰	۵۶,۹۷۵	۰.۰۳	۴.۰۱
۱۳۹۱	۶	۰۸۰۴۱۰۱۰	خرماا ستعمرا ن تازه یاخشک کرده	۱۸,۰۰۰	۲۳,۴۰۰	۳.۶۸	۱.۶۵
۱۳۹۱	۷	۹۷۰۱۱۰۰۰	تابلوی نقاشی،نقاشی سیاه قلم ونقاشی با مداد رنگی، تماماً با دست کشیده شده.	۶۷۰	۴,۴۰۰	۰.۱۴	۰.۳۱
۱۳۹۱	۸	۰۹۱۰۲۰۱۱	زعفران اماده برای خرده فروشی دربسته بندی کمتراز ۱۰گرم .	۱	۲,۱۳۷	۰.۰۰	۰.۱۵
۱۳۹۱	۹	۸۴۳۸۱۰۰۰	ماشین آلات نانوایی یاانان شیرینی پزی، بیسکویت سازی وماشین آلات تولیدماکارونی، اسپاگتی یامحصولات همانند	۱۰۰	۱,۵۰۰	۰.۰۲	۰.۱۱
۱۳۹۱	۱۰	۴۸۱۹۱۰۰۰	کارتن ،قوطی ،جعبه ا زکاغذیامقوا ی موج دا ر	۱,۱۰۰	۹۲۴	۰.۲۲	۰.۰۷
			جمع اقلام فوق	۴۸۹,۳۸۲	۱,۴۲۰,۳۰۹	۹۹.۹۳	۹۹.۹۴
			جمع کل	۴۸۹,۷۴۲	۱,۴۲۱,۱۳۹	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۲	۱	۰۸۰۶۲۰۵۰	آفتابی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۱۵۹,۵۰۰	۳۵۰,۹۰۰	۶۱.۰۶	۵۳.۳۱
۱۳۹۲	۲	۰۸۰۶۲۰۳۰	تیزا بی بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۶۲,۲۵۰	۱۰۷,۹۸۷	۲۳.۸۳	۱۶.۴۱
۱۳۹۲	۳	۰۸۰۶۲۰۶۰	ا نگوری بی دا نه (ا نگورخشک کرده)	۲۴,۵۰۰	۸۵,۷۵۰	۹.۳۸	۱۳.۰۳
۱۳۹۲	۴	۵۷۰۱۱۰۰۰	فرش وسایرکف پوش های نسجی،ا زپشم یاا زموی نرم (کرک)حیوا ن، گره باف.	۱۷۰	۵۱,۲۷۲	۰.۰۷	۷.۷۹
۱۳۹۲	۵	۴۹۰۱۹۹۰۰	کتاب، بروشور،جزوه ومطبوعات چاپ شده که درجای دیگر گفته نشده	۹,۵۵۰	۳۸,۱۸۳	۳.۶۶	۵.۸۰
۱۳۹۲	۶	۴۹۰۱۱۰۰۰	کتاب، بروشور،جزوه ومطبوعات چاپ شده همانندبصورت ا ورا ق مجزا، حتیتاشده	۲,۳۵۰	۹,۴۰۰	۰.۹۰	۱.۴۳
۱۳۹۲	۷	۰۹۱۰۲۰۱۱	زعفران اماده برای خرده فروشی دربسته بندی کمتراز ۱۰گرم .	۴	۶,۳۵۴	۰.۰۰	۰.۹۷
۱۳۹۲	۸	۵۷۰۲۹۲۰۰	کف پوش های غیرمخملی باف، ا زمواد نسجی سنتتیک یامصنوعی آماده مصرف.	۴۵۰	۳,۷۵۰	۰.۱۷	۰.۵۷
۱۳۹۲	۹	۹۴۰۳۶۰۹۰	سایر مبلهای چوبی بغیراز صنایع دستی	۲,۰۰۰	۱,۹۹۸	۰.۷۷	۰.۳۰
۱۳۹۲	۱۰	۹۷۰۱۹۰۰۰	کولاژوپلاکهای تزئینی همانند.	۳۱۰	۱,۸۶۰	۰.۱۲	۰.۲۸
			جمع اقلام فوق	۲۶۱,۰۸۴	۶۵۷,۴۵۴	۹۹.۹۴	۹۹.۸۹
			جمع کل	۲۶۱,۲۲۹	۶۵۸,۲۰۴	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۳	۱	۵۷۰۱۱۰۹۰	سایر کف پوش ها بجز گبه از پشم یا از موی نرم (کرک) حیوان	۱,۵۱۹	۲۲۰,۹۳۷	۲۱	۴۶
۱۳۹۳	۲	۴۴۰۸۳۹۰۰	ورق های روکش وورق های لائی برا ی تخته های چندلا،بضخامت حدا کثر۶mm زچوبهای گرمسیری مذکوردریاد	۱۲۲	۲۱۲,۶۴۶	۲	۴۴
۱۳۹۳	۳	۶۸۱۵۹۹۹۰	سایرا شیاساخته ا زسنگ یا ا ز سایرموا د معدنی غیرمذکور در جای دیگر	۳,۷۳۰	۲۹,۸۴۰	۵۱	۶
۱۳۹۳	۴	۹۴۰۳۶۰۹۰	سایر مبلهای چوبی بغیراز صنایع دستی	۱,۹۵۰	۱۱,۷۰۰	۲۷	۲
۱۳۹۳	۵	۰۹۱۰۲۰۱۱	زعفران اماده برای خرده فروشی دربسته بندی کمتراز ۱۰گرم .	۳	۵,۱۰۶	۰	۱
			جمع کل	۷,۳۲۴	۴۸۰,۲۲۹	۱۰۰	۱۰۰
۱۳۹۴	۱	۵۷۰۱۱۰۹۰	سایر کف پوش ها بجز گبه از پشم یا از موی نرم (کرک) حیوان	۲۶۲,۶۳۰	۸,۹۶۰,۷۰۳	۷۴.۸۸	۸۹.۶۰
۱۳۹۴	۲	۵۷۰۲۱۰۹۰	سوماک (غیرازسوزنی)کارامانی ،فرشها(دست باف مانند غیر مذکور درجای دیگر)	۴,۳۷۸	۳۵۶,۴۷۱	۱.۲۵	۳.۵۶

جدول ۳. اقلام عمده صادر شده به کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا» طی سال های ۹۴-۱۳۹۰ و اطلاعات موجود و مقدماتی یازده ماهه سال ۱۳۹۵

سال	رتبه	تعرفه	شرح تعرفه	وزن (کیلوگرم)	ارزش (دلار)	سهم وزن	سهم ارزش
۱۳۹۴	۳	۴۱۱۳۹۰۰۰	جرم بیشتر آماده شده بعدا زدباغی یابعدا زکرا ستینگ همچنین چرم پارشمینه شده ا زسایر حیوا نات	۱,۱۰۰	۱۳۷,۵۰۰	۰.۳۱	۱.۳۷
۱۳۹۴	۴	۵۷۰۱۱۰۱۰	گبه از پشم یا از موی نرم (کرک) حیوان	۲,۴۳۶	۱۰۰,۰۱۰	۰.۶۹	۱.۰۰
۱۳۹۴	۵	۰۳۰۶۱۷۰۰	سایر انواع میگو	۲۲,۰۰۸	۹۹,۰۳۶	۶.۲۸	۰.۹۹
۱۳۹۴	۶	۹۴۰۳۸۹۰۰	سایر مبلمان (furniture) اقلام آسایشی یاتزئینی قابل جابجایی جهت تجهیز محل های زندگی یاکارواماکن عمومی یاخصوصی	۹,۰۰۰	۵۴,۰۰۰	۲.۵۷	۰.۵۴
۱۳۹۴	۷	۴۹۰۱۹۹۰۰	کتاب، بروشور،جزوه ومطبوعات چاپ شده که درجای دیگر گفته نشده	۱۰,۸۸۰	۴۳,۷۲۰	۳.۱۰	۰.۴۴
۱۳۹۴	۸	۰۹۱۰۲۰۹۰	زعفرا ن دربسته بندی بیش از ۳۰گرم	۲۵	۳۹,۸۳۹	۰.۰۱	۰.۴۰
۱۳۹۴	۹	۵۶۰۲۲۱۰۰	نمدا زپشم یاموی نرم (کرک)حیوا ن (باستثناءآغشته، ا ندوده یاپوشانده بامطبق شده).	۱,۹۳۰	۳۸,۶۰۰	۰.۵۵	۰.۳۹
۱۳۹۴	۱۰	۹۴۰۳۹۰۰۰	ا جزا ءوقطعات مبلهای مشمول ۹۴۰۳	۵,۱۰۰	۳۰,۶۰۰	۱.۴۵	۰.۳۱
			جمع اقلام فوق	**۳۱۹,۴۸۷**	**۹,۸۶۰,۴۷۹**	**۹۱.۱۰**	**۹۸.۶۰**
			جمع کل	**۳۵۰,۷۱۸**	**۱۰,۰۰۰,۵۷۲**	**۱۰۰**	**۱۰۰**
۱۳۹۵	۱	۵۷۰۱۱۰۹۰	سایر کف پوش ها بجز گبه از پشم یا از موی نرم (کرک) حیوان	۱,۶۳۸,۱۷۶	۷۹,۸۸۶,۳۱۷	۶۸.۶۵	۹۰.۳۸
۱۳۹۵	۲	۵۷۰۱۹۰۰۰	فرش وسایرکف پوش های نسجی،ا زسایرموا دنسجی،گره باف.	۷۶,۴۰۶	۳,۵۹۴,۳۱۴	۳.۲۰	۴.۰۷
۱۳۹۵	۳	۵۷۰۲۱۰۹۰	سوماک (غیرازسوزنی)کارامانی ،فرشها(دست باف مانند غیر مذکور درجای دیگر)	۱۴,۲۴۰	۷۸۰,۱۸۰	۰.۶۰	۰.۸۸
۱۳۹۵	۴	۸۰۲۵۲۱۰	مغز پسته تازه یا خشک	۳۸,۰۰۰	۵۷۸,۰۰۰	۱.۵۹	۰.۶۵
۱۳۹۵	۵	۵۷۰۱۱۰۱۰	گبه از پشم یا از موی نرم (کرک) حیوان	۱۵,۱۴۸	۵۶۵,۲۴۶	۰.۶۳	۰.۶۴
۱۳۹۵	۶	۵۷۰۲۹۲۰۰	کف پوش های غیرمخملی باف، از مواد نسجی سنتتیک یا مصنوعی آماده مصرف	۴۸,۷۳۰	۵۱۵,۹۲۶	۲.۰۴	۰.۵۸
۱۳۹۵	۷	۱۲۰۹۹۱۰۰	تخم سبزیجات برا ی کشت	۱,۰۰۰	۲۶۴,۰۰۰	۰.۰۴	۰.۳۰
۱۳۹۵	۸	۹۱۰۲۰۹۰	زعفرا ن دربسته بندی بیش از ۳۰گرم	۱۱۳	۲۰۱,۸۵۹	۰.۰۰	۰.۲۳
۱۳۹۵	۹	۹۱۰۲۰۱۰	زعفران خرد نشده و ساییده نشده	۸۳	۱۷۵,۵۳۳	۰.۰۰	۰.۲۰
۱۳۹۵	۱۰	۵۶۰۲۲۱۰۰	نمدا زپشم یاموی نرم (کرک)حیوا ن (باستثناءآغشته، ا ندوده یاپوشانده بامطبق شده)	۷,۹۶۰	۱۵۹,۴۰۰	۰.۳۳	۰.۱۸
			جمع اقلام فوق	**۱,۸۳۹,۸۵۶**	**۸۶,۷۲۰,۷۷۵**	**۷۷.۱۰**	**۹۸.۱۱**
			جمع کل	**۲,۳۸۶,۳۵۸**	**۸۸,۳۹۳,۵۶۱**	**۱۰۰**	**۱۰۰**

واردات، صادرات و تراز بازرگانی طی سال‌های میلادی

در جدول زیر، میزان واردات، صادرات و تراز بازرگانی با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، طی سال‌های ۲۰۱۶-۲۰۰۹ میلادی آورده شده است.

جدول ۴. میزان واردات، صادرات و تراز بازرگانی با کشور «ایالات متحده آمریکا»، طی سال های۲۰۱۶-۲۰۰۹

سال	واردات		درصد تغییرات نسبت به مدت مشابه سال گذشته		صادرات		درصد تغییرات نسبت به مدت مشابه سال گذشته		تراز بازرگانی (هزار دلار)
	وزن (تن)	ارزش (هزار دلار)	وزن	ارزش	وزن (تن)	ارزش (هزار دلار)	وزن	ارزش	
۲۰۰۹	۳۳۳,۹۵۰	۲۹۲,۶۰۸	_	_	۵,۵۷۸	۸۵,۰۲۴	_	_	-۲۰۷,۵۸۴
۲۰۱۰	۴۷,۷۰۶	۱۷۶,۳۹۷	-۸۵.۷۱	-۳۹.۷۲	۳,۷۶۳	۱۰۴,۴۱۷	-۳۲.۵۴	۲۲.۸۱	-۷۱,۹۸۰
۲۰۱۱	۳۱,۹۴۱	۱۴۱,۳۴۷	-۳۳.۰۴	-۱۹.۸۷	۱۷۶	۷۶۶	-۹۵.۳۳	-۹۹.۲۷	-۱۴۰,۵۸۲
۲۰۱۲	۱۳۷,۸۹۳	۱۲۷,۵۶۱	۳۳۱.۷۰	-۹.۷۵	۴۶۱	۱,۳۹۷	۱۶۲.۰۶	۸۲.۴۹	-۱۲۶,۱۶۴
۲۰۱۳	۲۱,۸۸۸	۱۱۰,۴۱۴	-۸۴.۱۳	-۱۳.۴۴	۴۲۸	۱,۱۰۶	-۷.۱۷	-۲۰.۸۱	-۱۰۹,۳۰۸
۲۰۱۴	۲۷,۱۷۱	۱۵۳,۵۲۵	۲۴.۱۳	۳۹.۰۴	۱۱	۴۶۵	-۹۷.۵۴	-۵۷.۹۸	-۱۵۳,۰۶۰
۲۰۱۵	۱۱۰,۱۶۳	۱۵۶,۲۷۵	۳۰۵.۴۴	۱.۷۹	۵۰	۶۴۳	۳۷۷.۸۷	۳۸.۴۰	-۱۵۵,۶۳۲
۲۰۱۶	۲۶۶,۹۱۴	۲۶۴,۸۱۲	۱۴۲.۲۹	۶۹.۴۵	۲,۰۷۶	۸۰,۴۷۱	۴,۰۲۰.۱۳	۱۲,۴۰۸.۲۲	-۱۸۴,۳۴۱