

Volume II

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Annex 1.

S. Said and R. Jones, “Gaza Chief’s Brutal Calculation: Civilian Bloodshed Will Help Hamas” The Wall Street Journal (10 June 2024).

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EXCLUSIVE

Gaza Chief's Brutal Calculation: Civilian Bloodshed Will Help Hamas

Yahya Sinwar's correspondence with compatriots and mediators shows he is confident that Hamas can outlast Israel

By *Summer Said* [Follow](#) and *Rory Jones* [Follow](#)

June 10, 2024 9:00 pm ET

For months, Yahya Sinwar has resisted pressure to cut a [ceasefire-and-hostages deal](#) with Israel. Behind his decision, messages the Hamas military leader in Gaza has sent to mediators show, is a calculation that more fighting—and more Palestinian civilian deaths—work to his advantage.

“We have the Israelis right where we want them,” Sinwar said in a recent message to Hamas officials seeking to broker an agreement with Qatari and Egyptian officials.

Fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas units in the Gaza Strip's south has disrupted humanitarian-aid shipments, caused [mounting civilian casualties](#) and intensified [international criticism](#) of Israel's efforts to eradicate the Islamist extremist group.

For much of [Sinwar's political life](#), shaped by bloody conflict with an Israeli state that he says has no right to exist, he has stuck to a simple playbook. Backed into a corner, he looks to violence for a way out. The current fight in Gaza is no exception.



Relatives carry the bodies of children who were killed in Israeli strikes on Rafah in southern Gaza. PHOTO: SAID KHATIB/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In dozens of messages—reviewed by The Wall Street Journal—that Sinwar has transmitted to cease-fire negotiators, Hamas compatriots outside Gaza and others, he’s shown a cold disregard for human life and made clear he believes Israel has more to lose from the war than Hamas. The messages were shared by multiple people with differing views of Sinwar.

More than 37,000 people have been killed in Gaza since the start of the war, most of them civilians, Palestinian officials say. The figure doesn’t specify how many were combatants. Health authorities said almost 300 Palestinians were killed Saturday in an Israeli raid that [rescued four hostages](#) kept in captivity in homes surrounded by civilians—driving home for some Palestinians their role as pawns for Hamas.

In one message to Hamas leaders in Doha, Sinwar cited civilian losses in national-liberation conflicts in places such as Algeria, where hundreds of thousands of people died fighting for independence from France, saying, “these are necessary sacrifices.”

In an April 11 letter to Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh after three of Haniyeh’s adult sons [were killed by an Israeli airstrike](#), Sinwar wrote that their deaths and those of other Palestinians would “infuse life into the veins of this nation, prompting it to rise to its glory and honor.”

Sinwar isn’t the first Palestinian leader to embrace bloodshed as a means to pressure Israel. But the scale of the collateral damage in this war—civilians killed and [destruction wrought](#)—is unprecedented between Israelis and Palestinians.

Despite Israel’s ferocious effort to kill him, Sinwar has survived and micromanaged Hamas’s war effort, drafting letters, sending messages to cease-fire negotiators and deciding when the U.S.-designated terrorist group ramps up or dials back its attacks.

Sinwar in his own words



SAID KHATIB/AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“We have the Israelis right where we want them.”

-On who's winning the war

“Necessary sacrifices.”

-On Palestinian civilian casualties

“For Netanyahu, a victory would be even worse than a defeat.”

-On the Israeli prime minister

“Israel's journey in Rafah won't be a walk in the park.”

-On Israel's Rafah offensive

His ultimate goal appears to be to win a permanent cease-fire that allows Hamas to declare a historic victory by outlasting Israel and claim leadership of the Palestinian national cause.

President Biden [is trying to force](#) Israel and Hamas to halt the war. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is opposed to permanently ending the fight before what he calls “total victory” over Hamas.

Even without a lasting truce, Sinwar believes Netanyahu has few options other than occupying Gaza and getting bogged down fighting a Hamas-led insurgency for months or years.

It is an outcome that Sinwar foreshadowed six years ago when he first became leader in the Gaza Strip. Hamas might lose a war with Israel, but it would cause an Israeli occupation of more than two million Palestinians.

“For Netanyahu, a victory would be even worse than a defeat,” Sinwar told an Italian journalist writing in 2018 in an Israeli daily, Yedioth Ahronoth.



The 1967 war, which took place when Sinwar was a child, reordered the Middle East. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

Sinwar, now in his early 60s, was roughly 5 years old when the 1967 war brought him his first experience of significant violence between Israelis and Arabs. That brief fight reordered the Middle East. Israel took control of the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank from Jordan. It also captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, as well as the Gaza Strip, where Sinwar grew up in a United Nations-run refugee camp.

The conflict was a constant presence. Sinwar published a novel in 2004 while in Israeli prison and wrote in the preface that it was based on his own experiences. In the book, a father digs a deep hole in the yard of the refugee camp during the 1967 war, covering it with wood and metal to make a shelter.

A young son waits in the hole with his family, crying and hearing the sounds of explosions grow louder as the Israeli army approaches. The boy tries to climb out, only for his mother to yell: “It’s war out there! Don’t you know what war means?”

Sinwar joined the movement that eventually became Hamas in the 1980s, becoming close to founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and setting up an internal-security police that hunted and killed suspected informants, according to the transcript of his confession to Israeli interrogators in 1988.



Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (center, in 2003) was close to Sinwar. MAHMUD HAMS/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

He received multiple life sentences for murder and spent 22 years in prison before being freed in a swap along with a thousand other Palestinians in 2011 for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

During the negotiations between Israel and Hamas over the Shalit swap, Sinwar was influential in pushing for the freedom of Palestinians who were jailed for murdering Israelis.

He wanted to release even those who were involved in bombings that had killed large numbers of Israelis and was so maximalist in his demands that Israel put him in solitary confinement so he wouldn't disrupt progress.

When he became leader of Hamas in Gaza in 2017, violence was a constant in his repertoire. Hamas had wrested control of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in a bloody conflict a decade earlier, and while Sinwar moved early in his tenure to reconcile Hamas with other Palestinian factions, he warned that he would "break the neck" of anyone who stood in the way.

In 2018, Sinwar supported weekly protests at the fence between Gaza and Israeli territory. Fearful of a breach in the barrier, the Israeli military fired on Palestinians and agitators who came too close. It was all part of the plan.



An injured Palestinian protester is carried by fellow demonstrators during clashes with Israeli security forces in Gaza in 2018. PHOTO: SAID KHATIB/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“We make the headlines only with blood,” Sinwar said in the interview at the time with an Italian journalist. “No blood, no news.”

In 2021, reconciliation talks between Hamas and Palestinian factions appeared to be progressing toward legislative and presidential elections for the Palestinian Authority, the first in 15 years. But at the last moment, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas canceled polls. With the political track closed, Sinwar days later turned to bloodshed to change the status quo, firing rockets on Jerusalem amid tensions between Israelis and Palestinians in the city. The ensuing 11-day conflict killed 242 Palestinians and 12 people in Israel.

Israeli airstrikes caused such damage that Israeli officials believed Sinwar would be deterred from again attacking Israelis.

But the opposite happened: Israeli officials now believe Sinwar then began planning the Oct. 7 attacks. One aim was to end the paralysis in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and revive its global diplomatic importance, said Arab and Hamas officials familiar with Sinwar’s thinking.

Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories had lasted more than half a century, and Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners were talking about annexing land in the West Bank that Palestinians wanted for a future state. Saudi Arabia, once a champion of the Palestinian cause, was in talks [to normalize relations with Israel](#).

Though Sinwar planned and greenlighted the Oct. 7 attacks, early messages to cease-fire negotiators show he seemed surprised [by the brutality of Hamas’s armed wing](#) and other Palestinians, and how easily they committed civilian atrocities.

“Things went out of control,” Sinwar said in one of his messages, referring to gangs taking civilian women and children as hostages. “People got caught up in this, and that should not have happened.”



Palestinians transported a captured Israeli civilian from Kfar Aza kibbutz into Gaza on Oct. 7, 2023.

PHOTO: HATEM ALI/ASSOCIATED PRESS

This became a talking point for Hamas to explain away the Oct. 7 civilian toll.

Early in the war, Sinwar focused on using the hostages as a bargaining chip to delay an Israeli ground operation in Gaza. A day after Israeli soldiers entered the strip, Sinwar said Hamas was ready for an immediate deal to exchange its hostages for the release of all Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.

But Sinwar had misread how Israel would react to Oct. 7. Netanyahu declared Israel was going to destroy Hamas and said the only way to force the group to release hostages was through military pressure.

Sinwar appears to have also misinterpreted the support that Iran and Lebanese militia Hezbollah were willing to offer.

When Hamas political chief Haniyeh and deputy Saleh al-Arouri traveled to Tehran in November for a meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, they [were told that Tehran backed Hamas](#) but wouldn't be entering the conflict.

“He was partly misled by them and partly misled himself,” said Ehud Yaari, an Israeli commentator who has known Sinwar since his days in prison. “He was extremely disappointed.”

By November, Hamas's political leadership privately began distancing themselves from Sinwar, saying he launched the Oct. 7 attacks without telling them, Arab officials who spoke to Hamas said.

At the end of November, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire and the release of some hostages held by the militants. But the deal collapsed after a week.

As Israel's army quickly dismantled Hamas's military structures, the group's political leadership began meeting other Palestinian factions in early December to discuss reconciliation and a postwar plan. Sinwar wasn't consulted.

Sinwar in a message sent to the political leaders blasted the end-around as "shameful and outrageous."

"As long as fighters are still standing and we have not lost the war, such contacts should be immediately terminated," he said. "We have the capabilities to continue fighting for months."

On Jan. 2, [Arouri was killed](#) in a suspected Israeli strike in Beirut, and Sinwar began to change the way he communicated, said Arab officials. He used aliases and relayed notes only through a handful of trusted aides and via codes, switching between audio, messages spoken to intermediaries and written messages, they said.



The coffin of Hamas deputy chief Saleh al-Arouri is carried during his funeral in January. PHOTO: MARWAN TAHTAH/GETTY IMAGES

Still, his communications indicate he began to feel things were turning Hamas's way.

By the end of that month, Israel's military advance [had slowed to a grueling battle](#) in the city of Khan Younis, Sinwar's hometown. Israel began to lose more troops. On Jan. 23, about two dozen Israeli troops were killed in central and southern Gaza, [the invasion's deadliest day](#) for the military.

Arab mediators hastened to speed up talks about a cease-fire, and on Feb. 19, Israel set a deadline of Ramadan—a month later—for Hamas to return the hostages or face a ground offensive in Rafah, what Israeli officials described as the militant group's last stronghold.

Sinwar in a message urged his comrades in Hamas's political leadership outside Gaza not to make concessions and instead to push for a permanent end to the war. High civilian casualties would create worldwide pressure on Israel, Sinwar said. The group's armed wing was ready for the onslaught, Sinwar's messages said.

"Israel's journey in Rafah won't be a walk in the park," Sinwar told Hamas leaders in Doha in a message.

At the end of February, an aid delivery in Gaza turned deadly as Israeli forces fired on Palestinian civilians crowding trucks, adding U.S. pressure on Israel to limit casualties.



People mourn over the body of a Palestinian killed when Israeli forces fired on people crowding aid trucks. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Disagreements among [Israel's wartime leaders erupted into public view](#), as Netanyahu failed to articulate a postwar governance plan for Gaza and his defense minister, Yoav Gallant, privately warned against reoccupying the strip. Israelis grew concerned [the country was losing the war](#).

In May, Israel again threatened to attack Rafah if cease-fire talks remained deadlocked, a move Hamas viewed as purely a negotiating tactic.

Netanyahu said Israel needed to expand into Rafah to destroy Hamas's military structure there and disrupt smuggling from Egypt.

Sinwar's response: Hamas fired on Kerem Shalom crossing May 5, killing four soldiers. Hamas officials outside Gaza began to echo Sinwar's confident posture.

Israel has since launched its Rafah operation. But as Sinwar predicted, it has come at a humanitarian and diplomatic cost.

Sinwar's messages, meanwhile, indicate he's willing to die in the fighting.

In a recent message to allies, the Hamas leader likened the war to a 7th-century battle in Karbala, Iraq, where the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad was controversially slain.

“We have to move forward on the same path we started,” Sinwar wrote. “Or let it be a new Karbala.”



In his messages, Sinwar has indicated he's willing to die in the fighting. PHOTO: AHMED DEEB FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

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Annex 2.

M. Chance, "Outrage in Israel as Hostage 'Horror' Videos Emerge at Decision Time for Netanyahu's Government" CNN World (5 August 2025).

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Outrage in Israel as hostage 'horror' videos emerge at decision time for Netanyahu's government

UPDATED AUG 5, 2025

Analysis by  [Matthew Chance](#), CNN Chief Global Affairs Correspondent  World

Sign in



“What I’m doing now is digging my own grave,” says Evyatar David, as his fragile figure, weak with hunger, scrapes at the dirt with a shovel in a cramped Gaza tunnel.

“Every day, my body becomes weaker and weaker,” the 24-year-old hostage adds, “and time is running out.”

This is just one of the horrifying scenes recorded in the [latest hostage videos](#) released by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad at the weekend showing two of the surviving Israeli hostages, kidnapped on October 7, 2023, sharply deteriorating in captivity.

Broadcast of the disturbing images across Israeli and international media was approved by the traumatized hostage families, who told CNN they

wanted the plight of their loved ones to be witnessed.

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“Evyatar was a young, healthy man before he was abducted, even a bit chubby. Now he looks like a skeleton, a human skeleton, buried alive,” the captive’s brother, Ilay David, told CNN in Tel Aviv.

The state of Rom Braslavski, still just 22, seems even more dire. In a video released by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group holding him, his emaciated body is shown writhing in pain on the floor of a makeshift Gaza prison as he tearfully pleads for relief.

“My foot doesn’t look good and I can’t walk to the bathroom. I’ve run out of food and water. I can’t sleep, I can’t live,” he sobs.

His own mother says her son’s weak voice sounds like he’s accepted he may never come out alive.

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The videos come amid a worsening hunger crisis in Gaza, with a UN-backed food security agency warning that the **“worst-case scenario of famine”** is unfolding in the territory. Health officials in Gaza say a further 13 people died from malnutrition over the weekend, including one child, bringing the total death toll from starvation since the conflict began in 2023 to at least 175.



Demonstrators take part in a protest to demand the immediate release of hostages held in Gaza since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas and to end the war, as a video released by Hamas of hostage Evyatar David is displayed, in Tel Aviv, Israel, on August 2. (Ammar Awad/Reuters)

It all piles further pressure on the Israeli government, already facing growing international isolation over the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza, and now facing renewed calls for it to get the remaining 50 hostages back home from Gaza as soon as possible.

How best to do that is one of the key questions dividing Israeli opinion.

“The horror videos by Hamas stem from one goal – their attempt to pressure the State of Israel,” said Itmar Ben Gvir, the right-wing firebrand, in remarks made during a controversial visit at the weekend to the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in East Jerusalem, known to Jews as Temple Mount.

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“It is from here that a message must be sent: to conquer the entire Gaza Strip, declare sovereignty over all of Gaza, eliminate every Hamas member, and encourage voluntary emigration. Only in this way will we bring back the hostages and win the war,” Ben Gvir added.

His calls to double down on Israel's already devastating military action in Gaza, and to essentially evict the local Palestinian population, might be dismissed as the ravings of a fringe radical.

But Ben Gvir is a senior minister in the Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu depends on him and other Jewish nationalist hardliners, who are against any kind of deal with Hamas, to keep his fragile governing coalition in power.

Furthermore, Israeli media reports suggest Netanyahu may indeed be **leaning towards** stepping up military operations in Gaza.

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In the past, many Israelis, including many hostage families, have accused Netanyahu of deliberately prolonging the Gaza conflict in order to preserve his governing coalition, accusing him of essentially sacrificing their loved ones to cling on to power.

But the latest hostage videos, showing emaciated captives in a, frankly, appalling state have provoked shock and outrage across Israel.

With hostage families convinced time is running out for their loved ones to be rescued or returned, enormous pressure has been placed on the Israeli government to strike a deal with Hamas before it is too late.





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Judicial Integrity and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

Christopher Greenwood

Introduction

The advisory jurisdiction conferred on the International Court of Justice by Article 96 of the United Nations Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court represents a significant part of the overall work of the Court. During its first 67 years, the Court has given 26 advisory opinions,¹ compared to 116 judgments in contentious cases (67 of which were judgments on the merits), covering a broad range of subjects, which included not only the predictable issues of United Nations law and international civil service staff cases but also questions of international humanitarian and human rights law, acquisition of territory and decolonisation, the law of treaties and declarations of independence. Many of these broader questions also arose in contentious cases before the Court.

There are, of course, important differences between the advisory and contentious jurisdictions. Contentious cases take place between the States parties to a dispute, whereas the advisory jurisdiction can be invoked only by the Security Council, the General Assembly or one of the other UN organs or specialised agencies duly authorised by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter and there are no 'parties' in the sense in which that term is used in the contentious jurisdiction. Moreover, while Article 59 of the Statute makes the judgment of the Court in a contentious case binding on the parties to that case, no provision of the Statute or the Charter imposes an obligation of compliance with an advisory opinion. It is true that advisory opinions are sometimes binding on the organization which requests them but in such cases the binding quality results from the provisions

* Judge at the International Court of Justice.

1 It should be noted, however, that the Permanent Court was kept far busier by its advisory jurisdiction. In the 18 years of its active existence, the Permanent Court delivered 27 advisory opinions.

of a legal instrument other than those under which the Court operates;² so far as the Court is concerned, advisory opinions are ‘advisory’. Nevertheless, it is important to recall what Judge Gros said in his declaration in the *Western Sahara* case: “when the Court gives an advisory opinion on a question of law it states the law” and “the absence of binding force does not transform the judicial operation into a legal consultation, which may be made use of or not according to choice”.³

That reminder is but one reflection of a principle which the Court and its predecessor have stressed from the outset, namely that in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction it must be careful to maintain its integrity as a judicial institution. As the Permanent Court put it, “the Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding [its] activity as a Court”.⁴ The Court has various means open to it to ensure that its judicial integrity is not compromised by a request for an advisory opinion. In the last resort, it can exercise its discretion to decline to give an opinion if it considers that this course is necessary to protect its judicial integrity. The existence of that discretion was asserted by the Permanent Court in the *Eastern Carelia* case and has been repeated on numerous occasions by the present Court.⁵ Although the Court has always insisted that “the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction represents its participation in the activities of the

2 See, e.g., Article XII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal relating to review of the decisions of the ILOAT, which was recently considered by the Court in *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 10 (the “*IFAD Opinion*”). The Court there repeated what it had said in *Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints made against the UNESCO*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 84, that “that effect goes beyond the scope attributed by the Charter and the Statute of the Court to an advisory opinion”. In both the *UNESCO* and *IFAD* cases, the Court held that this additional effect derived from the ILOAT Statute “does not affect the way in which the Court functions; that continues to be determined by its Statute and Rules” (*IFAD Opinion*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 23, para. 28). Advisory opinions are also treated as binding under a number of treaties; see, e.g., *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 62, applying Article VIII, Section 30 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

3 *Western Sahara*, Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Gros, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 73, para. 6.

4 *Status of Eastern Carelia*, Advisory Opinion of 23 July 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No. 5, p. 29. For application of this principle by the current Court, see *IFAD Opinion*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 25, para. 34.

5 See, e.g., *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 156, para. 44.

[United Nations] Organization and, in principle, should not be refused”⁶ and “compelling reasons” are required if the Court is to refuse a request,⁷ there is no doubt that if the Court considered that it could not respond to a request for an advisory opinion without compromising its judicial character, then it would exercise its power to refuse.⁸

That power has, however, never been used by the present Court. It is, therefore, perhaps of more interest to consider some of the other, less drastic, ways in which the Court has attempted to ensure that its judicial integrity is preserved in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. To that end, I propose to examine three matters: the Court’s willingness to depart from the terms of the question put to it by the requesting body; the difficulties of fact-finding in the advisory jurisdiction; and the difficulties of ensuring due process in hearing certain types of advisory request.

The Willingness of the Court to Depart from the Terms of the Question

The Court has never considered itself bound to adhere to the precise terms of the question on which it is asked to give an opinion. Thus, it has considered itself free to reformulate questions which were badly drafted⁹ and to simplify questions which were unnecessarily complicated or repetitive.¹⁰ More importantly, in the *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951*

6 *Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase)*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 71.

7 *UNESCO Opinion*, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 86.

8 The power to refuse to respond to a request is not, however, limited to the preservation of the judicial integrity of the Court; see the discussion in *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 415–423, paras. 29–48, and the separate opinion of Judge Keith, pp. 482–490. The present Court has never actually exercised its discretion to refuse to give an advisory opinion; the decision in *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66 was based on the finding that the request did not arise within the scope of the activities of the WHO, so that an essential condition for the jurisdiction of the Court was not satisfied (see p. 84, para. 31).

9 See, e.g., *Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 325.

10 In the *IFAD Opinion*, the Court was confronted with a set of nine questions, essentially raising the same point, and decided that it need answer only two; ICJ Reports 2012, p. 48, para. 96.

between the WHO and Egypt, the Court stated that “if it is to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, it must ascertain what are the legal questions really in issue in questions formulated in a request”.¹¹ A similar approach may be seen in the opinion on *Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa* and, even more clearly, in the trenchant comments by Judge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion, where he remarked that “the General Assembly, although actually desirous of an answer of the Court bearing upon a specific situation, cast its request in an apparently general form unrelated to that situation” and warned that “it is a matter of common experience that a mere affirmation or a mere denial of a question does not necessarily result in a close approximation to truth”.¹²

In this connection, the reformulation by the Court of the question posed by the General Assembly in *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo* is of particular interest. The General Assembly had asked the following question:

Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?¹³

Whether the authors of the declaration of independence were in fact the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo was, however, disputed. The Court held that this was a matter which the Court had to decide and, after considering the evidence before it, concluded that

the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration.¹⁴

11 *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 88, para. 35.

12 *Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa*, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 37.

13 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 407, para. 1.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 447–448, para. 109.

The Court therefore proceeded to give an opinion on the accordance with international law of the declaration made by those representatives thus, in effect, reformulating the question put to it so as to remove the reference to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.

That decision has attracted some controversy.¹⁵ To the extent that the controversy concerns whether the Provisional Institutions were in fact the authors of the declaration, it falls outside the scope of this paper. What is of immediate concern, however, is whether the Court was entitled to investigate that matter for itself and, having come to the conclusion that the declaration was not the work of the Provisional Institutions as such, to depart from the terms of the question put to it. The Court considered that it was the protection of the judicial function which required it to examine the identity of the authors of the declaration for itself, rather than treating that matter as settled by the terms of the question. The Court observed:

The identity of the authors of the declaration [...] is capable of affecting the answer to the question whether that declaration was in accordance with international law. It would be incompatible with the proper exercise of the judicial function for the Court to treat that matter as having been determined by the General Assembly.¹⁶

That is surely right. It is difficult to see how, without compromising its judicial integrity, the Court could provide an answer to a question regarding the legality of an action while considering that the terms of that question precluded it from inquiring into an issue which had a bearing on whether or not that action was lawful. Having conducted its own inquiry and concluded that the Provisional Institutions were not the authors of the declaration, the Court could not then have answered the question as originally formulated. In those circumstances, the only response it could have given to the question as originally formulated would have been that there had been no such declaration, an answer which would have been wholly unhelpful to the General Assembly.

15 See the dissenting opinions and Mohamed Bennouna, "The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice in the Light of Recent Developments," in *The Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence*, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al. (New York: Oceana, 2013), 98.

16 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 424, para. 52.

The Difficulties of Fact-finding in the Advisory Jurisdiction

Since requests for advisory opinions are frequently (as Judge Lauterpacht emphasised in the opinion quoted above) bound up with specific situations, it will be necessary for the Court to have a clear picture of that specific situation if it is to give an answer which is helpful to the requesting body and is compatible with the Court's judicial function. That can present problems if the facts are not easy to establish.

In many cases, no real problem arises because the Court finds that the body requesting an advisory opinion has supplied all the elements necessary for the Court to give a reply to the question. Moreover, Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute provides for all States entitled to appear before the Court and any international organization considered by the Court "as likely to be able to furnish information on the question" to be notified of the request and to be afforded the opportunity to make written and, if oral proceedings are held, oral submissions to the Court.¹⁷ The Court has interpreted this provision as giving it a broad power to seek information from those who might be in a position to provide it. Thus, in the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, the Court decided that Palestine could submit observations and in *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, it considered that the authors of the declaration of independence were likely to be able to furnish information on the question and invited them to make written and oral submissions. While the Court will, therefore, usually have a substantial dossier of information available to it, resolving disputed points of fact may still prove problematic.

Determining the facts relevant to a particular case can, of course, present serious problems in contentious cases but the difficulties which arise in the contentious jurisdiction are greatly reduced by the effect of the burden of proof. As the Court has repeatedly held, "it is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of such facts",¹⁸ and if that party fails to establish the existence of those facts, the Court can give judgment on the basis that the relevant allegation has not been proved. In advisory proceedings,

17 While no State or organization is obliged to respond to this invitation, in several cases many have done so. Thus, in *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, a total of forty-two States and the authors of the declaration took part.

18 *Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 71, para. 162.

however, subject to one qualification which will be considered in the next section, there are no parties and thus no burden of proof as such.

The result is that if the Court considers that it does not have sufficient information before it to enable it to resolve a particular issue of fact, it cannot fall back upon considerations of burden of proof and may, therefore, be unable to answer the question in whole or in part if it is to remain faithful to its judicial function. While the Court has never held that it lacked sufficient information to give an opinion, in *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, it considered that it lacked sufficient information to return a full answer. Thus, in the critical paragraph 2(E) of its conclusions in that case, the Court stated:

It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

However, *in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal*, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.¹⁹

On any analysis, this paragraph is less than satisfactory. It was adopted by seven votes to seven on the casting vote of President Bedjaoui, with the dissenting votes including those of judges who criticised the Court for pronouncing what was in effect a *non liquet* and contended that the Court should have ruled that there were—or at least might be—circumstances in which a nuclear weapon might lawfully be used, as well as judges who criticised the Court for leaving any possibility that nuclear weapons could ever lawfully be employed. Moreover, the idea that “an extreme circumstance of self-defence” might legitimise what would otherwise be a violation of international humanitarian law (if that was indeed what the paragraph implies, which is not entirely clear) suggests that *jus ad bellum* may prevail over *jus in bello*, something which was not advocated by any State participating in the proceedings and is contrary to decades of doctrine and jurisprudence.²⁰ The second part of operative paragraph 2(E) also has the uneasy appearance of having been bolted onto

19 *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 266, para. 105, subpara. 2(E) (emphasis added).

20 See Christopher Greenwood, “*Jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,” in *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear*

the opinion at a late stage. The only basis for it in the reasoning of the Court is a short section of the opinion, culminating in paragraph 97, which echoes the language of paragraph 2(E) but with one significant difference. Whereas paragraph 2(E) speaks of the use of nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”, paragraph 97 refers to the use of nuclear weapons “by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which *its* very survival would be at stake”. In a world with few nuclear powers but many States connected by alliances of one kind or another to a nuclear-armed State, this is a nuance of language which has the potential to be of considerable importance. Finally, paragraph 2(E) blends a complaint about the lack of factual information with a curious reference to “the current state of international law”, which invites the criticism of a *non liquet*.

Nevertheless, for present purposes, the important point is that the Court did consider that it lacked the factual information necessary for it to give a full answer to the question put to it. That emerges most clearly from paragraph 94, in which the Court stated:

The Court would observe that none of the States advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, including the “clean” use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court does not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view.²¹

Whether any State (or organization) could have supplied that kind of information is open to question.

The Difficulties of Ensuring Due Process

A central concern in relation to the preservation of judicial integrity in any proceedings must be that those proceedings properly respect the principles of due process and, in particular, of equality of arms, as those principles have evolved over time. That presents particular problems in relation to one type

Weapons, ed. Philippe Sands and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 247–267.

21 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 262, para. 94.

of advisory proceeding, namely that in which an international organization requests an advisory opinion from the Court regarding the validity of a ruling by a staff tribunal.²² Five of the 26 advisory opinions given by the International Court of Justice have concerned this kind of request.²³

Formally speaking, the position before the Court is that, as these are advisory proceedings, there are no parties. However, the subject on which the Court is asked to rule in this type of case is the validity of a decision given by a tribunal in proceedings between two parties, namely the staff member initiating those proceedings and the international organization against whom the complaint is made. In effect, the Court acts as a review body in relation to the outcome of proceedings which were contentious. Moreover, its advisory opinion has a binding effect, so that if it rules that the tribunal's decision was invalid, the staff member will lose the benefit of the judgment in his or her favour which had been given by the administrative tribunal. The reality, therefore, is that the Court has to consider the rights and interests of both the parties to the original proceedings. That gives rise to concern in two respects.

First, only one of those parties, the international organization, may invoke the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; the individual staff member has no right to seek an advisory opinion. In the case of judgments of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the inequality of access to the Court was ameliorated by the fact that staff members were given access to a review process which could lead to a request for an opinion from the Court. Three of the staff cases before the Court concerned judgments of UNAT. Provision for either party to challenge a judgment of UNAT by means of advisory proceedings in the Court was, however, brought to an end in 1995. The situation with judgments of the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal is different. Under Article XII of the ILOAT Statute, there is no comparable provision giving access for the staff member to a review procedure, with the result that the international organization which is the respondent before the ILOAT may challenge the validity²⁴ of a judgment given in favour of a staff

22 Concerns about ensuring due process may, however, arise in other types of advisory proceedings where the conduct of one State or international organization may be at the heart of the issue in respect of which an opinion is sought.

23 *UNESCO Opinion*, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 77; *Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 166; *Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 325; *Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 18; and *IFAD Opinion*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 10.

24 Article XII, para. 1, of the ILOAT Statute provides for a challenge on the basis that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or committed a fundamental error of procedure.

member but there is no scope for a staff member to bring about a challenge to a judgment in favour of the respondent organization. Secondly, the staff member has no standing before the Court. It is the responsibility of the international organization to supply the Court with the relevant factual material and to communicate to the Court any submissions which the staff member may wish to put before the Court. In both respects, the Court is asked to exercise its advisory jurisdiction under conditions in which the equality of the parties to the original proceedings is absent in the proceedings before the Court.

Whether such proceedings are compatible with the judicial function was first considered by the Court in 1956. The Court, while recognising the concerns regarding inequality of access, considered that they were not sufficient to justify it in declining to respond to the request for an advisory opinion. It stated that the inequality of access was not an inequality before the Court but something antecedent to the examination of the question by the Court. In addition, it thought that the inequality was more apparent than real, since the staff member would have no interest in challenging the judgment of the tribunal as that judgment was in the staff member's favour.²⁵ The first consideration is formalistic to say the least. The second is frankly bizarre. Of course, if the respondent organization challenges a tribunal judgment it will be because that judgment was in favour of the staff member and the latter will therefore have no interest in bringing a challenge against that judgment, but that fact does not obviate the inequality of access. Staff members commencing proceedings do so in the knowledge that a judgment in their favour may be challenged but that they cannot challenge a judgment against them.

This matter has recently been reconsidered by the Court in its advisory opinion in *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*. The Court there drew attention to the fact that concepts of due process and equality of arms had undergone considerable development in the years since the 1956 opinion. It referred, *inter alia*, to the General Comments of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees equality before courts and tribunals, a principle which the Court, in its 1956 opinion, described as following from "the requirements of good administration of justice".²⁶ The Court concluded that:

25 *UNESCO Opinion*, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 85.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

That principle must now be understood as including access on an equal basis to available appellate or similar remedies unless an exception can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds [...]. [...] questions may now properly be asked whether the system established in 1946 meets the present-day principle of equality of access to courts and tribunals.²⁷

The Court also considered that it had a duty to ensure as far as possible equality in the proceedings before it. To that end it had required IFAD to transmit statements from the staff member (Ms Saez Garcia) and declined IFAD's request for oral proceedings in which Ms Saez Garcia would not have been entitled to take a direct part. The Court noted that "the process was not without its difficulties".²⁸ IFAD had required several requests before it had supplied all the information requested by the Court, had failed to inform Ms Saez Garcia in a timely way of certain procedural requests which it made to the Court and had initially failed to transmit to the Court certain communications from Ms Saez Garcia. In the end the Court concluded that the proceedings had been fair but only as a result of its own insistence.²⁹

The formal position cannot be allowed to mask the reality of this type of advisory proceeding. That reality is that there *are* two parties and that the Court is asked to give an opinion which will act as a final decision on the rights and obligations of those two parties towards one another. Recognition of that fact has at least two implications. First, it is incompatible with the integrity of the Court as a judicial body for it to proceed in a case of this kind without ensuring the equality of arms between those two parties. Secondly, this type of case is one in which the burden of proof may be applied in the event of a factual dispute, although care is needed if it is to be applied to the detriment of the staff member, given that the staff member lacks direct access to the Court.

There is, however, a more important concern, namely whether such proceedings should be brought at all. In *IFAD*, the Court took the view that since it had ensured equality of arms in the proceedings themselves, it would be wrong to refuse to respond to the question and thus withdraw without warning from a system which had been in place for several decades. The warning for the future is nonetheless clear. It is to be hoped that it is heeded and that the *IFAD* case is the last of its kind.

²⁷ *IFAD Opinion*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 29, para. 44.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30, para. 46.

²⁹ See also Judgment No. 3152 of the ILOAT given on 6 February 2013, which is sharply critical of the approach of IFAD.

Annex 4.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reported
impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (9 October 2024), (9 October 2024).

DAY 369

Disclaimer: Figures that are yet-to-be verified by the UN are attributed to their source. Casualty numbers have been provided by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Israeli authorities. The fatality breakdowns currently cited are those that the MoH in Gaza has fully identified as of 31 August out of the higher number of casualties they report. The latest casualty updates are also available on the Health Cluster's [Unified Dashboard](#).

KEY FIGURES



42,010
Palestinian fatalities

Source: MoH Gaza



~1.9 million
internally displaced persons
(90% of Gaza)

UN estimate




495K
People facing catastrophic levels
of food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).

Source: IPC projection for 1 May - 30 September 2024



~84%
of Gaza under Israeli-issued evacuation
orders, excluding those that have been
revoked, as of 8 October




REPORTED CASUALTIES (Cumulative) as of 9 October 2024

Palestinians*

42,010
Reported fatalities include


34,344 identified as of 31 August as:
13,737 men, 6,297 women, 11,355 children, 2,955 elderly



Separately, more than 10,000 people reported missing or under the rubble (source: GMD and PCD).

*Source: MoH Gaza

97,720
Reported injuries



*Source: MoH Gaza

Israelis**

Israel
Over 1,200***
Reported fatalities, including at least 33 children

~5,400
Reported injuries

Gaza****
348 Reported fatalities, 2,319 Reported injuries, estimated 101 hostages remain in Gaza

** According to Israeli media citing official sources.
*** This includes fatalities on 7 October and the immediate aftermath, including foreign nationals.
**** The reported Israeli casualties are soldiers killed or injured since the start of the ground operation (source: Israeli military website).

FOOD SECURITY

- 96% of the analyzed population (2.15 million) was projected to face crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC 3 or above), including*:
 - 745K people facing emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 4).
 - 495K people facing catastrophic levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).
- 60-70% of meat and dairy-producing livestock killed or prematurely slaughtered (source: FAO).
- 68% of cropland, 52% of agricultural wells, & 44% of greenhouse area damaged (source: UNOSAT as of Aug 2024, FAO as of 1 Sep 2024).
- 70% of the fishing fleet destroyed (Food Security Sector, August 2024).

* Source: IPC projection for 16 June - 30 September 2024

PROTECTION

- >1 million children in need of mental health and psycho-social support (source: UNICEF).
- 17,000 children are unaccompanied or separated (source: UNICEF, as of Feb 2024).
- At least 307 aid workers killed (300 nationals, 7 foreigners), some in the line of duty, including:
 - 229 UN staff - UNRWA: 225; WHO: 1; UNDP: 1; UNOPS: 1; UNSSS: 1.
 - 33 PRCS staff and volunteers, including 19 while on duty.
 - At least 45 other aid workers.
- 986 health workers, including some also counted under aid workers above (source: MoH Gaza).
- 85 Civil Defence staff killed while on duty (source: PCD).
- 167 journalists and media workers killed (source: PJS).
- 190 UNRWA installations damaged (source: UNRWA).

SHELTER*

- 87% (411,000) of housing units are destroyed (141,000) or severely/partially damaged (270,000).
- 1.5 m² average space per person in IDP shelters, below the minimum emergency indicator of 3.5 m² per person.
- 1.34 million people in need of emergency shelter and essential household items.
- 0.9 million people in need of winterization support.

*Source: Shelter Cluster, unless otherwise noted

HEALTH*

- 17 hospitals partially functional (3 in North Gaza, 7 in Gaza, 3 in Deir al Balah, 4 in Khan Younis).
- 19 out of 36 hospitals out of service.
- 11 field hospitals functional, including 4 fully and 7 partially (3 in Deir al Balah, 6 in Khan Younis, and 2 in Rafah).
- 43% of primary health care centres are partially functional (56 out of 131).
- 30% (8 out of 27) of UNRWA health centres are operational (source: UNRWA, as of 3 Oct).
- 16 Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) deployed, including 15 international and 1 national.
- 130 ambulances damaged (source: MoH Gaza).
- 39% (6,075 out of 15,600) of critical patients who submitted requests for medical evacuation have had their requests approved; these include 33% (5,138 out of 15,600) who were medically evacuated abroad as of 26 August.
- As of 30 September, it is estimated that 12,000 patients are in need of medical evacuation. On six occasions, 229 patients along with 316 companions have been exceptionally evacuated since the closure of Rafah Crossing on 7 May.


*Source: WHO, unless otherwise noted

EDUCATION*

- ~625,000 students with no access to formal education.
- 10,479 students and 423 educational staff killed and >16,300 students and 2,479 teachers injured (source: MoE, as of 7 October 2024).
- At least 87% of school buildings (493 out of 564) require either full reconstruction or major rehabilitation (as of 6 September 2024).
- 35 university buildings were destroyed and 57 were damaged (source: MoE, as of 7 October 2024).

*Source: Education Cluster, unless otherwise noted

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS (1-7 Oct)



NUTRITION*

- Over 96% of women and children aged 6-23 months are not meeting their nutrient requirements due to lack of minimum diet diversity.
- 346,000 children under five and 160,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women require feeding and micronutrient supplements.
- 50,000 children are estimated to require treatment for acute malnutrition in 2024.

*Source: Nutrition Cluster

WATER AND SANITATION*

- All three water connection points (Mekero) coming from Israel are partially operational, producing 36,271 m³ per day (20,000 m³ in northern Gaza and 16,271 in central and southern Gaza).
- Two out of three water desalination plants are intermittently operational.
- 113,954 m³ of water produced and supplied on average per day between 15 and 28 September, or just over a quarter of water supply prior to October 2023. This includes 72,661 m³ of water produced by municipal wells and desalination plants.
- 395,000 tons of accumulated solid waste and two central landfills remain inaccessible.

*Source: WASH Cluster
**70% of water supplied through networks is lost due to damages.


REPORTED DAMAGE

- 80% of commercial facilities (source: World Bank, as of Jan 24).
- 68% of the total road network (source: UNOSAT, as of Aug 24).

INCOMING TRUCKLOADS*

The pre-crisis average per working day in 2023 was 500 truckloads, including fuel.

*Commercial trucks are not captured in the totals following 7 May, as the UN has been unable to directly observe the arrival of private sector cargo at Kerem Shalom crossing. Fuel is not included.



Annex 5.

COGAT, @cogatonline, X (formerly Twitter) (5:52 pm, 11 March 2025).

← Post



COGAT 
@cogatonline



The COGAT humanitarian assessment team monitors the humanitarian situation across Gaza in all areas, including water, from a wide range of sources.

Drinking water in Gaza is available from waterlines from Israel, water desalination plants, and pumping facilities, above international standards.

76 liters per person per day in central and southern Gaza.

67 liters per person per day in northern Gaza. 🇵🇸

5:52 PM · Mar 11, 2025 · **14.9K** Views



Annex 6.

Hamish Falconer MP, @HFalconerMP, X (formerly Twitter) (6:12 pm, 16 March 2025).

← **Post**



Hamish Falconer MP 
@HFalconerMP



The humanitarian situation in Gaza is critical. For two weeks, Israel's blockade of aid has impeded access to food, water, and healthcare: now only 10% of people have access to safe drinking water.

Israel must lift aid restrictions immediately to prevent further suffering.

6:12 PM · Mar 16, 2025 · **27.4K** Views

 87

 76

 135

 7



Annex 7.

N. Freund, “Wie echt sind die Bilder aus Gaza?” Süddeutsche Zeitung (3 August 2025).

English Translation

Süddeutsche Zeitung

War and the media. How real are the images from Gaza?

3 August 2025, 7:36 PM|

Reading time: 6 min.

Nicolas Freund, Zurich



Message and reality: The fact that these people are holding out their pots at a photographer rather than at a food distribution centre does not mean that the picture does not depict the reality in Gaza. (Photo: Khames Alrefi/Imago/Anadolu Agency)

People are starving in Gaza, as documented by many independent sources, including the UN. However, some images purportedly showing the hardship are taken out of context. Experts argue that it is important to take a very close look.

The photos from Gaza are difficult to bear. Several images, currently circulating in the news and on social media, will not be forgotten anytime soon: a crowd of desperate people behind a barrier, clutching empty pots and bowls, apparently begging for food. A mother holding her emaciated child in her arms. A child's ribs and spine are visible through the skin. He is wearing a garbage bag as a diaper. And again and again, people bending over white sheets, beneath whose fabric the outlines of human figures can be discerned.

Over the weekend, Hamas released a video showing one of the Israeli hostages who has been held captive by the terrorists for almost two years. The video shows the 24-year-old Evjatar David, completely emaciated, digging a shallow pit in one of the tunnels where Hamas is said to be holding many of the hostages. His own grave, he says. There is no food, only lentils or beans sometimes. The terrorist organisation may be trying to send a message with the video: the hostages are also suffering from hunger in Gaza.



At a demonstration in Tel Aviv, calling for the release of the hostages, a photo of Evjatar David, published by the terrorist organization Hamas, was shown. The photograph was circulated with the consent of Evjatar David's family. (Photo: Ammar Awad/REUTERS)

The impact of the images also reached President Trump

It is almost impossible to escape the force and power of these images. They are so pervasive and powerful. This is evidenced from the political reactions of the past few days. Even US President Donald Trump, one of the biggest supporters of Israel and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, commented: "These children look very hungry." He went on to say that there is "real hunger" in Gaza and that he had advised Israel that they should, perhaps, do some things differently. The Israeli army is accused of hindering the food supplies with its blockade of the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu had previously denied that the people in Gaza were suffering from hunger.

Last week, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Jordan's King Abdullah II also had aid supplies dropped from the air on Gaza. The *Tagesschau.de* reports that "Chancellor Merz and his coalition government are sensing that public sentiment is shifting in this country as well". "The images from Gaza are now causing outrage even among Israel's friends.". A few days ago, the United Nations warned of an impending famine in Gaza, including videos on social media and a report, and also showed images of children who appeared to be starving.



Food drops over northern Gaza Strip on 27 July. (Photo: Dawoud Abu Alkas/Reuters)

It was precisely in this atmosphere of outrage that it was reported that the children in some of the photographs from Gaza, which politicians and aid organizations refer to, did not look so emaciated solely because of the lack of food. Rather, it could also be due to illness, which was concealed when the images were circulated. For example, the boy in his mother's arms, whose photo was also published by the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, suffers from cerebral palsy, a neurological disorder that explains his appearance. And the photo of another extremely emaciated boy does not show the child in Gaza. The boy has a pre-existing genetic condition and has been undergoing treatment in Italy since mid-June, according to Israeli media reports citing local authorities who helped the boy and his family leave the country.

“Attempts at manipulation using professionally produced press photos”

The German Journalists' Association (“DJV”) warned against "attempts at manipulation using professionally produced press photos" in response to these cases, among other things. DJV Chairman Mika Beuster wrote: "Warring parties on all sides, domestic and foreign media outlets, and intelligence agencies are using the power of images to influence public opinion as never before."

There is little doubt that Gaza is facing the threat of famine. More than a hundred humanitarian organizations have warned of a "mass famine" in the Gaza Strip, and the World Food Programme (“WFP”) has criticised the aid deliveries that began a few days ago as insufficient, saying they are far from enough to avert a famine. "Hunger exists, and it is clear who caused it," says Christopher Resch, Middle East spokesperson for Reporters Without Borders. "The trigger was the attack of October 7 and the terror of Hamas; we must not forget that. But it is also due to the Israeli army's warfare”.

It is equally true that these images from Gaza show exactly what Hamas wants: a civilian population suffering from Israel's warfare. But if it is now known that some of these images have been placed in a false or misleading context, can images from Gaza no longer be trusted — or even used as a basis for political decisions?

"These are not fakes. But the people are presented in a certain way."

"I assume that many of these images of starving and sick children are simply staged or taken from other contexts," says Gerhard Paul, professor emeritus of history and photography expert, who has been researching images from Israel and Gaza for 25 years and has travelled to the region himself. "These are not fakes," he says. "But the people are presented in a certain way or given a misleading caption to mobilise our visual memory and our emotions."

The fact that these images are not all authentic snapshots can sometimes be determined on the basis of certain criteria, for example: is the lighting particularly elaborate? Does the situation appear staged, are the people posing? In some images, this can only be determined upon closer analysis.

For example, Paul and his students at the University of Flensburg once recreated scenes from images of various wars in three dimensions in order to understand the situation depicted, which are often difficult to comprehend from two-dimensional images alone. "Where is the photographer standing? Who is standing around him?" he asks. "What do the people in the picture see? Do they see what we assume they see, for example, a food distribution point? Or are they facing a front line of photographers?"

"Hamas is a master at staging images."

In fact, there are photos of people with empty pots in Gaza, showing they are not standing in front of a food distribution point, but in front of a photographer. "The Palestinian side is primarily concerned with emotionalising Western, democratised societies. And that works extremely well," says Paul. "The images also have an additional function: they are intended to overwrite the brutal images of the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023. Many people no longer even remember those images. Hamas is a master at staging images."

But not everyone who takes a photo in Gaza, and then circulates it, is working for Hamas. Christopher Resch of Reporters Without Borders considers it is important to emphasise this. "Otherwise, it is easy to get the impression that it is propaganda or a deliberate fabrication. And that has consequences," he says. "In the public perception, these photographers become also like combatants. That is brutally dangerous. Once a name is circulating, these people receive death threats every second."



According to the information provided by the agency, this photograph shows food being distributed to starving Palestinian children in the town of Az-Zawayda on 29 July. (Photo: Hassan Jedi/Imago/Anadolu Agency)

Historian Paul and journalist Resch both point out that photographers and journalists in the Gaza Strip are already limited or no longer able to conduct independent research and documentation. "Moreover, since 7 October, the Israeli government has been attempting to cast doubt on the credibility of journalists and photographers," says Resch.

"That is how many photographers around the world work. Of course, it is always about the effect."

Even before the war, it was not possible for journalists in Gaza to directly criticise Hamas. "But to a certain extent, it is possible to work as a journalist without being influenced." Resch finds it difficult to say what the situation is like today. The staff of Reporters Without Borders are no longer on site. "But it is probably still the case that little gets past Hamas," says Resch. Paul agrees: "In the south, where Hamas still has influence, you have to assume that it controls 100 percent of image production." And in the north, where Israel has occupied territory, the army controls which images can be released to the world. Journalists are still not allowed access, and if an exception is made, it is under strict surveillance of the army. Photographers and journalists are only allowed to see what they are supposed to see.

So how do we deal with the images from Gaza? For example, the images of emaciated boys suffering from serious illnesses without this being clearly communicated? "More context should have been provided for the image," says Resch. "But that does not make the situation any better," because it does not change the fact that people in Gaza are currently starving. Resch also does not see any major problems with the staging of some images. "That is how many photographers around the world work. Of course, it is always about the effect," he says. "I do

not think it is fundamentally reprehensible for a photographer to give people a few instructions. As long as the photo describes reality as closely as possible."

The photography expert Paul remains, nevertheless, very sceptical about the images from Gaza. He fundamentally advocates for more accompanying text, clear citation of sources, and more transparency regarding uncertainties in reporting. He does not look at these images anymore. "I can imagine what it means when someone starves to death," says the historian. "I do not need the image for that. It is all about emotionalising." That is exactly what the warring parties want, as the DJV also warns.

Images convey information and evoke emotions. They can provoke, make a point unmistakably clear or prove something unequivocally. But they can just as easily simplify, mislead, and conceal. In war, this power of images is often used deliberately to harm the opposing side or to manipulate public opinion. Not every image shows what it claims to show. But that doesn't mean all images are lies.

Original Document

Krieg und Medien

Wie echt sind die Bilder aus Gaza?

3. August 2025, 19:36 Uhr | Lesezeit: 6 Min.

In Gaza hungern Menschen, das belegen viele unabhängige Quellen bis hin zur UN. Manche Bilder, die die Not angeblich zeigen, sind aber aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen. Experten plädieren dafür, ganz genau hinzusehen.

Von Nicolas Freund, Zürich

Die Fotos aus Gaza sind schwer zu ertragen. Derzeit kursieren in den Nachrichten und sozialen Netzwerken mehrere Motive, die man so schnell nicht wieder vergisst: Eine Menge verzweifelter Menschen hinter einer Absperrung, in den Händen leere Töpfe und Schüsseln, offenbar um Nahrung bettelnd. Eine Mutter, die ihr abgemagertes Kind auf dem Arm hält. Man erkennt die Rippen und die Wirbelsäule durch die Haut des Kindes. Als Windel trägt es eine Mülltüte. Und immer wieder Menschen, die sich voller Trauer über weiße Säcke beugen, unter deren Stoff man die Umrisse von Menschen erahnen kann.

Am Wochenende veröffentlichte die Hamas selbst ein Video, das eine der israelischen Geiseln zeigt, die von den Terroristen seit fast zwei Jahren gefangen gehalten werden. Es zeigt den 24 Jahre alten Evjatar David völlig abgemagert, wie er in einem der Tunnel, in denen die Hamas viele der Geiseln gefangen halten soll, eine flache Grube aushebt. Sein eigenes Grab, wie er sagt. Es gäbe kein Essen, nur manchmal ein paar Linsen oder Bohnen. Womöglich möchte die Terrororganisation mit dem Video die Botschaft senden: Auch die Geiseln leiden unter dem Hunger in Gaza.

Die Wucht der Bilder erreichte auch Präsident Trump

Sich der Wucht und Macht dieser Bilder zu entziehen, ist kaum möglich. So allgegenwärtig sind sie und so stark wirken sie. Das merkt man schon an den politischen Reaktionen der vergangenen Tage. Sogar US-Präsident Donald Trump, eigentlich einer der größten Unterstützer Israels und des israelischen Premierministers Benjamin Netanjahu, kommentierte: „Diese Kinder sehen sehr hungrig aus.“ In Gaza gebe es „echten Hunger“, sagte er weiter, und er habe Israel geraten, dass sie manches vielleicht anders machen sollten. Der israelischen Armee wird vorgeworfen, mit ihrer Blo-

ckade des Gazastreifens die Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln zu behindern. Netanjahu hatte zuvor abgestritten, dass die Menschen in Gaza Hunger leiden.

Auch Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz und der jordanische König Abdullah II. haben vergangene Woche aus der Luft Hilfsgüter über Gaza abwerfen lassen. „Kanzler Merz und seine schwarz-rote Koalition spüren, dass auch hierzulande die Stimmung kippt“, heißt es auf *Tagesschau.de*. „Die Bilder aus Gaza sorgen auch bei den Freunden Israels mittlerweile für Empörung.“ Die Vereinten Nationen warnten vor wenigen Tagen vor einer drohenden Hungersnot in Gaza, unter anderem mit Videos in sozialen Netzwerken und einem Bericht, und zeigten dazu ebenfalls die Bilder von offenbar hungrigen Kindern.

Ausgerechnet in diese empörte Stimmung kam dann die Meldung, die Kinder auf manchen der Bilder aus Gaza, auf die sich Politiker und Hilfsorganisationen berufen, würden nicht oder nicht nur wegen fehlender Nahrung so abgemagert aussehen. Sondern unter Umständen auch aufgrund von Krankheiten, die aber bei der Verbreitung der Bilder verschwiegen wurden. So leide der Junge auf dem Arm seiner Mutter, dessen Bild auch die SZ veröffentlichte, an Zerebralparese, einer neurologischen Erkrankung, die sein Aussehen mit erkläre. Und das Bild eines anderen, äußerst abgemagerten Jungen, zeige das Kind gar nicht in Gaza. Der Junge habe eine genetische Vorerkrankung und befindet sich seit Mitte Juni zur Behandlung in Italien, berichten israelische Medien unter Berufung auf örtliche Behörden, die bei der Ausreise des Jungen und seiner Familie geholfen hätten.

„Manipulationsversuche mit Hilfe von professionell erstellten Pressefotos“

Der Deutsche Journalisten-Verband (DJV) warnte unter anderem wegen dieser Fälle vor „Manipulationsversuchen mit Hilfe von professionell erstellten Pressefotos“. Der DJV-Vorsitzende Mika Beuster schrieb: „Kriegsparteien aller Seiten, in- und ausländische Meinungsmedien sowie Geheimdienste nutzen wie noch nie die Macht von Bildern, um die öffentliche Meinung zu steuern.“

Es besteht kaum ein Zweifel, dass in Gaza mindestens die Gefahr einer Hungersnot besteht. Mehr als hundert Humanitäre Organisationen warnten vor einer „Massenhungersnot“ im Gazastreifen, das Welternährungsprogramm (WFP) kritisierte die vor wenigen Tagen angelieferten Hilfslieferungen als unzureichend, sie reichten bei Weitem nicht aus, um eine Hungersnot abzuwehren. „Der Hunger existiert und es ist klar, wer ihn verursacht hat“, sagt auch Christopher Resch, der Sprecher von Reporter ohne Grenzen für den Nahen Osten. „Auslöser waren der Angriff vom 7. Oktober und der Terror der Hamas, das darf man nicht vergessen. Aber es liegt eben auch an der Kriegsführung der israelischen Armee.“

Ebenso wahr ist, dass diese Bilder aus Gaza exakt das zeigen, was sich die Hamas wünscht: eine Zivilbevölkerung, die unter der Kriegsführung Israels leidet. Wenn nun aber bekannt ist, dass manche dieser Bilder mindestens in einen falschen oder irreführenden Kontext gestellt wurden: Kann man Bildern aus Gaza dann gar nicht mehr trauen – oder sich gar bei politischen Entscheidungen auf sie berufen?

„Das sind keine Fakes. Aber die Menschen werden in einer bestimmten Art und Weise präsentiert.“

„Ich gehe davon aus, dass viele dieser Bilder mit hungernden und kranken Kindern schlichtweg Inszenierung sind oder aus anderen Zusammenhängen stammen“, sagt Gerhard Paul, emeritierter Professor für Geschichte und Experte für Fotografie, der seit 25 Jahren zu den Bildern aus Israel und Gaza forscht und die Region selbst bereist hat. „Das sind keine Fakes“, sagt er. „Aber die Menschen werden in einer bestimmten Art und Weise präsentiert oder mit einer verfälschenden Bildunterschrift versehen, um unser Bildgedächtnis und unsere Emotionen zu mobilisieren.“

Dass diese Bilder nicht alle authentische Schnappschüsse sind, lässt sich manches Mal anhand bestimmter Kriterien feststellen, zum Beispiel: Ist eine Szenerie besonders aufwendig ausgeleuchtet? Wirkt eine Situation inszeniert, posieren die Menschen? Bei manchen Bildern ist das erst bei genauerer Analyse zu erkennen.

Mit seinen Studenten hat Paul an der Universität Flensburg zum Beispiel einmal die Szenen aus Bildern verschiedener Kriege dreidimensional nachgebildet, um die dargestellte Situation zu verstehen, die sich aus dem zweidimensionalen Bild oft nicht ohne Weiteres nachvollziehen lässt. „Wo steht der Fotograf? Wer steht um ihn herum?“ fragt er. „Was sehen die Menschen, die auf dem Bild abgebildet sind? Sehen sie das, was wir vermuten, zum Beispiel eine Essensausgabe? Oder stehen sie einer Front von Fotografen gegenüber?“

„Die Hamas ist ein Meister im Inszenieren von Bildern.“

Tatsächlich gibt es Fotos von Menschen mit leeren Töpfen in Gaza, die zeigen, dass sie nicht vor einer Essensausgabe, sondern vor einem Fotografen stehen. „Der palästinensischen Seite geht es vor allem um eine Emotionalisierung der westlichen, pazifisierten Gesellschaften. Und das funktioniert hervorragend“, sagt Paul. „Die Bilder haben außerdem eine zusätzliche Funktion: Sie sollen die brutalen Bilder vom Hamas-Angriff am 7. Oktober 2023 überschreiben. An diese Bilder erinnern sich viele schon gar nicht mehr. Die Hamas ist ein Meister im Inszenieren von Bildern.“

Aber nicht jeder, der in Gaza ein Foto macht und es anschließend verbreitet, steht in den Diensten der Hamas. Christopher Resch von Reporter ohne Grenzen ist es wichtig, das zu betonen. „Es entsteht sonst leicht der Eindruck, das sei Propaganda oder eine bewusste Fälschung. Und das hat Folgen“, sagt er. „In der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung rücken diese Fotografen dann schon in die Nähe von Kombattanten. Das ist brutal gefährlich. Wenn ein Name einmal im Umlauf ist deshalb, bekommen diese Leute Morddrohungen im Sekundentakt.“

Historiker Paul und Journalist Resch weisen beide darauf hin, dass es Fotografen und Journalisten im Gazastreifen ohnehin nur eingeschränkt oder gar nicht mehr möglich sei, unabhängig zu recherchieren und dokumentieren. „Außerdem wird von der israelischen Regierung seit dem 7. Oktober versucht, die Glaubwürdigkeit von Journalisten und Fotografen in Zweifel zu ziehen“, sagt Resch.

„Das ist, wie viele Fotografen weltweit arbeiten. Es geht natürlich immer um die Wirkung.“

Auch vor dem Krieg sei es nicht denkbar gewesen, als Journalist in Gaza die Hamas direkt zu kritisieren. „Aber bis zu einem gewissen Teil war eine unbeeinflusste journalistische Arbeit möglich.“ Wie die Lage heute ist, kann Resch nur schwer sagen. Die Mitarbeiter von Reporter ohne Grenzen sind nicht mehr vor Ort. „Aber es ist wohl immer noch so, dass wenig an der Hamas vorbeigeht“, sagt Resch. Das sieht auch Paul so: „Im Süden, wo die Hamas noch Einfluss hat, muss man davon ausgehen, dass sie die Bildproduktion zu 100 Prozent kontrolliert.“ Und im Norden, wo Israel Gebiete besetzt hat, kontrolliert die Armee, welche Bilder von dort nach außen dringen. Journalisten haben dort nach wie vor keinen Zutritt, und wenn doch eine Ausnahme gemacht wird, dann unter strenger Überwachung durch die Armee. Die Fotografen und Journalisten bekommen nur zu sehen, was sie sehen sollen.

Wie also umgehen mit den Bildern, die uns aus Gaza erreichen? Zum Beispiel den Bildern der abgemagerten Jungen, die an schweren Krankheiten leiden, ohne dass dies klar kommuniziert wurde? „Zu dem Bild hätte mehr Kontext mitgeliefert werden müssen“, sagt Resch. „Aber das macht die Situation keinen Deut besser“, denn es ändere nichts daran, dass Menschen in Gaza aktuell hungern. Resch sieht auch in den Inszenierungen mancher Bilder kein großes Problem. „Das ist, wie viele Fotografen weltweit arbeiten. Es geht natürlich immer um die Wirkung“, sagt er. „Ich finde es nicht grundsätzlich verwerflich, wenn ein Fotograf den Leuten ein paar Anweisungen gibt. Solange das Foto möglichst nahe die Wirklichkeit beschreibt.“

Fotografieexperte Paul ist den Bildern aus Gaza gegenüber dennoch sehr skeptisch. Er plädiert grundsätzlich für mehr begleitenden Text sowie eine klare Nennung von Quellen und mehr Transparenz bei Unsicherheiten in der Berichterstattung. Er selbst sieht sich diese Bilder oft gar nicht mehr an. „Ich kann mir vorstellen, was es bedeutet, wenn ein Mensch verhungert“, sagt der Historiker. „Ich brauche dazu das Bild nicht. Dabei geht es nur um Emotionalisierung.“ Genau das wollen die Kriegsparteien, wie auch der DJV warnt.

Bilder transportieren Informationen und verursachen Emotionen. Sie können aufrütteln und einen Sachverhalt unmissverständlich klarmachen oder etwas eindeutig beweisen. Sie können aber genauso vereinfachen, in die Irre führen und verschleiern. Im Krieg wird diese Macht der Bilder oft gezielt eingesetzt, um der Gegenseite zu schaden oder um die öffentliche Meinung zu manipulieren. Nicht jedes Bild zeigt, was es zu zeigen behauptet. Aber nicht alle Bilder sind deshalb eine Lüge.

Anmerkung der Redaktion: In einer vorherigen Version dieses Textes haben wir eine Aussage unseres Gesprächspartners Christopher Resch unpräzise wiedergegeben. Wir haben das Zitat nachträglich korrigiert.

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Annex 8.

O. Reingold and T. Lukyanova, “They Became Symbols for Gazan Starvation. But All 12 Suffer from Other Health Problems.” *The Free Press*, (18 August 2025).

They Became Symbols for Gazan Starvation. But All 12 Suffer from Other Health Problems.



A PHOTOGRAPHER POINTS HIS CAMERA AT A CHILD IN GAZA ON JULY 24, 2025. (KHAMES ALREFI / ANADOLU VIA GETTY IMAGES)

A Free Press investigation found that the viral photos lacked important context: The subjects have cystic fibrosis, rickets, or other serious ailments.

By **Olivia Reingold** and **Tanya Lukyanova**

08.18.25 — Israel and Antisemitism

455 355  

 UPGRADE TO LISTEN

5 MINS

For the past several weeks, critics have fumed at *The New York Times* over a misleading photo of an 18-month-old boy in Gaza on its front page. It turns out that Muhammad Zakariya Ayyoub al-Matouq, who was a symbol for a story about [widespread hunger in Gaza](#), wasn't simply suffering from malnutrition. He had preexisting health issues "affecting his brain and his muscle development," according to an updated version of the story. But that detail didn't find its way into print.

When the so-called paper of record updated its story with [an editors note](#) four days later, it also quietly deleted the mother's claim that her son was "born a healthy child." There was still no mention of the boy's brother, who appears healthy in the background of [another photo](#) that appeared online.

[This incident](#) wasn't just a one-off.

An investigation by *The Free Press* reveals that at least a dozen other viral images of starvation in Gaza also lacked important context: The subjects of those photos have significant health problems. Those appeared all over social media, in the reports of leading international aid organizations, and on some of the most prestigious news outlets in the United States, including CNN, NPR, and the *Times*—without disclosing the complicated medical histories that help explain their stark appearances.

It's not that there isn't hunger in Gaza. [There is](#). The World Health Organization [reported 63 deaths from malnutrition](#) last month alone, including 25 children. Some of them might have been sick or worse even if there was no war. In 2022, about 50 Gazans under the age of 20 died from malnutrition, according to [the Palestinian Ministry of Health](#).

Yannay Spitzer, an economist at Hebrew University of Jerusalem who has been tracking food prices in Gaza during the past few months, said hunger in Gaza is largely declining since Israel [resumed aid](#) deliveries in [late May](#) after its nearly 80-day blockade. In mid-July, prices for basic necessities like flour skyrocketed by 4,000 percent, according to his review of data from the Gaza Chamber of Commerce and the World Food Programme.

"If a situation like that lasts more than a few days, a lot of people will go hungry but not starve to death en masse. That's the beginning of a process, which the media portrayed as already at the catastrophic end stage," Spitzer said, before pausing. "But it never happened."

Still, he said, food prices are "15 times higher than peacetime," but are nowhere near their high point earlier this summer. "It's very different from these Ethiopian-like famine pictures that readers in the West were led to believe in."

But those photos have helped convince a growing number of Americans that Israel has induced famine and is committing war crimes in Gaza.

In a poll this month from the progressive Data for Progress, [nearly half](#) of the likely voters surveyed said that they believe Israel is "committing genocide against the Palestinian people living in Gaza." Images like these have turned the tide against the only Jewish nation in the world—and are pressuring policymakers to isolate Israel. Anti-Israel activists recently splattered [red paint](#) on Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's campaign office over her decision to back an amendment supporting Israel. A [sign placed at the office](#) said: "AOC funds genocide in Gaza."

The children in all of the images reviewed by *The Free Press* were either sick or facing death at the time their images circulated online, according to local reports in Arabic. Their situations were dire. But in every instance, they were already facing grave situations because of their health, irrespective of any third-party action.

Here are more details about the viral images:

Maryam Dawas

In a [UNICEF ad](#) soliciting donations, Maryam Dawas, a 9-year-old girl, sits on a hospital bed staring off into space. Her collarbone protrudes underneath her pink T-shirt. When she takes a deep breath, she darts her eyes around as if strained.

"Maryam has been suffering from malnutrition for a year and a half," the girl's mother tells the camera. "And I have been suffering along with her."

Then this message flashes on screen in big, bold letters: "All children under five in the Gaza Strip are at risk of acute malnutrition."



Photos of the day

Starvation in Gaza and Russian troops in Ukraine: photos of the day - Friday

▲ Nine-year-old Maryam Abdulaziz Mahmud Davvas, whose family is calling for medical evacuation, is now unable to walk because of severe malnutrition. Photograph: Anadolu/Getty Images

MARYAM DAWAS (VIA THEGUARDIAN.COM)

But Dawas is not typical of the average child in Gaza. In fact, her mother suspected that her daughter was suffering with a serious illness that local doctors were struggling to diagnose. She spoke about her battle to get answers about her daughter's health [in a video](#) uploaded to [@translating_falasteen](#), an Instagram account with more than half a million followers.

"I suspect that Maryam has another problem besides malnutrition," she said in Arabic in the video, adding that she had taken her daughter to multiple doctors in search of a diagnosis. "I suspect that my daughter has a condition that no one understands here in Gaza."

In an interview with *The Palestine Post*, an Arabic outlet [focused on raising](#) "awareness of the Palestinian cause," the mother said that her daughter has been struggling with "chronic diarrhea." She said that she had taken her daughter to a gastroenterologist during the war but that all the tests had come out "perfectly clean."

The story of her malnutrition also appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*, *The Telegraph*, and [The Guardian](#). In an [Instagram post](#) of Dawas that was liked nearly 100,000 times, the comments included "Israel!!! You'll pay the price one day!!!" and "STOP TERRORIST ISRAEL." The [LA Times](#) article included authoritative and definitive language regarding her health, without attribution.

"Maryam Abdulaziz Mahmoud Davvas," the article said, "has become unable to walk due to severe malnutrition in Gaza City, Gaza, on Thursday. Hospital tests revealed no underlying medical condition, and doctors confirmed that her condition is solely the result of hunger and malnutrition."

The *LA Times* did not respond to a request for comment.

Youssef Matar

On July 29, subscribers of *The Guardian's* morning newsletter woke up to an image of the bony spine of toddler Youssef Matar as he was cradled by his mother. "Famine Under Way in Gaza, UN-Backed Experts

Say,” [the headline said](#).

The caption said: “Displaced Palestinian mother Samah Matar holds her malnourished son Youssef, in Gaza City.”

First Thing: Famine under way in Gaza, UN-backed experts say

It comes as Donald Trump reduced deadline for Russia to move towards ending Ukraine war. Plus, eastern US swelters in heatwave



YOUSSEF MATAR. (IMAGE GRAB VIA WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM)

A few days before, Reuters published the same image [on its own website](#), and the caption’s text included several crucial words that weren’t part of *The Guardian*’s caption. We marked those words in italics: “Displaced Palestinian mother Samah Matar holds her malnourished son Youssef, *who suffers from cerebral palsy*, at a school where they shelter amid a hunger crisis, in Gaza City.”

When asked for comment, a *Guardian* spokesperson said that *The Free Press* could file a complaint “directly to the readers’ editor,” providing a general email address. “The vast body of our reporting on the conflict—which is led by journalists working on the ground across the Middle East with deep expertise in the region—speaks for itself,” the *Guardian* spokesperson said.

Hamza Mishmish

To accompany the July 29 [NPR article headlined](#) “People Are Dying of Malnutrition in Gaza. How Does Starvation Kill You?” the news outlet selected a photo of an emaciated man carried like a child in the arms of another Gazan.

The caption identifies him as 25-year-old Hamza Mishmish and says that he shows “signs of severe malnutrition and bone loss in the Nuseirat refugee camp amid worsening hunger in the region.”

People are dying of malnutrition in Gaza. How does starvation kill you?

JULY 29, 2025 · 12:22 PM ET



Michal Ruprecht



HAMZA MISHMISH (VIA WWW.NPR.ORG)

The implication is unmistakable: Mishmish is being carried because he cannot walk, and he cannot walk because he is being starved.

Though his condition may have been made worse by food scarcity in Gaza, a woman who claims to have helped care for Mishmish said that he has long struggled with his health.

“He has, of course, had a disability since birth—he has cerebral palsy and suffers from many countless illnesses,” the woman said in [a July 30 video](#) published by the state-run news agency of the Palestinian National Authority. “Everything with him is worsened because he has no immunity at all. His immune system is extremely, extremely weak.”

NPR did not respond to a request for comment.

Najwa Hussein Hajjaj

According to CNN, Hajjaj was a 6-year-old girl “suffering from severe malnutrition in Gaza City.” Her image appeared in a multimedia article titled [“Starvation in Gaza,”](#) with an editors note at the top: “This gallery contains disturbing images. Viewer discretion is advised.”

Sandwiched between images of Gazans begging with tin bowls and airdrops falling from the sky, Hajjaj appears against a white background holding a spoon nearly as wide as her frail frame. The original version of the article missed one crucial detail: She suffers from an “esophagus condition,” according to her father.



NAJWA HUSSEIN HAJJAJ, IN GAZA CITY, MAY 25, 2025. (SAHER ALGHORRA / THE NEW YORK TIMES / REDUX)

In an interview with [Al-Araby Al-Jadeed](#), a [Qatar-backed](#) Arabic outlet, the girl’s father said that her disorder results in “constant vomiting.”

“This condition has accompanied her throughout her life,” her mother, Islam Hajjaj, [told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed](#) in May, adding that she has suffered from “several ailments since birth.”

When *The Free Press* sought comment from CNN, it said that it would add “additional details to these photo captions” but not issue a correction.

“This information does not change the fact that the children depicted in this story are suffering from malnutrition due to the difficulties they face accessing aid in Gaza, as reported,” a CNN spokesperson told us.

Mosab al-Debs

The 14-year-old boy was featured in the same CNN story as another child “suffering from malnourishment.” The original caption didn’t mention that last May, he sustained a traumatic head injury amid what SHMS News Agency, a Gaza-based outlet, called “[an Israeli shell](#)” explosion.

“My son was injured in the head,” his mother explained. “Part of his skull was removed.”



MOSAB AL-DEBS (IMAGE GRAB VIA SHMS.PS)

An [Instagram post](#) uploaded to [@translating_falasteen](#) said that he had suffered “severe brain hemorrhaging, leaving him completely paralyzed.”

These details did not appear on [Reuters](#), [Al Jazeera](#), and [other news organizations](#), which used his image in their coverage of the “mass starvation” in Gaza, in the words of [the BBC](#), which also ran his image.

After we contacted CNN, it added two lines to its story, including that the boy “needs a special nutrient formula for tube feeding that the hospital doesn’t have.” But the CNN spokesperson was unapologetic.

“Like other international news organizations, CNN is unable to report independently from inside Gaza, despite multiple and ongoing requests to be granted access. As such we are reliant on agencies and local journalists working inside the enclave.”

Atef Abu Khater

On July 24, *The New York Times* article “[Gazans Are Dying of Starvation](#)” opened with a description of Atef Abu Khater, a 17-year-old boy “who was healthy before Gaza was gripped by war,” according to *The Times*. The article said that he was “suffering from severe malnutrition.” But it didn’t mention the “mysterious illness” that the boy’s father detailed just a few days earlier in an interview with [Al Jazeera Mubasher](#), the network’s Arabic TV channel.

“We did every possible test, but to no avail,” said the father, who did not cite malnutrition as a possible cause. “His condition keeps deteriorating, and the doctors are unable to determine what the illness is or what caused it.”



ATEF AID ABU KHATER, AT AL-SHIFA HOSPITAL IN GAZA CITY, GAZA ON JULY 25, 2025. (AHMED JIHAD IBRAHIM AL-ARINI VIA GETTY IMAGES)

In another interview with [Al Jazeera Mubasher](#) published late last month, the father said his son had not been the same after receiving burns on his toe and hand at a soup kitchen.

“He stopped eating and drinking and wouldn’t even open his mouth,” the father said, noting that a hospital had recently installed a feeding tube. “He’s like someone completely paralyzed.”

The photojournalist behind some of the viral images of Khater’s condition [posted on X](#) that the boy “suffered a psychological shock after being burned inside one of the shelters in the Gaza Strip.”

When approached for comment, a spokesperson for *The New York Times* replied that they were “confident” in their reporting.

“Our interviews and reporting found that no matter what else may have affected Atef’s life, he lacked sufficient access to food and nutrition during the war, suffered from hunger, and died from severe malnutrition after the publication of our story,” the spokesperson replied, adding that “The *Times* has seen an official report that lists the cause of his death as severe malnutrition.”

The spokesperson did not respond to questions from *The Free Press* about the nature of the “official report,” including whether it was stamped by the Hamas-controlled Gaza Ministry of Health.

Abdullah Hani Muhammad Abu Zarqa

In late July, images of bald and emaciated 4-year-old Abdullah Abu Zarqa began circulating on Hamas-affiliated social media accounts, including [Quds News Network](#). A video of the boy wailing and telling the camera, “I’m hungry” received over 23,000 likes [on Instagram](#). The comments included “Allah will never forgive Israel and Netanyahu” and “ISRAEL, AMERICA, WHY DO YOU ENJOY DOING THIS.”

But in a [video interview](#) with Al Jazeera Mubasher, the boy’s father shared that his son’s health problems dated back to before the war’s start and included joint pain since age two.



Quds News Network ✓
@QudsNen



Abdullah Abu Zarqa, a young child in Gaza, is suffering from severe hunger as food and medical supplies have run out under a crippling, total Israeli blockade.

Many children in Gaza are facing similar conditions amid the critical shortages of basic supplies due to Israel's closure of the border crossings.



ABDULLAH ABU ZARQA (VIA @QUDSNEN/X)

“The doctors said they suspected he might have rickets or a muscle problem,” the father said in the interview.

A review by Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the agency that oversees humanitarian aid to Gaza, reached a similar conclusion. The agency’s investigation, which it said was done to counter “Hamas’s ‘Starvation Campaign,’” [found that](#) the boy “suffers from a genetic disease causing vitamin and mineral deficiencies, osteoporosis, and bone thinning.”

The Israeli agency said that the boy traveled with his mother to East Jerusalem to receive care in 2023. A [photograph of his medical records](#), written in Hebrew and shared online by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, lists his diagnosis as “Rickets, active.”

Karam Khaled Al-Jamal

“Al Jazeera has aired a harrowing report from central Gaza, where a 27-year-old man has died of starvation caused by the ongoing Israeli blockade.” Thus begins the caption of a [July 31 Instagram post](#) from Middle East Eye, a UK-based media company, featuring a subtitled video report from Al Jazeera. “Medical sources

at Al-Awda Hospital confirmed the cause of death was famine and lack of proper nutrition,” the caption adds.

The lengthy post, which has collected nearly 3,000 likes on Instagram alone, never mentions that Karam has suffered from muscular atrophy and partial paralysis since childhood—conditions that rendered his body unable to digest food—according to [the Arabic edition of Anadolu](#), Turkey’s state-run news agency.



KARAM KHALED AL-JAMAL, IN AL-AWDA HOSPITAL AT NUSEIRAT CAMP IN GAZA CITY, GAZA ON JULY 31, 2025. (HASSAN JEDI VIA GETTY IMAGES)

Belal Abu Amer, a Gaza-based photojournalist who filmed the viral video, didn’t include any of [those details](#), either, blaming the man’s death solely on “malnutrition” and “the famine imposed on the residents of the Gaza Strip.”

Al Jazeera did not respond to our request for comment.

Osama Al-Raqab

The photos of an emaciated 5-year-old illustrated stories about the Gaza hunger crisis in [The Guardian](#), [CBC](#), [Al Jazeera](#), and the [Financial Times](#), among other news outlets. The English edition of Anadolu Agency published a [video report](#) about the boy’s plight, calling his condition “a stark symbol of crisis under Israel’s genocide.”



OSAMA KAMAL AL RAKAB, IN KHAN YUNIS, GAZA ON APRIL 14, 2025. (HANI ALSHAER VIA GETTY IMAGES)

None of these reports mentioned the fact that Osama also suffers from cystic fibrosis—the detail one could learn without even having to read in Arabic, as the information is readily available in English-language reports like [this AP story](#).



These omissions—whether deliberate or negligent—have appeared in some of America’s most prestigious newsrooms, including *The New York Times*, CNN, and NPR.

Uncovering this missing context didn’t require in-depth, on-the-ground reporting—or months of investigative work. It took minutes, and required nothing more than a computer with a stable internet connection. We simply ran the story subjects’ names through Google Translate to get the Arabic spelling, then searched those names in Arabic-language media. Even a quick scan of the results revealed that many of these children suffer from muscle atrophy, head injuries, or other serious medical conditions that help explain their emaciated appearance. (In some cases, the relevant information was available in English, too.)

A [new report](#) from Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) documents other instances of what it calls “journalistic malpractice,” including one instance in which *The Washington Post* published a year-old photo in an article arguing that a “worst-case scenario is finally unfolding” in Gaza. A *Post* spokesperson replied that it issued a correction to reflect that the photo was taken in June 2024.

“These stories were not just shaped by omission: They were laundered from unverified or partisan Arabic- and Turkish-language sources, while being presented as credible journalism to Western audiences,” the report said. “The resulting journalistic products resemble propaganda more than neutral reporting.”

Olivia Rose, NCRI's extremism researcher, added that Hamas has an incentive to spread panic about alleged famine. That narrative undercuts one of its biggest threats: the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which Israeli and U.S. officials created to prevent aid from falling into the terrorist group's hands. Last month, the NCRI released a [35-page report](#) about how the GHF became the target of "narrative assault" that alleged it was "systematically murdering civilians." The report traces those claims back to Hamas-run news agencies and anonymous social media accounts—and yet they were picked up by many top outlets, including BBC, *Haaretz*, and the Associated Press.

There will be a cost for their basic lack of due diligence, said Rose.

"People in the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, their houses are being attacked," she said. "Their families are coming under threat here in the United States."

One leading legal expert says these images aren't just whipping public opinion into a frenzy—they could also play a role in the International Criminal Court (ICC) case against top Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Eugene Kontorovich, [who leads](#) George Mason University's Center for the Middle East and International Law, said that claims of starvation are a "central allegation" in the court's pursuit of crimes against humanity and war crimes charges.

Since early in the war, international agencies have leaned heavily on famine claims. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), the international body responsible for declaring famine, [initially projected in March 2024](#) that Gaza was on the brink of famine. But three months later, in June, it [walked that back](#), saying that the evidence didn't support such a declaration after food deliveries increased. "If this did not lead the ICC prosecutor to change course, nothing will," Kontorovich said. "This isn't the kind of thing where a bit of evidence is going to stand in the way of a politicized prosecution."

A year later, by [July 2025](#), the IPC reversed course again, declaring that famine was unfolding across much of Gaza. As [The Washington Free Beacon reported](#), the IPC quietly changed its methodology in Gaza, essentially redefining the criteria for determining a famine. The IPC shifted away from a more comprehensive approach to tallying weight and height toward merely using arm circumference, a cruder assessment—and halved the threshold for famine from 30 percent of children registering as malnourished to 15 percent.

And the narrative of famine, according to Kontorovich, still matters—chiefly, in terms of optics and politics. "Obviously, it tends to suggest that much of the information coming from Gaza, in general, is false," Kontorovich said. "It lends further credence to the proposition that information coming out of Gaza is coordinated propaganda."

John Spencer agrees. He leads the Modern War Institute at West Point, a research institute that tries to advance U.S. military knowledge, and has embedded with the IDF in Gaza four times since Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, 2023.

"The inference is that Israel is behind this, and if they just agree to a ceasefire, all of this will stop now—and that is the farthest thing from the truth," Spencer said. "If the war stops now, Hamas will continue to control every grain of rice, every sack of sugar, and use it to enrich themselves at the cost of civilians."

The images have stirred worldwide anger against Israel. In cities across the U.S. from [Atlanta](#) to [Philadelphia](#) to [New York City](#), protesters have taken to the streets to decry what they believe is a manmade famine.

Tzvika Mor, a 47-year-old Israeli, wonders why no one is shouting his son's name in the streets.

On October 7, 2023, his son, Eitan, was working as a security guard at the Nova Musical Festival when Hamas terrorists descended on the event. Militants spotted him and his friends in an open field, taking him hostage. It has been more than five months since his family has received an update on his status.


“I don’t know if he has access to food or even water,” the elder Mor said over Zoom earlier this month.

In early August, Hamas militants released shocking images of two other hostages, Evyatar David and Rom Braslavski, both of whom were skeletal with protruding bones. In one video, Braslavski clutches his stomach one moment, then cries the next.

“I am at death’s door,” [he said](#), adding that all he had eaten recently was “three crumbs of falafel” and “barely a plate of rice.”

A video of David shows him in a dim tunnel digging his own grave. Mor said it has been at least a year since a humanitarian group beyond Israel has contacted him or his family.

“I feel like the world has forgotten about my son.”



Olivia Reingold

Olivia Reingold is a staff writer at The Free Press. She has cocreated and executive produced Matthew Yglesias’s podcast, *Bad Takes*. She got her start in public radio, regularly appearing on NPR for her reporting on indigenous communities in Montana. She previously produced podcasts at *Politico*, where she shaped conversations with...



Tanya Lukyanova

Tanya Lukyanova is a video journalist at *The Free Press*.

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Annex 9.

R. Ahmad, I. Kershner and A. Bashir, “Gazans Are Dying of Starvation” The New York Times, (29 July 2025).



Gazans Are Dying of Starvation

After 21 months of devastating conflict with Israel, Gaza’s most vulnerable civilians — the young, the old and the sick — are facing what aid groups say is impending famine.

▶ Listen to this article · 8:44 min [Learn more](#)

By Rawan Sheikh Ahmad, Isabel Kershner and Abu Bakr Bashir Visuals by **Saher Alghorra**

Rawan Sheikh Ahmad reported from Haifa, Israel; Isabel Kershner from Jerusalem; and Abu Bakr Bashir from London. Saher Alghorra recorded images in Gaza.

Published July 24, 2025 Updated July 29, 2025

Atef Abu Khater, 17, who was healthy before Gaza was gripped by war, lies in intensive care in a hospital in the north of the Palestinian enclave, suffering from severe malnutrition.

“He is not responding to the treatment,” said his father, A’eed Abu Khater, 48, who has been sheltering in a tent in Gaza City with his wife and five children. “I feel helpless,” he added in a phone call, his voice strained with grief. “We lost our income in the war. Food is unaffordable. There is nothing.”

Gaza’s hospitals have struggled since early in the war to cope with the influx of Palestinians injured and maimed by Israeli airstrikes and, more recently, by shootings meant to disperse desperate crowds as they surge toward food convoys or head to aid distribution sites.

Now, according to doctors in the territory, an increasing number of their patients are suffering — and dying — from starvation.

“There is no one in Gaza now outside the scope of famine, not even myself,” said Dr. Ahmed al-Farra, who leads the pediatric ward at Nasser Hospital in southern Gaza. “I am speaking to you as a health official, but I, too, am searching for flour to feed my family.”



Palestinians in Gaza carrying bags of aid on Sunday.



Grieving on Sunday for people who were killed while on their way to receive aid in Gaza City.

The World Food Program, an arm of the United Nations, said this week that the hunger crisis in Gaza had reached “new and astonishing levels of desperation, with a third of the population not eating for multiple days in a row.”

Dr. al-Farra said the number of children dying of malnutrition had risen sharply in recent days. He described harrowing scenes of people too exhausted to walk. Many of the children he sees have no pre-existing medical conditions, he said, giving the example of Siwar Barbaq, who was born healthy and now, at 11 months old, should weigh about 20 pounds but is under nine pounds.

After 21 months of devastating conflict set off by the deadly Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the lack of available food and water is taking a heavy toll on Gaza’s most vulnerable civilians — the young, the old and the sick.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Sign up for [Your Places: Global Update](#), and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The Gaza ministry of health has reported more than 40 hunger-related deaths this month, including 16 children, and 111 since the beginning of the war, 81 of them children. The data could not be independently verified.

Throughout the war, U.N. agencies and independent aid groups have accused Israel of allowing far too little food into Gaza, warning of impending famine for its more than two million people. For much of that time, Israel has said that enough food was reaching Gaza, blaming diversions by Hamas and mismanagement by aid groups for problems.



A mostly empty market in Gaza City on Thursday.



Ms. Matar cooked for her children on an open fire because of a shortage of cooking gas.

Hollow-eyed, skeletal children languish on hospital beds or are cared for by parents, who gaze helplessly at protruding ribs and shoulder blades, and emaciated limbs resembling brittle sticks. The haunting scenes are a stark contrast to the plenty that exists just a few miles away, across the borders with Israel and Egypt.

Mohammed Zakaria al-Mutawaq, who is about 18 months old and was born during the war, lives with his mother and brother in a tent on a Gaza beach.

Mohammed's mother, Hedaya al-Mutawaq, 31, said the toddler's father was killed last October when he went out to seek food.

"I walk the streets looking for food," she said by phone, her voice barely audible. The charity kitchens she relies on to help feed Mohammed and his brother, Joud, 3, cannot always help, and they go hungry. "As an adult, I can bear the hunger," she said. "But my kids can't."

Mohammed, according to his doctor, had pre-existing health problems affecting his brain and his muscle development. But his health deteriorated rapidly in recent months as it became increasingly difficult to find food and medical care, and the medical clinic that treated him said he suffers from severe malnutrition.

"I look at him and I can't help but cry," she said.

"We go to bed hungry and wake up thinking only about how to find food," she added. "I can't find milk or diapers."

Mohammed was diagnosed with severe malnutrition by the Friends of the Patient clinic and Al-Rantisi children's hospital, she said, but there was little they could do. On a recent visit to the clinic, she said, "they told me, 'His treatment is food and water.'"

Yahia al-Najjar was 4 months old when he died of severe malnutrition on Tuesday at the American Hospital in Khan Younis, in southern Gaza, his aunt, Safa al-Najjar, 38, said in an interview.

Yahia was born without serious health issues, but his condition soon deteriorated, she said.

The family has been sheltering under a tent made of a blanket held up by four poles. Yahia's mother, subsisting on one meal of lentils or rice per day, could not produce enough milk to nurse him, though she had no problems nursing her previous three children. The family could not afford baby formula.

At the hospital, the doctors tried to help, but he was already in critical condition and had lost weight. He died shortly after, she said.

After Israel ended a two-month cease-fire in mid-March and resumed its military campaign in Gaza, it imposed a total blockade on the entry of goods for about 80 days to try to pressure Hamas into surrendering, exacerbating the already severe deprivation.

Now, aid enters in two ways. One is a new, much-criticized system run by private American contractors under the auspices of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a private Israeli-backed group, which has a few set distribution sites in southern Gaza and one in the center of the strip. The other consists of convoys of aid brought in by independent international organizations.

Both systems have been plagued by worsening chaos and violence after months of siege, war, mass displacement and lawlessness. Most of the Israeli shootings, according to the United Nations, have occurred around the Israel-backed distribution sites.

The hunger crisis is the result of human failings, with each of the involved parties blaming someone else for the suffering.



Collecting water in Gaza City last week.



Children outside a charity kitchen in Gaza City on Wednesday.

Israel accuses Hamas of engineering a narrative of starvation by looting aid trucks and disrupting the distribution of aid to Gazans. It also accuses the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations of failing to collect hundreds of truckloads of aid that have piled up on the Gaza side of the border crossings.

Aid groups blame Israel for laying siege to Gaza, restricting supplies and failing to provide safe routes for their convoys inside Gaza. The only solution, they have long said, is an extensive increase in food deliveries.

Israel countered the images of starving children this week with images of pallets of supplies lying uncollected on the Gaza side of a border crossing and footage of what the military described as Hamas terrorists enjoying platters of food and fresh fruit in the group's underground tunnels. The military declined to say when the video was recorded.

The leaders of Israel and Hamas are engaged in sluggish negotiations, through mediators, for another temporary cease-fire that could bring relief and have Hamas release hostages it is holding in the tunnels in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody.

Doctors warn that malnutrition in early childhood can have long-term effects, disrupting growth, cognitive ability and emotional development.

Mohammad Saqr, head of the nursing department at Nasser Medical Complex, said that on Monday afternoon alone, the hospital received 25 women and 10 children requesting intravenous glucose solution.

While the treatment may briefly relieve symptoms, Mr. Saqr warned, "they feel the hunger again soon after." He added, "Some arrive shivering from hunger."

The hospital's limited supply of IV solution cannot meet the growing demand, he said, adding: "The team is exhausted from hunger. Yesterday, some staff members ate just 10 spoons of plain white rice."

Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City had recorded three deaths from malnutrition in the previous 36 hours, Dr. Mohammad Abu Salmiya, the hospital director, said in an interview on Tuesday. One was a 5-month-old baby.



Waiting for food aid in Gaza City on Wednesday.

Editors' Note: July 29, 2025

This article has been updated to include information about Mohammed Zakaria al-Mutawaq, a child in Gaza suffering from severe malnutrition. After publication of the article, The Times learned from his doctor that Mohammed also had pre-existing health problems.

Isabel Kershner, a Times correspondent in Jerusalem, has been reporting on Israeli and Palestinian affairs since 1990.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Young, Old and Sick Starve to Death in Gaza: 'There Is Nothing'

Annex 10.

“UN aid chief admits starving Gazan baby claim was amid 'desperation' to let aid in” The Jerusalem Post, (30 May 2025).

Advertisement

Jerusalem Post / Israel News

UN aid chief admits starving Gazan baby claim was amid 'desperation' to let aid in

Fletcher admitted that when he made the comment, he was 'desperate' to get aid into Gaza, acknowledging that he needed to be more precise with language.



THE JERUSALEM POST



Tom Fletcher, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (OCHA) attends a press conference in Geneva, Switzerland, December 3, 2024.
(photo credit: DENIS BALIBOUSE/REUTERS)

By JERUSALEM POST STAFF


MAY 30, 2025 11:34

Updated: MAY 30, 2025 12:21

UN aid chief Tom Fletcher expressed regret for his recent claim that [14,000 babies could die within 48 hours](#) in Gaza without aid - a claim the UN retracted - in an interview with the BBC on Friday.

Fletcher acknowledged a need to be "precise" with language, admitting that when he made the comments, "we were desperately trying to get that aid in."

"We were being told we couldn't get it in, and we knew that we'd probably have a couple of days, a window to get as much aid in as possible, and that was being denied, and we were desperate to get that in. And so yes, we've got to be utterly precise with our language, and we've clarified that," he said



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After retracting Fletcher's statement, the UN later cited a report that said there could be 14,100 cases of malnutrition in children in Gaza between April 2025 and March 2026, a timeframe of one year, not two days.

When questioned by the BBC about his claim of "10,000 aid trucks on the Gaza border, cleared and ready to go" - a claim that had been refuted by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Fletcher said that he "especially needed to be careful and really precise."



GAZA RESIDENTS carry aid supplies which they received from the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, near the Netzarim Corridor, yesterday. (credit: Ramadan Abed/Reuters)

Despite his retraction, Fletcher still maintained that Israel has caused forced starvation in Gaza, amounting to a war crime.

"It is classified as a war crime. Obviously, these are issues for the courts to take the judgement on, and ultimately for history to take a judgement on," he told the BBC.

Over one million meals have been distributed in Gaza by the GHF

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which the UN refuses to cooperate with, [opened its third distribution center](#) in Gaza on Thursday.

Approximately 997,920 meals were distributed on Thursday, according to [GHF](#), bringing the total number of meals distributed to date to approximately 1,838,182 via roughly 17,280 boxes.

"We're seeing food set on the borders and not being allowed in when there is a population on the other side of the border that is starving, and we're hearing

Israeli ministers say that is to put pressure on the population of Gaza," Fletcher said, adding that Prime Minister [Benjamin Netanyahu](#) should "absolutely" disavow those statements.

"We would expect governments all over the world to stand for international humanitarian law, the international community is very, very clear on that," Fletcher said, calling on Netanyahu to ensure that "this language, and ultimately, this policy... of forced displacement, isn't enacted."

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Annex 11.

John Spencer, @SpencerGuard, X (formerly Twitter) (4:31 am, 28 July 2025).



← Article ↗

 **John Spencer** ✓
@SpencerGuard



Israel's Aid to Gaza Is Historically Unprecedented

305 1.7K 4.9K 648K

Historical Comparison: Military Aid to Enemy Civilian Populations During Active War

Conflict	Aid Provided by Warring Party to Enemy Civilians	While Enemy Still Controlled Territory?	Combat Still Ongoing?	Scale Comparable to IDF in Gaza?
WWII – Germany	No	No	Yes	No
WWII – Japan	No	No	Yes	No
Korean War	No	No	Yes	No
Vietnam War	No	No	Yes	No
Battle of Mosul (2016)	Limited (by allies post-clearance)	No (after ISIS cleared)	Yes	No
Syria Civil War	Some (via UN under truce)	Yes (briefly)	Yes	Not by military directly
Israel–Gaza (2023–2025)	Yes (IDF-coordinated food, fuel, medical, water)	Yes	Yes	Unprecedented



Many things can be true at the same time.

Flooding Gaza with humanitarian aid is the right, moral thing to do. A military must balance its operational objectives with humanitarian imperatives, including the prevention of starvation and the protection of civilian life. A military can restrict the flow of humanitarian supplies if the enemy is diverting them for its own purposes. And it is also true that civilian populations are routinely moved out of combat zones to reduce harm and ensure more effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

These are all basic truths of war, well established in both military practice and international law.

But there is another truth that must be acknowledged. One that is rarely said out loud, despite being plain and provable: **There is no historical precedent for a military providing the level of direct aid to an enemy population that Israel has provided to Gaza.**

This aid has taken place:

- While the war is ongoing
- While the enemy, Hamas, continues to control territory
- And while that enemy is still fighting, launching attacks, and holding hostages

X

Israel is delivering fuel, food, medicine, and water into territory still under the command of the very group that murdered its civilians on October 7, that continues to fire rockets into Israeli towns, and that openly declares it will repeat those atrocities again and again.

There is no precedent for this. None.

Throughout history, wars between nations or between governments and insurgent groups have often involved humanitarian disasters. And in most of those wars, the fighting side does not provide relief to the enemy's population. In World War II, the Allies provided no aid to German or Japanese civilians while those governments were still fighting and in control of their territory. In Vietnam, the United States never delivered humanitarian assistance to North Vietnamese or Viet Cong-held areas. Even during battles against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, U.S.-backed forces facilitated aid only after clearing territory, not while ISIS still held it.

But Israel is doing what no military has done. It is facilitating direct humanitarian aid to the population of a territory governed by a terrorist army that it is still fighting in close-quarters urban combat.

Whether this fact is recognized or not by the international community, it is a historic first.

At the same time, this war has produced another anomaly. One that should deeply trouble anyone who cares about humanitarian norms. There is no historical precedent to a non-warring party with the sole ability to assist, Egypt, not allowing civilians to flee a war zone.

Egypt has refused to open the Rafah border crossing to allow Gazan civilians to escape, even as active combat, food shortages, and humanitarian collapse have worsened. This is not a case of reluctance by a distant country. This is the only nation that borders Gaza besides Israel. It is not a party to the war. And it is not constrained by law, logistics, or inability. It is constrained only by political choice.

In almost every other modern war, neutral countries have opened their borders to civilians seeking safety. Poland did so during the war in Ukraine. Jordan and Turkey took in millions during the Syrian civil war. Tanzania and Congo (then called Zaire) accepted refugees during the Rwandan genocide. Egypt is doing the opposite. It is keeping the gate closed and leaving civilians trapped while the world blames Israel for what happens inside.

This too is without precedent.

It is easy to criticize Israel for the humanitarian costs of its war. It is much harder to hold Hamas accountable for embedding its fighters in schools, hospitals, and civilian neighborhoods. And harder still to acknowledge when a military is doing something not just legal, but extraordinary.

The truth matters. And the truth is that no military in modern history has delivered more aid to an enemy population during active war than the Israel Defense Forces have to Gaza. That fact stands, regardless of whether anyone wants to say it out loud.



John Spencer is executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute

He is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare

Learn more at www.johnspenceronline.com

You can also follow him on 'X' at: @SpencerGuard

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The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

4:31 am · 28 Jul 2025 · **648.1K** Views

 305

 1.7K

 4.9K

 1K



Annex 12.

Prime Minister's Office, "Prime Minister's Office Statement" (14 May 2025).



Prime Minister's Office

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Prime Minister's Office Statement

Type: Media Statements • Government: The 37th Government • Publish Date: 14.05.2025

The Prime Minister's Office, today:

Macron has once again chosen to stand with a murderous Islamist terrorist organization and echo its despicable propaganda, accusing Israel of blood libels.

Israel is engaged in a multi-front war for its very existence following the horrific massacre committed by Hamas against innocent people on October 7th, including the murder and kidnapping of dozens of French nationals.

Instead of supporting the Western democratic camp fighting the Islamist terrorist organizations and calling for the release of the hostages, Macron is once again demanding that Israel surrender and reward terrorism.

Israel will not stop and will not surrender.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is determined to accomplish all of Israel's war goals, including the release of all our hostages, destroy Hamas's military and governance capabilities and ensure that Gaza will never again pose a threat to Israel.

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Annex 13.

Prime Minister's Office, "Prime Minister's Office Statement" (25 August 2025).



Prime Minister's Office Statement

Type: Press Releases ▪ **Government:** The 37th Government ▪ **Publish Date:** 25.08.2025

Israel deeply regrets the tragic mishap that occurred today at the Nasser Hospital in Gaza.

Israel values the work of journalists, medical staff, and all civilians. The military authorities are conducting a thorough investigation.

Our war is with Hamas terrorists. Our just goals are defeating Hamas and bringing our hostages home.

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Annex 14.

Prime Minister's Office, "Statement by PM Netanyahu" (18 March 2025).



Prime Minister's Office

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Statement by PM Netanyahu

Type: Events and Speeches • Government: The 37th Government •

Publish Date: 18.03.2025



“ Hamas is responsible for this war.

It invaded our towns, murdered our people, raped our women and kidnapped our loved ones.

Hamas refused offer after offer to release our hostages.

In the past two weeks, Israel did not initiate any military action in the hope that Hamas would change course. Well, that didn't happen.

While Israel accepted the offer of President Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, Hamas flatly refused to do so.

This is why I authorized yesterday the renewal of military action against Hamas.

Israel does not target Palestinian civilians. We target Hamas terrorists.

And when these terrorists embed themselves in civilian areas, when they use civilians as human shields, they are the ones who are responsible for all unintended casualties.

Palestinian civilians should avoid any contact with Hamas terrorists, and I call on the people of Gaza, get out of harm's way. Move to safer areas.

Because every civilian casualty is a tragedy and every civilian casualty is the fault of Hamas.

I thank President Trump for his unwavering support for Israel. Our alliance with the United States has never been stronger.

To those who criticize Israel, I ask, what would you do if terrorists murdered and kidnapped your children?

You would do what we are doing.

In the face of pure evil, free societies have no choice but to fight.

So, I want to assure all our friends around the world, Israel will fight and Israel will win. We will bring our people home and we will destroy Hamas.

We will not relent until we achieve all these vital goals and we will not rest until we give our country a future of peace, prosperity and hope”.

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Annex 15.

Israel Foreign Ministry, @IsraelMFA, X (formerly Twitter) (6:29 pm, 23 July 2025).

← Post



Israel Foreign Ministry
@IsraelMFA



Nearly 950 aid trucks are waiting at the border, ready to support the people of Gaza.

So who's holding them back?

The UN.

While Israel facilitates the entry of humanitarian aid and the [@GHFUpdates](#) delivers it directly to civilians in Gaza, the UN is obstructing the efficient flow of assistance.

We call on the United Nations to stop blocking essential aid. Immediately.



6:29 PM · Jul 23, 2025 · 100.9K Views

378

394

905

52



Annex 16.

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, @GHFUpdates, X (formerly Twitter) (8:30 pm, 7 Aug 2025).

← Post

 **Gaza Humanitarian Foundation** ✓
@GHFUpdates



We've provided over 110 million meals to the people of Gaza.

Imagine how much more we could do together with the @UN.

We call on the international aid community to join us in providing Palestinians with secure and efficient humanitarian aid that works.



8:30 PM · Aug 7, 2025 · 49.2K Views

91

163

483

15



Annex 17.

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, @GHFUpdates, X (formerly Twitter) (3:04 pm, 6 Aug 2025).

← Post



ICYMI: GHF's Executive Director John Acree called on the @UN to partner with us during a live briefing this week.

With over 108 million meals delivered safely and directly, GHF has proven humanitarian aid can reach the people of Gaza without interference. With the UN's support, we could scale our impact even further.

WATCH: youtube.com/watch?v=Q8Xge6...



WATCH:

In today's briefing, GHF Executive Director John Acree shares what collaboration could look like if the @UN accepted our offer of partnership.



3:04 PM · Aug 6, 2025 · 10.4K Views



Annex 18.

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, @GHFUpdates, X (formerly Twitter) (6:11 pm, 16 Aug 2025).

← Post



Gaza Humanitarian Foundation ✓

@GHFUpdates



We are grateful for the support of over 200 NGOs and faith groups who signed a letter urging the @UN and other aid groups to collaborate with GHF.

"We respectfully request that the @UN and world leaders take steps to shift U.N. policy in Gaza away from refusal to cooperate with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and toward one that works in partnership and collaboration with the GHF for the good of the citizens of Gaza."

Read via @ChristianPost:



The Christian Post ✓ @ChristianPost · Aug 16

Over 200 faith groups, NGOs urge UN to stop enabling Hamas, support US-backed aid effort christianpost.com/news/over-200-...

6:11 PM · Aug 16, 2025 · 25.7K Views

35

267

989

37



Annex 19.

Government of Israel, The Connection Between UNRWA and Hamas in Gaza
A summary of declassified intelligence, methodologies, and sources (23 April
2025).

The Connection Between UNRWA and Hamas in Gaza

A summary of declassified intelligence, methodologies, and sources

April 23th 2025

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Introduction

Following the October 7th massacre in Israel by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) launched an extensive military operation in Gaza. In the course of the operation, the IDF seized an immense quantity of documents and electronic devices (labelled as Captured Enemy Material or CEM) with a wealth of information on the terrorist organizations, their structure, operational plans and operatives. Early in the war, the picture emerging from those materials and other intelligence sources showed extensive infiltration of Hamas and other terrorist organizations into the ranks of the United Nation's Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and systematic, premeditated abuse of its facilities as shields for terrorist activities against Israel.

This document, which is based on an analysis by the Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), outlines large parts of the intelligence picture regarding the Hamas-UNRWA connection in Gaza, as it stands in early 2025, and explains some of the methodologies used to construct it. To demonstrate the methodology, examples of CEM are included in the annexes, following a lengthy process of verification and declassification. The collection and analysis of CEM and other information are still ongoing at the time of publication, therefore **the numbers in this document may change as this process continues.**

The findings and evidence presented below expose like never before the unprecedented infiltration and exploitation of a UN agency by terrorist organizations. They illustrate how in a systematic process, throughout the years, billions of dollars of taxpayers' money, mostly from Western countries, in practice served Hamas' war machine. At the tragic low point of that process, UNRWA staff and infrastructures were an integral part in Hamas' genocidal attack of October 7th and its abhorrent fighting tactics during the ensuing war. To make matters even worse, UNRWA's and the UN's leadership, which failed to heed Israel's warnings on this matter for years, has refrained from even launching an independent investigation into the agency's connections with Hamas.

As the head of UNRWA, Commissioner General Phillipe Lazzarini, points out routinely, UNRWA is a unique UN body. In Gaza alone, prior to October 7th, it ran a state-like enterprise of over 12,000 local staff with less than 40 international staff and operated hundreds of loosely-supervised facilities. Under Hamas' oppressive rule, this organization became the perfect safe haven for terror and a serious threat to Israel's national security.

Executive Summary

UNRWA in Gaza has been deeply infiltrated by operatives from Hamas and other terrorist organizations. The presence of nearly 1,500 Hamas operatives, according to the current count, including from its military wing, in key positions in UNRWA (school principals, engineers, medical workers, finance, security, etc.) has enabled Hamas to exploit the agency's extensive infrastructure and resources for its terror activities against Israeli civilians and armed forces, particularly on and since October 7th. Hamas' systematic use of UNRWA facilities as a cover for tunnels, weapons caches, command centers, rocket launchers and attack positions was meticulously planned and prepared years before the current war.

Key findings:

- Among the 12,521 UNRWA employees in the Gaza Strip, at least 1,462 (12%) are members of Hamas or other designated terrorist organizations.
- Out of 546 principals and deputy-principals in UNRWA's education facilities, at least 80 (15%) are members of terrorist organizations.
- UNRWA employees actively participated in the October 7th attacks on Israel.
- Throughout the current war and long before it, Hamas systematically exploited UNRWA's facilities, equipment and infrastructure as a method of warfare.
- Hamas dug terror tunnels intentionally under UNRWA schools placing shafts in or next to those facilities. In at least two confirmed cases, the schools' principals were Hamas military wing members.
- Hamas operated the advanced server farm of its central intelligence command center underneath UNRWA's Gaza headquarters using electricity from that facility.
- Hamas regularly fired rockets from areas adjacent to UN institutions, especially from the vicinity of UNRWA schools.

Chapter 1: UNWRA staff involved in terrorism

Background

Over the years, Israeli authorities alerted UNRWA's senior management several times that the agency employed members of terrorist organizations in Gaza. Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) submitted letters with details of the implicated staff members and demanded their dismissal. However, UNRWA never acted upon that information.

UNRWA claims that as part of its recruitment process, all candidates are screened against the Consolidated UN Sanction List. However, the list does not include Palestinian terrorist organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad which are designated as terrorist organizations by the EU, the US and nearly all of UNRWA's donor countries.

As part of that process, UNRWA also reportedly files "requests for non-conviction letters from the local authorities" which in the case of Gaza, since 2007, means Hamas. According to UNRWA's Commissioner General, Phillippe Lazzarini, UNRWA staff are required to declare only that they would refrain from "political activities" but not from membership in armed groups.¹

As the above shortcomings demonstrate, nothing in UNWRA's staff screening procedures prevents the employment of members of Hamas or PIJ by the agency in Gaza, as long as they do not self-identify as such. This was acknowledged also by the Independent Review of Mechanisms and Procedures to Ensure Adherence by UNRWA to the Humanitarian Principle of Neutrality (the "Colonna Review Group"), which examined UNRWA's vetting procedures in February-April 2024, and concluded that those measures "do not allow sufficient verifications".²

The reality portrayed in this chapter is corroborated by various other sources from recent decades, including many that are publicly available. In fact, UNRWA's disregard to the employment of Hamas operatives and its failure to assign the importance it warranted were also exemplified by its own public statements. For example, a former UNRWA Commissioner-General stated in an interview

¹ L. Lema, Philippe Lazzarini: 'Israel is targeting UNRWA to have it dismantled', *Geneva Solutions* (13 February 2024).

² Independent Review of Mechanisms and Procedures to Ensure Adherence by UNRWA to the Humanitarian Principle of Neutrality, Final Report for the United Nations Secretary General, 20 April 2024, p 22.

broadcast in 2004: “Oh, I am sure that there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll and I don’t see that as a crime”.³

Even after Israel had already exposed the scale of Hamas' infiltration into UNRWA, the agency's current Commissioner-General maintained the unacceptable position that “[o]ur employees are part of the social fabric of Gaza and its ecosystem. And as part of the social fabric in Gaza, you have also Hamas”.⁴ A former UNRWA General Counsel has recently stated that “[t]he U.N. has been unable and or unwilling to eliminate Hamas militants and their supporters, as well as those from other terrorist groups, from [UNRWA's] ranks”.⁵ He accepted that “the numbers the Israelis are talking about are probably pretty close to the truth”.⁶

Some of the information below, including CEM documents, was presented to the inquiries appointed by the UN Secretary General regarding UNRWA (the Colonna Review Group and the investigation by the UN's Office for Internal Oversight Services - OIOS). However, both declined to assess the information or reach any findings regarding UNRWA staff's involvement with terrorist groups in Gaza, claiming that the issue was outside the scope of the mandates given to them by the UN Secretary General.⁷

Methodology

In late January 2024, UNRWA announced that Israel had shared with it information on twelve of its employees in Gaza who took part in the October 7th attack on Israel. It was only after this scandal broke out, and following significant intervention by UNRWA's donors, that the agency, for the first time ever, provided Israel in March 2024 with a list of its staff in Gaza in a digital format with ID numbers, which allowed for their vetting against other lists. Official UNRWA tables for the years

³ ‘Canada looking at UN agency over Palestinian connection’, *CBC news* (3 October 2004).

⁴ P. Kingsley and R. Bergman, ‘U.N. Agency in Gaza Fought Hamas Infiltration; Not Hard Enough, Israel Says’, *The New York Times* (10 February 2024).

⁵ J. Becker and A. Rasgon, ‘Records Seized by Israel Show Hamas Presence in U.N. Schools’, *The New York Times* (8 December 2024).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ OIOS "Investigation Report on Misconduct by Staff Members at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East", report no. 185/24, 31 July 2024, para. 25: " In accordance with its original mandate, OIOS has restricted its conclusions to the evidence, obtained predominantly from Israeli officials, in support of the alleged involvement of the subjects in the armed attacks of 7 October 2023 and **has not drawn conclusions regarding their alleged membership of the military wing of Hamas or other militant groups**" (emphases added). The Colonna Review Group has been explicitly instructed in the Terms of Reference given to it by the UN Secretary General **not to investigate any allegations of breaches of neutrality by UNRWA "nor make any findings of fact in respect of them."** Mme Colonna confirmed that in a press conference on April 24th 2024 with the release of her report.

2023-2024 were provided to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with the most recent being from September 2024. Those lists were cross-referenced with several classified databases of terrorist operatives, comprised of thousands of CEM and other intelligence sources (including lists of Hamas members; individuals involved in hostile terrorist activity; administrative, manpower, and training lists related to the Hamas military wing and other Palestinian terrorist factions in Gaza, etc.). Those who appeared in both UNRWA's staff list and the consolidated database of terrorist operatives were classified as UNRWA employees who are also part of a terrorist organization. Subsequently, any new information on the matter was updated and verified in the database.

Determining the reliability of the IDF's database:

In order for a piece of intelligence to be considered a reliable source for the database, it must include unambiguous biographical and military data, such as full names, personal ID numbers, military ID numbers, weapons commissioned, military specialization, military rank or military unit details. Another strong indication of reliability is where the information was physically found. For instance, if IDF soldiers found information containing military information in a military compound, or on the computer of a military-wing commander, this fact would increase the reliability of the source. Additionally, new information was cross-referenced and corroborated with older information, as an extra measure of reliability.

Cross-reference methodology

Like in most countries, Palestinians are given unique personal ID numbers at birth, so that no two people can have the same number. These ID numbers are used in every aspect of daily life, especially when completing bureaucratic processes, such as opening a bank account or voting. Hamas lists these ID numbers in most of their administrative and manpower documents, including those of the military wing. Therefore, the personal ID numbers of UNRWA employees in Gaza, given to the Israel MFA by UNRWA, were cross-referenced with the personal ID numbers in the terrorist operatives database, ensuring a one-to-one match.⁸

⁸ The UNRWA lists do not provide complete information on the positions of employees within the organization. Specifically, there are 353 employees who cannot be associated with a workplace due to inconsistencies between the different lists. In cases where an employee changed his place of employment during the year, and as a result his position and employee number changed, duplicate records were excluded from the database.

Definition of membership

It is important to note that membership in Hamas or other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, means much more than political affiliation with them or other forms of support. It means fulfilling a function within their organizational hierarchy, with a rank, a title and an organization ID number. Such members go through a process of recruitment which includes receiving security clearances and pledging allegiance to the movement. They can also elect and be elected to bodies within the organization, which includes the Hamas government in Gaza – a privilege only granted to Hamas' members. Additionally, military wing-members undergo a military-style recruitment and training process, which includes learning terror tactics. In brief these individuals should be considered terrorists by nearly all of UNRWA's Western donors (US, EU, Australia, Canada, and more) where Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and other Palestinian organizations have long been designated as terrorist organizations in their entirety. Members in non-military positions fulfill various functions which are critical for the organization's terror activities, such as dealing with finances, construction, medical work, administration, communications, weapons development and more.

Indications of personnel involvement: initial findings

So far, out of 12,521 UNWRA employees who worked in the Gaza Strip between 2023-2024, 1,462 (12%) were identified as members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) or other Palestinian terrorist factions. Of these, 1,157 (79%) are employed in education and teaching in Gaza, 79 (5%) work in medical services, 63 are employed in engineering and construction, and dozens more include administrators, social workers, security officers and other professionals.

Chart 1: UNRWA employees in Gaza who are members of terrorist organizations divided by professional categories





Chart 2: UNRWA employees in Gaza who are operatives in Hamas's military wing divided by professional categories



Annex 1 contains examples of cross-references of personal ID numbers between Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas military wing) manpower lists, with lists of UNRWA employees, indicating the membership of 75 UNRWA employees in Hamas' military wing.

Terrorists holding senior positions in UNRWA's education system:

In UNRWA's education institutions, out of 546 principals and deputy-principals, **80 (15%) are members of designated terrorist organizations** (79 Hamas, including 16 in its military wing, and one in PIJ), **working in 60 different UNRWA institutions.**

Annex 2 contains 30 examples of UNRWA education employees, **most of whom are employed as principals or deputy principals.**

UNRWA employees who participated in the October 7th massacre:

Annex 3 contains examples from the documents provided by Israel to the OIOS between March and June 2024, with information on 18 UNRWA employees for whom there is strong evidence of participation in the Hamas-led massacre of October 7th.

Confirmed terrorists among UNRWA staff who were killed during the war:

To date, UNRWA has provided names of 100 out of a total of 275⁹ of its workers which it claimed were killed in Gaza during the war. From that list, at least **23 employees were members of Hamas, including 12 in its military wing, and one employee belonged to PIJ.** One of them, Faisal Ali Naami, was captured on video in Israel during the October 7th massacre, loading a body of a 21 year-old Israeli civilian, Yonatan Samerano, into his car to abduct it to Gaza.¹⁰

Annex 4 contains a list of those 23 employees. In a highly misleading manner, they were counted as "humanitarian personnel" in the frequent statements by the UN Secretary General and other UN officials about the numbers of or "aid workers" killed in Gaza.

⁹ As of March 9th 2025.

¹⁰ See: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/video-shows-unrwa-social-worker-abducting-body-of-israeli-on-oct-7/>

Chapter 2: Hamas' use of UNRWA facilities

Background

Throughout the current war and long before it, Hamas exploited equipment and infrastructure belonging to UNRWA as part of its method of warfare. The intelligence gathered on Hamas strongly indicates that it systematically uses UNRWA's vehicles, warehouses, apartments, and even the agency's headquarters, as headquarters, accommodation complexes, and weapons depots.¹¹

The use of UNRWA facilities by terrorist organizations in Gaza was raised by Israeli officials with UNRWA's leadership for years, both in writing and in official meetings. However, UNRWA did not take any meaningful actions to prevent this abuse, opting instead for cosmetic measures such as quarterly "neutrality inspections" of its facilities which mostly looked for posters of a political nature, and graffiti, yet did not include any physical examination of the premises and their surroundings for terror assets or infrastructure. The Colonna Review Group found that those inspections "are insufficient to ensure the neutrality of the premises".¹²

Unlike other humanitarian organizations operating in Gaza, UNRWA did not inform Israel, not even once throughout the hostilities, about an instance where Hamas had infiltrated or used its infrastructure, thus breaching its duty to give notice that its facilities have been compromised and their neutrality have been violated.

These practices were continuously exposed by the IDF Spokesperson throughout the war and were widely reported.¹³ Despite the mounting evidence, UNRWA's Commissioner General stated only that the agency's facilities have "allegedly" been used for military purposes **by both sides**,¹⁴ thereby creating a misleading equivalence between Hamas, which militarized those UN facilities intentionally, in clear violation of international law, and the IDF which operated to thwart threats

¹¹ For a wealth of examples, including audio-visual materials, of Hamas' extensive use of UNRWA facilities during the war, visit this page by the IDF Spokesperson: <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/the-unrwa-hamas-connection/hamas-using-unrwa-s-infrastructure/>

¹² See FN2, p.26.

¹³ Ibid. See also the New York Times expose " How Hamas Is Fighting in Gaza: Tunnels, Traps and Ambushes" by Patrick Kingsley and others, July 13th 2024.

¹⁴ See for example Lazzarini's statement at the meeting of UNRWA's Advisory Commission on November 18th 2024: "Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, as well as Israeli forces have allegedly used our premises for military purposes."

from those facilities after they had been militarized, in accordance with international law.

Hamas military use of UNRWA schools

Intelligence shows that Hamas has been using schools as part of its combat doctrine for years and has designated military positions in them prior to the outbreak of war on October 7th. During the fighting, there were numerous incidents where the IDF came under fire from UNRWA schools, some of which were captured in video.¹⁵

In at least two cases, terrorist infrastructure, such as tunnels and anti-tank positions, were found in UNRWA schools whose principals are Hamas military wing members (see details in Annex 2).

The militarization of civilian facilities, and UNRWA schools in particular, has been part of Hamas' fighting tactic for many years, as reaffirmed by captured enemy material seized in Gaza since October 7th. Below are several examples which have been declassified for this document.

- In Hamas' Da'wah Council meeting in 2022, it was stated that **"the movement is making efforts to take over these offices and use them to benefit the movement, in addition to abusing spaces under UNRWA offices as security warehouses for rocket storage and for tunnels."** Indeed, during the current war Hamas held regular meetings in UNRWA properties. For instance, the IDI (Israel defense intelligence) intelligence indicates that in May 2024, the Shuja'iyya Battalion Council met with the Brigade Operations Department in an UNRWA facility.

¹⁵ For example: IDF Spokesperson, "Terrorists Shoot at IDF Troops from UNRWA School", December 9th 2023. <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/the-unrwa-hamas-connection/exploitation-of-unrwa-schools/terrorists-shoot-at-idf-troops-from-unrwa-school/>

- In a 200-page Hamas military field manual titled, "Military Engineering Fundamentals - Stage Three, Obstacles",¹⁶ there is a sub-chapter called "Civilian Facilities," which states:

"These are the civilian facilities that fighters can use: homes, schools, universities, hospitals, bridges, electricity companies, legislative councils, mosques, markets... Depending on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the nature of the guerrilla fighting, civilian facilities are considered the best obstacles to defend the resistance. If the resistance would be isolated from its people, it would easily be destroyed by the Zionist enemy."

- Another high-confidence classified indication suggests that to guarantee that tunnels will not be attacked, Hamas adds the caption "UN" to the roof of the buildings with underground infrastructure in them.

أولاً: الأراضي ذات المنشآت:

١- المنشآت المدنية:

وهي جميع المنشآت المدنية التي يمكن أن يلجأ إليها المقاتلين مثل: البيوت، المدارس، الجامعات، المستشفيات، الجسور، شركات الكهرباء، المجالس التشريعية، المساجد، الأسواق،... الخ. وفي حالة قطاع غزة ومن ينتهجون نهج حرب العصابات، تعتبر المنشآت المدنية من أفضل الموانع لحماية المقاومة. فلو كانت المقاومة معزولة عن شعبها لتم إبادتها بكل سهولة من قبل العدو الصهيوني.



قصف البيوت المدنية

تدمير مبنى المختبرات في الجامعة الإسلامية

The sub-chapter "Civilian Facilities", in the booklet "Military Engineering Fundamentals - Stage Three, Obstacles"

- In a document from February 2022 saved as: "The 2022 Deployment Plan of the Third Battalion," there is a list that includes each operative's deployment position, the weapon that will be at the position, and the number of soldiers at each position. **This list includes two schools: the Al-ris school and the Al-Zahraa' school.** Those positions contained 8 operatives armed with personal weapons.

¹⁶ The document was written after 2011 because it refers to events that happened in that year.

ألية الإغلاق	السلح	المرحلة (الخطة) أ-ب-ج	قائد الفصيل	العدد	التداء	السرية	المكان
حواجز حديدية	R.B.G + B.K.C + سلاح شخصي	أ + ب	قائد لفصيل أول: عصر عمارة "أبو عبدة" جوال (0899753584) أرضي (72170) قائد لفصيل ثاني: محمد كاسي "أبو حمزة" رقم جوال (0598959431) أرضي (73119)	8	1	العامة	المصلىة
حواجز حديدية	B.K.C + سلاح شخصي	أ + ب		8	2	العامة	مفتوح حستين
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ب		8	3	العامة	دار الأرقم
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ب		8	4	العامة	مدرسة الريس
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ب + ج		8	5	العامة	مفتوح السنالور
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ب + ج		8	6	العامة	مفتوح سلاح الدين مع رعد
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ج		8	7	العامة	مفتوح الوكالة مع السكة
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ج	حازم البريطي + مهند الشوا	8	1	الرابعة	ساحة النوا
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ج		8	2	الرابعة	مدرسة الزهراء
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ج		8	3	الرابعة	مسجد الشيخ خالد
حسب طبيعة المكان	سلاح شخصي	أ + ج		8	4	الرابعة	مفتوح الساحة

The document "The 2022 Deployment Plan", contains the operatives' positions in 2 schools armed with personal weapons.

- A document from 2014 titled "The Defense Plan of the Al-Tuffah and Al-Daraj Battalion - Especially the Air Defense", details several emergency positions and the battalion personnel assigned to each one. **There are two positions in schools: at the Asaad Al-Zaftawi School and the Fahmi Al-Jarjaou School**, and the document also notes that there is an arms depot adjacent to one of them.



The document, "The Defense Plan of the Al-Tuffah and Al-Daraj Battalion - Especially the Air Defense " in which the 2 positions in the schools are marked

These documents and other intelligence sources provide solid evidence that Hamas systematically uses UNRWA schools as refuge (including for its elite forces, the Nukhba) and as part of its force deployment. Moreover, Hamas operatives exploited several instances of civilian mass evacuations from schools, including those affiliated with UNRWA, to blend into crowds (by wearing civilian clothing) and evade IDF soldiers.

Hamas' server farm under UNRWA's Gaza headquarters

In February 2024, IDF forces arrived at a tunnel shaft right outside the fence of UNRWA's al-Rimal school. The shaft led to an underground terror tunnel that served as a significant asset of Hamas' military intelligence and passed under another UNRWA school and the compound that serves as UNRWA's headquarters in the Gaza Strip (see marked in the aerial photo below). It also had an extension into the compound of the Al-Azhar University complex where a shaft was located.



The tunnel included a central server farm lying 18 meters underneath UNRWA's headquarters and **servicing as the intelligence command center of Hamas**. It was connected directly to UNRWA's electricity supply. The IDF released videos from the site¹⁷ and brought journalists to observe it and report on it, as many of them did.¹⁸

During the military operation to expose the terror infrastructure in UNRWA's compound, large quantities of weapons were found inside its buildings, including explosive drones, grenades, sniper rifles, rockets, mortar bombs and RPG launchers. Intelligence and documents discovered at the site confirmed that the offices had in fact also been used by Hamas terrorists. In addition, bodies of Hamas and PIJ terrorists were found on the premises.

Rocket fire near UNRWA assets

Hamas fires from areas adjacent to UN institutions, especially from the vicinity of UNRWA schools. Launching positions, as well as launches that have been carried out, can be identified from these areas. It should be noted that a significant portion

¹⁷ IDF Spokesperson, "Inside UNRWA Facilities: Weapons and Underground Hamas Intelligence Asset", February 10th 2024, <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/february-24-pr/inside-unrwa-facilities-weapons-and-underground-hamas-intelligence-asset/>.

¹⁸ See for example in the Wall Street Journal, "Hamas Military Compound Found Beneath U.N. Agency Headquarters in Gaza" (February 10th 2024); Reuters, "Hamas had command tunnel under UN Gaza HQ, Israel says" (February 11th 2024); Associated Press, "Israel unveils tunnels underneath Gaza City headquarters of UN agency for Palestinian refugees (February 11th 2024).

of the launches land within the Gaza Strip, posing a danger to Gaza residents and may even damage UNRWA assets in the area.

To give but one example, the aerial photo below shows an UNRWA school in Gaza (marked in yellow) surrounded by red circles indicating areas from where rocket launches which were identified and located by Israel's aerial defense systems (the numbers next to each circle shows the date and time of the launch). As can be seen, most of the launches around that school were done on the morning of October 7th as part of Hamas' invasion into Israel.




Below are a few examples out of many incidents since October 7th in which rockets were launched near UNRWA facilities.

August 7th 2024: the IDF Spokesperson announced that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had conducted precision strikes on rocket launchers embedded near two humanitarian aid and distribution warehouses run by international organizations, including UNRWA, which are used to distribute humanitarian aid to the civilian population in Gaza. Over the previous week, Hamas fired dozens of projectiles from those launchers toward Israeli towns and communities in southern Israel.



October 13th 2023: Rockets fire 80 meters from an UNRWA school.



Annexes

Annex 1: Examples of CEM implicating UNWRA employees as members of Hamas or PIJ

Below are several cross-references of personal ID numbers between Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas military wing) manpower lists, with lists of UNRWA employees, indicating the membership of 74 UNRWA employees in Hamas' military wing.

Comparison 1 – July 2022 Al-Qassam HR list

Al-Qassam HR list with 15,362 members dated July 2022

The list includes full names, IDs, Military IDs, Military units, brigades and echelon (rear/forward)

المحور	التواء	الوحدة/ميدان	الحالة	رقم الهوية	الاسم الحقيقي	الرقم العسكري	الذاتي
المحور الأول	لواء رفح	وحدة الصاروخية العامة	فعال	800686503	عادل موسى حسين زنون	5765	244
المحور الأول	لواء رفح	وحدة أمن السرايا المركزية	فعال	804680735	يوسف صالح حماده التينه	14815	377
المحور الثاني	لواء رفح	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	921895769	عبدالرحمن محمد موسى الشيخ عيد	5554	936
المحور الثاني	لواء رفح	وحدة التنظيم والإدارة المركزي	فعال	900498411	مجدي عبدالوهاب طالب الزظمة	8252	1073
المحور الرابع	لواء رفح	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	800755308	مصعب عمر محمد لافي	5382	1790
محور الصحابي معاذ بن جبل	لواء خانينون	ميداني	فعال	802231027	ابراهيم محمد عبدالرحمن محمد ابوالخنيك	41975	3628
محور الصحابي ابو عبيدة بن الجراح	لواء خانينون	وحدة الصاروخية العامة	فعال	908957186	ابراهيم محمد ابراهيم ابومصطفى	5947	4763
محور الصحابي عبد الله بن رواحة	لواء خانينون	وحدة الدعم والامداد المركزي	فعال	906661160	محمود احمد محمد ابوشماله	5466	5346
محور الصحابي عبد الله بن رواحة	لواء خانينون	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	802740241	احمد موسى احمد الجليل	5522	5716
المحور الرابع	لواء الوسطي	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	900290339	عصام رزق علي البنا	5362	7593
المحور الرابع	لواء الوسطي	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	400897096	ونام مجدي عبدالقادر كلوب	13185	7773
محور الجديدة	لواء غزة	وحدة التصنيع العربي- سامر3	فعال	802431064	محمود اسامه محمد المملوك	11973	10054
محور الرضوان والنصر	لواء غزة	وحدة أمن السرايا المركزية	فعال	900491622	ايد سليمان عيد التكريم ابوظاهر	5172	11299
محور الشاطئ	لواء غزة	وحدة العمليات المركزية	فعال	925726598	محمد اسماعيل السيد ابوشحيل	19450	11691
محور الشاطئ	لواء غزة	ميداني	فعال	923916498	عبدالمجيد توفيق يوسف قاسم	10026	11852
محور الشاطئ	لواء غزة	وحدة التصنيع العربي- سامر3	فعال	957474257	يوسف سليمان يوسف ابوحسين	11975	11888
محور الشاطئ	لواء غزة	وحدة التفتية المركزية	فعال	901014316	هاني ابراهيم اسماعيل كمشكين	9655	11969
محور الزيتون	لواء غزة	وحدة أمن السرايا المركزية	فعال	800299547	روبيضي سعد روبيضي الملائحه	9734	12876
المحور الثاني الشهيد مطلق حميد	لواء الشمال	ميداني	فعال	803520022	محمود عادل احمد ابوداير	20446	14332

Comparison 1 – UNRWA Employees list

EMP. NO.	NAME	EMP.SUB.GR	Location of Work	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC	EOD.	ID NO.
10249136	A Majid Tawfiq Qasem	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Elem C Boys School	Teacher Science	Palestine	21/08/1999	923916498
10249424	A Rahman Mohd Zamli	Permanent (Teaching)	Al Razi Elem Girls School	Teacher	Palestine	15/05/1999	921895769
10216879	Adel Musa Zannoun	Fixed Term	Pld- Vehicle Control Div	Driver	Palestine	10/01/2014	800686503
10217049	Ahmad Mousa El Jekhleb	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Khan Younis Elem E Boys School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	01/02/2015	802740241
10210115	Hani Ibrahim Kaskin	Permanent (Teaching)	New Gaza Elem B Boys School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	01/09/2003	901014316
10775357	Ibrahim Abed El Rahman Abu El Hashik	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Fukhari Prep Boys School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	14/01/2020	802231027
10211504	Ibrahim Mohammad Abu Mustafa	Permanent (Teaching)	Khan Younis Elem E Boys School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	01/02/2006	908957186
10249836	Isam Rezig El Banna	Permanent (Teaching)	Deir El Batah Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	01/09/1996	900290339
10241422	Iyad Sulaiman Abu Daher	Permanent (Teaching)	Jabalala Prep C Boys School	Teacher Physical Education	Palestine	25/07/2002	900491622
10778373	Mahmoud Adel Abu Dayer	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Jabalala Prep C Girls School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	22/08/2023	803520022
10211468	Mahmoud Ahmad Abu Shammala	Permanent (Teaching)	Bahrain Kingdom Prep Boys School	Teacher Science	Palestine	01/02/2006	906661160
10770746	Mahmoud Osama El Marnioulk	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Shijaya Prep Boys B School	Teacher Science	Palestine	27/01/2016	802431064
10219056	Majdi A Wahhab Hasan	Permanent	Rafa Httl Centre	Health Centre Receptionist	Palestine	02/01/2012	900498411
10242086	Mohammed I Abu Sukhail	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	01/11/2001	925726598
10778434	Musab Omar Lafi	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Burey Elem Girls School	Teacher	Palestine	22/08/2023	800755308
10213978	Ruwadi Saad El Radaween	Permanent (Teaching)	Zaitun Prep A Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	17/08/2009	800299547
10777281	Weam Majdi Kalloub	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Bi/Hanoun Prep Boys "B" School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	27/08/2022	400897096
10777307	Yousef Saleh El Dina	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Rafah Prep Boys "D"	Teacher Computer	Palestine	30/08/2022	804680735
10777555	Yousuf Sulaiman Abu Hasanin	Fixed Term	Tal El Sulhan Hlth Centre	Health Centre Pharmacist	Palestine	10/01/2023	957474257

Following the comparison we have found 19 people with identical IDs in both lists (see the Al-Qassam HR list in the previous slide)

Comparison 2 – March 2021 AI-Qassam HR list

AI-Qassam HR list with 11,019 members dated March 2021 extracted from technical equipment captured by Israeli paratroopers in an AI-Qassam Isaa military outpost

The list includes full names, ID, military IDs, dates of births, dates of drafts, military roles, ranks, dates of ranks, battalions and more

الرقم العسكري	اسم الموظف	رقم الهوية	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التجنيد	رتبة المنصب	الرتبة العسكرية	تاريخ الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة المدنية	التاريخ المدنية	المنصب الحالي	اللقب
932603 561	ياسر عطية شعبان العرابي	904842749	19/02/1993	01/07/2010		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2013-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الخصاصين هزوت
663742 573	وائل ناصر محمد الدارسون	802715888	16/10/1990	01/07/2009		حدي	01/07/2004	حدي	2009-07-01	رصد و استطلاع	الاستخبارات العسكرية
429487 1759	زمنج ابراهيم بنح الطاهر	401188990	04/03/1996	01/07/2014		حدي	01/07/2013	حدي	2014-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
830643 1936	محمود محمد طاهر الوائلي	900509721	16/06/1975	01/07/2003		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2016	لقد تموجرة	2003-07-01	حدي	الاستخبارات
311860 1908	سليمة عبد القادر العلي	912285860	22/02/1972	01/07/2004		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2016	لقد تموجرة	2008-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
448929 1935	عاطف محمود احمد الفوري	900630387	06/07/1978	01/07/2002		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2019	لقد تموجرة	2002-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
790510 1961	محمود ابراهيم محمد الشاشي	805280304	02/06/1980	01/07/2012		حدي	01/07/2007	حدي	2012-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
762870 2808	محمد ناصر العلي محمد ابو نعمة	926823154	16/10/1982	01/07/2010		حدي	01/07/2010	حدي	2010-07-01	حدي	مقعد القاد القوي
569007 2976	عاشق محمد محمود جابر	909833356	04/04/1969	01/07/2002		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2002-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
220600 4028	محمود مرام محمود الوائلي	804814444	30/10/1993	01/07/2011		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2019-10-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
404370 4047	السفة سليل عبد القادر الوائلي	803201951	30/07/1991	01/07/2011		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2016	لقد تموجرة	2014-02-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
487357 4074	محمد طاهر العبد القادر الوائلي	802673971	14/03/1992	01/07/2011		حدي	01/07/2019	لقد تموجرة	2011-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
924154 4090	الدي سميح محمد الوائلي	903478774	15/11/1979	01/07/2005		حدي	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2013-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
423221 4354	محمد عبد البراهمة الوائلي	814607796	14/10/1995	01/07/2012		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2008	حدي	2019-10-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
203737 4034	محمد عمار محمد الوائلي	806516770	26/01/1982	01/07/2003		حدي	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2003-07-01	حدي	الفرسان القوي
748660 4840	عبد الكريم محمد الوائلي	917259044	05/03/1973	01/07/2002		حدي	01/07/2016	لقد تموجرة	2008-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الفرسان القوي
320040 5069	محمد علي سلمان الوائلي	802335662	04/07/1989	01/07/2007		حدي	01/07/2019	لقد تموجرة	2007-07-01	حدي	الشارف القوية
903261 6761	الغسان جميل محمد الوائلي	926658733	18/01/1983	01/07/2003		حدي	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2013-07-01	حدي	الشارف القوية
683372 8488	عاشق عبد الوائلي	910020336	03/04/1976	01/07/2009		حدي	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2009-07-01	حدي	الشارف القوية
691422 9076	جوزف يوسف جوزف الوائلي	909130106	28/03/1981	01/07/2007		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2009-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الشارف القوية
899030 7147	محمد سلمان محمد الوائلي	821886057	20/12/1963	01/07/1992		حدي	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2008-07-01	مسؤول الخدمة و التوجيه	الشارف القوية
381114 8272	محمد محمد حسان الوائلي	801289976	19/09/1989	01/07/2010		حدي	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2013-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الشارف القوية
154444 9096	عاشق عبد الوائلي	914637336	19/11/1972	01/07/2007		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2018	لقد تموجرة	2014-07-01	لقد تموجرة	الشارف القوية
865088 10916	مؤمن محمد الوائلي	900291049	23/08/1974	01/07/2004		لقد تموجرة	01/07/2020	لقد تموجرة	2016-07-01	المعلم و المرشد في التوجيه	الاستخبارات العسكرية

Comparison 2 – UNRWA Employees list

EMP. NO.	NAME	EMP. SUB. GR.	Location of Work	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	EOD.	ID NO.
10249244	A Karim Hasan Abu Maali	Permanent (Teaching)	Jabalia Prep C Girls School	Teacher Special Needs St	Palestine	01/10/1999	917330544
10212225	Ahmad Abboud Abu Ras	Permanent (Teaching)	Gaza Elem B Girls School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	02/09/2006	903651570
10216439	Ahmad Mohammad Murtaga	Permanent (Teaching)	Beit Hanoun Elem B Coed School	Teacher	Palestine	17/02/2013	801288978
10215173	Ahmad Nabil Al Afandi	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	04/09/2011	902335662
10210077	Atef Mahd El Ouqa	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Prep A Boys School	Teacher Physical Education	Palestine	01/09/2003	900530387
10248093	Azmi Mohd Suwan	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Elem E Boys School	Teacher	Palestine	30/09/1997	914637335
10211614	Fadi Samir Abu Znada	Permanent	Gaza Area Area Education Office	Education Specialist	Palestine	01/02/2006	903478774
10214601	Ghassan Nabil El Jabari	Permanent	Sabra Health Centre	Health Centre Receptionist	Palestine	13/03/2010	926658733
10212227	Jawdat Yousef Humad	Permanent (Teaching)	Beit Hanoun Prep Boys School *A	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	02/09/2006	909130106
10775001	Mahmoud Ibrahim El Shami	Fixed Term	Ici-Maintenance Div	Storekeeper A	Palestine	01/11/2019	905280304
10777738	Mahmoud Maher Abu Sharekh	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Daraj Elem D Co-Ed School	Teacher	Palestine	26/04/2023	804591444
10249652	Mahmoud Mohd Abu Nima	Permanent (Teaching)	Shijaya Prep Boys B School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	02/09/2000	900900721
10770734	Mohammad Ab Ghurab	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Beach Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	01/11/2015	803573971
10212439	Mohammad Hasindin Abu Nima	Permanent	Eds. Admin Unit	Clerk G	Palestine	01/07/2003	926823154
10248362	Mohd Salman Abu Hasira	Permanent (Teaching)	Shijaya Prep Boys B School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	18/10/1999	921886057
10777791	Munir Omar Lubbad	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Zaitoun Elem Girls D	Teacher	Palestine	26/04/2023	414607796
10249163	Nabhan Mohd El Annasi	Permanent (Teaching)	Zaitoun Prep B Boys School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	26/08/1999	900291048
10217280	Osama Nabil Radi	Fixed Term(Teaching)	New Gaza Prep A Boys School	Teacher Science	Palestine	01/02/2015	803381951
10777295	Rabeeh Zaher Al Tanani	Fixed Term(Teaching)	New Gaza Elem D Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	27/06/2022	401188990
10245553	Saber Mohd Alwawad	Permanent (Teaching)	New Gaza Elem B Boys School	Teacher	Palestine	17/09/2002	909693384
10246396	Said Abed Ayyesh	Permanent (Teaching)	Beach Elem C Boys School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	26/09/2002	912288968
10248716	Sajer Amer Abu Mane	Permanent (Teaching)	Rimal Prep B Boys School	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	01/09/1998	910090398
10777916	Wael Nasser El Badrasawi	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Daraj Elem E Co-Ed School	Teacher	Palestine	26/04/2023	802715888
10774635	Yaser Aliya El Khounzar	Fixed Term(Teaching)	New Gaza Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	28/08/2016	804342749

Following the comparison we have found 24 people with identical IDs in both lists
(see the AI-Qassam HR list in the previous slide)

Of note, the IDs marked in Yellow are also mentioned in the List of UNRWA deceased staff members Gaza written by UNRWA

Comparison 3 – April 2022 Al-Qassam HR list

Al-Qassam HR list dated April 2022 listing military wing members of the five brigades in the whole Gaza strip

The list includes the members' full name, ID, military ID, status (active/ non-active), echelon, brigade

الرقم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم الحقيقي	رقم الهوية	الحالة	الوحدة/ميدان	النوع	المحور	الملف الفرعي
83	5266	احمد توفيق سليمان ابوخسين	928631985	فعال	ميداني	لواء رفح	المحور الأول	ملف الإحتياط العسكري
573	14850	ممدوح حسين احمد القاق	804817195	فعال	ميداني	لواء رفح	المحور الثاني	ميداني
932	7568	محمد طارق محمود منصور	803795616	فعال	ميداني	لواء رفح	المحور الرابع	ملف الصاروخية الميدانية
1463	6613	محمود محمد محمود ابوظبير	953980861	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عبد الرحمن بن عوف	ميداني
1543	7187	محمود سامي احمد فريج	802879122	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عبد الرحمن بن عوف	ميداني
1669	6087	ناجي احمد محمود ابوعامر	900332735	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي مصعب بن عمير	ملف إدارة اللواء
2301	6648	فادي محمود سليمان ابوصواوين	800149189	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عثمان بن عفان	ميداني
2697	6796	عظيمة فريج علي سحنول	901610691	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عبد الله بن رواحة	ميداني
2699	6798	اسماعيل يحيى محمد ابولمر	802227942	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عبد الله بن رواحة	ملف إدارة اللواء
2746	6872	احمد نظام علي العويني	800390239	فعال	ميداني	لواء خانيونس	محور الصحابي عبد الله بن رواحة	ملف إدارة اللواء
2985	10568	احمد عتي احمد ابورحمة	900946674	فعال	ميداني	لواء الوسطى	المحور الأول	ملف الإحتياط العسكري
3522	11354	اسلام سعيد علي الخلو	900763749	فعال	ميداني	لواء الوسطى	المحور الثالث	ميداني
4952	9120	محمد جميل يوسف الحرازين	801989005	فعال	ميداني	لواء غزة	محور التركمان	ميداني
6317	8960	حسام الدين محمود احمد الغول	400033668	فعال	ميداني	لواء غزة	محور الشاطن	ميداني
6386	9703	صفر حسن محمد يعقوشة	926649476	فعال	ميداني	لواء غزة	محور الشاطن	ملف الصاروخية الميدانية
6590	11852	شادي مروان محمود بصل	801485004	فعال	ميداني	لواء غزة	محور الزينتون	ميداني
7211	905	مزه خيرى خميس العرييد	926708249	فعال	ميداني	لواء الشمال	المحور الرابع الشهيد ناهض كتكت	ميداني
7307	12679	محمد زهير عبدالحكيم كرزيم	803060193	فعال	ميداني	لواء الشمال	المحور الرابع الشهيد ناهض كتكت	ميداني
7465	1338	محمد كمال محمد سعدالدين المريح	801705260	فعال	ميداني	لواء الشمال	المحور الثاني الشهيد مقلد حميد	ملف الركن العلياني

Comparison 3 – UNRWA Employees list

EMP. NO.	NAME	EMP. SUB.GR	Location of Work	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC	EOD.	ID NO.
10771772	Ahmad Ali Abu Rahma	Fixed Term	Mmp- Branch Ofc Nuseirat	Cleaner	Palestine	02/01/2017	900946674
10215783	Ahmad Nizam El Uwaini	Permanent (Teaching)	Khan Younis Elem A Boys School	Teacher	Palestine	04/09/2011	800390239
10221006	Ahmad T Abu Hasanani	Permanent (Teaching)	Rafiah Elem A Boys School	Teacher	Palestine	29/05/1992	928631985
10215259	Atiya Freih Sahloul	Permanent	Khan Younis- Sanitation Ofc	Sanitation Labourer	Palestine	21/12/2010	801610691
10216160	Fadi Mahmoud Abu Suwawin	Permanent	Deir El Balah Prep A Boys School	School Attendant	Palestine	22/01/2012	800149189
10771213	Hussam El Din Mahmoud El Ghoul	Fixed Term	Field Security & Risk Management Office	Guard	Palestine	01/10/2016	400033668
10215967	Islam Said El Helu	Permanent (Teaching)	Nuseirat Elem G Coed School	Teacher	Palestine	13/09/2011	900763749
10213228	Ismai Yahya Abu Nimer	Permanent	Khan Younis Prep B Grils School	School Attendant	Palestine	14/02/2009	802227942
10246042	Mahmoud Mohd Abu Tair	Permanent (Teaching)	Khuzaa Prep Boys School	Teacher English	Palestine	25/09/2002	953980861
10771979	Mahmoud Sami Qudah	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Khuzaa Prep Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	01/02/2017	802879122
10778389	Mamdouh Husan Al Qaq	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Qarara Elem Coed School	Teacher	Palestine	22/08/2023	804817195
10210509	Mizher Khairi El Arabed	Permanent	Khan Younis Training Centre	Handyman A	Palestine	10/03/2004	926708249
10216583	Mohammad Jamil El Harazin	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Shijaya Elem C Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	18/08/2013	801989005
10777888	Mohammad Zuhair Kurazem	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Mamouniya Elem A Coed School	Teacher	Palestine	26/04/2023	803060193
10771900	Mohammed Kamal El Muranmakh	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Fakhoura Prep A Boys	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	01/02/2017	801705260
10777035	Mohammed Tareq Mansour	Fixed Term/Teaching)	Zahrh Al Madain Prep Co-ed School	Teacher	Palestine	27/09/2022	803795616
10210161	Naji Ahmad Abu Amer	Permanent (Teaching)	Abu Tu'Ena Elementary Co-Ed School	Teacher	Palestine	01/09/2003	900332735
10776742	Saqr Hasan Balousha	Fixed Term	Bahrn Elem A Boys	School Attendant	Palestine	02/03/2022	926649476
10215646	Shadi Marwan Basal	Permanent (Teaching)	Imam Shafi Prep B Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	12/09/2011	801485004

Following the comparison we have found 19 people with identical IDs in both lists (see the Al-Qassam HR list in the previous slide)

Comparison 4 – May 2022 Al-Qassam Khan Younis Brigade HR list

Al-Qassam Khan Younis Brigade HR list with 6741 members dated May 2022
 The information was extracted from a computer used by the deputy commander of the Khan Younis Brigade
 The list includes full names, IDs, military units, military roles and units

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم العسكري	المنصب في البكيتة	التبعية	رتبة المنصب في البكيتة المحلية	الرقم البكيتة
20	312369	موسى منجي موسى الفرد	محايد	أواء خالوتس/قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية/محايد	فك فصيل	905400768
512	790344	عبدالله محمود عليان عثمان	طاقم حد	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة لخدمة الدعم والخدمات القتالية/مدرسة حد	فك مجموعة	802327296
636	194136	احمد عبد الصاح سالمه الشارح	شعبة الرطب	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة لخدمة الدعم والخدمات القتالية/مدرسة حد	فك مجموعة	802172312
806	615075	عبد الرحمن مصطفى راشد شمت	ضابط تجلة امنية كتيبة	أواء خالوتس/الواء الاسلحة/قسم الامن العسكري/مدرسة حد	فك مجموعة	803115179
887	400390	باسم علي عبد فهد	مسؤول اسلحة	أواء خالوتس/الواء الاسلحة/قسم الحجز والاسلحة/مدرسة حد	فك مجموعة	900141524
988	877880	عبدالله ماجد عبدالله ابو مصطفى	زمره	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة المتفجرة/مدرسة حد	فك مجموعة	802312850
1728	960725	علي حسين عمرو لوشمله	مجاهد مشاة	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	جندي	803784511
2448	834351	باسم سالمه صفيه ابو موسى	مجاهد	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	جندي	800670613
2674	168301	وسام فهد جابر اعين	مجاهد	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	فك مجموعة	804021269
2774	844387	سالم فكري ابراهيم الطو	مجموعة قتالية	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	فك مجموعة	803151257
2789	731591	علي صفيه علي ابوعمر	مجاهد حد	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	جندي	803185909
2801	619303	يوسف الكرم محمد واتي	مجاهد قصص	أواء خالوتس/الكتيبة قتالية	جندي	400152328

Comparison 4 – UNRWA Employees list

EMP. NO.	NAME	EMP. SUB. GR.	Location of Work	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	EOD.	ID NO.
0216894	Abdalla Majed Abu Mustafa	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Khan Younis Prep C Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	01/02/2014	802312850
10777169	Abdullah Mahmoud Othman	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Abasan Prep Boys School	Teacher Science	Palestine	27/08/2022	803237296
10773758	Abad Al Rahman Mustafa Shaat	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Gaza Training Centre	Technical Instructor - Trd Thry	Palestine	18/10/2017	803115179
10770377	Ahmad Abed Al Fattah Al Shaer	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Abasan Prep Boys School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	01/09/2015	802172312
10217090	Ali Atiya Abu Nemer	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Maen Prep Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	01/02/2015	803185909
10771975	Ali Husain Abu Shammala	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Rafah Prep C Boys School	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	01/02/2017	803784511
10211464	Basem Ali Mlqdad	Permanent	Khan Younis Hth Centre	Physiotherapist	Palestine	12/04/2006	900141524
10213211	Basem Salama Abu Mousa	Permanent	Khan Younis West- Rel & Soc Svcs Ofc	Relief Worker	Palestine	02/01/2007	900670613
10211044	Mousa Subhi El Qidra	Permanent	Khan Younis Elem E Boys School	School Counsellor	Palestine	01/03/2005	905400768
10777211	Saleh Fakhri Al Helo	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Maen Prep Boys School	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	27/08/2022	803151257
10778284	Wesam Nabil Ubaid	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Zahra Elem B Girls School	Teacher	Palestine	22/08/2023	804021269
1077256	Yousef Akram Wadi	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Khuzaa Prep. Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	27/08/2022	400152328

Following the comparison we have found 12 people with identical IDs in both


Annex 2: Examples of 30 senior UNRWA education workers who are also members of Hamas' military wing

This annex is divided into two parts presenting 30 examples of UNRWA education employees, **most of whom are employed as principals or deputy principals.**

The first section contains 17 examples showing cross-references between personal ID numbers **from the list of UNRWA employees** provided by the agency and personal ID numbers from Hamas documents.

Mohammed Mohd Shuwaideh – UNRWA School Principal – Al-Qassam 3rd Battalion, Gaza Brigade with Combat Engineering Expertise

Mohammed Mohd Shuwaideh
901634410, DOB: 01/10/1977



School Principal, Zaitun Prep A Boys School and deputy squad leader 3rd battalion, Gaza District

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 2001

0249954	Mohammed Mohd Shuwaideh	Permanent (Teaching)	Zaitun Prep A Boys School	School Principal	Palestine	01/09/2001 901634410
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CEM – HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise – September 2021

رقم العسكري و	اسم الموظف	رقم الهوية	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التمتيد	رتبة الشغف	الرتبة العسكرية	تاريخ الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة المحظية	تاريخ الرتبة المحظية	المنصب الحالي	اللقبية	المسمى	الدرجة	الوظيفة
1788	محمد محمد الشوايده	901634410	01/10/1977	01/07/2010	مدير	مدير	01/07/2010	مدير	01/07/2010	مدير	مدير	مدير	1	مدير

Mohammed Mohd Shuwaideh – UNRWA School Principal – Al-Qassam 3rd Battalion, Gaza Brigade with Combat Engineering Expertise

CEM – Secret document by the Military Censorship of Al-Qassam. Document dated September 2021 – The POI's full name is suggested among other two candidates for one of the Training and Planning department's programs

رقم	الاسم	محل الميلاد	الجنس	العقد	الدرجة	الجهة	المؤهل	تفاصيل العمل في القسم	أخرى
1	محمد عبد المنعم ابراهيم (أبو اس)	قزاة تارح	الذكور	عقد	مديرة	مدير	مؤهل	مدير	مدير
2	محمد عبد المنعم ابراهيم (أبو اس)	قزاة تارح	الذكور	عقد	مديرة	مدير	مؤهل	مدير	مدير
3	محمد محمد الشوايده (أبو اس)	قزاة تارح	الذكور	عقد	مديرة	مدير	مؤهل	مدير	مدير






It was revealed already in 2021 that the school of which Shuweideh serves as principal had a tunnel running right under it. However, despite UNRWA's statement condemning the "existence and potential use by Palestinian armed groups of such tunnels underneath its schools in the strongest possible terms",¹⁹ The terror operative Shuweideh remained in his position and the Hamas tunnel under his school was still operational when the IDF operated there in 2023.

¹⁹ UNRWA, "The Neutrality and Inviolability of UNRWA Installations Must be Respected at All Times", June 4th 2021.

Adeeb Juma Raei - UNRWA Deputy School Principal – Deputy Company Commander in Al-Qassam Infantry Battalion

Adeeb Juma Raei
908979073, DOB: 01/02/1982



Deputy School Principal, Rimal Prep A Boys School
and **Deputy Company commander in the 5th infantry battalion, Gaza District**

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since February 2006

f0211910_Adeeb Juma Raei	Permanent (Teaching)	Rimal Prep A Boys School	Deputy School Principal	Palestine	01/02/2006/908979073
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CEM – Al-Qassam HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise (September 2021)

رقم العسكري	اسم الموظف	رقم الهوية	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التسمية	الدرجة العسكرية	تاريخ الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة الحالية	تاريخ الرتبة الحالية	التخصص	الجنسية	الوظيفة
9229	309907	946232519	02/01/1972	01/07/2007	مجندي	01/07/2019	مجندي	2007-07-01	مجندي	فلسطين	التخصص في حارب
9229	478603	908979073	01/02/1982	01/07/2004	مجندي	01/07/2018	مجندي	2011-07-01	مجندي	فلسطين	التخصص في حارب
9229	589344	802847726	09/02/1989	01/07/2006	مجندي	01/07/2020	مجندي	2009-07-01	مجندي	فلسطين	التخصص في حارب

Adeeb Juma Raei - UNRWA Deputy School Principal – Deputy Company Commander in Al-Qassam Infantry Battalion

CEM - The POI was discharged in mid-2022 due to illegal romantic contact between the POI and a married woman. The evidence include an official Interior Ministry document that indicates the POI holds a educational position in a school attended by the Woman's son (November 2021)

CEM - Al-Qassam Gaza Brigade Command document that includes the POI's military ID, rank and full name of the POI and the fact that he was discharged in June 2022


Document details: Ministry of Education, Gaza District. Document number: 01/11/2021. Subject: Adeeb Juma Raei, Deputy School Principal at Rimal Prep A Boys School. The document is signed by the District Director of Education.

Document details: Al-Qassam Gaza Brigade Command. Document number: 01/06/2022. Subject: Discharge of Adeeb Juma Raei. The document is signed by the Commander of the Gaza Brigade.

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الفرقة أو الرتبة	تاريخ التسمية	الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة الحالية	تاريخ الرتبة الحالية	التخصص	الجنسية
908979073	أديب جوما رايع	مجندي	01/07/2004	مجندي	مجندي	01/07/2018	التخصص في حارب	فلسطين

Ahmad Ali Abu Zayda - UNRWA Math and Computers Teacher – Squad Leader in Al-Qassam’s Military Intelligence Department

Ahmad Ali Abu Zayda
800019549, DOB: 02/06/1983



Teacher Mathematics and Computers,
Jabalia Prep B Boys School
and Squad leader in the Military
Intelligence, North District

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since April 2016

00770880 Ahmad Ali Abu Zayda	Fixed Term(Teaching)	Jabalia Prep B Boys School	Teacher Mathematics Computer Palestine 02/04/2016 800019549
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CEM - Al-Qassam HR lists of the organizational structure of the military intelligence department that includes full name, ID and Military ID, Rank, unit, draft date, active status and mentions a salary from UNRWA (the agency) \$810.3, some of the other members in that list receive their salaries from Al-Qassam (May 2023). In our estimation this indicates that Al-Qassam don't need to pay him because he receives a paycheck from UNRWA

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الدرجة	الفرقة	اللقب	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التجنيد	تاريخ الخدمة	الدرجة	الفرقة	اللقب	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التجنيد	تاريخ الخدمة	الدرجة	الفرقة	اللقب	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التجنيد	تاريخ الخدمة
00770880	Ahmad Ali Abu Zayda	Teacher	Mathematics	Computer	Male	02/06/1983			Teacher	Mathematics	Computer	Male	02/06/1983			Teacher	Mathematics	Computer	Male	02/06/1983		

Ahmad Ali Abu Zayda - UNRWA Math and Computers Teacher – Squad Leader in Al-Qassam’s Military Intelligence Department

CEM – Al-Qassam HR Department document from December 2018 listing names of Al-Qassam members, military ID, full name, rank, Brigade and Battalion. The POI is listed at the time as a deputy Platoon commander in the Department of Training. His employment status in Al-Qasam is not categorized “full-time”, likely due to his full-time employment in UNRWA

م	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرتبة العسكرية	التفرع	جهة التفرع	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
1	266701	احمد علي احمد ابو زيدا	رئس قائد سرية	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
2	792743	محمد جمال محمد طالب	رئس قائد سرية	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
3	910135	مصطفى عرفات مصطفى ابوسلمان	قائد مجموعة	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
4	268500	عرفات سمير حبيب ابوسليم	رئس قائد سرية	الكتابة	الاعلام	التدريب	الكتابة/القاعدة
5	436529	اراهيم عبد السلام ابراهيم حجاز	قائد مجموعة	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
6	130011	محمد محمود محمد ابو فودة	قائد سرية	الكتابة	الاعلام	التدريب	الكتابة/القاعدة
7	279629	خالد خليل ابراهيم وناح	رئس قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
8	821541	اراهيم محمد الدين ابراهيم الرمز	قائد مجموعة	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
9	181948	مصطفى احمد محمد نسيب	قائد مجموعة	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
10	767653	فادي مصطفى عبد الوهاب	رئس قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
11	711815	تامر خليل شحاته حنين	رئس قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
12	820895	محمد يوسف ابراهيم صالح	قائد فصيل	الكتابة	الاعلام	التدريب	الكتابة/القاعدة
13	332530	اسى فوزى محمد بروفوم	رئس قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
14	156889	يوزة الكرم حسين ابوشلق	قائد سرية	الكتابة	الاعلام	التدريب	الكتابة/القاعدة
15	495662	ابن فهمي جمال شنتفي	قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
16	715826	فهميل عبد الرؤوف توفيق قاسم	جندي	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
17	590250	زكي عامر محمد حسني	قائد فصيل	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
18	372138	احمد احمد بكر قريظة	رئس قائد سرية	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة
19	892694	محمود حندي محمد المدهون	قائد مجموعة	عمر حفراز	التدريب	الوحدات	الكتابة/القاعدة

مكتب الشؤون العامة
 قسم الشؤون العسكرية
 دائرة التنظيم والإدارة

الأخت /الفاضل/ ابو النجد (توفيق) حفلة الله ..
 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الموضوع / الزر بملصق طلب اختيار بيشات

بادياً استقبلتكم في كل وقتنا بصحة وعافية من بعدكم وسعدتكم بشركتكم
 نسئ عليكم ووالديكم باسمي التوسيع لخدمة ترفوقكم ببناء الأمانة
 نظركم بسلامة خدمتكم للوطن

وبارك الله فيكم
 مدير المكتب

دائرة التنظيم والإدارة

Bilal Imad El Swairki – UNRWA School Psychosocial Counsellor – AI-Qassam Squad Leader, Combat Engineering Battalion



CEM – AI-Qassam List showing the organizational structure of the third company in the battalion . The POI is listed with his full name, military ID number and expertise (2023)

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	المصنّف في الجهتها	رتبة المصنّف	ملاحظات
578326	نضال يوسف بشاري بركاشي	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد
501845	احمد حسن احمد السوس	مجموعه قتالية 3	مجنّد	مجنّد
303628	رامي فواز يوسف ثقبه	زمره 1	مجنّد	مجنّد
111754	ساجد ابو ساجد السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد
666768	بطل عبد الرحمن السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد
949183	ابون محمد نضال السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد
220551	عبد السلام حسن ساجد السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد
884694	محمود محمد عبد ربه	زمره 2	مجنّد	مجنّد

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since July 2017

0772960	Bilal Imad El Swairki	Fixed Term	Shijaiya Prep A Boys School	Psychosocial Counsellor	Palestine	01/07/2017	800695975
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CEM – AI-Qassam HR List showing AI-Qassam members. The POI is listed with his full name ID and military ID number (2023)

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الجنس	الرتبة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة
666768	بطل عبد الرحمن السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد

CEM – AI-Qassam HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise (September 2021)

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة
666768	بطل عبد الرحمن السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد

Bilal Imad El Swairki – UNRWA School Psychosocial Counsellor – AI-Qassam Squad Leader, Combat Engineering Battalion

CEM – AI-Qassam Operations Branch document listing the POI with his full name and military ID and his specialty as a combat engineer

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة
666768	بطل عبد الرحمن السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد


CEM – The POI's name is listed in an AI-Qassam training and specialization unit document from February 2020. The people on the list underwent training in various military specializations such as combat engineering, anti-tank training and sniper courses



الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة	الفرقة
666768	بطل عبد الرحمن السوس	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد	مجنّد

Mohammad Said Musallam – UNRWA Medical Staff – Deputy Squad Leader Combat Support Battalion

Mohammad Said Musallam
400127866, DOB: 21/08/1994



Practical Nurse, Gaza Town Hlth Centre and a deputy squad leader Combat Support Battalion in the Gaza District

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since September 2021

10778542	Mohammad Said Musallam	Fixed Term	Gaza Town Hlth Centre	Practical Nurse	Palestine	14/09/2021	400127866
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CEM – Al-Qassam HR List with the POI's full name, ID and military ID, unit, and other information (March 2021)

الرقم	الاسم	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	الهوية الوطنية	الهوية العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة	ملاحظات
# 805815	محمد سعيد مسلم	ذكر	400127866	300	True	False		

CEM – Al-Qassam HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise (September 2021)

الرقم	الاسم	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	الهوية الوطنية	الهوية العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة	ملاحظات
3495	521622	محمد سعيد احمد الخرباش	05/03/1993	01/07/2010	01/01/2015	2019-01-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم
3495	326296	عبدالله محمد عيسى	03/03/1992	04/07/2010	04/07/2010	2016-07-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم
3495	408244	عبدالله محمد عيسى	20/03/1990	01/07/2010	01/07/2010	2016-07-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم
3495	085617	محمد سعيد مسلم	400127866	21/08/1994	01/07/2010	2019-07-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم
3495	001242	محمد سعيد مسلم	400127866	21/08/1994	01/07/2010	2019-07-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم
3495	001910	محمد سعيد مسلم	400127866	21/08/1994	01/07/2010	2019-07-01	ممرض	مستشفى ام الفحم

Mohammad Said Musallam – UNRWA Medical Staff – Deputy Squad Leader Combat Support Battalion

CEM - Al-Qassam Document dated May 2022 by the Gaza Brigade Command that includes the list of Al-Qassam operatives from the Brigade's support battalion: includes the POI his military ID, full name, role, brigade and battalion

الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
819889	محمد عصفور محمد عصفور	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
838387	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
734835	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
100883	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
722434	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
272888	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
138822	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
867048	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
343878	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
312048	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
716703	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
282288	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
284838	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
879838	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
899938	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
414870	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
986880	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
870708	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
134438	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
479838	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
487847	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
886613	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
728834	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
387227	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
787845	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
488782	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة
833110	محمد وليد احمد الشاذلي	الدرجة العسكرية	الوحدة	المهنة

Ezzabden Al-Qassam Brigades
Gaza Brigade Command

القوات المسلحة لقطاع غزة
قيادة كتبة غزة

تمت الموافقة على القائمة المذكورة في اجتماع قيادة كتبة غزة بتاريخ 2022/05/09
موافق 09/05/2022
موافق 09/05/2022

الإدارة العامة لقيادة كتبة غزة
المقام: غزة
التاريخ: 09/05/2022

Mohammad Said Musallam – UNRWA Medical Staff – Deputy Squad Leader Combat Support Battalion


CEM - Another Al-Qassam document from March 2022 with similar data

308111	47	حلي عوي ربيع الغول	نائب قائد مجموعة	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
685613	48	محمد سعيد محمود مسلم	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
457847	49	كمال اسماعيل يعقوب حلامه	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
591773	50	محمود جابر حماد حبيب	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
334420	51	محمود عبد العزيز حسين حلس	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
472188	52	مؤمن موسى عامر الجرو	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
515050	53	حمزة خليل محمد ابوكميل	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
110433	54	محمد خضر فضل ابو سالم	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
514915	55	احمد علي عوض محيسن	فائد مجموعة	جندي	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية
709924	56	زاد طلعت زياد كرم	نائب قائد مجموعة	جندي	لواء غزة	كتيبة أسلحة الدعم والخدمات القتالية



Mahmoud Maher Sammour – Arabic Teacher – Deputy Platoon Commander Gaza Brigade

CEM – A letter from the Battalion HQ to the Gaza Brigade HQ -



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since August 2023

Fixed Term(Teaching) 10778428 400031381 Mahmoud Maher Sammour Teacher Arabic Palestine 22/08/2023

CEM - HR lists containing name, Military ID and Expertise

الرقم العسكري	اسم المجاهد	رقم الهوية	تاريخ الميلاد	تاريخ التجنيد	رتبة التوظيف	الرتبة العسكرية	تاريخ الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة المدخلة	تاريخ الرتبة المدخلة	التخصص الحالي	الكتيبة	المنصب	تاريخ التعيين
5251	محمد، ماهر عاتق حيدر	400031381	24/06/1994	01/07/2012	جندي	نائب قائد مجموعة	01/07/2018	جندي	2012-07-01	جندي	كتيبة القدس	معلم	01/01/2014

Khaled Said Mustafa El Masri – UNRWA School Principal – Member of the Hamas movement



Impartment Note: in the previous IDI document, he was categorized as a military wing member
However, updated information shows that Al-Masri is Hamas movement member, and not a military wing member

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 1987

Permanent (Teaching)	10223124	945308054	Khaled Said El Masri	School Principal	Palestine	01/09/1987
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Khaled Said Mustafa El Masri – UNRWA School Principal – Member of the Hamas movement

As can be seen in the attached list from 2017, his name, ID and movement rank is Raqib (sergeant) is listed with other Hamas members

م	رقم الهوية	الاسم رباعي	التسعة	المسجد	الرتبة الحالية
5	968781781	اسامة سلمان احمد	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
14	900640244	يمن فؤاد محمد المياثر	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
15	916010945	بشر مأمون محمد عيلاش	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
20	909124216	حسن حسين حسن أبو كريم	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
23	945308054	خالد سعيد مصطفى المصري	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
25	321456218	خالد محمد حسين الصليبي	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
26	968771865	خليل علي محمد الشاعر	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
35	969966274	صلاح محمد ابراهيم النعماني	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
39	968781294	عامر عبد الرزاق أبو بريك	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
42	955617915	عبد القادر سالم حسين الماتني	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
46	920001070	عبد المجيد رمضان ابراهيم نصار	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
48	930675814	عثمان محمد أبو حجر	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
52	917141640	عزو اسماعيل سالم عفانة	المهاجرين	الدعوة	رقيب
56	920001062	علي رمضان ابراهيم نصار	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
58		عواد سعد الدين بكر	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
60	959986878	عوني حامد عون ابو عون	المهاجرين	الانصار	رقيب
63	969966282	ساجد محمد ابراهيم النعماني	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
67	920001047	محمد رمضان ابراهيم نصار	المهاجرين	المهاجرين	رقيب
74	960603579	محمود سالم مصطفى خليفة	المهاجرين	أبو بكر الصديق	رقيب
77		موسى ابراهيم صبحي ابو عين	المهاجرين	الانصار	رقيب

Khaled Said Mustafa El Masri – UNRWA School Principal – Member of the Hamas movement

His affiliation with Hamas movement dates back to 2017, which correlates with other information presented earlier such as the construction of a tunnel under his school



Mohammad Nasr Fahajan - Practical Nurse Maen Hlth Centre - Al-Qassam Medic

Mohammad Nasr Fahajan - Practical Nurse Maen Hlth Centre - Al-Qassam Medic



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 2012

Fixed Term: 02/10/2012 - 01/09/2012 | Mohammad Nasr Fahajan | Practical Nurse | Palestine | 21/09/2012

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 2012

Fixed Term | 10216355 | 802020768 | Mohammad Nasr Fahajan | Practical Nurse | Palestine | 21/09/2012

Mohammad Nasr Fahajan - Practical Nurse Maen Hlth Centre - Al-Qassam Medic

CEM - Al-Qassam medical department - Rafah brigade official document from 2020 lists the POI as a medic in the organization

كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام السلطنة الطبية العسكرية						
77	22.58	ضباطية الجنوب	10-Aug	محمد ناصر محمد العبد	402560110	15
54	15.84	ضباطية الجنوب	10-Aug	محمد ناصر محمد العبد	804607935	16
25	7.33	ضباطية الجنوب	09-Aug	فارس ناصر محمد العبد	400853602	17
43	12.32	ضباطية الجنوب	11-Aug	موسى موسى محمد العبد	803237866	18
20	5.87	ضباطية الجنوب	11-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	700187248	19
137	40.18	ضباطية الجنوب	10-Aug	السيد محمد ناصر محمد العبد	906624515	20
52	15.25	ضباطية الجنوب	12-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	800744639	21
22	6.45	ضباطية الجنوب	22-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	802049789	23
26	7.33	ضباطية الجنوب	26-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801944812	24
34	9.97	ضباطية الجنوب	29-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	903328078	25
56	16.42	ضباطية الجنوب	22-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	452255300	26
30	8.80	ضباطية الجنوب	10-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801153172	27
24	7.04	ضباطية الجنوب	15-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801153172	28
28	8.21	ضباطية ارك	16-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	802020768	29
54	15.84	ضباطية ارك	16-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	406057372	30
30	5.87	ضباطية ارك	22-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	806479219	31
65	19.06	ضباطية ارك	03-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	906352253	32
130	39.59	ضباطية ارك	20-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801438375	33
54	15.84	ضباطية ارك	22-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	927942292	34
276	80.94	ضباطية ارك	01-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801944612	35
630	184.75	ضباطية ارك	10-Aug	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد		

كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام السلطنة الطبية العسكرية						
ملحة طبية - لواء رفح من 21/7/2020 حتى 21/08/2020						
1. التوزيعات						
مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ
مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ
مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ	0.00	مبلغ
2. التوزيعات						
1. الخدمة (علائق)						
مبلغ	مبلغ	التاريخ	الخدمة	الخدمة	مبلغ	مبلغ
380.00	102.64	07/25/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	404522005	1
380.00	102.64	07/25/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	803052702	2
380.00	102.64	08/13/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	402109226	3
380.00	102.64	08/13/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	408014140	4
800.00	234.60	08/13/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	452255300	5
800.00	234.60	08/13/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	412285439	6
100.00	29.33	07/28/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801944612	7
300.00	87.98	06/05/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801870429	8
380.00	102.64	08/16/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	400749858	9
380.00	102.64	08/16/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	404163087	10
480.00	117.50	07/22/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	827942292	11
800.00	234.60	08/16/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	401963288	12
500.00	146.63	08/12/2020	تولى فطرس	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	400585998	13
5800.00	1700.88		المجموع			
2. الخدمة (تلفات)						
مبلغ	مبلغ	التاريخ	الخدمة	الخدمة	مبلغ	مبلغ
20	5.87	08-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	405176140	1
20	5.87	12-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	400853602	2
20	5.87	29-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	802314119	3
20	5.87	15-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	403804958	4
20	5.87	18-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	406967448	5
20	5.87	15-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	410222541	6
20	5.87	13-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	402168700	7
20	5.87	13-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	450732450	8
20	5.87	05-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	403105225	9
20	5.87	29-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	405178359	10
20	5.87	29-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	405178359	11
20	5.87	18-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801944612	12
20	5.87	22-Aug	خدمة التفرغ	عبدالله محمد ناصر محمد العبد	801944612	13

Mohammad Nasr Fahajan - Practical Nurse Maen Hlth Centre - Al-Qassam Medic

CEM - Secret Al-Qassam medical department list with military IDs and full names - Rafah brigade

سري

لواء رفح - الكتيبة الشرقية " أبو جبريل الشمالي "

دورة (جندي طبي مختص)

م	اسم المجاهد رباعي	الرقم العسكري
1.	محمد نصر فحجان	754605
2.	ابراهيم جهاد ضهير	196182
3.	براء محمود لافي	871768
4.	محمود سالم عبد العال	786402
5.	هيثم عاتق أبو لولي	481667
6.	محمد جلال شيخ العيد	551296
7.	يوسف محمد حمد	866605
8.	سيف الدين محمود عبد العال	685874

Shadi Mohammad Jamal Razak Darabiah –UNRWA School Attendant - AI-Qassam Squadron Commander



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since May 2005

Permanent | 10211575 | 949824957 | Shadi Mohammad Darabiah | School Attendant | Palestine | 15/03/2005

CEM - Shadi is a Hamas military wing operative (military ID: 441982) serving as a squadron commander in the East Jabaliya Battalion

رقم الهوية	الاسم	المنصب في الهيئة	التبعية	رتبة المنصب في الهيئة	تاريخ التعيين	الرتبة السابقة	التاريخ	الاحتماد	الرتبة المسوية	نقل شهري	نظام المراتب	مجموع	رقم الهوية
441982	شادي محمد جمال رزاق درابيه	قائد فوج 61	لواء العمل/فصيلة قتالية 2 - سيجل زبده/المرتبة قتالية	قائد مجموعة	2003-07-01	قائد مجموعة	2007-07-01	True	قائد فصيل 0	0	مجموع	31	949824957
936462	عوني خالد حسن نديم	جندي فوج 61	لواء العمل/كتيبة قتالية 2 - سيجل زبده/المرتبة قتالية	جندي	2005-07-01	نائب قائد مجموعة	2016-07-01	True	قائد مجموعة + 0	0	مجموع	21	903278828
263276	احمد عطا احمد شعاده	مجموعة قيادة الافلق	لواء الشمال/كتيبة قتالية 2 - سيجل زبده/المرتبة قتالية	قائد مجموعة	2012-07-01	نائب قائد مجموعة	2019-01-01	True	قائد مجموعة + 2	3	مجموع	6	803450212

Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba – UNRWA Math Teacher and AI-Qassam Fighter

Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba (900216664)

Permanent (Teaching) | 10248153 | 900216664 | Hani A Karim Wahba | Teacher Mathematics | Palestine | 23/08/1997

Voting records with name and ID

هاتف	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات	الهيئة الانتخابية : الانتخابات
هاتف	900216664	ذكر	30/12/1974	08791047	عبد الكريم سعيد واهبة	هاني	عبد الكريم سعيد واهبة

CEM - AI-Qassam HR list from May 2023 containing the Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba, Military ID and unit

F	E	D	C	B	A	1
رقم المنصب في الهيئة	الاسم	المنصب في الهيئة	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	رقم الهوية	1675
جندي	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/الفصيل المرابطين/مجاهد 279	مجاهد 279	هاني عبد الكريم سعيد واهبة	199580	5551	1675

Mohammad Kamal El Maqqousi - UNRWA Driver - Al-Qassam Militant

Mohammad Kamal El Maqqousi - UNRWA Driver - Al-Qassam Militant



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since July 2023

LDC	10778067	801432501	Mohammed Kamal El Maqqousi	Driver	Palestine	23/07/2023
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UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since July 2023

LDC	10778067	801432501	Mohammed Kamal El Maqqousi	Driver	Palestine	23/07/2023
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Mohammad Kamal El Maqqousi - UNRWA Driver - Al-Qassam Militant

CEM – Al-Qassam HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise (September 2021)

م.م	الرقم العسكري	الاسم
5441	5440 352370	سليمان مازن أحمد المدهون
5442	5441 292153	محمد جواد محمود المدهون
5443	5442 744782	جمال عبد العزيز المدهون
5444	5443 632270	خليل محمد خليل المدهون
5445	5444 726126	أحمد محمد علي المدهون
5446	5445 704514	محمد سالم علي المدهون
5447	5446 193048	أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون
5448	5447 851315	شادي خليل حسان المدهون
5449	5448 758923	مصطفى خليل علي المدهون
5450	5449 789770	أحمد محمد علي المدهون
5451	5450 228892	أحمد محمد علي المدهون
5452	5451 704887	الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون
5453	5452 614065	ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون

Mohammad Kamal El Maqqousi - UNRWA Driver - Al-Qassam Militant

CEM – Al-Qassam HR lists containing the POI's full name, ID, Military ID, unit and expertise (September 2021)

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الرقم المدني	الاسم	الرقم المدني	الاسم	الرقم المدني
محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153	5441 292153	محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153	محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153
جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782	5442 744782	جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782	جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782
خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270	5443 632270	خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270	خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126	5444 726126	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126
محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514	5445 704514	محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514	محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514
أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048	5446 193048	أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048	أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048
شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315	5447 851315	شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315	شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315
مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923	5448 758923	مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923	مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770	5449 789770	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892	5450 228892	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892
الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887	5451 704887	الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887	الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887
ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065	5452 614065	ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065	ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065

التاريخ الرتبة العسكرية	الرتبة المدنية
1/07/2010	جندي
1/07/2012	جندي
1/07/2019	نائب قائد مجموعة
1/07/2016	جندي
1/07/2017	جندي
1/07/2016	جندي
1/07/2008	نائب قائد مجموعة
1/11/2016	جندي
1/07/2018	جندي
1/07/2016	جندي
1/07/2006	جندي
1/01/2021	قائد مجموعة
1/07/2009	جندي

CEM - Al-Qassam HR list with military ID number and rank

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الرتبة
محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153	جندي
جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782	جندي
خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270	جندي
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126	جندي
محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514	جندي
أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048	جندي
شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315	جندي
مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923	جندي
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770	جندي
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892	جندي
الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887	جندي
ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065	جندي

CEM - Al-Qassam HR li

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الرتبة	الاسم	الرقم المدني	الاسم	الرقم المدني
محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153	جندي	محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153	محمد جواد محمود المدهون	5441 292153
جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782	جندي	جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782	جمال عبد العزيز المدهون	5442 744782
خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270	جندي	خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270	خليل محمد خليل المدهون	5443 632270
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126	جندي	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5444 726126
محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514	جندي	محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514	محمد سالم علي المدهون	5445 704514
أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048	جندي	أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048	أحمد محمد أحمد المدهون	5446 193048
شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315	جندي	شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315	شادي خليل حسان المدهون	5447 851315
مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923	جندي	مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923	مصطفى خليل علي المدهون	5448 758923
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770	جندي	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5449 789770
أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892	جندي	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892	أحمد محمد علي المدهون	5450 228892
الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887	جندي	الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887	الرحمن أحمد محمد المدهون	5451 704887
ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065	جندي	ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065	ممدوح أبو محمد المدهون	5452 614065

التفصيلية
22/08/2022

Mohammad Kamal El Maqqousi - UNRWA Driver - Al-Qassam Militant

سيرة الفاروق عمر بن الخطاب

الأخ لإدريس أبو حنيفة حياطة الله...
 إمام حياطة وحياطة الله ورثته
 ترشيح الأسماء للمناصب لطلاب الجامعات

بإذنه تعالى في كل يوم الجمعة صباحا وبعدها في كل يوم من أيام الجمعة والجمعة...
 في كل يوم من أيام الجمعة والجمعة...
 في كل يوم من أيام الجمعة والجمعة...

الترتيب	الاسم	رقم الهوية	رقم الهاتف	الرقم الجامعي	الجامعة	التخصص	الفرع
1	محمد جمال محمد صالح	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
2	أحمد ياسر عبد الحليم	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
3	سليم محمد حسن السويدي	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
4	محمد مراد محمد العلي	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
5	محمد فارس محمد العلي	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
6	فهد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
7	علي أحمد علي حياطة	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
8	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
9	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
10	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
11	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
12	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
13	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
14	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
15	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
16	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
17	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
18	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
19	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
20	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
21	أحمد محمد حسن الكفاية	899257571	899257571	899257571	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة

CEM - Secret Al-Qassam – Gaza brigade list al-Qassam operatives designating them for activities with university students in Gaza (2021). The POI's ID number and full name are in the list

سيرة الفاروق عمر بن الخطاب

الترتيب	الاسم	رقم الهوية	رقم الهاتف	رقم الجامعي	الجامعة	التخصص	الفرع
14	محمد كمال سعيد أبو مائلة	0599774074	802377929	120190275	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
15	خالد محمد خليل البطرس	0597221421	802186205	1608190964	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
16	محمد سليم علي الجرجر	0594757538	404327744	016001171128	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
17	محمد كمال عبد العزيز المصري	0594691691	801432501	1206211941	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
18	محمد مظهر محمود محجوب	0598834949	400922167	1301162956	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
19	عبد الله حسن عودة حسين	0592198876	405997214	120191941	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
20	يوسف وسام يوسف حديد	0592887322	405149840	120181881	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة
21	محمد عبد الكريم خالد غنية	0595092623	406013144	1206212875	الجامعة الإسلامية	الهندسة المدنية	غزة

وكتشفوا يقولون فائق الاحترام والتقدير...
 أحوكم/ أبو ماجد
 قائد السرية الثالثة

Ali Isa Hamuda Matar – UNRWA Arabic teacher - Al-Qassam Militant

Ali Isa Hamuda Matar
 900237462



Arabic Teacher and a Al-Qassam Militant

CEM – appears in Hamas excel under: “anti-tank guided missile department /New folder/ armored vehicles and vehicles” (فصيل م د الموجه/جند/معدات واليات/جميع الصور)

الضوابط	ضوابط الرخص	13377433	104062373
الضوابط	مذكور	31332233	111068374
الضوابط	مذكور	38953213	111068375
الضوابط	وليد رمضان	5957401391	104153376
الضوابط	وليد رمضان	24920846	104153377
الضوابط	وليد رمضان	900237462	104153378
الضوابط	ضوابط الرخص	9017681132	111392379
الضوابط	ضوابط الرخص	90115894	111392380
الضوابط	ضوابط الرخص	10328202	111392381

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since February 2000

Permanent (Teaching)	10249282	900237462	Ali Isa Matar	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	07/02/2000
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CEM – Al-Qassam HR list with Matar’s full name, military ID, unit and military role

رقم التوظيف في الهيئة	الاسم	المنصب في الهيئة	النتيجة	رقم التوظيف في الهيئة
4117	105036	رائد عبدالله احمد مفاد	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2	4117
4151	572240	محمد حمود حمود مطر	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/فصيل قتالي 1/مجموعة قتالية 3/امرأة 2/مجاهد خدنة	4151
4154	522874	عز الدين سعيد مطلق ابوبهيان	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/فصيل قتالي 2	4154
4155	979789	يحيى عيسى محمد فرج الله	رامس الرشاش المتوسط	4155
4266	842497	محمد اسماعيل علي سالم	مجاهد ود	4266
4291	381200	عمران وليد عبد الرحمن راضي	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/فصيل قتالي 4/مجموعة قتالية 4/امرأة 2/مجاهد مشاة	4291
4292	473961	مهدي عبد المجيد حسين ابو عودة	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/فصيل قتالي 4/مجموعة قتالية 4/امرأة 2/مجاهد خدنة	4292
4345	808110	علي عيسى حمود مطر	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/مجموعة قتالية 2/مرايطين	4345
4346	830191	فائق محمد فهد نوران	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/مجموعة قتالية 2/مرايطين/مراييط 1	4346
4355	830309	أحمد ابراهيم محمد أبو مغصيب	لواء الوسطى لكتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس اسرية قتالية 2/مجموعة قتالية 2/مرايطين/مراييط 10	4355

Baker Mahmoud Abdallah Darwish- School counsellor – Al-Qassam Platoon Commander

Baker Mahmoud Abdallah Darwish
901383570



School counsellor, Nuseirat Prep E Boys
School and a Al-Qassam Platoon
Commander

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members
since March 2005

Permanent 10211102 901383570 Baker Mahmoud Darwish School Counsellor Palestine 01/03/2005

CEM - Record of military intelligence personnel (2011), in which Darwish in listed as the head of logistics in his company as well as a counsellor in UNRWA

الرقم الوطني	الاسم	الجنسية	الوظيفة	التاريخ	ملاحظات
44	دارwish Baker Mahmoud	فلسطين	مستشار / قائد لوجستيات	2011	
49	دارwish Baker Mahmoud	فلسطين	مستشار / قائد لوجستيات	2011	

CEM – Records of the Military Intelligence Personal from May 17th 2023, listing Darwish as a platoon commander

الاسم	الرقم الوطني	الجنسية	الوظيفة	التاريخ	ملاحظات
دارwish Baker Mahmoud	901383570	فلسطين	قائد لوجستيات	2023	
دارwish Baker Mahmoud	901383570	فلسطين	قائد لوجستيات	2023	

Mohammad Jabr El Khatib - Emergency Clerk – Al-Qassam

Mohammad Jabr El Khatib
901345660



Emergency Clerk and a Al-Qassam

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since January 2003

Permanent 10213432 901345660 Mohammad Jabr El Khatib Emergency Clerk Palestine 04/01/2003

CEM - Al-Qassam Military Wing North table of wounded operatives their full name, ID, military ID, unit, date of injury, percentage of disability. The table is from September 2022 and El Khatib is listed among other members

الاسم	الرقم الوطني	الجنسية	الوظيفة	التاريخ	ملاحظات
دارwish Baker Mahmoud	901383570	فلسطين	قائد لوجستيات	2023	
دارwish Baker Mahmoud	901383570	فلسطين	قائد لوجستيات	2023	

Mohammad Maher Salem – Clerk B - Al-Qassam Militant



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since October 2010

Permanent 10215124 803161652 Mohammad Maher Salem Clerk B Palestine 04/10/2010

CEM - Al-Qassam Military Wing North table of wounded operatives their full name, ID, military ID, unit, date of injury, percentage of disability. The table is from September 2022 and Salem is listed among other members

رقم	الاسم	الوحدات	النسبة المئوية للإصابة	التاريخ	التفاصيل	الدرجة	المنطقة	اللقب	الجنسية	الجنس	التاريخ
4187	محمد مصطفى حماد البرادق	لواء القدس	10 %	2019/07/01	ضربه بموتور في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2019/07/01
4188	محمد يحيى كامل حصر	لواء القدس	10 %	2014/07/12	ضرب في الكتف بالأسلحة الحربية في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2014/07/12
4189	محمد مصطفى حشوة	لواء القدس	10 %	2009/02/01	ضرب في الأضلاع الشظية	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2009/02/01
4190	جول كامل سليم عبد النبي	لواء القدس	10 %	2018/10/08	ضرب في القدم اليسرى بعد انفجار في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2018/10/08
4191	محمد محمد محمد	لواء القدس	10 %	2016/09/19	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2016/09/19
4192	محمد علي حريز حريز	لواء القدس	10 %	2017/07/01	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2017/07/01
4193	أحمد محمد أحمد الشويخ	لواء القدس	10 %	2012/07/01	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2012/07/01
4194	محمد Maher Salem	لواء القدس	10 %	2017/02/01	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2017/02/01
4195	ياسر زكي بوزيد البوعنانه	لواء القدس	10 %	2019/01/19	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2019/01/19
4196	فادي محمد محمد العمار	لواء القدس	10 %	2022/01/19	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2022/01/19
4197	مصطفى حاتم مصطفى الشكات	لواء القدس	12 %	2016/10/05	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2016/10/05
4198	تريفة محمد محمد عبد الشكيب رباح	لواء القدس	12 %	2014/08/10	ضرب في الكتف الأيمن في قطاع غزة	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2014/08/10

Khalil Muwafaq Safi – Field Security & Risk Management Office – Hamas Member



UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since December 2015

Fixed Term 10770533 802514786 Khalil Muwafaq Safi Senior National Security Officer Palestine 08/12/2015

CEM - Hamas movement members list dated October 2023 that includes ID, full name, movement rank, area, work place and occupation. Safi is listed

الاسم	الدرجة	المنطقة	اللقب	الجنسية	الجنس	التاريخ	رقم الهوية	رقم البطاقة
عبد الحميد أمين عبد الحميد صفا	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	9498155617	9
محمد ابو ادهم أحمد مرجان	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	803206838	11
محمد شمس محمد ابو موسى	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	403263740	14
شرف شاكش شاكش صافي	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	901352112	17
أحمد ابو ادهم محمد صافي	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	401878376	21
ياسر عيسى مطوع الظفره	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	963793880	26
خالد امرفا خالد صافي	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	802514786	29
محمد عبد الشكيب يوسف ابو شرفه	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	411002538	40
محمد عزمي خالد الكفان	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	402141055	41
مصطفى جمال محمد ابو سبون	مقاتل	القطاع	مقاتل	فلسطين	ذكر	2015/01/01	800498040	42

Naji Abdalla Abu Aziz – A Military Wing Member that Israel Notified UNRWA about in 2011

CEM – the POI is mentioned Manufacturing Unit Document

الاسم	الرقم	الرقم	نوع التوثيق	التاريخ
1. أبو بكر	0599-848118	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
2. أبو جعفر	0598-900931	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
3. أبو جعفر	0594-070085	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
4. أبو جعفر	0465-802400	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
5. أبو جعفر	0592-347381	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
6. أبو جعفر	0595-803583	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
7. أبو جعفر	0599-401693	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
8. أبو جعفر	0599-443102	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
9. أبو جعفر	0595-443105	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
10. أبو جعفر	0595-188464	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
11. أبو جعفر	0595-904199	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
12. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
13. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
14. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
15. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
16. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
17. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
18. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
19. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
20. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
21. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
22. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
23. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
24. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
25. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
26. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
27. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
28. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
29. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
30. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
31. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
32. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
33. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
34. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
35. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
36. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
37. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
38. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
39. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...
40. أبو جعفر	0593-842058	كشافة	الخدمات الصناعية	...

CEM - Military Security Document affiliating Naji to the Manufacturing Unit



Three Anti-Tank positions and a Tunnel Shaft in Khuzaa Prep Boys School



Alaa Jameel Abu Anza - UNRWA Teacher – Deputy in Al-Qassam’s Internal Security Apparatus and Counterintelligence

CEM - Al-Qassam document from September 2021 with the POI's full name, military ID and AK-47 (serial number 1708428) officially transferred from him to a different Al-Qassam member

الرقم	الاسم	رقم الهوية	رقم السلاح	الاسم
1708428	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	AK47	1708428

Mohammad Tawfiq El Ghafari – UNRWA Arabic Teacher - Al-Qassam Deputy Squad Commander

Mohammad Tawfiq El Ghafari
800015687

Arabic Teacher and a Al-Qassam Deputy Squad Commander

Voting records with name and ID

الجهة المحلية: العمرة
المرکز: مدرسة بنت الصمصرة الابتدائية

الاسم: محمد
رقم التلقين: 01/07/1983 91459542
توفيق ابراهيم الغفاري

الرقم الانتخابي: 800015687
مخيم الصمصرة

CEM - Al-Qassam HR Master Table

الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم
محمد توفيق ابراهيم الغفاري	800015687	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since October 2011

Permanent (Teaching) | 10216007 | 800015687 | Mohammad Tawfiq El Ghafari | Teacher Arabic | Palestine | 01/10/2011

CEM - El Ghafari listed with military ID number in Hamas May 2023 records

الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم	الاسم	الرقم
محمد توفيق ابراهيم الغفاري	800015687	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316	علاء جميل عبد العزيز أبو أنزا	917316

Ayman Adnan Al Alami - UNRWA Teacher – Deputy Platoon Commander Artillery Battalion

CEM – Official Al-Qassam Training and Specialization unit - artillery weapons document, dated 2023. The POI is listed with his military ID, full name and unit. The document includes training and procedures for malfunctions in high trajectory weapons


CEM - Document Title page



CEM - Content showing High trajectory weapons



CEM - Document Title page



Ala Abd Al-Hamid Qassem Jouda –Teacher Arabic Religion - Al-Qassam Platoon Commander

Abd Al-Hamid Qassem Jouda
900148727



Arabic Religion Teacher and a Al-Qassam Platoon Commander

Voting records with name and ID

الاسم	رقم التلقيح	تاريخ الميلاد	الجنس	البلد الشخصية	مكان الإقامة
علاء عبد الحميد قاسم جودة	09/01/1974	08781362	ذكر	فلسطين	خانيونس

CEM – Military training progress chart with Jouda's full name:

الاسم	رقم التلقيح	تاريخ الميلاد	الجنس	البلد الشخصية	مكان الإقامة
علاء عبد الحميد قاسم جودة	09/01/1974	08781362	ذكر	فلسطين	خانيونس

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 2002

Permanent (Teaching)	10243368	900148727	Ala A Hamid Jouda	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	01/09/2002
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CEM – Al-Qassam HR list with Jouda's full name, military ID, unit and military role

م	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	المنصب في الهيكلية	التعبئة	رتبة المنصب في الهيكلية
3812	761568	علاء عبد الحميد قاسم جودة	وحدة التعبئة والتوجيه	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/سرية الدعم والخدمات القتالية/وحدة التعبئة والتوجيه	قائد فصيل
3814			ضابط التعبئة	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/سرية الدعم والخدمات القتالية/وحدة التعبئة والتوجيه/ضابط التعبئة	قائد مجموعة
3815	271545	أحمد ناهض محمد ابو هويشل	ضابط تعبئة سرية 1	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/سرية الدعم والخدمات القتالية/وحدة التعبئة والتوجيه/ضابط التعبئة/سرية 1	قائد مجموعة
3816	553406	معتز محمد عبدالله نصار	ضابط تعبئة سرية 2	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/سرية الدعم والخدمات القتالية/وحدة التعبئة والتوجيه/ضابط التعبئة/سرية 2	قائد مجموعة

CEM – Al-Qassam HR list with Jouda's full name, military ID, unit and military role

م	الرقم العسكري	اسم المقاتل	التعبئة	الاحتياط	المنفذ	المنفذ	قائد الفصيل المدرب
939	751568	علاء عبد الحميد قاسم جودة	الثانية-القدس	الاحتياط 2019	عسكرة كيمان	المفتخر 2018	قائد الفصيل 30/09/2017

Hamdi Yousef El Qedra – UNRWA Teacher – Al-Qassam Radio Company Squad Leader

Hamdi Yousef El Qedra
800405813, DOB: 24/02/1985



Teacher, Al Amal Elementary Boys School and Squad Leader in the Combat Support Battalion, Radio Company Khan Yunis

Voting records with name and ID

الهيئة المحلية: خانيونس	لجنة الانتخابات المركزية - فلسطين
المركز: مدرسة طربا الثانوية للبنات	الانتخابات الفلسطينية 2021 - سجل الناخبين الابتدائي
الاسم: حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدرة	رقم الناخب: 09281133
تاريخ الميلاد: 24/02/1985	الجنس: ذكر
الاثبات الشخصية: مكان الإقامة	رقم الهوية: 800405813

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since September 2010

10214864	Hamdi Yousef El Qedra	Permanent (Teaching)	Al Amal Elementary Boys School	Teacher	Palestine	14/09/2010	800405813
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CEM – Al-Qassam list showing Al-Qassam members from the Khan Yunis Combat support Battalion. The POI is listed with his full name military ID number and other information

الاسم	تاريخ التسجيل	الرقم العسكري	الجنس	تاريخ الميلاد	الخدمة	المنطقة	الحي	المنهج	الدرجة
حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره	01/07/2007	328410	ذكر	24/02/1985	مدرسة طربا الثانوية للبنات	خانيونس	خانيونس	1	الدرجة

CEM – Archived Al-Qsasm list showing Al-Qassam members from the Khan Yunis Combat support Battalion. The POI is listed with his full name military ID number

الكود	اسم	الرقم العسكري / الكود	الخدمة / التخصص	صورة	وصية	قبيلته	تاريخ الوصية	كثيبتة ام	الحالة	عمود
AL376	حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره	328410	مدرسة الانتشار	80	يوجد	2	2	2		

Hamdi Yousef El Qedra – UNRWA Teacher – Al-Qassam Radio Company Squad Leader

CEM - Lists attached with other documents from 2021, listing Al-Qassam members from the Khan Yunis Combat Support Battalion. The POI is listed with his full name and military ID number

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الخدمة	المنطقة	الحي	المنهج	الدرجة
حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره	328410	مدرسة طربا الثانوية للبنات	خانيونس	خانيونس	1	الدرجة

CEM - Al-Qassam (Khan Yunis) document from March 2019 signed by the POI and military equipment assigned to him, including Kalashnikov assault rifle, magazines and grenades

EZZEEN AL-QASSAM BRIGADES
MILITARY WING OF HAKES MOVEMENT
KIBRITOHU PALANKE

التاريخ: 2019-03-17

قرار امتلاك عهدة
باسم القائد حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره عسكري، 328410

بأنه يوجد لدى القائد التالي وهو عهدة كالتالي:

نوع العهدة	التاريخ	العدد	رقم العهدة
بنادق	2019-03-17	1	328410
مخارج	2019-03-17	12	328410
قذائف	2019-03-17	1	328410

اسم القائد: حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره

التوقيع: حمدي يوسف ابراهيم القدره

Ahmad Samir El Khatib - UNRWA Deputy School Principal – Squad Leader in Al-Qassam Infantry Battalion

Ahmad Samir El Khatib
803293117, DOB: 04/08/1991



Deputy School Principal, Maghazi Elem B Boys School and Squad Leader, 2nd Infantry Battalion, Khan Yunis Brigade

Voting records with name and ID

الاسم	رقم الناخب	تاريخ الميلاد	الجنس	مكان الإقامة
سمير محمود الخطيب	91386392	04/08/1991	ذكر	803293117 خاتون

UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA – Registered as staff member since August 2013

10216733	Ahmad Samir El Khatib	Permanent (Teaching)	Maghazi Elem B Boys School	Deputy School Principal	Palestine	25/08/2013	803293117
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CEM – list of final results of the military readiness of Al-Qassam members containing the POI's full name, military ID and expertise – April 2022

م	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	اللواء	الكتيبة	السرية	القصيل	الرتبة العسكرية	التخصص	نسبة المهاري من البرنامج	نسبة المعرفي من البرنامج	مجموع النتائج
146	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	خاتون	الثانية	الأولى	الثاني	فك المجموعة	مشاة	70.7%	10%	80.7

Ahmad Samir El Khatib - UNRWA Deputy School Principal – Squad Leader in Al-Qassam Infantry Battalion

الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الرقم العسكري
أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654	أحمد سمير محمود الخطيب	837654

CEM – Secret Al-Qassam document from September 2022 mentioning names of fighters with attributed munitions in one of the Battalions – the POI and his Military ID number is in the document




CEM – Al-Qassam document from April 2019 signed by the POI including his Military ID and military equipment assigned to him such as: Kalashnikov assault rifle, hand grenades, Shawaz type IED, DFC type IED, explosives and more



Ahmad Hisham Mahmoud El Louh – UNRWA Teacher – Al-Qassam Sniper

Ahmad Hisham Mahmoud El Louh
802588574



Arabic Teacher and a Al-Qassam Platoon Sniper

Voting records with name and ID

الاسم	أحمد	رقم الناخب	09/02/1990 91312084	الجنس	ذكر	البيانات الشخصية	مجان الأقامة	الجهة الانتخابية	الانتخابات الفلسطينية 2021 - سجل الناخبين الإبدائي
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CEM - Hamas HR master table including El-Louh's (according to Military ID) claiming he receives 3200 Shekels from the agency (i.e., UNRWA):

م	الاسم	رقم العسكري	نوع الدورة	التقييم المعرفي	التقييم المهاري	التقييم المملوكي	المجموع النهائي	تاريخ الدورة
1	أحمد هشام محمود اللوح	960542	عسكرة الكمان	12%	42%	23%	77%	2/25/2021

UNRWA Staff provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since August 2013

10216546	Ahmad Hisham El Louh	Permanent (Teaching)	Shijaiya Prep A Boys School	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	18/08/2013	802588574
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CEM - Hamas's Central Camps Brigade training assessment with El-Louh's full name and military ID (960542) from the year 2021

م	تسلسل الدورة	نوع الدورة	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الكتيبة	التقييم المعرفي	التقييم المهاري	التقييم المملوكي	المجموع النهائي	تاريخ الدورة
232	316	عسكرة الكمان	960542	أحمد هشام محمود اللوح	القدس	12%	42%	23%	77%	2/25/2021

Mahmoud Mohammad Sarraj – UNRWA School Principal and deputy School Principal – Al-Qassam fighter

Mahmoud Mohammad Sarraj
931546840, DOB: 02/07/1982



School Principal, Nuseirat Prep C Boys School and Soldier, 2nd battalion (Al-Quds/ Nuseirat) Central Camps Brigade

Voting records with name and ID

الاسم	محمود	رقم الناخب	02/07/1982 08911275	الجنس	ذكر	البيانات الشخصية	مجان الأقامة	الجهة الانتخابية	الانتخابات الفلسطينية 2021 - سجل الناخبين الإبدائي
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UNRWA Staff list provided to the Israeli MFA - registered as staff members since September 2004

10210604	Mahmoud Mohammad Sarraj	Permanent (Teach)	Nuseirat Prep C Boys School	School Principal	Palestine	01/09/2004	931546840
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CEM - Al-Qassam HR list from May 2023 containing the A Rahman Atiya Abu Awad full name, Military ID and unit

م	الاسم	رقم العسكري	المنصب في الهيكلية	المنصب في الهيكلية	التعبئة	الرتبة المنصب في الهيكلية
5464	محمود محمد فايز السراج	104966	مجاهد	مجاهد	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/فصيل المرابطين/مجاهد 168	جندي

Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba – UNRWA Math Teacher and Al-Qassam Fighter

Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba (900216664)

Permanent (Teaching) 10248153 900216664 Hani A Karim Wahba Teacher Mathematics Palestine 23/08/1997

Voting records with name and ID

الاسم	رقم التسجيل	تاريخ الميلاد	الجنس	البيانات الشخصية	مكان الإقامة
هاني	08791047	30/12/1974	ذكر	900216664	مخيم النصيرات

CEM - Al-Qassam HR list from May 2023 containing the Hani Abd A-Karim Said Wahba, Military ID and unit

F	E	D	C	B	A
رقم التسجيل في الهيكلية	الشيعة	التسجيل في الهيكلية	الاسم	الرقم العسكري	1
جندى	لواء الوسطى/كتيبة قتالية 2 - القدس/فضيل المرايئين/مجاهد 279	مجاهد 279	هاني عبد الكريم سعيد وهبة	199580	5551

Annex 3: Examples of UNRWA employees who participated in the invasion and were presented to the OIOS (Office of Internal Oversight Service)

As part of the OIOS' mandate to investigate the involvement of UNRWA employees in the invasion, the IDF Military Intelligence presented to the OIOS 18 detailed examples of UNRWA employees for whom there is strong evidence of their participation in the 7th October 2023 invasion. **This annex presents part of the information provided to the OIOS.**

The OIOS did not provide Israel with the details of its investigation into these cases. The findings and conclusions of the investigation's final report, which were provided to the Israeli MFA, were redacted.²⁰ The report included only a general conclusion that in nine out of the 18 cases, “the evidence obtained by OIOS indicated that the UNRWA staff members may have been involved in the armed attacks of 7 October 2023” (emphasis added).

Below are examples of 7 employees presented in the document:

	Name	ID	Terror Affiliation	UNRWA job
1	Mousa Subhi Mousa El Qidra	905400768	Hamas	School counsellor
2	Rami Mohammad Ramadan Sabbah	900969791	Hamas	Math Teacher
3	Faisal Ali Mussalem Al Naami	900641721	Hamas	Social Worker
4	Ibrahim Atiya Mohammad Abu Ghafra	803335371	Hamas	Teacher
5	Yusuf Zedan El Hawajri	900775503	Hamas	Arabic Teacher
6	Mamdouh Husain Al Qaq	804817195	PIJ	Teacher
7	Hafez Mousa Mohammed Mousa	909125957	Hamas	School Principal

²⁰ The report included only a general conclusion that in nine out of the 18 cases, “the evidence obtained by OIOS indicated that the UNRWA staff members may have been involved in the armed attacks of 7 October 2023”

Mousa Subhi Mousa El Qidra (ID: 905400768)



1. position in UNRWA: Mousa Subhi Mousa El Qidra from Khan Yunis is an UNRWA School Counsellor. He appears on line 5,605 of an UNRWA staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

UNRWA ID	POST TITLE	UNRWA ID	UNRWA ID	SCHOOL ADDRESS	PALESTINE	15/2009
5600	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10217244	80225167	Mona Kamel Abu Shammakh	Palestine	2/1/2015
5601	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10217257	802923231	Mona Khalil Enshas	Palestine	2/1/2015
5602	Permanent (Teaching)	10219698	801557208	Mona Mohammad El Haj	Palestine	9/25/2009
5604	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10778426	801199381	Mousa Jamal Abu Sai	Palestine	8/22/2023
5604	LDC	10777715	802280118	Mousa Subhi Amer	Palestine	4/18/2023
5605	Permanent	10211944	805400768	Mousa Subhi El Qidra	Palestine	3/1/2006
5606	Permanent (Teaching)	10230904	816527378	Muhammad Wahyem Fama	Palestine	1/11/1997
5607	Permanent	10215179	85930879	Muhammad Qudrah	Palestine	2/13/2014
5608	Permanent (Teaching)	10248527	82444734	Muhammad A. Abu Abu	Palestine	2/13/2014

2. Position in Hamas: Mousa is a Hamas military wing operative (military ID: 312369) serving as a platoon commander in the Khan Yunis Brigade.

CEM - Hamas membership records

رقم الكسوة	الاسم	مستوى العضوية	المنطقة	رقم الحساب في المنظمة	الدرجة الوظيفية	التاريخ	الدرجة الوظيفية	التاريخ	رقم الكسوة
قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية: 103									
820395	محمد يوسف ابراهيم صلاح	مستشار	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	لواء	2020-07-01	لواء	2020-07-01	80221492
162723	بلال جليل عودة بركة	إداري	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	لواء	2016-07-01	لواء	2016-07-01	801534736
312369	موسى صليحي موسى القدره	مستشار	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	لواء	2010-07-01	لواء	2010-07-01	905400768

Military ID: 312369; Name: Mousa Subhi Mousa El Qidra; Job: accountant; Department: financial; Rank in organization: Department Commander; From date: 01/07/2010; Military rank: Deputy company commander; draft date: 01/07/2003; ID: 905400768.

#	ر.ع	الاسم	لواء/ركن	كثيبيّة/دائرة	ملاحظات
148	312369	موسى صليحي موسى القدره	لواء خاتيونس	قسم الشؤون الإدارية والمالية	

Military ID: 312369; Name: Mousa Subhi Mousa El Qidra; Brigade: Khan Yunis Brigade; Department: Department of financial and administrative affairs.

Moreover, his ID card was physically found in Mohammad Sinwar's assistant office.



3. **Involvement in the October 7th massacre:** assisted his son and brother in infiltrating Israel and returning to Gaza and participated in the kidnapping of an Israeli woman.

a. Phone calls + cell phone triangulation:

- i. Phone number used by Mousa: 972598044445. Phone number used by Mousa’s son: 972592631907.
- ii. In several conversations between 9:14am and 10:32am on October 7th, Mousa’s son informs Mousa that he killed and kidnapped many Israelis and that he is on his way back to Gaza with the hostages. During the calls, his son refers to Mousa as his father, and they refer to “their” Vespa.

(News can be heard in the background)	-	Mousa
Yes, father?	-	<i>Hasem</i>
Hello?	-	Mousa
Yes	-	<i>Hasem</i>
There is no fuel in the motorcycle, you idiot. It’ll stop working!	-	Mousa
I put 20 shekel (seemingly for fuel). [Also], I killed someone!	-	<i>Hasem</i>
What?	-	Mousa
I killed someone and I took an old woman in a jeep!	-	<i>Hasem</i>
What?!	-	Mousa
We took an old woman in a jeep!	-	<i>Hasem</i>
An old woman in a jeep?!	-	Mousa
Yes, we took her and we are bringing back (i.e. to the Gaza Strip).	-	<i>Hasem</i>
Who is this woman?	-	Mousa
An old woman! An old woman! From the Jews, from the Jews, I’m inside (Israeli territory)!		<i>Hasem</i>
You brought a woman with you?	-	Mousa
(Seemingly to someone in the background) What? What?!	-	<i>Hasem</i>
Ok, where is the motorcycle?	-	Mousa
(Seemingly to someone in the background) Yes?	-	<i>Hasem</i>
Return the motorcycle you son of a... before I...(unclear what he says)	-	Mousa


- iii. At 10:32am, Mousa requests his brother's location on the Israeli border, in order to aid him and pick him up.
- iv. At 10:52am, a militant coordinates with Mousa to meet on a hostage-related matter.

Hello, Mohammad	-	Mousa
Abu-Hasam, where are you	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
What do you have?	-	Mousa
I brought something (i.e. a kidnapped woman according to later references) with me from there (i.e. Israeli territory).	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
Where should I meet you?	-	Mousa
I am at home. I just sent her (I.e. the kidnapped woman) with my uncle.	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
Should I meet you near the cemetery?	-	Mousa
One (i.e. kidnapped) female. [Come] to the house. Do you know where our house is?	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
Yes.	-	Mousa
So go there.	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
I don't know exactly where it is. I want to come to you, me and my brother, is that ok?	-	Mousa
So I'll send you Ahmed, my brother, and he will meet you on the street (Ahmed can be heard in the background asking "Where is he?")	-	<i>Mohammad</i>
Next to the park?	-	Mousa
Next to "Al-Namsawi" Park there is a field. I'll give you the number, I mean I'll him (i.e. Ahmed) your number and he will call you.		<i>Mohammad</i>

b. CEM Phone number connection: both cellphones above are known to be used by their respective owners. Mousa's phone number was found in a battalion bookkeeping file (line number 10), along with his full name, ID number, and profession as a teacher.

الاسماء والمعلومات		الاسماء		الاسماء		الاسماء		الاسماء		الاسماء	
الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم	الاسم
أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني	أحمد محمد الزهراني
090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748
موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني	موسى محمد الزهراني
090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748	090329748

Rami Mohammad Ramadan Sabbah (ID: 900969791)



- Position in UNRWA:** Rami Mohammad Ramadan Sabbah from Deir el Balah is an UNRWA Math Teacher. He appears on line 682 of an UNRWA staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

EMP. SUB. GR.	EMP. NO.	ID NO.	NAME	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	EOD.	SEP. DATE
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10770749	300848251	Raed Khaled Abu Aukhadde	School Principal	Palestine	1/27/2016	
Permanent	10219916	111672911	Raed Mohammad Abu El Husain	Medical Laboratory Technologist	Palestine	9/4/2011	
Permanent	10231130	325728172	Raed Mohd. Abu Khureiba	Health Centre Pharmacist	Palestine	1/10/1997	
Permanent (Teaching)	10244421	308748140	Raed Mohd. El Kurd	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	8/23/1997	
Permanent (Teaching)	10211490	305490489	Raed Muftar El Tebbah	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	2/1/2006	
Permanent (Teaching)	10212998	309340623	Raeda Mahmud Ismail	Teacher	Palestine	9/1/1993	
Permanent	10220958	111248843	Rafat Hassan El Habbosh	Area Education Officer	Palestine	9/17/2009	
Permanent (Teaching)	10213624	300651418	Rafat Hassan Mousa	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	9/17/2009	
Permanent	10210877	309089333	Rafat Mahal Hamdan	Emergency Clerk	Palestine	11/25/2004	11/30/2023
Permanent (Teaching)	10212426	303097137	Rafat Sabah Hijem	Teacher	Palestine	2/3/2007	
Permanent (Teaching)	10213871	3011516394	Raghad Hammed Sajda	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	9/17/2009	
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10216540	302705508	Raghad Sulaiman Abu Ghayyad	Teacher	Palestine	9/16/2013	
Permanent (Teaching)	10240496	302767773	Raja Saleem Abu Daher	Teacher	Palestine	9/1/2001	
Permanent (Teaching)	10249721	300969791	Rami Mohammad Sabbah	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	9/2/2006	
Permanent (Teaching)	10213046	301523789	Rania Kamel Ammal	Teacher English	Palestine	9/1/2008	
Permanent (Teaching)	10213657	303418679	Rania Adnan El Masri	Teacher	Palestine	9/24/2008	

- position in Hamas:** Rami Sabbah is Hamas military wing operative (military ID: 600295, movement rank: Naqib) in the Deir el Balah Battalion. He appears in a document of Hamas movement members in Deir el Balah.

الاسم	الرقم	تاريخ الميلاد المتكفل	الرتبة الحالية	تاريخ البيعة الخالدة	الشعبة	الفرع	المسجد
رامي محمد رمضان صباح	900969791	2/12/1976	راقيب	1/1/1994	بافا	بافا	بافا

Mosque	Quarter	Branch	Status	Dating of swearing of allegiance	Current rank	DOB	Name	ID		
Jaffa	Jaffa	Jaffa	Bader	Active	1/1/1994	Raqib	2/12/1976	Rami Mohammad Ramadan Sabbah	900969791	2645

- Involvement in the October 7th Massacre:** Rami was involved in receiving and holding hostages.

- VISINT:** Rami was identified via facial recognition from photos uploaded to social media, photographing the kidnapping of Israeli hostages.



b. **Phone calls:** Rami is part of a group of Hamas militants from the Deir el Balah battalion that kidnapped an Israeli female hostage. These individuals are also part of the Deir el Balah region emergency committee.

- i. Phone number used by Rami: 972599600251.
- ii. At 1:01pm on October 7th, Tamer Abu Miri requests the phone number of Amar Kafeh from Rami.
- iii. At 1:06pm Tamer is identified to be directly involved in holding a hostage.
- iv. At 1:11pm, Tamer reports to Rami about holding a hostage via SMS.

Time	Sendr	Recip	content
07/10/2023 13:11:52	972599603041	972599600251	مجندة

- v. At 2:56pm, Tamer requests the phone number of Abu Hamzah from Rami.
- vi. CEM: This document describes the organizational structure of the Deir- el Balah region emergency committee, and contains the names and phone numbers of Tamer, Amar, and Rami.

هيكلية لجنة الطوارئ لمنطقة دير البلح									
اسم اللجنة	اسم العضو 1	اسم العضو 2	اسم العضو 3	اسم العضو 4	اسم العضو 5	اسم العضو 6	اسم العضو 7	اسم العضو 8	اسم العضو 9
اللجنة العامة	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة التنفيذية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الإعلامية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة القانونية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الاقتصادية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الاجتماعية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الثقافية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الرياضية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الصحية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة البيئية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الأمنية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الإعلامية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة القانونية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الاقتصادية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الاجتماعية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الثقافية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الرياضية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الصحية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة البيئية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد
اللجنة الأمنية	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد	عبد الحامد

- vii. **CEM Phone number connection:** This is a phone list containing Rami's name and phone number.

أرقام الجوال			
ملاحظات	رقم الجوال	الاسم	#
	0599470770	احمد حزب احمد الكوي	1
	0598992999	سجاد احمد حيدر نصار	2
	0599013205	سجاد احمد احمد حسن	3
	0599428508	محمد عماد الله ابراهيم ابو العماد	4
	0595922429	محمد عبد الكريم احمد بشان	5
	0595191409	اياد عبد الكريم احمد سلمان	6
	0598607507	محمد احمد حزب الكوي	7
	0595817393	عبد الهادي محمد رمضان مساح	8
	0597259898	عبد الرحمن علي حسن مطر	9
	0599013129	محمد احمد اسحاق الكوي	10
	0592212631	سامي احمد اسحاق الكوي	11
	0599983339	محمد احمد محمد بويحيى	12
	0599600251	رامي محمد اسحاق مساح	13
	0599140146	محمد حماد محمد حسن	14
	0502021160	داود احمد حزب احمد الكوي	15

Faisal Ali Mussalem Al-Naami (ID: 900641721)



- Position in UNRWA:** Faisal Ali Mussalem Al-Naami from Nuseirat is an UNRWA Social Worker. He appears on line 187 of an UNRWA staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
EMP. SUB. GR.	EMP. NO.	ID NO.	NAME	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	EOD.	SEP. DATE
169	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10771549	803571314	Brian Muhammad Abu Tuama	Teacher	Palestine	10/19/2016
170	Permanent (Teaching)	10216791	802242980	Bushra Aiyat Abu Shawish	Teacher	Palestine	9/4/2011
171	Permanent (Teaching)	10249725	808344058	Buthaina Mhd Abu Diyab	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	11/3/1998
172	Permanent (Teaching)	10248844	800891573	Diya Hamdan Suhail	Teacher English	Palestine	10/19/1998
173	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10777922	802505552	Dusa Ahmad El Shukur	Teacher	Palestine	4/26/2023
174	Permanent (Teaching)	10214271	813379629	Dusa Umar Ayyash	Teacher Science	Palestine	8/17/2008
175	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10771920	803023957	El Husain Kamal Abu Ayala	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	2/12/2017
176	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10775167	810217715	Emad Fawzi El Sahe	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	5/14/2020
177	Permanent (Teaching)	10222477	802942078	EMAN M.A. ZAQTOUT	Teacher	Palestine	10/8/1984
178	Permanent (Teaching)	10214745	828745310	Emran Sujeeran Abu Sjeitan	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	9/14/2010
179	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10770583	803863908	Eslem Marwan Abu Khalife	Teacher English	Palestine	9/20/2015
180	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10771998	800145777	Fadel Munir El Jarousha	Teacher Science	Palestine	2/1/2017
181	Permanent	10248102	820618949	Fadi Younes Jeeban	Sch. City Assoc. Coord.	Palestine	6/29/1997
182	Permanent	10218160	805149189	Fad. Mahmoud Abu Suwaim	School Attendant	Palestine	1/23/2012
183	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10770741	801986124	Fadel Khamis El Haddad	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	1/27/2010
184	Permanent (Teaching)	10249232	807487429	Fadwa A.A. Abu Galerna	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	9/8/1999
185	Permanent	10211012	805511946	Fadwa Fayez Ishtefan	School Counselor	Palestine	3/1/2005
186	Permanent (Teaching)	10212968	802027957	Fadwa Khalil Yashin	Teacher	Palestine	1/1/2004
187	Permanent	10212847	900641721	Faisal Ali Naami	Social Worker	Palestine	8/3/2006
188	Fixed Term	10770044	800629747	Fakher Saleh Abu Shammala	School Attendant	Palestine	4/1/2015
189	Permanent (Teaching)	10248104	807089538	Falhin Aiyat Sarhan	Teacher	Hydrusini	8/1/1996

- Position in Hamas:** Faisal is a Hamas military wing operative serving in the comms and combat support branch of the Nuseirat Battalion.

CEM - Hamas membership records - His name and ID were found in a Hamas military document entitled “Personal details of comms branch” (بيانات أفراد صالح الإشارة).

10/03/1988	3/10/1988	801904558	معظم فايز علي التوابنة
30/10/1983	30/10/1983	949820443	علي عبد المعطي الحيلة
03/22/1970	22/3/1970	910743930	نعيم عبد الرحمن حمدان
03/12/1987	12/3/1987	801810466	سامح سمير محمود ابو جبارة
03/02/1989	2/3/1989	802198184	حنيفة عبد الفتاح حسن دخان
14/11/1987	14/11/1987	801802679	محمود عبد الله عبد القادر محمود
02/01/1994	1/2/1994	804689867	حمزة خالد عبد الرحمن راضي
16/8/1978	16/8/1978	900641721	فيصل علي مسلم النعاسي
05/10/1984	10/5/1984	800276867	شادي اسماعيل احمد تيهان
07/12/1993	12/7/1993	804436729	محمد علي حمدان عبد

3. **Involvement in the October 7th massacre:** Faisal was identified in Israeli territory, and was involved in kidnapping a man from Be’eri based on CCTV, CEM, and cellular activity.

a. CCTV footage:

- i. At 9:34am on October 7th, Faisal appeared in CCTV footage from within Kibbutz Be’eri. He can be seen loading the dead body of an Israeli into this SUV to kidnap it.



- ii. **CEM - licensing plate data-base** from the year 2020 which lists the license plate of Faisal’s car (pictured above) and his name.

T	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P			
رقم المركبة	الامتلاك	CARS	PRI	CARS	DE	عدد المعاد الجوال	CARS	STA	تاريخ المر	سنة الامتلاك	اللون	الوقوف	CAR	STA	نوع الملكية الاستخدام	رقم الهوية	الاسم		
94878	394842	داهلر	بنفم	354036	2400		4	WDB1231	2013-07-0	1084	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	021684691	عندم رجب
94879	342332	ديكوتا		1003006	884946	059228354	4	WDB1231	2015-01-1	1999	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	مركبة خصوصية	مزدوجة الامتلاك	309122057	داني زهدي
94880	340282	داهلر	بنفم	103005	2400	059720711	4	WDB1231	2015-02-0	1083	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	913832440	نوره طيب
94881	352630	فولكسواغن		103001			4	WVWZZZ	2011-01-0	1082	اخضر	الغزير			ملك عادي	مركبة خصوصية	مزدوجة الامتلاك	924460725	خواد ساميرا
94882	1003002	فيلسوفينكر		30841			4	MBVRV2	2010-07-0	1093	كحلي	مستوح الاجنبي			ملك عادي	مركبة خصوصية	مزدوجة الامتلاك	800318917	محمد سعد
94883	307052	ديكو		1002999	905	058701204	4	VF315B04	2010-10-0	1091	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	854774621	صبر زيب
94884	579372	فيلسوفينكر		1003004	C62	لاصم	4	MB5N06	2013-01-0	1991	خض	ملا			المركب	بهدا ديرل	شخصي	862022270	محمد هندا
94885	303782	داهلر	بنفم	103000	3000	059940960	7	WDB1231	2014-07-2	1083	بيج	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	903280162	ياسر اسما
94886	301930	ديكو		1003010	200	059964121	4	VF320AK3	2020-07-0	1993	ابيض	الغزير			ملك عادي	مركبة	مؤقت	808891361	موزي حليل
94887	317120	داهلر	بنفم	1003011	2500		4	WDB1243	2016-04-0	1094	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	902917400	عكرم احمد
94888	811780	مازدا		1003016	321	LY	4	MZD012	2020-01-0	1995	الاحمر	الغزير			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	940791734	عبد الله
94889	374102	فيلسوفينكر		1003018		كرونا	4	JMC5NDV	2019-02-0	1999	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	801468109	راند بنشام
94890	354842	داهلر	بنفم	103015	2400	056609946	4	WDB1231	2016-04-0	1104	بيج	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	807341802	محمد عبد
94891	3193102	هيونداي		1003012	1100P20	0599792942	8	V8KTVUP2	2020-05-0	1998	ابيض	ديرل			ملك عادي	مركبة خصوصية	مزدوجة الامتلاك	900641721	فضل علي
94892	328192	داهلر	بنفم	1002750	1900	056888254	4	WDB2010	2016-07-0	1093	بيج	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	801663971	احمد عبيد
94893	394350	ميتسوبيشي		1002748		البيجو	4	JSAE0C51	2013-07-0	1999	ابيض	الغزير			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	803184794	خالد ثابت
94894	373222	هوندا		1002748	905	059933064	4	VF315ED9	2013-10-0	1999	ابيض	الغزير			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	800494375	انور عويد
94895	320230	هوندا		1002747		ميتسوبيشي	4	JH4EK15	2017-07-0	1998	ابيض	الغزير			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	800877690	عبدان حمد
94896	335882	فيلسوفينكر		1002739	CB4	لاصم	4	MB5N06	2016-07-0	1097	خض	ديرل			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	800423873	احلام خالد
94897	300180	KIA		FF273		059904077	4	KNAFE27	2019-12-2	2007	خض	الغزير			ملك عادي	صانور	شخصي	955620182	احمد اخير

b. Phone calls:

- i. Phone number used by Faisal: 972597920421.
- ii. In a phone conversation at 11:28am, a Hamas operative tells Faisal that he returned Faisal's truck, guns, and equipment, and that he transferred people (likely hostages) to other operatives.
- iii. **CEM - Phone number connection** - His phone no. that was used to make the phone call was found in a customer list along with his full name and ID (line number 3,237).

كشف بالاشتر اوقات												
الاسم	الاسم	المنطقة	الغوا	المنطقة	الموقع	التاريخ	الهوية	رقم الجوال	رقم العداد	نوع الاشتراك	التصنيف	الاسم
40A	40103551	3227	رواد محمود	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	592165419	34739806	اتارفة	موظف الدرع	40A
40A	40103552	3228	محمد سلامة	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	933181414	8980298	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103553	3229	احمد محمود	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	592165419	900598057	اتارفة	موظف الدرع	40A
40A	40103554	3230	عمرو حسام	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	399896406	11003440	اتارفة	موظف الدرع	40A
40A	40103555	3231	ابراهيم احمد	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599924134	22633	اتارفة	زراعي	40A
40A	40103556	3232	حاتم عبدالرحمن	الضواحي	4122	200	NS:13/01/	597454510	1.51E+11	عداد مسبق	موظف الامن	40A
40A	40103557	3233	حسن محمود	الضواحي	4121	10	NS:12/01/	934090663	41090516	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103558	3234	ابراهيم سلام	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599410101	6985187	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103559	3235	احمد سلام	الضواحي	4122	200	NS:13/01/	1.69E+11	عداد مسبق	موظف وكلاء	40A	
40A	40103560	3236	احمد سلام	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599016336	8982665	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103561	3237	فaisal علي	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	597920421	8989883	اتارفة	موظف وكلاء	40A
40A	40103562	3238	صالح محمد	الضواحي	4122	200	NS:13/01/	1.31E+11	عداد مسبق	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A	
40A	40103563	3239	قاسم محمد	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599784279	31710545	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103564	3240	رازي محمد	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	399627429	8989102	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103565	3241	عبدالمطلب	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599898306	8980058	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103566	3242	محمود احمد	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	599771984	39672455	اتارفة	موظف الدرع	40A
40A	40103567	3243	محمود احمد	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	594035241	1.09E+08	اتارفة	اتارفة/ممتاز	40A
40A	40103568	3244	محمد ابراهيم	الضواحي	4122	10	NS:13/01/	598709684	10305611	اتارفة	موظف الامن	40A
40A	40103570	3245	امير رجب	الضواحي	4122	200	NS:13/01/	599065284	3.01E+11	عداد مسبق	موظف الدرع	40A

Ibrahim Atiya Mohammad Abu Ghafra (ID: 803335371)



1. **position in UNRWA:** Ibrahim Atiya Mohammad Abu Ghafra from Gaza City is an UNRWA school teacher. He appears on line 2930 of an UNRWA staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

1	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	EMP. SUB. GR.	EMP. NO.	ID NO.	NAME	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	EOD.	SEP. DATE
2912	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10216991	802527762	Huda Nayef Safha	Teacher Science	Palestine	8/25/2013	
2913	Permanent (Teaching)	10213097	800580150	Huda Ramadan Usaid	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	10/25/2008	
2914	Permanent (Teaching)	10213070	801294257	Huda Yousef El Sawlat	Teacher	Palestine	8/25/2008	
2915	Permanent (Teaching)	10214643	806724521	Huda Yousef Assad	Teacher Science	Palestine	2/1/2010	
2916	Permanent (Teaching)	10213087	800658559	Huda Ziyad Dahman	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	10/12/2008	
2917	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10278994	410089106	Huda Zuhair Basran	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	8/22/2023	
2918	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10219320	801420499	Husam A Rabin Azzam	Teacher	Palestine	2/1/2014	
2919	Permanent	10216948	801674774	Husam A Rabin Hamad	Practical Nurse	Palestine	8/15/2011	
2920	Permanent (Teaching)	10249796	800880574	Husam Eddin Ref Hrzalla	Teacher Science	Palestine	8/13/2000	
2921	Permanent (Teaching)	10212393	800070468	Husam Mohammad Thaher	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	2/1/2007	
2922	Permanent (Teaching)	10248177	806342173	Husam Mushah El Eadab	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	8/1/1996	
2923	Permanent (Teaching)	10213827	410203946	Husam Ramadan El Masri	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	8/17/2008	
2924	Permanent	10212107	800147852	Husam Uthman El Sayes	Education Specialist	Palestine	9/3/2005	
2925	Permanent	10215906	8019798199	Huwaida Rolq Shappoura	Cleaner	Palestine	8/22/2011	
2926	Permanent (Teaching)	10222147	801988887	Ibrahim Ahmad El Mabbouh	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	10/1/1994	
2927	Fixed Term	10271015	410193130	Ibrahim Ali Nassar	School Attendant	Palestine	8/15/2015	
2928	Permanent (Teaching)	10249546	800847047	Ibrahim Ashour Hamada	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	10/3/2000	
2929	Permanent (Teaching)	10214788	800770471	Ibrahim Ala El Mahalawi	Teacher	Palestine	10/14/2010	
2930	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10271988	803335371	Ibrahim Atiya Abu Ghafra	Teacher	Palestine	2/1/2017	
2931	Permanent	10211295	804895587	Ibrahim Hasan Abu Nada	Education MHPSS Specialist	Palestine	2/20/2008	
2932	Fixed Term (Teaching)	10216883	802381420	Ibrahim Ismail Ghunaim	Teacher English	Palestine	8/25/2013	

2. **Position in Hamas:** Ibrahim is a Hamas military wing member (military ID: 314008), serving as a Nukhba operative in the 2nd company in the Nuseirat Battalion.

a. From CEM of military courses, 2021

تسجل الدورة	نوع الدورة	الرقم العسكري	الاسم	الواء	الكتيبة	التدريب المعرفي	التدريب المهاري	التدريب التقني	المجموع التدريبي
305	الدروع	314008	ابراهيم عطيه محمد ابو غفرا	الوسطى	القدس	12	38	26	76

Battalion	Brigade	Name	Military ID	Course type	Course number
El Quds	Central Camps	Ibrahim Atiya Mohammad Abu Ghafra	314008	Armored Corps	305

3. **From CEM of military courses, 2020:**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	م	الرقم العسكري	الاسم الزماني	أ	نوع الدورة	ب	التاريخ	ج	ملاحظات	د	تاريخ التقييم
221	792	900837	نادر نيهان زكي عقل	القدس	تنشيط	القدس	7/6/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
222	793	869904	طارق قهيد سعيد القادود	القدس	تنشيط	القدس	7/6/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
223	794	192681	ماهر محمد حسن ابو جبر	القدس	تنشيط	القدس	7/6/2020	جيد	مقاتل فاعل		
224	795	693478	مصطفى ابراهيم كامل عبود	القدس	تنشيط	القدس	7/6/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
225	962	314008	ابراهيم عطيه محمد ابو غفرا	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
226	963	911895	فارس عيسى كامل ابراهيم	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
227	964	158169	ابراهيم محمد سلامه البليبيسي	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
228	965	587984	اسامه ابراهيم رجب الشاعر	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
229	966		محمد خالد حسين الحماي	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	جيد	مقاتل فاعل		
230	967	357491	خالد محمد فوزي محمد	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	ممتاز	مقاتل فاعل		
231	968	754435	فهد عبدالله حسن ابو مراحيل	القدس	تنشيط	الدروع	12/3/2020	جيد	مقاتل فاعل		

4. **Involvement in the October 7th massacre:** Participated in the massacre in Reim, based on CEM, geolocation and calls.

a. Phone calls + cellphone triangulation:

- i. Phone number used by Ibrahim: 972597736926.
- ii. At 6:36am and 7:25am, Ibrahim speaks with other Hamas operatives about preparing and making their way to the Israeli border.
- iii. At 8:15am, Ibrahim's cellphone was located via triangulation inside Israeli territory outside of Kibbutz Reim.
- iv. At 8:44am, Ibrahim and another operative mention being across the border, and Ibrahim declares that "they have killed people!"
- v. At 9:55am, Ibrahim's cellphone was still located via triangulation inside Israeli territory.

5. **CEM found near Kibbutz Reim, near his cell phone location:** A list containing militants, weapons, ammunition, and rank that was found in a Hamas vehicle near the location of Ibrahim's cellphone. Ibrahim Abu Ghafra is number 17.

A handwritten list of militants. The columns include rank (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), name in Arabic, and other details. Entry 17 is highlighted in yellow and corresponds to Ibrahim Abu Ghafra.

PTT	Number of bombs				weapons			profession	name	men
	Smoke grenades	Light bombs	Qassem	Official	magnazines	bullets	rifles			
V	1		1		4	240	V	M Commander	Ibrahim Aliys Mohammad Abu Ghafra	17

6. **CEM Phone number connection:** His phone number was found along with his full name, school position and UNRWA employee number in a CEM document.

A spreadsheet listing militants. Columns include ID, name, phone number, and other details. Entry 17 is highlighted in yellow and corresponds to Ibrahim Abu Ghafra.

Yusuf Zedan El Hawajri (ID: 900775503)



1. Position in UNRWA: Yusuf Zedan El Hawajri is an Arabic teacher in UNRWA. He appears on line 930 of an UNRWA staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

EMP SUBGR	EMP NO	ID NO	Name	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT DESC	BOB	EXP DATE
Permanent (Teaching)	10248999	900775503	Yusuf Zedan El Hawajri	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	3/21/1990	
Permanent (Teaching)	10213841	900158840	Zahra Jamil El Sumari	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	3/17/2000	
Permanent (Teaching)	10223804	907297907	Zaina Jamil Abu Munkaj	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	1/15/1980	
Permanent	10239651	902697323	Zaki Ahmad El Lia	Sanitation Labourer	Palestine	3/16/1990	
Permanent (Teaching)	10236903	901717458	Zakiya Oryah El Awar	Teacher	Palestine	1/1/1987	
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10218659	901275584	Zakiya Mahmoud Abed El Ali	Teacher Physical Education	Palestine	2/1/2014	
Permanent (Teaching)	10248975	909770413	Zarifa Khail El Zaki	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	9/1/2001	
Permanent (Teaching)	10235719	904627800	Zayyat A R Abu Amer	Teacher	Palestine	6/20/1987	
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10771700	903818065	A Rahman Ahmad Abu Hae	Teacher	Palestine	3/28/2016	
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10778229	903867180	A Rahman Ali Abu El Ouf	Teacher	Palestine	3/22/2021	
Permanent	10248385	900694450	A Rahman Mansour Buhaj	Health Centre Pharmacist	Palestine	2/29/2000	

2. Position in Hamas: Yusuf is a Hamas Military Wing operative (military ID: 498737) in the Deir el Balah Battalion of the Central Camps Brigade. Below is a **Hamas contact list (CEM) including El Hawajri's full name and phone number:**


 حركة المقاومة الإسلامية - حماس
 المنظمة الإلكترونية

أرقام جوال الإخوة

رقم الجوال	الاسم	م
5827090	عبد محمد محمود أبو حوس	160
9334042	ابراهيم عيسى محمود سلامة	161
9602145	اسماعيل ابراهيم عبد المعطي أبو عزيزة	162
0592117511	وائل عطا عبد الفتاح أبو عطا	163
2760815	عادل حسونه حسن منصور	164
599684955	عبد الكريم محمد عبد القريم الملقاب	165
0598891985	جمال ابراهيم أحمد ريان	166
0592215086	أحمد محمد أحمد العفرائي	167
0599858462	نيسر حسين ملقح عيسى	168
0598838336	مصباح أحمد سليمان أبو فوز	169
9155835	تور الكين شقيق شبل منسج	170
8210321	عاطية نظراء عطية أبو نصير	171
9411742	علاء محمود عيسى أبو كندة	172
0592170369	نبيل محمد علي تمار	173
9344016	أحمد يونس أحمد أبو كندة	174
599188685	محمد ريان سليمان الحوافري	175

3. Involvement in the October 7th massacre: Participated in the infiltration.

Phone number used by Yusuf: 972599188685.

- a. **Phone call** (audio available on YouTube²¹): At 1:15pm on October 7th, Yusuf discusses with Person B on the phone how they both stole many things while they were in Israel, and Person B mentions that he has a few young girls with him at his house and he personally kidnapped one of them. Yusuf quickly shushes Person B.
- b. **CEM phone number connection:** His phone number and name can be found on the Hamas contact list above. He also identifies as "Abu (= father of) Mohammad (مهند)", which is indeed the name of his son.

²¹ Audio of the call with English subtitled can be found here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHty60CVjVU>

Mamdouh Husain Al Qaq (ID: 804817195)



1. **Position in UNRWA:** Mamdouh is a teacher in UNRWA. He appears on line 5408 of an UNRWA 2023 staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA:

EMPLOYEE OR	EMP. NO.	NAME	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	JOBS
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10778368	Mamdouh Husain Al Qaq	Teacher	Palestine	8/22/2023
Permanent (Teaching)	10211668	Mansour Ahmad Abu Dawqa	Teacher Computer	Palestine	1/1/2006
Permanent (Teaching)	10249950	Mansour Ahmad Abu Dawqa	Teacher Mathematics	Palestine	8/1/2001
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10777777	Mansour Ahmad Jstijah	Teacher	Palestine	4/29/2023
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10775100	Mansour Al Khateb	Teacher Social Studies	Palestine	1/14/2020
Permanent (Teaching)	10249305	Mansour Al Hamed	Teacher	Palestine	11/5/1997

2. **Position in PIJ:** Mamdouh is an operative in the Rafah Brigade of PIJ (Military ID: 14850).

PIJ membership records:

CEM – Mamdouh is found on a list of the Eastern Battalion members of the PIJ, which was collected from a PIJ education committee computer. He is number 29. This computer was found in the house of a PIJ Lieutenant Colonel.

الشرقية	
الاسم	الترتيب
شريف فخري عبد الواسع	1
امير عبد القادر فريم ابو شلوف	2
يحيى سلامة محمود الزاوي	3
محمد محمود عبد العال	4
ابراهيم ابن شقفة	5
محمد طلال القنبري	6
محمد عبد القادر فريم ابو شلوف	7
ابراهيم جمال حمدان الدياري	8
يحيى سليمان صفاة شلوف	9
شرفيد سالم الدياري	10
محمد كامل عبد الدياري	11
ابراهيم ثابت سلامة حنون	12
عدي عائل محمد الدياري	13
مهدي عبدالعزيم محمد الدياري	14
محمد فرزي محمد الدياري	15
يوسف محمد عبد الله السعيدني	16
ابراهيم كامل عبد الدياري	17
فارس محمد طلال ابو حنون	18
محمد عبدالعزيم محمد الدياري	19
حاتم محمد عبدالله السعيدني	20
عمر محمد عبدالله السعيدني	21
مصعب حسن ابو سفيانة	22
ابراهيم محمد موسى زغون	23
محمد اسماعيل محمد ابو سفيانة	24
عبدالمجيد محمد العجالة	25
عبدالمجيد محمد العجالة	26
محمد سعيد العجالة	27
مكيان محمد عبدالعظيم عقل	28
ممدوح حسن احمد القاق	29
مصطفى حسن احمد القاق	30

3. Involvement in the October 7th massacre: Participated in the massacre.

a. Phone calls + cellphone triangulation:

- i. At 9:38am, Mamdouh speaks to his mother on the phone, and tells her that he is in Israel.
- ii. At 9:41am and 9:43am, Mamdouh was located inside Israel via triangulation.
- iii. At 10:29am, Mamdouh again tells his mother that he is in Israel.
- iv. At 10:31am, Mamdouh tells someone else that he is in Israel. When asked when he plans to return, Mamdouh replies “when I die”.

b. CEM phone number connection: His phone number that was used to make the phone calls was in a list along with his full name and ID.

0099104004 مصطفي باسم ابو مصطفي 400070480
0599198218 يقين خاتم طه حمدان 804403350
0599055142 بيري محمود محمد الجزائري 918480369
0597960517 الإء سامي محمد ابوسبيسي 401089404
0592778174 براء زاهر محمد ابو محسن 804551745
0599951555 مصطفي جمال شوكت التركماني 803322908
0592161039 محمدم ماهر محمد العقاد 803187558
0597631630 **مصطفى حسين احمد الفاي** 804817195
0599485431 محمد محمود فرح سلفه 903119428
0597031071 علاء سالم علي ابو عوض 400854790
0598056719 سعد أحمد حسين الكفارنة 402035968
0599012204 باسم داصر عماد الموسوي 402523245
0592639589 منذر أحمد عبد الكريم ابو عودة 800625949

Hafez Mousa Mohammed Mousa (ID: 909125957)



1. **Position in Hamas:** Hafez Mousa Mousa is a Hamas military wing operative in the East Jabaliya Battalion, as well as a member of the Hamas movement with the rank of Raqib.

CEM – Hamas document listing movement members

Rank	Sub-specialty	Specialty	Training	Branch	Sub-area	Area	Name	ID	#
Raqib		Computers	MA in engineering	Sheikh Ziad	Wasit al Muaskar	North	Hafez Mousa Mohammad Moussa	909125957	521

الرتبة	م الموهل	التخصص	الموهل	الشعبة	المحلية	الكبرى	الاسم	الهوية	#
راقب		حاسوب	ماجستير	الشيخ زايد	وسط المسكر	الشمال	حافظ موسى محمد موسى	909125957	521

2. **Involvement in the October 7th massacre:** Phone number used by Mousa: 972597502700.

On the morning of October 7th, Hafez used the same cellphone to perform his duties both as an UNRWA school principal and a Hamas militant. He made 5 phone calls and sent messages to more than 20 fellow operatives, ordering them to infiltrate Israel via the Erez crossing with cars and weapons.

a. Text messages:

- At 8:13am, he informed his UNRWA area supervisor (Fatma Ibrahim Aita Area, Education Officer) that the school is closed and the students are safe.
- From 9:03am, he used the same phone number to send text messages to Hamas operatives, mostly from his battalion, ordering them to immediately go to the Erez crossing with weapons.

عاجل جدا_التعميم على الجميع_التوجه الآن إلى معبر إيرز بما يملك من سيارات وسلاح...	7/10/2023 9:03
	7/10/2023 9:03

iii. Throughout the day until 10:24pm, he used the same device to manage UNRWA shelters.

b. **Phone calls:** In a number of conversations at 9:08am, two around 9:22am, 9:23am, and 12:19pm on October 7th, Hafez organized and ordered a number of fellow Hamas operatives to infiltrate Israel via the Erez border crossing.

c. **CEM phone number connection** – His details and phone number appear in a phone list that was found in Gaza, mentioning his ID, phone number and School name.

م جباليا - مسجد	595650017	5	800334146	فأتن ربيع مصباح العربي	1815
الشيخ زايد	592024012	5	934954934	أحمد شعبان محمد الكريزي	1816
الشيخ زايد	592021075	7	900582743	عبد الرحمن اسماعيل محمود البسيوني	1817
منطقة الهدى	597678181	6	802385310	حسن فتحي شحادة أبو القرع	1818
قالبو	597502700	8	909125957	حافظ موسى محمد موسى	1819
الشيخ زايد	597802126	6	801605346	حاتم سامي محمد أبو مرعي	1820
عزبة بيت حاتور	595602214	7	926679689	أحمد محمد محمود فياض	1821

3. **Position in UNRWA:** Hafez Mousa is a School Principal. He is listed in line 2755 of an UNRWA 2023 staff list provided to Israeli MFA by UNRWA.

EMP SUB GR	EMP. NO.	ID NO.	NAME	POSITION DESCRIPTION	NAT. DESC.	ENDD.
Permanent (Teaching)	10211872	909125957	Hafez Mousa Mousa	School Principal	Palestine	12/15/2005
Permanent (Teaching)	10212270	911167090	Hafez Salman El Karhout	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	9/12/2006
Permanent (Teaching)	10222230	906883541	Haisa Khalil Abu El Eish	School Principal	Palestine	11/9/1993
Permanent (Teaching)	10230754	945893089	Haider Mohd Ghabayen	School Principal	Palestine	12/1/1996
Fixed Term	10776331	908568018	Hafa Abd Al Cader Farajallah	Health Centre Receptionist	Palestine	8/1/2021
Fixed Term	10773012	902557215	Hafa Abd Al Saada	Practical Nurse	Palestine	7/1/2017
Fixed Term	10772368	908971229	Hafham Khalid El Sewasi	School Attendant	Palestine	3/16/2017
Permanent (Teaching)	10213698	901359008	Hafyam Abd Karim Ahmad	Teacher	Palestine	10/1/2009
Permanent (Teaching)	10213350	900279449	Hala A Ghafour Husain	Teacher	Palestine	9/1/2008
Permanent (Teaching)	10249792	900979451	Hala A Munem El Basyouri	Teacher Arabic	Palestine	9/2/2000
Permanent (Teaching)	10211705	903182962	Hala Adli El Hayek	Teacher Computer	Palestine	1/1/2000
Permanent (Teaching)	10212865	900275553	Hala Al Abu Muawad	Teacher	Palestine	9/1/2007
Fixed Term (Teaching)	10777092	900638738	Hala Ayesha Al Amoudi	Teacher Arabic Religion	Palestine	8/27/2022
Permanent (Teaching)	10212201	973236264	Hala Fayege Hassan	Teacher English	Palestine	9/2/2006

Annex 4: UNRWA employees who were members of terrorist organizations and were claimed by UNRWA to have been killed during the war

ID	Work location	Name	Employee no.	Position	Part of:
800564668	Nuseirat Camp-Admin Srvcs	Mahmoud Taysir Abu Dan	10211506	Security Shift Supervisor	Hamas (military wing)
801140351	Abasan Prep Boys School	Alaa Jameel Abu Anza	10217160	Teacher Arabic	Hamas (military wing)
803093293	Deir El Balah Prep A Boys School	Mohammad Ali Dabour	10771485	Teacher Mathematics	Hamas (military wing)
900641721	unknown	Faisal Ali Naami	10212247	Social Worker	Hamas (military wing)
901608455	PII- Supply Warehousing B	Mustafa Abd Al Majid Abu Auda	10776029	Logistics Assistant	Hamas (military wing)
903485290	Ayyoubiya Elem Boys School	Yusuf Mahmoud Abu Naser	10246427	Teacher Science	Hamas (military wing)
905196358	Deir El Balah Prep B Boys School	Mohd Ahmad El Kord	10210190	Teacher English	Hamas (military wing)
906515770	Gaza Elem B Girls School	Ahmad Abboud Abu Ras	10212225	Teacher Arabic	Hamas (military wing)
917359044	Jabalia Prep C Girls School	A Karim Hasan Abu Maali	10249244	Teacher Special Needs St	Hamas (military wing)
921886057	Shijaiya Prep Boys B School	Mohd Salman Abu Hasira	10248362	Teacher Arabic Religion	Hamas (military wing)
926682154	Edn- Admin Unit	Mohammad Nasriddin Abu Nima	10212438	Clerk B	Hamas (military wing)
991206814	Nuseirat prep E Girls School	Mohammad Adnan Abu Zayed	10212900	School Attendant	Hamas (military wing)
400070223	Bani Suhaila Prep A Boys School	Abdallah Ibrahim Al Uwaini	10777085	Teacher Arabic	Hamas
800044844	Al Amal Elementary Boys School	Khaled Fuad Abu Auda	10212985	Teacher	Hamas

800301087	Nuseirat Prep B Boys School	Yaser Ibrahim Abu Sharar	10214339	Teacher Social Studies	Hamas
900573478	Beach Prep A Boys School	Khaled Matar Ubaid	10210483	Teacher Mathematics	Hamas
906733738	Field Security & Risk Management Office	Samah Mahmoud El Zahhar	10210787	Administrative Assistant C	Hamas
916170376	Edn-Edn Development Centre	Ahed Matar Moqayyad	10248022	Hd Schl Qlty Assnc Unit	Hamas
930677679	Ici - Construction Div	Bassam Ali Miqdad	10242612	Construction Projects Manager	Hamas
930692157	Bani Suhaila Prep A Boys School	Omar Salman Abu Shab	10225512	School Attendant	Hamas
932077175	Nuseirat Prep C Boys School	Iyad Yaqoub Matar	10248713	Teacher Social Studies	Hamas
934095449	Central Record Unit	Khalil Juma Ahmad	10728170	Senior Clerk	Hamas
969190537	Gaza Training Centre	Mohd Ismail Abu Tamaa	10231571	Administrative Officer C	Hamas
800686503	Pld- Vehicle Control Div	Adel Musa Zannoun	10216879	Driver	PIJ

Annex 5: Examples for militarization of UNRWA schools by terrorist organizations

On May 30th 2024, an anti-tank missile was fired at Israeli forces from an UNRWA school. Later on, the IDF troops located significant shafts in the school leading to a wide network of underground terrorist tunnels.²²



²² IDF Spokesperson, "Anti-Tank Missile Fired from an UNRWA School", May 30th 2024.
<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/the-unrwa-hamas-connection/exploitation-of-unrwa-schools/anti-tank-missile-fired-from-an-unrwa-school/>



Tunnel Shafts found at the school

Operation in Beit Hanoun (December 9, 2023)

According to an IDF Spokesperson report dated **December 9, 2023**, IDF forces operated in the **Beit Hanoun** area. During the operation, they targeted militants who were firing from a **mosque** and a **UNRWA school (Western School, coordinates: N 31.542453 / E 34.533410)**.

Usage of Abu Oraiban School (July 14, 2024)

In a statement dated **July 14, 2024**, the IDF announced that it had attacked **terrorists operating from the Abu Oraiban School**, a facility belonging to **UNRWA in the Al-Nuseirat area (coordinates: N 31.3958 / E 34.79923)**. The building was being used as a **hiding place and an active operational base** for terrorist activities.

UNRWA Al-Nuseirat Elementary School (D) (July 16, 2024)

A statement from the IDF Spokesperson dated **July 16, 2024**, reported that the IDF had attacked **terrorists operating from the UNRWA Al-Nuseirat Elementary School (D)** in the **Al-Nuseirat area** (coordinates: **N 31.450180 / E 34.388410**).



UNRWA School in Al-Bureij (June 4, 2024)


On **June 4, 2024**, the IDF Spokesperson announced that **Hamas terrorists** had attacked an **UNRWA school in Al-Bureij**, located in the **central Gaza Strip**. The facility, known as the **UNRWA Abu Al-Hillu School** (coordinates: **N 31.435622 / E 34.400544**), was being used as a **Hamas compound** where militants were staying.

Hamas Compound in Al-Nuseirat (June 5, 2024)

On **June 5, 2024**, a report confirmed that **fighter jets** had attacked a **Hamas compound** located inside an **UNRWA school in Al-Nuseirat** (coordinates: **N 31.442591 / E 34.386118**). The strike resulted in the **elimination of eight Hamas terrorists** who were inside the school at the time.



On 7/6/24 - the IDF spokesman reported that the IDF attacked a container that was used as a Hamas operational compound and as a gathering point for internal security operatives of the Hamas terrorist organization who were staying there. The container was located in the area of the UNRWA 'Asmaa' school (coordinates: 34.44785,31.534681) in the Al-Shati area.



Hamas' terrorists at Al-Farqan and Daraj Tafah (July 4, 2024)

In a statement on **July 4, 2024**, the IDF Spokesperson reported that the IDF targeted **Hamas terrorists** who were staying in **UNRWA schools** used as **headquarters** for directing terrorist acts against IDF forces. The targeted schools were:

- **Al-Qahra School** in **Al-Farqan** (coordinates: **N 31.349484 / E 34.293439**).
- **Musa School** in **Daraj Tafah**, located in the **Gaza City area** (coordinates: **N 31.512901 / E 34.467225**).

Hamas in Al-Ja'uni School (July 6, 2024)

On **July 6, 2024**, the IDF Spokesperson announced an attack on **terrorists** operating in the area of the **UNRWA Al-Ja'uni School** (coordinates: **N 31.446711 / E 34.393177**) in the **central Gaza Strip**. The school had been used as a **headquarters for Hamas terrorists** from which they directed attacks against IDF forces.

UNRWA Shaja'iya School (September 30, 2024)

On **September 30, 2024**, the IDF Spokesperson reported that **Israeli Air Force fighter jets** targeted **terrorists** operating in a **command and control complex**. The strike took place during the night in the area that previously housed the **UNRWA Shaja'iya School** (coordinates: **N 31.4969 / E 34.4887**) in **Gaza City**.

These examples demonstrate the ongoing and systematic use of **UNRWA schools** as operational bases by **Hamas**, in a complete breach of UNRWA's neutrality.

Annex 20.

State of Israel Ministry of Defense Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, “COGAT Humanitarian Efforts in the Gaza Strip – Response to recent IPC publication/August 2025” (22 August 2025).



22/08/2025

COGAT Humanitarian Efforts in the Gaza Strip – Response to recent IPC publication/August 2025

Overview

The Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) firmly rejects the findings of the latest IPC report published on August 22, specifically the claim of famine in Gaza city. Unfortunately, the report is false and relies on partial, biased data and superficial information originating from Hamas, a terrorist organization, often laundered through organizations with vested interests. Previous IPC assessments have repeatedly proven inaccurate and fail to reflect the reality on the ground. This one-sided approach completely disregards the extensive humanitarian efforts undertaken in Gaza.

COGAT has engaged directly with the report's officials and continuously provides updated, verified data. The report chose to ignore the information provided by Israel and preferred to stick with incomplete and misleading information. The IPC report not only distorts reality but also undermines an accurate understanding of the humanitarian situation, fundamentally compromising its credibility. The report disregards the fact that in recent weeks we have advanced significant efforts and that the overall trend has shifted. Despite this progress, it still predicts that the situation will deteriorate further. It is illogical to suggest that conditions will worsen when improvements are already evident on the ground.

Since the start of the war, and specifically over the past several months, COGAT, in cooperation with other Israeli authorities and international partners, has implemented an extensive humanitarian operation in the Gaza Strip. This work continues under the dual pressures of active conflict and the need to prevent aid diversion to Hamas, while adhering to international law. Hamas has not ceased its attempts to exploit humanitarian aid for its own military buildup. In contrast, the IDF has worked to create and strengthen mechanisms that ensure the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip and its direct delivery to the civilian population.

Over 100,000 trucks of aid have entered Gaza since the start of the war, including food, medical supplies, fuel, and shelter equipment entered the Gaza Strip through the various crossings. Close to 80% of the aid that entered consisted of a wide variety of food. Israel has expanded efforts to facilitate a humanitarian response based on the needs on the ground and a continuous humanitarian assessment.

Starting January 19, 2025, and as part of the hostage release deal, more than 25,200 trucks of food, water, medicine, and shelter equipment have entered Gaza through the crossings. Since the reopening of the crossings on May 19th, following its temporary closure in March by the directive of the political echelon, daily deliveries of food enter Gaza. Over 10,000 trucks have entered through the crossings, both to the UN and international aid organizations and to distribution points. There is no ban on the entrance of aid by the UN, nor a quantitative restriction.

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While challenges remain due to the security situation, Hamas' exploitation of humanitarian channels and challenges of the UN bodies on the Gazan side (improving but not at the rate required), Israel is learning from experience, improving procedures, and increasing efficiency.

Due to reliable information regarding Hamas's exploitation of humanitarian aid for smuggling purposes, prior to the resumption of aid entry into the Gaza Strip, the Israeli security establishment formulated a new mechanism for the entry, monitoring, and supervision of humanitarian aid. This mechanism is designed to minimize Hamas's ability to interfere in the aid distribution process.

In recent weeks, significant steps have been advanced to expand the volume of aid entering Gaza and to ease the collection process at the crossings by the UN and international organizations. These measures include facilitating the entry of humanitarian aid via a variety of donors, including the UN, states (such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates), international aid organizations, the American company distribution sites, the private sector, and airdrops. The actions taken led to a significant uptick in the availability of food throughout the Gaza Strip and caused a sharp decline in the prices of food, which plummeted in the markets.

Aid enters southern Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, and northern Gaza through the Zikim Crossing. Aid also enters through Crossing 96 and Crossing 147. In this context, it's important to note that there is free pedestrian and vehicular passage, including goods, from north to south and vice versa. In addition, operating hours for the collection and distribution of aid inside Gaza have been extended, humanitarian pauses have been implemented, transportation routes for aid trucks have been expanded, and more. The sustained rise in aid deliveries reflects a consistent policy: to ensure vital assistance reaches Gaza's civilians while safeguarding against its misuse for terror.

The responsibility for the collection of aid from the crossings, as well as for its distribution to the population in Gaza, lies with the UN and international aid organizations. Israel constantly urges the UN and these organizations to improve the effectiveness of aid distribution and ensure that aid does not fall into the hands of Hamas.

It should be noted that, on the Gazan side of the crossings, hundreds of truckloads of humanitarian supplies are still awaiting collection by the UN and international organizations.

The fact that the report relies on UN figures that reflect only part of the aid that has actually entered is misleading the international community and creates a distorted picture of reality. This misrepresentation directly affects global media reporting on the matter as well as the positions of international decision-makers regarding the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The UN's data on aid volumes, on which the report's analysis of food stocks in Gaza is based, as well as the UN's documentation and tracking mechanisms, are incomplete and flawed. They present a false, partial, and sometimes outright inaccurate depiction of the humanitarian reality in the Gaza Strip.

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COGAT data on aid entry is regularly published on a dedicated [public website](#) accessible to the international community. This website provides a daily breakdown of the number of trucks entering Gaza, by crossing point and by type of goods. The figures published there reflect the full and accurate picture of the assistance that Israel facilitates into the Gaza Strip and clearly demonstrate Israel's commitment to facilitating the transfer of aid into Gaza.


Despite Hamas's false propaganda campaign, the IDF, through COGAT, is and will continue to work in coordination with international actors to facilitate and ease the ongoing entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, in full accordance with international law while refuting the false claim of starvation.

Recent Key Humanitarian Actions and situation, on the ground

The monitoring and assessment of the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the needs of its population are based, *inter alia*, on humanitarian aid data of aid entry, dialogue with various international organizations, open source publications on food and fuel stocks and intelligence.

Food Security and Supply Routes

- Two main channels are operational for the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip. The first is the distribution sites mechanism operated by the American company, where residents arrive to receive weekly food packages for their families. The second channel is through complementary response aid trucks, coordinated in partnership with the UN and international organizations, which primarily deliver raw materials for bakeries and local kitchens, as well as medical supplies and hygiene products. More than 70% of the aid entering Gaza today is delivered by the UN and international organizations through the complementary response framework.



- Aid is delivered through multiple crossings, including Kerem Shalom in the south, Zikim in the north, and 147 and Gate 96 in the central region.

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- Inside Gaza, Israel coordinates the movement of aid through multiple humanitarian corridors to facilitate its collection and distribution by the UN and international organizations across the Gaza Strip.
- Approval and expanded coordination with the private sector, allowing them to bring necessary commodities in larger quantities. This is to bridge the gap between the UN aid entry abilities and the needs on the ground.
- Humanitarian aid airdrops: Over 2,300 aid packages were airdropped since the beginning of the airdrop operations in collaboration with twelve different countries participating in the effort.
- Expanded cooperation with the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) to accelerate aid flow.
- Since the resumption of aid entry on May 19, over 10,000 trucks of aid have entered the Gaza Strip.
- According to international organizations reports, over 90 community kitchen are operational throughout the Gaza Strip, providing 600,000 meals a day.
- Since kitchens close to 5,000 tons of baby food and formula, as well as special high-calorie food for children, have entered Gaza.
- The analysis of contents of food aid trucks that entered the Gaza Strip reveal that 4,400 calories per person per day entered Gaza since the beginning of August.
- At the beginning of July, we witnessed a sharp decline in the UN and international organization aid collection. This corresponds with Hamas pressure to reach a deal, pressure which the UN played a role in, whether willingly or not.
- Following significant pressure by COGAT and measures implemented to upscale collection, the UN and international organizations have resumed high collection levels, between 300-400 collected trucks a day, evident in the food availability in the Gaza Strip.
- The measures taken by Israel to facilitate the expanded collection of aid trucks led to a significant increase in food availability across the Gaza Strip, resulting in a sharp decline in market prices.



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
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Distributions centers

- Since the beginning of its operations, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has distributed more than 2.2 million relief packages to civilians in need. These packages, delivered through four distribution centers across the Gaza Strip, have contained essential food items and supplies amounting to over 132 million meals. Humanitarian aid is also distributed to the population through the UN and other international organizations.

Support the delivery of aid



- Harnessing the UN and international organizations to increase the effort to collect the aid.
- Designated routes for humanitarian purposes are operational from 6:00 to 11:00 to assist in the collection of aid from the crossings in an efficient manner.
- Paving roads dedicated to the efficient transfer of aid within Gaza.
- The IDF has implemented daily humanitarian pauses between 10:00 to 20:00 in densely populated areas, namely Al-Mawasi, Deir al-Balah, and Gaza City.
- Entry of spare parts for trucks to increase the number of operational trucks in the Strip and enable more efficient aid collection.
- Expansion of crossing hours to facilitate the extended number of trucks.

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- Daily meetings take place with the UN and international organizations to coordinate the humanitarian response and delivery of aid within Gaza in an efficient manner.
- Special access in a complex operational environment was given to UN agencies to facilitate its response.

Healthcare Support and Medical Evacuations

- There are currently 18 operating hospitals and medical aid centers, as well as 12 field hospitals, that are providing medical services to the civilians in Gaza.
- Patients, mostly children and their caregivers, exit Gaza on a weekly basis and based on coordination requests from a third country. The medical transfers take place through the Kerem Shalom Crossing to the Allenby Bridge Crossing and the Ramon airport for treatment in Jordan, the UAE, the EU, etc. Since the start of this mechanism in June 2024, close to 4,000 patients and caregivers have exited the strip.
- Since March 2025, Israel's security establishment has significantly eased the process for the exit of Gaza residents to third countries. The approval rate for residents has risen substantially, and the vast majority of requests are granted. Every week, at least one transfer takes place, involving dozens to hundreds of Gaza residents.
- Increased facilitation of medical missions into Gaza.
- Coordination with international organizations to restore essential medical infrastructure, including hospital generators, blood banks, and water and sanitation in healthcare facilities.
- Since the start of the war, close to 48,000 tons of medical supplies have entered the Gaza Strip.
- Israel continuously and consistently facilitates the ongoing operation of medical services through humanitarian and international community organizations, maintaining regular communication with these organizations in the Gaza Strip to address hospital needs.

Water and Infrastructure

- Water is currently available based on waterlines from Israel, water pumping facilities operating on fuel and desalination plants, one of which is operating on an electricity line from Israel, following the approval of the political echelon.
- Fuel enters Gaza daily to support the operations of water pumping facilities throughout Gaza and other humanitarian systems.
- An electricity line from Israel supplies power to support the desalination plant in Khan Yunis, aiding in ensuring drinking water for hundreds of thousands of residents.

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- Repair coordinations of major water pipelines damaged during fighting take place, as well as the facilitation of delivery of bottled water to high-risk communities.
- The UAE initiative to construct a water pipeline from the desalination plant in Egypt to the Al-Mawasi area along the coastline is underway. This pipeline is expected to serve over 600,000 civilians.

The recent IPC Publication:

Throughout the course of the war, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has released reports and publications regarding the food and food security situation in the Gaza Strip. Systematically, the IPC has presented projections of dire situations in Gaza, which did not materialize. Among other questionable [methodology issues](#), IPC hasn't taken into account Israel's measures to stabilize the situation and the significant humanitarian efforts mentioned above.

In its latest report, the IPC determined that famine is currently playing out in Gaza city, projected to spread later in September. This report represents yet another case of an international institution abandoning its noble mandate in favor of politicization and weaponization against Israel, ultimately serving Hamas. Like previous IPC assessments on Gaza, it disregards Israel's extensive humanitarian efforts and ignores Hamas' deliberate obstruction and exploitation of aid. Its famine classification rests on an unpublished phone survey and questionable assessments by UNRWA, a UN agency known for its workers being an integral part of Hamas, and local NGOs, while speculating wildly about mortality rates that even Hamas's own Health Ministry does not report. Such a distortion of facts not only undermines the IPC's credibility but echoes the same pattern we have seen since October 7, when once-respected institutions and media outlets rushed to amplify falsehoods against Israel.

The report also relies heavily on other UN data, which have been established to include only partial information, as well as being biased, and include non-public internal documents, many sourced from entities linked to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. This makes independent verification of claims, such as thousands of malnourished children and recent hunger-related deaths, impossible. Given the fact that the IPC relies heavily on UN data, the lack of use of COGAT data, the Israeli body coordinating the humanitarian effort, in concluding this humanitarian outcome of the situation is another serious methodological flaw that undermines the credibility and integrity of the findings.

Additionally, the IPC's call for "immediate, unconditional, and sustained ceasefire" reads less like neutral analysis and more like a political demand, implying that humanitarian aid cannot reach civilians without one. By framing the improvement of the situation and aid delivery as contingent on a ceasefire, the report overlooks the practical mechanisms and Israel's efforts already in place to ensure assistance reaches those in need and takes an overtly political stance.

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Conclusion

The sustained increase in food, water, and medical aid deliveries over the past three months in general and four weeks specifically reflects a consistent Israeli policy to facilitate humanitarian assistance to Gaza's civilian population.

Israel has undertaken measures to improve logistical coordination and enhance targeted deliveries to the most vulnerable, even under active security threats.

The IPC publications do not take into account aspects in which Israel operates and puts in significant efforts. Which, combined with the latest changes in its methodology, to "lower the bar" for the declaration Which, famine in Gaza, raise serious questions on the organization's integrity and professionalism.

While operational challenges persist due to ongoing hostilities and attempts by Hamas to exploit humanitarian channels, Israel remains committed to maintaining and, where possible, increasing the volume and efficiency of aid flows. These steps ensure that essential supplies reach those in need while minimizing the risk of diversion to terrorist use.

Despite Hamas's false propaganda campaign, the IDF, through COGAT, is and will continue to work in coordination with international actors to facilitate and ease the ongoing entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, in full accordance with international law.

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Annex 21.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Netanyahu holds press conference for foreign media” (10 August 2025).



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PM Netanyahu holds press conference for foreign media



“The war can end tomorrow if Gaza, or rather, if Hamas lays down its arms and releases all the remaining hostages.”

Type: Media Statements ▪ **Topic:** [Foreign Policy](#), [Terrorism](#) ▪

Secondary topic: [Swords of Iron](#) ▪ **Publish Date:** 10.08.2025

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today (Sunday, 10 August 2025) at the press conference for foreign media:

“Good afternoon. I'm glad you came here, because I'd like to take the opportunity to puncture the lies and tell the truth.

The truth is, Hamas still has thousands of armed terrorists in Gaza. It vows to repeat the October 7 massacre and to do so again and again. It openly professes its goal to destroy the State of Israel. It subjugates Gazans, it steals their food, it shoots them when they try to move to safe zones. And I think it's instructive that now, many Gazans are fighting back. They are begging us, and they're begging the world: “Free us. Free us, and free Gaza from Hamas”.

No nation can accept a genocidal terrorist organization, an organization committed to its annihilation, a stone's throw from its citizens. Our goal is not to occupy Gaza. Our goal is to free Gaza, free it from Hamas terrorists.

The war can end tomorrow if Gaza, or rather, if Hamas lays down its arms and releases all the remaining hostages. Gaza will be demilitarized, Israel will have overriding security responsibilities. A security zone will be established on Gaza's border with Israel to prevent future terrorist incursions. A civilian administration will be established in Gaza that will seek to live in peace with Israel. That's our plan for the day after Hamas. And let me summarize it:



PM Netanyahu at the press conference for the foreign media / © GPO/Haim Zach

Five principles for concluding the war: One, Hamas Disarmed. Second, all hostages freed. Third, Gaze Demilitarized. Fourth, Israel has overriding security control. And five, Non-Israeli, peaceful civil administration. By that I mean a civilian administration that doesn't educate its children for terror, doesn't pay terrorists, and doesn't launch terrorist attacks against Israel. That's what we want to see in Gaza. So, its neither Hamas nor the PA. That's our plan.

Given Hamas's refusal to lay down its arms, Israel has no choice but to finish the job and complete the defeat of Hamas. Now, we've done a great deal. We have about 70 to 75 percent of Gaza under Israeli control, military control. But we have two remaining strongholds, okay? These are Gaza City and the Central Camps and Moasi. That's roughly, schematically, presented here, but it's fairly accurate.

Last Thursday, Israel's cabinet, security cabinet, instructed the IDF to dismantle the two remaining Hamas strongholds in Gaza City and the Central Camps. Contrary to false claims, this is the best way to end the war, and the best way to end it speedily.

We will do so by first enabling the civilian population to safely leave the combat areas to designated safe zones. In these safe zones they will be given ample food, water and medical care, as we have done before. And again, contrary to false claims, our policy throughout the war has been to prevent a humanitarian crisis, while Hamas's policy has been to create it.

Since the beginning of the war, Israel has let in close to 2 million tons of aid! I know of no other army that has enabled such aid to go to the

civilian population in enemy territory.

Now, if we had a starvation policy, no one in Gaza would have survived after two years of war. But our policy has been the exact opposite. We've let in, as I said, almost 2 million tons of aid and sent millions of text messages, millions of phone calls, to Gazans to get out of harm's way.

Yet in the last few months, Hamas has violently looted the aid trucks meant to get to Palestinian civilians. They deliberately created a shortage of supply. And the UN consistently refused, until recently, to distribute the thousands of trucks that we let into Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing.

So, the problem is, we've had tons of uncollected food rotting on the Gazan side of the border because the UN was, and still is, unwilling to deliver all of it. Here are the tons and tons and tons of humanitarian aid that Israel led in to the Gazan side of the Kerem Shalom Crossing, just sitting there, because it's not distributed.

So now, we are going to go around this obstacle, we are going around it, by doing these three things:

1. Designating safe corridors for humanitarian aid distribution – (that's showing the problem. Not showing the solution, but here it is). First, designating rather safe corridors for aid distribution. You can go, you can drive trucks there, and you'll be safe.
2. Increasing the number of safe distribution points managed by the Gazan Humanitarian Foundations.
3. Air drops. That's air drops done by the Israeli Air Force and we're inviting others to join us.

The result has been a humanitarian surge, which we are coordinating with President Trump and his team, and hundreds of trucks have gone in, in recent days. This is preventing hunger. But it's not prevented the global campaign of lies that we have all witnessed.

So in Gaza, despite Hamas's obstacles, two million people are now getting access to humanitarian aid.

But I'll tell you who isn't. The only ones that are being deliberately starved in Gaza are our hostages.

This is Evyatar David, look at his hand and his arm. He's being deliberately starved by these Hamas monsters. And look at the Hamas captor, look at the difference. He's eating, and he's eating well.

The purpose of this news conference is to puncture the lies and spread the truth. But that distortion has been propelled around the earth, almost the way that the Jewish people, who are maligned in the Middle Ages. Every massacre of the Jewish people was preceded by massive vilification. We were "spreading" – we were said to be "spreading vermin" to Christian society, we were said to be "poisoning the wells", we were said to "slaughter Christian children for their blood". And as these lies

spread around the globe, they were followed by horrific, horrific massacres, pogroms, displacements, finally culminating in the worst massacre of them all – the Holocaust.

Today the Jewish state is being maligned in a similar way. Everything that I told you, could be verified easily, but it hasn't. And the international press has bought hook, line and sinker – Hamas statistics, Hamas claims, Hamas forgeries, and Hamas photographs, for example, these three children.

The first one is Osama Al-Rakab. He is in Italy, getting treatment, because Israel got him out. That's what he looks like today. He has a genetic disease that damages the lungs and digestive system, it makes it hard to absorb nutrients and gain weight, okay? So, Israel facilitated Osama's travel to Italy, where he got the medical aid that transformed his position.

The second one is Abdul Qader al-Fayoumi. He suffers from a genetic neurological disorder – spinal muscular atrophy, a degenerative condition that causes muscle wasting weakness and severe weight loss, unrelated to nutrition. This was the real cause of his frail appearance, not starvation. In fact, he was treated in Israel in 2018, doesn't help because it's a congenital disease and it defies most treatment, at least.

The third one is the most celebrated one. This is a New York Times cover photo. It's on the front page, of Mohammed Zakaria Ayoub and his mother. Mohammed Zakaria Ayoub is suffering from a genetic illness which you're familiar with, it's called cerebral palsy. His mother is well-fed, and his brother is healthy.

I'm looking right now into the possibility of a governmental suit against the New York Times, because this is outrageous. Of course, the correction was postage-size, I don't know where it was buried. But this is outrageous, these are the three most celebrated photos, and they're all fake.

It's the kind of malignant lies that were leveled at the Jewish people in the Middle Ages we won't suffer. We won't allow it to go unchallenged, and this is the purpose of this press conference. I hope that you open your eyes to a simple fact: Hamas lies”.

LIVE: PM Netanyahu Holds a Press conference



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Annex 22.

Benjamin Netanyahu Interview with Fox News (Excerpt of Transcript), (7 August 2025).

Transcript- Prime Minister's Interview with Fox News on 7 August 2025

Prime Minister (5:07-5:35)

But we have three missions – one, to eliminate Hamas as a governing and military power in Gaza, otherwise there is no future for anyone, and we will have many more kidnappings, and many more hostages. Second, to achieve the liberation of all our hostages, and third, to make sure that Gaza doesn't pose a threat to Israel. And we are well on our way to achieve all three. Now there are difficulties because there's so much vilification and misrepresentation in the press. There's an attempt to put blame on Israel for the interdiction of humanitarian supplies that Hamas is interdicting. And Israel is, the international community is delivering the blame to Israel. They're doing everything to rob these food trucks. They're taking the food for themselves and then jacking up the price for the remaining supplies to their own population. That's monstrous.

Prime Minister (6:10-6:30)

We did something that no army in history ever did. We're supplying humanitarian food to the enemy's population because we distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. We're putting in, we put in 2 million tons of food. I mean if we wanted to commit genocide, we wouldn't give 2 million tons of food to the population.

Prime Minister (8:16-9:00)

What I intend to do with President Trump, we talked about that and agreed upon that, is to have to overcome this with a humanitarian surge. So we're opening up safe routes that through which aid trucks can go through. We're setting up, we're going to try to quadruple the distribution points that are manned by Americans and they're doing a hell of a job distributing food to Gazans without Hamas taking over the food. And that's really what we're doing, and airdrops that we intend to do, we're already doing and we invite other countries to join us. So it's Israel that's doing now and has been doing for some time an effort to give humanitarian aid to the population without letting the Hamas terrorists take it, steal it for themselves and sell it at exorbitant price.

Prime Minister (9:23-9:40)

We (Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump) have got into a discussion on two things. One – the humanitarian surge that we're going to do which will precede our final military action. Because I want the population to be in safe zones to have food, water, sewage, electricity, medical help. I want to free two million Gazans from Hamas terrorism. The second thing that we agree on is that the day after has to have certain principles... The five principles, the key

principles is one – Hamas has to lay down its arms; two – Gaza has to be demilitarized; three – all the hostages have to be released; and four – Israel will be responsible for overall security, so if there is an attempt to have a resurgent Hamas or resurgent terrorism, we are the ones who will take care of it; and five – let Gaza be governed by a civilian authority that is not Israel. Because I don't want to occupy Gaza forever, I don't want to govern Gaza, I want to have a different governance there, that basically is willing to live in peace with Israel, and give Gazans a different future.

Annex 23.

GermanForeignOffice, @GermanyDiplo, X (formerly Twitter) (7:02 pm, 10 July 2025).



← Post



GermanForeignOffice ✓
@GermanyDiplo



I welcome the Israeli government's decision to allow more humanitarian aid into [#Gaza](#). This is also a result of negotiations with the EU. Humanitarian organizations must now be granted unrestricted access to people in Gaza. – [@AussenMinDE](#) today in Vienna 4/4

7:02 pm · 10 Jul 2025 · 3,974 Views

20

4

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Annex 24.

EEAS Press Team, European Union, Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative/Vice President Kaja Kallas (10 July 2025).



The Diplomatic Service of the European Union

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Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative/Vice President Kaja Kallas

🕒 10.07.2025 👤 [EEAS Press Team](#)

Following the Israeli Cabinet's resolutions and the constructive dialogue between the EU and Israel, significant steps have been agreed by Israel to improve the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

These measures are or will be implemented in the coming days, with the common understanding that aid at scale must be delivered directly to the population and that measures will continue to be taken to ensure that there is no aid diversion to Hamas.

These steps include, among other things, the substantial increase of daily trucks for food and non- food items to enter Gaza, the opening of several other crossing points in both the northern and southern areas; the reopening of the Jordanian and Egyptian aid routes; enabling the distribution of food supplies through bakeries and public kitchens throughout the Gaza strip; the resumption of fuel deliveries for use by humanitarian facilities, up to an operational level; the protection of aid workers; the repair and facilitation of works on vital infrastructure like the resumption of the power supply to the water desalination facility.

The EU stands ready to coordinate with all relevant humanitarian stakeholders, UN agencies and NGOs on the ground, to ensure swift implementation of those urgent steps.

The EU calls again for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all remaining hostages and supports the current efforts of Egypt, Qatar and the United States of America as mediators.

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Annex 25.

U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, “Ambassador Huckabee’s Interview with CBS News”, (8 August 2025).



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AMBASSADOR HUCKABEE'S INTERVIEW WITH CBS NEWS

By **U.S. EMBASSY JERUSALEM**

41 MINUTE READ

AUGUST 8, 2025

Reporter

Videos of Evyatar David and Rom Braslavski, where do things stand with negotiations? We know it's one of the United States' top priorities.

Ambassador Huckabee

I think the negotiations are broken down completely because Hamas is not serious about negotiating. I'm not sure they ever were, but they certainly aren't anymore. Europe has given them some cover, and the European leaders are putting more pressure on Israel than they are on Hamas, and they're talking about people in Gaza, and they're not talking about the hostages Hamas is celebrating. And they're realizing that they're winning the message war here. Interestingly, last week, the entire Arab League did something that the European leadership should have been doing. The Arab League was calling for Hamas to disarm and to release all of the hostages. Incidentally, that's what needs to be a universal and global message.

Reporter

So, what would it take to revive those negotiations?

Ambassador Huckabee

I'm not sure. I'm not sure there is a way to revive negotiations with people who were so savage that they would rape women in front of their families, burn elderly people in their wheelchairs, in front of family, and do the hideous things that they not only did on October 7, but they continue to

do in torturing hostages that have been in these tunnels now for almost 22 months. So, if I believe that there was a way to sit down and reason with people like that. I would love to see it happen, but you have to look at who they are and what they have done, what they've done to their own people. How many of their own people they've murdered in Gaza and ask yourself, are these people that really want a conclusion? Do they want some level of stability? I see no sign of it.

Reporter

So, the alternative is?

Ambassador Huckabee

I think the alternative is to recognize that they understand one thing they lose, they have to be defeated. And President Trump has repeatedly said, Hamas has no future in Gaza, and they can't lead it. I think that's exactly right. It would be the equivalent of saying, well, the Nazis can stay in Germany after World War Two and continue to be a party and maybe have a role in government. Nobody would have thought that that was realistic. Nobody, and to think that Hamas has any future in Gaza. I'll tell you who doesn't think that. For my visit there last week, the Gazans that I talked to, they don't want any part of Gaza. I mean, any part of Hamas, being a part of the future of Gaza.

Reporter

We do know that most of the hostages that have come out have, come out through negotiations, though.

Ambassador Huckabee

Some of them have no doubt about it, and some of them have come out because they've been rescued, but there's still 50 hostages, and this is two years later, and they're holding both living and deceased hostages for reasons that make no sense to anyone but Hamas and so we'd love to see them all out. I've been wearing this yellow ribbon since I've been here. It's my prayer. My goal is that very soon I take this off, and when I do, I'm going to throw it away, and I don't ever want to see it again. I don't want to keep it as a souvenir, because when I take it off, it means they're all home, as long as I have to wear it means they're still there. And it's, it's a horrible thing, mostly for their families, who have been through this long, enduring nightmare.

Reporter

Prime Minister Netanyahu is considering a full takeover of Gaza. What is the U.S. position on an Israeli occupation of Gaza?

Ambassador Huckabee

I think the U.S. has been very clear that it has respect for the country that was attacked on October the second ... seventh I mean. The United States has respect for the nation that was attacked on October the seventh. We understand that they're the ones who have to make some of these tough decisions. So it's not our job to tell them what they should or should not do. Certainly, if they ask for wisdom, counsel advice, I'm sure the President would offer it. But ultimately, it's the decision that the Israelis, and only the Israelis can have.

Reporter

And what would that advice be?

Ambassador Huckabee

I don't know. You'd have to ask President Trump, and I'm not sure what he would say. He almost alluded to it a week ago when he was answering questions and talked about how awful it was that Hamas continued to torture the hostages when he saw the videos of the hostages that were clearly being starved, being made to dig their own graves. What a disgusting display of savagery of the part of Hamas to do that to people. And he was, I think, shocked by it, disgusted by it. And I remember him saying that I know what I would do, but I'm not sure anybody else would do it. I think we've got the inference that it would not be good for Hamas.

Reporter

Many of the families of hostages do not support an expansion of the war and takeover [inaudible]. In fact, the mother of Nimrod Cohen said this would be a death sentence for the hostages. The Israeli Defense Force does not support this.

Ambassador Huckabee

I'm not sure that one can say that IDF doesn't support it or does support it. I'm not sure that they take a position. They're soldiers. They follow the orders that they're given. So, to infer that they have taken a public position one way or the other, I'm not sure that I would be able to concur that that has happened.

Reporter

But they do seem to be at odds with the government. They have said that they've achieved the aims and that there's nothing more that they can do in Gaza.

Ambassador Huckabee

Well, once again, to say that, that's pretty inclusive for a lot of people in the military, a lot of officers, a lot of people involved.

Ambassador Huckabee

Yeah, and I'm not sure that all the top brass are in complete agreement with the statement you made. So I would not categorize that there is an overarching view of consensus among the IDF I don't know for sure, but they're soldiers. They, they follow orders. They do what they're required to do. Sometimes it's maybe an order they totally agree with. Other times they may not agree with, but their job is not to make the decision is to carry it out. If they want to make them, then they run for office.

Reporter

I'm talking about the top brass.

Reporter

What about the families, though, of the hostages? Surely, their voice matters.

Ambassador Huckabee

And even among the families, there's no absolute consensus. Families have different views of what should be done, what could be done. The one thing I would hope all the families understand, and I hurtful as a parent, somebody who can't imagine the horror that they've gone through with their own children, when I hear people say, well, the Israeli government, they don't want to end this war. That's absurd. That's utterly false. I'm with the top levels of the Israeli government. And most of the people sitting in that room have children, either, who have just come out of Gaza, are actively there right now, fighting in the battle. And then you have, for example, Israeli ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Leiter, whose son was killed in Gaza, to say that he wants this to go on. Please don't insult the man or the dignity of his family by acting like he doesn't care or that any of the others don't care.

Reporter

I have spoken to many families of the hostages interviewed in countless times, and there is real frustration, though, with Netanyahu and his government, the feeling that they could perhaps be beholden to right wing factions in the Cabinet who don't want the war to end, who have said that they don't want the war to end until Hamas is completely defeated.

Ambassador Huckabee

I think the question is does anyone want the war to continue? I think the answer that is an emphatic no. Now some people would want it to end regardless of the outcome, even if Hamas gets to stay, but that's an outcome that ultimately, Israel has to ask itself, can we live with that? Can the world live with that? Does that not just invite another October 7, which is what Hamas has pledged, promised, guaranteed, they would do again. How many more hostage families will there be in the future? If Hamas gets to stay, they get to chalk this up as a victory. That's the tough part of this. Do the families want their loved ones home? 100%. Does everyone want the war again? 100%. How to end it, and the manner in which it ends, and whether it ends with some semblance of victory for Hamas, that's the difficult part of the equation.

Reporter

But ambassador, you've seen the protests, over half of Israelis want the war to end.

Ambassador Huckabee

I think 100% of the Israelis want the war to end. I would venture to say I couldn't find somebody in this country that wants it to continue. But I don't think that there is a consensus as to whether or not the war should end with Hamas getting a victory. Do you allow these savages who did what they did and continue to do it? Sometimes [inaudible], and October the seventh wasn't the only time they ever did something that was absolutely a massacre, the number of deaths that they inflicted would have been the equivalent 40,000 people in America killed on a single day by a terror organization. I can't even begin to tell you what would be the reaction in the United States. So, from the perspective as an American who's here watching in the middle of this, I can tell you that Americans, if 40,000 of us, would have been slaughtered, massacred, mutilated in front of our families, I don't think Americans would say: 'you know, we just want this to be over. We're just tired of this'. If the people who did it were going to claim a victory and put a flag up and say: 'And we're going to do it again'.

Reporter

President Trump has said, is real starvation in Gaza, and you can't fake that, he said. And he appeared deeply troubled by images of starving children. Have you been similarly moved?

Ambassador Huckabee

I'm moved when the photos are verified. I mean, we're all moved when you see someone, especially a child who's starving. But the New York Times published a picture on the front page of what was purported to be a starving child. Turns out the child had a birth defect and had not been starving. There were other pictures, for example, that were published of starving children in Gaza. Turned out one of them was from Yemen. One was from 2017, there was another photo that appeared to be somewhat staged, with photographer all set up to get pictures of a few people herded into a small area,

Reporter

But they all (inaudible)

Ambassador Huckabee

Oh, I think that there are certainly people suffering in Gaza. Part of the reason is, is because you've had pallets and trucks full of food that the UN won't take in because they say they don't want military escort from IDF, but they say it's not safe, and 87% of their own food every time they do take it in gets hijacked and looted. That's their numbers. Those aren't mine. I didn't make that up. That's what they report. So there's not been a lack of food or even a lack of attempt. It's been an inefficient way of getting it in. It's been a problem because you have a terror organization who is stealing it, looting it, and then turning around and selling it to the people who are hungry. And one thing that's true certain is that Hamas is not feeding hostages. Where's the Red Cross? Where's the Red Crescent? How come they haven't demanded that the hostages get fed? Where is the outrage over the way the hostages have been treated? We know there's hunger and deprivation there. Hunger is terrible, no matter who it happens to, but I hope everybody is very clear eyed about why it's happening. It's happening because Hamas has not allowed the food to get to the people who are hungry. And we know from the testimony of Gazans and some of them with whom I spoke personally, that when they tried [inaudible]

Reporter

There is no evidence that has been shown, for example, to the World Food Program of Hamas looting food. We are sure that it happened...

Ambassador Huckabee

I saw it with my own eyes.

Reporter

We spoke to the World Food Program, and they have not been shown any evidence of this at all. Their food is being looted...

Ambassador Huckabee

Are you telling me they say that their food has not been looted?

Reporter

No, I'm saying there's no evidence that it's been diverted to Hamas. They're not saying it's not being looted. What they're saying...

Ambassador Huckabee

I am shocked they would say that

Reporter

What they're saying, and to be fair, there are officials within the military who have also said there's no evidence of it. We're sure that some of this must be happening like that, but on a mass, wide scale, are you saying there is no starvation in Gaza?

Ambassador Huckabee

No, I'm not saying there's no starvation. I'm saying the starvation is the result of Hamas blocking the fact that there have been millions of tons food, over 2 million tons of food, that have gone into Gaza enough to feed the entire population for quite some time. Just two weeks ago, I put pictures on social media that showed 900 UN trucks parked ready to go in, but the food sitting there, rotting in the sun, thousands of pallets of food ready to go in. Nobody moving them in. Why do they not get the food in?

Reporter

Okay, their explanation, and I'm not their spokesperson, and I've been exactly to where you're talking about and seen it with my own eyes as well, is that there is still a war on in Gaza. There is not a humanitarian force across the whole of the territory. There is one road, road to go in and one road to come out. So, what happens is that you, Palestinians see the food the trucks. They see the trucks leaving. They see the trucks coming back for the food, and it gets looted every time it is the same road. They know that the trucks are going to come down that road. No one's denying that there is looting. It's a competition for food. And we see also at the GHF sites, when people storm the sites because they're so desperate for the food, surely there is a better way across the whole territory to distribute food.

Ambassador Huckabee

There absolutely is. And here's what it is: Hamas stops keeping the food from coming in. The GHF sites are effective, and they are getting food to people. It's not perfect, but it's doing what President Trump required us, asked us to do, that was set up through GHF, give food to people, but in a way that Hamas didn't steal it. Hamas made half a billion dollars last year, 500 million U.S. dollars stealing food, selling it on the black market in order to finance their activities. That's stunning. That's a real business they have. They put it in warehouses. Yes, there have been some of the just regular population who are looting the trucks. One of the things we heard at GHF feeding sites was people, when they first started coming, they said, well, this is the first time you didn't have to pay for the food. They were used to having to buy a food from Hamas at prices that Hamas was inflating because they stole something. And then they turned around and sell it.

Reporter

But GHF has no ability to verify who's getting that food. They don't know if the men, and it's mostly men who go there. To this day, you have to be strong to compete. How do we know that those people aren't from Hamas?

Ambassador Huckabee

You can't absolutely guarantee that they're not

Reporter

But there's zero verification process.

Ambassador Huckabee

Look, no, there is a screening that is done. But here's

Reporter

What is that screening? (Inaudible)

Ambassador Huckabee

There's a screening to make sure they're not carrying weapons. There's a screening, you know, there's some people that they might recognize they have captured some

Reporter

There's no list like the WFP has, for example. There's no list of who the people are, which families they belong to, where the food is going, and what happens to the food once it leaves the GHF site.

Ambassador Huckabee

The reason the GHF process is working better than this mass distribution is because it's boxed in a way that feeds a family to [inaudible] for eight to 10 days. I'm not saying that somebody from Hamas couldn't come and grab a box of food. They could. They can't grab a truckload of food because they can only get one box. So the difference is, if you take a truckload of food and Hamas takes over the whole truck, there's probably tons of food. They get the whole thing. They can't steal enough boxes at a time to make it worth their while, so we've de-incentivized the process of stealing the food, and that's why it's been more effective.

Reporter

Do you have plans to go out with the World Food Program, for example, like you did at GHF sites, to see the process?

Ambassador Huckabee

Sure, I would love to, if I'm invited to go and do that, and hopefully they'll start moving a lot more food in. One of the problems that has happened with the UN process is they've said, We will not bring food in if the military is around. Well, they'll not explain this to them. There's a hot war going on. And if you don't have some military providing some level of security? Your trucks are going to get hijacked, and you're putting in danger even the drivers who are driving those trucks in. And you have to wonder, what is the UN's primary goal? Is it to feed hungry people, or is it to make sure they preserve some type of particular method of getting it in? I'd like to think that the most important thing is the humanitarian result of feeding people, not whether it meets some arbitrary humanitarian practice that they have imposed upon themselves.

Reporter

Ambassador, the U.S. has thrown its support and money behind GHF.

Ambassador Huckabee

It's a U.S. program.

Reporter

And yes, it's a U.S. program. And yet, every single day there are people dying near GHF sites, there are also people dying.

Ambassador Huckabee

Tell me about the people dying at the GHF, sites in what way?

Reporter

They're being shot, allegedly, according to either countless, and we have interviewed just the other day a private security contractor, not a security contractor, a private civilian contractor who drove the truck and has provided us with new video of constant shooting at these GHF sites, he says, by both Americans and IDF soldiers, live ammunition being used as a form...

Ambassador Huckabee

Could you show that video to me, because I have not seen it. No one in the U.S. government has seen it. And frankly, we have no reports. And we get reports every single day from all four feeding sites. When someone says something like that, I say, I don't believe it, until you show it to me.

Reporter

[inaudible] no reports of anybody being killed near a GHF site?

Ambassador Huckabee

No, we've had reports that there have been incidences, but we've also had reports one day that there were 27 people killed at a GHF site. We had the video to show that no one was even injured. much less killed. But it went all over the world, the New York Times, The Washington Post, BBC, CNN all reported it turned out as a total hoax. It's never happened. Did those media companies come back, some of them with a tiny little correction in the fine print, but the story went out there that 27 people had been murdered at the GHF side. It never happened. So forgive me if I'm a little skeptical and someone says these people are being killed in the GHF sites. I'm getting reports every day from them, every single day. If I would hear that, I assure you we'd be interested in getting the details. And if there was some random shooting of people who are coming for food, those people would be consequent severely.

Reporter

So, the idea that people are killed going to get aid is something that the U.S. is completely against?

Ambassador Huckabee

Well, of course, we're against that. My gosh, who would, who would be for people being killed getting aid but here's what Gazans told me when I was there last week. The people who live in

Gaza, the people, the ones who are going to get the food, said that they did not hate the IDF, and they loved the Americans. But they hated Hamas because every single one of them with Hamas [inaudible] had had some family members in their clan who had been murdered by Hamas when they were trying to get food so who's doing the killing? That's a good question. You honestly think it's some U.S. contractors, or it's the IDF just gunning people down. Or is it Hamas, who have tried to keep people from getting to the feeding sites for a simple reason, because it's business to them. If they can keep people from getting the free food, then they can sell the food that was supposed to be given to them for free. That's what no one seems to be wanting to talk about. Why not?

Reporter

Ambassador, I'm a little confused, because you're saying there's no killings, which you're saying now there are killings.

Ambassador Huckabee

No, I've never said there were no killings. I've never said that. I've never said there weren't killings, but I'm saying for you to say that there were killings at the GHF sites, and it's happening all the time, and it's being done by Americans, and it's being done by IDF. I have no evidence of that. I did say that there's killing, and I do have eyewitness accounts of people who say their family members were killed by Hamas when they were trying to get food because Hamas doesn't want them to get free food. They want them to be dependent on Hamas to get the food that these poor, starving people have to pay Hamas for.

Reporter

At what point is the human suffering in Gaza so great that the U.S. demands, the U.S. demands that Israel allows free flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

Ambassador Huckabee

I think Israel is allowing a very steady flow of foods

Reporter

But it's different to when there's a ceasefire.

Ambassador Huckabee

I'm just telling you, Israel has allowed over 2 million tons of food. And you know, it's a question I'd love to ask some of the people who are so critical of Israel, how many countries who are in the middle of a war are expected to feed the enemies who murder their people? When does that happen in human history? Can someone tell me, I've not heard anyone be able to answer that question. Tell me, was it the Brits responsibility that these the Germans, as they were bombing Dresden? Did that happen? They were dropping bombs, not food? When the Americans were bombing Japan, were we dropping food or bombs? So when in history, in all of history, has the country who has been attacked viciously, brutally, unexpectedly, when is that the country that is expected to feed the country that started the war and killed their people?

Reporter

I think the issue is not providing food. It's preventing food.

Ambassador Huckabee

I just told you, they're not preventing food. There's food that's sitting there. They can get it in. They're trying to get it in. But the UN themselves say that 87% of their own food, these are UN numbers about their own food. It's not getting to the people. It's getting in. It's not getting to the people.

Reporter

They say it's being looted by (inaudible) so desperate.

Ambassador Huckabee

That may be the case in some form, but I've seen the pictures and the videos last week in real time of people with rifles, sitting up on top of the trucks and hijacking them. So is some of it desperate people. I'm sure it is. Some of it is Hamas, but 87% of the intended food for people who are starving isn't getting there. How is that Israel's fault if they're not the ones who are preventing the food from coming in.

Reporter

Six Americans have been killed in the West Bank since October 7, allegedly by Israeli settlers. What progress has been made in investigating the deaths of 20-year-old Saif Musallet?

Ambassador Huckabee

We just got his medical records back about a week ago. We have had one, we have more meetings scheduled with the Israelis. I have asked for, and will continue to demand, a full-throated investigation of what happened, who did it. There's never been any doubt about the U.S. position on this. He's an American citizen. I went and visited with his family in his home. Committed to the family. We will do everything we can to find out who did it. We don't know who did it. I'm not going to jump to the conclusion that we know that it's settlers. It may have been, but we don't know. In any investigation, one of the hallmarks of American jurisprudence is a person is innocent until proven guilty. So we're not going to jump to the conclusion and say we know who did it, because we don't, but if we find out who did it, doesn't matter who it is, that person should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

Reporter

And given the circumstances, should we pass the US led investigation, as some senators are calling for?

Ambassador Huckabee

I think that if it turns out that there's not a thorough and credible investigation, and then we would have to determine at what level we have the authority to conduct an investigation, and there would be some authority because it was a U.S. citizen. We want to get to the bottom of it, for that family's sake. If for no other reason than that family deserves to know.

Reporter

Would the U.S. consider sanctioning the individuals who may be found to have committed this crime?

Ambassador Huckabee

If someone murdered someone, a sanction is a pretty pathetic consequence. They should be tried and if convicted, they should experience the most harsh punishment possible. That's a crime of capital intent to murder someone or to commit an act of terror. We are less interested in who did it than what they did, and making sure that the consequences for whoever did it would be the same, whether they're Israeli, Palestinian, that's of less consequence. Who did this should be fully prosecuted and consequenced as much as humanly possible.

Reporter

Since there's another American, Chicago's Khamis al-Ayyad has died. Do we know how he died?

Ambassador Huckabee

Not yet. There are a lot of questions. Sometimes it's difficult to get the medical reports. It's not always simple to get the full cooperation of all the authorities, because we're dealing with both Israeli and Palestinian authorities. So that's part of the challenge that we face, it takes more time than I wish it did, but we certainly are asking a lot of questions about who did this. What are the pieces of evidence. we want to be able to serve the family that is an American citizen that's important to us.

Reporter

Ambassador, regarding an end to all of this. Where do you see Gaza, once this war is over? What happens to the Palestinians living there, more than 2 million.

Ambassador Huckabee

I would make it upon them. How many of them want to stay and rebuild their lives. We talked to some last week, and that's what they really want to do, and they know it's going to take years to rebuild their, their homes, their businesses, their families. They have their own vision for what that's going to look like, but there are undoubtedly many people who live there now would love a way to leave and go somewhere else, start over.

Reporter

And where would that be?

Ambassador Huckabee

I have no idea where people intend on or who would want them to come and whether or not they could be welcomed in a different environment. But they should have the right to at least make that decision. They shouldn't be forced out, I don't think should be required to leave. And it's interesting that other than allegations that people are going to be forced out, both the U.S. and the Government of Israel has been very clear, nobody's going to be forced out, at least not by the U.S. And Israel has said it doesn't plan to force people to leave. [inaudible] most people want to have the freedom to start over. make a new life away from Gaza and away from the horrific memories they have that were inflicted upon them, because unfortunately, in 2007 they voted in Hamas and all the billions and billions and billions of dollars that was poured into Gaza to build a better life for the people there were spent instead of building a tunnel system over 500 miles is bigger than the London Underground for the sole purpose of being able to hide Hamas and [inaudible] war, keep hostages and ultimately be able to kill the Jews.

Reporter

Increasingly strong language is being used about Israel's prosecution of this war, including from Israeli organizations, they've been accused of genocide, war crimes. What's your view?

Ambassador Huckabee

If Israel is attempting genocide, they're really, really bad at it. They could have had genocide on October the eighth. They could have dropped a few bombs and have annihilated all Gazans, it's not that big an area. They certainly had the capacity to do it, and saw that in the 12-day war with Iran. It is the most ridiculous thing in the world to say that Israel is committing genocide. That's absurd. On its face. It's absurd. If they were trying to commit genocide, it would not have taken them 22 months

Reporter

Has Israel committed war crimes?

Ambassador Huckabee

We don't know. We don't know because that requires a specific charge against a specific person with credibility and witnesses. So if that happens, somebody steps forward, and they have evidence, then one of the things I believe about Israel is that it will prosecute its own people. One thing I haven't seen is who's calling for the war crimes against Hamas to be prosecuted? Who's asking for that? Who, tell me who?

Reporter

I think, I think the, the criminal court has put out warrants of arrest but some of the people that they put them out for are now dead.

Ambassador Huckabee

I'm glad they are, but I don't see the clamoring from Macron and from the UK, Canada and Ireland I don't see them clamoring for the arrest of the instigators, the planners or those who have carried out the horrific murders for them to be prosecutable organs. I heard about the Israelis, and I'm wondering something's out of balance here. I say again. It was a great irony that it was the Arab League who called for Hamas to disarm and release all the hostages the very week that European leaders were saying that Israel ought to end the war and create a Palestinian state.

Reporter

There is no doubt that there is leadership, I think that people are saying on both sides, who are not participating in these negotiations in good faith [inaudible].

Ambassador Huckabee

I disagree that all the parties are not participating in good faith. I'm personally aware of concessions and reasonable things that Israel has put on the table, that the U.S. has put on the table, that Egypt and Jordan have put on a table and said, What about this? and Hamas will say, well, we'll consider it, and then they always reject it, and then they always add new things. So the reason that there have not been any successes in the negotiating process is because there's only one side that's in my mind, serious about trying to bring it to a halt, by way of negotiation.

Reporter

President Trump had said that there's is a plan to deliver more aid. And in fact, we've heard that the GHF sites may be increased from four to 16. What is the plan?

Ambassador Huckabee

Plan is to scale up the GHF sites up to 16, and to expand the hours up to as much as 24 hours a day, so that there's not a great rush at one point in the morning, that that would be spread out over a broader period of time. And there are other things in the works, not ready to be disclosed publicly, but some significant steps that are planned to make the process much more efficient, safer, and I hope they happen real soon.

Reporter

So the U.S. is going to take over delivering aid to Gaza?

Ambassador Huckabee

I don't know that it would be fair to say they're going to take over. We certainly have been very involved, because we really want to establish the GHF program to get it started. I think you will see a heightened participation. But the U.S. is not trying to do it alone. We'd love for international partners to be helpful. We'd love for the NGOs to get more involved. We'd love for the UN to become more involved, but we'd like them to be involved in an efficient and effective way, rather than just drive trucks in after letting it sit there for weeks and then allowing it to be stolen and looted.

Reporter

Ambassador, you have spoken a lot about what should happen to the people of Gaza. What about the two-state solution? Where do you stand on that?

Ambassador Huckabee

It's really not an ambassador's position to make the decision of what that policy would be. It's the role of the President. He was the only one elected last November.

Reporter

Do you support it though?

Ambassador Huckabee

It doesn't matter whether I do or don't. I wait to see what the president tells us. But here's what I would ask anyone even ask the President, where would the state be? What are the boundaries? Who rules it? What are its authorities? What are its limitations? Where does it? Where does it actually exist? And how is it? How does it function in the context of what we're living with right now? And nobody seems to answer that as a sort of an aspirational goal. We need a two-state solution. But when you start asking people the specifics of what it looks like and where it's going to be, where the boundaries. interesting, that very few people have an answer to that,

Reporter

You said that the sites are going to be increased for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, is that an acknowledgement that what's happening now is not working.

Ambassador Huckabee

No, it's an acknowledgement that it is working. If it wasn't working, we'd go from four to zero. Do something different. It's working, so we're going to scale it up and help it to work more.

Reporter

But 4 to 16 is a big change, and 24 hours a day is a massive change.

Ambassador Huckabee

It's a massive change, right. It requires a great deal of additional funding, which is the reason it hasn't scaled up prior to now. But I think, as people have seen the effectiveness of that process, now they're willing to invest. Before they weren't sure it would work.

Reporter

Thank you very much.



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Annex 26.

Israel Defense Forces, “Everything You Need to Know About the Humanitarian Aid Situation in Gaza” (19 August 2025),

Clearing Up the Misconceptions:

Everything You Need to Know About the Humanitarian Aid Situation in Gaza

The humanitarian aid situation in Gaza is severe, but there is a clear discrepancy between public claims about the aid and the reality on the ground. While hunger in Gaza dominates headlines with blame largely placed on Israel, the reality is far more complex. Below is a breakdown of the IDF's efforts to ensure the aid reaches the civilians of Gaza

⚡ 19.08.25

IDF

Statistics - As of August 18, 2025

Despite multiple claims, Israel has indeed been allowing and facilitating the entry of aid into Gaza. Copious amounts of food, medical equipment, sanitary products, and more, have been flowing continuously across the border with over 4,000 tons of baby formula having recently entered Gaza.

Over 1.9 million tons of aid have been delivered since the start of the Swords of Iron war; nearly 100,000 large trucks. Just this week, Israel has overseen 23,000 tons of aid, and 1,200 trucks have entered Gaza.

Furthermore, Israel, via COGAT, a unit responsible for implementing government policies within certain territories, has coordinated airdrops with international partners, as an additional method of entering aid into Gaza. Packages are airdropped at gathering points, at specific times that Gazan civilians are alerted to.

Preparations for the Airdrop of Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza St...



Preparations for the Airdrop of Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip (August 5, 2025)

Airdrop of Humanitarian Aid as Part of the Efforts To Deliver Ai...



Airdrop of Humanitarian Aid as Part of the Efforts To Deliver Aid to the Gaza Strip (August 5, 2025)

Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore, Indonesia, Canada, Spain, Germany, the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt, have all been sending aid packages increasingly over the past few weeks. Countries have delivered by airdropping independently, or via Jordan and Egypt, after which they are collected by Israel and brought across the Kerem Shalom crossing. Today, a total of 7,800 tons of aid have been delivered via the aerial route.



Preparations for the Airdrop of Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip

Israel has not only been supplying aid, but has also restored infrastructure in Gaza. In coordination with the Israel Electric Corporation, a power line now supplies energy to a desalination plant serving 900,000 Gazans.

On July 30, 2025, in a further effort to ensure Gazans have enough safe drinking water, work began to connect the Emirati water line from the desalination plant in Egypt to the Al-Mawasi area along the coast. Around 600,000 residents of Gaza will be served by this water line.

The Steps

Once aid from all international sources has been acquired, it is organized onto trucks in Jordan and Egypt. These trucks approach the Kerem Shalom crossing, a border point that connects Egypt, Gaza, and Israel. A border point that was also heavily bombed on October 7, 2023, used as a method of invading Israel by Hamas.

The trucks are handed over to Israel, and are then submitted through a quick screening process, checking for any product that could be used for terror activity. Thereafter, the aid enters into Gaza, up to 600 meters past the border.



Aid entering Gaza

At this stage, Israel has completed its part in the humanitarian aid process. It is now the responsibility of international organizations to collect this aid and distribute it. A task in which the UN has unfortunately fallen short of expectations.

Following the delivery across the border, international organizations pick up the aid, and transfer it over to distribution points. The UN has sites surrounding their warehouses, both within and around the humanitarian zone.

Distribution Center Established in the Tel al-Sultan Area





Humanitarian aid waiting at the Kerem Shalom crossing (July 27, 2025)

Israel has dedicated time and effort and paused military activity to get humanitarian aid into Gaza. When international organizations do not distribute the aid, they allow it to sit in the distribution centers, allowing for valuable resources to waste away. The GHF has been more consistent in its handling of aid. Today, over 2 million meals across three distribution sites have been distributed.

The second issue, by no surprise, is Hamas. They have a strong record of stealing aid in order to survive, and this time it has come at the expense of Gazan civilians. Aid meant for families is hoarded for the leaders' nourishment or sold to support their terrorist activities.

When international organizations eventually pick up the trucks from the crossings, they are often intercepted and looted. Standing on top of trucks, guns loaded and active, driving wildly down roads packed with hungry civilians, they disregard and abuse the public they are supposedly governing over.

Hamas Looting Humanitarian Aid (June 1, 2025)



Footage of Hamas looting humanitarian aid (June 1, 2025)

Where's the aid?




Footage of Hamas looting humanitarian aid (July 25, 2025)

Additionally, they have committed multiple sabotage attempts at GHF distribution centers. On June 11, 2025, Hamas hijacked a bus carrying American GHF workers, and murdered multiple employees. On July 5, 2025, they threw two grenades at the Rafah distribution center - while Gaza's civilians were still present - that led to the injury of two GHF workers.

Hamas's ongoing exploitation of humanitarian aid is aimed at preserving its dominance. If the population is receiving supplies elsewhere, they no longer rely on Hamas for survival. Without a public to threaten, they have no foundation.

Hamas will stop at nothing to ensure their own needs are fulfilled. They are pushing this false narrative of deliberate starvation that is being echoed by the media, meanwhile they sit in their tunnels feasting on stolen food.



Footage of Hamas eating the looted aid in tunnels (July 23, 2025)

What the western world is forgetting while they blame Israel for stopping the aid, is that in those very tunnels seen above, are 50 hostages, whose hunger is all the more reason for Israel to be getting food into Gaza.

There is no denying the hunger in Gaza. But Israel is not at fault. The UN is failing, and Hamas is exploiting, obstructing, and weaponizing the aid. They are intentionally inflicting civilian suffering to gain international sympathy and control - and it is working.

The IDF will continue to educate and inform the public about its goals and efforts: to keep humanitarian aid flowing into Gaza, to bring home our hostages, and to ensure that the civilians in Gaza are no longer under Hamas rule.

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Annex 27.

E. Halabi and D. Edelson, “ Hamas Kills 5 Aid Workers, Others May Have Been Taken Hostage, Gaza Relief Group Says” Ynet News (6 December 2025).



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Hamas kills 5 aid workers, others may have been taken hostage, Gaza relief group says

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation says bus carrying its aid workers came under attack after repeated threats by terror group; calls on international community to condemn the 'heinous and deliberate attack'

Einav Halabi, Daniel Edelson, New York | 06.12.25 | 07:00

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Related Topics Attack Hamas humanitarian aid Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

The [Gaza Humanitarian Foundation](#) (GHF) said on Thursday that five of its Palestinian workers were killed, and others were injured when Hamas attacked a bus carrying them to their workplace in Gaza.

GHF said it was concerned that some of its workers may have been abducted by terrorists in the attack.

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Trucks carrying humanitarian aid into Gaza (Photo: GHF)

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The American fund said that the bus was carrying more than 20 Palestinian residents who were en route to one of the distribution centers west of Khan Younis.

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"We are still gathering facts, but what we know is devastating: there are at least five fatalities, multiple injuries, and fear that some of our team members may have been taken hostage," GHF said in a statement. "We condemn this heinous and deliberate attack in the strongest possible terms."



Gaza residents receive humanitarian aid from GHF (Photo: Ramadan Abed / Reuters)

GHF said it held Hamas responsible for the attack and called on the international community to condemn the terror group. "The attack did not happen in a vacuum. For days, [Hamas has openly threatened our team](#), our aid workers and the civilians who receive aid from us. [Their threats have been met with silence.](#)"

Hamas said in a statement that it had killed members of a [local militia led by Yasser Abu Shabab](#) that [Israel had reportedly armed](#), a claim the militia denied.

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Annex 28

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Annex 29.

Letter from Hamas's Emergency Committee to the Hamas's Military Wing
dated 9 January 2025

Explanatory Note

Letter from Hamas's Emergency Committee to the Hamas's Military Wing dated 9 January 2025

In this document, the "Emergency Committee" (the local governing body on behalf of Hamas during hostilities) reassures Al-Qassam brigades – Hamas's Military Wing, of a new plan to divert aid received from international organizations, including UNRWA, to its operatives.

English Translation

The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas -

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Dear Brother/ Eng. Emad

May Allah protect him

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings

Subject/ Reasons for Delay in Delivery of agreed combat pallets

First of all, we pray to God that this message reaches you in the best of health, and we ask God to grant us a swift victory and imminent liberation.

With reference to the above, please note that the reasons for the delay in the delivery of combat unit pallets are as follows:

1. My dear brother, as you know, the Agency [UNRWA] has taken some administrative measures, the most significant of which was the dismissal and replacement of Abu Firas Shweideh. In addition, international organizations tightened their procedures and prevented the receipt of any pallets in Ras Al-Koum as was previously allowed. They have also threatened to suspend aid due to increased restrictions imposed by the occupation in this regard.
2. Therefore, we stopped receiving the pallets that we used to receive for the security apparatus, Al-Qassam [Hamas's military wing] and the movement. Consequently, all that was previously agreed upon in terms of disbursing pallets to any movement or government entity or Al-Qassam have also ceased.
3. Despite the difficulties we faced, we managed, through the brothers in the Institutions Department, to secure quantities for the brothers in the Security Apparatus and the Safe Rooms, amounting to 60 pallets per month. Your brothers in the security have complained to you about the delay in distributing the pallets and have sent me urgent messages regarding this matter.
4. We also managed, through the brothers in the Department of Institutions, to secure some pallets for the brothers in Al-Qassam, amounting to 200 pallets, as explained by Brother Fares in his letter. Afterwards, we sent 95 cartons of meat, and then we sent 100 pallets. It should be noted that these pallets were an initiative by the Movement Institutions Department through us only, and not through the agency or other active organizations.
5. Since the monthly quantity required for the brothers in Al-Qassam is 500 pallets and the brothers in the movement institutions have not been able to provide it monthly. We held many meetings to follow up on solving this problem with the development sector, the Agency, the institutions and all the relevant authorities, and with the knowledge of our beloved brother Shehab.



حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Hamas

The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas -

6. In the end, we were guided to make a daily deduction from the pallets (i.e., taking 10–30 pallets from each organization that receives aid). This is the same method we use to sort the pallets for the security apparatus. The purpose of this daily deduction is to prevent large quantities from accumulating in Ras Al-Koum while at the same time ensuring that the required quantities are provided to the brothers in Al-Qassam, which is the least we can do.
7. I assigned Brother Shehab, the representative of Al-Qassam, to be a representative of the movement in the sorting committee, and he, through his delegate, will monitor the receipt of the daily share from the trucks that arrive each day.
8. We have started working according to the arrangements that have been reached, and the agreed system will start from Saturday, 11 January 2025, God willing.

In conclusion, we assure you, my dear brother, that we will always strive to meet all the needs of the brothers in Al-Qassam and the combat units. This is the least we can do, as they are the ones through whom God has elevated our mention in the worlds, they are the righteous mujahideen, and we ask God to accept from you and from them, and to write for you, for us, and for them, and to double our wages for us. We ask God to protect them and grant them the necks of the aggressor Jews, and that God will grant us victory and liberation through their hands.

Please accept it with the utmost appreciation and respect

Your brother, Abu Ahmed Ibrahim

Thursday 9 January 2025



حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Hamas

Movement Emergency Committee

Original Document

حركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس - لجنة الطوارئ الحركية

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

حفظه الله

الأخ الحبيب/ م. عماد

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الموضوع / أسباب التأخير في تسليم طرود العقد القتالية

بدايةً نسأل الله تعالى أن تصلكم رسالتنا هذه وأنتم بألف خير، ونسأل الله أن يكتب لنا نصراً عاجلاً وفرجاً قريباً.

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه؛ يرجى التكرم بالعلم ان أسباب التأخير في تسليم طرود العقد القتالية هي كالتالي:

1. أخي الحبيب كما تعلم أن الوكالة قامت ببعض الإجراءات الإدارية والتي كان أحدها وأهمها (إقالة وتغيير أبو فراس شويدج) وكذلك شددت المؤسسات الدولية من إجراءاتها ومنعت استلام اية طرود من رأس الكوم كما كان في السابق وهددت بإيقاف المساعدات لان عليها تشديد من الاحتلال بهذا الخصوص.
2. ولذلك توقف استلامنا للطرود التي كنا نستلمها للتأمين والقسم والحركة وبالتالي توقف كل ما تم الاتفاق عليه سابقاً من صرفه طرود لأي جهة حركية او حكومية او القسم.
3. رغم الصعوبات التي واجهتنا قمنا عبر الاخوة في دائرة المؤسسات بتأمين كميّات للاخوة في جهاز الامن والغرفة الامنة ومعددها 60 طرد شهرياً. وقد شكنا لكم الاخوة في الامن من التأخير في صرفه الطرود وارسلوا رسائل صعبة لي بهذا الخصوص.
4. وكذلك قمنا عبر الاخوة في دائرة المؤسسات بتأمين بعض الطرود للاخوة في القسم بعدد (200) طرد كما وضع الأخ/ فارس في كتابه وكذلك أرسلنا بعدها عدد (95) كرتونة لحمه هنا، وبعدها أرسلنا (100) طرد، علماً بأن هذه الطرود كانت اجتهاد عبر دائرة المؤسسات الحركية من خلالنا فقط وليس من خلال الوكالة أو المؤسسات العاملة.
5. ونظراً لان الكمية الشهرية المطلوبة للاخوة في القسم 500 طرد ولم يستطيع الاخوة في المؤسسات الحركية من توفيرها شهرياً.. فقمنا بعقد العديد من اللقاءات لمتابعة حل هذه المشكلة مع التنمية و الوكالة والمؤسسات وكافة الجهات ذات العلاقة وبعلم الأخ الحبيب شهاب.



حركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس

لجنة الطوارئ الحركية

حركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس - لجنة الطوارئ الحركية

6. واهتدينا في النهاية الى ان يتم استقطاع يومي من الطرود (أي يتم استلام (10 - 30) طرد من كل مؤسسة من المؤسسات التي يدخل لها طرود) وهي نفس الطريقة التي نفرز بها طرود الإخوة في التأمين.. والمدفوع من هذا الاستقطاع اليومي الا تكون كميات كبيرة ترفع من راس الكوم وفي نفس الوقت يتم توفير الكميات المطلوبة للإخوة في القسم وهذا اقل الواجب.
7. قدمت بتكليف الأخ/ شهاب ممثل القسم بأن يكون ممثل عن الحركة في لجنة الفرز ويقوم هو عبر مندوبه بمتابعة استلام الحصة اليومية من الشاحنات التي تدخل بشكل يومي
8. باشرنا العمل وفق ما تم التوصل إليه وسيتم البدء بالنظام المتفق عليه بدءاً من يوم السبت الموافق 2025/01/11 بمشيئة الله تعالى.

وفي الختام نؤكد لكم أخي الحبيب بأننا دوماً نسعى لسد جميع الاحتياجات التي يحتاجها الاخوة في القسم والعقد القتالية، وهذا اقل الواجب فهم من يرفع الله بهم ذكرنا في العالمين وهم المجاهدين الأبرار ونسأل الله أن يتقبل منكم ومنهم وأن يكتب لكم ولنا ولم أجربنا ويضاعف لنا في أجورنا، ونسأل الله أن يحفظهم ويمكنهم من رقباء اليهود المعتدين وأن يكتب الله لنا على أيديهم النصر والتحرير.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق التقدير والاحترام

أخوكم/ أبو احمد ابراهيم

الخميس 2025-01-09م



حركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس

لجنة الطوارئ الحركية

Annex 30.

“Presidency condemns escalating Israeli aggression and looting of aid in Gaza”
Palestine News & Info Agency (2 May 2025).

IMPORTANT NEWS

n as famine fatalities rise to 303



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02/May/2025 07:41 PM

Presidency condemns escalating Israeli aggression and looting of aid in Gaza

RAMALLAH, May 2, 2025 (Wafa) – The Presidency strongly condemned Israel's ongoing aggression and escalating crimes against the Palestinian people across all areas, particularly in the Gaza Strip, as well as its continued policy of siege and starvation.

In a statement issued on Friday, the Presidency stressed that the international community must act swiftly to put an end to the unprecedented atrocities being perpetrated against the Palestinian people.

The Presidency also expressed its categorical rejection and firm condemnation of the looting and theft carried out by criminal gangs targeting warehouses and storage facilities of humanitarian aid designated for the people of Gaza.

It held Hamas-affiliated gangs primarily responsible, emphasizing that the Palestinian people will not forgive these disgraceful acts committed in such a critical time, especially in the besieged

Strip.

The Presidency underlined that all such gangs and their affiliates are well known to the Palestinian public and will top the blacklist to be held accountable and brought to justice in accordance with the law at the appropriate time.

T.R.

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Annex 31.

Israel Defense Forces, “The IDF Reveals How the Hamas Terrorist Organization Systematically Exploited Humanitarian Aid in Gaza To Fund Terrorist Activity” (12 June 2025).



June 12, 2025

The IDF Reveals How the Hamas Terrorist Organization Systematically Exploited Humanitarian Aid in Gaza To Fund Terrorist Activity

⚡ 12.06.25

IDF

Following an in-depth analysis of a wide range of intelligence reports, some of which can now be disclosed, the IDF is revealing the method by which the Hamas terrorist organization systematically exploited the humanitarian aid intended for the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Since the outbreak of the war, the Hamas terrorist organization identified the opportunity to take advantage of humanitarian aid and assumed control of aid distribution at large throughout the Gaza Strip, exploiting international aid organizations in the process. Throughout the war, there have been many instances in which Hamas terrorists have, both covertly and overtly embedded themselves on aid trucks with the goal of confiscating and taking control of the aid entering the Gaza Strip.

Hamas developed several methods to exploit the aid it had stolen:

1. Confiscation of Humanitarian Aid

Throughout the war, Hamas decided that varying portions (ranging from 15% to over 25%) of the humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip would be automatically diverted to the terrorist organization and its needs. The aid allocated to Hamas was either transferred to its terrorists on the ground or sold at high prices for profit at the expense of the residents of the Gaza Strip. The now revealed document proves that decisions were made on this matter during the war, including adjusting the percentage of aid diverted to Hamas based on the terrorist organization's internal assessments.

2. Smuggling of Prohibited Goods

Hamas smuggled certain items, such as cigarettes, into the Gaza Strip in order to seize and resell them at inflated prices, while prohibiting independent merchants from selling them in the markets. In addition, Hamas smuggled these products into the Gaza Strip and sold them to merchants at inflated rates. It should be emphasized that the entry of cigarettes into the Gaza Strip via the crossings has

not been approved as part of the humanitarian aid process. Throughout the war, security personnel from the Ministry of Defense's Crossings Points Authority thwarted dozens of attempts to smuggle tobacco products.

3. Foreign Funding Funneling Mechanism

According to IDF assessments, Hamas has received hundreds of millions of shekels in the Gaza Strip from Iran and other funding sources through a funneling mechanism ("Hawala") operated by Hamas members based in Turkey, in coordination with senior Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip. Hamas exploited the humanitarian aid process and international aid organizations, whether knowingly or through manipulation, by pushing for the entry of "excess" aid items, purchased using Hamas' external funds, into Gaza. Hamas then sold the aid at inflated prices to the residents and collected the cash proceeds.



4. The "Protection" Extortion Tactic

Hamas systematically exploited its de facto control throughout the Gazan territory to impose taxes and security fees, taking over entire industries and extracting profit through forced "protection" extortion schemes.



Today, it is estimated that Hamas has accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and goods by exploiting humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The halt in the entry of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip at the beginning of March, following a directive from the political echelon, led to a significant decrease in Hamas's profits. This caused severe financial difficulties within the organization, to the extent that they were forced to reduce, and at times completely suspend, salary payments to some of its members.

In parallel, in recent months, the IDF, led by the Intelligence Directorate and COGAT, has conducted an in-depth learning process. As part of this effort, a framework was formulated and launched to enhance oversight and monitoring of the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The process includes: registration of organizations, customs procedures, verification of aid content at the crossings, improved security inspections at the crossings, and the formulation of a sanctions protocol for organizations that fail to meet these conditions.

In recent months, humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip has resumed through dedicated distribution centers operated by international organizations and secured by the civilian company, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, in a manner that was not feasible at the start of the war. This process has enabled the direct delivery of food packages to Gaza's residents via the civilian company, effectively cutting Hamas off from direct control over humanitarian aid.

[Graphic of documents collected in the Gaza Strip:](#)

[The Original Documents](#)

[The Documents Translated](#)

The IDF will continue to allow the operation of the distribution centers by international organizations, managed by the American civilian company while making every possible effort to ensure that the humanitarian aid does not reach the hands of the Hamas terrorist organization.

The method and intelligence now being revealed serve as clear and undeniable evidence to the entire world: the Hamas terrorist organization cares only about its own survival and its ability to harm the civilians of the State of Israel. Hamas is cynically exploiting the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Recordings of Conversations Between Two Gazans Revealing Hamas' Method To Exploit Humanitarian Aid:

Conversation Between Two Gazan Residents About Hamas' Ex...



Conversation Between Two Gazan Residents About Hamas' Ex...



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Annex 32.

Internal intelligence summary of a conversation with a source regarding diversion of WCK aid to Hamas.

English Translation

Translation

12. Report Number 12:

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- According to the source (in December 2024), [REDACTED] (there is a person who works with a unit from Al-Majayda family which is securing trucks together with [REDACTED]) who is associated with Fatah.

[REDACTED].

Furthermore, they brought shipments which belong to the World Central Kitchen Organization.

According to the source, they brought two shipments to Hamas.

[REDACTED]

Original Document

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

• לדברי המקור (בדצמבר 2024), [REDACTED] (יש בן אדם ש)עובד עם חולייה ממשפחת אלמג'אידה אשר מאבטחת משאיות יחד עם [REDACTED] המשויך לפת"ח.

[REDACTED]

כמו כן, הם הביאו משלוחים ששייכים לארגון המטבח המרכזי העולמי. לטענת המקור, הם הביאו שני משלוחים לחמאס.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Annex 33.

Internal intelligence summary of a conversation with a source regarding
Hammas's diversion of aid.

English Translation

4. Report Number 4:

[REDACTED]

- According to the source, on 25 January 2025, the Beit Lahiya Municipality oversaw the establishment of a refugee camp for the displaced [REDACTED] for the residents of Beit Lahiya.

The supervisor of the refugee camp is Murad Abu-Durabi [REDACTED] – which is part of Al-Qassam’s [*Hamas’s military wing*] Nukhba [*Hamas’s “special forces”*]. The source added that Hamas wants to manage the refugee camps because they represent an important source of income – through donors from abroad from various States, such as: Malaysia, Indonesia and Qatar. The source mentioned that half of the aid reaches Hamas as well, and perhaps even more than that, [*while*] the rest is transferred to individuals who are not affiliated with Hamas.

[REDACTED]

Original Document

Annex 34.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2720 (2023) Adopted by the Security Council at its 9520th meeting, on 22 December 2023, UN Doc S/RES/2720 (2023) (22 December 2023),



Resolution 2720 (2023)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 9520th meeting, on
22 December 2023**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling all of its relevant resolutions, particularly resolution [2712 \(2023\)](#), which, *inter alia*, demands that all parties comply with their obligations under international law, notably with regard to the protection of civilians, calls for urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout the Gaza Strip for a sufficient number of days to enable full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access and to enable urgent rescue and recovery efforts, and calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring immediate humanitarian access,

Reaffirming that all parties to conflicts must adhere to their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable,

Stressing that the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the territory occupied in 1967, and reiterating the vision of the two-State solution, with the Gaza Strip as part of the Palestinian State,

Expressing deep concern at the dire and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and its grave impact on the civilian population, underlining the urgent need for full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access into and throughout the entire Gaza Strip, and taking note of the concerning reports from the leadership of the United Nations and humanitarian organizations in this regard, *reaffirming its strong concern* for the disproportionate effect that the conflict is having on the lives and well-being of children, women, and other civilians in vulnerable situations, and *stressing* the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence,

Stressing the obligation to respect and protect humanitarian relief and medical personnel,

Reaffirming its call for all parties to refrain from depriving the civilian population in the Gaza Strip of basic services and humanitarian assistance indispensable to their survival, consistent with international humanitarian law,

Commending the indispensable and ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all humanitarian and medical personnel in the Gaza Strip to



alleviate the impact of the conflict on the people in the Gaza Strip, and *expressing* condolences for all civilians, including humanitarian and medical personnel, killed in the course of this conflict,

Welcoming the efforts of Egypt to facilitate the use of the Rafah Border crossing by United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners for the provision of humanitarian assistance for people in need throughout the Gaza Strip,

Taking note of the 15 December 2023 decision by the Government of Israel to open its crossing at Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom for direct delivery of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians in Gaza, which should ease congestion and help facilitate the provision of life-saving assistance to those who urgently need it, and *emphasizing* the need to continue working closely with all relevant parties to expand the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance, while confirming its humanitarian nature and ensuring that it reaches its civilian destination,

Encouraging engagement with relevant states in the implementation of this resolution,

Welcoming the implementation of a recent ‘humanitarian pause’ in the Gaza Strip, and *expressing* appreciation for the diplomatic efforts of Egypt, the State of Qatar, and other states in this regard, and also expressing grave concerns as to the impact the resumption of hostilities has had on civilians,

Recognizing that the civilian population in the Gaza Strip must have access to sufficient quantities of assistance that they need, including enough food, water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and medical services essential for their survival, and that the provision of humanitarian supplies in the Gaza Strip needs to be sufficient to alleviate the massive humanitarian needs of the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip, and *recognizing* the importance of resuming commercial imports of essential goods and services into the Gaza Strip,

Welcoming financial contributions and pledges by member states in support of the civilian population in Gaza, and *taking note* of the International Humanitarian Conference for the Civilian Population of Gaza held in Paris on 9 November 2023 and its follow-up meeting on 6 December 2023,

1. *Reiterates* its demand that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, including with regard to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of civilians and civilian objects, humanitarian access, and the protection of humanitarian personnel and their freedom of movement, and the duty, as applicable, of ensuring the food and medical supplies, among others, of the population, *recalls* that civilian and humanitarian facilities, including hospitals, medical facilities, schools, places of worship, and facilities of the UN, as well as humanitarian personnel, and medical personnel, and their means of transport, must be respected and protected, according to international humanitarian law, and *affirms* that nothing in this resolution absolves the parties of these obligations;

2. *Reaffirms* the obligations of the parties to the conflict under international humanitarian law regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance, *demands* that they allow, facilitate and enable the immediate, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance at scale directly to the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip, and in this regard *calls* for urgent steps to immediately allow safe, unhindered, and expanded humanitarian access and to create the conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities;

3. *Demands* that the parties to the conflict allow and facilitate the use of all available routes to and throughout the entire Gaza Strip, including border crossings, including full and prompt implementation of the announced opening of the Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom Border Crossing, for the provision of humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that humanitarian personnel and humanitarian assistance, including fuel, food, and medical supplies and emergency shelter assistance, reaches the civilian population in need throughout the Gaza Strip without diversion and through the most direct routes, as well as for material and equipment to repair and ensure the functioning of critical infrastructure and to provide essential services, without prejudice to the obligations of the parties to the conflict under international humanitarian law, and *stresses* the importance of respecting and protecting border crossings and maritime infrastructure used for the delivery of humanitarian assistance at scale;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the objective of expediting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the Gaza Strip, to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator with responsibility for facilitating, coordinating, monitoring, and verifying in Gaza, as appropriate, the humanitarian nature of all humanitarian relief consignments to Gaza provided through states which are not party to the conflict, and *further requests* that the Coordinator expeditiously establish a UN mechanism for accelerating the provision of humanitarian relief consignments to Gaza through states which are not party to the conflict, consulting all relevant parties, with the goal of expediting, streamlining, and accelerating the process of providing assistance while continuing to help ensure that aid reaches its civilian destination, and *demands* that the parties to the conflict cooperate with the Coordinator to fulfil their mandate without delay or obstruction;

5. *Requests* that the Coordinator be appointed expeditiously;

6. *Determines* that the Coordinator will have the necessary personnel and equipment in Gaza, under the authority of the United Nations, to perform these, and other functions as determined by the Security Council, and *requests* that the Coordinator report to the Security Council on its work, with an initial report within 20 days and thereafter every 90 days through 30 September 2024;

7. *Demands* the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address medical needs of all hostages;

8. *Demands* the provision of fuel to Gaza at levels that will meet requisite humanitarian needs;

9. *Calls for* all parties to adhere to international humanitarian law and in this regard deplores all attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as well as all violence and hostilities against civilians, and all acts of terrorism;

10. *Reaffirms* the obligations of all parties under international humanitarian law, including with regard to respecting and protecting civilians and taking constant care to spare civilian objects, including such objects critical to the delivery of essential services to the civilian population, and with regard to refraining from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, as well as respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations;

11. *Reaffirms* that civilian objects, including places of refuge, including within United Nations facilities and their surroundings, are protected under international humanitarian law, and *rejects* forced displacement of the civilian population, including children, in violation of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law;

12. *Reiterates* its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions, and *in this regard stresses* the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority;

13. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, those of its specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief activities consistent with international humanitarian law, without prejudice to their freedom of movement and access, *stresses* the need not to hinder these efforts, and *recalls* that humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected;

14. *Demands* implementation of resolution [2712 \(2023\)](#) in full, *requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council in writing within five working days of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of resolution [2712 \(2023\)](#), and thereafter as necessary, and *calls upon* all parties concerned to make full use of the humanitarian notification and deconfliction mechanisms in place to protect all humanitarian sites, including UN facilities, and to help facilitate the movement of aid convoys, without prejudice to the obligations of the parties to uphold international humanitarian law;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution in the regular reporting to the Council;

16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 35.

World Central Kitchen, @WCKitchen X (formerly Twitter) (6:12 pm, 12 August 2025).



← Post



World Central Kitchen ✓

@WCKitchen



WCK was contacted by Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), and confirmed the vehicle and persons of interest were not affiliated with WCK. We strongly condemn anyone posing as WCK or other humanitarians as this endangers civilians and aid workers. The safety and security of our teams are our top priority.



Grok ✓ @grok · 12 Aug

Replying to @amkathu18, @LTC_Shoshani and @cogatonline

The IDF video shows aerial footage of five armed individuals exiting a vehicle marked with a fake World Central Kitchen emblem in Gaza. They appear to carry weapons and disperse. IDF claims real-time verification with WCK confirmed no affiliation. No denials from WCK found;

[Show more](#)

6:12 pm · 12 Aug 2025 · **846.5K** Views

230

1.5K

4.9K

710



Annex 36.

Israel Defense Forces, “Mohammed Sinwar’s Body Located” (8 June 2025).

June 8, 2025

Mohammed Sinwar's Body Located

⚡ 08.06.25

IDF

In a targeted operation of the IDF in the southern Command, and following the completion of an identification process, it is now confirmed that the body of Mohammed Sinwar was located in the underground tunnel route beneath the European Hospital in Khan Yunis.

3D Illustration of the Underground Tunnel Route That the IDF Revealed, Along With Footage From the Underground Tunnel Route:

3D Illustration of the Underground Tunnel Route That the IDF R...



Sinwar was eliminated along with the commander of the Rafah Brigade, Mohammad Sabaneh in a joint operation of the IDF and the ISA on May 13th, 2025, while hiding in an underground command and control center in which IDF troops are currently operating.

Footage From the Process of Locating the Bodies Within the Underground Tunnel Route:

Footage From the Process of Locating the Bodies Within the U...




During searches in the underground tunnel route, several items belonging to Sinwar and Sabaneh were located, along with additional intelligence findings that were transferred for further investigation.

Documents Belonging to Mohammed Sinwar That Were Located in the Underground Tunnel Route:



Additional bodies of terrorists were located during the operation, their identities are currently under examination.

Additional Footage of the Underground Tunnel Route That Was Located Beneath the European Hospital:



The Removal of the Bodies From the Underground Tunnel Route Beneath the European Hospital:



The Removal of the Bodies From the Underground Tunnel Rout...



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Annex 37.

COGAT, @cogatonline, X (formerly Twitter) (2:28 pm, 28 May 2025).



← Post



COGAT
@cogatonline



During the hostage release deal, 25,200 trucks of aid and food entered Gaza in just 42 days.

That is a very significant amount of aid, in just over a month, creating large stores of food and aid.

There is plenty of food in Gaza.

If Hamas lets civilians in Gaza have the aid, there is enough for a long period of time.

We continue to monitor and assess the humanitarian situation in coordination with the international community.



2:28 pm · 28 Mar 2025 · 22.9K Views

39

158

296

25



Annex 38.

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, Announcing New Pilot for Families to Reserve Aid Parcels (18 August 2025).



ANNOUNCING NEW PILOT FOR FAMILIES TO RESERVE AID PARCELS

August 18, 2025 – Gaza Humanitarian Foundation Pilot Enables Families to Reserve and Guarantee Aid Parcels in Advance:

As more aid flows in, families can now secure their parcels in advance, bringing more ease, dignity, and order to the collection process.

Following the delivery of more than two million boxes containing nearly 127 million meals to families in Gaza, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) is launching a new system to enable families to reserve aid parcels in advance. The system, long requested by the community and modeled on programs used by humanitarian organizations in Gaza and around the world, is designed to provide safe, predictable access to GHF's food aid parcels.



The new program, which will scale over the coming weeks, launched on Sunday, 17 August at SDS2 (Saudi Neighborhood), with 350 participants. Plans to expand the pilot to other GHF sites are in development, with the goal of full implementation of the voluntary program in the coming weeks.

“It has always been our plan to offer a way for families to reserve aid in advance and guarantee access, just as other aid organizations do,” said John Acree, Executive Director of GHF. “Until now, however, conditions on the ground have made implementation of such a program impossible. But with more aid flowing into Gaza and GHF’s deliveries helping stabilize food availability, conditions are improving. We are proud to take this step to deliver on the requests of the community and make distributions easier and more reliable for the people we serve.”

Under the current set-up at GHF’s distribution sites, younger, more fit men often outpace women, children, older men, and people with disabilities to access aid, which is collected on a first-come, first-served basis. In response to this challenge, GHF has

successfully implemented innovative solutions, including women-only days and lanes and community-based distribution. This pilot program is the latest example of GHF's ongoing efforts to meet the very dynamic needs on the ground.

The process to participate is simple, voluntary, and secure:

- A trained local worker invites beneficiaries to participate.
- Those who opt to participate will have their photo taken and receive an ID card with their photo and a unique number.
- Beneficiaries have the option to create a profile online, where they can input information such as household size.
- A box of aid will be set aside on specific days for each participant, eliminating the need to partake in the rush.
- Aid will continue to be available on a first come first serve basis to those who choose not to participate.
- All data is securely stored and never shared.

The system also enables GHF to communicate directly with participating households about distribution times, special deliveries, and urgent updates, allowing the organization to adapt quickly to community needs.

“This is real progress,” Acree added. “It both demonstrates that GHF’s model is working and reflects our commitment to adapting to the needs of those we serve and delivering on President Trump’s call for innovation to get more humanitarian aid into the hands of the people who need it most in Gaza.”

Please follow [@GHFUpdates](#) for regular updates.

EMAIL US AT MEDIA@GHF.ORG IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR TO CONFIRM INFORMATION RELATED TO GHF'S HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN GAZA.

###

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Annex 39.

Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, GHF Operational Updates – Friday, August 22,
2025 (22 August 2025).



GHF OPERATIONAL UPDATE – FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 2025

More than 133 million meals distributed to date

More than 1.5 million meals delivered today across three distribution sites

Please follow [@GHFUpdates](https://twitter.com/GHFUpdates) for regular updates.



BY THE NUMBERS

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) continued its operations today to provide vital food aid for the Palestinian people in Gaza. Below is an update on today's operations:

Distributed 26,784 boxes of aid today across three distribution sites:

Location	Truckloads	Boxes	Meals
SDS2 (Saudi Neighborhood)	10	8,640	498,960
SDS3 (Khan Younis)	12	10,368	598,752
SDS4 (Wadi Gaza)	9	7,776	449,064
TOTAL	31	26,784	1,546,776

Today, GHF distributed one truckload of potatoes and one truckload of onions at SDS2 along with four truckloads of potatoes and two truckloads of onions at SDS3 as

part of our ongoing pilot program to provide additional, supplemental food to our established distribution portions and feed more people in Gaza.

In addition to a general food distribution, GHF is conducting a blanket supplemental feeding program (BSFP) to prevent malnutrition for vulnerable women and children using Ready-to-Use Supplemental Food (RUSF). RUSF is formulated to both treat and prevent acute malnutrition in nutritionally vulnerable groups. Today, four pallets (approximately 25,000 individual packs) of RUSF were distributed at SDS2 and SDS3.

Approximately 133,690,266 meals distributed to date via roughly 2,227,960 boxes.

SAFETY/SECURITY

Distributions at all sites ran smoothly today, ensuring the protection of all civilians present.

STATEMENTS FROM GHF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JOHN ACREE

August 22, 2025

“We’ve surpassed more than 133 million meals to date since we began our operations in May. This significant progress is made possible by our brave humanitarian staff who show up each day committed to our mission of feeding as many Gazans as possible.

“While we are always seeking ways to improve our aid delivery, such as our new reservation/distribution system, we cannot do this alone. We continue our call to the international humanitarian community to join us to feed the people of Gaza – we have the operational capacity and scale to deliver more aid.”



Children salute at a GHF distribution site while awaiting food aid.

FROM @GHFUpdates:


Gaza Humanitarian Foundation 



@GHFUpdates · [Follow](#)

This smiling Gazan woman is picking up aid she reserved in advance through our new system.

In response to challenges with our first-come, first-served model, we launched a reservation program that guarantees secure access to aid for women, children, older men, and people with [Show more](#)



8:15 PM · Aug 21, 2025



535



Reply



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Gaza Humanitarian Foundation 


@GHFUpdates · [Follow](#)



Local Gazan workers are essential to our mission.

Because of them, GHF has built trust with the people of Gaza and better systems to meet their needs.

Watch GHF's Executive Director John Acree explain their vital role, and the threats they face from Hamas:



Please follow [@GHFUpdates](#) for regular updates.

PLEASE EMAIL US AT [MEDIA@GHF.ORG](mailto:media@ghf.org) IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR TO CONFIRM INFORMATION RELATED TO GHF'S HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN GAZA.

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Annex 40.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister's Office announcement – 28 July 2025” (28 July 2025).



Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Prime Minister's Office announcement – 28 July 2025



We'll continue to act responsibly, as we always have, and we'll continue to seek the return of our hostages and the defeat of Hamas. That is the only way to secure peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Type: [Press Releases](#) ▪ **Topic:** [Foreign Policy](#), [Terrorism](#) ▪

Secondary topic: [Swords of Iron](#) ▪ **Publish Date:** 28.07.2025

Prime Minister's Office:

Israel will continue to work with international agencies as well as the U.S. and European nations to ensure that large amounts of humanitarian aid flows into the Gaza Strip.

As part of this effort, Israel paused IDF operations in key populated areas of Gaza from 10am to 8pm every day and designated secure routes from 6am to 11pm that will ensure the safe passage of more convoys delivering aid.

We already allow significant amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza every single day, including food, water and medicine.

Unfortunately, Hamas, which openly uses civilians as human shields, operates from hospitals and uses schools and kindergartens to store weapons, has been stealing aid from the Gaza population many times by shooting Palestinians.

While the situation in Gaza is difficult and Israel has been working to ensure aid delivery, Hamas benefits from attempting to fuel the perception of a humanitarian crisis. As such, they have been releasing unverified numbers to the news media while circulating images that are carefully staged or manipulated by Hamas.

We are fighting a just war, a moral war, a war for our survival. No country in the world would allow the continued rule in neighboring territory of a terror group bent on its destruction that already stormed across its borders in a genocidal attack, as Hamas did on Oct 7 when it butchered

over 1,200 innocent people, burning babies alive and slaughtering teenagers at a music festival. Hamas boasts they will repeat the Oct 7 massacre over and over.

We'll continue to act responsibly, as we always have, and we'll continue to seek the return of our hostages and the defeat of Hamas. That is the only way to secure peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike.



Please note, if there is any difference or conflict between the information on this page and the law, the provisions of the law will apply.

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Annex 41.

Internal COGAT summary of a meeting with UN representatives

Explanatory Note

Internal COGAT summary of a meeting with UN representatives

This document contains screenshots of a message from an internal COGAT group chat. This message provides a summary of a coordination meeting with UN representatives that took place on 1 July 2025. The group chat is used to provide updates between all relevant COGAT officers regarding meetings with various international actors and the humanitarian efforts.

In the example provided, UN officials and COGAT officers discussed various humanitarian efforts that were underway on that day, the planning for the coming days and challenges and solutions that could be implemented.

These sections have been redacted due to including personal details of all group members (e.g. phone numbers) impertinent to the document's substance.

English Translation

1.7.2025

7/1/25, 10:04 PM - [REDACTED]: Summary of the daily humanitarian planning meeting with the UN 1 July 2025:

Today (01/07), a humanitarian planning meeting was held with the UN, led by the head of the International Cooperation Branch. Participants included the Deputy Head of the Civilian Planning Branch, International Cooperation Officer, Head of the International Cooperation Section in the CLA, Commander of the Kerem Shalom crossing and Commander of the Economic Center. Participants from the UN side were representatives of the Logistics Cluster, WFP, WHO, UNICEF and UNOPS.

Daily crossing summary:

During the day, 23 complementary-response trucks entered the Strip — 22 of WFP and one of WCK — all carrying food.

During the day, 41 trucks were picked up, all from the Kerem Shalom crossing, all via the “Burma” route and “Gate 96” — 36 belonging to WFP and 5 to WCK (the plan was to pick up 44 but 3 trucks got stuck enroute). The WFP representative noted that all trucks were looted in a “friendly and pleasant manner”.

On the red [*enemy*] side of Kerem Shalom around 300 trucks are waiting to be picked up.

Additional issues:

- It was noted that during the day an empty ANERA truck that got stuck on the blue [*Israeli*] side was returned to the Gaza Strip.

Tomorrow’s plan:

Tomorrow, 36 trucks are expected to enter the Gaza Strip — 24 belonging to WFP (15 trucks from Ashdod and 9 from Jordan), 6 belonging to the UAE (all from Israel), 4 trucks carrying baby-food belonging to UNICEF (all from Ashdod), and 2 belonging to the WCK (all from Israel).

In addition, there is a plan to pick up around 100 trucks tomorrow, out of which approximately 70 belonging to WFP, for pickup and movement via “Tencher” route, and 15 for movement on “Burma”—[“Gate”] 96.

Other topics:

- In response to a question from UNICEF’s representative regarding the entrance of aid via the Tarqumiya crossing, it was mentioned that the crossing is expected to open on Sunday, so it will not be possible to bring aid through it, although there are other alternative crossings.

WFP representative remarks:

Translation

- The agency representative asked to make sure that truck convoys are released on time from the Netzarim corridor, out of concern for local population crowding and widespread looting that could endanger the agency's drivers and even the local population.

UNOPS representative remarks:

- At present, there are approximately 100,211 liters of diesel and 3,233 liters of gasoline that are accessible.
- Additionally, 1,243,773 liters of diesel and 468 liters of gasoline are not accessible.
- During the day, 21,490 liters of diesel and 50 liters of gasoline were distributed.
- Plan for tomorrow — tomorrow about 91,130 liters of diesel are expected to be transferred from south to north.
- It was noted that there are around one million liters at the power plant. However, they have not yet managed to receive approval from the power plant owners to collect the fuels from there.

UNICEF representative remarks:

- The agency is working to release additional containers waiting at Ashdod Port in order to bring them into the Gaza Strip soon.
- There is special high-nutrition food that the agency wishes to bring in — this aid must not be looted given the sensitivity and importance of the food. They ask to examine changing the pickup routes for this food. The head of the International Cooperation Branch replied that in a meeting this week with the UN, it was agreed that UNICEF will examine integrating the sensitive food in medical equipment trucks, since medical equipment trucks are usually not looted.

WHO representative remarks:

- A medical evacuation tomorrow of around 120 patients and their companions is expected tomorrow. During the day, some of the patients were transferred from Shifa Hospital to Al-Mawasi.
- They noted that during the transfer of patients and companions from north to south there were many delays, and the movement took around three hours in total.
- During today's visit to Shifa Hospital, it was noted that the dialysis department is expected to cease operating in about two days due to fuel shortages.
- It was also noted that Shifa Hospital is above full capacity, and therefore some patients are lying on the floor. Accordingly, they wish to transfer beds from the European Hospital to Shifa. In response, the Head of the International Cooperation Section in the CLA noted that our forces are operating in the European Hospital area — and that if possible, the movement will be coordinated. Furthermore, the head of the International Cooperation Branch noted that it is possible to bring in necessary medical equipment from Israel or the West Bank.
- The agency is expected to bring in 8 medical equipment trucks in the near future.

Translation

- They also want to bring in medical equipment and medicine from Egypt in the near future.

Summary by the Head of the International Cooperation Branch:

- The Head of the International Cooperation Branch emphasized the importance of these meetings, for end-of-day summary, synchronizing efforts, coordination and alignment of data, and planning for the next day.
- During the day there was turnover of [*humanitarian aid*] workers with permits—without unusual events.
- Also, the Deputy Head of Global WFP entered the Gaza Strip today, together with 5 suitcases of food for the agency's staff.
- The Zikim crossing remains closed at present due to the takeover by gunmen associated with Hamas of the aid that entered last week through this crossing (both UAE aid that entered via ANERA and WFP aid) — this is unacceptable and the crossing will not open until a solution is found.
- Regarding the fuel, there is a mechanism in the process of formulation — the UN will receive an update soon on a date for fuel entry.
- The head of the Branch emphasized that our pickup target is 100 trucks per day, and clarified that there is no limitation and even more is possible and therefore asked all participants to work together towards this goal.


Original Document

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

סיכום פגישת תכנון הומניטרי יומית

עם האו"ם 01/07/2025:  

היום (01/07), התקיימה פגישת התכנון ההומניטרי עם האו"ם, בר' רע"ן קש"ח בה השתתפו ס' רע"ן תכנון אזרחי, קמ"ד קש"ח, רמ"ד קש"ח מת"ק עזה, מפקד מעבר כרמ"ש ומפקד מוקד כלכלי, ומצד האו"ם השתתפו נציגי האשכול הלוגיסטי, WFP, WHO, UNICEF ו-WFP, UNOPS.

סיכום מעברים יומי: 

במהלך היום נכנסו לרצועה 23 משאיות מענה משלים - 22 של סוכנות WFP ואחת של ארגון WCK - כולן מזון.

במהלך היום נאספו 41 משאיות, כולן ממעבר כרמ"ש, כולן דרך ציר בורמה ושער 96 - 36 של סוכנות WFP ו- 5 של ארגון WCK (היה תכנון לאיסוף 44 אך 3 משאיות נתקעו בדרך). צויין ע"י נציגת WFP כי כלל המשאיות נבזזו באופן "ידידותי ונעים". בצד האדום של מעבר כרמ"ש

הודעה 

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

בצד האדום של מעבר כרמ"ש
ממתינות להיאסף כ- 300 משאיות.

נושאים נוספים:

- צויין כי במהלך היום הוחזרה לרצ"ע משאית ריקה של ארגון ANERA אשר נתקעה בצד הכחול.

תכנון למחר: 🚚

מחר, צפויות להיכנס לרצ"ע 36 משאיות - 24 של סוכנות WFP (מאשדוד 15 משאיות ומירדן 9), 6 של איחוד האמירויות (כולן מישראל), 4 משאיות מזון לתינוקות של סוכנות UNICEF (כולן מאשדוד) ו- 2 של ארגון WCK (כולן מישראל).
כמו כן, קיים תכנון לאיסוף כ- 100 משאיות מחר, מתוכן כ- 70 של סוכנות WFP לאיסוף ותנועה דרך טנצר ו-15 לתנועה על בורמה-96.

נושאים נוספים:

- לשאלת נציג UNICEF אודות הכנסת סיוע דרך מעבר תרקומיא, הושב כי המעבר צפוי להיפתח רק ביום ראשון, על כן לא ניתן יהיה להכניס דרכו סיוע, אם כי קיימים

מערבית נוספים בפליטה ומשירות




הודעה




מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

להכניס דרכו סיוע, אם כי קיימים מעברים נוספים כחלופה אפשרית.

דברי נציגת WFP: 

- נציגת הסוכנות ביקשה לשים דגש על תזמון שחרור שיירות המשאיות מציר נצרים, מחשש להתקהלות האוכלוסייה המקומית ולביזה בהיקפים נרחבים אשר עלולה לסכן את נהגי הסוכנות ואף את האוכלוסייה המקומית.

דברי נציג UNOPS: 

- בעת הנוכחית, ישנם כ- 100,211 ליטר דיזל ו- 3,233 ליטר בנזין אשר נגישים.
- כמו כן, 1,243,773 דיזל ו- 468 ליטר בנזין אינם נגישים.
- במהלך היום חולקו 21,490 ליטר דיזל ו- 50 ליטר בנזין.
- תכנון למחר - מחר צפויים להעביר כ- 91,130 ליטר דיזל מדרום לצפון.
- צויין כי ישנם כמיליון ליטר בתחנת הכוח. יחד עם זאת טרם הצליחו לקבל אישור לאסוף את הדלקים משם מבעלי תחנת הכוח.

הודעה



מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

דברי נציג UNICEF:

- הסוכנות פועלת לשחרור קונטיינרים נוספים אשר ממתינים בנמל אשדוד במטרה להכניסם לרצ"ע בקרוב.
- ישנו מזון מיוחד עתירי תזונה אשר הסוכנות מעוניינת להכניס - אסור שסיוע זה ייבזז לאור רגישות וחשיבות המזון. הנ"ל מבקשים לבחון שינוי בנתיבי האיסוף של מזון זה. רע"ן קש"ח השיב כי במהלך פגישה השבוע עם האו"ם, סוכם כי הסוכנות תבחן לשלב משאיות צר"פ עם מזון רגיש, היות ומשאיות צר"פ לא נבזזות לרוב.

דברי נציג WHO:

- צפויים לקיים פינוי רפואי מחר של כ- 120 חולים ומלווים. במהלך היום העבירו חלק מהחולים למוואסי מביה"ח שיפאא.
- ציינו כי במהלך ההעברה של החולים והמלווים מצפון לדרום היו עיכובים רבים, והתנועה ארכה כשלוש שעות בסה"כ.
- במהלך הביקור היום בביה"ח שפיאא, עלה כי מחלקת הדיאליזה


הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

- היום העבירו חלק מהחולים למוואסי מביה"ח שיפאא.
- ציינו כי במהלך ההעברה של החולים והמלווים מצפון לדרום היו עיכובים רבים, והתנועה ארכה כשלוש שעות בסה"כ.
- במהלך הביקור היום בביה"ח שפיאא, עלה כי מחלקת הדיאליזה צפויה להפסיק לפעול בעוד כיומיים לאור המחסור בדלקים.
- כמו כן, צויין כי ביה"ח שיפאא נמצא מעבר לתפוסה מלאה, ועל כן חלק מהחולים שוכבים על הרצפה. אי לכך, מעוניינים להעביר מיטות מביה"ח האירופאי לשיפאא. בתגובה, רמ"ד קש"ח מת"ק עזה ציינה כי כוחותינו פועלים באזור ביה"ח האירופאי - ככל שיתאפשר התנועה תתואם.
- כמו כן, רע"ן קש"ח ציין שקיימת אפשרות להכניס ציוד רפואי נדרש מישראל או מאיו"ש.
- הסוכנות צפויה להכניס 8 משאיות צר"פ בתקופה הקרובה.
- כמו כן, הנ"ל מעוניינים להכניס צר"פ ותרופות ממצרים בתקופה הקרובה.

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

סיכום רע"ן קש"ח: 

- רע"ן קש"ח הדגיש את חשיבות פגישות אלו, לצורך סיכום היום, סנכרון מאמצים, תיאום ויישור קו על הנתונים, ותכנון ליום המחרת.
- במהלך היום התקיימה תחלופת כ"או בעלי אשרות - ללא אירועים חריגים.
- כמו כן, היום נכנס ס' ר' WFP העולמי לרצ"ע, יחד עם 5 מזוודות מזון לעובדי הסוכנות.
- מעבר זיקים נשאר סגור גם כעת לאור השתלטות חמושים הקשורים לחמאס על הסיוע אשר הוכנס בשבוע שעבר דרך מעבר זה (הן סיוע אמירתי שהוכנס באמצעות ארגון ANERA והן סיוע של WFP) - דבר זה אינו מקובל והמעבר לא יפתח עד למציאת פתרון.
- בהקשר הדלקים, ישנו מנגנון אשר נמצא בתהליך גיבוש - האו"ם יקבלו עדכון בקרוב אודות תאריך להכנסת הדלקים.
- רע"ן קש"ח הדגיש, כי אנו מעוניינים להגיע ליעד איסוף של 100 משאיות ביום, והבהיר כי אין הגבלה וניתן אף יותר ועל כן ביקש

הודעה 

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

פגישות אלו, לצורך סיכום היום, סנכרון מאמצים, תיאום ויישור קו על הנתונים, ותכנון ליום המחרת.

- במהלך היום התקיימה תחלופת כ"או בעלי אשרות - ללא אירועים חריגים.

- כמו כן, היום נכנס ס' ר' WFP העולמי לרצ"ע, יחד עם 5 מזוודות מזון לעובדי הסוכנות.

- מעבר זיקים נשאר סגור גם כעת לאור השתלטות חמושים הקשורים לחמאס על הסיוע אשר הוכנס בשבוע שעבר דרך מעבר זה (הן סיוע אמירתי שהוכנס באמצעות ארגון ANERA והן סיוע של WFP) - דבר זה אינו מקובל והמעבר לא יפתח עד למציאת פתרון.

- בהקשר הדלקים, ישנו מנגנון אשר נמצא בתהליך גיבוש - האו"ם יקבלו עדכון בקרוב אודות תאריך להכנסת הדלקים.

- רע"ן קש"ח הדגיש, כי אנו מעוניינים להגיע ליעד איסוף של 100 משאיות ביום, והבהיר כי אין הגבלה וניתן אף יותר ועל כן ביקש מכלל המשתתפים לפעול יחד לשם כך.

22:04

הודעה

Annex 42.

Internal COGAT summary of a meeting with the head of WCK

Explanatory Note

Internal COGAT summary of a meeting with the head of WCK

This document contains screenshots of a message from an internal COGAT group chat. This message provides a summary of a coordination meeting with the head of the World Central Kitchen that took place on 7 August 2025. The group chat is used to provide updates between all relevant COGAT officers regarding meetings with various international actors and the humanitarian efforts.

In the example provided, The Head of the COGAT's Civilian Department met with the Head of WCK to discuss the operation of the organization in Gaza, challenges faced by the organization and possible solutions that could be implemented.

These sections have been redacted due to including personal details of all group members (e.g. phone numbers) impertinent to the document's substance.

English Translation

Excerpt 10

7.8.2025

8/10/25, 7:12 PM – [REDACTED]: **Summary of the meeting of the Head of COGAT's Civil Affairs Department with the head of the global WCK organization on 07 August 2025:**

On 7 August 2025, a meeting was held between the head of COGAT's Civil Affairs Department and the head of Global WCK aiming to prompt the organization to increase its activity in the Strip, following the Head of COGAT's meeting with the head of the organization on 3 August 2025.

The main points raised by the organization:

- a. The head of the organization noted that at present time, the organization's main goal is to increase its activity with an aim of supplying one million food portions per day.
- b. It was noted that the organization encounters looting, mainly in the northern part of the Strip, while in the south they usually succeed in collecting aid without problems.
- c. It was emphasized that successful collection depends on the flexibility of the CLA regarding convoy size, routes and pick-up hours – such flexibility allows operations to succeed. They also mentioned that their independence from the UN and their ability to transfer convoys independently are critical for their success in collecting [aid], since WFP convoys are often looted.
- d. After the [Civil Affairs] Department Head emphasized that we [COGAT] will not accept any contact between the organization and Hamas, the head of the organization stated they do not have contact with Hamas and do not intend to have any such contact in the future.
- e. In response to the [Civil Affairs] Department Head question regarding the looting incident that the organization encountered, it was noted that looting is usually carried out by the population and not by gunmen.
- f. The organization representative requested to transfer the aid within the Strip (regardless of its collection from the crossings) with small closed trucks — which, in their view, will reduce looting incidents.
- g. The organization's operations in the Strip – operating 2 kitchens and a mobile bakery, all in Deir El-Balah, supplying 120,000 meals and 42,000 pita bread per day.
- h. As an alternative to UN collection from Zikim crossing, the organization wishes to provide COGAT with a list of partners that, in their opinion, are known to COGAT, and wish to support the organization in collecting aid in the Northern [part of Gaza].
- i. It was noted that the organization faces a shortage of spare parts for trucks used by them – it was agreed the organization will send a list which the [Civil Affairs] Department Head will review individually.

j. In response to a question by the head [*Civil Affairs*] Department, the organization noted that most of the aid that enters is purchased in Israel, except the aid to Zikim [*crossing*], which arrives from Jordan. In addition, it was stated that they also wish to bring aid to the Northern [*part of Gaza*] via additional routes, not only from Jordan.

k. The organization wishes to bring in potatoes and fresh meat into the Strip. In response, the head of the Civil Affairs Department mentioned that fresh/frozen meat is not likely to be included in the policy; however, it will probably be possible to bring in canned meat and potatoes may be possible.

l. The organization wishes to examine bringing ships to Ashdod Port with large quantities of aid for the Strip.

m. They asked to prioritize the entry of their aid from Egypt. According to them, there is aid worth 11 million dollars in Egypt that includes spare parts for trucks, firewood and more, that they wish to bring in as soon as possible. The head of the Civil Affairs Department replied he will discuss this with the Egyptians.

n. Fuel — [*the head of the organization*] asked to examine independent entry of fuel. Currently the organization needs 30,000 liters of diesel per week, and if their activity increases, they will need up to 90,000 liters per week.

o. It was noted that the organization's ultimate goal is to enable Gazans [*to receive*] aid supplies independently, without dependence on international actors.

The main points from the head of the Civil Affairs Department:

a. The head of the Civil Affairs Department presented the main elements of the current humanitarian situational assessment in the Strip – increasing aid, activating “Kelah” electric line, the UAE water pipeline, repairing water lines from Israel, improving communications coverage up to 90% and more.

b. He noted that since 21 July 2025 humanitarian aid entrance increased to 300 trucks per day, through opening of additional aid entrance routes, facilitating the Egyptian customs process, airdrops, entrance of aid through the private sector (under restrictive conditions and tight monitoring) and more. These efforts aim to flood the Gaza Strip with aid and stabilize the humanitarian situation.

c. He noted that the understanding is that the humanitarian situation in the northern part of the Strip is more complex, mainly due to the many looting incidents which occur there and the unstable access routes – work is underway to find new transport routes.

d. He emphasized that the link between the organization and the Gaza CLA with respect to movements inside the strip is extremely important, and it should be continuously implemented. In addition, he offered to establish a joint working group – COGAT-CLA-WCK regarding the collection of aid from the crossings.

- e. He proposed to examine the transfer of aid from the South to the North of the Strip — it was agreed the organization will send an operational plan.
- f. He emphasized that cooperation with Hamas is a red line, and thanked the head of the organization for saying they will not cooperate with Hamas.
- g. He emphasized the importance of collecting aid from the crossings – a precondition for the continued success of aid entry.
- i. He praised that the organization and said that WCK and WFP are the main humanitarian actors currently in the Strip, and he hopes that would continue, all while increasing their activity and collecting from the crossings. In addition, it was mentioned that as long as they continue to operate and increase their activity, they will be prioritized in the entrance of aid through the various routes.
- j. He noted that if the operation of positive organizations like WCK and WFP will continue to grow, then the entry of aid by the private sector will minimize and might even cease, from the Egyptian and even the Jordanian route.
- k. In the view of the department aid the solution for the looting incidents is flooding the strip with aid.
- l. It is expected that in the upcoming weeks, prices will be significantly lowered in the markets – a precondition we [COGAT] set for the merchants who bring [aid] in as part of the private sector.
- m. Internal planning is underway to the aid policy – it should be published in the coming weeks.
- n. It was noted that in the last few weeks, 25 different request to allow the entrance of spare parts to the Gaza Strip in order to operationalize 250 trucks were approves, while the entrance of 50 empty trucks by Egypt and dozens by WFP was also approved, in order to increase the logistical capability in the Gaza Strip.
- o. As an answer to the organization’s question regarding buying from Israeli suppliers, it was mentioned that t work in currently underway with the Ministry of Finance in order to agree upon a list of approved suppliers from which aid can be brought.
- p. The head of the Civil Affairs Department mentioned that eases in the customs proceedings for the organization through the Egyptian route will be examined.
- q. The main goal is the operationalization of all the kitchens and bakeries in the Gaza Strip is that in a few month and the entrance of 300 trucks per day, without trucks from Judea and Samaria or private sector.
- r. Regarding the organization, the main goal is to multiply its operation within the upcoming month.
- s. Regarding the organization’s question on the distribution centers, it was mentioned that it is just a tool to provide aid while preventing the aid to reach Hamas, and not the

goal by itself. If the international organization will increase their activity while preventing Hamas taking control of the aid, the existing mechanisms can change.

t. It was mentioned that the organizations that have gone through the registration process can operate in the Gaza Strip, similar to how the organization operated in the past.

The following was agreed:

a. The organization will bring forth a plan for operationalizing all its kitchens, including all their needs.

b. A plan will be brought forth for transferring aid from the south to the north.

c. An additional plan will be presented to improve the organization's logistical capabilities inside the Strip.

d. It was emphasized that many things were approved for the organization during the meeting and that the burden of proof is now on them — increasing activity and increasing collection from the crossings.

Original Document

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ...
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

סיכום פגישת רמ"ח אזרחית עם
ר' ארגון WCK העולמי בתאריך
:07/08/2025

בתאריך ה- 07/08/2025, התקיימה
פגישת רמ"ח אזרחית עם ר' WCK
העולמי במטרה לרתום את הארגון
להגברת פעילות ברצועה וע"ר
פגישת המתאם עם ר' הארגון ב-
03/08/2025.

להלן עיקרי הדברים שעלו מצד
הארגון:

א. ר' הארגון ציין כי המטרה המרכזית
של הארגון בעת הנוכחית הינה הגברת
פעילות עד לכדי אספקת מיליון מנות
מזון ביום.

ב. ציינו כי הארגון נתקל באירועי ביזה
בעיקר בצפון הרצועה, בעוד בדרומה
מצליחים לאסוף סיוע ללא בעיות
לרוב.

ג. הדגישו כי הצלחת האיסוף תלויה
בגמישות המת"ק בגודל השיירות, צירי
גישה ושעות האיסוף - ככל וזה קורה,
האיסוף מתבצע בהצלחה. כמו כן,
ציינו כי חוסר התלות באו"ם וביצוע

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

ציינו כי חוסר התלות באו"ם וביצוע שיירות באופן עצמאי מהווה גורם קריטי להצלחת האיסוף, היות ושיירות WFP נבזזות לרוב.

ד. לאחר הדגשת רמ"ח אזרחית כי לא נקבל כל קשר של ארגון עם חמאס, ציין ר' הארגון כי הנ"ל אינם עומדים בקשר עם החמאס ואינם מעוניינים לקיים קשר כזה בעתיד.

ה. לשאלת רמ"ח אזרחית בנוגע לאירועי הביזה בהם הארגון נתקל, צוין כי לרוב הביזה מבוצעת ע"י האוכלוסייה ולא ע"י חמושים.

ו. ביקשו לשנע את הסיוע בתוך הרצועה (ללא קשר לאיסוף

מהמעברים) עם משאיות סגורות קטנות - יקטין את אירועי הביזה לטענתם.

ז. פעילות הארגון ברצועה - הפעלת 2 מטבחים ומאפייה ניידת, כולם בדיר אל באלח, אשר מספקים 120,000 מנות ו- 42,000 פיתות ביום.

ח. כחלופה לאיסוף הסיוע ממעבר זיקים ע"י האו"ם, הארגון מעוניין

להעביר רשימת שותפים אשר פועלים ברצועה אשר מוכרים לטענתם למתפ"ש אשר ברצונם לתמוך את

הארגון באותם הסיוע בצפון



הודעה



מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

למתפ"ש אשר ברצונם לתמוך את הארגון באיסוף הסיוע בצפון. ט. צוין כי הארגון נתקל במחסור בחלקי חילוף למשאיות אשר משמשות אותם - סוכם כי הארגון יעביר רשימה אשר רמ"ח אזרחית יבחן באופן פרטני. י. לשאלת רמ"ח אזרחית, צוין ע"י הארגון כי מרבית הסיוע אשר מכניסים נרכש בישראל, מלבד הסיוע לזיקים, אשר מגיע מירדן. כמו כן, צוין כי מעוניינים להביא סיוע לצפון גם מצירים נוספים, מלבד מירדן. יא. הארגון מעוניין להכניס תפוחי אדמה ובשר טרי לרצועה - בתגובה, רמ"ח אזרחית ציין כי בשר טרי/קפוא לא צפוי להיות במדיניות, אך יחד עם זאת ככל הנראה תהיינה אפשרות להכניס בשר בשימורים ותפוחי אדמה.

יב. הארגון מעוניין לבחון הבאת ספינות לנמל אשדוד עם סיוע רב לרצועה. יג. ביקשו לתעדף את הכנסת הסיוע שלהם ממצרים. לדבריהם, ישנו סיוע בשווי 11 מיליון דולר במצרים הכולל חלקי חילוף למשאיות, עצים להסקה ועוד אשר מעוניינים להכניס בהקדם -

רמ"ח אזרחית

הודעה



מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

רמ"ח אזרחית השיב כי יקיים שיח עם המצרים בנדון.
יד. דלקים - ביקשו לבחון הכנסת דלקים באופן עצמאי. בעת הנוכחית צריכים 30,000 ליטר סולר בשבוע, וככל שיגבירו פעילות יצטרכו אף 90,000 ליטר בשבוע.
טו. צוין כי מטרת הארגון בסופו של יום הינה לאפשר לעזתים לספק סיוע באופן עצמאי, ללא תלות בגורמים בינ"ל.

להלן עיקרי דברי רמ"ח אזרחית:
א. רמ"ח אזרחית סקר את עיקרי תמונת המצב ההומניטרית ברצועה בעת הנוכחית - הגברת הסיוע, חשמול קו קלע, קו המים האמירתי, תיקון קווי המים מישראל, שיפור הכיסוי התקשורתי עד לכדי 90% ועוד.
ב. ציין כי החל מה- 21/07/2025 הוגבר הסיוע ההומניטרי עד לכדי הכנסת 300 משאיות ביום, באמצעות פתיחת צירי הכנסת סיוע נוספים, הקלה על ההליך המכסי ממצרים, הצנחות סיוע, הכנסת סיוע ע"י הסקטור הפרטי (תחת תנאים מחמירים ופיקוח הדוק) ועוד, במטרה

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

להציף את רצ"ע בסיוע ולייצב את תמונת המצב ההומניטרית. ג. ציין כי ההבנה היא שהמצב ההומניטרי בצפון הרצועה מורכב יותר מבדרום, בעיקר לאור אירועי הביזה הרבים אשר מתרחשים שם וצירי הגישה הרעועים - מתבצעת עבודה למציאת צירי תנועה חדשים. ד. הדגיש כי הקשר בין הארגון למת"ק עזה בהקשר התנועות הפנים-רצועתיות חשוב ביותר, וכי יש להמשיך לקיימו. כמו כן, הציע לקיים קבוצת עבודה משותפת - מתפ"ש-מת"ק-WCK בנוגע לאיסוף הסיוע מהמעברים. ה. הציע לבחון העברת סיוע לצפון מדרום הרצועה - סוכם כי הארגון יעביר תוכנית פעולה. ו. הדגיש כי שיתוף פעולה עם חמאס מהווה קו אדום, והודה לר' הארגון על אמירתו שלא ישתף פעולה עם חמאס. ז. הדגיש את חשיבות איסוף הסיוע מהמעברים - תנאי סף להמשך הצלחת הכנסת הסיוע. ח. ציין לחיוב את הארגון ואמר כי WCK ו-WFP משמשים כשחקנים ההומניטריים המרכזיים ברצועה בעת

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ...
[REDACTED]

הנוכחית, וכך גם רוצה שימשיך, במקביל להגברת פעילות והאיסוף מהמעברים. כמו כן, צוין כי ככל וימשיכו לפעול ויגבירו פעילות יקבלו תיעדוף להכנסת סיוע בצירים השונים. ט. הודגש כי ככל ופעילות ארגונים חיוביים, כמו WCK ו-WFP, תמשיך ותגדל, כך גם תקטן עד לכדי תבוטל הכנסת הסיוע ע"י הסקטור הפרטי, מהציר המצרי ואף מהציר הירדני. י. בראיית הרמ"ח, הפתרון לאירועי הביזה הינו הצפת הרצועה בסיוע. יא. צפויה ירידת מחירים משמעותית בשווקים בשבועיים הקרובים - תנאי סף שהצבנו לסוחרים אשר מכניסים כחלק מהסקטור הפרטי. יב. מתבצע עמ"ט להסדרת מדיניות הסיוע - צפוי להתפרסם בשבועות הקרובים. יג. צוין כי אושרו במהלך השבועות האחרונים 25 בקשות שונות להכנסת חלקי חילוף לרצ"ע במטרה להכשיר 250 משאיות, זאת במקביל לאישור הכנסת 50 משאיות ריקות ע"י המצרים ועשרות נוספות ע"י WFP, במטרה להגביר את היכולות הלוגיסטיות ברצועה.

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

יד. לשאלת הארגון בנוגע לרכש מספקים בישראל, נמסר כי מתבצעת עבודה בעת הנוכחית עם משרד האוצר על מנת לגבש רשימת ספקים מורשים אשר מהם ניתן יהיה לרכוש סיוע.

טו. רמ"ח אזרחית ציין כי יבחן הקלות בהליך המכסי בציר המצרי לארגון. טז. המטרה העילאית הינה הפעלת כלל המטבחים והמאפיות ברצ"ע בתוך מספר חודשים והכנסת 300 משאיות ביום, ללא משאיות מאיו"ש וללא הסקטור הפרטי.

יז. לגבי הארגון, המטרה העילאית הינה הכפלת המענה אשר ניתן על ידה בתוך כחודש.

יח. לשאלת הארגון לגבי המחפ"זים, צוין כי מדובר בכלי לאספקת סיוע תוך מניעת הגעתו לחמאס ולא המטרה. ככל והארגונים הבינ"ל יגבירו את פעילותם, תוך מניעת השתלטות החמאס על הסיוע כך גם מנגנונים קיימים עשויים להשתנות.

יט. צוין כי רק ארגונים אשר עברו הליך רישום/רישוי יוכלו לפעול ברצועה, בדומה להליך אשר הארגון עבר.

לכל עזרה בדרכים ושירותים

הודעה

מחלקה אזרחית- מפ... →

הכפלת המענה אשר ניתן על ידה בתוך כחודש.
יח. לשאלת הארגון לגבי המחפ"זים, צוין כי מדובר בכלי לאספקת סיוע תוך מניעת הגעתו לחמאס ולא המטרה.
ככל והארגונים הבינ"ל יגבירו את פעילותם, תוך מניעת השתלטות החמאס על הסיוע כך גם מנגנונים קיימים עשויים להשתנות.
יט. צוין כי רק ארגונים אשר עברו הליך רישום/רישוי יוכלו לפעול ברצועה, בדומה להליך אשר הארגון עבר.

להלן עיקרי הדברים שסוכמו:
א. הארגון יעביר תוכנית להפעלת כלל המטבחים אשר ברשותם הכוללת את כל צרכיהם.
ב. תועבר תוכנית להעברת סיוע מהדרום לצפון.
ג. תועבר תוכנית נוספת לשיפור היכולות הלוגיסטיות של הארגון בתוך הרצועה.
ד. הודגש כי במהלך הפגישה אושרו לארגון דברים רבים וכי כעת חובת ההוכחה עליהם - הגברת הפעילות והגברת האיסוף מהמעברים.

19:12




הודעה



Annex 43.

Prime Minister of Israel, @IsraeliPM, X (formerly Twitter) (8:59 pm, 28 July 2025).

← Post

Prime Minister of Israel 
 @IsraeliPM



Israel will continue to work with international agencies as well as the U.S. and European nations to ensure that large amounts of humanitarian aid flows into the Gaza Strip.

8:59 PM · Jul 28, 2025 · 79.7K Views

 336  256  1.1K  46 

Post your reply

Reply

Prime Minister of Israel  @IsraeliPM · Jul 28



As part of this effort, Israel paused IDF operations in key populated areas of Gaza from 10am to 8 pm every day and designated secure routes from 6am to 11pm that will ensure the safe passage of more convoys delivering aid.

 13  11  72  4.4K  

Prime Minister of Israel  @IsraeliPM · Jul 28



We already allow significant amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza every single day, including food, water and medicine.

 9  11  67  4.1K  

Annex 44.

COGAT order – coordination of entry of dual-use equipment for the UAE
Rafah water pipeline project on 27 July 2025.

Explanatory Note

COGAT order – coordination of entry of dual-use equipment for the UAE Rafah water pipeline project on 27 July 2025

This document contains details regarding the coordination of the entry of equipment for use in the UAE Rafah Water Pipeline Project, which occurred on 27 July 2025. The document contains redacted sections. Redacted sections include personal details of truck drivers (e.g. phone numbers, ID), impertinent to the document's substance.

English Translation

**Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
Civilian Department**

Re: Coordinating the Entry of Dual-Use Equipment for the UAE's Rafah Water Pipeline 27 July 2025

1. General:

1. In the context of the UAE's Rafah Water Pipeline, the entry of dual-use equipment through Egypt has been approved ("Gate 38").
2. On Monday, 27 July 2025, **25 trucks from Egypt** are expected to arrive at the Kerem Shalom crossing, carrying equipment for the aforementioned project.

2. Method:

1. The trucks will pass through "Gate 38" to the Kerem Shalom crossing, at **08:00** for security screening.
2. Afterwards, collection of the equipment will ensue, from red [*enemy*] territory (coordination is under the responsibility of the CLA [*Coordination and Liaison Administration*]).
3. Route: Egypt -> "Gate 38" -> Kerem Shalom -> a warehouse agreed upon with the contractor.

3. Additional Points of Emphasis:

1. It is the CLA's responsibility to coordinate a transportation route from Kerem Shalom to the warehouse agreed upon with the contractor.
2. It is the CLA's responsibility to coordinate the entry of trucks from Egypt to Kerem Shalom.
3. It is the CLA's responsibility to coordinate [*the presence*] of an engineer at the crossing.

4. "Yuval" [*identification system*] numbers for equipment requiring approval:

- 1051795, approval date: 05.01.2025
- 1052330, approval date: 05.01.2025
- 1057962, approval date 30.06.2025
- 1058121, approval date 30.06.2025
- 1058122, approval date 30.06.2025

4. Details of drivers and trucks on the Egyptian side:

Serial #	Full name	Phone #	ID	Vehicle #	Towed baggage
1-25.	[REDACTED]				

Translation

Annex A – Equipment Details

[See original in English]

Original Document



תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אזרחית

הנדון: תיאום כניסת ציוד דו"ש לפרויקט קו המים האמירתי ברפיח 27/07/2025

1. כללי:

1. במסגרת פרויקט קו המים האמירתי ברפיח, אושרה הכנסת ציוד דו"ש דרך מצרים (שער 38).
2. ביום שני ה-27/07/2025 צפויות להגיע למעבר כרמ"ש 25 משאיות ממצרים המכילות ציוד לפרויקט הנ"ל.

2. שיטה:

1. המשאיות יעברו דרך שער 38 למעבר כרמ"ש בשעה 08:00 לצורך בידוק.
2. לאחר מכן, יתבצע איסוף הציוד מהצד האדום (תיאום באחריות מת"ק עזה).
3. מסלול: מצרים <-- שער 38 <-- כרמ"ש <-- מחסן שאושר מול הקבלן.

3. דגשים נוספים:

1. באחריות מת"ק עזה לתאם ציר תנועה מכרמ"ש למחסן שאושר מול הקבלן.
2. באחריות מת"ק עזה לתאם את כניסת המשאיות ממצרים לכרמ"ש.
3. באחריות מת"ק עזה לתאם מהנדס במעבר.

4. מס' יובל לציוד הנדרש בהיתר:

- 1051795, תאריך אישור: 05.01.2025
- 1052330, תאריך אישור: 05.01.2025
- 1057962, תאריך אישור 30.06.2025
- 1058121, תאריך אישור 30.06.2025
- 1058122, תאריך אישור 30.06.2025

4. פרטי נהגים ומשאיות בצד המצרי:

מס"ד	שם מלא	מס"ט	ת"ז	ל"ז	נגרר
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
7	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
8	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
9	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
11	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]



תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אזרחית

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תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אזורית

נספח א'- פרטי הציוד



**תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אורחית**

Truck #1			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports, Manhole 1.5 meter with 1 meter high	Emergency Response Project		20	 
Truck #2			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports, Manhole 1.5 meter with 1 meter high	Emergency Response Project		20	 
Truck #3			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports, Manhole 1.5 meter with 1 meter high	Emergency Response Project		20	 
Truck #4			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports, Manhole 1.5 meter with 1 meter high	Emergency Response Project		20	 
Truck #5			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports,	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #6			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports,	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #7			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports,	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #8			Truck	שליפה
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
Steel water tanks supports, Linen hosepipe 2" with threaded heads diameter L= 15m, Steel Welding Rods 2.5mm, Teflon sealing tape, Washer for cooper nipple 3/4 inch., Sandwish Wood Plate 2.44m*1.2m with 2.5cm thick., Double fire hydrant	Emergency Response Project		20	      



תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אורחית

Truck #9			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes, fittings, Steel water tanks supports, and Manhole Cover	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #10			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE Fittings, Valves, HDPE welding machine, Weldig Machie, Socet flage, Tapping saddle, Pipe P 10 L100 meter	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #11			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
20 Ton cement, PPR fitting , HDPE hosepipe 50mm/2inch., Repair Collar , Stainless steel Band	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #12			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #13			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #14			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #15			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #16			Truck	شاحنة
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	



תיאום פעולות הממשלה בשטחים
מחלקה אורחית

Truck #17			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #18			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #19			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #20			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #21			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #22			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #23			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #24			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	
Truck #25			Truck	שליחת
DRIVER NAME	Mobile #	ID	Truck No.	TRAILER NO
Shipment	Description		Pallets quantity	Item Picture
HDPE pipes 315 mm	Emergency Response Project		20	

Annex 45.

COGAT order dated 21 July 2025 – coordination of entry of a fuel tanker through Kerem Shalom crossing.

Explanatory Note

COGAT order dated 21 July 2025 – coordination of entry of a fuel tanker through Kerem Shalom crossing

This document contains details regarding the coordination of the entry of equipment for use in the UAE Rafah Water Pipeline Project, which occurred on 23 July 2025. The document contains redacted sections. Redacted sections include personal details of truck drivers (e.g. phone numbers, ID), impertinent to the document's substance.

English Translation

Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories

Civilian Department

Strategic Planning Section

21 July 2025

Re: Coordinating the Entry of a Fuel Tanker through the Kerem Shalom crossing – 23 July 2025

1. General:

1. On 23 July 2025, a fuel tanker (25,000 liters of Diesel) is expected to arrive at the Kerem Shalom crossing for the water pipeline project in Rafah.
2. The fuel will be transferred from the tanker in friendly territory to a tanker in enemy territory by siphoning.
2. **The CLA [*Coordination and Liaison Administration*] is responsible for coordinating a route for the transportation of the Palestinian tankers from the red [*enemy territory's*] side of the Kerem Shalom crossing.**
3. **RFA [*Restricted Fire Area*]:** shall be coordinated by the CLA.
4. **Up to date details on the driver and the tanker from blue [*Israeli*] territory:**

Details of driver and tanker

Serial #	Driver name	ID	Vehicle #	Phone #
1.			[REDACTED]	

Original Document



21 יולי 2025

הנדון: תיאום כניסת מכלית דלק דרך מעבר כרמ"ש – 23/07/2025

1. כללי:
 1. בתאריך 23/07/2025, צפויה להגיע למעבר כרמ"ש מיכלית (25,000 ל' סולר) עבור פרויקט קו מים ברפיח.
 2. הדלק יועבר מהמכלית בצד הכחול למכלית הצד האדום בשיטת סניקה.
 3. באחריות מת"ק עזה תיאום ציר תנועת המכליות הפלס' מהצד האדום של מעבר כרמ"ש.
 4. מי"ב: יתאום על ידי מת"ק עזה.
 4. פרטי נהג ומכלית עדכניים מצד כחול:

פרטי נהג ומכלית

מס"ט	ל"ז	ת"ז	שם נהג	מס"ד
██████████	██████████	██████████ █	██████████	1

Annex 46.

Operations Division directive dated 1 March 2024 – coordination of humanitarian aid airdrops in the Gaza Strip.

Explanatory Note

Operations Division directive dated 1 March 2024 – coordination of humanitarian aid airdrops in the Gaza Strip.

This is an operational directive authored by the IDF's Operations Directorate detailing the mechanism for air-dropping humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. The directives given by the operational directorate are binding and are then implemented through further orders and go down the chain of command.

The document contains redacted sections. Redacted sections include sensitive information, regarding operational materials, systems and processes.

English Translation

Translation

Operations Directorate

Operations Division

[Redacted]

21 Adar 5784

1 March 2024

[Comes into effect on 06 March 2024, 11:30AM]

Re: Operational Directive Regarding the Coordination of Airdropping Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip – Operations Division Directive

General

1. In the wake of the war in the Gaza Strip, requests from partners (Egypt, Jordan, the USA, the UAE and additional partners) are received through COGAT and/or the International Cooperation Division's International Operation Center, to airdrop humanitarian supplies.

Directive Purpose

2. Setting out the principles for the operational procedure to coordinate airdrops of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.
3. Establishing time frames for executing the mission.
4. Delineating areas of responsibility between the different bodies.

Defining the Operational Procedure

5. The operational requester [*to coordinate the airdrop*] (the International Operations Center) must prepare an operation request [*for conducting the airdrop*] which will detail the following:
 - a. Precise coordinates within the polygons detailed in the annex – including a marked map.
 - b. Precise time frame for executing the airdrop.
 - c. Quantity and types of aircraft participating in the airdrop.
 - d. Definition of the type of airdrop – guided drop (guided by GPS) or unguided (“free fall”).
 - e. Description of the quantity of packages and their content.
6. [REDACTED]
7. Conveying requests by partners that are part of the planning team until 10:00 AM (Israel time) on the day of the planning.
8. Execution of a bi-daily planning team after receiving the request.
9. Synchronization [REDACTED] of the airdroppers.
10. [REDACTED]
11. **Points of Emphasis –**

Translation

- a. The airdrops must be accurate.
- b. All airdrops north of the corridor [REDACTED] in order to prevent airdrops [*landing*] in the vicinity of Israeli townships (avoidance of airdrops landing in Israeli territory).

12-19. [REDACTED]

Southern Command

20. Shall recommend, based on an up-to-date situation assessment, whether or not to execute the airdrop, its timing and its locations.
21. Shall ensure the safety of our forces, while maintaining security perimeters.
22. Shall update the maneuvering forces on details of the airdrop.
23. Shall recommend relevant drop-sites.

Air Force

24. Shall command and monitor the process of air transporting of the humanitarian aid.
25. Shall recommend, based on an up-to-date situation assessment, the weather and Air Force operations, whether or not to execute the airdrop given the recommended timing and locations.
26. Shall ensure the safety and security of our forces during the airdrop.
27. [REDACTED]
28. Shall monitor and update the Operations Division on the supplies' landing location.
29. Shall define **the time frame** [REDACTED] for executing humanitarian airdrops, based on which the weekly planning will be conducted.

COGAT

30. Shall recommend whether to approve the airdrop locations, according to up-to-date humanitarian policy.
31. Shall establish the security screening policy with respect to parcels.
32. Shall coordinate with the receiving party at the drop-site.
33. Shall recommend relevant drop-sites.

International Cooperation Division – International Operation Center

34. [REDACTED]
35. Shall communicate drop-sites to all the relevant partners for planning purposes.
36. Shall convey requests by partners that are part of the planning team until 10:00.
37. Shall synchronize the airdrops effort with the international partners.
38. [REDACTED]

IDF Spokesperson Unit

39. For media purposes, shall put out **a statement upon the completion of the mission.**

Translation

40. The statement shall be approved by the Head of the Operations Department.

[REDACTED]

41-43. [REDACTED]

Signed,

Colonel [REDACTED]

Head of the Operations Department

Operations Division

Translation

Annexes

[REDACTED]

Annex C – geographical polygons for airdrops (descriptions of geographical polygons for airdrops, divided “North” and “Center”)

Original Document

המבצעים	אגף	
■	חטיבת	
המבצעים	מחלקת	
■	זירת	
[Redacted]		
התשפ"ד	באדר	כ"א
2024	במרץ	01



(03)061130

הנדון: הוראה מבצעית לתיאום הצנחת סיוע הומניטרי לרצ"ע – הוראת ח"מ

כללי

1. על רקע הלחימה ברצ"ע מתקבלות בקשות מהשותפים (מצרים, ירדן, ארה"ב, אמירויות ונוספים) באמצעות מתפ"ש ו/או חטיבת תבל – המכלול הבינלאומי להצנחת אספקה הומניטרית.

מטרת ההוראה

2. הסדרת התהליך המבצעי התהליך המבצעי לתיאום הצנחת סיוע הומניטרי לרצ"ע.
3. הגדרת קבועי זמן לביצוע המשימה.
4. הגדרת תחומי אחריות בין הגופים השונים.

הגדרת התהליך המבצעי

5. הדורש המבצעי (תבל- המכלול הבינלאומי) נדרש להכין דמ"ץ אשר יכלול את הנתונים הבאים:
 - א. נצ מדויקים בתוך הפוליוגונים שמפורטים בנספח – כולל עזר מפתי מסומן.
 - ב. טווח שעות מדויקות לביצוע ההצנחה.
 - ג. מספר וסוג המטוסים המשתתפים בהצנחה.
 - ד. הגדרת סוג ההטלה – הטלה מנוהגת (מוכוון ע"י GPS) או לא מנוהגת ("נפילה חופשית").
 - ה. פירוט כמות המארזים ותכולתם.

6. [Redacted]
7. העברת דרישות השותפים בצוות התכנון עד השעה 10:00 בבוקר (שעון ישראל) ביממת התכנון.
8. ביצוע צוות תכנון דו יומי לאחר קבלת הדרישה.
9. סנכרון [Redacted] המצניחים.
10. [Redacted]
11. דגשים –

- א. על הצנחות להיות מדויקות.
- ב. כלל הצנחות צפונית לנקזים [Redacted] על מנת להימנע מהצנחה במרחב יישובים ישראלים (המנעות מנחיתת המטענים בשטח ישראל).

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1.2 [REDACTED]
- 1.3 [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1.4 [REDACTED]
- 1.5 [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1.6 [REDACTED]
- 1.7 [REDACTED]
- 1.8 [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1.9 [REDACTED]

פד"ם

- 20. ימליץ לאור הערכת המצב העדכנית לקיים או לא לקיים את ההצנחה, עיתויה ומוקדיה.
- 21. יוודא את שמירת ביטחון כוחותינו, תוך הקפדה על טווחי בטיחות.
- 22. יעדכן את הכוחות המתמרנים בדבר פרטי הצנחת האפסניה.
- 23. ימליצו על נקודות הצנחה רלוונטיות.

חה"א

- 24. יפקד ויבצע בקרה על הליך הטסת הסיוע ההומניטרי.
- 25. ימליץ לאור הערכת המצב העדכנית, מז"א ופעילות חה"א לקיים או לא לקיים את ההצנחה במועד ובמוקדים שהוצעו.
- 26. יוודא שמירת על בטחון ובטיחות כוחותינו בהטלה.
- 27. [REDACTED]
- 28. יעקוב ויעדכן את ח"מ אחר מיקום נחיתת האפסניה.
- 29. יגדיר את **חלון הזמנים** לביצוע הצנחת הומניטריות שעל בסיסן יבוצע התכנון השבועי.

מתפ"ש

- 30. ימליץ לאשר או לא לאשר את מיקומי ההטלות בהתאם למדיניות ההומניטרית העדכנית.
- 31. יגדיר את מדיניות בידוק המארזים.
- 32. יבצע תיאום מול הגורם המקבל בנקודת ההצנחה.

33. ימליצו על נקודות הצנחה רלוונטיות.

חטיבת תבל – המכלול הבינלאומי

34. [REDACTED]
35. יעבירו את נקודות הצנחה לכלל השותפים הרלוונטיים למטרות תכנון.
36. יעביר את דרישות השותפים בצוות התכנון עד השעה 10:00.
37. יסנכרן את מאמץ ההצנחות אל מול השותפים הבינלאומיים.
38. [REDACTED]

דו"ץ

39. לטובת הישג תקשורתי נדרש להעביר מסר עם סיום המשימה.
40. הנוסח יאושר ע"י רמ"ח המבצעים.


- [REDACTED]
41. [REDACTED]
42. [REDACTED]
43. [REDACTED]

בברכה,
אל"מ [REDACTED]
רמ"ח [REDACTED]
חטיבת [REDACTED]

המבצעים [REDACTED]
המבצעים [REDACTED]


עמוד 4 מתוך 5

נספחים



עמוד 4 מתוך 5

נספח ג' – פוליגוני הצנחה



פוליגון למרכז:

- N3127.701\E3422.424
- N3125.765\E3420.542
- N3124.904\E3419.531
- N3124.575\E3419.615
- N3124.205\E3420.565
- N3123.751\E3421.013
- N3123.052\E3421.253
- N3124.145\E3422.077
- N3125.352\E3423.182
- N3125.860\E3423.900
- N3126.625\E3423.786

פוליגון צפוני:

- N3134.202\E3428.347
- N3133.709\E3428.841
- N3133.154\E3430.279
- N3132.570\E3430.154
- N3132.032\E3430.702
- N3132.129\E3431.602
- N3131.537\E3431.375
- N3129.858\E3428.274
- N3130.545\E3427.120
- N3131.160\E3425.657

Annex 47.


COGAT, @cogatonline, X (formerly Twitter) (1:08 pm, 18 August 2025).



← Post



180 food aid packages for the residents of Gaza were airdropped in coordination with the UAE, Jordan, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Indonesia.



1:08 pm · 18 Aug 2025 · 7,192 Views

40 54 107 5

Annex 48.

COGAT, @cogatonline, X (formerly Twitter) (3:56 pm, 8 August 2025).

← Post



🛩️ Humanitarian aid airdrops:

📦 Over 1,000 aid packages were airdropped since the beginning of the airdrops Operation.

📦 Nine different countries participated, including the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Canada, and for the first time today , the Netherlands.

📦 72 aid packages containing food were airdropped by six different countries today (Aug. 8).

We will continue to work in order to improve the humanitarian response in the Gaza Strip, along with the international community.

More than 1,000 aid packages have been airdropped since the beginning of the operation by nine countries from around the world

Aid drop locations

- United Arab Emirates
- Jordan
- Egypt
- Spain
- France
- Germany
- Belgium
- Canada
- The Netherlands

📍 Countries participating in aid airdrops

3:56 PM · Aug 8, 2025 · 14.7K Views



Annex 49.

Ministry of Defence Singapore, “Singapore Deploys RSAF C-130 to Conduct Airdrop Operations for Gaza and Deliver the Ninth Tranche of Humanitarian Aid for Gaza” (12 August 2025).

Home > News and events > Latest Releases >


Singapore Deploys RSAF C-130 to Conduct Airdrop Operations for Gaza and Deliver the Ninth...

News Releases

Singapore Deploys RSAF C-130 to Conduct Airdrop Operations for Gaza and Deliver the Ninth Tranche of Humanitarian Aid for Gaza

12 August 2025

The Singapore Government has deployed a Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) C-130 transport aircraft to Jordan this morning.



The Singapore Government has deployed a Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) C-130 transport aircraft to Jordan this morning. At the invitation of the Jordanian government, the C-

130 will conduct airdrop operations alongside other foreign air forces to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. The C-130 carried humanitarian aid comprising medical supplies from the Ministry of Health (MOH), and food supplies from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Humanity Matters, Caritas Humanitarian Aid and Relief Initiatives Singapore (CHARIS), Mercy Relief, and the Rahmatan Lil Alamin Foundation (RLAF), coordinated through the Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC). 58 defence and military personnel were deployed in support of these operations.

The send-off ceremony at Paya Lebar Air Base was attended by Senior Minister of State (SMS) for Defence, Mr Zaqy Mohamad, Minister of State for Defence, Mr Desmond Choo, *Chargé d'Affaires* at the Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to Singapore, Qais Biltaji, Singapore's Non-Resident Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Shamsheer Zaman, and Singapore's Representative to the Palestinian Authority Hawazi Daipi. Acting Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Associate Professor Faishal Ibrahim was also present to meet with representatives from the participating NGOs.

SMS Zaqy said, "The SAF stands ready to support humanitarian assistance into Gaza. This is one way to show how the whole community rallies together to show compassion and shows how it brings together all the resources and Singaporeans...This reflects the SAF's operational readiness, commitment and professionalism to aid those in need, and certainly the assistance of the SAF's Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) to bring together all these food packages."

Acting Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Associate Prof Faishal Ibrahim said, "I thank the Muslim community and all Singaporeans for your generosity, compassion, and prayers. Every act of giving is a light in the darkness for someone in need. Let us continue to keep Gaza in our prayers, support humanitarian initiatives, and work towards a future of peace, safety, and dignity for all."

This is the second time the RSAF C-130 is conducting airdrop operations to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023, Singapore and Singaporeans have conveyed nine tranches of humanitarian assistance for Gaza, totalling over S\$22 million. Singapore will continue to work closely with our regional partners to support the pressing humanitarian needs in Gaza.

[↑ Back to top](#)

Annex 50.

Constantinos Kombos, @ckombos, X (formerly Twitter) (8:32 am, 19 August 2025).

 **Post** Cyprus MFA reposted**Constantinos Kombos** 

@ckombos



The Republic of Cyprus continues its tangible action in the humanitarian field, always in close cooperation and coordination with international partners and humanitarian organisations, and within the framework of the United Nations.

On this basis, yesterday evening, humanitarian aid of 1,200 tons departed from the Port of Limassol for Gaza, including food items, particularly to cover the nutritional needs of children. Of this, 700 tons were donated by the Republic of Cyprus and 500 tons constitute a donation from the Government of Malta, as well as from international humanitarian organisations based in the United States, Italy, the Sovereign Order of Malta, and Kuwait.

The contribution of the Government of the United Arab Emirates to this undertaking is instrumental.

The aid is expected to be distributed by the international humanitarian organisation World Central Kitchen, within the framework of the UN delivery mechanism.

The Republic of Cyprus remains active in the humanitarian field, contributing to the international effort.

The video player displays a graphic with the following elements:

- CYPRUS MARITIME CORRIDOR** (Text on the left side, with 'CYPRUS' and 'CORRIDOR' in yellow and 'MARITIME' in blue)
- AMALTHEA PLAN** (Large white text on a dark blue background on the right side)
- 1960** (Faint white text on the dark blue background)
- 19 August** (Date displayed in the bottom right corner of the video frame)
- REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS** (Logo and text in the bottom left corner of the video frame)
- #WorldHumanitarianDay2025** (Hashtag in the bottom right corner of the video frame)
- 0:05 / 0:38** (Progress bar and duration indicator)
- Standard video player controls: play/pause, volume, settings, full screen, and share.

8:32 AM · Aug 19, 2025 · **3,335** Views

1

44

115



Annex 51.

COGAT, @cogatonline, X (formerly Twitter) (6:37 am, 5 August 2025).



← Post



COGAT 
@cogatonline



📍 Following the Cabinet's decision to expand the scope of humanitarian aid, a mechanism was approved for the gradual and controlled renewal of the entry of goods through the private sector in Gaza. This aims to increase the volume of aid entering the Gaza Strip, while reducing reliance on aid collection by the UN and international organizations.

📍 As part of formulating this mechanism, a limited number of local merchants were approved subject to specific criteria and security screening.

📍 Goods include basic food products, baby food, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene supplies. Payments for the purchase of these goods will be conducted via bank transfers only, under a monitoring and oversight mechanism. All goods will undergo thorough inspection.

📍 In cooperation with security agencies, we will continue to operate monitoring and oversight mechanisms for the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip, while taking all possible measures to prevent the involvement of Hamas in the processes of bringing in and distributing the aid.

6:37 am · 5 Aug 2025 · **61.8K** Views

 33

 144

 287

 31



Annex 52.

Israel National Digital Agency, “Politics Disguised as Science: The Credibility Crisis of IPC ‘Famine’ Analyses in Gaza,” .

IPC famine
credibilityIPC broken
principles

Politics Disguised as Science: The Credibility Crisis of IPC "Famine" Analyses in Gaza

Introduction: The Gaza City Famine Declaration

On 22 August 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) issued an analysis declaring famine in Gaza City. While the IPC has previously confirmed famine in other crises, this was the first such declaration for Gaza — and the first based on evidence that fell far short of the system's own established standards. Famine classifications are meant to be exceptional, invoked only when mortality and malnutrition rates clearly and indisputably exceed the most extreme thresholds. In Gaza City, however, the declaration was issued not only without evidence that would justify it under the IPC's own criteria, but also on the basis of partial or misrepresented data — most prominently an alleged breach of the acute malnutrition threshold presented as key justification.

Before turning to statistics and methodologies, it should be emphasized that Israel is fully aware of the complex humanitarian challenges in Gaza and has taken numerous steps — some unprecedented in the history of warfare — to mitigate them. These efforts are carried out in close cooperation with a wide array of international partners. Reports that misinform the public are counterproductive to this work and merely politicize a discourse that should remain professional and objective.

Omission and Misrepresentation of Malnutrition Data

The IPC's conclusion that Gaza City crossed the famine threshold rests on the claim that acute malnutrition among children supposedly rose from about 10% in the first half of July to around 16% in the second half — suggesting not only a breach of the 15% "famine threshold", but also a sharp upward trend.

There are, however, two fundamental problems with this claim:

1. Use of incomplete data

The report relied on **only half of the data** actually collected in July — five sub-samples covering 7,519 children, described on [pages 49–50 of the FRC report](#), with a combined average of roughly 16% — just above the threshold.

By contrast, a Nutrition Cluster presentation released on August 8 — a week before the August 15 cut-off date — reported the [full July sample of 15,749 children](#). Those results showed unweighted and weighted GAM rates of 13.5% and 12.2%, respectively — both well below the famine threshold.

2. Misreporting of "trend"

In addition, the alleged rise from 10% in early July to around 16% later in the month is not supported by t

data in the report. In fact, the averages from their own partial dataset are 16.7% for the first half and 16.1% for the second — essentially flat, not rising.

In short: the IPC ignored the complete July data, which placed Gaza City well below the threshold, and instead relied on its partial dataset, misrepresented to suggest an upward trend. This distortion of malnutrition data propped up the famine designation — a designation that would have collapsed had the IPC acknowledged the complete July results.

Mortality Estimates Built on Sand

The IPC itself acknowledged that available data on non-trauma mortality were nowhere near the famine threshold of **2 deaths per 10,000 people per day**. Based on its own population estimate for Gaza Governorate — about 937,600 people — this threshold would correspond to roughly 188 non-trauma deaths per day. By contrast, the Hamas-run Ministry of Health reported that as of 15 August the five-day moving average across all of Gaza was just six deaths per day.

Even if every one of these had occurred in Gaza City and were malnutrition-related, the death rate would still be **over thirty times lower than the famine threshold**.

To explain away this gap, IPC claimed that large numbers of deaths went unreported. It cited studies — including one authored by a Famine Review Committee member and [criticised for serious methodological flaws](#) — suggesting that wartime trauma deaths were undercounted by about 60% compared to MoH figures. It also referred to an unpublished Médecins Sans Frontières survey of its staff and families, which estimated a total death rate of 0.4 per 10,000 people (three-quarters trauma, one-quarter non-trauma). Yet neither source supports IPC's assertion that unreported non-trauma deaths were thirty times higher than recorded, or that Gaza City crossed the famine mortality threshold.

With no direct evidence, IPC resorted to inference. It argued that widespread malnutrition, collapsed health and sanitation systems, and outbreaks of disease have historically coincided with high famine mortality. On this basis, it concluded that the alleged "exponential rise" in malnutrition must inevitably be accompanied by an exponential increase in mortality, and presented this assumption as "reasonable evidence" that the famine mortality threshold had been breached.

To summarize – the famine classification in Gaza City rested on a two-stage manipulation:

1. IPC misrepresented partial July data as evidence of a breach in the GAM threshold and a sharp upward trend.
2. It carried this manufactured "exponential rise" in malnutrition into its mortality analysis, using it as the central justification for inferring vast numbers of unreported deaths — despite all available evidence showing mortality rates far below famine levels.

Positive Trends Ignored by the IPC

The analysis also downplayed or disregarded newer information — available well before the 15 August cut-off date — that pointed to clear signs of improvement:

- **Sharp rise in aid deliveries and distributions:** From the second half of July, the volume of food and humanitarian supplies entering Gaza increased markedly, with expanded distribution mechanisms reaching much wider portions of the population.
- **Steep decline in market prices:** Food prices, which had spiked in June and early July, began to fall at the end of July and dropped steeply in early August — a strong indicator of improving availability and access.
- **Documented measures by Israel to expand humanitarian access:** These included daily humanitarian pauses (misleadingly referenced as a single event in the IPC report), the opening of crossings and supply routes, repairs to water and electricity lines, and other steps reported in real time ([this document by COGAT](#)).

A Pattern of Eroding Standards

The issues outlined above — misrepresented malnutrition data, speculative mortality assumptions, and the omission of evidence showing improvement — point to deeper problems in IPC's approach. The Gaza City declaration was not merely an isolated error; it illustrates a broader erosion of standards in IPC's reporting. Since October 2023, thresholds have been blurred until they lost meaning, criteria applied inconsistently, and worst-case assumptions repeatedly elevated as central conclusions — the Gaza City "famine" designation is just the starkest example of this trend.

The second part of this document examines in greater depth the principles the IPC system is meant to uphold and the methodological flaws that have characterized its Gaza reporting since the start of the war.

The IPC and Gaza: A Case Study in Broken Principles

What is IPC?

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is the UN-backed system for assessing and communicating food insecurity and famine risk. It has become the central reference point for governments, humanitarian agencies, media, and even international legal bodies. Since October 2023, five IPC reports and two alerts on Gaza have been published, cited widely in the UN Security Council, in proceedings before the International Court of Justice, and across international media. The IPC is [funded by a consortium of major donors—including the EU, the UK, Germany, and Canada \(with USAID participating until 2025\)](#), which gives its outputs both political weight and global visibility.

IPC and the Principle of Neutrality

One of the IPC's core principles is **neutrality**. The classification system was designed to avoid politicisation by grounding food security analysis in [transparent, evidence-based, and multi-stakeholder consensus processes](#). To achieve this, the IPC relies on national **Technical Working Groups (TWGs)** that bring together government institutions, UN agencies, NGOs, and donors. Where a TWG cannot function — for example in conflict settings — the IPC permits **Globally-Led Analyses** conducted by its Global Support Unit.

Furthermore, the [IPC official guidance](#) requires that its "analyses are fully transparent as to how findings were reached and conclusions made, ensuring credibility at every stage of the process.", meaning that it must draw "on existing evidence in the public domain" so that "all underlying data should be accessible to anyone."

Gaza as a Case Study in Neutrality Breach

The Gaza IPC reports show how these safeguards broke down. Each Special Brief carried the disclaimer: "Produced by the IPC Global Initiative and not necessarily reflecting the views of stakeholders in Palestine". Strikingly, the sentence makes no mention of stakeholders in Israel, even though both IPC's own reports and international NGOs consistently frame Israel as the actor primarily responsible for humanitarian access into Gaza. More importantly, Israel was not merely omitted in name - it was excluded from active participation in the analysis and denied any opportunity to provide its perspective on the complete body of the evidence or the conclusions drawn.

This absence stripped the process of the rigorous multi-stakeholder validation that IPC methodology normally demands - instead, the Gaza analyses were produced behind closed doors by a small, homogeneous circle of humanitarian experts, whose views remained largely anonymous and unchallenged.

Structural Consequences of Exclusion

The practical effects of excluding Israel were evident in the numerous major factual errors and methodological flaws that appeared in the IPC's reporting on Gaza since October 7.

These flaws were presented in detail both to the IPC's Famine Review Committee and were also published in documents that are available online:

1. [Analysis of the IPC report of March 2024 \(published in May 2024\)](#)
2. [Analysis of the IPC report of June 2024 \(published in August 2024\)](#)
3. COGAT's responses to the "IPC alerts" in [November 2024](#) and [July 2025](#)

Similar critiques were published also by various independent researchers.

The IPC never responded or addressed that criticism, nor were any corrections or retractions made.

They reflect the absence of scrutiny that a genuine multi-stakeholder process would have provided. Lacking a feedback loop, incomplete and erroneous data remained uncorrected, consistently biasing results toward worst-case scenarios.

Forecast Bias: Predicting Decline, Ignoring Improvement

This problem is particularly visible in projections - in every single Gaza analysis since October 2023, forecasts predicted worsening conditions, that is, larger shares of the population in Phase 4 and Phase 5. Yet subsequent reports often showed the opposite trend of improvement.

For example, the March 2024 report projected that the share of people in Phase 5 would rise from 30% to 50%. In reality, the percentage fell to 15%. Yet despite this reversal, the following projection again assumed deterioration, forecasting a rise to 22%. The next report, however, showed further improvement - to just 6%. This pattern reveals a clear directional bias: [worst-case scenarios were systematically deemed as the likely ones](#), while evidence of recovery was consistently downplayed or disregarded

Bending the Rules: Lack of Analytical Rigor

One of the clearest problems in the Gaza IPC reports was the way they handled malnutrition screenings data. Representative weight-for-height (WHZ) surveys, the gold standard for diagnosing acute malnutrition, were never conducted - instead, IPC reports relied almost exclusively on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) data. While MUAC can be used under IPC rules, the guidelines explicitly clarify that there are no globally developed cut-off thresholds for phase classification and require that the results are carefully [interpreted against local conditions](#), including historical baselines and relationship between MUAC and WHZ. However, none of those safeguards were followed in Gaza.

Normally, MUAC-based rates tend to be lower than those based on WHZ, but in Gaza the situation was reversed – before the war, MUAC prevalence was around five times higher than WHZ ([roughly 4% vs. 0.8%](#)). This striking fact, which IPC’s own methodology requires to be taken into account as critical context for analysing screenings results, was systematically ignored.

Even more problematic, [the most recent IPC alert](#) described the 15 percent MUAC reference point as a “famine threshold”, even though the IPC manual defines it solely as the cut-off for Phase 4 (‘Emergency’), not Phase 5 (‘Famine’). By using the “famine threshold” misnomer, IPC blurred a key distinction in its own classification system, lowering the bar for famine designations and making the situation appear worse than the data justified.

Facility Screenings Misused as Representative Data

A further problem was IPC’s reliance on **clinic-based screenings**. Sentinel sites in hospitals and health centres can provide useful early-warning signals, but they do not represent the general population. Children brought to clinics are more likely to be sick or undernourished than those in the wider community, which naturally pushes prevalence rates upward. **Consequently, IPC guidance [explicitly prohibits using such data in IPC analysis](#).**

In Gaza, however, those guidelines were ignored and health facility screenings have been routinely used as an integral part of the malnutrition dataset. In other words, what should have been flagged as **indicative signals**, at best, were instead treated as hard evidence, distorting the overall picture of nutritional conditions.

Taken together, these practices show a consistent lack of analytical rigor and consistency. MUAC was stripped of the contextualisation required by IPC’s own rules, thresholds were misrepresented, and clinic screenings were treated as if they were population surveys. Each of these shortcuts tilted the analysis toward more severe classifications than the evidence could sustain.

Conclusions at Odds with the Evidence

Beyond methodological shortcuts, several IPC Gaza outputs reached conclusions that were directly inconsistent with the evidence presented.

[Mortality data ignored or downplayed](#). Throughout the war, the IPC analysis ignored the fact that official figures for malnutrition-related deaths were orders of magnitude below the thresholds it prescribes for crude death rates (CDR) and under-five mortality. At no point did the mortality evidence come close to justifying a famine declaration, or even a Phase 4 classification. When a systematic mortality survey — required under IPC methodology — was finally conducted, its results conflicted with the phase classifications being advanced. Instead of prompting correction, the inconsistency was downplayed: only the aggregate death rates were released, while [the more decisive non-violent mortality figures, central to famine determination, were withheld](#) and requests to release the full survey data were ignored, in direct violation of the transparency principle. However, even the published total death rates remained well below famine thresholds - a fact that was brushed aside in the final conclusions.

Malnutrition rates not consistent with phase designation. Similarly, the MUAC prevalence rates themselves rarely supported the severity of the classifications. For much of the period, they were below the 15 percent Phase 4 threshold, and in most cases [well within Phase 3 or even Phase 2 territory](#). Yet the reports continued to project worsening conditions and "imminent famine".

The June 2024 Famine Review Committee report. The clearest example of conclusions contradicting evidence came in the June 2024 FRC review. That report presented a number of food consumption indicators that pointed to a relatively small share of the population in Phase 4 and Phase 5. However, [the percentages cited in the final report were several times higher than what the actual hard data suggested](#). This demonstrated not only weak methodology, but also a willingness to override the data to sustain a narrative of crisis.

Lack of Transparency

Although the IPC formally upholds transparency as one of its guiding principles, the Gaza analyses often fell short of this standard. Repeatedly, the reports relied on datasets that were not publicly available, preventing independent verification. At the same time, requests to access the underlying data - or even to obtain clarification on the reasoning process that produced the final classifications - were routinely ignored. The result was a process that not only lacked transparency in practice, but also undermined confidence in the credibility and robustness of the conclusions.

Conclusion: A Systemic Bias and Credibility Problem

The Gaza IPC reports reveal more than isolated technical errors. They expose a systematic lowering of standards: neutrality safeguards abandoned, critical stakeholders excluded, data selectively used, projections skewed toward worst cases, famine thresholds bent until they no longer matched the IPC manual, and transparency sidelined as key datasets and analytical reasoning remained inaccessible to outside scrutiny.

Analyses that should have reflected transparent, evidence-based consensus were instead produced by a narrow circle of actors, relying on non-public data, without the inclusive multi-stakeholder validation that IPC requires, and in disregard of the system's own rules. Given the enormous political and legal weight attached to IPC outputs, this pattern is not just a technical flaw — it is a credibility crisis for the IPC system as a whole.

Accessibility statement

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Annex 53.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Third IPC Report on Gaza (June 2024) Displays Persistent Neutrality, Transparency and Methodology Failures” (7 October 2024).

The Third IPC Report on Gaza (June 2024) Displays Persistent Neutrality, Transparency and Methodology Failures

Executive Summary

The third Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report on Gaza,¹ published on 25 June, concluded that, for the "current" period (1 May–15 June), all of the Gaza Strip is classified in phase 4 ("emergency") of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. It further found that 95% of the population is classified in phase 3 ("crisis") or above. The report claimed that 15% of the population was currently in phase 5 ("catastrophe", the highest IPC phase) and defined the situation in the whole of Gaza as "catastrophic" with "a high and sustained risk of Famine".

This paper will review the main indicators and other information that were used by the IPC Analysis Team in its "Special Brief" (henceforth: SB), and later endorsed by the Famine Review Committee (FRC) in its "conclusions and recommendations" report (henceforth: FRC), to arrive at the above conclusions. Unless specified otherwise, references to "the IPC report" apply to both documents.

The third IPC report contains the same methodology and transparency issues which were identified in the review of the second IPC report on Gaza from March 2024 and detailed in a [document](#) published by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 May. The IPC never responded to the findings in that document, but rather repeated the very same deviations from its standards and guidelines in the subsequent report.

Divergence Between the Report's Evidence Base and Conclusions

A key finding in this analysis is that the evidence the IPC report provides, particularly on the IPC's direct indicators for the Acute Food Insecurity classification, point to far less severe levels of food insecurity than the conclusions it offers. This divergence is explained in detail in [Part 1](#).

Table 1 illustrates the gaps between the indicators and the phase classifications of the three areas of Gaza: 1) Northern Gaza, 2) Rafah, and 3) Dir Al-Balah and Khan Younis. The divergence is particularly notable in the latter where, according to the IPC, **78% of Gaza's population is currently located**.

¹ <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1157065/>

Table 1: Main IPC Acute Food Insecurity outcome indicators² and the IPC's "current" phase classifications

	Northern Gaza	D. Al-Balah and K.Y.	Rafah
Population (%)	13%	78%	8% ³
IPC classification (approved by the FRC)			
Area phase	Phase 4	Phase 4	Phase 4
Population:			
Phases 4-5	65%	40%	45%
Phase 3	35%	55%	40%
Phases 1-2	0%	5%	15%
IPC indicators			
Food availability	No caloric input data. Indicators show steady increase since March.	No caloric input data. Increase Mar-Apr. Data on May "incomplete".	No caloric input data. Increase Mar-Apr. Data on May "incomplete".
Food Consumption Score (May-June)	<div style="background-color: red; width: 13%; display: inline-block;">13%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 27%; display: inline-block;">27%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 60%; display: inline-block;">60%</div>	<div style="background-color: red; width: 5%; display: inline-block;">5%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 20%; display: inline-block;">20%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 75%; display: inline-block;">75%</div>	<div style="background-color: red; width: 3%; display: inline-block;">3%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 20%; display: inline-block;">20%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 77%; display: inline-block;">77%</div>
Household Hunger Scale (May-June)	<div style="background-color: red; width: 39%; display: inline-block;">39%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 41%; display: inline-block;">41%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 20%; display: inline-block;">20%</div>	<div style="background-color: red; width: 24%; display: inline-block;">24%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 44%; display: inline-block;">44%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 32%; display: inline-block;">32%</div>	<div style="background-color: red; width: 31%; display: inline-block;">31%</div> <div style="background-color: orange; width: 43%; display: inline-block;">43%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 26%; display: inline-block;">26%</div>
Reduced Coping Strategy Index* (May-June) *Phases 3-5 combined	<div style="background-color: yellow; width: 87%; display: inline-block;">87%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 13%; display: inline-block;">13%</div>	<div style="background-color: yellow; width: 82%; display: inline-block;">82%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 18%; display: inline-block;">18%</div>	<div style="background-color: yellow; width: 85%; display: inline-block;">85%</div> <div style="background-color: lightgreen; width: 15%; display: inline-block;">15%</div>
GAM based on MUAC (latest)	Indicative of phase 1	Indicative of phase 1	Indicative of phase 1
Mortality	Indicative of phase 1	Indicative of phase 1	Indicative of phase 1
Children eating Minimum Dietary Diversity (MDD)	Indicative of levels 2-4 of Chronic Food Insecurity	Indicative of levels 2-4 of Chronic Food Insecurity	Indicative of levels 2-4 of Chronic Food Insecurity

Despite the wide divergence between the outcome indicators and phase classification, the FRC endorsed the Analysis Team's recommendation, and attempted to bridge the gap in two main ways:

² Several standard IPC outcome indicators are not provided in the IPC report on Gaza, including: Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), Household Economy Analysis (HEA), Food Insecurity Experience Scale, GAM based on Weight-for-Height Z-score (WHZ), and Body Mass Index (BMI).

³ The population figure for this area in the Special Brief in 200,000, the FRC wrote in its report that the actual number is less than half of that, around 80,000-90,000.

1. **Misrepresenting the direct outcome indicators:** this was done in various ways as explained in [Part 1](#), including depicting indicator results as more severe than they are by deviating from the IPC guidelines.
2. **Heavy reliance on indirect circumstantial indicators:** those include a wide variety of "contributing factors" related to damage, displacement and hardship caused by the fighting, yet with no clear method to determine how they are indicative of IPC phase classifications. Furthermore, much of the data cited has transparency and methodological issues as explained in [Part 2](#) of this paper.

Projections Detached from Actual Trends on the Ground

The IPC's projections from the period between June and September are based on the claim that the positive trends seen in March and April were reversed since May, therefore the situation is likely to deteriorate in the coming months. As explained in [Part 3](#) of this paper, this "trend reversal" thesis is based on false or flawed analyses of information and a recurring failure by the IPC to adequately predict (or reluctance to acknowledge) the expansion and improvement of Israel's humanitarian response in Gaza in cooperation with its international partners.

Lack of Transparency

In the latest IPC report, the names of the organizations making up the Analysis Team were, again, undisclosed in sharp contrast to the IPC practice in all other conflict areas. It was only revealed that their number had increased from 18 in the March report to 27 in the June report (SP p. 40). The latest IPC analysis, like the previous one, is said to have been conducted "remotely" based on a special protocol for places where there is no IPC Technical Working Group ("non-TWG led analysis process") which has not been used anywhere else but for Gaza and is not explained in any of the IPC's official guidelines.

In addition, as opposed to the IPC's stated commitment to "draw on existing evidence in the public domain" so that "all underlying data should be accessible to anyone,"⁴ the June report mirrors its predecessor by relying extensively on sources which are not publicly available and therefore cannot be assessed independently (see examples in Part 2 of this document). Furthermore, like the March report, this report repeatedly cites figures that originated from Hamas, which were not independently verified and have been shown to be unreliable⁵, as proven fact.

Lack of Neutrality and Impartiality

The IPC report describes the reality in the Gaza Strip in a highly biased and one-sided manner which casts doubt on the neutrality and impartiality of the unnamed organizations which drafted it. The FRC even repeated the shocking statement from the

⁴ https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf

⁵ See: <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-casualties-toll-65e18f3362674245356c539e4bc0b67a> ; <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/untangling-uns-gaza-fatality-data> ; <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/05/gaza-death-count/678400/>

previous report that the current hostilities in Gaza "began with a heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023", thus erasing the October 7th massacre by Hamas from the context of entire crisis. Furthermore, in its descriptions of the war, the report refers extensively to Israeli military operations⁶ yet makes no mention of Hamas' military tactics which are major impediments to humanitarian assistance and hence drivers of food insecurity. Those include, inter alia, the launching of rockets from densely populated areas, including humanitarian areas; using tunnels underneath and carrying out attacks from within civilian homes, schools, and hospitals; seizing food, fuel and other goods supplied as humanitarian assistance; firing rockets and mortars at crossings into Gaza, humanitarian routes inside Gaza, and the maritime access route (JLOTS); and many more similar practices which have been thoroughly documented and widely reported.⁷

Conclusion

The accumulation of unique and problematic practices in the IPC reports on Gaza since December 2023 point to a systemic failure by the FRC to ensure compliance with the most basic IPC standards and principles when it comes to this situation.

The expressly biased descriptions of events, coupled with the lack of transparency throughout the process – from the identity of the organizations in the Analysis Team, through the details of the "non-TWG analysis process," to the extensive reliance on sources that are factually or methodologically flawed – raises serious doubts regarding the neutrality and impartiality of the IPC reports on Gaza, and hence on their credibility.

Hamas' October 7th atrocities, including the taking of over 200 hostages, and its use of civilians as human shields at an unprecedented scale are the cause of the large-scale destruction in Gaza and the serious hardship suffered by its population. Addressing the food security crisis which ensued is a complicated challenge which requires, first and foremost, a reliable and accurate analysis. Sadly, after three reports, it is clear by now that the IPC has been providing a highly misleading picture of reality and projections which are divorced from the actual trends on the ground.

The pattern emerging raises concern that at least some of the organizations involved in the IPC have instrumentalized the analysis process for their campaign to force Israel into an unconditional ceasefire, without the release of its hostages or the removal of Hamas' genocidal threat. Some IPC partner organizations have also been lobbying openly for a weapons embargo on Israel and Hamas (but focusing only on countries supplying them to Israel)⁸ and for other legal measures against Israel, including the issuing of arrest

⁶Examples for such references include inter alia: "Recent attacks in densely populated areas" (SB p. 12); "Attacks on convoys" (SB p. 12); "Attacks on healthcare facilities continued in May 2024" (SB p. 22); "the Rafah offensive on 6 May, which displaced about one million people" (SB p. 2); "the Israeli military operation in An Nuseirat Refugee Camp, which involved intensive land and air strikes" (SB p. 5).

⁷ See for example: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/13/world/middleeast/hamas-gaza-israel-fighting.html>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/us/politics/gaza-hospital-hamas.html>; <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hamas-attacks-israel-gaza-border-crossing-cease-fire-talks-continue/>; <https://apnews.com/article/european-union-condemn-hamas-human-shields-2c0d1c04cb38fc4acce37d8d624e1a3f>.

⁸ Including Oxfam, Save the Children, Action Against Hunger and Care International.

warrants by the ICC. The skewed IPC reports on Gaza thus became the primary "evidence" for the libel that Israel has a policy of intentionally starving Gaza's population, making it appear as a plausible accusation in the public, political and academic discourses, as well as in the highest institutions of international law. That is not robust humanitarian advocacy, but a dangerous and irresponsible, even if unintentional, fueling of hate.

Given all these institutional and methodological failures, the FRC should retract its reports on Gaza immediately to uphold the IPC standards and guidelines.

Part 1: The IPC Acute Food Insecurity Indicators in the Report

This part reviews the evidence provided in the IPC reports on Gaza according to the table of indicators for an IPC AFI analysis (see the [IPC Technical Manual](#) p. 37).

1. First Level Outcomes

a. Food availability

The Analysis Team was unable to provide a definite account of the volume of food entering Gaza or its caloric value. It explained that:

"An attempt was done to calculate caloric coverage attributing different caloric values for different commodities. However, the interval ranges resulting from conversion have proven too wide among sources to be used directly as indicators of food availability."

A striking omission in the report is the lack of reference to an academic study by nutrition experts which analyzed the data on the contents of all food shipments to Gaza and found that:

*"Between January and July 478,229 metric tons of food delivered by land crossing, air drops and sea, to Gaza. The crude mean per capita per day of energy availability was 3,004 kcal, protein was 98 gr (13.0% of energy), fat was 61gr (18% of energy), and iron was 23 mg. **Energy, protein, and fat amounts exceed Sphere standards, and remain consistent after stringent food weight adjustment to high food loss, and after adjustment for the age distribution of the Gazan population.**"*

An earlier version of the analysis, covering the period until June, was shared with the FRC. While the academic paper is still under peer review and therefore has not yet been published, a version of it is available online for reference.⁹ The FRC's decision not to even mention the study is inconsistent with its policy of referring to other academic work which has not been published in an academic journal in the IPC reports on Gaza.¹⁰

⁹<https://biochem-food-nutrition.agri.huji.ac.il/arontroen/publications/nutritional-assessment-of-food-aid-delivered-to-gaza>

¹⁰ See references to: Oregon State University and City University New York, Building damage assessment via satellite imagery analysis by (26 February and 27 May 2024); London School of

Since the IPC chose not to use or even mention the data from COGAT on the nutritional value of the food provided to Gaza, it relied on indirect indicators of food consumption including access to market, financial access, fuel supply, commercial food supply, food availability, and on farmers' damages and needs. However, all that information is either based on sources which are not publicly available and therefore cannot be independently evaluated (in contravention of the IPC guidelines) or suffer from other methodological shortcomings. See a detailed analysis below in [Part 2](#) of this paper on transparency and methodology issues.

The report did determine that, overall, the food supply in Gaza increased in the months leading up to its publication, except for a limited decrease in Rafah governorate (8% of the population) in May following Egypt's decision to temporarily halt aid supplies from its territory:

"According to WFP CATI survey, the Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) in northern Gaza governorates increased from 0 to around 80 percent between November 2023 and May 2024. Whereas the number of beneficiaries in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah has been consistently between 60 and 75 percent since January 2024. In Rafah, HFSA beneficiaries rose from 66 percent to 82 percent between December 2023 and April 2024, followed by a sudden decrease to around 65 percent in May 2024 due to the increasing access challenges that persist at the time of writing of this report" (SB p. 14).

It should be noted that the previous IPC report from March 2024 included an attempted analysis of Kcal availability per capita based on UNRWA's partial data of truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 21 October 2023 to 3 March 2024. The absence of a similar exercise in the new report may indicate that its flaws have been acknowledged by the FRC, yet no correction has been issued.

b. FCS, HHS and rCSI

The IPC reports on Gaza have relied heavily on Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) conducted by a Palestinian polling agency for the World Food Program (WFP).¹¹ There is a significant discrepancy between the results of the latest CATI survey used for the report (1 May – 2 June, see on pages 14-15 in the FRC report) and the IPC phase classification made by the Analysis Team for the "current" period (1 May – 15 June) which was endorsed by the FRC. As the tables below show, **the phase classification of each of the three areas (red columns) are consistently higher than the survey outcomes (green columns) in phases 4 and 5, and lower than them in phases 1 and 2.**

Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections, 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-Based Health Impact Projections (cited in the IPC report of March 2024).

¹¹ According to the FRC report (p.31), the polls were conducted by the Palestinian company Awrad. For more issues concerning the CATI surveys, see Part 2, article 14.

Food Consumption Score - FSC (p. 18):

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey
4-5	65% (+52)	13%	40% (+35)	5%	45% (+43)	3%
3	35% (+8)	27%	55% (+35)	20%	40% (+23)	20%
1-2	0% (-60)	60%	5% (-65)	75%	15% (-67)	77%

Household Hunger Scale – HHS (p. 19):

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey
5	20% (+6)	14%	15% (+9)	6%	10%	10%
4	45% (+20)	25%	25% (+7)	18%	35% (+14)	21%
3	35% (-6)	41%	55% (+11)	44%	40% (-3)	43%
2	0% (-8)	8%	5% (-10)	15%	15%	15%
1	0% (-12)	12%	0% (-17)	17%	0% (-11)	11%

Reduced Coping Strategy Index – rCSI (p. 18):

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey	Classification	Survey
3-5	100% (+13)	87%	95% (+13)	82%	85%	85%
1-2	0% (-13)	13%	5% (-13)	18%	15%	15%

The FRC's analysis of these indicators raises several questions.

1. The FRC acknowledges that "in the months previous to June there has generally been a marked improvement in the food consumption outcome indicators in all areas." However, it claims that "the most recent data from late May and early June indicates a reversal of these improving trends and a general deterioration of the food consumption indicators" (p. 12). No data is provided allowing to assess the "reversal of these improving trends" in late May and early June. However, since the Special Brief of 10 July contains survey results only until 23 May 23, it is possible to compare them with the results until 2 June which were published in the FRC report of 25 June and consider the impact of the observations between 24 May and 2 June.

Food Consumption Score – FSC: comparison b/w results (1.5-23.5 vs. 1.5-2.6)

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6
4-5	13%	13%	7%	5% (-2)	2%	3% (+1)
3	28%	27% (-1)	21%	20% (-1)	17%	20% (+3)
1-2	59%	60% (+1)	72%	75% (+3)	82%	77% (-5)

Household Hunger Scale – HHS: comparison b/w results (1.5-23.5 vs. 1.5-2.6)

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6
5	15%	14% (-1)	4%	6% (+2)	8%	10% (+2)
4	25%	25%	20%	18% (-2)	21%	21%

3	40%	41% (+1)	45%	44% (-1)	43%	43%
2	8%	8%	12%	15% (+3)	16%	15% (-1)
1	12%	12%	18%	17% (-1)	13%	11% (-2)

Reduced Coping Strategy Index – rCSI: comparison b/w results (1.5-23.5 vs. 1.5-2.6)

Phase	Northern Gaza		D. Al-Balah and K.Y.		Rafah	
	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6	1.5 – 23.5	1.5 – 2.6
3-5	87%	87%	85%	82% (-3)	85%	85%
1-2	13%	13%	15%	18% (+3)	15%	15%

As these tables show, the addition of observations from late May and early June had a mixed impact on the three areas, which does not support the claim that a "reversal" of improving trends and "a general deterioration" had occurred in that period. In Northern and Central Gaza there were more improvements than deteriorations in the indicators, with more people in those areas being below the "acute" level (phase 3) in the surveys covering the extended period until 2 June. In Rafah there were very minor increases of 1-3 percentage points in phases 4-5, mainly in FSC.

2. Another peculiarity in the FRC's analysis is its apparent treatment of an FSC "acceptable" level as indicative of phase 3, while IPC ["guidance note on indicators"](#) defines it as indicative of phases 1-2. See the following tables from the guidance document (p. 6)

Box 8: Adopted cut-offs for IPC

Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table		Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table	
Phase	FCS cut-off (usual diet)	Phase	FCS cut-off (diet rich in sugar/oil)
1-2	Acceptable	1-2	Acceptable
3	Borderline	3	Borderline
4	Poor	4	Poor

Now, consider the following quotes from the FRC report:

"In the Northern governorates, for the month of May, 13% of respondent have a poor Food Consumption Score (FCS), 23% borderline and 60% acceptable. This is indicative of a high IPC phase 3 (Crisis)" (p. 15).

"In Deir Al Balah and Khan Younis, for the month of May 6% of survey respondents have a poor Food Consumption Score (FCS), 20% borderline and 75% acceptable. This is indicative of a high IPC phase 3 (Crisis)" (p. 15).

"In Rafah, for the month of May (1-2 June has been included by the FRC reanalysis to ensure highest possible available count), 3% of respondent

have a poor Food Consumption Score (FCS), 20% borderline and 77% acceptable. This is indicative of a high IPC phase 3 (Crisis)" (p. 16).

This phrasing is misleading since it conceals the fact that in all three areas, most people were **below the "crisis" level (phase 3)** in May according to the Food Consumption Score. When factoring in the population sizes in each area, according to the IPC (north: 300,000, Deir Al Balah and Khan Younis: 1,751,457, Rafah: 200,000), the FCS survey results **place 1,647,593 people in Gaza (73% of the population) in phases 1 or 2, below the "crisis" level**. This is not reflected either in the Special Brief or the FRC report.

3. **The FRC misrepresented the survey results for Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) by swapping between the "high" and "very high" categories.** While this error may have been done by mistake, it was repeated in all three areas, creating the impression that more people are in the "very high" category compared to the "high" category when the opposite was true. See the following quotes from the report:

In the Northern Governorates "28% and 59% have a high and very high reduced Coping Strategy Index (42+ and 19-41 rCSI respectively), and 13% have a medium rCSI" (p. 15).

In Deir Al Balah and Khan Younis "30% and 52% have a high and very high reduced Coping Strategy Index (42+ and 19-41 rCSI respectively), and 18% have a medium rCSI" (p. 15).

In Rafah "32% and 52% have a high and very high reduced Coping Strategy Index (42+ and 19-41 rCSI respectively), and 15% have a medium rCSI" (p. 16).

According to the IPC's "[guidance note on indicators](#)" regarding rCSI, there is no defined cut off between phases 3, 4 and 5 for the "high" and "very high" levels. The Analysis Team stated in the Special Brief that rCSI is a "less sensitive and informative indicator compared to the FCS and HHS in the context of high severity" (SB p. 19) and is "valued for its accuracy particularly on the lower phases and levels of severity" (SB p. 20).

c. Livelihood Coping Strategies

The FRC's references to the "livelihood coping module" regarding the three areas is also, at best, misleading and possibly not in accordance with IPC standards.

See, for example, the following sentence on the northern governorates:

"The livelihood coping module shows that about 85% of respondents declare facing safety risks to access food, 57% are picking up trash to sell, 56% exchange clothes for food, 50% are looting food from debris, 26% beg and about 17% pick up food waste" (FRC p. 15).

The FRC relies on these indicators to claim that, although the northern governorates had 13% and 14% of the population in phase 5 according to the HHS and FSC indicators respectively (and an unknown percentage according to the

rCSI), when the livelihood indicators are included, **they all together "indicate high levels of acute food insecurity, converging towards IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), with 20% of the households estimated to be in that phase"**. Therefore, the livelihood indicators have significant weight in the "upward revision" of the phase 5 classification in relation to the HHS and FCS indicators.

On the issue of Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS), the FRC explains that "although the module employed in the WFP survey for gathering information on livelihood change is **not the standard one**, making this indicator indirect evidence in IPC terms, it provides key information as most of the strategies included can be considered extreme" (FRC p. 40). However, the manner by which those non-IPC-standard indicators correspond with the IPC phase classification are not explained. Moreover, the term "extreme" is not part of the official LCS methodology which classifies coping strategies into three levels: stress, crisis and emergency.

The "[guidance note on indicators](#)" explains clearly how LCS indicators should be applied (p. 23):

*"The IPC incorporates livelihood coping in all IPC AFI Phases. In Phase 1, households are not expected to engage in stress, crisis or emergency coping. They may, however, employ some other coping strategies (sometimes called 'insurance' strategies) that do not have any negative impacts on their food security or livelihoods. In Phase 2, households are expected to employ stress strategies, in Phase 3, crisis strategies, and in Phase 4, emergency strategies. **In Phase 5, households are expected to have almost completely exhausted their coping capacity albeit some options may still be open to them such as begging or migration of entire households.**"*

In the CATI survey used in Gaza, there is no clear correlation between each coping strategy and the "stress", "crisis" and "emergency" categories, which correspond with IPC phases 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The following table presents the coping strategies that appear in the survey in Gaza and their closest equivalents in WFP's "List of strategies and their definitions" document.¹²

WFP LCS survey - Gaza	Equivalent in WFP guide	Severity level
Facing potential safety risks in challenging situations	No equivalent (not a coping strategy)	-
Picking up trash to sell (other than food)	No equivalent. Closest option: "Did anyone in your household have to sell non-food items that were provided as assistance due to a lack of food or money to buy it?"	Stress (phase 2)
Exchange clothing for food	"Did anyone in your household have to barter/exchange clothing for	Crisis (phase 3)

¹² Available for download here: <https://resources.vam.wfp.org/data-analysis/quantitative/food-security/livelihood-coping-strategies-food-security>

	food due to a lack of food or money to buy it?"	
Looting food (from debris)	"Did anyone in your household have to beg (i.e., ask strangers on the streets for money or food) and/or scavenge due to a lack of food or money to buy it?"	Emergency (phase 4)
Beg (ask strangers on the street for food or money)		
Picking up food waste		

The following table shows the May results of the LCS and the IPC classification of each area. It is hard to see how the LCS results lead to the eventual classifications of each area (see at the bottom of the table).

Coping strategies (LCS)	N. Gaza	D. Al-Balah and K.Y.	Rafah
Picking up trash to sell (other than food) (Stress - Phase 2)	57.3%	41.7%	42.7%
Exchange clothing for food (Crisis - Phase 3)	56.5%	56.3%	59.2%
Looting food (from debris) (Emergency - Phase 4)	50.4%	30.7%	31.1%
Beg (ask strangers on the street for food or money) (Emergency - Phase 4)	26%	22%	25.2%
Picking up food waste (Emergency - Phase 4)	16.8%	10.2%	17.5%
% of pop. classified in phase 2 or above	100%	100%	100%
% of pop. classified in phase 3 or above	100%	95%	85%
% of pop. classified in phase 4 or above	65%	40%	45%

d. Dietary Diversity

The IPC guidelines define the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) as one of the main indicators used in the classification of food insecurity. That indicator is not provided in the IPC reports on Gaza. The only data on dietary diversity which appears to be collected in Gaza is for two distinct groups: children between 6-23 months old, and pregnant or breastfeeding women.

The indicator dealing with children aged 6-23 months, "Children eating Minimum Dietary Diversity" (MDD), does not appear in the IPC guidelines as an indicator for classifying situations of Acute Food Insecurity (AFI, like in Gaza) but only of Chronic Food Insecurity (CFI, which has four rather than five levels of severity). According to the IPC's "[guidance note on indicators](#)" not meeting the MDD of eating five food groups in the past 24 hours is indicative of levels 2-4 in the IPC's CFI classification (p. 18). In other words, when children are in this state, the situation can be defined as a "Mild Chronic Food Insecurity" (level 2) or worse. The FRC failed to note this fact.

According to the IPC Special Brief of July 2024, all children aged 6-23 months in Gaza were below the MMD, i.e. consumed four food groups or less in the past 24 hours. However, the FRC does not explain in its report how this finding is translated to an IPC AFI classification. It could be argued that if this result is indicative of a level two **Chronic** Food Insecurity, it may very well be indicative of a phase 2, or even phase 1, in the **Acute** Food Insecurity scale.

As for the dietary diversity of pregnant or breastfeeding women, this indicator does not exist at all in the IPC technical manual and guidance note on indicators. The closest indicator in the IPC protocol is "Minimum Dietary Diversity of Women of Reproductive Age" (MDD-W). Like the MDD for children, MDD-W is applied only in CFI classification and has the same cut-off by which not meeting the minimum threshold of five food groups per day is indicative of IPC CFI levels 2, 3 or 4.

It remains unclear how these dietary diversity indicators were applied for the IPC's classification of Gaza's population according to the Acute Food Insecurity scale.

2. Second Level Outcomes

a. Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) Screenings:

The IPC report states very clearly that this indicator points to IPC levels 1 or 2 in all three areas. The Special Brief reported (p. 28):

*"The improved humanitarian response throughout March and April, albeit very modestly, with more food available in the markets, as well as higher coverage of micronutrients interventions, could have possibly stabilized the situation. Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings carried out in April by various partners, targeting children aged 6 to 59 months, at health service delivery points, shelters, and community level in the three governorates of Southern Gaza, show a proxy GAM corresponding to an **equivalent of IPC Phase 2 for Acute Malnutrition** - IPC AMN. The range is similar to data from February-March 2024, indicating some stabilization in the situation.*

*Recent MUAC screenings carried out between the end of April up to 25 May in the northern governorates show a proxy GAM **corresponding to an equivalent of IPC AMN between Phase 1 and 2.**"*

The FRC went even further to say that in May the MUAC results in the northern governorates were at the low end of the phase 1 classification range:

*"In the Northern governorates, a very steep fall in the prevalence of GAM by MUAC was reported following the publication of the previous IPC/FRC analysis in March, **with a prevalence of 1% reported for a screening conducted with a midpoint of May 18th**" (p. 17).*

The MUAC results graphs included in the FRC report (p. 51) show that the latest screenings in the three southern governorates were all below 5%, which is indicative of IPC phase 1.

b. Mortality:

The IPC Special Brief did not contain any references to mortality data, although it is one of the core indicators used in the IPC protocol. The FRC did cite in its "conclusions and recommendations" report (p. 19) mortality figures calculated according to the VATI survey, which "yielded an all-cause CDR of 0.55 deaths/10,000/day and an all-cause U5DR of 0.72 deaths/10,000/day." The FRC noted that these figures include deaths caused by violence, and that the exclusion of those cases "resulted in lower estimated death rates." **According to the IPC "guidance note on indicators", a U5DR of below 1 deaths/10,000/day and a CDR of below 0.5 deaths/10,000/day are indicative of a phase 1 classification.**

To put these figures in perspective, a Crude Death Rate (CDR) indicative of IPC phase 4 (which the FRC assigned to all of the Gaza Strip) is between one and two deaths per day for every 10,000 people. In Gaza, that would have meant between 220 and 440 deaths each day. However, according to Hamas' Ministry of Health figures which are [published by WHO](#), in the nine months **between 7 October 2023 and 6 June 2024 there were 32 deaths from malnutrition in Gaza**. That is four people more than was [reported](#) two months earlier, on 2 April according to the same source. It is unclear why the IPC did not cite these figures in any of its reports on Gaza, while showing no reservations about relying on other statistics from Hamas' health ministry (see in Part 2, article 1).

c. Food Groups Consumed (p. 20):

In this indicator, the Special Brief noted an increase in the consumption of cereals and pulses in all three areas of Gaza:

*"In the middle and southern governorates, the average weekly consumption of cereals and pulses **increased linearly since the beginning of the conflict** in November 2023 through 23 May 2024, due to the use of existing stocks in the markets and humanitarian support afterwards. In northern Gaza governorates, cereal consumption (a proxy of food consumption as a whole) was extremely low in the aftermath of the peak of hostilities... In February 2024, **then increased steeply to reach a normal consumption pattern of daily consumption of cereals in May 2024.**"*

Moreover, the graphs on the same page show increases between March and May in the consumption of nearly all food groups, including fruits, oil, sugar, protein-rich foods, and dairy products. These increases, which correspond with the survey results on food consumption (FCS) are not noted in both IPC reports.

The report claims that there was a reduction in the consumption of pulses only in Rafah between 23 May and 2 June (after the period covered in the graphs), basing it on a tiny sample of only 20 cases that were surveyed.

3. Contributing Factors

a. Communicable Diseases (SB pp. 21-22):

The Special Brief found that the available data does not enable a clear determination of trends in the prevalence of communicable diseases. It acknowledges that "most of the disease curves are showing a downward trend", however it is "difficult to attribute this entirely to the improved conditions" since "supply and service disruptions may also be contributing to fewer people seeking treatment at health points." The report further explains that due to the movement of population between governorates, it is hard to conduct a trend analysis in each area.

b. Nutrition Services (SB p. 27):

The Special brief claims that while there was a significant scaling up of nutrition services throughout Gaza between February and April, this trend was reversed in May following the Israeli military operation in Rafah. However, nothing in the data provided supports this claim. Citing the [Nutrition Cluster Dashboard](#), the report says that by the end of April, there were 300 operational nutrition service sites in all of the Gaza Strip. According to the same source, in June, when the FRC report was published, there were 314 such sites, and their number grew to 326 and 362 in July and August respectively.

The report shows that the Israeli military operation in Rafah reduced the number of Outpatient Therapeutic Programs (OTPs) in Gaza from 102 in April to 66 at the end of May, mainly due to the near complete secession of those programs in Rafah (from 55 to 4). However, the report fails to show that this decline was merely temporary as OTPs were being relocated to the Middle Area along with the evacuating population. In June, according to the Nutrition cluster, the total number of OTPs in Gaza was already 98, and by August it returned to its number in April, 102.

Another indicator used to suggest that since May nutrition services went on a downward trend is the number of children aged 6-59 months who were screened for malnutrition in the Southern Governorates (Rafah, Dir Al-Balah and Khan Younis). However, the data shows that after a slow decline between March and May (26,325, 24,293 and 22,716 respectively), the number of screenings in that area spiked in June and July (41,814 and 56,593 respectively). Once again, this shows that by the time of the publication of the IPC report it had already been clear that the impact of the military operation in May on nutrition services was temporary.

Part 2: Methodology and Transparency Issues

As shown in Part 1, there is a significant divergence between the evidence on the main IPC indicators and the report's conclusions regarding the "current" period. It is therefore clear that the Analysis Team and FRC gave significant weight to various indirect indicators which supposedly reflect drivers of food insecurity. This part will show that

the data for many of those indirect indicators is either not publicly available, in contrast to the IPC standards, or is methodologically flawed. The list below is not exhaustive and provides some examples for such issues in the IPC report.

For each indicator, the relevant paragraph from the report will be quoted, followed by an explanation of the issues associated with it.

1. Fatalities:

The IPC continued its malpractice from the previous reports on Gaza of citing figures from Hamas authorities without disclosing this fact to its readers. The Special Brief claims that:

"As of 19 June 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 37,400 fatalities and over 85,500 injuries, totaling over 6 percent of the total population in the Gaza Strip, while women (above 20 percent) and children (above 30 percent) account for more than half of all fatalities or injuries" (SB p. 4).

There is no disclaimer about the source of these figures or pointing to the growing body of research and reports raising doubts about their accuracy.¹³ Unlike the UN, the IPC did not caveat these statistics with the term "reportedly", nor point out that they do not distinguish between civilians and combatants.

The Special Brief's quote of the Hamas figures is quite misleading. It creates the impression that the 20% of women and 30% of children refers to the total number of fatalities that is cited (37,400), making them equal to 7,480 and 11,200 respectively. However, a look at the [OCHA document](#) referred to in the footnote reveals that those percentages are given in relation to a 34% lower number of 24,686 fatalities which were "identified".

Unlike the previous IPC report, this time the FRC did acknowledge the downward trend in mortality caused by the conflict between January and April, but added that "from the start of May conflict mortality has been increasing" without referring to any source proving such an increase (FRC p. 19). In fact, according to Hamas' figures which the IPC relies upon, the steady downward trend in the rate of Palestinian fatalities in Gaza continued also through May and June despite the operation in Rafah.¹⁴ The FRC's claim for an increase in mortality in May appears to be baseless and possibly inserted to support the "trend reversal" narrative of the report.

The Special Brief also cited Hamas claims regarding fatalities from specific incidents:

¹³ See: <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-casualties-toll-65e18f3362674245356c539e4bc0b67a> ; <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/untangling-uns-gaza-fatality-data> ; <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/05/gaza-death-count/678400/>

¹⁴ According to Hamas' figures, the average daily number of fatalities (civilians and non-civilians) was as follows: January – 169; February – 112; March – 92; April – 62; May – 58; June – 57.

"...on 8 June 2024 the Israeli military operation in An Nuseirat Refugee Camp, which involved intensive land and air strikes, resulted in the deaths of 274 Palestinians and injuries to 698 others" (SB p. 5).

Unlike the UN [report](#) which is cited as the source, the IPC does not attribute the casualty figures to Hamas' Ministry of Health, thus presenting them as a verified fact. Moreover, neither the Analysis Team nor the FRC found it relevant to mention that the operation referred to was intended to release four Israeli hostages held in the heart of the densely populated area in civilian apartment buildings. During the operation, the Israeli forces came under heavy fire and had to fight their way out with the hostages.

2. Comparison of food supply pre-7 October:

The FRC recycles the misleading comparison with "pre-war 500 trucks per day" which it used in its previous reports on Gaza. The report includes a chart (p. 11) showing monthly supplies into Gaza by the truckload, and a line next to it for reference saying that "the pre-crisis average per working day" was 500 trucks, "including fuel." In the Israeli [response](#) to the previous IPC report it was noted that this figure has no reference and is significantly higher than data published by the UN before the war. Moreover, the "500 trucks per day" reference is misleading and irrelevant for an evaluation of current food supplies since it includes all types of commodities and fuel for the Gaza power station which has been shut since 7 October.

According to a [document published](#) in June by the Food Security Cluster, only 32% of UN-recorded incoming goods to Gaza (not including fuel) before 7 October were food or food production inputs. If one is to rely on those UN statistics, **the pre-war monthly average of trucks carrying food into Gaza was 2,288** (an average of approximately 100 trucks per working day). This figure puts the food supply figures in the IPC report in a totally different perspective than the misleading "500 trucks per day" reference. However, for some reason, the Food Security Cluster statistic was not cited by the Analysis Team or the FRC.

3. Humanitarian vs. Commercial Shipments:

The FRC makes repeated false claims on Israel's policy regarding aid deliveries. Its report claims that beginning in May, Israel implemented a policy by which "preference [was] accorded to commercial deliveries" over humanitarian ones (FRC p. 11). The alleged "reduction in the contribution of humanitarian versus 'commercial' inputs **facilitated by COGAT** has resulted in greater uncertainty about the ability of vulnerable populations to access the available resources and is reducing the capacity of the humanitarian system to deliver the assistance" (FRC p. 10).

This claim turns the actual reality on its head. In truth, Israel's facilitation of commercial shipments in May was as a mitigating measure to Egypt's decision in early May to halt all humanitarian supplies passing through its territory, which are the majority of the humanitarian supplies to Gaza. Only in late May, Egypt allowed the resumption of aid

deliveries from its territory into Gaza via Kerem Shalom crossing, while maintaining Rafah crossing closed.

The assertion that the decline in the share of humanitarian supplies was the result of an Israeli policy, is baseless. Moreover, Israel's success in quickly surging commercial shipments to make up for the blockage of humanitarian aid prevented an acute food shortage, as reflected in the fact that food prices continued to decline in June (see item 12 below).

4. **Conflicts and Displacement (FRC p. 8):**

*"According to a WFP Survey, **three thirds of the households** interviewed in northern Gaza governorates are sheltering in a damaged house or apartment."*

"Three thirds" is probably an error. There is no way to check what the actual survey found since its results are **not publicly available**.

5. **Sanitation and Communicable Disease (SB p. 7):**

"Health organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), have identified a heightened risk of communicable disease outbreaks directly attributable to insufficient sanitation infrastructure and the consumption of contaminated water. The prevalence of such diseases is projected to escalate with the absence of electricity or fuel provision to facilitate the resumption of operations within water treatment and sanitation facilities".

The information in this paragraph is outdated and ignores significant improvements on the ground. These sentences are cited from a [WHO report from 2 May](#), which cited them from an NGO [report](#) from 13 December, which cited them from a Health Cluster [report](#) from 6 November. Since November 2023, there has been significant improvements in the supply of fuel and other measures taken by Israel for the operation of water treatment and sanitation facilities in Gaza as was acknowledged by the FRC in its latest report.¹⁵ Therefore the validity of the statement cannot be substantiated by these sources and has most likely been incorrect for months.

6. **Survey of Farmers (SB p. 9):**

"The Gaza farmers damages and needs assessment conducted by Action Against Hunger in the Middle Area of Gaza between 19 May and 27 May 2024 with 48 men and 2 women farmers, highlighted the challenges faced by 90 percent of farmers interviewed who have currently partial or full access to their farmlands and greenhouses. All farmers reported that their crops have sustained either partial or total damage, with 65 percent reporting total damage to assets and 33 percent reporting partial loss. From these farmers, 31 percent of those who have access to

¹⁵ "The response in the nutrition, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health sectors was scaled up (FRC p. 2).

their agricultural property reported that they are able to obtain water for irrigation, out of which 29 percent manage to obtain water fully and 2 percent partially. Farmers reported facing numerous obstacles in watering their crops. Farmers highlighted that water and fuel unavailability, and increased prices pose significant burden. Nearly all respondents (98 percent) pointed to water quality as a major irrigation issue. Finally, deficiency in electricity access constituted a constraint for 93 percent of the surveyed farmers and nearly a third (29 percent) of respondents reported the inability to harvest their crops."

There is no public source for this information. The footnote Refers to: "Action Against Hunger, Gaza Farmers Damages and Needs Assessment Report, May 2024" (no link).

A Very small and unrepresentative sample: 50 individuals, in the scope of one week (just before the resumption of aid flows from Egypt in late May), only in the Middle Area.

7. Local Food Production (FRC p. 11):

"Since the last FRC review in March, little has changed in the capacity of local production to provide food to the market... Recent opening to deliveries of livestock fodder might improve access to dairy and animal protein products, however the scale so far is extremely limited. "

Significant information on local production is missing from this paragraph. According to an [official FAO video](#), 1,500 tons of fodder were to be delivered in early April which would be "sufficient to provide for about 50 days [of] milk for all children under 10 years of age in Gaza, providing around 20 percent of the WHO recommended minimum daily requirement in terms of caloric intake." According to this prediction by a FAO official from April, the planned supply of fodder was expected to contribute to local dairy production beyond an "extremely limited" degree. By early May, according to FAO, about 500 tons of fodder were delivered to 3,100 livestock keepers in Gaza. The IPC report does not mention this project nor refer to any source informing on its impact.

The Special Brief acknowledged that some local food production is still taking place, yet it offered no assessment of its quantities (SB p. 9). The report noted that "some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing", yet "it is very limited", and that "some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel." The "availability of poultry meat and eggs is **reduced** throughout the Gaza Strip" due to lack of animal feed. According to [statistics](#) from the Food Security Cluster, before the war 35% of the available food in Gaza came from local agricultural production. While local production has no doubt been reduced significantly, it quite clearly has not been completely halted, making it a recurring lacuna in the IPC's food supply calculations since the start of the war.

8. Food Availability (SB p. 11):

"According to the Cash Working Group, canned food is generally available in markets across all governorates. Bread is available in the southern governorates, while staple food is available in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. However, the availability of fresh food is low to non-existent in all governorates, and water appears scarce in North Gaza Governorate."

No publicly available source is provided for this information. The footnote refers to: "Cash Working Group, Gaza Strip – Market Overview and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance Analysis period: 1 to 30 April 2024, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)."

The methodology on which these assertions were based is unknown.

9. Commercial Food Supplies (SB p. 11):

"According to WFP Market monitoring, the commercial food trucking contents has been primarily flour, fruits, vegetables, salt, egg, rice and vegetable oil. Very little quantity of meat has been imported and this can be observed also through disaggregation of the Food Consumption Score of the WFP CATI survey."

No publicly available source is provided for this information. The footnote refers to: "WFP, Market Monitoring Update, May 2024."

10. Fuel supply for food storage (SB p. 11):

"The lack of electricity is affecting storage of items and reducing the shelf life of products. It is important to highlight that only 29 percent of fuel allocations (1 million litres) entered the Gaza Strip, which inhibited the work of the bakeries, hospitals, water wells and other critical infrastructure."

This paragraph contains highly misleading representation of statistics. The footnote points to the [wrong source](#) (it does not include the 29% figure).

The Special Brief failed to note that the figures cited in this paragraph (as can be seen in the [correct source](#)) **refer only to the two-week period** immediately after Egypt's decision to halt all humanitarian shipments from its territory, including fuel (7-23 May). That period was not representative of the report's reporting period nor of the trend in fuel supplies. Between March and June, nine million litres of fuels entered Gaza, [according to COGAT](#). After the temporary slowdown in May, the Israeli authorities quickly adapted, and fuel supply increased reaching over 3.3 million liters in July, the highest monthly figure in 2024.¹⁶

¹⁶ See COGAT's dashboard: <https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/main/>

11. Access to Market (SB p. 12):

"According to the Cash Working Group survey, the main challenge to market access across all governorates in April 2024 was insecurity, reported by 47 percent of respondents. This was followed by market access issues, cited by 40 percent of respondents, particularly in Khan Younis (80 percent). The high cost of items, which was the main barrier identified in March 2024, was reported as only the third most significant barrier in April. Insecurity was further highlighted when respondents were asked about feeling safe while traveling to receive assistance. For instance, 41 percent of the respondents who were residing in Deir al-Balah reported feeling unsafe, followed by 39 percent of respondents in Rafah, 35 percent in Khan Younis and North Gaza, and 32 percent in Gaza Governorate."

No publicly available source is provided for this information. The footnote refers to: "Cash Working Group, Gaza Strip – Market Overview and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance Analysis period: 1 to 30 April 2024, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)."

The survey sample's size, geographic location and timeframe are not disclosed.

12. Financial Access (SB p. 12):

"The scarcity of items has resulted in increased food prices, and reduced households' purchasing power. As a result of improved availability in March and April, prices of various commodities such as wheat flour (Egyptian), rice, sugar, vegetable oil, onions, and eggs decreased in May compared to March 2024. However, a reverse trend was noted for the prices of other food items including lentils, salt and tomatoes."

The source does not substantiate the assertions in this paragraph. The footnote refers to: "Cash Working Group- Reflecting on humanitarian cash response in Gaza - Insights and key takeaways - 9 May 2024" ([link](#)).

This paragraph appears to suggest that despite some price fluctuations in May, overall food prices have been on the increase or, at best, showed a mixed trend. It is unclear why the Analysis Team and the FRC did not refer to the publicly available [Price Index tables](#) of the Palestinian Authority's Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), which show that food prices in Gaza dropped significantly in April (-21%) and increased only slightly in May (+2.9%) yet remained 18% lower than in March and 9% lower than in February. These figures show that Israel's reaction to Egypt's halt of humanitarian deliveries from its territory in May by facilitating a surge of commercial deliveries succeeded in preventing a drop in food supply and a consequent price hike. This is further substantiated by the official price index statistics for June and July which show further decreases in food prices of 7.5% and 4.43% each month respectively. In other words, **in the four months from March to July, food prices in Gaza declined by 28%**. This serves as yet another indicator contradicting the FRC's overarching narrative of a "trend reversal" in May following the military operation in Rafah.

13. Comparison and Trends of Prices of Key Commodities (SB tables 8 and 9 on p. 13):

No publicly available source is provided for the information in both tables. Moreover, the WFP data in the tables is widely inconsistent with the official price data [published by the PCBS](#). For example, according to WFP, the price of salt in Gaza in May 2024 was 12.3 times higher than in September 2023 and 60% more expensive than in April 2024. According to the PCBS, salt was only 5 times more expensive in May than in September 2023 and 3% cheaper than in April 2024. Another example, according to WFP, the price of tomatoes increased by 141% from April to May 2024, yet according to PCBS it decreased by 12%. These discrepancies are not explained since WFP sources and methodologies are not transparent.

14. Regarding the Sample of the WFP CATI Surveys (FRC p. 31):

*"Households were randomly selected from the master list used in previous analyses (320,000 households (HH), **80 percent of HHs in the Gaza Strip**), including current beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries."*

The description of the survey sample is misleading and inconsistent with previous reporting on WFP surveys in Gaza since 7.10. This phrasing obscures the fact that the households on the lists used for the survey are all pre-war aid recipients, thereby not representative of the three better off deciles in the population. See the varying descriptions of the sample used:

- A WFP [report](#) from December 2023 said that the households contacted in the CATI survey "were randomly selected from the list of **WFP beneficiaries** master phone lists" which "**represent 75% percent of households in Gaza.**"
- According to a WFP [report](#) from February 2024, the agency's CATI survey in Gaza since the outbreak of the war used "Lists from previous distribution (targeting **70% of the population in Gaza**)" (p. 6).
- The March IPC report gave a slightly different description of the sample: "Households were randomly selected from a master list of 320,000 WFP **pre-conflict beneficiary households** representing **80 percent of the total pre-conflict population in the Gaza Strip**" (p. 13).
- Finally, the June IPC report completely omitted the fact that all households on the list were aid beneficiaries before the war, and further obscures it with the vague assertion that some of them are "current non-beneficiaries."

The July Special Brief relied only on CATI surveys taken between 1 and 23 May to which 488 households responded – about 0.1% of the total number of households in Gaza. In northern Gaza Governorate, the sample size was a miniscule 23 household.

A peculiarity regarding the more recent CATI surveys is left unexplained. According to the FRC, the surveys taken between 20 February and 23 May had a 57% success rate which is significantly higher than the 13.3% success rate in the CATI surveys held in Gaza between 6 December and 19 February which were cited in the March report. In that report, the IPC explained that the 13.3% figure is "in line with the 10 percent to 20 percent typical of CATI analyses in the region" (Special Brief of 18 March 2023, p. 13). The spike in the response rate between the two survey periods, which resulted in extremely atypical rates, merits an explanation and raises questions regarding the survey's methodology.

Generally, remotely conducted telephone surveys are highly limited in their methodology as all self-reported information could not be confirmed and may be subjected to various biases.

Part 3: Projection Scenarios

The IPC's projections in its first two reports on Gaza (21 December 2023 and 18 March 2024) proved to be highly exaggerated and failed to predict the emerging trends on the ground. Given this record, it might have been expected that the FRC would exercise greater caution in the projections of the third report, yet this did not happen.

In December 2023, the FRC wrote that it "expects that excess mortality will continue to increase, and these increases may be very rapid, potentially at exponential rates. This applies to mortality caused by both the direct and indirect effects of the conflict, including non-trauma related deaths." In reality, mortality caused directly from the conflict plummeted in the subsequent months and there was no evidence of any increase in non-trauma mortality.

In March, the IPC predicted that over one million people in Gaza, over 50% of its population, will be in IPC phase 5 before July and nearly all the rest (38%) will be in phase 4 by then. It warned that in Northern Gaza "famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months" and "mortality levels will likely breach the Famine thresholds (extremely critical) - by the end of May 2024." These predictions also proved wrong. In June, the FRC acknowledged that "in contrast with the assumptions made for the projection period (March – July 2024), the amount of food and non-food commodities allowed into the northern governorates steadily increased" and concluded that the "available evidence does not indicate that Famine is occurring." The increase in infectious diseases that the March report predicted in all three areas by May also did not materialize.

The fundamental flaw in the March report which caused the IPC's misinformed and wrong projections was defined in the Israeli [response](#) as "what appears to be a systematic and consistent effort to ignore two undeniable trends on the ground in Gaza: a significant decline in the war's intensity and a significant increase in the humanitarian effort and the flow of aid." In the latest report, the IPC did acknowledge these two trends yet claimed that both had been reversed in May, thus justifying projections pointing to a deterioration in the situation by September in all three areas of Gaza.

As already shown, the "trend reversal" thesis proposed by the IPC was based on false or flawed analyses of information (explained above in relation to food consumption indicators, fuel, food prices, mortality rates and nutrition services). As explained in this document, the decline in aid supplies in May due to Egypt's halt of aid supplies was a temporary disruption which was successfully mitigated by surging private sector shipments of food, among other means. Mortality rates continued to decline into June, as did food prices, while food consumption surveys provided no evidence for any reversal of the steady improvement they reflected in the subjective food security assessments of respondents in all three areas.

Israel has proven throughout the war that it works relentlessly to expand and improve humanitarian assistance to Gaza. However, the projections of the IPC continue to ignore those efforts and assume that assistance would deteriorate or, at best, remain as it is. Those projections would have been more precise if the FRC had incorporated in its report and analysis the full scope of the data and information on the humanitarian efforts that were presented to it by Israeli authorities during the period between the second and third IPC reports.