

**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MEMORIAL**

**DOCUMENTS PRÉSENTÉS À LA COUR
APRÈS LE DÉPÔT DU MÉMOIRE**

I

LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE TO THE AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA¹

Washington, 14 March 1980.

In response to your inquiry, the following information is provided to assist in establishing the reportorial accuracy and authenticity of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report* items cited in the US Memorial filed in the litigation before the International Court of Justice. We have attempted to provide a more detailed description of the FBIS *Daily Report* as well as some insight into the manner in which the reporting is collected, assembled and disseminated.

FBIS may be described as follows: the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, with some minor changes in title, has monitored foreign media on behalf of the US Government since the spring of 1941. During World War II it was the primary source of information from the Axis radios, first from Germany and Italy, and after December 1941 from Japan and the areas under their control. In addition to monitoring foreign radio broadcasts, television and press agencies, FBIS also has had the responsibility since 1967 for translating foreign publications as a service of common concern to US departments and agencies. FBIS disseminates its product to all interested agencies of the US Government. Its publications are available to the public in the United States and abroad by subscription through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the US Department of Commerce.

The FBIS *Daily Report* is a compilation of significant material monitored from foreign news media selected initially on the basis of potential interest to the US Government. It includes translations of foreign leader speeches, government statements, official communiqués and interviews; major editorials, articles and commentaries; and news reports on significant political, economic, cultural and scientific developments. It is published daily Monday through Friday and is divided into eight geographic volumes—People's Republic of China, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Together the eight volumes carry about 210,000 words in 400 pages each day. They are printed overnight for distribution the next morning in more than 7,000 copies distributed throughout the Government. Both paper and microfiche versions are available to the public in the US and abroad by subscription through NTIS. NTIS distributes more than 1,000 copies of the *Daily Report*. The *Daily Report* has a wide reputation as a reliable and accurate source of current information on international affairs and is used as a research aid by the US Government as well as the press, academic institutions and libraries.

FBIS materials, including those used in the *Daily Report*, are derived from public radio and television broadcasts that are electronically recorded, press agency news reports, and printed media such as newspapers and magazines. Audio recordings of radio and television news broadcasts are normally translated into English direct from the original tape at the facility which made the recording. The English language version of the item is then transmitted to

¹ See p. 513, *infra*.

Washington, DC, where the formalized daily publications of the FBIS are produced and disseminated. Given the high volume of recorded matter, it is not economically feasible to store the tapes for more than a temporary period. Typically they are erased and re-used within 30 days. Being able to retrieve the original recordings of the FBIS items cited in the Memorial thus is problematical at best. Because of their dates it is not reasonable to expect that many, if any, have not been re-used by this date.

(Signed) John F. PEREIRA.

II

SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS¹

1. Student Statement No. 91

LD111750 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 11 Jan. 80 LD.
[Statement No. 91 issued "on the eve of the first Islamic Iranian presidential election", by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy; date not given—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. The alert and revolutionary Iranian nation: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, led by the Imam of the nation, the great Khomeini, put an end to monarchy in its first triumphant step and overthrew the corrupt and black Pahlavi régime. It has swiftly taken steps to strengthen the Islamic Revolution, one of the greatest aspects of which is the stability of the Islamic Republic. Toward this, having held a referendum, it successfully formulated and changed the constitution during its second vital and sensitive stage, despite all plots and attacks. Now that the dear nation is in the process of electing its first president with its own hands, criminal America has expanded the dimension of its plots to such an extent that it has even interfered in the work of presidential candidates. Fortunately, the interference and plots by the great enemy, the criminal America, aimed at disgracing the Islamic Republic were discovered and then foiled by the Iranian people and exposed to the world.

2. Latin: Gotbzadeh Sends "Intransigent" Messages to the United Nations

PA132022 Buenos Aires Latin in Spanish, 1919 GMT, 13 Jan. 80, PA.

[By Paul Taylor.]

[Text] Tehran, 13 Jan. (Latin-Reuter)—In an intransigent message to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Iran stated that not even the formation of a committee by that international organization to study the charges against the deposed Shah would end the crisis between Tehran and Washington. The text of Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh's message to Waldheim was published today by the Tehran daily *Bamdad*. Informed sources have confirmed its authenticity.

The message, which last night postponed a vote on economic sanctions against Iran in the Security Council, made no reference to the 50 US hostages imprisoned in the US Embassy in Tehran, which are the cause of the request for sanctions.

The group of Muslim students occupying the US Embassy for the past 10 weeks said it had no knowledge of the Gotbzadeh message, but that its position is unchanged.

"Our demands have not been modified. The hostages will not be released until the Shah and his money are returned to Iran", a student spokesman told this agency. He added that they are sure that revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has not changed his position on the problem.

The Iranian Foreign Minister's letter made reference to proposals discussed with Waldheim during his visit to Iran 10 days ago to the effect that the United

¹ See p. 514, *infra*.

Nations would investigate the violation of human rights under the Shah's government. "The only solution is that we talk about this. Naturally, the mere formation of this committee or the outlining of its views will not in itself solve any problem", stated the letter.

"Our demands for the extradition of the Shah and his properties must be confronted in a legal way", he said.

He did not mention the release of the hostages.

The letter concluded on a challenging note: "Therefore, I once again declare that if the decisions of the Security Council are not based on the acceptance and implementation of our desires, they will be considered empty from our point of view."

3. Gotbzadeh on Hostages' Release

OW140516 Hong Kong AFP in English, 0512 GMT, 14 Jan. 80 OW.

[Text] Tehran, 14 Jan. (AFP)—Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said here today that the American hostages held by militants at the Tehran Embassy could be released only after total acceptance of three demands presented by Iran to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

He said the three points were:

- Creation of an international committee to investigate the "crimes" committed by the Shah of Iran during his reign.
- Recognition by the United Nations of Iran's right to demand extradition of the Shah (who is currently living out his exile on the Panamanian island of Contadora).
- Recognition of Iran's claim to the imperial family's wealth and property.

Mr. Gotbzadeh, who held a brief press conference at Tehran airport before flying to the south of the country, said that inquiry into the Shah's "crimes" would not in itself be enough to obtain freedom for the hostages who have been held at the US Embassy in Tehran since 4 November. The Foreign Minister said that if sanctions were applied against his country, they "would have no effect", and that if the United States persisted in trying to have sanctions imposed, the result would be contrary to what Washington was trying to obtain.

Asked about possible Iranian reprisals against countries which voted for sanctions, Mr. Gotbzadeh would only say that "the question would have to be studied".

4. Gotbzadeh Press Conference

JN140935 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 0800 GMT, 14 Jan. 80 JN.

[Text] Speaking about the United Nations Security Council resolutions at a press conference held at Mehrabad International Airport, Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh has said: I have often told United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim that if the Security Council votes in favour of imposing an economic boycott on Iran, it would have marched in a direction contrary to the solution of the crisis, and that the United States pressures against Iran will aggravate the situation.

The Iranian Foreign Minister denied reports which have been reiterated, that Iran is ready to enter into negotiations on the release of the hostages. He said international news agencies under the control of dirty Zionism are distorting facts and that certain domestic news media are falsifying reports.

The Foreign Minister added: The issue of the hostages release loses its context without the extradition of the deposed Shah.

5. Unacceptability of United Nations Decisions

LD141058 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 14 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] According to the central news bureau, the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic has called on other governments not to get involved in America's political games. The statement signed by the Foreign Minister says: As we informed the United Nations officials at 0200 that rulings by the Security Council or any other United Nations organs are not acceptable to us if they are not in compliance with the Iranian nation's demands and that they would be recognized as null and void, and now that the present senseless and obstinate attempts by America are defeated. We strongly call on other governments not to get involved in the United States political games and to refrain from any measure which may lead to a deterioration of our relations with them.

6. Revolution Council, Ministers Meeting

LD142140 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 14 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] A joint session of the Revolution Council and the Council of Ministers was held tonight and discussed and exchanged views on various State issues. One of the decisions adopted was to expel all US mass media correspondents from Iran. According to a correspondent of the PARS News Agency, following the session, which lasted until 2100, Mr. Mo'infar, the oil minister, in an interview with correspondents, discussing the position of foreign media correspondents in Iran said: in view of the constant adverse propaganda of US media and those of some other countries, the tendentious role played by the correspondents of certain foreign news agencies, and bearing in mind the fact that these people convey a distorted version of reports on Iran and that they insult Iran's Islamic Revolution and those we hold sacred in their press and other media, the government has deemed it no longer appropriate to tolerate such agency correspondents and adopted certain decisions in this regard. Mo'infar added: The following decisions were adopted at the joint session of the Revolution Council and the Council of Ministers:

1. All the agency, press, radio and television correspondents of the aggressive State of America will be expelled from Iran.

2. Other agency, press and other media correspondents, such as the German and British media and other countries are warned that should they in the future pursue a tendentious attitude toward Iran's Revolution, distort reports on Iran and make false allegations against the Iranian Islamic Republic they will be expelled immediately from the State of Iran.

3. If the agencies whose correspondents have been expelled from Iran because of their tendentious attitude send another correspondent to Iran, and if the replacement pursues the same attitude, such agencies will be banned from operating in Iran and will not be allowed to send correspondents to Iran.

7. Deadline for Media Departure

LD151733 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 15 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] Pars News Agency reports that the General Department of Foreign Media in the Ministry of National Guidance has begun carrying out the decision made last night by the Revolution Council concerning the expulsion from Iran of all the US mass media correspondents and it has announced that this decision covers all American mass media, including news agencies, press and radio and television organizations. Furthermore, all foreigners who were associated in any

way with the American media—there are 86 of them—must leave the territory of Iran as quickly as possible.

In this context, it will be forbidden for any of these organizations to dispatch any kind of news after midnight tonight, 15 January. The deadline for the departure of these persons from Iran will be midnight Friday, 18 January.

In very special circumstances and for reasons that are very convincing, when an individual cannot meet the deadline for leaving Iran, he must report at the latest by 1200 on Wednesday in person to the General Department of Foreign Media of the Ministry of National Guidance in order to present the necessary explanations. Likewise, no one—either officially or unofficially—has permission to gather news for the American media organizations and this will be the case until further notice.

8. Possible Movement of Hostages

LD151900 Paris Domestic Service in French, 1800 GMT, 15 Jan. 80 LD.

[Yves Loiseau dispatch from Tehran.]

[Excerpt] There is again room for doubt this evening on the true place of detention of the American hostages. The revolutionary authorities of Tehran took draconian security measures to reinforce secrecy around the Evin prison to the north of the Iranian capital several hours ago. There is a formal prohibition on parking any closer than 500 metres to the prison, of traffic at night, and all gatherings are formally prohibited. As for the army and gendarmerie, they are to work together with the Revolution Guards to see that all those provisions are respected. In short, there is almost a state of emergency around the Evin.

I would remind you that a few days before Christmas a Revolution Council figure affirmed that some Americans has already been transferred to that prison. The Islamic students are denying it this evening, and thus the news is to be taken with reservations. But such a step would further aggravate the dispute between Iran and the United States.

9. Denial of Waldheim Mediation Role

LD161114 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 16 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] According to the Pars News Agency, the Foreign Ministry of the Iranian Islamic Republic has denied an AP report regarding the acting of Waldheim as a mediator. The text of the Foreign Ministry denial, which was made available to the Pars News Agency today, is as follows:

In His exalted name. One of the American news agencies has as usual engaged in falsifying news reports and has quoted United Nations officials as saying that the Iranian Foreign Minister has won Imam Khomeini's agreement on Dr. Waldheim acting as a mediator in resolving the present crisis.

It is deemed necessary to note that at no time and under no circumstances was a single word uttered regarding mediation and, in principle, such a thing has never been accepted or will be accepted by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. This report is an absolute lie and one which, unfortunately, Zionist elements have these days given greater dimensions to by falsifying news.

Meanwhile, Dr. Waldheim is requested to exercise greater control over his associates, for this is the third time that his associates have been quoted on such rumours. Thus the interests of the United Nations in the context of the present crisis dictate that such false reports be immediately denied by the United Nations Secretariat.

[Signed] The Foreign Minister of the Iranian Islamic Republic.

10. Gotbzadeh on Hostages, Shah

LD181056 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 18 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] Following rumours about Iran's readiness for talks on the release of the hostages, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs said in an interview today: No shift has taken place in Iran's stand pertaining to the extradition of the traitor Mohammad Reza and the return of his wealth.

11. Gotbzadeh on Hostages, Soviets

LD181220 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 18 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] At a press conference this morning the Islamic Republic of Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that no shift has taken place in Iran's stand on the extradition of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the return of his wealth. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was speaking following rumours about Iran's readiness for talks on the release of the hostages. In reply to a question by the Pars correspondent about the outcome of his talks with Waldheim in Tehran and negotiations on the release of the hostages, he said: The conclusion we reached after declaring our ideas and demands, at our talks with Waldheim, was that the issue of Iranian-US relations and the crisis which has come about consisted of three parts: firstly, the extradition of the deposed [Shah]; secondly, the return of his wealth; and thirdly, the release of the hostages. There were also talks about the fact that the United Nations and the Security Council have already discussed the third subject, that is, the release of the hostages. This is contrary to justice and we do not accept the opinion of the Security Council.

He added: Finally, it was agreed that the United Nations Secretary-General, in accordance with his powers, will set up a commission made up of acceptable individuals whose neutrality and honour is irreproachable so that they can investigate the crimes and deeds of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran and then place the results of their work at the disposal of the Secretary-General. The report on the work of this commission should be debated by either the Security Council or the General Assembly. Similarly, should the United States have any problem, then that too should be debated and a resolution, which could embrace the said three parts, should be adopted. In that case one could say that everyone would be duty-bound to implement all aspects of that resolution. This was all that he discussed with Waldheim and constitutes the results which we achieved. Unfortunately, however, the Zionists and imperialists are endeavouring to interpret that differently, while our stand has not changed in the least and the problem is the same as it was.

In reply to the question whether Waldheim would or would not make a stopover in Tehran tomorrow the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: I, too, have heard this report, but I have no official information on it. It was thought that Waldheim would set up an international commission to investigate the violation of human rights by, and the unlawful measures of, the former régime in Iran but so far he has not done so and apparently his efforts have been blocked by the US authorities.

Referring to another question about the hostages the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: Every time we decide to analyze the fundamental issues in this crisis all the moves, whether they be positions adopted or propaganda here and there, are intended to concentrate the issue on the hostages and to avoid other issues. As a result we constantly reject talks on this issue and believe that this crisis should be discussed bearing in mind all its aspects and the way out of the crisis should thereby be sought. The moment the United States and its friends understand what the issue at stake is and accept that it should be solved the crisis will be ended.

In reply to a question by the Pars correspondent on his talks with the Panamanian authorities, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: There are talks in progress with the Panamanian authorities on our demand for the arrest of the traitor Mohammad Reza. This has no connection whatsoever with the unbridled propaganda launched by certain newspapers on public opinion about the deposed Shah's wealth. This is because the question of public opinion does not arise here.

12. Gotbzadeh Interview

OW191008 Paris, AFP in English, 1004 GMT, 19 Jan. 80 OW.

Turning to the question of the American hostages being held in Tehran, Mr. Gotbzadeh repeated the Iranian stand that once the United States had returned the Shah and his fortune the hostages would be released.

He said that he had had a telephone conversation with the President of Panama, where the Shah was currently living in exile. He said the President had asked for details on Iran's demand for the Shah's extradition but had made no decision.

Le Figaro's correspondent commented that Mr. Gotbzadeh did not appear to harbour any illusions about Panama's attitude to the Shah.

13. Student on Hostages' Condition

OW191249 Paris, AFP in English, 1220 GMT, 19 Jan. 80 OW.

[Text] Tehran, 19 Jan. (AFP)—A spokesman of the "Islamic students" holding 50 American hostages here said today not a single hostage would be freed until "the Shah sets foot in Tehran and his possessions are returned to Iran".

In a two-hour interview with an Agence France-Presse correspondent inside the US Embassy, the spokesman, a Mr. Habib, claimed the hostages, entering their 75th day of captivity today, were well treated, "according to the traditions of Islam". Mr. Habib said the Americans, "about 50", were in good physical and mental health, were well fed, not tied and had access to fresh air and exercise. He added that they could write and receive letters.

The Islamic militants' spokesman ruled out any separate release of hostages. He said that though some had been classed as "less compromised", all the Americans "were part of the system and contributed to the spying" in one way or another.

Mr. Habib gave the impression the hostages had been interrogated individually.

The young, slow-speaking, spokesman confirmed that if the Shah, currently exiled in Panama, was not extradited to Tehran all the hostages would be tried in Islamic tribunals. He added that no deadline had been set by when they would have to stand trial.

Asked about their relationship with the Iranian Government, Mr. Habib claimed the "students" saw "no reason for contact with any organization whatsoever". He explained the government was "part of the administration with the same weakness and strengths" and that the students "dealt directly" with religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Mr. Habib said the students did not fear the United States would attempt a military operation to free the hostages. "The Imam says the US would not dare", he explained, adding that in any case the Embassy grounds were mined and captors, hostages and their liberators would all die.

The students felt the hostage operation was a success as "now everyone knows

the Shah is a criminal and the United States does not really defend human rights".

Their spokesman explained Iran "had put so much pressure on Washington" the US had been forced to "impose the Shah on their Panamanian stooge". He added that "Iranians had also been rallied against our main enemy, the Americans".

Speaking in an embassy office, plastered with photos of "martyrs of the revolution", Mr. Habib defined the students' aim as "eradicating all foreign domination, pursuing the revolution until Islamic values are well and truly established".

14. Revelation Statement No. 26

LD100048 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 19 Jan. 80 LD.
[Revelation Statement No. 26 issued 19 January by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.]

[Text] [begin recording] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. As you know the programme revealing the documents discovered in the den of espionage was interrupted after the last revelation programme and its resumption was left to the people to decide. If the people agreed with the continuation of these revelations, then they would continue. During the period since then, the people have announced their support for these expositions by demonstrations, marches, and by telegrams, telephone calls and letters to us. And they have asked these expositions to continue. During this period, the nation has expressed its affection and love for the student followers of the Imam's policy, more than what we really deserved. We are really unable to respond to this extreme show of love and affection and feel embarrassed. We do not consider ourselves worthy of this pure sentiment from this honest and sincere nation. But we try within the limits of our power and capability to perform our duty and God willing, in spite of the delay, our revelations will continue from now on.

About the revelations and the latest revelation you will hear now, as we have explained before, is related to the incident which [word indistinct] and this incident was against the Imam's policy. Generally we can recognize three movements and separate them from each other. One is the movement believing that in order to stay alive we should favour or lean toward one of the two superpowers in the world, and that without this relationship with one of these powers, be it East or West, we cannot continue to live. The incident we are about to reveal shows an inclination to the West and that we should have close relations with America.

If we consider the Imam's speeches before, during and after the revolution, and remind ourselves of his stance with regard to America, we see that the Imam has always confronted America, saying that our relations with America are the relations between the oppressed and the oppressor, the relations between the plunderer and the plundered and examples like these. But this incident, in a society in which a person who was duty-bound to follow the policy of the Imam, in spite of all this and in spite of the nation's will, which is the will of the Imam, was increasingly getting close to America.

15. Gotbzadeh Interview

LD 201556 Paris Domestic Service in French, 1200 GMT, 20 Jan. 80 LD.
[Interview with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadeq Gotbzadeh, speaking from Tehran, by Paris correspondent Yves Mourozi from Cannes—live.]

[*Question*] Mr. Minister, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, has arrived in New Delhi. He said this morning that during his talks in Tehran he had worked together with Iranian authorities on an overall solution which could make possible the release of the American hostages. Now, Mr. Minister, this release of the American hostages held since 4 November inside the embassy in Tehran, are we getting closer to it?

[*Answer*] (?If you allow me), I want to recall to some extent the history of Mr. Waldheim's visit here. It was at Mr. Waldheim's request, for what is called fact-finding [in English] that he came here, in an unofficial capacity. But we have portrayed this visit as an official one. I welcomed him at the airport. We had talks together lasting about six hours. He was received by the plenum of the Council of the Revolution. This was the first time that a foreigner was received by the Council of the Revolution, and we reached agreement on three essential points. First of all, was the establishment of an international commission by Mr. Waldheim which would inquire into the violation of human rights by the former régime in Iran as well as its illegal actions. Right.

At that moment, regarding what will follow [as heard], the decision of this commission will be voted on either by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Of course, that which the Americans' demand, too, could eventually be in the same resolution. Right.

We have waited some time for Mr. Waldheim to appoint this commission but unfortunately up till now this commission has not been set up. I do not know if Mr. Waldheim is the one who feels that the time is not ripe to do so, or, if there is American pressure on him, as I believe there is, then this international commission will actually not be established.

[*Question*] Yes.

[*Answer*] At any rate, we are waiting for the moment when Mr. Waldheim will in fact decide to appoint this commission, because at that moment there will be some movement in the matter and we hope that we shall reach an appropriate and just solution to this crisis.

16. Militants Issue Statement on Khomeini's Hospitalization

LD231424 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 23 Jan. 80 LD.

[*"Text"* of statement issued by Student Followers of the Imam's Policy following a report concerning illness of Imam Khomeini; date not given—read by announcer.]

[*Text*] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. That is because God would never change his favour that he conferred on a people until they changed what was within themselves [Koran verse].

Victorious Islamic nation, valiant Iranian nation, the Imam of the nation, the idol-smasher Khomeini, rose with all his resolute strength and, in continuing in the path of God's prophets, took the path of the Imam of martyrs and lord of freedom-lovers, Husayn ibn'Ali, peace be upon him. He brought about such a movement in the Muslim and suffering people that in the shortest time necessary they triumphed over a 2,500-year-old imperial régime, this great anti-God barrier, and they are now confronting their enemy number one, the great Satan, America.

*

Yes, this blood-soaked nation, thanks to the leadership of its soul, the soul of God, and thanks to his uprising and benefits derived from his uncompromising position against all the roots of oppression and polytheism, of blasphemy and division, opened the great gates of Islam's victory to it. Greetings to the soul and spirit of the nation, Imam Khomeini: greetings to the idol-smasher of history.

It would perhaps be nothing more difficult to bear for this dear nation and follower of the Imam's policy than to hear the news of the illness of its soul and its Imam. Even more difficult and grave it would be to learn that it is the pressure of all these divisions, disagreements and disputes that has brought such pain to bear upon its Imam's heart. Truly, let us hope that the Imam's illness does not stem from the unpleasant and crushing pressures owing to our behaviour and to divisions which stem from our selfishness and (?waywardness).

Is it right, at this crucial moment when our nation is facing its greatest blood-thirsty enemy, America, for us to jeopardize the foundation and secret of our victory, namely the unity of word, by raising differences of taste and minor issues? O ye, the boiling blood in the body of religion; O ye, the fabric of the Islamic nation; O ye, the fit of God to the oppressed; O ye, the Imam of the nation, the great Khomeini: what can we offer except our humble life as a sacrifice to your message, which is a call for justice, which is Islam and unity of word?

Our nation has no choice but to repent and redress the mistakes and our complacency to this God-given gift. Our nation has raised its hands in prayer before the great and glorious altar of God. We pray to the merciful, blessed God, to grant our deprived and oppressed nation its Imam's long life and health, this true embodiment of Islam and the nation. It is to be hoped that we realize our neglect and desist from our open and latent disputes and differences.

In this connection we ask all the struggling and faithful in the nation to prepare themselves tomorrow afternoon, Thursday, to hold prayers across the land. It is expected from all the different classes and strata of the people in all parts of the country, to take part in the prayers and thanksgiving ceremonies, and, with their monotheistic and (?sure) voice, pray to the mighty, exalted God for the health of the Imam of the nation and for continuation of his much blessed life.

O God, keep the Imam of the nation healthy so that he may lead and guide this revolution and the oppressed in the world, and so that he may protect Islam. O God, reinforce the unity of word which was the secret of the Iranian nation's victory and which is needed now more than ever before. O God, protect our Islamic revolution against domestic and external plotters, particularly against the great Satan, criminal America.

[Signed] Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

17. Foreign Ministry: US Making "Big Mistake" on Shah

LD232046 Tehran in English to Europe, 1930 GMT, 23 Jan 80. LD.

[Text] The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a statement has said that the United States is now making another big mistake which is delaying decision-making and the extradition of the deposed Shah of Iran.

The statement further says that if the United States does not take a timely decision, not only will it not be able to help solve the existing crisis in the area, but it will create other issues as well.

In the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has been pointed out that in the recent developments, the Americans—due to lack of recognition of the Islamic Revolution of Iran—are making mistakes again and again, whereas they should come to their senses and come to the conclusion that without the extradition of the deposed Shah, the existing crisis will remain unsolved and it will assume wider international dimensions.

In the statement published by the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, countries that are members of the European Economic Community have been asked not to be entangled in the trap set by the Americans, but to thwart the expansionist America and to quickly put an end to the existing crisis by the extradition of the deposed Shah to Iran.

18. Gotbzadeh Interview

LD240046 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1735 GMT, 23 Jan. 80 LD.

[Interview granted by Sadeq Gotbzadeh, Iranian Foreign Minister and presidential candidate, to unnamed Tehran radio presenter—live or recorded.]

[Excerpts] *[Question]* I would like to thank Mr. Gotbzadeh for taking part in this interview. So that the listeners may get to know the presidential candidates better, we are going to ask a number of questions, most of which the people have asked us by telephone and some of which have been drafted by ourselves, so that the political and social character and position of the candidates may become clearer.

As the first question, I want to ask you about foreign affairs, as at present you are officially in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These days a number of issues have been uppermost, such as the questions of America, the hostages, the deposed Shah, his extradition and the trial of the hostages; also the [word indistinct] which has arisen in relation with this problem; because when the problem of the hostages came about you were in the post of supervisor of radio and television, and radio and television were accused of creating, in some ways, through certain actions, a certain amount of confusion in relation to a correct action, for instance in issues raised in connection with the Security Council.

Would it have been possible to go to the Security Council, and through the assistance of the Security Council to extradite the Shah or to change the world climate or public opinion in favour [words indistinct] which I referred to before, that in your official position first in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and second as a presidential candidate, if you achieve this position through the votes of the people how will you act, what are your views concerning the various issues? The other question in connection with foreign policy is that of Iran's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, after what the Soviet Union has done in Afghanistan and bearing in mind the clear policy of the Imam on this issue. The other question I want to raise, so that you may answer all of them together, is the relationship between Iran's foreign policies and the liberation movements in the world, especially with the Islamic movements which exist in the world. We would like you to explain these issues.

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. I am very grateful for this comprehensive question which you have put, because my answers can clarify some of the obscure issues for the people with this final opportunity before the people make their choice. First of all, what are the goals of foreign policy as far as I am concerned? Our foreign policy, as well as our domestic policies, our social, economic policies, must be based on our ideology, must be based on our intellectual philosophy, if we believe in and are interested in our philosophy. In my opinion, the failure of the communist countries on the world scene, despite all the military power which they have had and which they still have, has been due to the fact that their foreign policies in particular have not been based on their ideology. The Machiavellian principle, that the end justifies the means, prevails in their policies. As we have made a new revolution in the world and have begun a new order in the world, if we believe that this system is a world system and should prevail throughout the world, we have no choice but to base our foreign and domestic policies upon our ideology.

However, let us go back to the points that you raised. First, the issue of the Security Council; and before that, let us go back to the issue of the students. At that time I was in charge of radio and television and they began a movement. I did not have the slightest information about the movement which they started. Mr. Mosavi Kho'ini telephoned me—it was about 1100, 1130 or 1200—and he told me that this movement was a genuine movement. They are our own children; therefore, you must assist them. At that time I was his colleague; we

worked together and I had confidence in him. Just because of what he said I decided that the students should be supported.

The interesting thing is that radio and television, in fact, made this issue into a public issue. It was radio and television which took this issue out to the masses owing to the wide publicity it gave it. This is a fact, as they chose the Imam's policy and made this part of their name—if you remember, from the first day I adopted the Imam's policy, and in fact I kept referring to the Imam's policy. Many people outside thought that I led these students, as radio and television were supporting them, that I led these people, that I aroused them and sent them there, and that I did all the work. While—and I have said this before but now I say it clearly—while I had no role in their action, I nevertheless supported their action totally. Meanwhile, on that day—it was a Sunday, I remember very well; what I am now going to say I am saying for the first time and it is right that the people should hear this, because they may not have another opportunity—on that day there was a Revolution Council meeting, and Engineer Bazargan and Mr. Katira'i were there. Although many people used to say that I was against Mr. Bazargan and (?prevented) his government from functioning, such talk which was not really true. They were lies. I tried to reform that government, I tried to give it a vision. I tried to make that government adopt more decisive policies. This was what I tried to do.

Unfortunately they had their own policies and their own methods. It is up to history to pass judgment on the good points and bad points of these policies, on the gainful and gainless features. On that day, I told Engineer Bazargan and Engineer Katira'i that this was a genuine movement [the students' action], that it was the duty of the government and it was in its interest to take the lead in this issue and to follow the issue with decisiveness. We got involved in the conflict with the United States which we were bound to have sooner or later. It was possible that in two or three months' time the government might have been obliged to do this, but now the people themselves had done it. Therefore, I told them, be careful that you do not show weakness, be careful that you do not take slow steps. Engineer Katira'i turned and said: We are the government. The government must observe international laws and regulations. I said: In any case, international laws and regulations have come to an end with this action. International laws and regulations cannot prevent it. You should not stand in the path of the flood or you, too, may be destroyed. They got up and left. Incidentally, the council did not meet that day because it did not have a quorum.

What happened later? There were the announcements of the instructors of Qom Seminary, of the students of religious studies, of the spiritual leaders, of the different Islamic societies. Some of them—most of them—even contained very rude swear words against the government. They contained heavy attacks. We discarded some of them, and also we only referred to the names of some of them. We practically did not read more than 70 per cent of them. First of all, there was no time. Secondly, it was not proper to read these swear words on the radio. However, the government was so weak and had adopted such a defensive role that it disintegrated as the result of the very first attacks. In this respect, radio and television purely reflected a general atmosphere which had emanated from the people. Everybody, especially the members of the government, said this was the plan of Sadeq Gotbzadeh to destroy the Bazargan government which he opposed.

[Question] My question in the main was in connection with the Security Council.

[Answer] I took this opportunity to explain a historic fact, for if I did not, then you would miss some valuable information concerned with the future. Well, the government fell and left the scene with (?me) taking the blame. As for those opposing the government, they never gave me any credit; only those supporting the government tried to discredit me. Those who opposed the government

claimed responsibility. Well, this was yet another point we had to tolerate. We did not respond, so I want to take this opportunity to respond, for there is a connection between this and the second point, namely the Security Council.

As for the Security Council, I did not believe in it, for all the propaganda we had hoped to make in the Security Council I managed to achieve after a week. I held a 30-minute interview with three American (?networks). Even if the Security Council had met, we would not have had such an opportunity. After all, I was fully aware of the situation, whereas the then foreign minister [Bani-Sadr] was not, for he could not speak directly to the American people. In any case, the propaganda media are so strange, they are so much under the influence of the Zionists that [words indistinct]. The measures taken since then and those that are being taken, the results of which you will shortly notice, substantiate the decision made not to attend the Security Council, that it should be the Security Council which should come and attend to our interests. God willing, you will see this for yourself, I promise you.

The whole problem centres on this point: now that we have come this far, now that we have been dealt all the possible blows . . . [he does not finish sentence]. From the very first day, I kept arguing at the Foreign Ministry that either we should not have started something or, now that we have, we must see it through, so that [words indistinct].

19. Spanish Deputy Recounts Visit to US Embassy

PA231901 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1739 GMT, 23 Jan. 80 PA.

[By special correspondent Nemesio Rodriguez.]

[Text] Tehran, 23 Jan. (EFE)—A Spanish deputy who went into the US Embassy today told EFE that the Islamic students informed him that the US hostages are being treated well.

Miguel Angel Arredonda, a deputy representing the Socialist Party of Andalucia, said the students told him that the treatment given the hostages is "absolutely correct".

Arredonda ate with 15 Islamic students—7 of them women—with whom he discussed the international situation. The deputy said that the Islamic students told him that the captives eat separately.

The students have formed a special committee whose mission is to insure that the hostages are treated well and to investigate their complaints so that they may be remedied. They told Arredonda that one of the hostages had once complained that the person delivering his food was placing it on a chair instead of on the table.

Arredonda said the people that are in the embassy are being fed from the supplies in the embassy's cold storage rooms. The students said enough food for six months was stored in the embassy.

The students occupied the embassy on 4 November last year.

The Spanish deputy said the students showed him photographs of the tortures inflicted on the Iranians by the SAVAK, the Shah's secret police. Arredonda said the pictures were "shocking".

Arredonda is currently visiting Tehran as a guest of the son of Ayatollah Montazeri [name and title as received], a member of the Council of the Revolution.

20. Carter "Agents" Charged with Forging Letters from Captives

PA252118 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 2018 GMT, 25 Jan. 80 PA.

[By Special Correspondent Nemesio Rodriguez.]

[Text] Tehran, 25 Jan. (EFE)—The Islamic students occupying the US Embassy today accused President Carter of "forging" the letters sent by the hostages to the United States. In an EFE interview, a student spokesman stated that "special agents" of Carter forged the letters to "distort the truth" about the hostages' situation and make the American people "fail to understand the Iranian Revolution".

The spokesman, named Rahimi, noted that the Islamic students have "good relations" with the hostages because "Islam teaches it", and the hostages are comfortable.

He added that the letters were taken to the United States by the delegation of US Indians who participated in the conference of liberation movements held in Tehran in January so that the US people "would know the truth".

Rahimi, who sat at a desk with Khomeini pictures on a board behind him, said the Iranian insistence on requesting the extradition of the Shah from the United States prompted Washington to send the former emperor to Panama, "a puppet" of the United States. The student, reciting his answers, said the hostages "will be pardoned" when the former Shah and his holdings are returned to the Iranian people.

"We continue to demand the Shah's extradition from the United States." If the Shah is not returned, he added, the hostages will be tried. This trial will be "the trial of the imperialism and all the crimes of imperialism will be presented in it".

He constantly referred to the hostages as "spies" and said no visits are authorized because of "security reasons". Rahimi said the students occupied the embassy when they confirmed that it was "a centre of espionage" to plan and direct conspiracies against the Islamic Revolution. "The United States is afraid of Islam", he added, "because Islam teaches the people to confront oppression."

Regarding the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Rahimi said the superpowers cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of the nations. The spokesman added that the Iranian people will fight against the Soviet Union if it threatens Iran.

The USSR invaded Afghanistan, he continued, because the superpowers are afraid that the revolutions for independence "will spread throughout the world".

The Islamic student, approximately 28 years old, described the external problems—caused by the superpowers and the "reactionary governments of the region—and the domestic problems: poverty, ruin and the economic collapse inherited from the previous régime as the most important problems for Iran.

Regarding the health of Imam Khomeini, Rahimi said the students hope he will recover in a week "in order to liberate the oppressed people from the crimes and pressure of the United States".

He added that Islam is not an ideology based on individuals but a movement in itself. There have been many Imams in the history of Iran, he said, and there will be more in the future.

The Islamic students displayed a book of pictures found in the SAVAK files showing the bodies of Iranians who were tortured by the former political police of the Shah. The mangled bodies of men and women with wounds all over them appeared in the pictures.

"SAVAK," they said, "used the most sophisticated methods of torture of the CIA and the Jewish secret police."

21. Ayatollah Beheshti Interview

DW251156 Bonn *Die Welt* in German, 25 Jan. 80, pp. 1, 7 DW.

[Clay Bienfalt undated interview with Ayatollah Beheshti in Tehran.]

[Text] The chairman of the Iranian Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Mo-

hammad Beheshti, exerts influence on all important decisions at the point where the political and the religious leaderships come together. Shortly before the presidential elections he granted an interview to *Die Welt* in the senate in Tehran. His most important utterance was the clear threat to sever diplomatic relations with Bonn in the event the Federal Republic supports the planned economic sanctions against Iran.

[*Welt*] Mr. Beheshti, who will be number one in Iran after the elections, the new president or, as before, Imam Khomeini?

[*Beheshti*] Only one man can be the leader. And in any case the Imam is the number one, and not only here and now.

[*Welt*] How independent are the Iranian politicians from the Ayatollah?

[*Beheshti*] Our politicians are fairly independent from Khomeini. They look into every matter, discuss it and make the decisions. But if Ayatollah Khomeini voices his opinion about certain topics, the politicians discuss the matter with him as well. In this case two things may happen. Either Khomeini leaves the decision-making to the politicians or, and this happens very rarely, he makes the decision himself. If and when he says what ought to be done, then the politicians have to do as he says.

[*Welt*] The people in the US Embassy have been held captive for nearly three months now. Where do you go from here?

[*Beheshti*] There may be some motion outside Iran. Mankind has experienced sudden changes time and again. This matter is not, however, on the agenda of every meeting of the Revolution Council. We have a lot to discuss, and this is not Iran's only first-rate problem.

[*Welt*] Could the Revolution Council order a release of the hostages or would the student occupiers of the embassy resist such an order?

[*Beheshti*] It is the Imam exclusively who can make a decision in this particular matter.

22. Bani-Sadr Reuter Interview

JN261931 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 26 Jan. 80 JN.

[Text] Dr. Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, who is thus far ahead of the candidates in the presidential elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has stressed that he will seek to rebuild the Iranian economy and resolve the issue between Iran and the United States.

In an interview with Reuter, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr explained the philosophy of national independence and nonalignment, as well as his policy of rebuilding the national economy.

Referring to the US hostages detained at the US Embassy since 4 November, he said that he will exert his efforts to put an end to this issue within the framework that guarantees Iran's independence. He reaffirmed that priority will be given to rebuilding the economy.

23. Bani-Sadr *Le Matin* Interview

LD301111 Paris *Le Matin* in French, 26-27 Jan. 80, p. 12 LD.

[Bernard Poulet 25 January "exclusive" interview with Iranian Finance Minister Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr: "We Will Help the Afghan People with all Means"—place not specified.]

[Text] If Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr is elected president of the Islamic Republic on Monday he has no intention of merely playing a ceremonial role. True, the Constitution seriously limits the president's powers but Bani-Sadr does not overlook the fact that he will be elected by the entire nation rather than by a

parliament. "A parliament will have to be elected within one month", he stated, "but I hope that it will be favorably disposed toward me because otherwise the country could well become paralyzed. The president's role as defined by the Constitution is limited. However, this applies to ordinary situations, not to a crisis period when there is no political structure, when there are no parties and when there is a need for someone who would be able to prevent any breakup or splitup. As soon as a parliament is elected the Revolution Council will be dissolved. However, I feel confident because the people have shown that they are unlike the image presented of them—that of people who vote like sheep. Contacts must be maintained with the people and this is why I intend to spend one month in every province in succession instead of setting up presidential headquarters in Tehran. The first measure which I intend to take is abolishing radio and television censorship to enable free parliamentary elections."

As far as foreign policy is concerned, he indeed intends to continue what he started during his short term of office as Iranian foreign minister and has pursued since his appointment as economy and finance minister. "We can reach agreement with Europe and Japan. This will be more difficult to achieve with the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—because they remain superpowers and, consequently, expansionist", he stated.

"For instance, with regard to the USSR, we will help the Afghan people, who are part of Iran [qui fait partie de l'Iran], by all means, including military means. I hope that the Russians will be prudent. They already have lost their image in Iran where no one believes any longer in noninterventionism.

As for the United States, there are also many problems, but the hostages affair could be settled almost naturally. Once the people show that they trust me there will no longer be any major difficulties because this is a minor matter."

24. Bani-Sadr Discusses Policies, Cabinet Makeup

LD301203 Tehran *Bamdad* in Persian, 27 Jan. 80, pp. 1, 3 LD.

[*Bamdad* correspondent Mohsen Mahmudi interview with president-elect of Iran Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr: "I Guarantee the Fundamental Freedoms"; date and place not given.]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with *Bamdad* correspondent Mohsen Mahmudi on the eve of his assumption of office as first president of the republic, elected by the Muslim and revolutionary nation of Iran, Dr. Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr gave his views on how the country would be administered, his choice of prime minister, the makeup of the cabinet and other issues of State.

The text of our correspondent's taped interview with the country's first president is as follows:

[*Bamdad*] What is your programme as regards the hostages? Do you consider it in the country's interests to put them on trial or to set them free?

[*Dr. Bani-Sadr*] The importance of this issue is that the attack on the embassy proves that this nation sees independence, freedom and Islam as one and does not want to see the shadow of domination by any power hovering overhead. In itself, the trial of the hostages is of no importance. No one in the world doubts that we have the ability to try and convict 50 American employees. In my view, it was the Americans' intention that these hostages would be ill-treated, so that they could spread their propaganda throughout the wide world, alienate the Iranian Revolution and prevent such a explosive incident from recurring in other countries.

However, our problem is to regain the confidence of the present generation, and for that reason the return of the Shah is important. If it were not for this, my view is that the punishment of the Shah itself is not of great importance. He is

now a wretched man: If he is brought from Panama, tried and punished, it will hardly merit an entry in the history books, where he will go down as a tyrannical ruler who was captured and punished.

What is of vital importance to Iran is how a nation stood up and rendered the superpowers of the day powerless to resist their demands. That is why, when I was at the Foreign Ministry, I tried to make, or rather I initiated arrangements for the deposed Shah to be returned. That was not possible, and it is still not possible unless we can make him, his crimes and his corruption the main issue.

When this becomes the main issue, even if we are unable to bring him back, our primary aim is attained; wherever he is and for as long as he lives, he will be the manifestation of the Justice of our cause. Then we will have no further need of the hostages; but if we do not succeed in this purpose, we will have these hostages on our hands and we will not know what to do with them.

25. Bani-Sadr Policy Toward West

LD271817 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 27 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] At a press conference in the presence of local and foreign correspondents Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr said today that our policy is to live outside the domination of superpowers and to co-operate for the general progress of mankind with European countries and other countries who want to have equal relations with us. We now draw your attention to a part of Mr. Bani-Sadr's interview [begin recording].

[Bani-Sadr] The gentleman's question concerns what our policy will be with regard to the West, particularly West Europe, and with regard to the issue of the hostages. We have answered this question on a number of occasions, and my election as president will not change this policy. Our policy is based on living free from superpower domination and to co-operate with European countries and other countries which want to have co-operation with us on an equal basis for the general progress of mankind. This is difficult for the superpowers because the essence of power is expansionism, for power becomes meaningless without expansionism. Thus as long as they pursue an expansionist policy our policy will be to confront and resist their expansionist policy.

As regard the hostages, our position is that the report filed by Reuter yesterday did not properly reflect my views on the matter. We regard this issue as one depending upon the main issue, namely US domination of Iran. Thus our main expectation is not only that the United States definitely change its attitude on its domination in Iran but that adequate safeguards be brought about to insure that it will (?in no way) interfere in our internal affairs in the future either. The moment the United States desists from its expansionist policy it will be a different matter, and then things will be set in motion, making it possible to say that a solution will be attainable.

*

It has been asked how we are to resolve the US Embassy crisis. The solution to the crisis is not entirely up to us; it concerns the Iranian Government only partly, the major part of the solution is in the hands of the US Government. It depends on when the US Government decides to tell the American nation and the people of the world that it is going to desist from its expansionist policy and domination over other nations, and when it concedes the right to our people to pursue criminals anywhere in the world. At that moment the ground for the problem's solution will also have been prepared.

At any rate, I hope that the formation of the government within the

framework of the new constitution will make it clear to the US Government that the determination of our nation to defend its freedom and independence is firm and that the proper way to solve problems lies in accepting and conceding the right-seeking expectations of the Iranian people [end recording].

26. "Student" Statement No. 98 Calls for Marches Against US

LD282306 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 28 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] On the occasion of the anniversary of the birth of the most noble Prophet, may God's blessing be upon him and his descendants, and the anniversary of the birth of Imam Sadeq, may God's peace be upon him, the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy have issued their 98th statement. The text of this statement, which was issued tonight, is as follows:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.

Once again, I repeat that you should know that you are facing such a power that if any negligence is shown our country will be lost. There must be no negligence. Not being negligent means that you should combine all your forces and that you should raise your voice against America. All your demonstrations should be against America. You should mobilize your forces and should receive military training and provide military equipment and should train your friends—Imam Khomeini.

The 4th of February is the anniversary of the birth of the illustrious Prophet, the messenger of truth, justice, jihad and peace; the great and true founder of humanity; the founder of Islamic brotherhood. It is also the anniversary of the birth of the sixth leader, Imam Sadeq, may God's peace be upon him, who was the embodiment of Islamic spirit and culture. We express our greetings to all on this occasion.

More than 1,400 years have passed since the blissful birth of the most noble Prophet—the Prophet who worked a basic transformation in order to advance humanity toward victory and light and to bring about the oneness of humanity based on exalted values and divine thoughts, and to turn humanity against inhuman values, against idolatry, blasphemy and irreligion. The blissful birth of the most noble Prophet became the cause of the downfall of tyrannical monarchs and the destruction of the foundations of the palaces of oppression and tyranny. It extinguished the fire of hatred and animosity and changed it into brotherhood.

Today, our valiant nation, under the leadership of the Imam of the nation, the great Khomeini, and in the light of the divine teachings of the illustrious Prophet of Islam, and in emulation of the early Islamic society, is moving toward the goal of rubbing the back of the world devourers with dust. The Iranian nation has inherited this ancient legacy from the blessed personality of the founder of its ideology, the most noble Prophet, and the Islamic teachings of his descendant, Imam Sadeq. If our enemies knew that our movement and our uprising for the sake of unity and brotherhood have been kneaded with the flesh and blood of this nation, and if they knew that the men of Islamic ideology and the followers of the school of monotheism are the champions of the field of battle and jihad, perhaps they would refrain from bullying and would reform their ways.

The original and revolutionary Islamic ideology that has become enshrined in the heart and soul of this arisen nation will at every moment make the fire of the Islamic Revolution blaze and will add to the movement and mobility of the nation's uprising. We honour the anniversary of the birth of the precious Prophet of Islam, which is a blessed day for the Muslims of the world and for all humanity, and in its honour we proclaim a day of public marches throughout Iran.

These marches will demonstrate the mobilization of all the forces and strata of

the Islamic nation and community and will manifest the greatness of the uprising and the depth of the wakefulness of the distinguished Iranian nation against the plots and conspiracies of the great Satan, the criminal America. The mobilization of the valiant Iranian nation on this blessed feast will take the form of a public march that will frighten America, this enemy of humanity, and will dispel the ignorance of the enemies as to the scenes of the enchanting and epic-making uprising of the beloved and brave nation of Iran.

We invite all the beloved strata and the valiant Iranian nation—young men and children, workers, farmers, shopkeepers, students, members of the clergy, the young and the old, men and women—to honour this blissful day in remembrance of the most noble Prophet and in commemoration of his blessed nativity. Let us try to repulse our dangerous enemy with the divine and powerful weapon of unity, whose sharp end is pointed at the heart of the enemy and that will set ablaze the mighty oceans of humanity. Let us wrest the executioner Shah from the supportive hands of our number one enemy, the plundering America, and prepare ourselves for his trial followed by the trial of the criminal leaders of America. Let us all unite together in obedience to the call of our Imam and rise together so that we can expel this germ of corruption, America, from the face of history. May God make firm our steps against the tyrants and idolators of the world and may He make us victorious over them.

[Signed] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

27. Bani-Sadr Press Conference

LD311609 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 28 Jan. 80, p. 3 LD.

[Unattributable report: "Within the Framework of the Constitution, Bani-Sadr Guarantees Political Freedom".]

[Text] "As regards prime minister, there are two possibilities. Either we can choose him without waiting for the Majles to convene or, since the prime minister has to work with the Majles, we could wait for the Majles election and let the Majles choose him, having regard to its composition and inclination in the matter.

Since it would seem sensible to allow the Majles to convene first, the election of the prime minister should be postponed until after the Majles election, when the Majles may better reflect the mood of the electorate."

At a press conference attended by numerous local and foreign correspondents yesterday, Dr. Bani-Sadr gave the above reply to a question from *Keyhan's* political correspondent.

Relations With the Leader.

In reply to the question "what will be your relations or those of another president be with the leader?", Bani-Sadr said: "The function of the relationship between the president and the religious leader has been determined, and I shall act within that framework. In addition, given the situation in which it is placed, the country is obliged to mobilize all its forces to solve the problems which confront it. For many years I have held the view—a view which has enjoyed success in Iran—that an informed clergy should unite with committed intellectuals and that they should apply themselves to the pressing demands and issues of the day and participate in solving problems. I hope that during my period in office as president this unity will attain perfection and that we shall be able to eradicate entirely the great problems which beset Iran."

The Students Following the Imam's Policy.

In reply to the question: "What do you think of the students following the Imam's policy and do you approve of them?", Bani-Sadr said:

One great truth underlies what they accomplished: They have become the manifestation of the people in expressing the truth that Iran does not wish to live under the domination of the superpower America; there is no conflict of conscience as regards the external independence of a country and freedom within the country both of them together constitute the one important fact that a country under the hegemony of another foreign power cannot enjoy internal freedom at home. Seen from this viewpoint, their actions embody the desire of all our people, and this is why they have received support. Now as for my approving of all their views—no! I would not like to live that sort of life.

Human beings must be free to have different approaches and hold different opinions. Regimentation may seem right to some, but others consider it wrong. The right thing is for these differences to be reconciled by free discussion and it is wrong that they should be used as weapons with which to crush one another. I hope that we shall choose the right way.

28. Resolution's Impact on Hostages

LD291834 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1653 GMT, 29 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] Kamal Kharrazi, political under secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who heads the Iranian delegation at the Islamabad conference, today said about the resolution of the Islamic conference with regard to the existing disputes between Iran and the United States that the resolution will make no difference to the American hostages in Tehran. He said there would be no compromise. The United States must return the deposed Shah, and after that the hostages will be released. Kamal Kharrazi said about the conference's resolution: We expected the United States to be condemned. The resolution expresses the hope that Iran and the United States would be able to end their disputes through peaceful means.

29. *Le Monde* Interviews President-Elect Bani-Sadr

LD291619 Paris *Le Monde* in French, 29 Jan. 80, pp. 1, 3 LD.

[Eric Rouleau interview with Iranian president-elect Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr in Tehran: "Iran Must Give Multifaceted and Particularly Military Aid to the 'Afghan people'"—date not specified.]

[Text] Tehran—Although the final, complete results of the 25 January election have not yet been officially announced Mr. Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr is already considered here as elected to the presidency of the republic. Moreover he is behaving as head of State without waiting for his investiture by Imam Khomeini, by whom he must be sworn in: since Saturday evening he has issued many communiqués and statements; on the evening of Sunday, 27 January, he gave his first press conference to several hundred Iranian and foreign journalists.

*

[Question] Are you going to help the normalization of relations between Tehran and Washington by releasing the hostages?

[Answer] The American Government must first publish a statement recognizing the crimes it committed in Iran through the imperial régime and our right to take proceedings against the Shah and his acolytes. It must also promise to henceforth respect Iran's independence and sovereignty.

[Question] You would then expel the American diplomats?

[Answer] The problem of the hostages could then be easily solved . . .

[Question] Several weeks ago you repeatedly said that you regarded the seizure of hostages as immoral from the Islamic viewpoint and harmful from the political viewpoint. However, you now impose conditions on the release of the captives. Could these be contradictory stances?

[Answer] I have always demanded that the US Government should issue a statement admitting its crimes against us but it is true that I did not previously link it to the release of the hostages. Since then, Iranian opinion has decided otherwise and it is impossible for us to separate the two matters.

[Question] Did the Revolution Council, of which you are a member, not agree to a very different solution with Mr. Kurt Waldheim: the formation of an international committee of inquiry in exchange for the American diplomats?

[Answer] I do not remember such a compromise. This may have been envisaged during talks between the UN Secretary and Mr. Gotbzadeh (the outgoing foreign minister). Personally, I do not like such deals which are based on blackmail. However, I cannot say anything definite on this question before consulting Imam Khomeini; however he is in no state to worry about this question.

[Question] The expulsion of American journalists from Iran has been interpreted as a measure aimed at reducing the publicity given to the hostages and, hence, to calm American opinion. Can you confirm that evaluation?

[Answer] I suspect that the Iranian authorities' intentions were less pure. Some people perhaps hoped to rig the elections and prevent me from becoming president; hence they tried to remove embarrassing witnesses. In any case I am on principle opposed to any limitation on freedom of speech. It was I who opened wide Iran's doors to the journalists and I intend to reopen them soon to representatives of the American press. Of course many of them have written abominable or ridiculous things about us but others have done their job honestly. However on the whole I think the experiment has been positive for us and for world opinion which understands better what is happening in Iran [answer ends].

*

[Question] What will become of the Imam's Islamic student followers after the American hostages are released?

[Answer] "They will continue to follow the Imam in their respective universities" (knowing smile). In other words, the new president would not tolerate decision-making bodies outside the State.

30. Militants on Hostages' Fate

TA300638 London BBC World Service in English, 0500 GMT, 30 Jan. 80 TA.
[From "Newsdesk".]

[Text] In Iran, a spokesman for the militant students holding the US Embassy has said the escape of six Americans from the country will not affect the treatment of the 50 Americans still held at the Embassy. Six Americans—four diplomats and the wives of two of them—were smuggled out of the country, posing as Canadian diplomatic staff. They left Iran last weekend just before the Canadian Embassy closed down on Monday. The six had been hiding since the students seized the American Embassy nearly three months ago. They have spent most of the intervening months at the Canadian Embassy or in the homes of Canadian diplomats in Tehran. There has so far been no official reactions from the Iranian Government, but the Foreign Minister, Mr. Gotbzadeh, has called a news conference for later today.

31. Beheshti on Hostages' Fate

NC301000 Paris AFP in English, 0957 GMT, 30 Jan. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 30 Jan. (AFP)—Iranian Revolution Council Secretary Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti said today that the fate of the American hostages held here since 4 November was "entirely in American hands".

Adding that Iran did not expect to "solve all its problems through the hostages", the Ayatollah said that the action of the Canadian ambassador to Tehran in smuggling out of the country six Americans who avoided being taken hostage "could" affect Canadian-Iranian relations.

Canada has "temporarily" closed its Embassy in Tehran and withdrawn all staff.

Turning to domestic problems, Ayatollah Beheshti said that "some people not exactly in line with the Islamic Revolution" were leading people astray.

This was seen as veiled criticism of newly-elected president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, known to disagree with the militants occupying the American Embassy over the hostages issue.

The Revolution Council secretary told journalists that once the council was dissolved, following parliamentary elections due in March, he would leave politics to "teach the new generations".

32. Gotbzadeh on Diplomats' Escape

LD301146 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1102 GMT, 30 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Foreign Minister of the Iranian Islamic Republic, has declared in an interview that the Foreign Ministry of the Iranian Islamic Republic did not have the slightest idea about the six Americans seeking asylum at the Canadian Embassy. Sadeq Gotbzadeh said: Last night we received a message from the Canadian Prime Minister through a third country in which the Canadian Government apologized to the Iranian Government for taking six Americans out of Iran. Gotbzadeh added: The message stressed that the Canadian Government took out the Americans with Canadian passports and forged Iranian stamps. The Iranian Foreign Minister provided some explanations in this regard to our colleague. We draw your attention to this interview [begin recording]:

[Question] Is this the Foreign Ministry?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Is this Mr. Gotbzadeh?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] We have heard in the news that six Americans have been clandestinely taken out of our country with Canadian passports. As the Foreign Minister, I would like to ask you how this could happen and whether the Foreign Ministry was aware of the matter.

[Answer] First of all I should say that we did not have the slightest idea about the presence of the Americans at the Canadian Embassy. And this was something nobody ever publicized. It seems—it has now transpired—that when a number of people were captured at the den of espionage a number of others managed to escape.

Apparently those who escaped went to the Canadian Embassy. We did not have the slightest idea of their presence there at any time. Meanwhile, there has been a problem here, namely that this is election time in Canada and that this action has been taken to help the ruling party win the elections. This was even communicated to us last night with the apologies. Another point is that the presence of these individuals should have been a matter for the country's

security officials, and this has nothing to do with the Foreign Ministry. Their departure also took place with Canadian passports and with forged Iranian stamps. Border officials did not realize this—of course we do not know from which border crossing they were taken out.

Today I made a couple of points to international correspondents. One was that the Canadian Government, by its very action, has engaged in an act of espionage in Iran.

They referred to this act of espionage as something to be proud of. This shows that so far our views with regard to international agreements, which are solely for the purposes of great powers and industrial countries, have been true. That is to say these countries, unfortunately, perpetrate all kinds of crimes on earth, and even pride themselves on the dirty things they do, but not a whisper can be heard about it anywhere in the world. However, as soon as a number of American diplomats are arrested here, then this is regarded as a violation of international conventions. Thus the least we could gain from what has happened is that, as far as we are concerned, these gentlemen can no longer tell us we have violated international conventions. This we will bring to the attention of the whole world; we will make it clear that they have always been violating international law. This is one thing.

Another point is that by its action the Canadian Government has proved that for the sake of its internal elections it is prepared to fan the flames of international crisis. The crisis that was going to end with a victory for the Iranian nation, they are trying, on the orders of their Zionist masters who, unfortunately, have a great deal of influence in Canada, to fan the flames of this crisis once again. Thus, as far as they are concerned nothing matters to them, even the greatest crime on earth. This is the character of these people.

Furthermore, I have stated that because of what they have done here the Canadian Government will be directly responsible for any harsh treatment meted out against the hostages. There is yet another point, namely that I once again gave an assurance today and told the foreign correspondents that the Canadian Government will sooner or later pay for its interference in our internal affairs for this duplicity and cheating.

33. Envoy to Canada Comments

LD011210 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1050 GMT, 1 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to a report from the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada, after many days of expectation by domestic and foreign reporters, Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Hoseyn 'Adeli, Chargé d'Affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada, eventually gave a press, radio and television conference at 1200 today [as heard] which was attended by more than 50 reporters.

Dr. 'Adeli said: Once again the world has witnessed a shameful violation of international laws and norms by imperialism and Zionism whose hand has, unfortunately, reached out of Canada this time. This irresponsible action by Canada which was carried out according to the plan of American imperialism is nothing but the violation of the laws which this country has pledged to observe. It is obvious that not only was this action not carried out on the basis of safeguarding Canadian interests, but it has harmed them, and was in the illegitimate interest of international imperialism.

So far, Iran has tried to show to the world that imperialism never has any respect for international laws. With this action which was planned from abroad, Canada has confirmed Iran's claim. Once again, we strongly condemn international imperialism and blame the Canadian Government which is responsible for this action for submitting to American pressures to violate Iran's sovereignty

and the Vienna Convention. It is better for Canada to defend its own national interests and to adopt an independent policy for itself.

Iran's Chargé d'Affaires in Canada, who is at the moment the only channel of communication between the two countries, said: Can anyone deny the effects of this foolish action by Canada on the foreign relations of this country, especially with the Muslim world?

Will the Canadian diplomats continue to enjoy their former support and respect in the world? Can they now be even called Canadian? Iran and Canada used to have good relations and Iran's great Islamic Revolution which aims at the creation of a great monotheistic society in which the rights and personalities of individuals are respected is not in conflict with Canadian interests. On the contrary it is fighting against Zionism and international imperialism.

In conclusion, while expressing his regret that the Canadian diplomats have abused the warm hospitality of the Iranians, Dr. 'Adeli said: Our Islamic Revolution, under the leadership of the great man of history, our Imam Khomeini, has brought American imperialism to its knees; and such actions cannot create a barrier in the path of the continuation of our struggle and revolution.

MORE ON ENVOY'S COMMENTS

LD312251 Montreal Domestic Service in English, 2200 GMT, 31 Jan. 80 LD.

[Text] Canada has once again received strong praise and equally strong criticism for smuggling six Americans out of the Canadian Embassy in Tehran. President Carter telephoned the Prime Minister to say that Canada had performed a heroic act, but Iran's acting ambassador in Canada angrily charged that the Canadian action would delay the release of the 50 hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran. The acting ambassador made the comment at a news conference in Ottawa. David Roberts was there:

Mohammad 'Adeli, Iran's senior representative in Canada, began his news conference by reading a prepared statement. He said his Government was deeply shocked that Canada had hidden the American diplomats and then smuggled the six out of the country. He said the plan was obviously organized by the CIA with Canada a willing stooge. The forging of exit visas and passports for the Americans was a scandalous violation of international law, one that would hurt Canada's relations with the whole of the Muslim world [begin 'Adeli recording].

This regrettable action does not serve the interests of Canada. Even more, it has certainly damaged these, and on the contrary it has served the illegitimate interests of international imperialism and Zionist [end recording].

After his statement Mr. 'Adeli answered reporters' questions. He said the Americans who were hiding in the Canadian Embassy would probably have been allowed to leave Iran if they'd gone to Iranian authorities. He maintained, despite denials from Prime Minister Clark, that Canada has apologized for the incident. The apology was delivered, he said, by a third party, but he wouldn't say if he'd actually seen such an apology.

Mr. 'Adeli's main point was that the Canadian action had delayed an arrangement that was under way to bring the release of the Americans still being held at the US Embassy in Tehran, but he wouldn't say what that arrangement was, when it would have come into effect, or how long it's been delayed [passage indistinct].

Mr. 'Adeli said the arrangement involved an international tribunal, the American and Iranian Governments, the United Nations, the Red Cross and Amnesty International. At times the Iranian envoy showed anger at reporters' questions, questions that related the legality of Canada's actions in Iran to the legality of holding 50 people at the American Embassy.

34. Students Issue "Lamentation" Addressed to Khomeini

LD011838 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1702 GMT, 1 Feb. 80 LD.

[“Text” of “Lamentation” issued by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Policy for the “Imam of the nation”—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. To the great Islamic leader, His Great Eminence Imam Khomeini. We do not see any need to reiterate the depth of the sorrows and the abundance of grief felt by your children. No, there is no need to verbalize them, for everyone is aware of them: The mountains, the deserts, the seas and the oceans; the sky and the earth and everything under it and on it; they all know. No, indeed, there is no need for them to know; for us it only suffices that God knows. Indeed, only He knows what goes on in our hearts. The only consolation for these anxious and restless hearts are the daily reports issued by the doctors treating you about the improvement about our Imam’s condition.

Indeed, O you leader. You told us not to be afraid of America, for there is nothing America can do. You proclaimed to our people that a greater revolution had been launched; that we must try to eradicate America, this source of corruption of the century, from the pages of history. You warned America: Do not scare us with the threat of military invasion, for we are men of war ready to be martyred. Do not threaten us with an economic boycott, for we will go on fasting and will not submit to indignity.

Indeed, oh you leader. We saw that America could not achieve anything at all. However, oh you leader, oh you Imam; oh you guardian of the oppressed in whose absence we have to take our grief and pain to the God of the oppressed, can we tell you, will the doctors treating you allow us to tell you, that during this brief period, when we have had no access to you what sort of attacks have been launched by those lying in wait?

In the chaotic world of politics, wherein some individuals entertain ideas of leadership, at times they accuse us of anti-divinity tendencies and at others of affiliation with this or that process. Their objective is to say that we are not adhering to the Imam’s policy. Some of these ignoble people, whose ugly faces have been revealed to our nation as a result of our revelations, are shamelessly and idiotically threatening us with manhandling, as if they are descendants of Genghiz and Reza Khan.

Those who have created for themselves a false personality behind the cloak of hypocrisy and deviousness have presented the revelation documents issued from this espionage den as baseless documents. What is more painful is that when US agents, who after the revolution, have taken the oath of allegiance, as before, to their overlords, are introduced to the people through evidence, the authorities feel no responsibility about the revelations made in connection with these mercenaries and continue to let them continue with their treacheries.

In the aftermath of your order, we have always said and will continue to say, that America must return the deposed and criminal Shah, as well as the wealth he has plundered, to the Iranian nation. Only then the nation, reducing the sentence by one degree, will agree not to put the hostages on trial and will release them.

Indeed, oh you leader, you Imam, oh you great Khomeini. It is only your order which should result in the extradition of the Shah, however, not through compromise, but rather in a revolutionary manner. For by applying attitudes of compromise, it is always the enemy which will vanquish us. The Iranian nation, both through the process of revolution and following the victory of the revolution, has repeatedly and decisively condemned these methods.

Oh you great leader of the revolution, we swear in your presence to God almighty, that we will remain loyal to your revolutionary path with everything we possess, that we will fight against compromise methods, so that the Iranian

nation may once again show America that it is determined to resist to the last drop of its blood like a soldier who is prepared to give his life in the battlefield of the nation of Mohammad. We proclaimed the anniversary of the holy Prophet as a day of public march throughout Iran. The Iranian nation on this day will cause the palace-dwelling men in Washington to tremble by shouting the slogan: We are all your soldiers, oh you Khomeini. We are ready to follow your order, oh you Khomeini.

[Signed] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

35. Bani-Sadr Interview

LD061317 Tehran *Ettela'at* in Persian, 2 Feb. 80, pp. 1, 2 LD.

[Mansur Taraji, 1 February, Tehran interview with Iranian President-elect Abolhassan Bani-Sadr: "Government and Revolution Council Positions To Be Clarified".]

[Excerpts] Dr. Seyyed Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, first President of the Republic of Iran, who caught a bad cold, received *Ettela'at* representative Dr. Mansur Taraji at his bedside yesterday morning and gave frank answers to all his questions on domestic and foreign issues.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES

[Question] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, what is your view of the occupation of the US espionage den and the issue of the hostages? What solutions have been considered for the release of the hostages, and in general how do you see future relations between Iran and America?

[Answer] My main concern is the universal preservation of the spiritual aspect of the message of the revolution of Iran, and the spiritual and clerical face of the Imam of the community. The effect of every problem and issue must be reviewed and analyzed in the light of this principle. What interpretation should be given to the world public view of the hostages issue? The meaning of the occupation of the former American Embassy and the taking hostage of members of the Embassy is that we disagree with a policy based on reaching an understanding with hegemonist power. This is an extremely important matter in contemporary Iranian history, since it is manifestly obvious that the age of American domination of Iran is over. As for the actual issue of the hostages: Were some of them spies, or not? What has not yet been made clear is that the nation of Iran is fighting not these individuals but American policy. We want American policy to change.

The Imam has said the same thing, namely that American policy must change perceptibly.

On the subject of the multiplicity of decision-making centres, the first president of the Iranian Republic stated his belief in these terms:

"If these decision-making centres, which have disrupted the country, pay no attention to warnings, we will appeal to the people themselves to determine their fate. In my opinion, the people are wise and mature, and they know that a multiplicity of decision-making centres spells danger to their country's existence."

36. Bani-Sadr Calls for Return of Shah's Wealth

LD032115 Tehran in English to Europe, 1930 GMT, 3 Feb. 80 LD.

[From the press review.]

[Excerpts] The *Jomhuri-Ye Eslami*, the organ of the Islamic Republican Party

of Iran, has reported that the people of Tehran will march from the mosques towards the den of CIA spies to mark the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad. The march has been called by the students following the policy of Imam Khomeini who have occupied the former American Embassy in Tehran.

Tehran *Times* has reported that Bani-Sadr yesterday called on the United States to return the wealth of the Shah's family to Iran as a gesture of good will to end the deadlock of the hostages held at the US Embassy in Tehran. The afternoon daily has quoted Bani-Sadr as saying that the US must block the wealth of that family as soon as possible so that the problem of the extradition of the Shah can enter into a more serious phase. [Words indistinct] that there could be no progress on the crisis in relations between Iran and the United States until the United States Government changed its policy the way that the Iranian people could see it was meaningful. Bani-Sadr said that if the students had taken the US diplomats hostage in spite of their diplomatic immunity, there was equally no tradition or contract in the world that enabled any country not to return to his country of origin someone who has committed genocide. The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran told *Ettela'at* also that the United States must [words indistinct].

37. Militants Interviewed on Hostages, Shah

LD040046 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2112 GMT, 3 Feb. 80 LD.

[Interview with anonymous Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy by announcer: date not given—recorded.]

[Text] [Question] It is now precisely three months since your revolutionary action. However, the question arises for many people as to when you will release the hostages, and, in principle, what conditions should be brought about so that the hostages may be released.

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Following the occupation of the den of American espionage by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, the demands that we enunciated stated our intention, namely, that the hostages, who are none other than American spies, should be held. They shall remain our hostages until the Shah and his assets are delivered to our nation by America. This action, in fact, was arrest and detention of a number of spies and traitors to the Iranian nation who were operating in our country under diplomatic cover. Since we had observed the signs of their crimes against our nation in our country for years, and since their hands were still at work in various ways to strike a blow at our revolution and to (?resume their domination), we resorted to this action and arrested these spies. The objective we stated was that if the United States returns the Shah and his assets to our nation then, as the Imam has said, we will release the spies by granting them a reprieve by one degree. From our point of view, they are the true traitors and murderers of our nation's martyrs. They are the same people who rendered our nation hovel-dwellers instead of being able to rely on itself and stand on its own feet. They subjugated our nation to America. They must be [word indistinct]. They have been arrested for trial.

But if America returns the Shah and his assets, if the Shah, this symbol of criminality and corruption, is returned to our nation, so that the Shah may be tried in Iran—an open trial under the republican régime—then, even though they are spies, they will be reprieved and may be returned to their country.

America must first bring the Shah and his assets back to Iran and then they will be released. To say that they should first be released and then ways be found enabling us to get the Shah and his assets is not a policy worthy of this movement. If America fails to deliver the Shah and his assets to our nation, they will be tried. A trial of these spies will, in fact, be tantamount to exposing the

nature of America, not only to our nation but also to all the nations the world over. It will identify the main enemy of our nation and all the deprived nations. If the Shah and his assets are returned to Iran the Shah will be tried, and then the nature of those who did injustice to this oppressed nation for years, who threw our country to the winds, and, as the Imam has said, who destroyed our villages but developed our cemeteries, will be recognized. So, the release of these hostages is contingent upon the condition stated in the first place, namely that America must deliver the Shah and his assets to our nation.

A matter I must again state here is that our nation wants the Shah and his assets from America, not from another country. As the Imam has said, our main enemy and the Satan of the century is none other than America. If America has taken the Shah to Panama, this has been done thanks to our nation's movement and pressure. America was forced to accept this defeat, otherwise, what America wanted was to keep him by its side in return for his services. But our nation's movement does not allow it to do what it desires. So America takes the Shah to Panama. Panama is a puppet of America. The State of Panama is in effect one of the American states. Panama occupies exactly the same position that Iran did under the Shah's régime. That is to say, whatever America wanted she carried out. This point is perfectly clear to us and the Iranian nation. We do not demand the Shah from Panama, but we want the Shah and his assets from America. And the condition for releasing the hostages is that America delivers the Shah and his assets to our nation in Iran.

[Question] Another question that is raised is why you have not taken any speedy action to get the Shah from America.

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. It is for Carter to take a range of speedy and crash measures in the deadlock he finds himself now, a deadlock in which lies his death. If Carter does not submit to the demand of the Iranian nation, by virtue of holding the hostages, are enjoying full initiative, and we are in a position of strength vis-à-vis America. This is patently clear, namely, that first, if the United States refuses to submit to the nation's demand and tries to sidestep it somehow, then naturally the trial of the spies will be started. The trial of the hostages is not something new. This is something America greatly fears because precisely with the start of the trial of the hostages America will be exposed. The antihuman and antimankind policies of America will be clear to the people of the world. For one thing, it will become clear to everyone that despite its resources, all its military might, all its vast economic resources and, particularly, all its Zionist propaganda apparatus, America is unable to get the hostages back from the Iranian nation. Furthermore, its nature will become clear to everyone. Its traitorous nature, its ugly face, its plundering nature, its murderous nature—all this will become clear to the people, and this is something extremely costly to America. Thus, by holding the hostages we have the initiative and we are in a position of strength. So, we should not, that is to say, there is no reason for us to take any speedy measures.

It is Carter who is losing because, on the one hand, the movements in the region, thanks to Iran's movement and Islamic Revolution, are revolutionary movements in a conscious manner and they are on the verge of ending the vital interests of America in the region. Thus, America is losing on this score as well, that is to say, America's vital interests in the region are facing a serious danger. Well, the Carter administration must somehow control this process so as to prevent it from spreading and endangering its interests. So, this is yet another matter, namely, that Carter is compelled to this crisis in relations between Iran and America.

Of course, from our point of view there is no crisis because what we say is the same, it is constant and we are firm on it, namely, the extradition of the Shah. It is America which has to be anxious, and is anxious, trying to settle the matter somehow.

We should bear in mind the Koranic command that if our confrontation with America should result in actual fighting and killing, we would win. We shall continue this path, continue with decisiveness, and, in accordance with the Koranic command I cited, humiliate America, destroy. God's punishment meted out at the hands of the fighting nation to the criminal American Government and the Muslim nation's victory are all none other than what God has promised and divine tradition. With this belief we shall stand on our word. We remain firm on our word and we are ready to give our lives in this path, in the same way that during the revolution to get the Shah out of the country and to overthrow the satanical régime many of the Muslim brothers and sisters gave their blood. The same applies today. Nothing has changed. The Iranian nation has not changed at all. And the Imam will continue his leadership from the hospital with great firmness and decisiveness. Thus it is Carter who must evaluate his position and seriously think about what he is to do. We have the initiative.

[Question] The third question concerns your announcement yesterday in which you mentioned that a revolutionary style would be employed for the return of the Shah. What do you mean by revolutionary style?

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. During this glorious struggle of the Iranian nation against America, two styles were proposed: The revolutionary style of those who really follow the path of the Imam, and second, the non-revolutionary style, which is not truly the Imam's way. The battling nation of Iran, by taking the Imam's path—the revolutionary style that certainly the Imam has expressed against the régime and against America—has benefited and advanced to this point. It is certain that non-revolutionary styles, which are in fact paths by which America can again penetrate our country and return again to its old bases, have not been supported by the nation. The revolutionary styles are those that are displayed by the Imam. We declare that our tie to America has been the tie of the oppressed to the oppressor. The declaration that we want to make to America is that there is no room for negotiations in our relationship with America, because the solution of this issue simply does not require negotiations.

The revolutionary style is different from that. It is a style that America, our nation's No. 1 enemy, does not recognize.

America, the fundamental enemy of Islam, does not recognize it. We embrace the theory of the Imam's way. In this struggle with America (we must all follow the revolutionary style). In fact, non-revolutionary practice permits America to penetrate and it may be able to re-establish its interests in this country. The thing that America believes in, what it likes to employ, is something that will not diminish the status of America and not cause it to lose face. This involves such things as sending Mohammad Reza to Panama, so that the investigation of him has to be done by way of Panama, and international institutions and courts convened by America to investigate the shortcomings of Mohammad Reza. This is the style that America has in mind and for this reason the nation of Iran will not use it. The nation of Iran will use the revolutionary style, the one shown by the Imam. And that means that America must return to Iran Mohammad Reza and the things that he took with him. Then, after this return, the spy hostages who are at the disposal of the nation will be given a one-step reprieve and be returned.

[Question] Another question in the same vein concerns the impact of this revolutionary style. That is, to what extent are you interfering in administrative affairs by carrying out your revolutionary style?

[Answer] We are not interfering in the administration of affairs. We simply do not believe in interfering in the administration of the country. In fact, we are not a group or special organization that for reasons of special interest tries to interfere in administration. [Words indistinct] the position of the Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, the direction of their effort and the basis of their

views stems from the principle of not interfering in administrative affairs. We see this as our duty and this is our understanding of the matter.

[Question] The next question: While you have decided not to interfere in administrative affairs, weren't your objections to the participation in the Pakistan conference a sort of interference?

[Answer] There has been no thought that the expression of opinion based on our contacts, our knowledge and our understanding of this matter—this is in no way interference. Since we—well, look: the Revolutionary Council decided to send a representative to the Islamic ministers' conference; then we decided to prepare an announcement and in fact we were not in agreement with the decision of the Revolutionary Council. But this cannot be called interference. It was just the declaration of another point of view. As we have said, we should make it known when we are in favour of or opposed to something; such matters should be aired so that the issues will be better understood and better decisions will be made.

The reason for this conference was basically that America was very afraid of the peaking of the demonstration, the peaking of the struggles of the oppressed nations, especially the Muslim nations of this region.

All the attacks in this region were directed toward the United States. You know that the US Embassy in Pakistan was set on fire and other US embassies in the region partly closed down, with reduced or no activities. In countries such as Saudi Arabia a revolution similar to that of Iran's is peaking in protest against the country's puppet régime. There are similar signs in Pakistan and Iraq. In order to control these anti-American movements, the United States planned a very complex tactic by employing a deceiving style.

This style involved finding a way to change the public's anti-American opinion to an anti-Soviet one. Now the Soviet Union has provided grounds for this by its military intervention in Afghanistan. We must mention here that from our point of view the Soviet military intervention and the military takeover of our Afghan brothers is completely wrong and we condemn it. Our revolution is a school, it is a revolution against tyranny and it should engage against any figure or any government in whatever part of the world they happen to be if they are cruel and decide not to respect humane standards. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is one example and we condemn it.

The problem is to identify our main enemy. As the Imam has said, our main and No. 1 enemy is the United States. The United States is trying to shift the struggles of the nations of the region against the Soviet Union. This conference was in fact organized for this main purpose. This conference was arranged on China's recommendation and Bangladesh invited the Islamic countries to participate. The conference was held in Pakistan, where the attack against the US Embassy took place, in order to destroy the effects of the anti-American movement. If you see the resolution issued after this conference, there is no mention of the United States. All the articles in this conference are concerned with the Soviet Union and its military occupation of Afghanistan. Well, our duty now is to support the movement of our (?Muslim brothers) in Afghanistan, but we must not forget our main enemy, who is determined to destroy us somehow. There is no reason to forget our main enemy and aim our attacks at a different target while the main enemy is in a safe position.

Besides the conference, there was Waldheim's trip to Iran; he thought there were some changes taking place in Iran at the time and perhaps he could solve the problem, direct these changes towards a compromise. All these moves are connected with each other; that is, first, the United States wants to solve the matter between Iran and itself peacefully and, second, it wants to shift the anti-American struggles to struggles against the Soviet Union. Our nation is firm and is keeping its word and, as the Imam is controlling the matter from the hospital, we are sure none of these plots will be successful and we will reach our goal.

[Question] The next question is about the documents that have been exposed by you so far. Has the exposure of these documents been fruitful and to what extent have they been able to promote the goals of our Islamic Revolution?

[Answer] Naturally, by taking over the espionage den some documents indicating the US plots and interventions against our Islamic Revolution were discovered. As we have said many times before in our interviews, most of these files and documents had been destroyed. One of the hostage spies was saying that he himself had destroyed many documents concerning the US intervention in Kordestan.

As for the documents that remained, we started to translate and to expose them. Well, while starting on its new course in continuation of its Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, our nation is going to knock the United States down; the revelation of these documents will assist the struggle by exposing the American bases in Iran and the points through which the United States penetrated our country and was going to control our fate by governing us. With the exposure of these documents our nation will recognize American connections among the Iranian people and the nation will fight against such agents.

One of the important points discovered against the struggle of our nation involved the compromise affair, which was perhaps the greatest blow to the United States during our revolution. Because they, unfortunately, are not co-operating with us in the revelation of these documents. After all, by exposing these documents we are trying to increase the awareness and knowledge of our people so as to progress toward the final victory of the revolution as fast as possible, as this is the Imam's opinion. Groups and parties which are Islamic ought to assist in the analysis and expansion of these revelations because this is a struggle against the United States but they do not help.

For example, we exposed the *Bamdad* newspaper and showed how the United States was taking advantage in that affair. Groups, parties and individuals do not show a revolutionary response toward the exposure of these documents. We expected all the Islamic groups especially those forces which are the future hope of the nation—Qom Seminary, Qom Teachers' Society and other groups—not to allow the establishment of such affairs as were exposed; we expected all these groups not to permit publication of *Bamdad* again.

As for the groups that claim to be anti-imperialist experts and do not see us, the Muslims, as people who can stand up to the United States and continue to accuse us, if these groups are so much against the United States why are not they joining us in this fight? Perhaps they are not sufficiently able to recognize anti-American affairs as to come on and prohibit *Bamdad* newspaper. Or perhaps there is a trick involved and they themselves have their hands in such affairs as that of *Bamdad*.

There were people who criticized us when *Ayandegan* newspaper was involved; now they have seen that *Bamdad* is an American newspaper but why are they not saying so? It is certain—or we are nearly sure—that if our nation is not taking action itself to close *Bamdad's* office it is only because they want to prevent chaos. Therefore they have left it to the responsible authorities to decide on this matter and to act in a revolutionary manner.

[Question] There is a question about the escape of six Americans. Would you please state your opinion?

[Answer] This is another of Carter's actions. As the American policy depends on this sort of inhumane and espionage act, each individual spy has a valued role in support of the government. It was a great blow to Carter that his experienced and talented spies were taken hostage by our nation. Therefore, he arranged the escape of several of these spies, who at the time of the takeover of the espionage den were not there, had hidden somewhere, so as to use them again to carry on with his inhumane policies. Basically, this is the way that the imperialist United States effectively uses its spies—to divert revolutions and oppress national

uprisings. If we remember the role played by US spies in Latin American countries, we realize how important these spies are to the United States.

[Question] The next question is about a [presidential] candidate, about whom you issued a revealing statement 48 hours before the start of the voting. There are several questions: whether this exposure was performed by you, or was it a shock, as some people say? Also, why did you make that announcement so late and why was your statement not broadcast by the radio and television? There are a lot more questions, such as why you do not go through (?channels).

[Answer] We say clearly that if a document is found and provided we can figure out the code, if there is one, then when it is translated we announce it to the nation. If a file is complete, then we announce it. There is no question about this. As for the document concerning one of the presidential candidates—we have clearly stated that a document which is complete is usually exposed to the public irrespective of the time. It might be midnight or morning when a document is completed and then it is announced immediately. Some people have said that this document was forged. When a document is exposed, if it is about a particular person there is nothing that person can say about it. The only option open to the relatives of such a particular person is to deny the document, to say that it was forged. None of us is a forger. Neither is the nation. This matter was (?too trivial to involve forgery). To say that file was forged is a calumny; a Muslim [words indistinct].

As for why the exposure was not announced by the radio and television, this is also a question we have asked. Apparently, there were some regulations concerning campaigning for the candidates that did not permit the broadcasting of the document. Anyway, it is not up to us to answer that question. You should ask the radio and television authorities about it.

[Question] The last question concerns rumours that some of the students in the US Embassy are not Muslims or that they are communists. Will you please explain?

[Answer] This is also a calumny, such an accusation against the Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy. Because of our movement, some circles in the United States and Carter himself are trying to isolate us by spreading such accusations. The first calumny uttered by Carter was to say that those who have occupied the Embassy, this centre of diplomacy, are a handful of terrorists. When our movement was supported by all our nation and the oppressed nations of the world and after the seminars of the world liberation movements and their clear declaration of support for us the world realized that a terrorist group could not have so much support. Then [words indistinct] it was asked whether all these people were wrong and Carter was right? The answer to this question was obvious. Carter then accused us of being communists or non-Muslims. This follows Carter's same sinister aim of turning the Muslim people of Iran against their youth. And other people who see any movement against themselves—they blame communists for it. The biggest and most dangerous enemy of Carter and the imperialists is Islam. It is Islam that condemns both the oppressor and those who surrender to oppression; it is Islam that gives the oppressed nations sufficient strength to sacrifice their wealth and lives in their struggle; it is Islam that says: Life is belief and holy war. They do not know Islam and think that the enemy is only communism, while the real enemy, the one that will certainly defeat the imperialist America through means of a revolutionary culture, is Islam. It was Islam that brought together all the believers and made them revolutionaries so as to eradicate an old and powerful régime in a short time. This sort of accusation is made by Carter to isolate our movement. His accusation will have no effect.

[Announcer] Thank you for participating in this interview. We hope that you will be able to continue your way to final victory with assistance from God and the struggling nation of Iran.

38. Message from Urumiyeh Guards

LD031337 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 3 Feb. 80 LD.

[Statement issued by the Urumiyeh Guards Corps in connection with the letter of lamentation released by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Student brothers and sisters following Imam's policy stationed in the US den of espionage: your message of grievance to Imam Khomeini, helper of the oppressed, has touched the hearts of all the nation of Iran and our own. For a long time the whispers of opportunists and traitors has been heard behind their pseudoclerical and pseudo revolutionary utterances against you, brothers and sisters. They have taken advantage of the Imam's illness and have intensified these cowardly attacks. These are the profiteers who took no part in the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran but are reaping the fruits of the nation's revolution. They are in no way following the Imam's policy and do not abide by his words or act on them. They are severely frightened by your brave revelations which directly endanger the interests of world-devouring America and the opportunist compromisers.

We support your rightful efforts to create an Islamic revolutionary movement and to expose the traitors and deviationists with all our might. We ask you to refrain from individualism, from being influenced by high-ranking officials and from falling when you should react [as heard]. We ask you to continue your Islamic movement following the policy of the nation's Imam, iconoclast Khomeini, the following of his guidelines with awareness and diligence. May God assist you.

39. Khuzestan Guards Corps' Support

LD032044 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 3 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps of Khuzestan issued an announcement today following publication of the text of the lamentation statement of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and following the televised interview with representatives of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy. The text of the announcement is as follows:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Brothers: We have heard your message so full of pain and feeling. This message recalled the complaint with which we were so hard pressed for months. Many times and with various presentations using the headline of "under the domestic agents of imperialism", we reminded the responsible authorities that these descendants of Reza Khan, these inheritors of Ghengiz Khan, harassed our Khuzestan during the days of their authority. They also tried to tie us up in knots, because we had recognized their anti-Islamic nature.

Yes, your disclosures have revealed the ugly face of these despicable people for our nation. Persons who would compare the struggle for development with the nation building camps [during the Shah's time] can be expected to describe the documents revealed in the American espionage centre as unfounded.

Yes, the most painful issue is that the agents who have sold out to America—and who even after the victory of the revolution swore an oath of allegiance to their masters—are being identified to the people through the citations in the documents. But those who should be responsible in these matters do not express their responsibility, and the authorities still give them permission for treason.

This is a warning to the Muslim nation of Iran that if you are not attentive on a continuing basis to the institutions of the revolution, and if you do not demand

the fulfilment of duty, then our revolution will draw more blood. With widespread publicity, these mercenary agents will cover their ugly faces, and they will introduce their mercenaries as the hope of Iran.

On the anniversary of the return of the Imam and the birthday of the greatest prophet and the anniversary of the revolution's victory, let us undertake even more disclosures of these devil-like forces. The responsible authorities should take their responsibilities more seriously and take the matter in hand.

Death to the great devil, America!

Glory to the only champion of the underdogs, the great Khomeini!

Rise to overthrow the elements that have sold out to imperialism!

40. Students on Hostages' Release

NC041012 Doha QNA in Arabic, 0925 GMT, 4 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 4 February—Leaders of the Iranian students have emphasized that, regarding the fate of the US hostages, they take orders only from Ayatollah Khomeini.

They said that the Ayatollah still supports them and will continue to do so until their just demands for the return of the Shah for trial are met.

The student leaders expressed appreciation for president-elect Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and voiced their willingness to help him within the limits of his duties, which are listed in the constitution and which, according to them, do not include the question of the hostages. This issue, they said, is not one of the numerous tasks and responsibilities of the president of the republic.

In an interview with the Abu Dhabi newspaper *Al-Ittihad*, published today, the student leaders announced their absolute and categorical rejection of any present or future idea about the formation of an international commission abroad to investigate the crimes committed by the Shah. They stress that the Shah must be tried on Iranian territory and by an Islamic court.

They also say that they will not release the hostages, whatever the justifications or the consequences, until the Shah is handed over for trial and the funds which he smuggled abroad are returned.

In their interview with *Al-Ittihad*, the Iranian students say that if the United States insists on its position of not handing the Shah over and not returning his funds, then the US hostages will be brought to trial as spies. We have documents which prove this and which incriminate them strongly, they maintain.

Meanwhile, the paper says that Iranian president-elect Bani-Sadr is very much in favour of settling this problem but he is not in a hurry to do so. It adds that the Revolution Council members have agreed on a number of alternative solutions to this problem, taking into account local and international considerations, and that they will submit them to Ayatollah Khomeini.

Al-Ittihad also says that Bani-Sadr is trying to avoid a confrontation with the students holding the hostages, but such a confrontation may become inevitable if Ayatollah Khomeini declares support for the position of the president-elect and the students reject it.

41. *Ettela'At* Publishes Interview with Students on Hostages

JN052012 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1915 GMT, 5 Feb. 80 JN.

[From the press review.]

[Text] *Ettela'At* newspaper has published the text of the press interview with the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy in which they spoke about their invitations to 50 well-known US correspondents and professors of universities and educational centres to become acquainted with the facts about the Islamic Revolution and to listen to the oppressed Iranian people.

One of the students said: After the occupation of the den of espionage in Tehran, the United States disregarded our call for liberation and the issue of handing over the deposed Shah and spoke only about the hostages. Unfortunately, there came the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan and the convocation of the Pakistan conference, checking to a certain extent the sensitivity and actual importance of our revolutionary action. Therefore, and in order to reflect the picture of our revolutionary march and make our voice reach the US people, we decided to invite a number of university professors and experts of the US community to come to Iran in order to become acquainted with our revolution and to brief the unaware masses in the United States on the nature and originality of our revolution.

Ettela'At adds: Despite the dangers they may be exposed to from their Government, these personalities have accepted the invitation.

One of the students said: The subject has nothing at all to do with the issue of the hostages.

Ettela'At published a story on the international committee and said: The members of the international committee, which will be formed in Tehran with the approval of the Revolution Council to look into the deposed Shah, will be elected under United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's supervision. The number of members and the date of this committee's meeting will be chosen from lawyers and well-known international personalities.

The Foreign Ministry official spokesman said that if Waldheim wants to choose a number of Americans for this committee, then the matter is up to him. He added that the formation of the committee will influence the issue of the hostages.

He said: There is a strong probability that the committee will be able to restore a part of the Iranian peoples' wealth, which was plundered by the ousted Shah.

42. Revelation Statement No. 30

LD052133 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1720 GMT, 5 Feb. 80 LD.

[Excerpts] As announced in the course of this bulletin, the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy in their Revelation Statement No. 30 tonight disclosed documents relating to contact between Naser Minatchi and the American den of espionage. We draw your attention to the disclosures by the Muslim student followers of the Imam's line [begin recording—all unidentified male speakers].

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. One of the results of the capture of the den of espionage was the capture of certain documents which show America's interference and the channels through which America infiltrated into matters concerning our country's internal affairs. As we have explained to the dear Iranian nation on several occasions, we regard these documents as belonging to the Iranian nation, and we regard it as our duty to make all these documents available to the heroic Iranian nation. So far, through the documents we have disclosed we have been able to expose a series of events which were moving against the course of the revolution and against the Imam's revolutionary path. The documents disclosed indicated the fact that these developments were necessarily moving in America's favour and direction, or were going to do so, if these events were not eliminated and thrown off the revolutionary path of the Iranian nation.

One of the documents we disclosed concerned Mr. Abbas Amir-Entezam and the related matters which, unfortunately, prevailed after the [words indistinct] was controlling the revolution, as it were.

Tonight, too, we have several documents which concern Mr. Naser Minatchi and which could be said to concern the continuation of a situation which is contrary to the Imam's line and that of the revolution. In addition to the documents which are the matter in question now, we should inform the dear nation that, in continuation of [words indistinct] press which were disclosed earlier, we came across a document recently which again concerns the newspaper *Bamdad*. This document will be disclosed tonight. Before disclosing the other documents, the one concerning the newspaper *Bamdad* will be read first and the other ones later.

The document that concerns the newspaper *Bamdad* is something to the effect that the Deputy Prime Minister [Bazargan] made contact with [name indistinct] and places at the disposal of this newspaper a document on behalf of Mr. [name of title indistinct]. The paper then proceeds to publish the document and subsequently the United States or the den of espionage objects to it. According to the officials of the newspaper themselves, [words indistinct] but because of the fact that the newspaper itself confirms that it was compelled to publish the matter and then apologize to the American Embassy for publishing it. Now we will draw your attention to this document. [Passage omitted containing purported text of US documents.]

Well, the foregoing was a document concerning the newspaper *Bamdad* and a follow-up on previous disclosures. As for the documents relating to Mr. Minatchi: the first document is one which we have captured from the CIA central reference bureau [daftar-e markazi-ye moraje'at-e CIA].

This is a special CIA bureau (? in) the American den of espionage. As you can see, this is the English text of the document and the name underlined as that of Mr. Naser Minatchi. On the righthand side you can see the special emblem of the CIA. [Passage omitted containing purported text of US documents.]

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Here is another document from the US Embassy, Tehran, to the State Department, Washington. [Passage omitted containing purported text of exchange of messages between the US Embassy in Tehran and the State Department.]

Here is another document, which you can see, from the US Embassy, Tehran, to the State Department, Washington DC. [Passage omitted containing purported text of exchange of messages between the US Embassy in Tehran and the State Department.]

Here is a document regarding the reports supplied by Mr. Minatchi to the American Embassy about the Imam's schedule for arriving in Iran and [words indistinct]. The document reads something to the effect that Minatchi said Khomeini's family will arrive on the same plane as the Ayatollah, and that they will reside in a house in Dowlat Street, as reported earlier.

There is a question here, namely that one must ask Mr. Minatchi whether the arrival of Khomeini's family in Iran has anything to do with the American Embassy for him to discuss the matter with the American Embassy. It is not clear to us what motive he has had in discussing the matter with the American Embassy [here begins voice of another male speaker].

Here is yet another document from the US Embassy in Tehran to the State Department, Washington DC. [Passage omitted containing purported text of exchange of messages between the US Embassy in Tehran and the State Department.]

43. Bani-Sadr *Keyhan* Interview

LD081743 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 6 Feb. 80, p. 12 LD.

[Unattributed report: "President Dr. Bani-Sadr: The Student Followers of the Imam's Policy Have Created a Government Within a Government."]

[Text] In a conversation with *Keyhan* concerning the disclosures by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and the arrest of National Guidance Minister Dr. Naser Minatchi, first president Dr. Seyyed Abolhassan Bani-Sadr condemned the students' action, which he termed "egoistic".

In this connection, Bani-Sadr said: "How can one govern a country when a number of individuals who go by the name of the 'Students Following the Imam's Policy' act in a self-centred manner and create a situation in which a government within a government is in evidence?"

Anyone who considers himself a follower of the Imam's policy should toe the Imam's line.

A law-court is the place where issues are investigated and where, after guilt is proven, [words indistinct] being ruled by chaos, which at this juncture is to the detriment of the State and the revolution.

But it may be that these children are acting as they do with good intention, but the result is that we find a number of them who harbour ill will and play havoc with people's reputations.

With the situation that has been created, how can one expect a civil servant to work diligently, with confidence and in safety?"

In the discussion with *Keyhan*, Dr. Bani-Sadr also said: "When the judiciary of the country enjoys no security, it will face chaos. They (the Students Following the Imam's Policy) have failed even to show respect for the Revolution Council, by not even going as far as to say: 'Here are some reports; would you decide what should be done'—no; they knock on a minister's door at midnight and arrest him."

Concluding the discussion, the president criticized the behaviour of the radio and television thus:

"The radio and television organization, which showed such inability in broadcasting the great and historic ceremony (the swearing-in of the president before the Imam Khomeini): How is it that it regularly makes radio and television time available to these children (Muslim Students Following the Imam's Policy) without the permission of the State authorities?"

44. Bazargan Criticizes "Students" in Minatchi Affair

LD111155 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 6 Feb. 80, p. 12 LD.

[Unattributed report: "Bazargan: The Revolution Council Was Aware of Amir-Entezam's and Minatchi's Work."]

[Excerpt] Minister of National Guidance Naser Minatchi was arrested at his home at 0200 hours today after the disclosure by the Students Following the Imam's Policy.

In an exclusive interview with a *Keyhan* correspondent this morning, Revolution Council member and Freedom Movement leader Mehdi Bazargan once again expressed his views on the disclosures by the Students Following the Imam's Policy.

[Question] In their recent disclosure the Students Following the Imam's Policy mentioned again and again meetings [at the US Embassy] attended by Freedom Movement leaders and their relations with the American Embassy, and the names of Amir-Entezam and Minatchi appear in this connection. What have you to say about this?

Bazargan said:

"My view is as I said in an interview a short time ago and as appeared in two letters I passed to *Keyhan*, including one from Shaykh 'Ali Aqa. The action of these gentlemen [the students] is quite illegal and anti-Islamic in that they come

and make unilateral disclosures and cast unwarranted aspersions. They do this by their own process of deduction and justification, while the other party is not present to defend himself. As the Revolution Council has said in its statement, such disclosures should first be sent to a law court, and if the law court should decide that a person is a criminal, it should summon him and he should defend himself. After this the public should be informed."

Elsewhere in the discussion Engineer Bazargan said:

"Now Mr. Amir-Entezam has sent in a defence, having secured permission from the prosecutor to do this, and I shall be passing this on to the radio and television organization; if it is allowed, it will be read out, and Mr. Amir-Entezam will appear in person to speak in his own defence, or he may record his defence and it will be broadcast. If radio and television refuse to broadcast the defence, I shall make it available to the press."

45. Bani-Sadr's Spokesman Denies Reports on Release of Hostages

NC071150 Paris AFP in English, 1148 GMT, 7 Feb. 80 NC.

[Excerpt] Tehran, 7 Feb. (AFP)—Reports that the 50 American hostages here were about to be released were denied today by a spokesman of the new Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and by the Islamic "students" holding the US Embassy.

But the spokesman said the prisoners "might perhaps be freed in the future".

46. "Students" Denial of Involvement

LD071056 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 7 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] The Public Relations Office of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy has stated that the students had nothing to do with the arrest and detention of Mr. Naser Minatchi, that they have never interfered or will ever interfere in the executive affairs of the country and that they regard it as a mere allegation that they interfere in the Government's affairs.

The students have placed at the disposal of the Prosecutor's Office documents relating to Mr. Minatchi available at the den of espionage.

47. Beheshti on Hostages

LD061206 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 6 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Ayatollah Dr. Beheshti, the secretary of the Revolution Council, this morning gave an interview to local and foreign correspondents and answered their various questions. In answer to a question as to whether he thinks the hostages will be released without the Shah being returned Dr. Beheshti said: I do not think so, and my belief in this regard has still not changed.

In answer to a question as to what will be the duty of the Revolution Council and that of its members after the election of the president and the formation of his government, Dr. Beheshti said: Once the president has formed his cabinet and government and once the parliament has been formed the Revolution Council will no longer have any job to do.

Thus it will be dissolved with the permission of the Imam, and the council's members have many duties to perform; as was the case in the past, everyone will perform his duty. We do not regard the duties we perform as merely a job; rather we regard ourselves as responsible. At this point a correspondent asked: Will you also be politically active? Dr. Beheshti said in reply: Of course.

48. Bani-Sadr on Power Centres

LD131029 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 7 Feb. 80, p. 1, 2 LD.

[Article by President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr: "Who Is In Charge of the Country: The President or the Revolution Council?"]

[Excerpts] President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr has made available to *Keyhan* the following important article dealing with important State issues. Let us read the president's article together:

There are groups in existence which are bent on stirring up trouble, but in the midst of all this the people have elected their president with a decisive majority. Now the question arises as to who is in charge of State affairs: The president or the Revolution Council. The president can act within the framework of the constitution. The period before the Majles is convened cannot be considered an interregnum since this term is defined in the constitution as the period between two terms of office; but during this period the government may administer within the limits set out in the constitution. It is an exceptional period and, coming as it does after the Revolution Council has been in charge, the Revolution Council should agree to continue to function and undertake to run the administration, while the president should be content to act as overseer. The president should be put in charge, in view of present exceptional circumstances. The prevailing limbo situation where anything goes is not in the best interests of the country.

However, whichever of these two methods are chosen, responsibilities should be delineated and everyone's task should be clearly defined. The basis of the Revolution Council's weakness lies within the Revolution Council itself: its approach in the past was one of indecisiveness and involved submitting to events and to the decisions of all and sundry. There is not a single case to be found of anyone having been punished for evasion of its decisions. The most obvious and recent example of this is the behaviour of the radio and television organization and the unlawful arrest of a serving minister at 0100, contrary to the law approved by the council itself. If radio and television personnel had behaved so disgracefully anywhere else in the world, particularly at a time when a page is being turned in the long history of a country and quite the most important event in the history of this great nation is occurring, such officials would have been dismissed and prosecuted. If a minister was arrested anywhere else in the world simply after something had been said about him on television, most assuredly those responsible for such a deed would be prosecuted.

Is our revolution Islamic or not? If it is, then its most important distinguishing feature is the observance of morality. One of the great crises facing Iran today is that of morality. With which Islamic precept is such behaviour congruent? To which of the ways and traditions of the Prophet is it attributable? How is it possible to have order in the country when without the slightest study of the case or prior investigation a serving minister is arrested at one o'clock at night, when the radio and television organization allows a number of individuals to act in a one-sided manner and give no right of defence to the victim, and when to act in a "revolutionary" manner means to crush others with no preliminaries, merely on a page [of accusations] being read out. Why shouldn't this spread? Why shouldn't everyone be allowed to do this? Is this the Islamic approach, or Stalin's method? It is for the judiciary to investigate the action taken, and to see if in truth there was a corrupt relationship with America or not. The issue is one involving the defence of individuals' esteem, that is, the legal rights and duties of each Iranian within the limits of the constitution.

There are more than one or two instances of such contraventions. There is the threat to the newspaper *Bamdad*—and they say that they have made only half their disclosures. Subsequently, they prevented the newspaper publishing—with-

out any legal order from a court and contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the press law—through coercive methods of intimidation.

Another example is that of the invitation to Iran extended to the 50 Americans without the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry. The significance of this is that a number of individuals have decided in the name of "the Imam's policy" to discredit totally at home and abroad the Islamic Revolution government, which functions with the approval of the Imam himself. People making such an invitation anywhere else in the world where there is no Islamic government would be severely punished, let alone a country where the government is an Islamic one.

At any rate, there should be an early decision made to clarify who is in charge of State affairs and the person so determined should assume responsibility with total decisiveness. The country cannot be left further to the dictates of events.

49. Students Reject Hostages' Release Unless Shah Is Returned

JN072158 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1905 GMT, 7 Feb. 80 JN.

[From the press review.]

[Excerpts] Regarding the deposed Shah's fate, *Keyhan* pointed to the Revolution Council's session to study and review the arrangements concerning the formation of an international committee to investigate the deposed Shah's crimes and the former régime. The outcome of the commission's investigation might end in the release of the hostages.

In a statement to AFP, the Student Followers of the Imam's Policy announced their rejection of the release of the hostages, whether the commission is formed or not. They repeated their demands for the extradition and trial of the deposed Shah.

50. Tape of Hostages' Telephone Calls

NC071642 Paris AFP in English, 0630 GMT, 7 Feb. 80 NC.

[Nick Pythian.]

[Text] Tehran, 7 Feb. (AFP)—Three hostages at the American Embassy here told relatives in the United States by telephone on Monday night that they would not be freed until the Shah was returned to Iran.

According to a tape released by their pro-Khomeini student captors here today, the three, Kathryn Koob, Frederick L. Kupke and Bruce German, told their families also that they could now phone the embassy directly.

The three said that the students would tape the calls and later allow the hostages to listen.

The hostages, who said the students let them call home on the occasion of the Prophet Mohammad's birthday, all stressed that they were being well treated and keeping fit.

Mr. Kupke and Kathryn Koob both asked for books but stressed they wanted nothing political. Mr. Kupke and Mr. German requested cookies to be sent to them.

Mr. Kupke asked his father to pass messages on from two other hostages, Mike Kennedy and John Graves. The message from Mr. Graves suggested that his family and friends campaign "actively" for the release of the hostages.

But Mr. German told his children Debbie, Matthew and Christopher that it [word indistinct] look as if it would "be too soon" before he was home.

Kathy Koob's parents, Mr. Kupke's mother [words indistinct] German's wife were all in Washington at a State Department briefing at the time and missed the calls, which were made late at night.

Kathy Koob, who spoke to her brother-in-law David Vogts, her sister Anabeth and nephew and niece, said "a couple of us were selected at random to make phone calls to let everybody know that we are OK".

"Well, at least as far as I am concerned, I am being treated very well. I get good food and too much, although I have been very careful what I eat and so I have lost a little weight", she (?added).

In a conversation in which she sounded in good spirits, she said "I am going to send one of the sisters (girl students) who takes care of me (?out) for new clothes pretty soon because these are getting too big for me".

She read a clipping from the Tehran *Times* newspaper quoting the students as saying that the hostages would only be released when the Shah and his wealth had been returned to Tehran.

Mr. German asked his children to tell his wife that he wanted letters and sports news. "Forget the little books", he said.

He added "this is very important, the Moslem students have issued a statement that we must stay until the Shah is extradited back to Iran".

Mr. German asked his children to tell their mother to watch out for a letter he had sent to the Washington *Post* newspaper in which he offered "possible solutions".

On his general health he said: "I (?am) fine physically, I get meals regularly, have a place to sleep, I am warm, fairly comfortable [word indistinct] mistreated." But he added "it is hard to be separated like this; we will just have to make the best of it".

Mr. Kupke told his father "the students are serious, they are religious and they treat us very, very well. They are doing every effort to make this as pleasant under the circumstances as possible."

But he added "I am anxious to come home. I am anxious to see you. We can come home as soon as they deliver the Shah back here."

51. Ahmad Khomeini's Visit to Embassy

LD081745 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1658 GMT, 8 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] This afternoon Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, Imam Khomeini's son, went to a gathering of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy in the American den of espionage and talked to them.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, while visiting the hostages, talked to some of them. In his meeting with the hostages, he said: The American Government has not regained its senses yet; otherwise it would have extradited the criminal Mohammad Reza and would have handed over his plundered wealth so that the nation of Iran would grant the hostages one degree of pardon and set them free. Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, addressing the hostages, stated: Compare the Islamic treatment you receive from the Iranian students with the way the American Government treats Iranians residing in America or blacks and Indians in America and make your own judgment.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mehdi Jamarani was also present at the meeting.

Archbishop Capucci, the struggling Christian bishop, also went to the American den of espionage this afternoon and met the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy. He also paid a visit to the American hostages. Archbishop Capucci in the meeting said: Contrary to the poisonous propaganda launched by the American Government, the hostages are healthy and are living in good conditions.

Today a huge crowd of those who took part in the Friday prayers marched towards the den of espionage and asked for the continuation of revelation statements by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy over the Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The demonstrators asked the students to

continue their revolutionary behaviour until the return of the Shah and, following the Imam's line, not to accept any compromise. Personnel of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran and families of those who were disabled or martyred during the revolution were among the demonstrators.

52. "Students" Meeting

PA081349 Buenos Aires Latin in Spanish, 1310 GMT, 8 Feb. 80 PA.

[By Paul Taylor.]

[Excerpt] Tehran, 8 Feb. (Latin-Reuter)—The students occupying the US Embassy here held an urgent meeting with their spiritual leader last night after being the target of a virulent attack by President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

A student spokesman told this agency that they discussed their role in Iran's political life with Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Mosavi Kho'ini [title as received] and reached conclusions that will be released to the press in due time.

The spokesman said, however, that there has been no change in the attitude of the students regarding the 49 US hostages, whom they have refused to release until the deposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is returned to Iran together with his assets.

"Our position in regard to the hostages has not changed and will never change": the spokesman said.

53. Khomeini Confirms Bani-Sadr as Revolution Council Head

LD080538 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0430 GMT, 8 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] At the end of last night's Revolution Council session it was announced that, with the consent of the Imam and the approval of the Revolution Council, Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, our country's president, has been appointed as the head of the Revolution Council.

According to a *Pars News Agency* correspondent, the Revolution Council met last night in the presence of the president and discussed the nation's important issues.

Mr. Hassan Habibi, the Revolution Council spokesman, said in an interview after last night's session [read by announcer]:

In this session, discussions were held concerning two alternatives: First, that Mr. Bani-Sadr should form a government and that the Revolution Council should consider its mission complete and that Mr. Bani-Sadr should run the country until the Majles is formed; second, that the Revolution Council should remain in its present form with Mr. Bani-Sadr becoming head of the Revolution Council.

He added: These alternatives were brought to the Imam's attention and he decided that the Revolution Council should continue its activities until the formation of the Majles and that Mr. Bani-Sadr, with the approval of the Revolution Council, should be appointed as the head of the council. In accordance with this decision, Mr. Bani-Sadr will chair the council sessions. In addition, in view of the fact that the head of the Revolution Council has both legislative and executive powers and since executive power is an activity of the ministers who are not members of the Revolution Council, therefore, in order to ensure that the procedures operate harmoniously, Mr. Bani-Sadr may hold sessions with the ministers in addition to attending the various sessions of the Revolution Council so that he may be more active in the issues.

Habibi added: If during this time, some of the ministers are changed, Mr. Bani-Sadr will inform the council of these changes and they will be implemented upon approval of the Revolution Council.

54. BBC: Bani-Sadr Wants Council to "Stand Up" to "Students"

TA080642 London BBC World Service in English, 0600 GMT, 8 Feb. 80 TA.
[From "News Desk".]

[Excerpt] In Iran itself, Mr. Bani-Sadr, who has strongly criticized the militant students, has been named head of the country's Revolutionary Council which has wide-ranging powers. Mr. Bani-Sadr recently attacked the council for failing to stand up to the students.

In another move the council announced that it is limiting the students' access to the State television and radio. The council is reported to have decided the students will not be free to broadcast accusations against public figures as they have done in the past.

55. Gotbzadeh Reportedly Wants Hostages Released Soon

TA090712 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, 0700 GMT, 9 Feb. 80 TA.

[Text] Iranian Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh has said that if it is necessary force will be used to make the extremists holding the US Embassy in Tehran release the hostages. Gotbzadeh was speaking to a British television station and these are the most severe remarks by an Iranian politician against the students holding the hostages.

He said that at first the authorities would try and persuade the extremists politely; however, if the Revolution Council makes the decision, force will be used. At the same time, the students yesterday received firm support for their position from Ayatollah Khomeini's son who visited the hostages yesterday. Upon leaving, Khomeini junior said that the hostages will be released only after the deposed Shah is extradited to Iran together with his money.

56. Bani-Sadr *Al-Ittihad* Interview

LD091038 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic, 0838 GMT, 9 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Abu Dhabi—New Iranian President Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr is quoted here as saying that Iran has not changed its attitude on the question of the American hostages in Tehran in spite of the continued talks on this crisis. The semi-official Abu Dhabi paper *Al-Ittihad* also says he believes that one of the direct reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is the Kremlin's anxiety as a result of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In the interview carried by the paper, the President of Iran ruled out the possibility of differences between him and the spiritual leader of Iran, Imam Khomeini.

Concerning the 50 hostages who have been held since last November, the President said his country's position remained unchanged in spite of his continuing discussion of the matter in the ruling Revolution Council. He added that the council has not yet taken a final decision to reconsider the Iranian attitude on the problem. He pointed out that Iran wanted to be certain that American public opinion realized that the policy of their government toward Iran was not in their interest and that the United States was still pursuing the same policy toward the Iranian people that it had during the régime of the deposed Shah.

57. Foreign Ministry on Gotbzadeh Statement

LD091529 Hamburg DPA in German, 1317 GMT, 9 Feb. 80 LD.

[Excerpts] Tehran—The Iranian Foreign Ministry was at pains today to tone

down the public statement by its head, Gotbzadeh, that the Iranian Government would if necessary use force to clear the occupants from the US Embassy. Gotbzadeh's spokesman, Nasir Salami, told DPA that in his interview with [British] Independent Television news his minister did not use the term "force".

"This is an arbitrary interpretation by the journalists", Salami said.

Salami said that there are no prospects yet of an early release of the hostages. Asked about the worldwide diplomatic efforts and clear signs that their release is imminent, he replied: "I shall make inquiries as to how you can arrive at that conclusion." Salami refused to say anything about the negotiations behind the scenes between the Iranian Government and the United Nations.

58. "Students" Interview

LD100029 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2125 GMT, 9 Feb. 80 LD.

[Interview granted to reporter 9 February by unidentified Student Followers of the Imam's Policy—recorded.]

[Text] [Question] Having in mind the words of Mr. Bani-Sadr regarding the lack of informed decision-making centres, what is the future programme of the students, and what will their relation be with the government of Mr. Bani-Sadr?

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. [Words indistinct] they accused us of having interfered with the [words indistinct] affairs of the government. Is this true or not? We ask you this question—is expressing one's point of view, although it may be against that of the government, in an atmosphere which should maintain freedom of speech, considered as a government within a government? If our points are correct, then they should accept it. If our points are wrong, then they should not make the government departments feel that we have interfered in their work. We have tried, many times, not to deal blows by our words to the workings and decisions of the executive powers of the country. When we asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hand over the *chargé d'affaires* to us so that we could ask him some questions, unfortunately we observed that our minister of foreign affairs put the issue forward in such a way that it appeared that we meant to interfere with the affairs of the country. This is why we did not pursue the matter further. Even the question of the employees of the Embassy, the den of espionage—when they came to us and asked for their wages, asked what will happen to their jobs, we sent them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the *chargé d'affaires* was being held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he was the person to decide what to do about them.

*

[Question] Pars: If the President makes a decision about the hostages, will you follow his views and decisions, and those of his legal government, or have you any other views?

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. In our view any Iranian subject and all Muslim people are duty bound to follow the guidelines of the Imam, which are the most revolutionary and ideological ones at present, and all the executive organizations and all personalities from beginning to end are responsible for following this path and implementing these guidelines in the society. The Imam's view about the American spies is quite clear. He himself said that these American spies will not be released under any circumstances until the extradition of the treacherous Shah. When the Shah has been handed over to Iran, then it will be possible for the nation of Iran to release the hostages after granting them a pardon. Our view on the election of the president is the same as that dictated by the Imam. The Imam said: The entire nation

should support Mr. Bani-Sadr, and should not weaken his position. Our view, following the saying of the Imam, is the same as his, and cannot be different. But the president and anybody else holding any office is dutybound to follow the policy of the Imam, and to follow the view and the guidelines provided by the Imam.

[Question] Have the students formed a cabinet, and is that why Mr. Bani-Sadr and other members of the Revolution Council oppose them? If yes, what is that government?

[Answer] We have said that our movement is not aimed at interfering with the affairs of the country or introducing a cabinet.

[Question] Have your views on releasing the hostages changed?

[Answer] As the Imam has repeatedly announced—and the brave and struggling nation of Iran has followed the behest of the Imam and has expressed its support by marches, demonstrations and other ways and manners—our views with regard to the hostages, these American spies, will not change until the treacherous Shah has been handed over to Iran by America and [words indistinct]. We cannot interfere in any way in this matter by announcing anything contrary to the above. Naturally, our views are those of the Imam and the nation, and will not change.

[Question] Keyhan newspaper: If the new government exerts pressure on you not to interfere in the issue of the hostages and to leave the solving of the problem to the responsible officials what will your response be?

[Answer] As mentioned before, the guidelines regarding the move to occupy the Embassy and the continued holding of the hostages have repeatedly been delineated, and it is the guidelines which remain unchanged, and the responsible organizations of the country and executive organizations should implement the guidelines of the Imam. The opposition we experience now in connection with the occupation of the den of espionage, and the pressures being exerted on us have no basis. Even when the Imam was enjoying good health, they exerted these pressures, but they were not quite clear or recognizable.

Let me read you some sentences from a speech by the Imam, dated 6 November 1979; we have been informed that the centre which our youth have taken over is a centre of espionage and conspiracy. America expects to take the Shah there, so that together they can conspire and have a base inside Tehran for their conspiracies. Our youths should sit and watch. Some of the rotten roots started working to make us interfere and tell these young people to come out. There have been pressures and movements against the occupation of the den of espionage and the taking of hostages. We think the best way to expose these movements is that the responsible organizations should follow the Imam's policy and the guidelines he has provided on this issue.

[Question] AFP: Yesterday Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini paid a visit here. Has the total support of the Imam been declared for your actions?

[Answer] Sometimes, the struggling brothers and Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, the son of the Imam, pay visits to the den of American espionage, as an expression of their generosity toward the brothers and sisters in the den of espionage. And the topics that he discussed and his views—and those of the Imam as well—are those expressed earlier in his speeches concerning the den of espionage.

[Question] Azadegan: What is your view on the prohibition of the use of television which was announced by the Revolution Council?

[Answer] On the topic of the revelation statements we should speak in somewhat more detail. As long as we can remember, the disclosure of documents and the revelation of those papers which were the [word indistinct] of our nation has been a strange procedure in our press. Many times we have seen that SAVAK documents have been published in the press—even in sensitive moments when such documents can be seen to be dangerous for everyone in our

country. But the prosecutor general has not criticized or protested such disclosures in the press. Likewise, they were not subject to criticism or protest by the people, who were satisfied with the procedures in the press.

The question which is posed at this time on the topic of revelations is whether the disclosures are interference in the judicial policy, and, in general, in the procedures of the country's judicial institutions. In our opinion, this is entirely different from the revelations themselves. By our revelations and our presentation of the facts to the people, we in no way intend to destroy the judicial apparatus of the country. They tell us to give the documents to the public prosecutor. But what is the purpose of giving the documents to the public prosecutor? Either the public prosecutor wants to correct this matter or he does not want to. If he does not want to correct it, then the nation and the people will be dissatisfied. And if he wants to correct it, (?what difference does it make) if we correct it?

As for the question of whether the failure to give the documents to the public prosecutor is correct or mistaken: these documents are in fact the demonstration of the way of thinking and the (?positions) which were taken by America during the revolution. They do not suit the needs of the public prosecutor. What is the public prosecutor going to do with documents (?that shows that the prime minister was the only) [words indistinct]? Is he going to have a trial? Or when somebody came to this Embassy, this den of espionage and established contact, passed intelligence (?saying) that his ideas were such and such. What is the public prosecutor going to do with such documents?

These documents are in fact only for the court of the people, that is to say they are only good for public opinion, and they must be presented to the people. In our opinion it is not very correct to neglect this kind of document, which can in truth clarify the truth for the people. The public prosecutor is not able to make correct use of them [words indistinct] public opinion is in fact the fundamental public prosecutor for these documents.

Concerning these revelations, they point out that we judge; we have tried—except in that case; that was judged and the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy have apologized to the generous Iranian nation; in other cases it has been tried—not to judge [sentence as received].

But, unfortunately, you see a group is deceptively trying to show the issue of the revelations in such a light that they will be discredited in the eyes of society and public opinion and he stopped.

They come forward and say that after exposing Minatchi those who had exposed him had gone and arrested him. They present it in such a way that everybody thinks that we have done this. We have repeatedly said that we do not interfere in the country's executive affairs. Minatchi's arrest was carried out by the deputy public prosecutor. Now, if the deputy public prosecutor has made a mistake, it is he that again and again has ordered the confiscation of some people's properties, the arrest of others. His orders were carried out. If he did right, then why do you not tell the truth. If he has been in error, again, why do you not come forward and tell the truth. In so far as the Prosecutor's Office has (?arrested) this man and we see that the Revolution Council, as the representative of the legislative, executive that rules the country, interferes in the affairs of the Prosecutor's Office and in fact interferes with the judicial power and orders the release of Minatchi; that is more regrettable.

As we said, if Minatchi has been arrested by the Prosecutor's Office and the judicial power has ordered his arrest, his release should also be by the same Prosecutor's Office and the judicial power. Other powers should not interfere.

If the actions of the responsible officials had been such that they had revealed the SAVAK documents, the documents of the Iranian Embassies abroad, the documents that generally show the connections of the previous régime to the people, about what they did, perhaps these problems would not have arisen.

That is why the people are in favour of the revelations. They see that many of the SAVAK documents, many of the documents that should have been publicized, have not been.

[*Question*] *Keyhan*: The Student Followers of the Imam's Policy have taken the form of a revolutionary structure of our country and are supported by the various and gigantic strata of the nation. During the past month, some of your revelations have encountered the objection and criticism of some people and groups. Therefore, what element or factor do you think has led to the increase of this wave of propaganda against you and where do you see it finally leading? Have your actions been erroneous or are some people intent on ruining your reputation?

[*Answer*] Before this is explained, if brother journalists mention us, "the student followers of Imam's policy" is not correct. It is "the Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy". If in future they refer to this point in their papers, it should be correct.

[*Another student speaks*] From the first days of the occupation of the den of espionage by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, the opposition started. It was on the second, third or fourth day that a group went to the Imam and asked him to have the students thrown out of the den of espionage. In reply, the Imam said: The place that our youths have taken, as they have said, had been the centre of espionage and conspiracy. The United States expects to take the Shah to the United States in order that they may start plotting and also create a base for conspiracies in Iran and that you youths should just sit and watch. Some of these roots of corruption were active so that Khomeini would interfere and tell the youths to come out of the Embassy.

Sometimes the wave of opposition against us was to the effect that the occupation of an embassy, although it had been a centre of conspiracies, the haunt of US international spies, although, in spite of the fact that this embassy should have had diplomatic activities, they had turned it into a place for spying against Iran and the Iranian nation's right of sovereignty; they [the opposition] still believed in international laws being applied to it and that an embassy is the territory of a country and that nobody has a right to do such things.

Other times the wave of opposition was to the effect that the documents that are here are forgeries. The public knows full well what kind of documents they are.

Sometimes the point was made with accusations of seeking self-interest. If seeking self-interest means that we have occupied a centre of conspiracies and hold spies as hostages—and, as the Imam has decreed, they will not be released until the Shah is extradited—is insisting upon the Shah's return seeking self-interest?

In all these cases our efforts have been toward implementation of all the Imam's instructions and points of view on this issue and if, at some time he were to deem otherwise, that will also be followed.

[*Question*] Will you be present in court in order to answer Minatchi's charges?

[*Answer*] Concerning Mr. Minatchi's request that we hold a television debate with him, we believe that it would be best that he should discuss the issues with the people by himself.

[*Question*] Why is it that most of the revelations have concerned the members of the freedom movement [nehzat-e azadi]? And, do you have documents concerning people outside this group?

[*Answer*] About the other names in the documents and the names of the other groups in the documents, we shall publish the documents soon. Before we let any rumours spread or any judgments be made on these documents we had better wait for publication of these documents.

[*Another student speaks*] Of course, some of the groups and individuals have

regarded some of the points that have been revealed as showing a bias toward a particular group, party or organization. We frankly declare our view on such comments, that they are completely untrue and, as a rule, such comments resemble childish talk.

[Question] What is your view on not broadcasting the revelations over radio and television? And, will you continue checking the files and publishing [the secrets?].

[Answer] About continuing the revelations, as our brother has stated: We shall continue to do so. The stance of the radio and television is an independent one. They could either decide to obey the orders of the Revolution Council, as was announced in the papers—that is one stance—or they could announce: We will publish the affairs of those in the den of espionage over radio and television as the nation wishes. That is a stance that is the concern of the radio and television, not us. We shall carry on revealing, somehow. If all possible restrictions were to be imposed on us we would ask the people to come to the den of espionage and, if possible, we would publish the documents through loudspeakers. In any case, we shall not stop doing this.

[Question] That is all of the questions, perhaps some of the questions have not been read, but generally, that is the drift of the questions. Therefore, the meeting is adjourned.

59. Minatchi on "Students" Charges

LD092024 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1703 GMT, 9 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Naser Minatchi, following the recent revelation statement issued by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and his arrest and release, went to the Hoseyniyh Ershad mosque and talked about the accusations levelled at him, which you will now hear:

At first he talked in detail about the struggles of Hoseyniyh Ershad and then said: Now I will refer to the issue of these accusations. First I should ask what is the method of judgment in this country? Are we Muslims and do we judge according to the principles and laws of Islam or do we pass judgment by ourselves? If we rely on the Koran we should show the world that we are the manifestation of the justice of the oppressed and we should not allow Islam to be disgraced.

Can one be accused so easily on radio and television and his honour be questioned? Is punishment by trial possible? The worst thing mentioned in Islam is for the honour of the person who has such a record of service and has suffered so much to be tarnished; and then when I want to read the dossier to be able to defend myself, to be refused permission. When, by confusing issues and mixing up the article in the newspaper with another accused person they put forward some accusations, how can I trust them? Are these based on Islamic justice? I do not intend to defend myself. The same night when they came to my house I said that I have seen SAVAK prisons and do not fear these things. I am not the kind of person to run away and leave the arena like those who have done so.

During the past year I have worked very hard and twice, because of heart trouble, I was taken to (?the hospital). But I did not complain and did not publicize the matter. I worked 16 to 17 hours every day, and because I was committed and felt that I had a religious duty, I continued my efforts. I asked the gentlemen who came to my house what their evidence was but they had brought along an empty file. I said I am a judge and do not intend to find fault with you young people since it would be like spitting in the wind but you cannot interrogate someone with an empty file. Their answer was that they were talking about what the radio had said.

What can I tell the world? I asked for the original of the document. Mr. Mahdavi Kani said that they would not let us have it. Mr. Qoddozi, the public prosecutor, said he did not have any idea that they had sent the translations and they said this was enough. Does being an active member of the human rights society, being the head of the board of directors of the Hoseyniyh Ershad and fighting the Shah for five years constitute a crime.

In the biography they have written for me, at the top of the page is written, National Front. If the writer of this biography knew me at all he would have known that I was a member of the liberation movement and not the National Front. There are 50 spies in the den of espionage of America and if you give any of them a hearty meal they will tell you what you want to hear. Can these documents be put forward just like that? Should these documents not be discussed in the presence of a reliable authority? This is disgraceful that the diplomatic greetings and expressions of hope for the betterment of relations between Iran and America when we still maintained our relations with them, and which are mere niceties, should be considered crimes. The other issue of interest is that in a part of the revelation statement they refer to my five years of struggle and in another part they state that I believe that the Shah can save the country from anarchy and confusion and that these two things contradict each other. The other point is that it has been stated that I had notified them of who was going to welcome the Imam in the airport and that the Imam's family would be with him. And then there is a report from Sullivan, a person whom I have not met up to this day. I knew that the Imam would come alone and that a house had been prepared for his eminence in E'tesamiyeh and the issue of a house in Dowlat Street and related stories are sheer lies and a person like Sullivan would have so many problems and difficulties that such information would not be important to him even if I were to tell him. I know that the issue of the Imam's family has been brought in because it is related to the emotions of the people, and the other point is that they ask what had Minatchi got to do with the Imam's family?

About the meeting of the heads of the army in which I was not present, but about which I was informed, as Mr. Bazargan has mentioned and Dr. Beheshti referred to in Hoseyniyh Ershad, if necessary I will provide a correct and detailed account of it and mention the names involved.

My question to the students is where are all those documents and evidence of the evil deeds of SAVAK and Nasiri and Sabeti and Hoveyda and what have they done with them? If all the documents are reduced to these documents against me and some other people, when we put the case of these spies to international courts, what evidence or documents have we got to resort to? It is obvious that an international court would not accept these documents from us and these are supposed to be our national evidence. Although these students are the apples of our eyes, although we do not really know them, they should be investigated like everybody else, their names should be checked in the department of vital statistics and if their records are in order then they can stay there. Since if these documents are destroyed, when we want to use the evidence there how can we try these spies in international courts?

60. Gotbzadeh Denial

LD101234 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1120 GMT, 10 Feb. 80 LD.
[Text] The Pars News Agency reports that news items connected with the press conference given by Sadeq Gotbzadeh to the independent British television station have claimed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Iranian Islamic Republic has said that in order to free the American hostages, if necessary Iranian authorities will have recourse to force.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of our country told us during a telephone conversation that: "The expression as quoted by the Associated Press employed the word 'force'." However, he said he did not use this word. The real opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Iranian Islamic Republic is that there will be no need to have recourse to force in circumstances where the issue can be solved by means of discussion and the mutual understanding that exists between officials and the students.

The Associated Press reported from London that Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Iranian Islamic Republic, during a conversation that was broadcast from London on Friday, announced that Iranian officials would have recourse to force should it be necessary in order to free the American hostages. Gotbzadeh was asked if at the present he intended to use force in order to take back the American Embassy. He replied that there is no need for such an action and that the matter can be pursued through discussions, encouragement and persuasion.

61. Bani-Sadr Interview

LD101841 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1705 GMT, 10 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has stated: We do not want to live under US domination; we regard as a compromise any policy that accepts such a domination as a reality, and we strongly condemn it.

In an interview with Pars News Agency, Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr expressed his views regarding the way in which the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy operate, the elections and the outlook for activities relative to the election of the Majles and the issue of prices.

Dr. Bani-Sadr stated: I have commented on this matter a great deal: the move on the US Embassy and the occupation of it were in fact the expression of the people's demand that we not live under US domination, that we regard as a compromise any policy that accepts such a domination as a reality and that we condemn it. Thus, to this extent and in this context the occupation of the Embassy is something that deserves to be praised, and something that has satisfied our people.

Bani-Sadr added: Of course, in their interview the students have said: We have not interfered in affairs and we have only expressed an opinion. But it must be said that inviting 50 Americans to Iran is not voicing an opinion. This is something for the Foreign Ministry to do, and, even if one wants to do such a thing, it is for one's government to do it. One should do this through the Foreign Ministry, and not bring 50 guests to the airport without the slightest knowledge of the Foreign Ministry. This is the way they behaved when they invited representatives of world liberation movements to Iran without bothering to inform the Foreign Ministry. Of course, the Foreign Minister claims that the students even issue orders to foreign embassies. If this situation were to continue and if they were to interfere and intervene not by expressing opinions, but by executive officials, then this will create a new centre of government. And this is something which I cannot accept, and if they are followers of the Imam's policy—and they are, God willing—they should not allow themselves to become involved in such matters.

We now have a country in which we have many problems here and there. Those who follow the Imam's policy should unify the decision-making centres as far as possible so that others would fear this unity of command and unity of decision-making and thus would be unable to hatch a plot every day. There are 10 to 15 decision-making centres in Tehran. There are several in the provinces, and no one would give them two cents. Dr. Bani-Sadr added: The best

encouragement we could offer those following the Imam's policy would be to invite them to exercise discipline. They themselves should submit to revolutionary discipline, so that we may be able to extradite the country from crises.

62. Further Reportage on Military Parade, "Students" Position

NC111757 Paris AFP in English, 1749 GMT, 11 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 11 Feb. (AFP)—Three people died and several others were injured when they were accidentally crushed by a tank in the huge crowd during today's military parade to mark the first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Pars News Agency reported.

A further 67 people were injured when a grandstand collapsed along the processional route, the radio added.

The massive parade, which was postponed from this morning because hundreds of thousands of Iranians crushed into Azadi Square, making it impossible for troops and vehicles to move, was finally cancelled after the collapse of the grandstand holding government guests.

The stand, sited near the official platform for President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his guest, Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir 'Arafat, contained Islamic experts from all over the world, some of them American.

Other Americans here were guests of the Islamic students holding 50 hostages at the US Embassy, but there were not thought to have been any serious injuries among the visitors.

Trouble started at Azadi (Freedom) Square with the arrival of President Bani-Sadr and Mr. 'Arafat. The crowd surged forward to greet the two men and security guards had to fight a way through to the platform for them.

There they appeared to withdraw in an attempt to calm the crowd but returned into view several minutes later to hear a message from spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, read by his son Seyyed Ahmad.

The military parade had to be cancelled after fewer than several dozen soldiers had marched past, leaving a long line of British Chieftain tanks, armoured personnel carriers and rocket launchers stretching beyond the crowds out of the city.

The Islamic students holding the US Embassy hostages repeated today that their stance had not changed and they were still demanding the extradition of the Shah and the return of his wealth. "We will only free the hostages on the order of Ayatollah Khomeini", a spokesman said.

The student declaration was in response to Mr. Bani-Sadr's statement in an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde* today that the hostages could be freed "shortly, perhaps in the next few days".

The spokesman said that was Mr. Bani-Sadr's "personal opinion". He had nothing to do with the hostages, and the students' only representative was Ayatollah Khomeini, he added.

63. BBC on Gotbzadeh Remarks

LD112238 London BBC Television Network in English, 2100 GMT, 11 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] The 50 Americans being held hostage in their Tehran Embassy have now completed 100 days in captivity and their release appears to be still weeks away. Iran's Foreign Minister, Mr. Sadeq Gotbzadeh, who is considered to reflect the views of Ayatollah Khomeini, says nothing can be done before the results of the international commission on Iranian grievances proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General. Our correspondent Keith Graves asked Mr.

Gotbzadeh if the students holding the hostages would accept the commission's report [begin recording].

[Gotbzadeh] Well, we will see to it, that it works.

[Question] You say you will see to it. You mean you could impose the Revolutionary Council's will upon the [Gotbzadeh interrupts].

[Answer] In the final analysis the Revolutionary Council is the supreme body governing this nation and I think with persuasion, understanding, reasoning and discussions the problem will be resolved.

[Question] But the Waldheim plan, if we may call it that, does not appear to include the return of the Shah. Now, does this mean if you are prepared to discuss or to approve the Waldheim plan, that the Revolutionary Council is accepting that the Shah is not going to be brought back to stand trial here, or does that still remain part of your demands for the release of the hostages?

[Answer] No, it is a part of our demands, nothing has changed in that. The fact is we are speculating again. I mean this is what [words indistinct] speculating on the results of the report of the commission.

[Question] Dr. Waldheim said a couple of days ago that he was hopeful that this whole incident might be concluded before the elections, which are scheduled I think for four or five weeks. You do not seem that optimistic.

[Answer] No, I am not that optimistic, but it does not mean that I am pessimistic either [end recording].

64. Fars Guards Chief on US

GF121200 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian, 1500 GMT, 11 Feb. 80 GF.

[Message from Engineer (Rajiab 'Ali Taheri), chief of the Revolution Guards of Fars Province, on first anniversary of Iranian Revolution—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Thanks to God, this revolution in favour of justice, under the leadership of Imam Khomeini and with the struggling Muslim people of Iran, was able to survive the sensitive period of the last year and sever the hands of the United States, meaning the imperial régime in Iran. The victory of the revolution had to come about because the Shah's hated imperial régime was blocking the evolution and advancement of the Iranian nation.

As we all know, after the Shah's hated imperial régime was ended, essential and fundamental changes took place in our country, destroying a 2,500-year-old régime that had bad effects on the thoughts of the people, having taught them to follow false ideas and to advocate the use of force in their lives. We will need a long period to correct these problems. We will succeed when we uproot all the corruption, all the manifestations of the pollution in our society, and eliminate the roots of all the corruption, the United States, that world-devouring country.

Fortunately, we have been successful in our struggle against imperialism over the last year. We can list the steps we have taken in this regard: the cancelling of the military and exploitative agreements and, even more important, the occupation of the den of spies, which was a great blow to the United States. We will continue to deal these blows. Their continuation ensures the continuation of our Islamic Revolution. The Iranian nation hopes that this revolution will result in great progress throughout the world, and particularly in Iran.

The most important message of the Revolution Guards of Shiraz [as heard] is our request that the people co-operate with us in continuing the revolution. They must not be satisfied with talk alone; they should transform words into deeds and expose all of the enemy's intrigues and conspiracies and destroy them.

65. Beheshti Interviewed on Demand for Shah's Return

LD151511 Kuwait *As-Siyasah* in Arabic, 12 Feb. 80, p. 21 LD.

[Interview granted by former Revolution Council Chairman Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti to Mahmud an-Najjar in Tehran on 5 February.]

[*Question*] In your capacity as chairman of the Revolution Council are you in a position to talk about the fate of the American Embassy hostages, and the students' stand on this matter or your attitude towards the students?

[*Answer*] On this subject, there are several points which I wish to make clear:

1. The student movement at the Embassy is part of the popular movement and it did not take place for the sake of the Government, the Revolution Council or Imam Khomeini. Since our revolution is a popular one, I believe that the students should not be opposed. We must give them the opportunity to express themselves like the rest of the people.

2. Naturally, the future of the hostages and the whole operation in all its magnitude have been and will continue to be the subject of constant concern and discussion by the Revolution Council.

3. The Revolution Council has not yet made any decision on the future of the hostages. When it makes a decision, it will announce then and there.

4. As the matter now stands it means that there has been no change with regard to our demands that the Shah be returned to stand trial for the crimes committed against the people and that the money he smuggled abroad be returned because it belongs to the people.

5. Nobody expects a decision to be made on this sensitive issue without reference to Imam Khomeini and his approval.

6. In the event of Imam Khomeini's approval being obtained on any measure, the students, all of whom follow the course taken by the Imam, will immediately abide by it and implement it. It is certain that they will implement it by themselves without any need to exert pressure on them, as long as they are sure that it is the wish and the decision of the Imam himself. Otherwise, I do not know how anyone can resolve the issue with them.

[*Question*] Now that Bani-Sadr has been elected President of the Republic and has succeeded you as chairman of the Revolution Council, as has been reported in your newspapers, what is your primary task?

[*Answer*] As for Bani-Sadr's assumption of the chairmanship of the Revolution Council as my successor, this has not yet happened despite newspaper reports to this effect. However, this is expected and we will discuss it at the council's meeting tomorrow. (Note: At this meeting, the council approved the granting of chairmanship of the council to Bani-Sadr. As president and Revolution Council chairman, Bani-Sadr becomes the strongest man after the Imam.)

The primary question to which Bani-Sadr is devoting his attention is the appointment of a prime minister and the selection of ministers, because this matter is in the best interest of the society in the present circumstances. Naturally, this is done after Imam Khomeini's opinion is sought and his approval obtained, bearing in mind that the government to be established by Bani-Sadr in this manner will be different from the government that is established according to the constitution, though it will neither be contrary to nor in accordance with the constitution; its basis and source will not be the constitution but the Imam himself, exactly as the case is with regard to the Revolution Council. A government that is based on the constitution and is actually a constitutional government will be established, in my opinion, after about three months—that is, after the election of the Consultative Council (parliament) and the nomination and appointment of a prime minister by the Imam and then the nomination of the ministers by Bani-Sadr and their appointment with the approval of the Imam.

Ayatollah Beheshti said: Being a man of religion, I believe that the best way for Bani-Sadr at present is to appoint a provisional government to manage things until a permanent constitutional government is appointed. We will help in this.

Ayatollah Beheshti then asked: In your opinion, isn't this proof that the men of religion do not monopolize power?

[Question] Tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, the Revolution Command Council will be dissolved, rather it will dissolve itself to give way to the new government. What will be the role of the members of the Revolution Council (14 members excluding Bani-Sadr) in the political and public domains after that?

[Answer] The Revolution Council will not dissolve itself or be dissolved under any circumstances except by Imam Khomeini's decision. When nothing is left for the Revolution Council to do—that is, when there is no need for it to exist any longer and it is dissolved—its members will find something to do to serve the people, exactly as they did before the council was formed. We will always put all our capabilities at the disposal of the revolution. God is the vouchsafer of success.

66. Bani-Sadr Gives Interview to French Radio

LD121118 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1040 GMT, 12 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Bani-Sadr, our country's President, in a telephone interview with French radio and television this morning answered their questions. Dr. Bani-Sadr, the President of the Iranian Islamic Republic, in answer to the question, what are your problems, said: Above all, high prices, unemployment, lack of security and the absence of a decision-making centre are the greatest problems at present.

In answer to a question as to whether he would be able to make decisions and implement them on his own, Dr. Bani-Sadr said: We have not staged a revolution so that a president could make a decision single-handed; rather decisions are made collectively.

In answer to a question as to which source would be making decisions regarding the hostages, our country's President said: Imam Khomeini and the Revolution Council.

Our country's president was asked: In the interview you had with *Le Monde* you said the hostages might be released in the next few days. Is this possible? Dr. Bani-Sadr said: If America agrees to our view this may be possible.

67. Bani-Sadr on Revolution Council Session

LD122304 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2047 GMT, 12 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] The Revolution Council held a session tonight with the participation of Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. During this session various issues of State were discussed. According to a Pars correspondent, Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said at the conclusion of tonight's session regarding the fact that the student followers of the Imam's policy do not uphold respect for the Revolution Council: the Revolution Council was appointed by the Imam—whether I agree or not—for the administration of the country prior to the application of the ideas proposed in the constitution. Therefore, when it adopts certain decisions they should be carried out, and naturally those who are in the first rank—the students—are expected to carry out the decisions. And these people refer to themselves as followers of the Imam's policy, since those who oppose the Imam's policy are in opposition and do not implement his line. And all I said was that the Revolution Council had

endorsed the idea that no government official should be arrested without prior information being given to the Government, let alone a minister. To which they reply: This issue has had nothing to do with us, which is right. But as to the fact of their inviting certain people to Iran without prior information being given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and carrying out certain actions without informing the [words indistinct], this is in fact tantamount to discrediting the Government and the Revolution Council. And this is a criticism which should not be elaborated on.

In this connection the President said: The students issued their invitations, and when the Foreign Minister came to the Revolution Council, he said that these people are already at the airport. But since we do not believe in balancing forces whereby we should meet force with force, we did not wish to repeat the same move since the students are both young and our brothers and also display goodwill. But the laws and the rules should be respected by them. This is why we did not repeat what they did and gave permission for these guests to enter the country.

Regarding the interview with *Le Monde* in which he was quoted as saying: Should the United States accept our demands the release of the hostages has nothing to do with the extradition of the Shah, Mr. Bani-Sadr said: "I said no such thing. All I said was that these two issues should not be linked together, that is, we will continue to seek the extradition of the Shah until doomsday and not that we will release these people while that gentleman enjoys himself where he is. And let me emphasize the point that the question of his extradition is a strategic issue to us, and as far as we can we will strive to achieve it.

68. Bani-Sadr *Le Monde* Interview

LD121051 Paris *Le Monde* in French, 12 Feb. 80, pp. 1, 5 LD.

[Eric Rouleau interview with Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in Tehran on the night of Saturday 9 and Sunday 10 February: "Iran Apparently No Longer Demands Shah's Extradition Before Releasing Hostages".]

[Text] Tehran—The American hostages could be released soon, "perhaps even in the next few days", if Imam Khomeini ratifies the compromise drawn up to this end by the Revolution Council and if the United States subscribes to it in its turn. The new solution proposed by the Iranian Republic's supreme body no longer includes the demand for the Shah's extradition and the restoration of his fortune to the Iranian State. Nonetheless, it is designed in such a way as to enable Tehran to attain that objective after rather than before the expulsion of the American hostages. This is one of the essential points to emerge from a long interview we had during the night of Saturday/Sunday with the President of the Iranian Republic following a meeting of the Revolution Council.

Referring to the optimism of the American Press with regard to the hostages' imminent release, Mr. Bani-Sadr told us:

The United States has not understood our revolution at all. It attributed the seizure of the hostages to the "barbarity" and "fanaticism" of the Iranians. It then interpreted my election as President as a victory against the clergy by a "pro-Westerner" moulded by French liberalism. It was wrong in both cases. It has not yet understood that the students' occupation of the American Embassy and my election are the two sides of one coin: our people's desire for independence. If it accepts this fact it would be easy for us to release the hostages shortly, perhaps even in the next few days.

[Question] What exactly are you asking of the United States?

[Answer] A formal self-criticism concerning the crimes it has committed in Iran for some 25 years and the recognition of our right to obtain the Shah's extradition and the restoration of his fortune. We are so certain of being proved

right that we are prepared in advance to accept the conclusions of an international inquiry.

[Question] Would you wait until the inquiry had been completed and the Shah extradited before releasing the hostages?

[Answer] The two affairs are not connected. I repeat that it would suffice for the United States to admit its responsibilities and promise never to interfere in our affairs again.

[Question] Two types of inquiry have been put to you. One submitted by Mr. Kurt Waldheim envisaging a United Nations committee comprising representatives of certain Third World governments. The other, proposed by Mr. Sean MacBride (former Irish foreign minister) and Mr. Nuri Albala (Paris lawyer), is considerably different: A "court" formed of non-governmental people would "try American imperialism", and would be the "Nuremberg of the Third World", to quote Mr. Albala. Which of these solutions attracts you most?

[Answer] I prefer the second. However, some Revolution Council members lean toward the Waldheim committee. The ideal solution would be a combination of the two. In any case we have submitted our proposals—the fruit of a consensus—to Imam Khomeini who is alone capable of taking a decision. We hope to obtain that decision in the next two days. If he accepts our proposals it will then be up to President Carter to give his verdict.

[Question] Meanwhile do you intend to replace the students guarding the hostages by State representatives?

[Answer] That is a possibility which I am considering for the next few days. However, in this case too, the Revolution Council and then the Imam would have to approve my proposal . . .

[Question] Have you not been granted increased powers to restore State order in the country?

[Answer] No, I have simply been appointed Revolution Council chairman, and the council is continuing to exercise its legislative and executive powers. Over the next few days there will probably be a ministerial reshuffle and changes in the management of radio and television, but all my suggestions on this subject will necessarily have to obtain the prior approval of the Revolution Council.

[Question] Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh has said that the expulsion of the Islamic students from the US Embassy compound, by force if necessary, has not been ruled out . . .

[Answer] At the present time it is not a question of such a step being taken. We will never use violence against young patriots whose sincerity and revolutionary feelings are above suspicion. If there is any difference of opinion I would possibly go to the US Embassy to persuade them to come over to my viewpoint. I merely criticize them for meddling in matters which do not concern them. If they want to denounce a particular politician they would henceforth only be able to use the radio and television after obtaining the Revolution Council's permission.

The students must stop slandering their political opponents. Like them, I regard men such as Mehdi Bazargan, Amir Entezam, Naser Minachi as reformists and pro-American. However, until I have proof to the contrary, I do not think they are spies in the CIA's pay. Waging a battle against political opponents is one thing, slandering them is a different matter. Like France, Iran has its "American Party" and its "Russian Party". The Tudeh is the instrument of Moscow's policy in our country. That is not a good enough reason to ban it or accuse it of collaborating with the enemy.

69. Gotbzadeh on Hostages' Release

LD121140 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1104 GMT, 12 Feb. 80 LD.
[Text] Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh, stated in an interview with

the ABC television network: An international commission to investigate the Shah's crimes will probably be convened in Tehran within a week. Gotbzadeh said: Our demands are the same as before, but he declined to state a time schedule for the release of the hostages, even after the convocation of a United Nations international commission.

Regarding the end of the period of hostage-taking, Gotbzadeh said he hoped the crisis would end soon. Gotbzadeh also said all this depends on diplomatic moves. We will co-operate with United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in this regard. Gotbzadeh said: Our main complaint is that while the Shah was committing many crimes and plundering our country's wealth he was backed by America.

70. AFP Interview with Gotbzadeh

NC121255 Paris AFP in English, 1250 GMT, 12 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 12 Feb. (AFP)—Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh today confirmed things were starting to move towards freeing the American hostages held by Moslem extremists, but insisted an international inquiry into the former régime was part and parcel of any deal.

In an exclusive interview with Agence France Presse, Mr. Gotbzadeh confirmed President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr's views stated in an interview yesterday with the French *Le Monde*, but added that the key word was caution.

Mr. Bani-Sadr told *Le Monde* that release of the hostages was no longer dependent on the international inquiry and on the extradition of the Shah.

Mr. Gotbzadeh said he preferred to act than make forecasts, but that the intense talks on the hostages, now over 100 days in captivity, would "accelerate" things.

He said the whole process to free the 50 Americans would soon be set in motion, including the work of an international committee to investigate alleged crimes of the ousted Shah's régime.

Mr. Gotbzadeh told AFP he was in touch with United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who is to select committee members, a couple of times a week. He added that the commission would likely have five members.

Mr. Gotbzadeh flies to Athens tomorrow on the first leg of a tour to include Rome and Paris. In Athens and Rome he was to meet foreign ministers and other leaders. No details of the Paris stop were known, but Radio Tehran said today the minister would be away five days in all.

Turning to the Afghanistan crisis, Mr. Gotbzadeh told AFP that Iran had "prepared" measures to aid Afghan rebels but would only implement them if the Soviet Union failed to pull its troops out in the near future.

He added no aid had yet been channelled and when asked if any aid would be military, replied: "We will see."

The Iranian Foreign Minister said there had been no strengthening or mobilization of Iranian forces along the country's borders with either Afghanistan or the Soviet Union as the Soviets had "reassured us and told us there is not the slightest problem".

He added: "I believe that the Soviet Union will not occupy Iran but in the hypothesis of a Soviet advance, certainly we will not confront them at the border but in each house in the country."

Mr. Gotbzadeh, commenting on Mr. Bani-Sadr's interview with *Le Monde*, said that the liberation of the hostages was tied to the start of the whole process of settling the differences between Iran and the United States.

President Bani-Sadr was quoted as saying that liberation of the hostages could depend just on the United States acknowledging alleged past crimes in Iran and recognizing the right of Iran to seek extradition of the Shah.

Mr. Gotbzadeh said that the plan under discussion with Mr. Waldheim envisaged a five-member commission to examine allegations against the Shah. He however counselled "prudence" and said that it was "best to begin the process" and to do things one after the other without speculation on the outcome.

The Iranian Foreign Minister also said that Iranian legal experts were busy preparing dossiers against the Shah and that he hoped these would be ready to send to Panama before the end of the month.

71. Ayatollah Beheshti on Hostages

NC131053 Paris AFP in English, 1038 GMT, 13 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 13 Feb. (AFP)—Iran wants the problem of the 50 hostages held at the US Embassy here to be resolved quickly, Revolutionary Council Secretary Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti said today.

The Ayatollah told newsmen that the release of the hostages need not be preceded by the extradition of the ex-Shah, provided that Iranian public opinion agreed.

Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr made similar statements yesterday, describing the extradition of the Shah as "a strategic problem".

The Ayatollah Beheshti also left open the possibility that the hostages could be released by the Islamic students before the Iranian legislative elections on 14 March. There were however differences of opinion on the hostage issue within the council, he said.

He said the Revolutionary Council has not yet envisioned Mr. Bani-Sadr's suggestion that the American hostages could be entrusted to government representatives instead of the students. He said in any case the students' opinions would have to be taken into consideration.

The Ayatollah also said that the council has not "totally accepted" all the arrangements for a United Nations investigatory commission examining the charges against the ex-Shah.

"It is a good plan, but it might not be enough to resolve the crisis", he said.

72. Bani-Sadr, 'Arafat Interview

LD131932 Paris Domestic Service in French, 1810 GMT, 13 Feb. 80 LD.

["Face the Public" programme, in which programme moderator Claude Guillaumin and journalists Christian Billman of Paris Radio, Gerard Saint-Paul of French television channel 1, Albert Zarka of *Figaro* magazine, Dominique Barry of *L'Humanité* and Benoit Raisky of *France-Soir* in Paris interview Iranian President Bani-Sadr and PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat via live linkup with Tehran—individual questioners not identified.]

[Question] As regards the centres of decision, Mr. President, can you explain precisely what are your relations with Ayatollah Khomeini. Who takes the decisions. For example, can you take a decision without referring to him?

[Bani-Sadr] To be alone in taking a decision is not a good thing. We carried out the revolution so that the President would not be alone in taking a decision. We want to settle problems together. Therefore, as previously, there will continue to be consultations followed by a decision. I will implement the decision.

[Question] But is it possible that you would not agree with Ayatollah Khomeini?

[Bani-Sadr] If there is no agreement between us and Ayatollah Khomeini, we will respect his will.

[Question] But there is not only Ayatollah Khomeini. In the case of the hostages who makes the decisions: You, the President, the council of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini or the Islamic students?

[Bani Sadr] As regards the hostages it is the Revolution Council, with the agreement of Imam Khomeini, which decides.

[Question] Mr. President, as regards the hostages, which is after all the essential question, in the long term are you not going to find yourself, if I may so put it, in the position of a hostage with regard to the hostages? Let me clarify my question: In so far as the United States now rejects all criticism, what are the prospects for the release of these hostages? You are not going to keep them forever?

[Bani-Sadr] Neither will the United States be able to refuse self-criticism forever. Because it is a fact that Iran was under their direct domination, and the revolution was against this domination. They have only to accept (this); and this is not to humiliate the American people. Quite the contrary. It is to make mankind aware that something has changed through our revolution, and that the man of today may nurture a hope for another world perspective.

[Question] Mr. President, can you tell me precisely what may be the procedure between the Americans and you for the release of the hostages?

[Bani-Sadr] That they accept self-criticism, that they accept that the possessions and the crimes of the former Shah and his family and entourage, can be proceeded against by Iran, and salvaged and returned. And that they accept never again to interfere in our affairs. You see they are simple conditions.

[Question] Mr. President, does the presence next to you of Mr. Yasir 'Arafat, mean that one day the PLO and Mr. Yasir 'Arafat could play the role of intermediaries, as was envisaged at the beginning with the Americans, between you and the Americans?

[Bani-Sadr] An intermediary; you know, it is not a good thing for a movement to play the role of an intermediary. I do not think that it is ready to accept this role. After all, intermediaries are not needed to settle something which is clear and simple.

[Question] Mr. President, US State Department Spokesman Mr. Hodding Carter said yesterday evening, and I quote, that it is absolutely out of the question for the United States to accept self-criticism about alleged crimes against Iran. What do you think, Mr. President, about this American attitude?

[Bani-Sadr] It is a pity. It is a pity because self-criticism is the best way for enemies to become friends. If they do not accept this self-criticism how can you expect us to agree to act before our people in their interest?

[Question] Mr. President, we hear you speaking about self-criticism. But until your election the condition for the release of the hostages was always that the Shah be returned to Iran. Does it mean that your attitude has changed?

[Bani-Sadr] Well, you know the return, the extradition of the Shah remains valid for us. We have taken steps and we will pursue them. But even when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs I never linked these two matters. Whatever happens, we must prosecute criminals.

[Question] Mr. President, naturally there are principles and, as you have recalled, there are also possibilities of a compromise. Apparently, these possibilities still exist. After all, as somebody who intends to revitalize the country, who wants to normalize the situation, tackle unemployment, and so on, do not the hostages constitute a burden or an obstacle to your political action in Iran?

[Bani-Sadr] [Words indistinct] you know, since the beginning of the interview it would seem that there is no other problem but the problem of hostages. But it is not the problem here. I travelled throughout the country during the presidential elections and nobody asked whether the hostages will be freed or not. Here, in this country, it does not constitute a major problem. Even on the international plane it does not constitute a problem of importance. The United

States, before the Afghanistan affair, wanted to use the affair of the hostages to attack us, to carry out propaganda against our revolution, to say: it is a revolution of fanatics, and so on, and so on. And, after the Afghanistan affair and the elections in Iran, which have shown that a conscientious people has taken a grip on its destiny, the Western press, both you and the Americans, has changed its tone, saying: (?Well), he [Bani-Sadr] has been educated in the West. He will arrange things, and so on. It is not true. I am a person chosen by this people. It is a people which wants to create a new culture for itself and for its efforts and creativity. I (?can) settle problems but only while respecting my people, the independence of Iran and (?the interests) of the oppressed people of the world. Not the interests of the United States.

*

[Question] Mr. President, coming back to a question of purely political policy. You said that the Ayatollah Khomeini, in the event of a disagreement, would take the decision and that you would respect it. If the students refuse to release the hostages, even if you yourself decided to, what then? What will the final decision be, and can you tell us if the hostages are still in the US Embassy, or dispersed around Iranian territory?

[Bani-Sadr] Well, if we decide, if we take the decision one day, it will be with the agreement of Imam Khomeini. So, if everyone is in agreement, why should the students in the US Embassy be opposed?

[Question] Does that mean, Mr. President, that with the agreement of Imam Khomeini, as Foreign Minister Mr. Gotbzadeh said the day before yesterday, Iran might possibly resort to force to get the students out of the Embassy?

[Bani-Sadr] With the agreement of the Imam, there is no need for force. It is the determining force.

[Question] What is the view of the Imam Khomeini on this question precisely?

[Bani-Sadr] When we presented an action plan to him, he accepted it.

[Question] What action plan?

[Bani-Sadr] Well, unfortunately, I am unable to reveal the details. I hope that the plan will be implemented.

[Question] If a decision in principle is taken on a release could it happen from one day to the other, in a few hours?

[Bani-Sadr] From one day to another, in a few hours; that depends on the United States. You know, a miracle is always possible.

73. Bani-Sadr Decries Multiplicity of Decision Centres

LD142136 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 14 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, today came over to the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran where, in an interview by way of satellite, he replied to questions put to him by Rome radio and TV correspondents.

In reply to a question on whether Iran's current attitude toward the United States was not contrary to the Vienna agreements the President said: The onslaught was not initiated by us. It was initiated by the US Government by means of the 1953 coup d'état during Mossadeq's time.

Mr. Bani-Sadr added: Our men and women were then dragged into torture chambers. Therefore, when the people staged a revolution against such a course of events, how could one tell them to remain at home, to not move and to not take up a position? The President said: The Americans should leave us alone and then they will see how the people, whether they be Muslims, Christians or Jews, could live together with understanding.

Our country's President was asked about the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy. He said: Some of these students' actions are correct but some of the others, which are connected with the Government and are part and parcel of the Government's business, are open to criticism.

Mr. Bani-Sadr added: So long as there are a multiplicity of decision-making centres, the country will not be able to emerge from the crisis.

74. Gotbzadeh Discusses Hostages, Other Issues

AT141330 Athens News in English 14 Feb. 80, pp. 1, 4 AT.

[Text] Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said Wednesday his Government's original demand for the return of the deposed Shah in exchange for the release of the American hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran remains unchanged.

"Our demands are legitimate and right and the Shah must be extradited", Gotbzadeh said.

He claimed that Iran's newly elected President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr has denied that he said the question of the hostages' release is no longer related to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's extradition to Iran.

However, there was no indication Bani-Sadr had repudiated statements made Tuesday in Tehran that Iran no longer demands the Shah's return as the price for freeing the 50 Americans now held hostage in the embassy by militant students for over 100 days.

Gotbzadeh said that statements attributed to him that force might be used on the student militants if they did not free the hostages following government orders, was a "reporter's trick".

"There is no need for such circumstance", Gotbzadeh said: "I cannot imagine such a situation will arise. The Imam (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) must be obeyed" if he says the hostages should be set free.

Asked at a news conference what he believed is a realistic period of time for a solution to be found to the hostage problem, Gotbzadeh replied: "Confusion exists within the United States created by contradictory reports. To resolve the crisis you must get to the root of the problem which means an international investigatory commission as proposed by United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim must be formed. There is no timetable for releasing the hostages. There is no timetable for the work of the international commission."

75. Further Gotbzadeh Comments in Greece

AT141332 Athens / *Kathimerini* in Greek, 14 Feb. 80, p. 3 AT.

[Text] Iranian Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh yesterday supported views on the hostage issue which are different than those expressed by Iranian President Bani-Sadr. He said the hostages will be set free only when the international commission to be set up to investigate the Shah's crimes reaches its conclusions.

76. AFP Report

NC141930 Paris AFP in English, 1926 GMT, 14 Feb. 80 NC.

[Excerpts] Rome, 14 Feb. (AFP)—Release of the American hostages in Tehran is "very much in sight" and could be a "question of hours as much as a question of months", Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said here today.

Mr. Gotbzadeh's statement, made at a news conference here echoed optimism

expressed in Tehran and Washington for an end sometime soon to the hostage crisis that is now in its 103rd day. He declined to comment on what arrangements still had to be made and what timetable was envisaged for the release of the estimated 50 hostages held by pro-Khomeini militants who stormed the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November.

Mr. Gotbzadeh said the return of the Shah to face Islamic justice, the original demand of the militants who took over the Embassy, would happen "not by force but by the determination of the Iranian people. This they have already shown one time with the downfall of the Shah. Why not a second time?"

The Foreign Minister said he would pursue the extradition of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, which Iran has already requested of Panama.

(But Mr. Gotbzadeh told France-Inter Radio that he was sceptical of the chances of freeing the hostages before the Iranian legislative elections scheduled for 14 March.)

The Minister, who will fly from Rome to Paris, denied that during his absence from Tehran Iranian authorities were taking a more flexible approach to their dispute with the United States.

"It defined an independent policy supported by Imam Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council", he said.

"My absence changes absolutely nothing. It will be thus as long as the Revolutionary Council exists."

77. Gotbzadeh on Commission's Investigation

LD151922 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 15 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to news agency reports from Rome, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, Iran's Foreign Minister, said today: the 49 American hostages will not be released before the publication of the results of the work of the committee which has been proposed by the United Nations to investigate the crimes of the deposed Shah.

Gotbzadeh added that United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim informed him in a telephone conversation today that the investigating committee will begin its work within the next two days.

Gotbzadeh added: Waldheim said that he is still busy contacting the various people chosen for the committee.

The Iranian Foreign Minister pointed out that the most important point is for the investigating committee to begin its work. He said that if the committee embarks on serious investigations, he is certain that the release of the American hostages will be (?decided).

In response to a question on whether the relatives of the hostages should be optimistic, Sadeq Gotbzadeh said: yes, certainly so.

78. Possible Questioning of Hostages

LD161428 Paris Domestic Service in French, 1400 GMT, 16 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] The American hostages in Tehran could be questioned as witnesses by the international commission of inquiry of five magistrates. Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh gave this information this morning.

He added that in principle the commission will hold its meetings in Tehran, but it could go to Paris or other places to study certain documents. The duration of the commission's work could last for more than one week and only after that—according to the Iranians—could the release of the hostages be considered.

79. Bani-Sadr Athens Television Interview

AT162018 Athens Domestic Television Service in Greek, 1930 GMT, 16 Feb. 80 AT.

[Exclusive interview of Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr by Greek national radio and television correspondent Evangelos Bistikas; date and place not given. Interview conducted in French with simultaneous Greek translation; translated from the Greek.]

[Text] [Question] Mr. President, you have just celebrated the first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. What are the problems you had to overcome?

[Answer] There are many problems—economic, political, there are cultural problems, social problems. The economic problems touch upon industry, and for us this is a disease. There are many agricultural problems. Even during the time of the Shah our economy was one of the most serious reasons for his failure. The economy was paralyzed and this cannot yet be overcome. In order to solve all these problems we must first of all solve the political problem. There are many decision-making centres. The situation does not permit a solution and we are unable to concentrate decisions, or if you wish, we cannot guarantee the prerequisites for the solution of the problems.

[Question] Yesterday, at the Revolution Council you said that it is extremely basic from the point of view of policy that your country must be completely independent from US influence, the influence of the Soviet Union and that of other countries. I wonder whether this policy will not lead you into total isolation, and whether this would make you more vulnerable to possible threats?

[Answer] There is no fate which says that a country must be dependent or else independence would mean isolation. Independence does not mean isolation. It means co-operation but at a level of equality.

[Question] Do you face a normalization of relations of your country with the West and the United States after solution of the hostage issue, naturally under the prerequisites you will enumerate?

[Answer] My policy is always one of independence. The problem of the hostages is at the same time a problem of humanitarianism and of politics. From the humanitarian viewpoint, it is painful for us to hold hostages. From the legal viewpoint we agree that we have violated the agreements, but from the political viewpoint this is entirely another thing.

We were not the ones who started violating international rules. This is the consequence of systematic violations by the United States. Today the political aspect is predominant. In order to overcome these difficulties it is essential that certain prerequisites are first overcome. I hope the United States will do whatever they have failed to do to date so that we will be able to say that what prevails today is the humanitarian issue, and that this problem must be solved. You must certainly know that might is might, authority is authority and if one is to be independent it is much better not to refer to might except in essential instances. I hope that the necessary instance will never arise. [Word indistinct] we have economic relations with the United States. It is far better that we guarantee relations with you, with other European countries so that both we and you will be able to have more freedom of movement.

[Question] Mr. President, would you once again like to enumerate the prerequisites for the liberation of the hostages?

[Answer] There are two phases: the liberation is the second one. First, there must be a change in the current psychological and political climate. In order to change this climate the United States must condemn the policy of the past and must undertake the obligation not to intervene in the present and in the future, and it must officially accept not only to avoid raising obstacles to the prosecution of criminals of the old régime—either in reference to their corrup-

tion or their crimes or their treason [sentence as heard]. If these prerequisites are met, then the climate will change and we will then be able to enter the other phase; that is, to the liberation of the hostages.

[Question] This may take some time and yet there is the impression the hostages will be freed very soon, in other words, within two or three days.

[Answer] This may be the impression, but we cannot adhere to impressions. I do not believe that things will change within two to three days. If however within three days the Americans adopt the necessary measures, then the climate will change and behaviour toward the hostages will also change.

[Question] Does the United States have even an indirect contact with the Iranian authorities on this problem?

[Answer] United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim is in contact with the United States in the same way that he is in contact with us. From time to time some ambassador or someone else states that the Americans say one thing or the other. Whether this can be considered contact is another matter. In other words, this is not dialogue with the Americans. No, it is not.

[Question] Tell me, Mr. President, whether the Gotbzadeh visit to Athens, Paris and Rome is related to this issue?

[Answer] No, he went in order to attend some observances in Athens and in order to have discussions with the European countries.

[Question] Will this international commission be ready within a few days?

[Answer] I hope so, because there are strong hopes.

[Question] How will the freeing of the hostages be achieved? Will it be before the findings of the commission or afterwards?

[Answer] You know, there is not much relation between the commission and the case of the hostages.

The commission was formed in order to study the crimes of the previous régime in Iran and the crimes of the United States—in order to find out what happened in Iran. As soon as they announce the results of their investigation and as soon as the Americans fulfil their responsibilities, then I hope the climate will change and then we shall see.

There are other cases—with Panama, with the extradition of the Shah—but the basic question is that the climate must change and we must assure the people that the past is over for good and that there is a certainty that the United States will never again interfere in our affairs.

[Question] Will the Revolution Council discuss the list of members on the international commission?

[Answer] This has already been done.

[Question] Was it approved?

[Answer] Approximately [as heard].

[Question] How is the Imam, whom you visited the other day?

[Answer] Extremely well.

[Question] If ever the students refuse to follow your orders, then what will happen?

[Answer] If there is an order, then this will be approved by the Imam and by the people and then the students cannot refuse. This will never happen.

80. Bani-Sadr on Students

NC161700 Paris AFP in English, 1654 GMT, 16 Feb. 80 NC.

[Nick Phythian dispatch.]

[Text] Tehran, 16 Feb. (AFP)—The Islamic students holding 50 Americans hostage at the US Embassy here must return to their university faculties and must not interfere in affairs of State, President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said today in a hard-hitting statement to the Pars News Agency. "They are brothers and we

love them well, but that is not in any way affected with affairs of State. They must not intervene", he said.

His comments, reported in the newspaper *Keyhan*, come in the wake of a 20-minute meeting he had yesterday with Iranian spiritual guide Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the man who holds the key to the release of the hostages. The meeting was the longest he has had with the 79-year-old guide of the Iranian Revolution since he was hospitalized with heart trouble more than three weeks ago.

The Iranian President said that the release of the hostages, who have been held since 4 November, depended on a favourable American response to three conditions.

"I have said it in French, English and Persian. When we have seen that the United States is agreed to our proposals, we will begin taking steps to prepare for the release of the hostages", he added.

"When the United States has prepared the way, then the release of the hostages will be possible", he said.

The Iranian President's three conditions are American recognition of past interference in Iran and undertaking not to intervene in the future and not to raise obstacles to Iranian attempts to secure the extradition of the Shah—now exiled in Panama—and his wealth.

"The Americans must drop their plot and we will see afterwards what we can do then", he said. But he dismissed reports that he had a secret plan for the release of the hostages that he had discussed with Ayatollah Khomeini. "All that we have said is out in the open. There are no secrets", he said.

81. Protest Lodged over Canadian Embassy Activities

LD161308 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1100 GMT, 16 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to a dispatch from the representative of the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada, Dr. 'Adeli, Chargé d'Affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada, yesterday went to the Canadian External Affairs Secretariat to hand over the Iranian Government's strong official protest against the activities of the Canadian Embassy in Tehran and while meeting and having talks with the political under-secretaries there, he handed over Iran's strongly worded note, registered [presumably cabled] his own protest to the United Nations and the International Court in The Hague, referred to Canada's meaningless, offensive and scandalous action as being tantamount to an abuse of the Iranian's trust and diplomatic immunity and called it a violation of Iran's sovereignty and interference in Iran's internal affairs. In his note he identified Canada as a partner in crime with the imperialists.

Iran also rejected Canada's excuse to the effect that its Embassy's action was prompted by humanitarian motives, adding that the Iranian nation's action in occupying the US Embassy was a reflection of its awareness and wrath and protest against the United States systematic interference in the internal affairs of Iran, beginning with the 1953 coup d'état.

After meeting the Under-Secretary of State at the Canadian Secretariat of External Affairs, Dr. 'Adeli took part in a press and radio and television conference, and said at the outset: Analysing this issue one ought to say that Iranian-Canadian relations in the past have never been antagonistic and Iran's Islamic Revolution, which seeks to set up a just society, poses no danger whatsoever to Canada although it has jeopardized the unlawful interests of the superpowers.

Pertaining to Iranian-US relations, no one could deny that the United States brought Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power and is also his partner in crime. No one could deny that the United States has interfered in Iran's internal affairs and

has continued to do so after the revolution. Therefore, the Iranian nation has had to deal with this revolutionary issue and, in any case, these two countries' relations are not like relations with any other country and have nothing to do with a country such as Canada.

One ought to bear in mind that this action by Canada is an empty, meaningless and offensive action but has been represented as heroic in order to deceive the Canadian nation, when as a matter of fact it only proves that Canada is at the service of the imperialists. As the Canadian people are busy with their elections, they do not comprehend the negative results of the action.

From now on, everyone should look on the Canadians as US spies. It is necessary that Canada should worry about itself. Canada will bear an enduring black stigma of shame.

82. Bani-Sadr on Students' Ouster

LD170220 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0055 GMT, 17 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, our country's President [words indistinct]. AP today reported, quoting *Al-Watan*, that Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr has obtained permission from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to oust the students occupying the US Embassy from the Embassy compound and put government soldiers in charge of guarding the hostages. *Al-Watan* wrote that Bani-Sadr, because of the disobedience of the students in implementing the orders of the President, was forced to go direct to Imam Khomeini, since the students will accept his order.

Al-Watan also reported that the ruling Revolution Council presided over by Bani-Sadr has faced (?difficulty) in its efforts to end the US-Iran crisis.

The elected President of the Iranian nation tonight said in a telephone conversation with Pars News Agency that these reports are fabricated from beginning to end and are strongly denied.

83. Bani-Sadr on United Nations Commission

NC171927 Paris AFP in English, 1915 GMT, 17 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 17 Feb. (AFP)—The release of the US Embassy hostages here will require more than a condemnation by an international commission of the ex-Shah and the role of the United States in supporting him, President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said today.

The Iranian President's comments came shortly after a United Nations spokesman in New York announced that the composition of the international commission to investigate Iranian grievances against the Shah only needed Iranian approval before it could be announced.

Mr. Bani-Sadr, speaking after a meeting of the ruling Revolutionary Council here, however, avoided all questions on Iran's attitude to the composition and mandate of the commission.

84. Gotbzadeh Postpones Return Trip

LD182006 Tehran in English to Europe, 1930 GMT, 18 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Iran's Foreign Minister, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, who is visiting Paris, has postponed his return to Tehran for another day in order to meet with some unofficial personalities there. The spokesman [as heard] did not further elaborate, but the postponement is related to the issue of the release of American hostages in Tehran. Meanwhile, the spokesman of the Revolutionary Council,

Hasan Habibi, has pointed out that the American hostages' issue will be discussed following the Gotbzadeh's return to Tehran. Habibi has further emphasized that the investigation commission should, more than anything else, look into the issue of the extradition of the ousted Shah to Iran. The commission will also have the opportunity to cope with the release of the hostages.

Meanwhile, Sadeq Gotbzadeh has said that the duration for the performance of this commission will be contained to 15 days and the commission may call the hostages into hearings as witnesses. Hasan Habibi has confirmed the statement by President Bani-Sadr that the issue of the American hostages being released is not irrelevant to the duties of the investigating commission.

85. AFP on Gotbzadeh Remarks

NC182210 Paris AFP in English, 2201 GMT, 18 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Paris, 18 Feb. (AFP)—Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said today in a French television interview that he did not think the American hostages in Tehran would be released within the next two weeks, as was implied earlier by a United Nations spokesman in New York.

"In any event, we are not there yet", Mr. Gotbzadeh said.

"We must not skip any stages. Let's try to take a solid first step with the composition of the commission which is to begin the work", he added.

Mr. Gotbzadeh said that the investigating commission on Iranian grievances being set up at the initiative of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim could go to Tehran this week, "maybe at the end of the week, if all goes well, if the commission really gets set up, if the announcement that it has been formed is official".

"A certain number of people at the United Nations talk a lot, sometimes irresponsibly", he added. "The release of the hostages is not the goal of the commission's work."

Mr. Gotbzadeh has been in Paris since last Friday.

86. AFP on Composition of Commission

NC180850 Paris AFP in English, 0833 GMT, 18 Feb. 80 NC.

[Nick Phythian report.]

[Text] Tehran, 18 Feb. (AFP)—Iran has yet to make a final decision on the composition of a United Nations sponsored commission to investigate Iranian grievances against the ousted Shah, Revolutionary Council spokesman Hasan Habibi said today.

The Revolutionary Council, Iran's supreme governing body, would consider the matter again once it had received a report from Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh, he added. Mr. Gotbzadeh was expected to return here tomorrow from Paris after a European tour that also took him to Athens and Rome.

A United Nations spokesman in New York said yesterday that Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim had selected the five members of the commission, a move seen as a step towards the release of the American Embassy hostages here. The US had agreed to the choice but Iran's decision was awaited, the spokesman added.

Mr. Habibi said that the best place for the commission to convene, if it wanted to call the hostages as witnesses, would be here in Tehran. The decision on whether to call the hostages or not would rest with the commission itself, he added.

Mr. Habibi said that the mandate of the commission, as he understood it, would be to make recommendations on three questions. These were the

extradition of the Shah, the return to Iran of his wealth and that of his family from every country in the world, and "perhaps a recommendation" on the release of the 50 hostages who have been in captivity since 4 November.

Mr. Habibi, however, drew a clear distinction between the work of the commission and the resolution of the hostages crisis. He stressed that the release of the hostages depended essentially on US acceptance of conditions laid down by President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. These conditions call for American recognition of past interference in Iran's internal affairs and undertakings not to interfere in the future and not to block Iranian attempts to secure the return of the Shah and his wealth.

87. Khomeini Names Bani-Sadr Commander in Chief

LD190922 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0830 GMT, 19 Feb. 80 LD.

[Order issued 19 February by Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, to Dr. Seyyed Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the "Islamic President" of Iran—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Your Excellency, Mr. Bani-Sadr, President of Iran: At this sensitive stage when there is more than ever a need for centralization, Your Excellency is appointed to represent me as the commander in chief of the armed forces, as defined by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is hoped that in line with your example the affairs of the country and the armed forces will continue working according to the codes of Islam.

I have asked God to bring you success in the service of the nation of Islam.

[Signed] Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini, 19 February 1980.

88. Bani-Sadr Announcement on Approval

JN192117 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 2100 GMT, 19 Feb. 80 JN.

[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has announced that Imam Khomeini has agreed to the formation of the international investigation commission on the crimes of America and the Shah in Tehran.

President Bani-Sadr, who was talking to journalists after an Iranian Revolution Council session held last night, Tuesday, added that the commission can hold its meetings in Tehran to investigate the former Shah's crimes and the US interference in Iran. He added that Imam Khomeini has also agreed to hold this commission's meetings in Tehran.

Dr. Bani-Sadr added that the way the above-mentioned commission will be formed has also been approved and that the Iranian Islamic Revolution Council has discussed this matter and endorsed it.

89. More on Gotbzadeh Remarks

LD200015 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2330 GMT, 19 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to a Pars News Agency report, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, refrained from giving his opinion about Iran's steps following the conclusion of work by the investigation commission on the Shah's crimes. He said: These issues should be studied by the Iranian authorities at the right time.

On his return from a tour in Europe, Sadeq Gotbzadeh was interviewed by a Pars News Agency correspondent. He said that for us the results of the work of

this commission are important. At any rate, the work of the commission in the present circumstances is not in the least connected with the question of the release of the hostages.

The Pars News Agency reporter asked: Are Waldheim's efforts also connected with the composition of the commission investigating the Shah's crimes in Iran and are they not connected with the issue of the crisis in Iranian-US relations?

Gotbzadeh answered: I am not interested in knowing Waldheim's or the United States real motives. What is important to me, as a person who is responsible for Iranian diplomacy, is the results to be obtained from discussing an issue to Iran's advantage; so that in a world where public opinion has been terribly aroused and provoked against us the justice of our cause might be proved.

In conclusion, the Iranian Foreign Minister, while protesting the reports of foreign newsmen and remonstrating against domestic journalists, said: Unfortunately this issue has been so portrayed as to make it appear that the steps toward holding the commission are contrary to the measures taken by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, when as a matter of fact such a thing is quite untrue.

Gotbzadeh also emphasized: We ought to prepare public opinion in Panama for the extradition of the deposed Shah and we should bring domestic pressure to bear on Panama for the return of the former Shah to Iran. This will only be possible when we [words indistinct].

90. Bani-Sadr Message to Waldheim

LD201118 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1046 GMT, 20 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the President of our country, in a telegram to Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, announced that the members of the commission for the investigation of US past activities in the internal affairs of Iran and the crimes, corruption and the treachery of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his régime, can come to Tehran. The text of the President's cable to Waldheim is as follows:

Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations: Now that the demand of Imam Khomeini and the nation of Iran has been conceded regarding the convocation of a court for the inquiry and investigation into past American intervention in the internal affairs of Iran through the régime of the former Shah, and investigation of their treachery, crimes and corruption, the commission, whose convocation and work have been agreed to by the Imam and the Revolution Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, can come to Iran.

[Signed] President and President of the Revolution Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

91. Muslim Students Read US "Documents"

LD210011 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1908 GMT, 20 Feb. 80 LD.

[Meeting of Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and news media representatives in Tehran on 20 February—recorded.]

[Excerpts] Now let us listen to a radio-television interview conducted by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy. The film of this interview will be carried tomorrow night by the television following the news [begin unidentified speaker recording]:

Today we face an enemy that the Imam has named the great Satan and this century's source of corruption. This is an enemy whose hands are stained with the blood of Muslims and oppressed people of the world.

The documents which will be read out today concern US attempts to establish contact with the armed counter-revolutionary forces in order to weaken and ultimately topple the Islamic Republic. America and its mercenary agents have been in contact abroad with the exiles—namely, the mercenaries of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's régime who fled Iran—in order to set up an opposition front. Moreover, inside Iran, too, it was through separate actions doing the same thing. We will deal with these two separately, that is, those operating abroad and those active in Iran [passage indistinct].

We have certain documents dealing with external affairs. However, due to the fact that there is no time to deal with them, only one document will be read [passage omitted containing purported text of US document].

Now a document dealing with internal affairs, that is, contact with counter-revolutionaries. One of those involved in this matter, people who, according to the Iranian people, must be prosecuted, even if they are in America, is Mr. Charles (Moss), former US Embassy chargé d'affaires in Iran. He was a [word indistinct] diplomat [passage omitted containing purported text of US document].

The fact is that they [the United States] will not give us our rights. We must fight the Satan, especially the great Satan. We must struggle; America must return to us our rights: that is, the extradition of the criminal Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the (?astronomical) riches he has plundered, thus depriving this poverty-stricken nation.

We call on the responsible officials to summon for investigation those who have been in contact with the Forqan group. In particular, in the course of trials held in the case of Forqan group (Mr. Constant), who is at present working at the US State Department, must attend the trials and answer questions raised during these investigations, so that we may see who is responsible for all the bloodshed in this country. Naturally, we consider the United States as having had a share in such bloodshed [end recording].

92. AFP on Revelations

NC201834 Paris AFP in English, 1808 GMT, 20 Feb. 80 NC.

[Nick Pythian report.]

[Excerpts] Tehran, 20 Feb. (AFP)—Islamic militants occupying the US Embassy here today released "confidential" documents as evidence of attempts by American diplomatic employees to unite counter-revolutionary elements against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The "students", who have been holding 50 Americans hostage since 4 November in an attempt to force the return of the ex-Shah and his wealth, said the captives should be brought to court to testify on the activities of people responsible for bloodshed in Iran.

The Islamic "students", who handed photocopies of certain Embassy documents to newsmen today, charged they showed that the United States had been engaging "a spectrum of antirevolutionaries" to work against 70-year-old Ayatollah Khomeini.

The militants said embassy officials had worked with political figures and other factions of society who, if found to be pro-American, were introduced to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

They would then be "handled" and "used" by the CIA, a spokesman for the militants said.

The Embassy documents were reports of meetings held after the revolution between Embassy officials and a number of people opposed to the new régime.

One such person, Reydu Afshar, said it would be easy "to recruit a force of

20-30,000 men in Azarbayjan (northwestern Iran) and train them in the nomad's land along the Kurdish border" to "take over northwestern Iran".

Another document referred to a meeting in Paris between a member of the US Embassy there and former housing and development minister Hushang Nahavandi, who spoke about an anticipated military coup to be launched from Kordestan.

93. Khomeini Address to Nation

LD202151 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 20 Feb. 80 LD. ["Message" issued 20 February to the Iranian nation by Imam Khomeini, "the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran", in connection with mobilization week—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. May I thank the honorable Iranian nation and the fruitful youth who have welcomed the general mobilization. The defence of Islam and the Islamic State in times of danger constitutes a religious, divine and national duty which is binding on all strata and groups.

At this sensitive juncture the nation is confronted by recalcitrant enemies and by the superpowers, particularly the United States, which, thanks to its heinous intervention throughout the usurping monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, held back our nation from political, cultural and economic growth and pillaged the riches of this poor nation. Should there be negligence and should the nation fail to prepare itself with all its might and perseverance against the foes of humanity and should it refuse to make itself ready with a general mobilization, which by the will of almighty God no power on earth could resist, and to fail to prepare itself for the defence of the country and Islam it would be dragging itself and the country into destruction.

What has been achieved so far thanks to the great efforts of honorable men and women prompts me to hope that they will be successful in the all-round mobilization for military, ideological, moral and cultural training with the succor of almighty God and will complete the practical military, partisan and guerrilla training course in a manner worthy of a rising Islamic nation.

Strive to become increasingly powerful in science and action and, trusting in almighty God, arm yourselves with weaponry and moral soundness since the great God is with you and since the powerful hand which crushed the satanic powers is the supporter of the divine society.

I hope that the general Islamic mobilization will become a model for all the meek and Muslim nations in the world and that the 15th century of the Hegira will become the century for smashing great idols and substituting Islam and monotheism for polytheism and atheism, justice and fairness for injustice and unfairness and the century of devoted men instead of uncultured cannibals.

O meek of the world, rise and rescue yourselves from the talons of nefarious oppressors; and O zealous Muslims in various countries in the world, wake from your sleep of neglect and liberate Islam and the Islamic countries from the clutches of the colonialists and those subservient to them.

O honorable Iranian nation, continue your Islamic movement and do not allow the aliens, whoever they may be, to interfere in your destiny, finally put an end to acts of pillage and decisively demand from the United States and any other government which may have risen in defence of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the criminal who has wronged Islam and the nation, to return to us this criminal and the lawful riches of the nation; and do not rest until final victory.

O God, be the support of our nation and our dear youth, since these people have risen in order to please you, and with their movement they have driven from the arena the foes of the faith: "Thou art truly able to do anything!" [quote from Koran].

A salute and wish of peace to the great nation and to the fighters along the path of truth, independence and freedom!

[Signed] Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini, 20 February 1980.

94. Bani-Sadr: Commission's Work not Related to Release

JN211857 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 21 Feb. 80 JN.
[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated today that the work of the international commission investigating the deposed Shah's crimes is not directly connected to the issue of the release of the US hostages.

In a statement to Radio Canada, Dr. Bani-Sadr declined to give information on the release of the hostages and on whether they will be released before or after the publication of the international commission's report. Dr. Bani-Sadr stressed that the Iranian Government is determined to bring the deposed Shah back for trial in Iran.

95. Beheshti on Hostages

LD281022 Budapest MTI in English, 0600 GMT, 28 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Budapest, 27 February, MTI—Istvan Ambrus, MTI's special correspondent reports from Tehran:

Truth is one and indivisible, thus the justice system also has to be unified and indivisible, stated Ayatollah Beheshti, member of the Islam Revolutionary Council in Tehran. At present Beheshti fulfils the duties of prime minister and was recently appointed as president of the Supreme Court.

The Ayatollah stated that the revolutionary courts, which have up until now operated independently and frequently arbitrarily, which caused for many criticisms, "will be integrated into a unified justice system under the control of the Supreme Court within a month or two". This system has to be Islamic from the roots to the top, but this [words indistinct] of the positive elements of foreign legal practice.

The answer to the question of MTI's correspondent Beheshti said: At least ten weeks are needed for the parliament to begin discussions in the affair of the American hostages. The Majles will be formed six weeks from now, he said, and following this further four weeks are needed by it for electing its president, vice-presidents, leading organs. Even at the end of ten weeks it is not certain that the Parliament already capable of operating will place the debate of hostage question, considered to be of small importance, on its agenda as the first point. Even if it does, the debate will be long and one cannot even guess when a final decision will be made concerning the fate of the American hostages, said Beheshti.

Answering other questions Beheshti emphasized that Iran does not want to isolate itself from the world, but it does not have and will not have in the future either need for any kind of relations in connection with the United States. Iran can stand on its own feet and watchfully guards its independence. Any sort of relation with the Americans, however, will automatically and obviously mean the violation of this independence.

96. Rafsanjani on Hostage Situation

LD271303 Tehran *Azadegan* in Persian, 21 Feb. 80, p. 5 LD.

[*"Azadegan* interview" with acting Iranian Interior Minister Hashemi Rafsanjani; date and place not specified.]

[Excerpts] [Question] As regards the Muslim students following the Imam's line, do you agree or disagree with their disclosures?

[Answer] As regards the students, I think that they have taken a great stride along the revolution path. Of course, ever since they went into action I have said in interviews and speeches that America was not leaving us alone but was seriously continuing to annoy us with its aggression, going as far as to extend protection to the Shah.

If we disregarded this, as happened in the past, America would make even worse attempts to destroy our revolution.

The action of the Students Following the Imam's Policy resulted in the repudiation of all America's shameful plans. Fortunately, all the plans it made were of no avail.

The most interesting point is that this was all accomplished by the people: if the Government had interfered and imprisoned those spies, the matter would not have been so important; after all, the Government is the Government and has the power to do that. The important point is that it was the people who carried out the action, just as since the revolution began they have been carrying out revolutionary acts; and we were, well, co-operating with public opinion. It was a praiseworthy action, with the oppressed nation standing up to tyranny and succeeding in achieving something. They have treated the hostages extremely well. They have maintained their position. This is one dimension of the task. We approve this action, as we did in the past, since it represents a national and popular measure carried out by a young class of students.

This matter is not under the jurisdiction of the Revolution Council or the Government; it was student action, and it is not over yet.

As for the documents, yes, I must say that a series of documents does exist and has been made public, and we must now see how the people will judge them and whether the accusations they contain are justified or not.

It was also logical for the Revolution Council to say that the radio and television should prevent the students from making their disclosures on radio and television, since it is wrong for the State radio and television to be made available to one group directly, regardless of the esteem in which that group is held, and for documents to be published if in the final analysis this is not beneficial, or where the prosecutor has not yet stated his views. Thus it is illogical for these documents to be published before an investigation has taken place. The Revolution Council has said that there must be some control over these documents but did not go so far as to ban their publication completely. They can be published through media other than the radio and television, which are not the sole means of communicating information. There are other channels open for the publication of these documents.

[Question] The President of the Republic has spoken of the possibility of talks with the Americans, after they have accepted the conditions, while the Imam has issued strict instructions that the only conditions for the hostages' release is the return of the Shah. What is your view of this?

[Answer] The President also holds the view that there should be talks leading to the Shah's return. After all, in order to obtain the Shah's return some talks are necessary, if only to make them understand that they must return him and that there is no place for compromise. Why should we compromise? Compromise means giving up the nation's interests; no, that is not right.

[Question] The reason that this question was raised here is that the nation does not want such talks and relations. The nation wants to know whether or not the contacts and talks to which Bani-Sadr refers are similar in nature to those of Mr. Bazargan. Is he working for the return of the Shah decisively, following the example set by the Imam?

[Answer] Well, of course, since it would be illogical not to speak to them at all, we must speak to them. In so far as we want the return of the Shah and our wealth and we wish to tell them that we intend to get our money back, we must talk to them. As a result of talks a committee of inquiry has been set up to gain

the fulfilment of our rights. This is true, but there is no reason why we should come to give up some of our rights and submit to pressure. No. And, in principle, why should we compromise?

As regards our interests, I do not think that such a thing as compromise is possible or that anyone, whether president of or foreign minister, who understands the issue perfectly, could wish for compromise.

97. Late Report: Students Issue Statement No. 102

LD211338 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1116 GMT, 21 Feb. 80 LD.
[Statement No. 102 of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, issued 21 February in connection with the general mobilization (basij-e omumi)—read by announcer.]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. O honorable Iranian nation, continue your Islamic movement and do not allow the aliens, whoever they may be, to interfere in your destiny; put an end forever to acts of plundering and decisively demand from the United States and any other government which may have risen in defence of the criminal to Islam and the nation, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the return to us of this criminal and the stolen riches of the nation. Do not rest until final victory! This is from Imam Khomeini's message on the occasion of the general mobilization.

The militant and heroic Iranian nation is today in the process of mobilization because the enemies of Islam and of the oppressed, namely the colonialist superpowers and particularly criminal America, are lying in wait for an opportunity, which exists in their futile and chimerical imaginations, to deceive the militant nation, to destroy the momentous Islamic Revolution, whose roaring waves have shaken the palaces of all the oppressors, and to rule over the dear and rich Islamic country. What vain indulgence in fanciful dreams! Our nation and our mighty and revolutionary Islamic culture regard every day as a day of 'Ashura and martyrdom, and every place as Karbala [the region where Imam Husayn was martyred] and as arena for battle against the enemy.

The nation knows that this divine school and this Islamic nation regards no honour as being greater than that of martyrdom, for whose attainment recognizes no particular time and place.

Today is a day of blood and martyrdom and a day of the Iranian nation's mobilization against all the aggressive occupiers, particularly America—an America that must deliver to our nation the fugitive Mohammad Reza and the assets he has stolen. America must realize that the longer it delays this matter, the more it exposes its anti-mankind nature to the world. In delaying the return of the Shah and his assets, any expectation of clemency with regard to the hostages will be a foolish one.

Today is a day of general mobilization against oppression and idolatry and a day of the great nation's mobilization to uproot blasphemy, polytheism and discord, as well as a day of mobilization to wrest our rights and those of the oppressed in the world from the mighty.

Yes, the only way to the victory of the Islamic nation lies in a universal and all-embracing mobilization against the Eastern and Western superpowers, particularly criminal America—a mobilization to incorporate not only a military dimension, but also the ideological, cultural and ethical ones, and a mobilization to make criminals tremble in fear and dispatch them to extinction.

Yes, a nation which has been mobilized and which is ready for battle against the cruel and plundering enemy is a victorious one. A nation whose young ones are marching forward, imbued with military and combat preparedness and with all the various military techniques, and which in its confrontation with satans and superpowers, particularly the great Satan, has adorned its trenches with

martyrdom and imbued its character with the nature and character of Islam and with its revolutionary culture, will be victorious.

Yes, being militarily powerful and having valour, bravery and faith are the main conditions for overcoming the enemy. Giving military training to the unarmed and inexperienced ones and arming them and imbuing the skilled and armed ones with piety are the most fundamental of our duties and particularly the duties of the valiant and lively young ones.

There is no doubt that the highest priority in the programme of mobilization, which aims at defending Islam, the Islamic countries and the Muslim nation, should be focused on efforts, carried out with ever greater unity and cohesion in the solid ranks in the service of Islam and the revolution and the path of the Imam, to honour the blood of the militant Iranian nation's martyrs.

Let us strive in this mobilization to advance our great Islamic movement, led by the great leader, Imam Khomeini, until all military, political and cultural dependence has been severed.

O Lord, our nation has taken up arms to march, group after group, army after army, in a collective way under the Imam's leadership and in the path of Imam, who is a revolutionary and a great source of inspiration and who is uncompromising. Grant us victory over the enemy.

[Signed] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

98. Bani-Sadr Discusses Return of Shah, Hostages

LD211104 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1048 GMT, 21 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of Iran, in an interview with Canadian Radio last night, emphasized that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is firmly determined to get the deposed Shah back and put him on trial.

Dr. Bani-Sadr, the Iranian President, also announced that the work of the international commission of investigation into the crimes of the deposed Shah has no direct connection with the release of the hostages in the US Embassy in Tehran.

99. AFP: United Nations Envoy Discusses Investigating Commission

NC221530 Paris AFP in English, 1521 GMT, 22 Feb. 80 NC.

[Text] Geneva, 22 Feb. (AFP)—The United Nations commission investigating Iran's former imperial régime will leave Geneva this weekend, Iran's United Nations Ambassador Mansour Farhang said here today. The commission, held up [word indistinct] Wednesday, will leave either Saturday or, at the latest, Sunday night, said Mr. Farhang, here for the 36th session of the Human Rights Commission. Mr. Farhang denied there was any political reason for the commission's delay of in Geneva [sentence as received]. "We were simply not ready to receive them," he said, "and they would have lost several days in Tehran if they had come right away."

The Iranian diplomat blamed the American Government for the delay, noting that Iran had asked for the commission two months ago. "It is ridiculous after two months to rush things in this affair without even awaiting an official acceptance of the commission by the Iranian Government", said Mr. Farhang.

He said he did not know if the commission would meet the hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran, but said that did not seem "important" to him. The diplomat added, "that might be important from a humanitarian point of view but that does not matter".

Mr. Farhang stressed that there is not a direct trade-off between the entry of

the commission into Iran and the freeing of the hostages. He said the idea of such a deal did not fit into "today's Iranian politics".

Mr. Farhang, who will return to New York Saturday, also stressed that the commission [words indistinct] involved investigating international problems. "It is a question of crimes committed by a régime installed in 1953 (?by the) United States and perpetuating itself with continued American assistance."

"It is a question of a problem which is larger than Iran. That is why the formation of an international investigating commission is legitimate."

Mr. Farhang concluded that he did not doubt the Iranian-American crisis would be resolved and with it the matter of the hostages.

100. Khomeini Says Majles Must Decide Hostages' Fate

LD231134 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 23 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text of message issued 23 February by Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, in connection with the issue of taking hostages and the importance of the tasks of the Islamic Consultative Assembly—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. The crimes of the deposed Shah are not something that have been or will be forgotten by the nation. It is patently clear that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi rendered us subservient to the United States from every point of view, whether from the economic and political, the cultural and military, or from the moral and human viewpoints. If he had had the chance, he would have dealt an irreparable blow to Islam.

Everyone knows that his hand and that of his father were soaked with the blood of young and old of this land. Massacres, imprisonments, tortures and exiles were daily occurrences of that odious régime. Thanks to backing and support from the US Government, the Shah resorted to these barbarous crimes and bled our nation white.

Regarding this filthy dynasty and the United States and its agents, our nation will not give up its righteous struggles.

Let the Iranian Government and His Excellency the President of the Republic devote all their effort to the retrieval of the traitorous Shah and the retrieval of the Iranian people's riches from him, since the valiant nation is not giving up in this, their just demand, and will not take a single step backward.

One of the indications of the demand is the occupation of the den of espionage, an act which enjoys the support of the nation, and this cannot be anything except a reaction to the crimes of the US Government.

Now that the commission investigating and studying past US interventions in Iran's internal affairs through the bloodletting Shah régime is being realized, thanks to the efforts of his excellency the President of the Republic and the Islamic Revolution Council of Iran, the crimes of the United States and the Shah will be proved.

On that day it is essential that the dear invalids and the heroes of our revolution should attend the forum of the commission and that the families of the martyrs should send their petition documents on the crimes of the Shah and the United States to the court.

As I have repeatedly said, we demand the return of the Shah and the riches of the nation from him. The Muslim and combatant students who occupied the den of espionage, have by their revolutionary deed dealt a crushing body blow against the world-devouring United States and have thereby made the nation proud.

But since in the near future the representatives of the people will meet at the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the issue of the hostages will be up to the representatives of the people so that they can decide about the release of the

hostages and the concessions they should obtain in return for their release, since it is the Iranian people who should have a voice in the course of political events.

Of course, until the setting up of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Revolution Council and His Excellency the President of the Republic will continue their efforts pertaining to the return of the Shah and the nation's riches and the political course of events that would pave the ground for the implementation of such demands.

I beseech almighty God to grant victory to Islam and defeat the foes of Islam.

[Signed] Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini. [Dated] 23 February 1980.

101. Students' Reaction

LD231216 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 23 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to the public relations office of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, the students stationed at the spy nest were jubilant and staged extensive demonstrations following the broadcast of the Imam's message at 1400 and the emphasis made by the Imam on the question of hostage taking. They were also jubilant about his re-emphasis of the will and determination of the combative Iranian nation for the return of the deposed Shah and his plundered assets from the hands of criminal America.

The students chanted slogans such as: "We are your soldiers, O Khomeini; we abide by your orders, O Khomeini!"; "Extradition of the criminal Shah is the cry of our nation; Khomeini's leadership is the foundation of our unity", and "70,000 martyrs, hundreds of thousands of wounded; compromise no more, surrender no more".

At the conclusion of the demonstrations, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mosavi Kho'ini, who is staying at the spy nest with the Muslim students, explained and analysed the Imam's historic message.

102. Student Statement No. 104

LD231756 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 23 Feb. 80 LD.

[Statement No. 104 (as heard) of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, date not given—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Greetings to you, the inheritor of Hoseyni! Greetings to you, the inheritor of the blood shed for God, the blood that was victorious over the sword! Greetings to you, oh Imam, whose message has breathed spirit into the corpses of the dead!

Greetings to you, oh leader, whose guidance has led the lost to the path and who has dispelled from the mind of the enemy the temptation of attacking the nation's caravan! Oh hope of all the oppressed, we have heard your brave message, and all have heard it; friend, enemy, all have listened. The enemy has once again been given to understand that they are faced with a nation that will not take a single step back in reaching its objectives.

The world-devouring America, the great devil and the century's mother of corruption, has understood that now as always Khomeini is fighting with a roar and with power. The mind of the Islamic world is in tune with Khomeini's rhythm. Eventually, this world-devourer must surrender in the face of the will of this nation.

Oh yes, oh inheritor of all those throughout history who have carried messages. We have heard the message of your order, and it is sufficient that before God you have testified to our Islamic nature [Islamiyat]. [The sense here is that the Imam has approved of what the students are doing.] This is despite what the satans and their friends may whisper to the contrary.

America, the criminal and fundamental enemy, has understood that you have made us soldiers in order to strike at it. The great and heroic nation of Iran, too, has also testified to this reality and will continue to do so. Before God and before the martyr-nurturing nation of Iran, we testify that we will enter into accord with you, that we will be your obedient soldiers. With the assistance of God, we will be steadfast in this alliance.

You have ordered that the matter of the hostages is to be the concern of the representatives of the nation who will be meeting in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Oh yes! The leader has always said that the deciding factor is the vote of the people and we had no other expectations from him. As for us, it makes us very proud that the nation is supporting our actions. We, too, shall always submit to the decision of our struggling and brave nations. Let us hope that all segments of the nation, from the most humble individual to those responsible for the nation, will be able to be worthy soldiers in the fulfilment and realization of your orders.

Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

103. Meeting with Gotbzadeh

LD241117 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1055 GMT, 24 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to the Pars News Agency, the first meeting between the United Nations commission of inquiry and the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic dealt with the commission's work schedule and working arrangements. Following the meeting, a joint announcement was issued as follows:

The members of United Nations commission on inquiry met the Foreign Minister for 90 minutes. This was their first meeting with Iranian officials. The meeting basically dealt with the commission's work schedule and working arrangements in Tehran. The commission was assured that there exists a satisfactory basis for considering substantial and practical issues. Consequently, the commission will begin its inquiry with regard to its assignment.

Assurances made by the Foreign Minister concerning co-operation with the commission are a source of encouragement for the commission.

104. Student Interview

LD215022 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0112 GMT, 25 Feb. 80 LD.

[Interview with Student Followers of the Imam's Policy in Tehran on 24 February; reporters, students not identified—recorded.]

[Text] Following the broadcast yesterday of the message of Imam Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which was mainly concerned with the takeover of the US den of espionage by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and the problem of the hostages and which stressed the policy demanding the return of the deposed Mohammad Reza and his stolen assets, today our colleagues have interviewed several of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, which we broadcast now at the end of our news bulletin.

[Question] Let us start tonight's interview with the Imam's recent message, which was broadcast yesterday, and let us discuss the many accusations brought against the Muslim students and the den of espionage. I would like to know [word indistinct] when this message was broadcast? We know that at the start of your revolutionary move you were supported by the Imam.

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. The Imam's message provided a lot of guidance, as all his messages before. The Imam has guided us with his messages. He has guided the entire nation and us as part of

the nation. He has solved our problems and clarified uncertainties. But before talking about the Imam's recent message regarding the den of espionage, it is worth mentioning the matter confirmed by the Imam again. I think the short absence of the Imam during this period has created a situation in which the Imam has spoken very little and the people have been less able to take advantage of his guidance.

It was very difficult to accept such a problem but it taught us a great lesson, and that is: this short absence teaches us to be always ready on the scene and the people themselves should all be the guardians of the revolution and the guardians of the path of the revolution, which is the path of the Imam. This will be a strong guarantee for the continuation of our revolution, and we can be certain, then, that our revolution will continue and will not divert from the Imam's policy.

The Imam's policy is the right way to govern the revolution, because all the individual members of the nation, all the Muslim individuals and all of those who have faith in the revolution are the guardians of this policy. They are all the guardians of this revolution. This is a great lesson which we should learn, God willing. And we should be responsible in encountering all the problems, and we must announce our ideas and feel responsible. But the message of the Imam yesterday had many points and subjects, if we want to talk about the Imam's message in full detail it would not be possible. Therefore we will discuss points which are more important and talk to our brothers about these points.

There is one subject which we come across in all the Imam's messages and that is the decisiveness of the Imam. It shows in the slogans used against America in the past, and in the demand about the Shah, a criminal who betrayed Iran and committed crimes in this country for many years. Now he has escaped from the grip of the nation, but he should be surrendered to this nation. The United States must surrender to this right demand of the nation and give the Shah back to the nation of Iran.

The Imam has emphasized in his message that the nation will not step back from its demand till it reaches its goal.

The next problem concerns the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The Imam has said that Iran owes its revolution to the nation, and that the continuation of this movement depends on the people. They have proved that what they said was not *only a slogan, and they feel responsible toward their [word indistinct]*. Thus it is up to the nation to decide. For this reason the Imam said: The decision regarding the fate of the hostages will be made by the representatives of the nation who will gather in the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the future.

The problem seems to be that because of the American hard line attitude in not surrendering to the nation's will and not giving back the Shah, the Imam has left this problem to the Majles. All the recent American hopes to save these spies have been shattered as a result of the Imam's recent message. It became clear that the hostages will remain at the disposal of the nation of Iran till the following months when the Islamic Consultative Assembly convenes, when the representatives of the nation will gather and make a decision about the hostages.

After the Islamic Consultative Assembly is formed, as the Imam has said, the Majles should review what concessions it should receive from America so that in exchange it may free the hostages. The Majles should decide on this matter. Naturally, the decisions of the Majles, which consists of the representatives of the nation and which is a true reflection of the nation, should be in accordance with the nation's wishes. The nation's wishes have always been those of the Imam. The views of the nation and the Imam are inseparable and the Majles deputies will decide accordingly, and their decisions will be carried out.

One of the important points in the Imam's message was the extremely vital and sensitive point that the nation has deemed that it should be involved in the country's internal affairs and political issues and follow these issues as observers.

The duties of the Revolution Council and the President, as outlined by the Imam, were that the issue of the extradition of the Shah should be pursued decisively, without the slightest hesitation, with a greater momentum and with unity of expression. The issue of the role of the people in political affairs is an extremely important point, to which the Imam had referred clearly in his message.

The philosophy behind the point that the nation and the representatives of the people should decide regarding the hostages and the right against America could therefore be (?explained) thus: that the people should take part in political affairs. We know that this issue is extremely vital, because, if a country's backing and capital are the people, if the country relies on its people, then the country's capital, those slum-dwellers and mountain-dwellers, would not possibly allow foreigners and plunderers to force an illegal, illegitimate and irrelevant issue on the nation. They see themselves (?as part of) all the affairs of the country; they would see that their wishes are granted. Other people do not decide for the nation, they themselves do. They welcome martyrdom; they fight the enemies; they would not retreat in the slightest in the face of the enemy. All that could only be successful if all the nation is involved in the affairs of the country. The most sensitive gauge for all the dangers and deviations is that of the nation, when it has a role in the country and sees that it is dealing with its future and is responsible to secure and guarantee the future. The nation would definitely not stay silent in the face of dangers and deviations.

What I should explain, in reference to the Imam's message, is the direction of the struggle and that of the Iranian Revolution against the murderous United States, and the [word indistinct] that the Imam had in his message, to the effect that the occupation of the den of espionage, is in fact a blow to the world-devouring United States.

The (?slogan) [word indistinct] that they put forward, that his stolen wealth should be returned, is in fact [words indistinct] the angry slogan of the [words indistinct] Iranian people against the United States, who by sheltering Mohammad Reza, and in fact by protecting him, is involved in a conspiracy against the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When the nation stated that the fugitive Mohammad Reza and the wealth that he has plundered from the Iranian nation should be returned to the Iranian nation by the US Government, it was in fact a [word indistinct] and scholastic struggle against America. With the same severity and decisiveness that it stated that Mohammad Reza should leave Iran and that the monarchical régime should be overthrown, the whole nation shouts that America should return Mohammad Reza.

The returning of Mohammad Reza and the wealth that he has taken with him, his trial and in fact exposing the criminal face of America and the (?Government) of America, the exposing of the disgraced face of the previous régime—which was a puppet of the US Government—is a great victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.

When this slogan was stated, the Imam himself put forward the slogan. He said that there is a revolution in Iran again, a great revolution. The question of the return of Mohammad Reza, his trial and punishment is definitely separate from this movement of the Islamic Revolution of Iran toward establishing a monotheistic system [words indistinct] the slogan itself, the returning of Mohammad Reza is a (?great) blow to the criminal United States.

As the Imam has often said in his messages the direction of this [word indistinct] and the direction of our revolution are toward the severance of dependences on the United States. The criminal United States which, during the reign of the Pahlavi régime—that puppet of the United States, [passage indistinct] the returning of Mohammad Reza is a step in that direction; the ending of all dependences, as the Imam says, is the fact the continuation of the movement [passage indistinct]. It is a slogan that has taken shape again in the

hearts of the world's oppressed [words indistinct] that with their solidarity and movement, following the Iranian Islamic Revolution, they could decisively deliver fatal blows to the superpowers, especially the criminal United States, and reach the goals they have been aiming for.

[Question] [Words indistinct] about differences of opinion between you and Mr. Bani-Sadr, the President of our country. It is that groups and individuals, who are not unknown of course, try to magnify them. I would like to ask you whether there are any differences of opinion between you and Bani-Sadr?

[Answer] Concerning the issue of the presidency we believe that, due to the status quo in our society, the President and the Government should have complete power. That is, we need a powerful central government that will face up to the many problems our revolution is faced with at this stage, and overcome them. He has stressed this point, too. The various problems we have in every corner of the country—on the borders, economic problems and or the fact that we are dependent in some cases—should be ended by the revolution. All this requires a powerful central government that will face up to these problems. The way such a government could attain power is, as our revolution has proved, the [word indistinct] of the victory of our revolution, is the Imam's policy; it is the Imam's policy that prolonged the revolution and is the guarantor of the continuation of the revolution. The Imam's policy itself will be the key to the victory of the revolution and the key to power. That is, as long as the government or any responsible official follow the Imam's policy, they will attain the necessary power to confront and solve the problems and advance the revolution. If this line is not followed, the necessary power to confront the problems will not be attained. The key to power and solidarity in our society is the Imam's policy.

About the differences of opinion that have been mentioned and [words indistinct] we believe that if differences in opinion or taste exist between (?bodies) who wish to serve the revolution earnestly and who have no intention but to serve the revolution—as between the Muslim students following the Imam's policy and the President—we believe that such differences are small differences between two brothers which can definitely be settled by the father of the family, especially when all of us, all the Iranian nation, all the responsible officials and all the [word indistinct] of the revolution have faith in and love for the father and serve him and follow his path with all their might. When we have such [word indistinct] our Imam, the father of the family [words indistinct] obedience and acceptance of the father's views, the differences between the two brothers, and brothers in general, will be solved.

[Question] Would you be willing to have a debate with the President about settling the differences?

[Answer] The occasion has not arisen, but there is no objection.

[Question] Could you possibly express your view on the international commission of inquiry into the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; [words indistinct] the Imam has approved this. Your view is not different to that of the Imam, but nevertheless, please state your view.

[Answer] The commission which has been formed to investigate the crimes of Mohammad Reza and the United States [words indistinct] the issue of the crimes of the Shah and the United States is not a small and (?unimportant) one; [words indistinct] the crimes committed against the Iranian nation by Mohammad Reza on the orders of the United States, are vast in dimension [word indistinct] so clear to the Iranian nation, that the denial of the issue proves under cover [words indistinct].

When the commission comes to Iran, sees the crimes of Mohammad Reza and the United States, sees what he has done to the nation and sees its extent, it could not fail to be aware. Even the Iranian nation is not aware of the full extent of the crimes. The Shah himself should come and explain. The crimes he has committed should be recited by the Shah himself, in an Islamic court.

[Question] Maybe the Shah could explain the [word indistinct] treacheries. Maybe he was [word indistinct] but not aware of it.

[Answer] [Words indistinct] all the orders for the crimes, killings and imprisonments were given by him. Nobody else had the right to issue orders in the country. [Words indistinct] and the natural conclusion of the commission would be to condemn these crimes, to relate the crimes to the United States and condemn them and [words indistinct] the crimes of this superpower and its puppet for the nations.

The commission's investigation of the crimes of the Shah and the United States has no connection with the release of the hostages. The issue of the hostages has, on the whole, been turned over to the nation and the representatives of the nation by the Imam. The commission will investigate the crimes of the Shah and the United States.

[Question] As the Imam has been indisposed due to illness for some time, rumours have been spread about the students following the Imam's policy and the den of espionage which have, unfortunately, intensified. Some of the problems and ambiguities were cleared as a result of the Imam's message. Do you have any explanations concerning the rumours?

[Answer] The source of most of the rumours should be sought in the White House, a house contaminated by the numerous crimes committed by the American leaders. America has spread many rumours through its agents in Iran, who are not few, who want to return [words indistinct] Mohammad Reza to power, or [words indistinct] SAVAK agents, former Rastakhizis, counter-revolutionaries. They (?beg) America to break-up the decisiveness of self-confidence of the nation by spreading rumours and creating division.

If we regard America as the Imam does, [words indistinct] as the great Satan, [words indistinct] that tries to create division in any way possible, regains its bases, if it reinfiltrates in the various levels of our society, strikes blows against our revolution and tries to make it deviate, if we recognize this great Satan, we will not heed rumours; we will try to stop them and reject them. In view of the Imam's reiterations, the source of these rumours is obvious.

Concerning the Embassy, the den of espionage, and the rumours spread about here: they are not merely rumours. We sometimes see a series of actions whose source is again the United States. A few nights ago, bullets were fired from around the den of espionage on the brother guards of the Revolution Guards Corps, the fighting brothers who guard this place day and night. Such things are done to lower morale, and destroy self-confidence.

[Question] Did this shooting create an incident?

[Answer] Fortunately not.

[Question] Were the perpetrators identified?

[Answer] In the pursuit that followed no trace was found; but what we definitely know, as you saw in the revelations, is that American agents and those who support America are desperately trying to commit such attacks.

[Question] This is done to lower the morale of the students stationed here?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] For my last question, let us talk about the revelations. May I ask, as you asked the people to declare if they are in favour of the revelations—and they earnestly did by way of marches, telegrams and telephone [words indistinct] here—the question arises why are the revelations not continued at speed, and why are they brief and not continuous? When the people encounter brief revelations they see the atmosphere that is created in society [as heard] against your revelations, and become anxious and [words indistinct].

[Answer] The point that is [words indistinct] this movement was the issue of the revelations. [Words indistinct] the issue has perhaps been put forward incorrectly and [words indistinct] they see the whole of the movement in the revelations, that is, as the movement is against the United States, they consider it

active and (?effective) as long as the revelations continue and the people are informed of the documents that are here. While it is obvious that this is not the whole of the issue, the revelation issue is a small part of the movement. If we remember what the Imam has repeatedly said, [words indistinct] this is the struggle of our revolution against America, the struggle of all Islam against all paganism; this is a great movement our revolution has embarked on and has placed America—the great demigod of the West, the symbol of crime in the world—in a maze. It is a great movement. To limit it to the revelations alone is definitely not the correct thing to do. All the revelations will be finished one day but the movement will not come to an end. The movement will continue until the great demigod is broken and the oppressed are saved.

[Question] Forgive me, but I believe the people have recognized this movement and this is why they demand a once and for all revelation, so that you may, without any worry, get on with your main movement.

[Answer] As for these revelations they have a positive result, for they identify US bases in our society. There is no doubt that continuing these revelations will culminate in our people having a better knowledge of America, particularly the complex operations involved therein. Consequently, they will be in a better position to see the cards the United States is holding and therefore face it. This is certain. Having said that, we believe that all these things should be made public, so that we as part of the nation, may (?maintain) control of the spy nest and the spies, check all their evidence and then make them public. We consider this our duty, a duty we shall uphold.

As for the problems raised in this connection, the recent difficulties concerned with the method of revelation and the question that before making these revelations they should be made available to the authorities—such as the public prosecutor—we hold the view that most of these documents may not be of great significance within the context of the public prosecutor's laws and criteria. It is possible that the man against whom evidence has been unearthed at the spy nest could not be prosecuted. However, we believe that these documents are important enough as far as the people are concerned. The people must know what sort of operations that America, the Number 1 enemy of this nation and the main perpetrator of the crimes committed in this country, has been involved in.

Moreover, the people should know about relations between individuals and America. We have no intention of passing any judgments as to whether these individuals should be punished or left alone; or if they are to be punished how the punishment should be administered. All we say is that the nation should be informed.

For instance, the case may involve the participation of an individual in a reception given by the US Embassy, where he has told some US Embassy staff that he is opposed to Khomeini. Well, considering our laws—our Islamic Revolution laws—such an individual should not stand trial. After all, this is not a dictatorship where if someone opposes the Imam he should be executed, for this does not merit even a trial. That person cannot be summoned by the public prosecutor. However, we believe our people must realize that such an individual has gone to the US Embassy and told the staff he was against Khomeini. Even if the public prosecutor cannot punish him, the people should be informed of the incident. Consequently, we believe that these documents belong to the nation, that it is our duty to make them public. God willing, all the documents unearthed here shall be made public.

105. Mobilization Headquarters Issues 9-Point Resolution

LD251854 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1640 GMT, 25 Feb. 80 LD.
[Resolution of the Iranian National Mobilization Headquarters read out at a ceremony on 25 February in front of the US Embassy in Tehran.]

[Text] 1. With the military mobilization decreed by Imam Khomeini we shall develop our combat-readiness and are ready with all our might to deliver a crushing answer to any superpower aggression against our country's national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

2. With a cultural and ideological mobilization and the greatest jihad aimed at bringing about fraternal relationships between and mercy toward one another and at the elimination of the decadent imperial culture and Westoxication [gharb zadegi], we shall strive to establish the system of Islamic rule.

3. With an economic mobilization and with emphasis on less consumption and on efforts to increase output, we shall tear away the chains of economic dependence.

4. With our political mobilization, which is none other than reliance upon the Imam's leadership and the people's sovereignty in State affairs and political developments, as well as overseeing all aspects of the country's life, we shall no longer allow any deviation to appear in the Islamic path.

5. We regard the Imam's message on the first anniversary of the revolution as a clear manifestation of the domestic and foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and call upon all those in charge in the executive organs, with their all-embracing mobilization, to move in the path of the Imam and that of the revolution.

6. We declare that the Iranian nation decisively demands the extradition of the criminal Mohammad Reza and the return of the wealth stolen from Iran from the criminal Government of America and that it will not retreat one single step in its bid to vindicate its right.

7. We express our support for the struggling Iranian people's vote for the presidency of brother Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and stress that as long as he moves along the path of the Imam, he shall not shirk from giving any assistance or making any sacrifices for the achievement of his Islamic objectives.

8. While renewing our support for the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, we demand that the documents available at the den of espionage, which are national documents, be revealed so that our militant nation can better identify the faces of its enemies.

9. With an all-embracing mobilization we shall elect committed representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly who believe in the Imam's policy and who will not retreat one step in the struggle against the enemies of Islam, led by world-devouring America.

106. Bani-Sadr Gives Interview on Hostages, Foreign Relations

DW261141 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German, 2130 GMT, 25 Feb. 80 DW.

[Correspondents Enke and Danesh interview with Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, in Tehran; original language unknown—recorded.]

[Text] [Question] Mr. President, the international investigating committee will now begin its work. Will it merely analyse the evidence, will it interrogate witnesses or will it also hand down a sort of verdict, and above all, what other concrete pre-conditions must be created for putting an end to the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran?

[Answer] I raised a condition during the presidential elections, namely that the US Government must condemn its past in Iran. I further stated that the special commitment of mankind today means that those who are stronger forego methods of oppression for moral reasons. The United States must admit its guilt and refrain from making this mistake again. Well, Carter has not accepted this and thus created a new situation. This also calls for new measures. In any event,

it is the task of the committee to investigate the crimes of the Shah and his dependence on the United States and to make the results known to the world public. The committee has no other mission.

[Question] Mr. President, Ayatollah Khomeini and the students stand by their maximum demands, namely the extradition of the Shah and the return of his foreign assets. How do you propose to prevail with your concept?

[Answer] Any solution to this problem must in any event be acceptable to Ayatollah Khomeini. So if a solution is found it means that Khomeini has accepted it, that all of us have approved.

[Question] Mr. President, how do you visualize Iran's relations with the West, and above all with the Federal Republic of Germany, after the solution of the topical problems?

[Answer] What we want to be is an independent country. The existing dependencies are impediments and difficulties for us which we must eliminate. Therefore, we are compelled to enter into new relations with the countries of the world. We do not see any sound basis in the former relations between the Shah's régime and Europe, the United States and the Far East, meaning Japan, so that we will not resume this kind of relations. If Europe were prepared to pursue a policy independent from the superpowers we would have an historic opportunity for co-operating with the European States, and that in all fields. The condition is the independence from the superpower. But if the Europeans do not live up to this precondition, for instance, then there is no economic necessity for us to purchase large-scale industrial installations which are built only in the West and to trade with them.

We can begin with small economic units and thus score headway slowly. We are aware that these experiences have been gained in the world. We are prepared to gain this experience as well. We do not want to sacrifice our independence to economic relations such as those which formerly existed. So if Europe refuses to respond to our concept we will establish relations with those countries which wish to co-operate with us likewise in independence from the superpowers—relations which will not deprive us of the chance for independence.

107. Beheshti: Ten Weeks Before Release of Hostages Can Be Discussed

WA270724 London Reuter in English, 0717 GMT, 27 Feb. 80 WA.

[Text] Tehran, Iran, 27 Feb. Reuter—The secretary of Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council said today it would take nearly ten weeks before the Iranian parliament could begin discussing the release of 50 American hostages held in Tehran.

Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti told reporters that even if the Islamic Assembly, due for election next month, made the hostages its first business, debate on the issue was unlikely to start for two-and-a-half months.

"How much time they then need to reach the last conclusion, I don't know", Dr. Beheshti said.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini handed over the 116-day-old hostage problem to the future parliament in a statement last weekend, saying that the assembly would have to decide what concessions Iran should expect in return for the captives' releases.

Although the new assembly is due to sit for the first time around 7 April, Dr. Beheshti said it would take about a month for the body to organize itself, elect a speaker and work out its procedures of business.

"Parliament will sit in six weeks' time but its session to discuss the hostages will perhaps be after ten weeks, because parliament needs nearly four weeks to organize itself", he said.

Asked whether he thought the parliamentary debate would be a long process, Dr. Beheshti said "perhaps".

He also indicated that it was still possible that Ayatollah Khomeini might decide the hostages' fate himself, even though the ailing revolutionary leader had passed on the problem to Iran's future deputies.

108. Vacating of Embassy

LD271758 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 27 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] According to a Pars report, those who had occupied the Afghan Embassy in Tehran left the Embassy premises this afternoon. According to this report, the students' union and the struggling Afghans who had occupied the Afghan Embassy in Tehran this morning, as a protest against the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and their activities there, left the Embassy building after intervention by police and security forces.

109. Gotbzadeh Interview on Commission

JN271959 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 27 Feb. 80 JN.

[Tehran "Arabic section" correspondent's interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh—date not given; recorded portions are in Arabic.]

[Text] [Begin recording] *[Question]* I would like to ask His Excellency the Minister if we can be told about the contents of your talks with the five-member commission investigating the deposed Shah's crimes [end recording].

Regarding the Foreign Minister's talks with the five-member commission investigating the deposed Shah's crimes, Gotbzadeh said: Our talks dealt with the way this commission is to work in Iran and what this commission requires in the way of documents in order to undertake its task.

On whether the commission will deal with the crimes of the United States in its investigation, Gotbzadeh said: No one can investigate the Shah's crimes in Iran without dealing with his crimes' relationship with the United States. Therefore, the commission will virtually tackle this subject. He added that making the world hear of these crimes represents a large constructive step for us along this path.

The Foreign Minister said: The United States has not welcomed the formation of this commission, but found itself forced to accept this matter.

Regarding the hopes Iran places in this commission, Gotbzadeh said: We hope that the commission will be neutral and independent in order to be able to carry out a full investigation into the crimes that were committed during the deposed Shah's era and then to announce its opinions and proofs to the world public.

Our correspondent asked the Foreign Minister about the steps to be taken by Iran to recover the deposed Shah and the people's wealth if the five-member commission does not achieve the required results. Gotbzadeh said: This commission's work is neither linked with the issue of the hostages nor the subject of extraditing the deposed Shah.

He added: This commission will submit the results of its work to the United Nations Secretary-General. If there is any hope that these results will be submitted at the United Nations or the Security Council, the Panamanian Government can benefit from these results, in its capacity as a United Nations member. As for the issue of recovering the Shah, it is a completely separate matter. We have embarked on this subject through legal proceedings, well aware of the laws existing in Panama. We have a good Panamanian lawyer and we seek to commence work on putting the Shah on trial [as heard] in Panama in order to get him back. We have a large hope that his recovery will be accomplished.

Our correspondent asked: If the United States refused to hand over the deposed Shah and the people's wealth, what will the destiny of the hostages be?

The Foreign Minister replied: As the Imam said, the destiny of the hostages will be determined by the Islamic Consultative Council. As for recovering the Shah, we are very seriously and firmly after that.

110. Gotbzadeh Discusses Commission's Meeting with Hostages

LD281953 Tehran in English to Europe, 1930 GMT, 28 Feb. 80 LD.

[Excerpt] A Pars News Agency report in Tehran says that the members of the United Nations commission probing into the crimes of the ousted Shah will probably meet the US hostages. Iran's Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh in a telephone contact told the news agency that he is presently holding a dialogue with the Muslim students adhering to the line of the Imam Khomeini in his capacity as the representative of the Revolution Council for arranging the commission's meeting with the US hostages.

Gotbzadeh emphasized that this meeting has been a part of the commission's schedule. In connection with the report on the departure of one of the commission members, he said that [word indistinct] Aguilar will be leaving Tehran today. In case the commission's probe is [word indistinct], Aguilar will return to Tehran. Gotbzadeh added that Aguilar, the Venezuelan member of the five-man commission was originally scheduled to leave Tehran today.

Meanwhile, a spokesman of the Muslim students said that contacts are underway for arranging such a meeting, but the students have so far taken no final decision.

111. Students' *Keyhan* Interview

LD041623 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 28 Feb. 80, p. 14 LD.

[Exclusive interview with students occupying US Tehran Embassy by *Keyhan* correspondents Manuchehr Hedayatpur and Isma'il Azimpur: "Muslim Students Following the Imam's Policy: Those Who Suspect That They Are To Be Exposed Are Spreading Rumours."]

[Excerpts] In an exclusive interview with *Keyhan*, the Muslim Students Following the Imam's Policy gave their views on various State issues.

Two *Keyhan* correspondents, Manuchehr Hedayatpur and Isma'il Azimpur, sat opposite two students and asked questions freely without restraint.

The text of the interview is as follows:

[*Question*] Why do you not disclose the existence of the documents over a fixed period of time? Hesitation in the timing of the disclosures has given rise to reservations.

[*Answer*] When the documents fell into our hands and we began to translate them we decided on a particular method by which we would disclose their contents, but owing to particular factors and conditions some delays are occurring. We shall in due course explain what these factors are, and they will show the extent of the deep consideration which we are giving to the documents, but from the outset it has been our intention to continue the exposures, following the method decided on, and God willing we shall in future continue to do this. There has been no hesitation on our part; it is that there are certain factors and problems raised by the community and particular groups which require a certain amount of consideration and reflection.

[*Question*] Are you aware of what these factors are?

[*Answer*] Naturally, when a series of documents pertaining to particular groups or individuals is published, it is not merely a question of [the actions of] these groups or individuals, but concerns a series of events, which are sharply affected by what is disclosed, and this naturally compels them to react against

us. They try in various ways to deflect the issue of occupation of the den of espionage—which represents the zenith of the anti-imperialist struggle—and to turn it into an issue of conflict between those individuals [the students] at the den of espionage, and those who are the subject of the disclosures. The groups who have been exposed, or who suspect that they are to be exposed, begin to spread rumours, and it is this that creates a series of problems in the community; it may create unrest and bring about agitation. There are issues which must be taken into account, and when the community becomes over-excited, and does not have enough patience to tolerate the disclosures, this naturally has an effect upon the manner in which we make the disclosures.

[Question] In defending himself on radio and television, Dr. Minatchi claimed that your documents are forgeries. He also said that you are led by one who does not believe in the constitution and that "under the former régime, when we were engaged in the struggle, he [Mosavi Kho'ini] did not dare to utter a word, he did not suffer a single blow, he did not spend a day in prison; but today he is more revolutionary than anyone else". What is your view of this?

[Answer] What that gentleman [Minatchi] said is quite wrong. The only person we contacted before the occupation of the den of espionage and whom we consulted as to whether this occupation was in line with the Imam's policy or not was Mosavi Kho'ini. It is people like Mosavi Kho'ini and the existing revolution forces whom the people recognize.

We consulted him, and he confirmed that if we carried out this action it would be in line with the Imam's policy and would not harm the revolution.

[Question] Are you in contact with or interfering with the committee of inquiry and what is your position vis-à-vis the committee?

[Answer] In a message which the Imam sent to the Revolution Council he asked members to appoint two delegations to investigate the crimes of the Shah and America in Iran and to tell the world about them. On the face of it, one of the committees which the Revolution Council formed in connection with this recent message from the Imam and at the request of the President of the Republic is the self-same committee of inquiry which has arrived in Iran, which intends to investigate the crimes of the Shah and America and tell the world about them.

In accordance with what the Imam said, and in our own view, the duty of the committee is: (1) to see first hand those crippled in the revolution; (2) to contact the families of the martyrs and see what they suffer; (3) to see the ruin of the Shah, America's agent, caused in Iran, familiarize itself with this, and tell the nations of the world about it. Naturally if the committee sees at close range the things mentioned by the Imam, they will reach the conclusion desired by the Iranian nation, namely that it was the Shah who introduced these inhuman practices and caused the massacres and the ruins and that he must be returned to Iran and put on trial.

As for contact between ourselves and this committee, we believe that it should follow the directions indicated by the Imam, approach the actual circumstances as closely and fulfil the demands of the Iranian nation.

We may make available to the committee documents which have fallen into our hands emanating from the American spies operating against the Islamic Revolution of Iran so that it can follow up America's crimes better and acquaint humanity with them; and let humanity be the judge.

[Question] Do you operate on a council [showra] system?

[Answer] Our forces have been divided up on the basis of the different activities undertaken, and each organ and unit has a council. In general, work is carried out according to a council system.

[Question] Where do funds for yourselves and for the hostages come from? If from a private source, should the wages of Iranian employees at the Embassy not be taken from this source?

[Answer] As far as the hostages are concerned, I must say that the den of espionage contains enough food, drugs and facilities for several years, and if this den of espionage were to be under siege, it could live for many years without contacting the outside world. However, funds for the students are provided by the people, or popular forces such as the Guards Corps. As for the Iranian staff's wages, in general embassies have a system recognized by international law whereby the government maintaining an embassy regards embassy premises as part of its territory, and that government must meet the cost of expenses incurred, employees recruited, and building costs; and in truth, staff expenses here must be paid for by the American Government. Having regard to the fact that the American Chargé d'Affaires is being held as a hostage of the people by the Foreign Ministry, he must ask the American Government to send funds and pay the Iranian staff. If this is not done we must be instructed to dispose of, by sale or other method, American property here, including property in American houses and whatever personal possessions they may own, to pay the staff.

[Question] Have you come under pressure from any political group?

[Answer] In principle no populist and original movement can come under pressure from a particular group, but it is clear that these groups react to populist and original movements. They adopt an attitude toward these movements. We have seen up to now that those who claim to be acting in the public interest do not come and show some support for the occupation of the den of espionage, but merely resort to uttering warnings. If they are [indeed] Soviet supporters, they should support the occupation of the den of espionage—so there must be some other reason why they do not support us.

This stance is in fact taken by groups and forces which feel that the occupation of the den of espionage, and in particular the disclosure of documents may lead to their downfall and expose them as they really are, or result in the people repudiating them. So they attempt to adopt these stances, confronting us with rumours and harming our movement through rumour-mongering.

But as I have said, no populist and original movements can be perverted by any political group, and although we are currently witnessing a series of reservations circulating among public opinion against us in connection with the occupation of the den of espionage, when we see the leader of the revolution again in the forefront of the movement and [when we have] Imam Khomeini's support for a person who truly represents [our] school of thought and this revolution, embodies the people's desire and really does represent their will [presumably a reference to Mosavi Kho'ini], many of these reservations will fade from people's minds and all the difficulties which all these groups are trying to make for us here and the pressures they are seeking to bring to bear on us will come to an end.

[Question] Rumours are circulating concerning those exposed in the documents to the effect that more important documents are in existence, but they have not been disclosed since they contain more important names.

[Answer] As the question indicates, this is mere rumour, and is inaccurate. If there were other documents in existence we would without doubt make them public.

[Question] You say that you do not meddle in executive matters, but it is clear that outside the den of espionage there are certain executive authorities who at the slightest sign from you go into action. An example of this is the arrest of Minatchi. How do you explain your "lack of interference"?

The same brother student replied: "First, we do not believe that we should interfere in the business of the executive, since we do not possess the ability to do this. There are so many revolutionary forces in existence, so many revolutionary individuals, so many State officials in charge who are prepared to support our revolutionary move; many of these populist forces exist, for example the Guards Corps, the Revolution Courts, the holy war for reconstruction, the Islamic

societies and so forth. They are ready to sacrifice themselves to prevent the revolution from following a wayward path, and they come forward every time they feel that there is division of strife.

The revolutionary forces are not limited [merely] to a number of students who have come and occupied these premises."

[Question] On the subject of the chargé d'affaires and several other persons at the Foreign Ministry, would you please clarify the information communicated to the public explaining what actually happened, how it was that these people were taken there, how they are being guarded, how long they will remain there, and why up to now they have not been delivered to you alongside the other hostages.

[Answer] As regards the chargé d'affaires and the two persons with him, Tomseth and Howland—notable American spies in Iran—being held at the Foreign Ministry, on the day we came here and occupied these premises they were at the Foreign Ministry, and they were not transferred here. You should really ask the Foreign Ministry this question; and since measures we took to have them transferred here were interpreted as amounting to interference in the affairs of the executive, we did not pursue the matter. The Foreign Minister must answer this, and similar questions.

As for our giving information about them: what is certain is that the people are not concerned with just one person, with just one more spy. It is not the extent of Laingen's crimes that is the point being stressed.

The be-all and end-all of our confrontation, and that of our people, in the matter of the occupation of the den of espionage of our struggle with America is not to study the true nature of these spies, or to discover what effect disclosure of the documents will have; the more important issue is the movement as a whole, and the total outlook of this revolution, which regards America as the principal enemy.

112. Khomeini Allows Italian to Act as Hostages' "Postman"

LD292208 Rome Domestic Service in Italian, 2130 GMT, 29 Feb. 80 LD.

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeini has authorized an Italian Salesian, Don Alfredo Picchioni, to act as postman for the American hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran. The Salesian, who speaks Persian, has already been to the Embassy twice to deliver mail and gift parcels to the American hostages, and very probably will be able to do this again in the near future. The Salesian succeeded in speaking to a delegation of Iranian students, but not with the hostages.

113. BBC Reports Consent for Commission Meeting with Hostages

TA291538 London BBC World Service in English, 1500 GMT, 29 Feb. 80 TA.

["Correspondent's report."]

[Text] The United Nations commission now visiting Tehran to investigate Iran's grievances against the deposed Shah is still expected to meet the hostages at the American Embassy. There was an earlier report on Tehran radio that the meeting had already taken place, but our Tehran correspondent, Alex Brody, says this is not so. At the same time, he says the Iranian Defence Minister Mr. Gotbzadeh [title as heard] insists that a meeting between the commission and the hostages is still on.

[Begin Brody recording] Mr. Gotbzadeh was reported by the official Pars News Agency to have said categorically the commission will see the hostages and the remark was said to have been made after last night's meeting of the

Revolutionary Council, though the implication is that the decision has the authority of the council. Mr. Gotbzadeh, however, gave no indication when this might happen, or whether the condition that the hostages would give evidence had been dropped. This condition was restated by the Revolutionary Council spokesman Dr. Hasan Habibi before the meeting. He said that if the commission were to see the hostages, it must be as witnesses to the crimes of the Shah and the United States. The commission has all along said it expected to see the hostages, but on what terms was not clear, and the United States, before the commission arrived here in Tehran, said it did not want the hostages cross-examined.

Yesterday, a spokesman for the students occupying the Embassy said the commission would not see their captives. That was not its purpose. But today, after Mr. Gotbzadeh's remark, the students were said to be still considering the matter.

Sources close to the commission say it has virtually finished the first part of its work to examine Iran's grievances, and this was climaxed by an extraordinary rally at the Hilton Hotel in Tehran yesterday. More than 1,500 people said to be either disabled during street violence, the victims of SAVAK torture or relatives of martyrs of the revolution, presented themselves to the commission and received, in return, an emotional speech on its behalf by the co-chairman, Mr. Mohammad Bedjaoui of Algeria. He promised to tell the world the unimaginable lengths to which violations of human rights have been carried out in Iran.

The second part of the commission's work is a sensitive part. According to its mandate, it is to allow for an early solution of the crisis between the United States and Iran [end recording].

114. Prosecutor Asks Foreign Ministry to Hand over Hostage

LD021744 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1722 GMT, 2 Mar. 80 LD.
["Notice" issued 2 March by the Islamic Revolution prosecutor general—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God. The Foreign Ministry, Mr. Sadeq Gotbzadeh, with respect, since the trial of Forqan group members is in progress and the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy have, in their documents, presented evidence concerning links between the US espionage den in Iran and the Forqan terrorist group, please issue necessary instructions to have Mr. (Thompson), a hostage held by the Muslim Iranian nation, handed over to the office of the Islamic Revolution's public prosecutor.

115. Bani-Sadr *Der Spiegel* Interview

DW031333 Hamburg *Der Spiegel* in German, 3 Mar. 80, pp. 134-138 DW.
[Iranian journalist Dr. Mostafa Danesh undated interview with Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in Tehran "on behalf of *Der Spiegel*".]

[Question] After your election to the office of President you conditionally advocated the release of the American hostages. What are these conditions?

[Bani-Sadr] I did not advocate it conditionally. It is quite simple. The Americans say we are holding the hostages in violation of the provisions of the Vienna Convention. We say: Yes, this is true. The Embassy occupiers have violated the convention. I was against the taking of the hostages from the outset. On the other hand, I have been one of the harshest opponents of US hegemony in Iran. The basis of that intrusion must be eliminated as quickly as possible in order to solve the hostage problem.

[*Bani-Sadr*] We can also live without their spare parts, and we did rescue those affected. This is not the problem. But how should we understand the fact that the Americans and Europeans keep talking about humaneness toward the hostages while deserting our compatriots in a flood disaster? So they are bound to lie. What matters is not at all the value of man. The hostages are used as a means of propaganda against our revolution. The conditions for the release of the hostages are known. If the United States fulfils these conditions we shall release them.

[*Question*] What is the task of the commission for the investigation into the crimes of the Shah set up by the United Nations?

[*Bani-Sadr*] The commission is coming to investigate the crimes, the treason the Shah committed and what his dependence on the United States was like. I heard that Mr. Carter said in the US Congress that the United States is not prepared to criticize its old policy in Iran and condemn it. What good does such a commission then do anyway? If he does not accept this he will have created a new situation. In this new situation we, too, would have to take our measures.

*

[*Question*] Ayatollah Khomeini and the students in the US Embassy stick to their maximum demand: release of the hostages only after the extradition of the Shah and the return of his foreign assets. What will happen if the commission condemns the Shah as a despot and murderer and also condemns US intrusion but this is not enough for either the Ayatollah or the Embassy occupiers or the Revolutionary Council?

[*Bani-Sadr*] Any solution to the problem in any case must be a solution acceptable to Ayatollah Khomeini. Nor will I raise any condition that is not acceptable to the Revolutionary Council. A solution must be supported by all of us. I shall act accordingly.

[*Question*] Who, then, makes the final decision on the release of the hostages?

[*Bani-Sadr*] The final decision will be made by the people and by Ayatollah Khomeini. This is quite simple. An individual has committed many crimes in this country. The people now want to convict him, meaning to put him on trial. What do the Americans and Europeans want? Anyone advocating human rights must know that the Shah murdered tens of thousands of people, not to mention many other crimes. This is a just demand. If you disagree with this demand, how can you expect us to release the hostages?

116. Commission's Announcement on Visit

NC031234 Paris AFP in English, 1228 GMT, 3 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 3 March (AFP)—The Iranian Revolutionary Council has voted unanimously to allow the visiting United Nations inquiry commission to meet the American Embassy hostages, the commission announced today.

A spokesman said that measures have also been taken for the five-man United Nations team to be given by tomorrow night all documents that the Iranian authorities plan to hand over. He did not specify when the Revolutionary Council gave the go-ahead for the Embassy visit.

Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said yesterday that the commission still had work to do here which included studying Central Bank documents about alleged embezzlements by the ex-Shah.

The five jurists earlier today had talks with Mr. Gotbzadeh lasting one hour.

117. Student Interview

DW031415 Hamburg *Der Spiegel* in German, 3 Mar. 80, pp. 138-139 DW.

[Undated interview by Iranian journalist Mostafa Danesh with unidentified occupier of the US Embassy in Tehran—date not given.]

[Text] [Question] Reports are being disseminated in the West that the hostages will be released soon. Is that right?

[Occupier] The policy of Carter and the ruling people in America consists of keeping public opinion in America under control. That is supposed to avoid having the Americans concentrate on the crimes of the Shah and on his extradition. Depending on the concept, the American Government uses a particular problem as a propaganda means. Sometimes there is talk of alleged hostages, sometimes it is stated that we students are communists and not Muslims. We are suspected of manipulating public opinion.

[Question] Once again: Will the Americans who are being held be released soon?

[Occupier] We and our people have said over and over again that a release is out. First Mohammad Reza (the Shah) the one who committed so many crimes, must be extradited to Iran together with his property which has been removed from the country. After these prerequisites we will release the hostages, as Ayatollah Khomeini says, instead of making them face trial.

[Question] Who will make the final decision on the release, you or Ayatollah Khomeini?

[Occupier] That decision will be made by the Iranian people, in fact by the one who announces the demands, the needs and the will of our people, in other words, by Ayatollah Khomeini.

[Question] The new State President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bani-Sadr, was from the very beginning opposed to the taking of hostages. Can that change your claim?

[Occupier] Our aim is the extradition of the Shah and of his property abroad. Only under that prerequisite we will release the hostages. Otherwise nothing will change.

[Question] Does Ayatollah Khomeini agree with your opinion?

[Occupier] In his statements and announcements Ayatollah Khomeini has repeatedly stressed this line of solution. He believes that the hostages will be released when the Shah and his foreign property have been extradited.

[Question] Recently an international commission was set up to investigate the crimes of the Shah and possibly also the policy pursued by America in Iran. Do you recognize the commission?

[Occupier] We have not formed an opinion about the authority of this commission. Its activity and its decision will show whether it will be in a position to sincerely fulfil its tasks or not.

[Question] And what is being sincere?

[Occupier] If the commission accepts that the former Shah, the servant of the United States, has committed many crimes under the protection of the ruling people of America, and if it will condemn the ruling people of America and confirm the extradition of the Shah and his property so that we will release the hostages, it will be clear that it has fulfilled its task correctly.

In this case its opinion will be in accordance with the opinion of our people. In the other case it would have done an unnecessary job.

[Question] So if the commission condemns the Shah merely for being a despot and for having murdered 10,000 patriots, it would not speed up the release of the hostages?

[Occupier] No. The activity of the commission has nothing to do with the release of the hostages.

[Question] You have named as a prerequisite for the release of the hostages

the extradition of the Shah and his property. Can you hold fast to that maximum demand?

[*Occupier*] We cannot abandon that aim, otherwise we would be punished by the people. The Iranian people have set that target. We here are nothing but the representatives of the people who follow their demands.

[*Question*] You are being charged in the West with exposing the hostages to physical and psychological torture.

[*Occupier*] These are rumours of the ruling people in America. The movement of the Muslim students in the American Embassy is not a terror organization. We have done nothing but hold these spies in the name of the people. Our people do not permit us to torture the hostages or oppress them psychologically. The letters written by the hostages to their relatives, the films that have been made here and the reports of the surprise visitors demonstrate that we are treating the hostages very well.

[*Question*] Could some hostages be prepared to make statements in court against the Shah and the American policy in Iran?

[*Occupier*] Some of the spies are very skilful. They are in a position to carry out many activities. They speak Persian very well, for example, they know very much about Islam and they have good information about the crimes of the Shah. They have confirmed in letters to their relatives in America that the Shah was a criminal. They admit that the Embassy in fact was a centre of espionage and conspiracy.

Many of the hostages do not believe in the human rights of Carter and his Christian mission. They are prepared in the future court proceedings to state their opinion about the Shah and the American Government.

[*Question*] Do the occupiers of the Embassy belong to a particular political organization?

[*Occupier*] If we belonged to a particular political organization we would have been isolated very quickly. Since we do not belong to a particular group and since we just follow the line of Ayatollah Khomeini, we have the support of the whole people. The people will support us only as long as we do not belong to a particular organization.

118. Gotbzadeh: Commission's Meeting with Hostages "A Certainty"

LD050803 Paris *Le Figaro* in French, 3 Mar. 80, p. 4 LD.

[Serge Chauvel-Leroux dispatch: "Khomeini Agrees to Hostages Meeting With United Nations Commission."]

[*Excerpt*] Tehran—Of course, the hostages are not about to be released yet, though in Mr. Gotbzadeh's view the United Nations commission's visit and the attention it has given over the past week to the imperial régime's extortions meet the heartfelt demand of many Iranians and have considerably altered domestic opinion, thus raising barriers.

Having finalized the last details of the imminent meeting one by one with the commission and the Revolution Council and before presenting them to the Imam, Sadeq Gotbzadeh received us. He has a sportsman's physique and wore a ski sweater even in the sumptuous offices inherited from the imperial administration; his hoarse voice was that of a heavy smoker. As we entered a notice requested that we leave our weapons at the door.

"The meeting with the hostages is a certainty", he said. "All that remains to be done is for the commission to complete its inquiry. The visit as a whole is a separate matter. When I was in Paris a fortnight ago I explained that this commission's work had nothing to do with the issue of the hostages' release. It is the world press which has raised false hopes."

Despite the twofold mandate issued by the United Nations—to investigate

the imperial régime and to settle the Iranian-US dispute, that is free the hostages—the Minister said that he never discussed with Kurt Waldheim linking the release to the commission's arrival: "If there was any ambiguity and misunderstanding, it was not on our part", he said. "I merely hoped that this commission's work would make it possible to create a more realistic atmosphere in which to really resolve the hostages issue." "Our people," Sadeq Gotbzadeh continued, "really are demanding international attention to the former régime's crimes and to its dependence on the United States. They know that as the commission verifies these atrocities it will bring them to the attention of the world."

"Win this crisis," he added, "the Foreign Minister has had to give guarantees dangerous to himself, in an atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding. Nor has logic prevailed at all on the American side. The creation of a United Nations commission which nobody believed in could not achieve any result. First, the international organization's credibility, which was lost in Iran, should have been restored so that our people would accept certain conditions for resolving the problem."

He does not regard the visit as futile. The commission was welcome and respected: This is the first positive thing that has happened since the start of the crisis ...

As for the delay in releasing the hostages, following on from Ayatollah Khomeini's statement a week ago as the five jurists set off confidently from Geneva, Mr. Gotbzadeh was not afraid of being cynical: "No timetables were decided", he said. "Things were totally ambiguous: no traps were set. I have done my utmost to insure that when the commission's report is published the hostages can be released."

Despite the students' announcements, the Foreign Minister believes that, according to the letter of the Imam's declaration entrusting a decision on the liberation to the future Parliament, the hostages' fate is not linked to the Shah's extradition and that the hypothesis of proceedings against some of them conflicts with the "envisaged directions" since, following the gradual decrescendo since November, the work of the commission currently in Tehran has replaced the previously suggested idea of a tribunal.

At the same time, according to Gotbzadeh, the demand for the Shah's extradition reflects a serious political requirement, and he personally is in favour of guaranteeing to the Panamanian State that the former sovereign will not be executed: "Never mind", he said with a sly look: "We will get him ..."

119. Gotbzadeh *Mesimvrini* Interview

AT041619 Athens *Mesimvrini* in Greek, 4 Mar. 80, p. 5 AT.

[Exclusive interview granted by Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh to *Mesimvrini's* Tehran correspondent. Koannidhis, presumably on 3 March.]

[Excerpts] Iran Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh is optimistic on the solution of the hostage issue. He believes the Parliament to be elected early in April will decide to put an end to the crisis. The students themselves, however, continue to appear intransigent.

[*Question*] I now come to the main and burning question of relations with the United States. I have personally spoken to the students who hold the hostages and they told me that the hostages will not be freed until the Shah is extradited and that this is the people's will and the line laid down by the Imam Khomeini. I believe this could lead to a state of "permanent hostages". Do you share this view of mine about "permanent hostages"?

[*Answer*] No, not permanent.

[Question] With "permanent", I mean long term.

[Answer] No, it will not be of a "long duration". As soon as the members of Parliament meet they will decide.

[Question] And if the people's will ...

[Answer] The people's will will be expressed through the Parliament and not through one person or through one group. This is also what the Imam recently stated. It is the representatives of the Iranian people who will decide on the question of the hostages.

[Question] What if the Parliament decides to try some of the hostages?

[Answer] I do not believe so. Let us not make suppositions.

[Question] I am simply repeating what I heard at the Embassy about the possibility of a trial.

[Answer] No, there will be no trial.

[Question] You most certainly must read what foreign newspapers write about you. They consider President Bani-Sadr as a moderate and you as hard. Do you consider yourself hard?

[Answer] It depends upon what all these words mean. I most certainly do not wish to make declarations or comments which I will be unable to implement. I am trying to explain the true situation and not to confuse my ideals with the reality which exists around me. We must look upon what we can and what we cannot do realistically. The term "hard" is an adjective given to me by the Western press and it is of no interest to me. In reference to the crisis of the hostages, I tried to solve it right from the beginning. I believe that its solution will be beneficial to world peace and to the countries of the Third World. At the same time it would also elevate the prestige of the United Nations and furthermore that it would be to the interest of the countries which got involved in this crisis.

[Question] You are, of course, referring to the solution of the crisis?

[Answer] Yes, to the solution of this problem. I have tried to have it solved right from the start. I tried to take steps of strategy instead of talking without my words having any relation to the realities which I have mentioned. In other words I have tried to take the steps that can be taken.

[Question] Do these realities provide any hopes for a speedy solution to the question of hostages?

[Answer] It depends on what we mean by speedy ...

[Question] I do not mean tomorrow.

[Answer] You must bear in mind that the efforts for the establishment of the United Nations commission lasted for three months. It was the United States which attempted to prevent its formation. In the end it realized that formation of the commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation was imperative. This is the first positive step.

[Question] Do you believe in the prospects created because of the commission?

[Answer] Most certainly this is the only way to solve this problem.

120. AFP: Students Agree to Visit

NC040950 Paris AFP in English, 0944 GMT, 4 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 4 March (AFP)—The Islamic militants occupying the American Embassy here said today that they will let the United Nations inquiry commission visit the 50 Embassy hostages, the Iranian Pars News Agency reported.

The five United Nations jurists would be allowed to meet the hostages if they simply wanted to verify that they were in good health, the militants were quoted as saying.

But Pars said they added: "We will not agree to letting them see them for other reasons."

121. Gotbzadeh Leaves Decision on "Refugee" up to Imam, Council

LD040453 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0338 GMT, 4 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] The central news bureau and Pars report: Foreign Minister Sadeq Gorbzadeh has left the decision on handing over to the revolution public prosecutor one or all of the Americans who are staying in the Islamic Republic of Iran Foreign Ministry up to the Imam and the Revolution Council.

The text of the Iranian Foreign Minister's letter of reply to 'Ali Qoddusi's message of yesterday regarding the handover of Victor Tomseth for questioning in connection with the revelation statement of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and his relation with the Forqan group is as follows: Respectfully it is announced that:

1. The three Americans in this ministry were accepted as refugees at the time of the government of Engineer Bazargan. This acceptance was approved by the Islamic Revolution Council of Iran and some of the exalted ulama. The matter was also reported to the Imam of the nation at the same time.

2. Some time ago the students stationed in the US espionage den wrote a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoning one of the three aforementioned persons. This letter was broadcast by the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran before it reached the Foreign Ministry. The reply to this letter was presented to the Imam of the nation in an open letter by the same means.

3. Last time, on behalf of the revolution public prosecutor, one of the brothers came to question Mr. Victor Tomseth and we provided an interpreter with facilities for the questioning.

4. At present if the Revolution Court intends to summon one or all of the individuals at this place, it must make a direct request through the Islamic Revolution Council because both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolution Court are performing their duties under the supervision of the Revolution Council. Regarding the fate of the three Americans in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the decision rests first with the Imam of the nation; in case there is no clear decision by the Imam of the nation, the Revolution Council will make a decision on this matter.

[Signed] Sadeq Gotbzadeh, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

122. Late Report: Students Say United Nations Panel Can Meet Hostages

LD041338 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1046 GMT, 4 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text of statement by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy on the meeting between their two representatives, four members of the Revolution Council, and the President---read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. The public relations officer of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy stationed at the American den of espionage announced that at 1800 yesterday, two Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy stationed at the den of espionage met and held talks with four members of the Revolution Council and the President about the proposed meetings between the members of the United Nations commission investigating the crimes of America in Iran and the spying hostages.

At this meeting, which took place in the office of the Prime Minister, Hojjat ol-Islam Mosavi Ardabili, former supervisor of the Ministry of Interior and the

present supervisor of the plan and budget organization, and Mr. Gotbzadeh were present. After putting forward the issue of the meeting with the hostages, Mr. Gotbzadeh gave a short report on the history of the formation and duties of the commission, saying that the abovementioned commission has come to Iran to investigate three issues: the violation of human rights by America in Iran, the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, and meeting with the hostages. This [presumably the report] was approved by Imam Khomeini and the Revolution Council.

The two sides then discussed the position of the Iranian Revolution, the international prestige of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and how to stop America from taking advantage of the situation and how to deal a blow to America.

Sadeq Gotbzadeh said: All the members of the commission were either chosen by us, or the Government of Iran approved them and most of them are known for their good reputations [sentence as heard]. Carter and his administration had no role in choosing them. The formation of this commission was planned during my discussions with Waldheim in Tehran.

He added: The formation of this commission in Tehran was the greatest victory after the occupation of the den of espionage.

He added that communists and Zionists would like the commission to fail in carrying out its objectives.

Members of the Revolution Council put forward a three-pronged plan for the investigation of the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America and visiting the hostages, and said that the Government of Iran had promised the commission this meeting and that the meeting should take place. If it did not take place, the position of the Government of Iran would be weakened.

The students put forward their views as follows: We do not have any objections to the nature of this commission and it should carry out its duty of investigating the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America since it has been approved by the Imam. But on the meeting between the members of the commission and the hostages it would have been more desirable if the students stationed in the den of espionage and who are holding hostages had been consulted beforehand.

Iran should continue, as always, to take the initiative. If we lose the initiative in any operation, the result will be that we will not be able to control the situation and we will not know whether it will be in the interests of the Iranian Revolution and the nation of Iran or America.

According to our analysis of the situation, it is the Government of America that has been insisting on a meeting between the members of the commission and the hostages and which is waiting for this meeting to take place in order to blow the event up using its propaganda organs all over the world and to overshadow the main objective, namely the investigation of the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America. Therefore, the investigation of the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America and the meeting with the hostages should be separated in such a way as to deal another blow at America; and the initiative regarding this issue—which America is waiting to blow up out of all proportion—should be held by Iran.

The reputation of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, which has shone the light of hope into the hearts of the deprived and oppressed people of the world, should not be blemished and only those steps should be taken that are directed decisively against America and at preventing any psychological defeat of the nation of Iran and other strugglers of the world.

As the Imam mentioned in his recent message, the United Nations commission has come to Iran in order to investigate the crimes committed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America, and to observe the destruction and those disabled during Iran's Revolution.

In addition to the above we are ready to arrange for a meeting between a

number of the spying hostages and the commission so that they can be shown witnesses and living evidence of the crimes committed by America in Iran.

All this will serve toward insuring the main objective, which is the investigation of the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America, and that whatever steps are taken should help the investigation of the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America, otherwise these steps will not be in the interests of the revolution and the nation.

If any commitments have been undertaken by the Government of Iran or the President [to let the commission see the hostages], then the commission must first finalize its investigations [into the Shah and the United States], submit the results and defend the results at the United Nations.

When the United Nations accepts the results and the nation of Iran sees the results and is convinced that, in spite of the pressure by America, the commission has been able to work along the correct lines, then the Revolution Council of the Government of Iran—in possession of the initiative—can invite the same commission or even other personalities to come to Iran and visit the hostages in order to find out about their health, their physical condition and the way they are living.

This plan was rejected by Dr. Bani-Sadr and Mr. Gotbzadeh and it was explained that the members of this commission had been chosen and were reliable, and that such a plan would not be in accordance with [accepted] standards, and might even be damaging.

The students emphasized that ever since the arrival of the commission in Iran, the White House and Washington spokesmen have insisted that the commission had come here in order to resolve the problem of the hostages and to visit them. Mr. Bani-Sadr, the President, believed that this was not true [presumably meaning that he did not feel this was the case] and the issue was mentioned in the [commission's] itinerary.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Mosavi Ardabili and two other members of the Revolution Council, emphasizing this point said: There are interesting and noteworthy points in what the students say. These should be considered. They said that we should come to some sort of conclusion and that the commission should not leave without any results, but that at the same time Iran's position should not be weakened.

During the session other plans were proposed, but the two sides did not approve them.

123. Revolution Council's Approval

LD042110 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2045 GMT, 4 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] According to the report of Pars News Agency, the Revolution Council had a session tonight with the participation of President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. At the end of this meeting, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with the reporters announced that with the approval of the Revolution Council the members of the commission of inquiry into the crimes of the former Shah and the United States in Iran will meet with the hostages. Gotbzadeh did not put any information at the disposal of the reporters concerning the time and date of this meeting. He added that Imam Khomeini has announced his approval concerning the meeting of the members of the commission of inquiry with the hostages.

124. Prosecutor General on Tomseth Summons

LD051146 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1050 GMT, 5 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] The Prosecutor General of the Islamic Revolution of Iran announced

today: In explaining the reply of the honourable foreign minister, it is brought to the attention of the struggling nation of Iran that:

1. The purpose of summoning Mr. Tomseth to the Office of the Islamic Prosecutor General was to bring him face to face with members of the Forqan group in relation to the revelation made by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, and it is clear that, on principle, it is neither justifiable nor possible to bring the said group to the Foreign Ministry to face Mr. Tomseth.

2. With respect to the independence of the legislative power, which was granted after the revolution and which was one of the great aims of the Islamic Revolution of the nation of Iran, the meaning of the sentence "because both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolution Court are performing their duties under the supervision of the Revolution Council" is not clear in Mr. Gotbzadeh's reply letter. It is hoped that Mr. Tomseth will be sent to the Central Office of the Prosecutor General of the Islamic Revolution.

[Signed] Prosecutor General of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, 'Ali Qoddusi.

125. Students Say Council Can "Take Delivery" of Hostages

LD061132 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1050 GMT, 6 Mar. 80 LD.

[Statement issued 6 March by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy stationed at the "den of espionage"—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Great and alert Iranian nation: as we informed you, in our two recent statements, heroic Iranian nation, we believe that in the approach to America, we should act from a decisive and revolutionary position, and should take the initiative. Thus, we did not agree to the members of the commission of inquiry meeting with the hostages, which is something imposed by America and which is the true purpose of the criminal American Government and great Satan, but which is not what the Iranian nation wants, and is not even the true wish of State officials.

But what can one do when the officials and those who are in charge in the commission have accepted that whatever the commission wants must be done. And since we cannot bow to and comply with a view which we do not accept and which we do not regard as being in line with the Imam's policy, but, since those in charge of the Government always regard our methods as a factor contributing to their weakness, always speak of a government within a government, thus, we declare to the Revolution Council, in order to allay any misunderstanding, to take delivery of the hostages, that is, the American spies, from us to do with them in any way they deem appropriate.

We do not believe in participating in something which does not benefit our revolution and which the enemy wants. While regarding our responsibility with regard to the hostages as at an end, we are confident that the Iranian nation genuinely supports the Imam's revolutionary line and that it will eventually bring back to the right path any deviation and erring with the necessary decisiveness.

[Signed] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

126. AFP on Council Meeting

NC061835 Paris AFP in English, 1827 GMT, 6 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 6 March (AFP)—Iran's Revolutionary Council today unanimously accepted the request by the militants holding 50 American hostages here that the council take charge of the captives.

Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said the methods for handing over the hostages would be finalized tomorrow.

It seemed likely that the United Nations commission, in Tehran to conduct an inquiry into the former Shah's régime, would meet the hostages over the weekend.

Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr also told Agence France-Presse today that the five-man United Nations commission would be able to see all hostages, but that the hostages must provide testimony.

The breakthrough, the most dramatic since the hostages were seized on 4 November, occurred after Mr. Bani-Sadr met with Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The meeting's results were immediately hailed as a victory for Mr. Bani-Sadr.

127. Tehran on AFP Interview

LD070621 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0430 GMT, 7 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, our country's President, in an interview with AFP yesterday, said: The international commission of inquiry will meet the hostages: it should, however, await their testimony.

Bani-Sadr said: I told them: You can meet the hostages but you should also ask them to testify. Regarding the response of the commission to these remarks, Bani-Sadr said that the members of the commission had agreed.

The President of Iran said: Normalizing the relations between Iran and United States has nothing to do with the fate of the hostages but depends on the US policy regarding Iran's dependence. Bani-Sadr said: If the Americans change their expansionist policy and not interfere in the affairs of others, relations will be normalized.

Concerning the three conditions for the release of the hostages on which, according to Bani-Sadr, Iran's future Parliament would decide, the President stressed that the fulfilment of these three conditions could bring about the possibility of the establishment of relations between the two countries.

We point out that Bani-Sadr's three conditions were that the United States should confess to its past crimes in Iran, guarantee that it will no longer interfere in Iran's affairs and not disagree with the extradition of the deposed Shah. Bani-Sadr added: The Parliament will not have any difficulty in deciding. The Parliament will be the indicator of the alertness of the nation. The Parliament will decide in favour of Iran and could not decide otherwise.

128. Students' Statement on Handover

LD080754 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0730 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.

[Statement issued today by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. According to information which has reached us, the published report quoting Mr. Sadeq Gotbzadeh pertaining to the Imam's command on the handing over of the hostages is a tissue of lies. Meanwhile, we regret that we cannot hand over the hostages to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is essential, therefore, for the Revolution Council to officially appoint another representative to take delivery of the hostages.

129. Gotbzadeh Interview

LD080945 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0730 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] In an interview last night Sadeq Gotbzadeh announced that, by the command of the Imam and with the unanimous approval of the Revolution

Council, he would go as the representative of the revolution to the site of the former US Embassy today to take delivery of the hostages from the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy [begin recording].

[Question] Mr. Gotbzadeh, during an interview you announced that by the command of the Imam and by the unanimous approval of the Revolution Council you are due to go to the US den of espionage in order to take delivery of the hostages there from the students. I would like to say that when we contacted the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, they said that the Imam had not issued such an order. I beg you to tell us what the purpose is behind your statement that you would be taking delivery of the hostages by the command of the Imam. Kindly provide an explanation for the benefit of our dear listeners.

[Answer] The report given to the Revolution Council affirmed that the students' proposal to hand over the hostages to the Revolution Council has been sanctioned by the Imam. Therefore, the Revolution Council, too, on the same basis agreed that it should take delivery of the hostages. This is what the whole thing was about. The Imam has not directly issued an order to myself in this connection. But it is a fact that the Imam entrusted the issue to the Revolution Council. What concerns me at the moment is that—since it is (?a fact) that the students themselves proposed adopting that course, and the Revolution Council agreed to it, and in view of the Imam's promise to entrust and bring this issue to the attention of the Revolution Council—therefore, the responsibility for taking delivery has been entrusted to myself. It follows, therefore, that to carry out the decision of the Revolution Council and to solve the present crisis I shall go to the den of espionage. In the meantime, I am forced to point out emphatically that taking delivery of the hostages is under no circumstances aimed at their release. That task, by the order of the Imam, is entrusted to the National Consultative Assembly.

[Question] Thank you very much for your reply.

[Answer] Not at all [end recording].

130. Khomeini Silent on Hostages

LD080944 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0930 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.

[Statement issued by the office of Imam Khomeini—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. In connection with the delivery of the hostages to the Revolution Council certain newspapers have attributed this to the Imam, but his holiness the Imam Khomeini, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, prefers to remain silent on this and has entrusted the issue of the hostages to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

[Signed] The office of Imam Khomeini, Qom.

131. Further Report

LD081117 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1039 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] In an interview with a correspondent of Pars News Agency today, a Revolution Council spokesman confirmed that the Revolution Council had entrusted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the task of taking delivery of the hostages.

In reply to the question of whether the students' proposal had been presented to the Imam and had not been placed at the disposal of the Revolution Council, the Revolution Council spokesman said: As you may well know, that proposal was in effect broadcast by the radio, which is how the Revolution Council

became aware of it. Based on past experience, and giving credence to reports by the media, the news was also brought to the attention of the Imam.

The Pars News Agency correspondent asked: Does it therefore follow that the Imam has not issued a direct order to the Revolution Council?

The Revolution Council spokesman answered: You should ask Mr. Bani-Sadr about this. But as far as the Revolution Council is concerned, the Revolution Council decided to approve the students' proposal on taking delivery of the hostages.

The question was then asked: Has the Revolution Council unanimously approved Sadeq Gotbzadeh as the council's representative?

The Revolution Council spokesman answered: Yes. It was decided that the responsibility for taking delivery should be entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of course Mr. Gotbzadeh would therefore be responsible. The Revolution Council spokesman refused to express an opinion about the viewpoint of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, who had deemed a meeting between the members of the commission investigating the crimes of the Shah with the hostages as a deviation from the Imam's policy.

132. Foreign Ministry Statement

LD081207 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1112 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.
[“Text” of statement issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran—read by announcer.]

[Text] In His exalted name. Regarding the statement issued by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy stationed at the US den of espionage about the lack of the Imam's approval concerning the handing over of the hostages to the Revolution Council, in which the student followers called [as heard] a tissue of lies, it is pointed out that:

1. Whatever has been said quoting the Imam has been based on the report submitted to the Revolution Council on Thursday.

2. The Revolution Council has declared its unanimous approval of the handing over of the hostages.

3. On behalf of the council, I [Sadeq Gotbzadeh] have been assigned to this task, and will inform the brave Iranian nation of all the matters in an interview tonight. May a dark day befall the-deceitful.

[Signed] Sadeq Gotbzadeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

133. Student Statement on Hostages

JN081958 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 1900 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 JN.
[Statement issued 8 March by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy residing in the US “den of espionage”—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Noble, struggling and mature Iranian people: Within our expression of our complete appreciation and thanks for your sincere support, especially that of our dear brother and sister students of schools and universities, we would like to draw your attention to the following points:

1. The destiny of the people and the homeland as well as the destiny of the progress of the Great Iranian Islamic renaissance in the face of the superpowers, particularly the colonialist oppressive United States—the first enemy, which is the source of all our catastrophes—cannot be achieved except through the unity and safeguarding of opinion under Imam Khomeini, leader of the nation and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. We humbly call on all the people to carry on with their great revolution under Imam Khomeini and his decisive and noncapitulatory leadership and to direct their slaps to the face of the United States, which is exposed and colonialist, so that it will learn that any initiative toward releasing the hostages will only be abortive efforts and that the struggling Iranian people have decided to continue their struggle in order to extradite the fleeing deposed Shah and the wealth he plundered until all forms of subservience are uprooted. As Imam Khomeini said, the destiny of the hostages will be decided by the Islamic Shura Council.

3. As long as we do not consider the issue of a meeting between the investigation commission and the hostages as a revolutionary step nor within the Imam's trend, and as long as we do not consider standing in the face of the officials and the executive authorities and creating a government within a government as a revolutionary act nor in the interest of the country, we decided to hand over the hostages.

We condemn, denounce and reject any sit-in, strike or any similar initiative that may end in the interest of opportunists and plotters.

134. Revolution Council Statement on Transfer

LD081918 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1830 GMT, 8 Mar. 80 LD.

["Text" of 8 March statement by the Revolution Council in connection with the transfer of the hostages, "issued in order to clear up the facts and remove any ambiguity"—read by announcer.]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Considering the rumours and discussions with regard to the handing over of the US hostages to the Revolution Council and in view of the fact that, regrettably, certain elements, wittingly or unwittingly, are always trying to fan rumours and thus remove the understanding and cooperation which are at present the secret of our (?success), the Revolution Council deems it necessary to inform the public of the details of the events, in order to clear up facts and remove any ambiguity:

When the question of arrival of the commission of inquiry into the crimes of the ousted Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was raised at the Revolution Council and approved, Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the chairman of the Revolution Council, raised the point with the Imam of the nation in order to seek his views. The Imam agreed with the arrival of the mission in Iran and its probable meeting [presumably with the hostages].

Having been notified of the council's decision about the probable meeting of the mission, the Muslim students stationed at the former US Embassy expressed their opposition. The Revolution Council which considered the opposition of these brothers and sisters, despite explicit orders issued by the Imam regarding the need to obey the Revolution Council as unacceptable, announced its decision as a responsible source in a meeting held with the participation of the President, a number of council members and the representatives of the students. This was on Monday, 3 March.

Some student representatives, during a long meeting with Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, a member of the Revolution Council, stated that they would hand over the hostages to the Revolution Council, thus relieving themselves of any responsibility. Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani warned the brothers against this action. This was on Wednesday, 5 March.

Despite all these, in a statement sent directly to the media on Thursday, 6 March, the students announced that they considered themselves as having no responsibility for keeping the hostages and that they would hand them over to the Revolution Council. The Revolution Council held a meeting on Thursday evening to discuss the persistent decision by the students to hand the hostages over to the

Revolution Council. The question was raised in this meeting concerning the students continuing to have responsibility for the hostages as the most suitable way to deal with the problem. However, as it appeared that the students were determined to relieve themselves of such a responsibility, the question as to which government organ should have the responsibility was discussed. It was eventually decided that should the students persist in their decision, then the Foreign Ministry should take delivery of and keep the hostages, until such time when the Islamic Consultative Assembly would make a final decision.

What has been and is the council's view is that the commission can meet the hostages, unless the students continue to oppose such a meeting, in which case, as they proposed, the hostages should be handed over and the Foreign Ministry should then be responsible for the procedure.

In conclusion it is emphasized that any decision about the fate of the hostages, as announced by the Imam, is up to the nation's representatives and the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

[Signed] The Islamic Republic Revolution Council; Saturday, 8 March 1980.

135. Guards Backing of Khomeini

LD091802 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1643 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 LD.

[Announcement issued by the central headquarters of the Revolution Guards Corps; date not given—read by announcer.]

[Text] It is written in the constitution of the corps and we have repeatedly announced that the Guards Corps considers the Velayat-e Faqih [vice-regency of the chief theologian] to be the most revolutionary article and one which should be adhered to at all costs, and is proud to deem itself dutybound to follow Imam Khomeini at all times and under all circumstances.

With regard to this issue, there is nothing left to say but the decree of our leader: the issue of the hostages is in the hands of the representatives of the people and the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

136. Gotbzadeh Communiqué on Negotiations

NC091720 Paris AFP in English, 1710 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 9 March (AFP)—The "Islamic students" holding 50 Americans hostage in the United States Embassy have set "new conditions" on handing them over to the Revolutionary Council, Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said today. In a communiqué published by Pars News Agency, Mr. Gotbzadeh said the conditions had been submitted to his ministry after "lengthy negotiations", but did not explain what the new demands were.

Mr. Gotbzadeh's communiqué gave the following account of these negotiations: "The representative of the Foreign Ministry went to the den of espionage (the US Embassy) to take delivery of the American hostages.

After detailed negotiations the Moslem students proposed the following conditions for the delivery of the hostages:

1. The students must be informed eight hours ahead about the time of delivery and this time should be sometime before the 8 a.m., 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. radio news so that the public could be informed of the measure.

2. From the moment of the delivery of the hostages the responsibility for their lives must rest with those who take delivery of them."

"In view of the above conditions it is clear that the students have no intention to deliver the hostages and do not wish the United Nations commission to meet them", the statement said.

The statement declared: "It is clear that (?the reasons) that prompt the students to (want to) publicize the precise time of the hostages' release will permit the 2,000-odd persons permanently assembled before the embassy, and whose opinions are known to all, to prevent the handing over from taking place, thus permitting the students to proclaim that the nation has asked them to keep the hostages."

The Foreign Ministry concluded by saying that the stand taken by the students "clearly reveals how the matter would end—no further comment is needed".

The militants must decide within the next 24 hours whether they will allow the international commission to see the hostages at the Embassy or whether they will hand them over to the Revolutionary Council, Mr. Gotbzadeh said.

Speaking after a council meeting, the Foreign Minister said, "Nothing has changed, as far as we are concerned. The essential thing is a commission visit to all the hostages."

The date for handing the hostages over to the Revolutionary Council will be set on Monday, Mr. Gotbzadeh said.

Council Spokesman Hassan Habibi said meanwhile that the Foreign Minister was still authorized to accept the hostages' transfer, despite the fact that the militants holding them had refused to go through Mr. Gotbzadeh.

137. Students on Commission Meeting, Handover

JN090824 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 0800 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 JN.
[Text] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy have announced that the holding of a meeting between the members of the United Nations fact-finding commission investigating the crimes of the deposed Shah and all the hostages is impossible and is considered a deviationist act.

In a statement released today and reported by the Pars News Agency, the students added that the US spy hostages are ready for delivery [Arabic: *muaddun li at-taslim*] to the representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Council who can come to the den of US espionage between 100 and 1700 [Tehran local time] today, provided he brings with him an official order from the council.

138. Students Demand Shah's Return

NC092032 Paris AFP in English, 2026 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 NC.

[Excerpts] Tehran, 9 March (AFP)—Moslem militants holding about 50 American hostages said today that the hostages would not be freed until the former Shah returned to Iran even if they are turned over to Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council. The militants, who reiterated threats that the captives will be tried as alleged spies, said that friendly Iranian-American relations are "absolutely out of the question" and vowed to continue holding the US Embassy here, site of the more than four-month-long hostage affair.

"If the Shah is not returned, the spies will not be liberated", the militants said repeatedly in their first news conference since offering last week to turn the captives over to Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council.

The militants also warned that "our people will start a series of trials against the hostages—dirty spies—to expose the dirty face of American imperialism".

The militants refused to confirm the precise number of hostages. They held that there was no way Iran and the United States could establish friendly relations in the future.

139. Mahdavi Kani Interviewed on Handover of Hostages

LD121115 Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, 9 Mar. 80, p. 2 LD.

[Unattributed report: "Mahdavi Kani: Revolution Council, not Gotbzadeh, Is Taking over the Hostages."]

[Excerpt] "If the questions of the handover of the hostages to the representative of the Revolution Council, or the visit by the commission of inquiry into the crimes of the Shah and America are not resolved, we will resolve this issue with the involvement of the Imam Khomeini, leader of the revolution."

In an exclusive interview with *Keyhan* Acting Interior Minister Mahdavi Kani made the above comment, and in reply to a question by the *Keyhan* correspondent, who said: "The students have said that they will hand over the hostages to any representative other than Gotbzadeh", he answered:

"The Revolution Council announced in a statement last night that the hostages must be handed over to the Foreign Ministry, and this must be done, with Gotbzadeh responsible for the actual handover arrangements; but it is the Revolution Council itself which is taking over the hostages, not Gotbzadeh or any other person."

The question was asked: "If the students refuse to hand them over, where do you think the matter will end?"

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani declared: "If this happens, the matter will be resolved with the involvement of the Imam, leader of the revolution."

In reply to the question: "Won't the taking over of the hostages by the Revolution Council result in the Government and the Revolution Council being stigmatized for hostage taking and provoke a large-scale political attack by America, with pressure being brought to bear on Iran by America?", Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani said:

"In my view there will be no change in America's policy since America knows that, although the hostages are in the hands of the students, the leader of the revolution, the Revolution Council and the Government have in effect approved [their actions]. Thus under present circumstances the American Government knows that it is the Iranian Government that is responsible, and there is no difference whether the hostages are held by the students or by the Foreign Ministry. The American Government knows that the Iranian Government cannot make a decision which runs counter to the wish of the leader of the revolution and the nation or Iran. On this basis, America will not intensify its measures more than before."

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani then replied to the question: "the Imam's announcement makes the hostage issue the responsibility of the national representatives in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Can the students therefore take advantage of this to refuse to hand over the hostages?"

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani said: "there are two issues: the release of the hostages, and the question of their being visited and moved to a new location. The Imam has delegated only the issue of their release to the Consultative Assembly representatives, not the question of their being visited or that of where they are being held, which has nothing to do with the Majles" [interview ends].

140. Students Interview

GF092030 Tehran Domestic Television Service in Persian, 1810 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 GF.

[Interview with three representatives of the students holding the hostages at the American Embassy; unknown whether live or recorded—intercepted in progress.]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified student] When this commission issues its findings and

statements regarding the hostages it will be the words of the commission that will be listened to around the world. What guarantee do we have that these commission members have any sympathy for the Iranian nation and the Iranian Revolution and all the sufferings of our people. It is natural that they do not have the same kind of sympathy as the Iranian people. We have no guarantee that these commission members will act the way we and our revolution demand. So, the only thing we can do once the commission releases its findings is to offset and neutralize its false propaganda, if any, against us.

[Question] I want you to give me your views about this whole problem and the reaction of the officials in this respect.

[Answer] One of the most important matters since the beginning of the revolution has been the way some of our officials and administrators have been behaving in this country. Whether or not their actions and behaviour have been in line with the Imam's policy in this respect, the Imam has repeatedly stated that we must get Mohammad Reza and he must stand trial. Otherwise, we will bring all the hostages to trial and by so doing will actually be bringing the United States to trial.

But as far as our officials and those in charge of the administration and their handling of this problem, they have not always been in line with the Imam's policy. Our executives have been following a different policy. After all it is the duty of these officials to recognize and identify the actual line and direction of the Imam's policy. We witnessed this during the provisional government. As soon as they were faced with any problem they would immediately threaten us with their resignation. This was nothing but an attempt to use the threat of resignation as a weapon against us, against domestic forces and against all proper lines and policies.

[Question] It has been said that if the hostages were in the hands of the Iranian Government it would mean a declaration of war against the United States. How would you answer and justify this point?

[Answer] From the very first day the hostages were taken by, in fact, the Iranian people, there were many views concerning the fact this act was in violation of international law. However Iran knows that the United States—the bloodthirsty and conspiratorial United States—ignores all matters and that it has violated the simplest rules regarding this nation. Therefore, for this nation international laws and regulation have no meaning. The Imam immediately confirmed this act of hostage taking and the whole nation approved it. This was a severe and irreparable blow to the United States. This whole episode was under the Imam's leadership and it was moving under his leadership. It was moving decisively. We saw that whenever there was any statement or decision by the United States, or by Carter himself, against Iran the Imam would immediately respond and refute them. For example, the United States said it would use force to free the hostages. The Imam replied that the United States would not dare to do anything. When they threatened us with their economic sanctions, the Imam stated clearly that the economic sanctions would be harmful to the United States, and not to Iran. However, the fact that the hostages are being turned over to the Government, if the hostages should be handed over to the Government, this would be as a declaration of war against the United States [as heard].

But we have to see under what conditions this whole thing would not be considered as a declaration of war against the United States. This is something that must be made clear to the Iranian people. But in the international language it would naturally mean a declaration of war.

[Question] Another question in this respect. Don't you think that this act of [transferring the hostages] may be in the interest of the United States as well?

[Answer] Yes. We believe that in our confrontation with the United States and in general in this whole question of the occupation of the espionage den, it

has been clearly proven that the United States cannot do anything at all. Our revolution proved this whole thing quite well and clearly. But if we should deviate from the Imam's path and policy, then there can be another (?story). Obviously, the United States will be very pleased if this should happen. We could have continued this whole thing as we had in the past. We could have proven our decisiveness and thus could have had a confrontation with the United States by continuing the policy that we had followed from the first day of the takeover. However, when we are faced with this other problem of government officials wanting to resign, and since this action would weaken them at this rate, and we do not in any way wish to enter into any controversy and disputes with the government officials, we prefer to hand them over to them. This way, if there should be any deviation we would not be a participant in it.

[Question] Could you tell us how the students are behaving and how their activities will be conducted in the future?

[Answer] The students at the US Embassy were formerly active in the society like everyone else. But all their activities were in line with the Imam's policy. When the matter of taking over the espionage den occurred it was an event that was in accordance with the nation's wishes. The entire nation approved and supported this action. This was an action that enjoyed the Imam's full support. Now that these students are handing the hostages over, it does not mean that these forces are being eliminated. These forces will pursue their activities in accordance with the Imam's policy. In other words, transfer of the hostages does not in any way mean these students will be removed from the scene. I hope they will follow and continue their activities in all dimensions of society.

[Question] What about all these accusations against you and the matter of the revelations?

[Answer] We hope we will, in one way or other, continue our revelations. As we announced previously, we consider it our duty to make all documents and papers obtained at the espionage den available to the nation because they belong to the people. We will do this in whatever way possible. If the radio and television networks are willing to carry them we will do it that way; or through the use of the press; or through the Embassy—the espionage nest itself. Otherwise, if no other way is available to us, we will publish them in books and make them available to the nation. Regarding the revelations and the accusations that these documents are forged and are not genuine, it is only natural that those who have been disgraced by these documents want to somehow acquit themselves.

The ironic thing is that the same people who try to say that these are all forged and phony documents, try on the other hand to justify why they have done all the things that we have revealed to them. Many of these spies we have been holding were the ones who had been in contact with these [Iranian] individuals. These papers and documents had been prepared by these spies as a result of their conversations and contacts with these individuals. We would have brought these spies on television so they could be confronted by these individuals. However, now that these hostages are being handed over to the Revolution Council they will be the ones to decide what to do about this episode. But all those documents were seized from the espionage nest and there is no question about their accuracy and authenticity.

[Question] As a last question, I would like to know what the outcome and consequences of your action would be in relation to the transfer of the hostages to the Revolution Council?

[Answer] As followers of the Imam's policy we wanted to preserve the ideological nature of our move and not give in to any kind of compromise or reconciliation. The Imam's line and policy with all its prestige and grandeur should not be tainted or blemished in any way because of our action. However, our decision was actually in the direction of unity. That is, our decision about

handing over the hostages to the Revolution Council was in reality for the purpose of preserving our unity lest we should in any way—God forbid—be the victims of our feelings and sentimentality. We did not want to create any situation or confrontation that would destroy the order of our society and that state of unity which is necessary for our society. This action *per se* does have certain consequences and it will bring about certain worries and despair—that the question of the hostages might be solved in some way [other than the way we wanted]—but the nation is wary and alert and would not let the question of the hostages, which the Imam has stressed, be solved in any other way.

As a matter of fact, nobody can toy with the hostage problem so easily, especially the hostages who are in our hands as a result of perhaps a whole century of tyranny and oppression inflicted upon this nation by colonialism. No one can kidnap them or let them go so easily. Our aim is to face this whole problem calmly with reason and logic without becoming victims of our own personal feelings and sentiments.

[Question] Thank you for taking part in this discussion.

141. Gotbzadeh Statement on Situation

GF092330 Tehran Domestic Television Service in Persian, 1830 GMT, 9 Mar. 80 GF.

[Statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh on 9 March—live or recorded.]

[Text] My thanks to the Almighty, and I pray to the Almighty that he should as soon as possible grant a speedy and total recovery to our beloved eminent leader so that he may witness the good deeds and wrongdoings, deviations, acts of honesty and events that have occurred this evening.

In response to our student friends—the students who are stationed at the espionage nest—a host of questions and points have been mentioned and discussed. In order to clear the public's questions about them, I have been commissioned by the Revolution Council to answer them. I hope this statement, which is being made for the first time, will provide some answers. I hope it will answer the people's questions and will draw the attention of our brothers and sisters to the comments and points which we hope were unintentionally overlooked by them. However, this is being done primarily to answer people's questions. For this reason, no efforts will be made to employ the same tone and manner used by them. Before anything else, there is the question of the Imam's policy. At least I, who had the honour of being his disciple for the past 17 years, have obeyed his orders. I was also in charge of reporting what I was commissioned to do, which I always did and would always return for further orders. When they talk about the Imam's line and policy—and up until now nobody has addressed nor clarified this line and policy—everybody has a certain way of speaking about it. I will discuss what I have understood of it so we can see how far these matters are based on what we comprehend from it.

I believe the Imam's policy speaks decisively, honestly, clearly and with moral honesty void of any and all kinds of politics and any other type of planning. It does not blame any one person or persons. It is based on knowledge, perspicacity and wisdom and it wants to preserve all our Muslim interests and the interests of our fatherland. It respects and honours the Islam of the oppressed. When someone claims to be a follower of the Imam's policy, he must not only keep these points in mind but he should also make all of these points his guide in his daily life. It is on this basis that I should like to make explanations tonight.

In an interview, in which three of the gentlemen took part and made certain comments and statements, the central point of the questioning was the

commission. I believe certain clearly inaccurate statements were made about this commission. In fact, certain false accusations were made. These are in no way parallel or compatible with the Imam's policy. I would like to refer to these accusations and regard them as having been made solely as a result of unawareness so we can see what the future will bring.

Let me first describe *once and for all* the background of this commission. Long ago, after I was entrusted with the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was talk about selecting and bringing an international grand jury to, on the basis of documents and evidence in our possession, conduct an investigation into the government of Reza Khan's son and his entourage as well as the meddlings of the colonialist and criminal policies of the United States in Iran.

This plan was presented to the Imam and was approved by him. So we started taking action in this direction. The Imam had made statements in this regard. Naturally, this was first approved by the Revolution Council and was later submitted to the Imam by the Revolution Council.

Unfortunately, in the course of implementing this plan, when we invited Mr. MacBride to come here, he came accompanied by two attorneys who were members of the communist party. In the course of our discussions with them we were told that they would be willing to participate in such a commission provided that the hostages were released. For, as they put it, no decent human being would be willing to take part in this commission without the release of the hostages. They said that at the very least the hostages should be released after the commission had been formed and came to Iran. Not only did they tell me this, but I reported it to the Revolution Council. The Revolution Council assigned three members to discuss the matter with these gentlemen: Ayatollah Montazeri; my brother, Mr. Habibi; and I attended the meeting. Naturally, these were unacceptable conditions. We could not actually accept them and could not choose the members of an international grand jury from among those personalities who could have had some international influence and impact, unless, of course, we wanted to simply have certain individuals who would come and sit and talk but who would not have had any public relations impact around the world.

After this incident, Mr. Waldheim asked to come to Iran on two or three occasions. We turned down his request every time. After everything has been discussed Mr. Waldheim once again asked to come to Iran in order to obtain first-hand information and witness what had been happening in Iran. This matter was discussed at the Revolution Council and was presented to the Imam. When everyone was present at the meeting of the Revolution Council the Imam said he would not object to the idea and went on to say that he [the Imam] was not an official person and would not meet anyone on an official basis. It was then clear that Mr. Waldheim could come to Iran to obtain certain information and that the Imam would not see him in any official capacity. This whole matter was immediately reported to Mr. Waldheim. So he came and we, as much as we could, discussed various matters. We talked about the crimes committed here. Details of these discussions were presented to the Imam who studied them. In order to help him [Waldheim] understand what had been going on in Iran we arranged for him to visit both the Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery as well as to see the invalids [passage indistinct].

The question of an international commission was brought up in our discussion with Waldheim. The commission was to be formed on three principles: investigation of the Shah's crimes; investigation of the Shah's looting and those of his family members; and a visit with the hostages. This was reported to the Revolution Council at a meeting attended by all council members, among them Ayatollah Montazeri, who also took part. The question was brought up and was approved by every member of the council and the recording of that meeting's

proceedings is still available. It was therefore agreed that Waldheim should take steps in this direction without delay. Upon his return to the United States, the US Government would not approve the plan for the commission unless the hostages were released. They were insisting that in accordance with the Security Council resolution, the hostages must be released in order for the commission to be formed. We resisted and insisted that the question of the hostages' release must be totally separate and divorced from the matter of the commission.

This was a point upon which we persisted from the very beginning and upon which we are still insisting. Our insistence and resistance eventually resulted in the formation of the commission. Now what kind of individuals are the members of the commission? Mr. (Banjavi) from Algiers is an Algerian revolutionary and a trustworthy person who for years had been in opposition to the régime. Mr. Davoudi, is a well-known judge in Syria and is one of the staunchest supporters of Iran's Revolution and [word indistinct]. Mr. Pettiti is a Frenchman who is a president of the French Bar Association. His statements and comments over the years against the Shah are innumerable. In fact, in all cases whenever we had sent any one of lawyers, they would have definitely voted for him [as heard]. Mr. [name indistinct] from Venezuela studied and investigated the same type of crimes in Chile. And the last person, from Sri Lanka, is also interested in events in Asia. We accepted this commission when it was formed and it came to Iran. The Revolution Council was fully informed about the details of the matter, and, in fact, this whole question of the commission coming here to investigate matters was also presented to the Imam. After taking this matter into consideration the Imam announced that the commission could come and investigate the Shah's crimes and act accordingly. The Imam advised the whole nation that whoever had any kind of document and evidence concerning the Shah's crimes was dutybound to go and discuss them with the commission members. In fact, there were times when one would be seized by a strange feeling upon seeing those scenes [passage indistinct]. All statements and documents given by these victims were prepared so that not only the commission members could study them but we could present them to the Panamanian court as well. But the fact is that of all these students who claimed and still claim they have documents and evidence against the Shah's régime—although the commission invited them and although the Panamanian lawyer invited them to present and submit their cases—not one of them came forward to submit their evidence.

However, there were no promises or obligations on the part of the commission members. Rather, it was our initiative. Unfortunately, there are certain people in this country who cannot believe that an Iranian can use his own initiative and can show resistance and take action. Even now, these people still find the American hand interfering in everything.

They still believe that the United States is always meddling. In the past there was also a time when if the meat in the stew was not cooked well everyone used to say that the British had something to do with it. Anyway, this was at our own initiative. It was our own initiative from the very beginning, and it was a right and proper initiative. Some people are saying that this commission is supervised by Waldheim or by the United States. What does this mean? Does this mean that you are doubting the honour and honesty of all the members of this commission? Or, going a step further, that it is the Imam's order that we should co-operate with this commission? And now you are trying to say that even the Imam is not following his own policies? What kind of logic is this? Why should the truth be twisted? It is very illogical and unbecoming. Some insist on saying that this commission was presented under a different guise. First they said it was established to obtain the purpose of visiting the hostages. Yes, all kinds of things were planned outside the country. Many things have been said against our revolution. Are we supposed to be an unchanging subordinate of the outside world or are we to follow our own deeds and actions? Even at that time we did

say that it was neither the question or condition of the hostages' release nor was it the question of solving the hostage problem. The commission's function was what has been explained and the question of the visit to the hostages was part of it.

Keeping all the documents and evidence in your possession for such a long time and your refusing to turn these documents over to the commission or to submit them to the Panamanian lawyer for the Shah's extradition on the one hand, and your refusal to let the commission visit the hostages on the other hand does not make any sense at all. During this television interview, they said the commission would report to the world about the condition of the hostages or that they should be transferred to the hospital. The entire Iranian nation is fully aware that the condition of these hostages is very good and that they live a far better life than even the students themselves. Why should we be afraid of letting them be visited if it is a fact that their condition is good and there is no cause for concern or worry? Up until last week not even one member of the Revolution Council had been able to visit the hostages much less [word indistinct]. The foreigners were allowed to see them but the members of the Revolution Council were not asked to come and see them for themselves or ask them about their conditions. We only had reports saying that they were fine. Why on earth were you afraid of letting anyone see them? Even a prisoner has visitation rights. Why has there been so much stubborn persistence in refusing to allow any one to see them? Unless we say that all claims about their being fine and well are false, and this is something we do not wish to say such a thing for the time being; not for now anyway. However, it is not right that we should try to hinder someone trying to prepare any kind of report about the condition of the hostages. The students, on the other hand, believe that right from this moment we should try to hinder their action through some kind of propaganda! This is where we must remember that the Imam is totally against any and all types of political manoeuvring. We must say that this is not the basis of our promises or obligations. It is false to say that there have been some promises made and there are certain sneaky things going on. It is false to say that we want to transfer them to a hospital and then release them from the hospital! We have always been honest. Not one wrong word has ever been uttered by the Imam's sacred tongue. Those who follow his policy must not resort to these types of tactics for these are tactics belying the Imam's policy and line. This is very important [passage indistinct]. Why is there suddenly the question of having the initiative within our power and control? The commission members should leave now and return later! Why? Why? If we have had the initiative, we still have it.

Secondly, when the commission members have been told that such a thing [visiting the hostages] is feasible and they have come here, and we then back out on our promise, is this not enough reason for us to be ashamed and embarrassed? How could they possibly trust us and take our word for it? And why should they? Now, you either have certain information and you should make it available to them, or this whole thing could be based on some false imagination. And false imagination before a Muslim brother is not worthy or dignified.

I am addressing the struggling Muslim people who for many long years have been tortured and oppressed. How could they allow themselves to think that all members of the Revolution Council—who are all devoted friends of the Imam, and some of whom have spent years in prison and some of whom have been serving the Imam for years—could be called conciliators? And now it is only these gentlemen [militant students] who are the followers of the Imam's policy? What kind of a mature, wise and unbiased person could accept this? Our nation is both mature, wise and unbiased. Concerning the fact that the United States is exerting pressure, I discussed this matter with the other four members of the council in the presence of Dr. Bani-Sadr to determine whether or not there is any proof or evidence for such a claim. So far, we have not obtained a single

document proving this. Such a thing does not exist. Therefore, this claim was not correct either.

As far as supporting the Imam and using the Imam's words, who said the United States would not dare do anything? Yes, the Imam did say that the United States would not dare do anything. The Imam said we were not afraid of their economic blockade. Yes, he did say that. But what is our duty? Our duty is to take the Imam's words and turn them into deeds. In other words, we must act so the United States will not dare do such a thing. Our duty is not simply to sit and shout slogans. Our duty is to act. We must convert the Imam's orders from words into deeds. All our struggles have been aimed toward this goal. This is where the confrontations between the responsible followers of the Imam and the irresponsible ones become evident. Here I must quite unfortunately mention that the scope of false accusations has become so prevalent that even at this time we hear that our Foreign Minister went to Europe and the US Secretary of State went to Europe and nobody knows what took place. Reports on my trip to Europe are still available and are clear. The US Secretary of State did not come to Europe at that time. He went there afterwards. Now, are you trying to say that nobody should travel from any part of the world to any other place simply because you can sit here and say that if they do go it would mean that they [word indistinct]? We went to Italy to discuss the helicopters that we have paid for, but they would not deliver them to us because of this whole episode. We needed and do need these helicopters. We needed the helicopters to cope with the problem of Khuzestan flood. As for other agreements and contracts with other countries, the same thing occurred in France. One billion dollars of our assets are frozen there in connection with nuclear energy. Should we not do these things? Are we not entitled? Don't we have a right? If we should take such a trip and later the US Secretary of State should take a trip, does this mean conciliation? This is where we can mention and remember that the Imam's policy is the guardian of moral honesty.

As for this commission working under Waldheim's supervision, I believe I have sufficiently and adequately explained how it started and where it is now. What kind of a guarantee can we have that they should in any way be sympathetic toward Iran? What kind of a guarantee? Guarantee in its full sense can never be provided by anyone in any place in the world. A guarantee is usually dependent on a person's actions.

It is our words and deeds that can guarantee our statements in this world. When a number of individuals entrusted with the responsibility of our country's administration enter a clear-cut agreement for the purpose of exposing these crimes and this agreement is blocked and hindered by a group, then who in this world will consider our words of our Government worth a penny? However, after all this and after all these explanations, one of the gentlemen brought up the question of whether or not executive bodies are in line with the Imam's policy? This is where I must mention that this suspicion and uncertainty do exist, if they allow themselves to have this kind of suspicion and uncertainty. I will mention something here so that we can get to its various cases later. The main question is whether or not we actually want to fight against the criminal United States or to weaken and destroy the country's executive power? One is entitled to such a question. These are the questions that it would not be a bad idea to debate someday and bring these matters up one at a time. Do not just use the word "mostly" by saying that the executive bodies are mostly not in line with the Imam's policy. What does this word "mostly" mean? Now, are we also going to sit and be told what our duties and functions are supposed to be? Then they said that we had threatened to resign. That was why we said it was not so and we would give back the hostages [sentence as heard]. This was not so.

The reality in the case of taking the hostages was that the Revolutionary Council unanimously agreed that the commission should complete its work on

all its three phases and should then leave the country. The students opposed this. They asked for discussions and negotiations. Yet there was no such arrangement that a number of the Revolution Council members would come and negotiate with these gentlemen.

Now, how many governments do we have in this country? Nevertheless, we did not object to their proposal. We got together and began talks. The next day a communiqué on the meeting was issued which unfortunately was not complete because other matters had been discussed at the meeting. After the meeting, these gentlemen went to the residence of one of the Council members—unfortunately I am not at liberty to mention his name because he is a candidate for the parliament—and held discussions there for three or four hours. That was where they had stated that they could not accept the Council's proposal, and the Council member had told them that the Council's order must be carried out. Then the brother of the Council member asked about our plan for the transfer of the hostages to the hospital, to which I replied that if there were no [health] problems there would be no such action. The question of transferring them to a hospital, I said, would only come up if there was a need for it. This can even be done under their own supervision if they so desire. After all, the nation must be aware of all of these, I went on to say. Presently, there is no talk about transferring them to a hospital at all. Then they issued their declaration that if we did not accept their proposal they would hand over the hostages. That is they would hand them over to the Revolution Council. The brother of the Council member insisted that they should not do this. It would not be proper; and they should keep the hostages. But they kept insisting that they wanted to hand them over to the Council. To tell you the truth, when I was told this over the telephone, I felt that it was a bluff rather than reality. So I said we would accept them and would be ready to confront any resulting international situation. It was very clear from the beginning that it was the Imam's order that the Parliament was the only group that could speak on the people's behalf, and it would determine the fate of the hostages. Therefore, they will be kept until the Parliament convenes. So they went to the Imam's residence and it was discussed there as well. The councilman's brother and Mr. Bani-Sadr were assigned by the council to call on the Imam and discuss the matter.

Mr. Bani-Sadr went to see the Imam, but the brother did not or could not go. The matter of students' statement about handing the hostages over to the Council was brought up. The Imam had replied that it would be acceptable provided that they should not be released until the Parliament convenes—without exception. Mr. Bani-Sadr, as member of the Council, accepted this.

Now, where is the falsity about this whole thing that the newspapers, which are managed and financed by the funds for the oppressed, should put out bold headlines on behalf of the students, who are supposed to be honest and sincere and to call this a falsity. And I am fully behind this statement. But of course, all of those demonstrations and marches that were staged were the symbol and manifestation of those who insist that under no circumstances can we have any free time to manage the nation's affairs and that all of our minds and efforts should be focused and exhausted on that centre [US Embassy], and everyday there should be a communiqué.

As for the students' revelations, I have many things to say about them. These documents and evidence—we said from the very first day that they should be entrusted to certain persons so that no one could reach them. However, this was not done. I must say that some of these so-called documents that I have heard about are totally worthless. They are not documents of evidence. They often turn out to be the words of a certain American regarding his chance meeting with someone.

And as I already said, if some day we can enter into a face to face debate, we can bring some of these documents and analyse them. Naturally, I do not want

matters to reach such a point. But day in and day out accusations are slapped at some people who have been toiling in this country for years and have gone through all types of miseries and misfortunes. They are called US spies, its affiliates. Unfortunately most of them are candidates for the parliament or else I would mention their names one by one. I will mention their names in the newspapers. After all, why should they be so unjustly slandered. I am saying this here and now: if you have any single item or document on me, go ahead and publish it. It does not matter what these documents relate to. I am not afraid to announce right here that as far as I know the documents published so far are almost all worthless and useless. There is no reason that our decent men and statesmen should be so slandered and defamed. Why do you do this? For whose benefit? Why?

As for the last remark that was made here, and I must answer it right here and now and stop it. They said they would have liked to take each and every one of the hostages one by one and show them these documents for their authenticity. And now that the hostages are being handed over to the Revolution Council, the Council has to take over this task. For four months you had these hostages and all radio and television media were at your disposal. You have had at least 50 or 60 interviews and statements. You would have done something about them if you had been able to do anything about these so-called documents. Now you are trying to set a trap for the Revolution Council! Why did you not take any action all this time?

So I shall return to the Imam's policy. The Imam's line is the symbol and indicator of honesty, frankness, firmness, moral honesty and is void of any and all type of politics and any other kind of strategy. It is void of any accusations and slander against a person or persons, and is based on wisdom, perspicacity, intelligence and vision. It is for the protection of the Muslims and our homeland and for the greatness and respect of the Islam of the oppressed throughout the world. Wherever there is no honesty, wherever there is no frankness, wherever there is accusation and slander, then they are not acting in accordance with the Imam's policy.

It has been decided that whenever there are any similar interviews they will be responded to every step of the way and word for word so that the public may be fully aware and enlightened. This was our discussion and answer. And as for the hostages, their decision to hand them over to the Revolution Council, the way I understood it, was nothing but a bluff. However, when they realized that the Council would take them up on it, they started shouting and asking the people to come and not let this happen, to come and decide for themselves. If the Revolution Council is receiving and has received its legal standing and legitimacy from the Imam, and if the Imam's order is to obey the Council's resolutions, then any kind of game playing with those decisions and any type of opposition to those resolutions would be in violation of the Imam's order. And it would be unacceptable. And no one can dare say that he is in line with the Imam's policy but that he does not abide by the Imam's decisions. This is very clear and explicit.

I hope all of these remarks helped many dear compatriots to have a clearer mind. I am perfectly willing and ready to make many revelations by bringing and presenting some of the documents and to make it clear through these face to face debates so that—as I said in my statement yesterday—whoever has any falsehoods in him can be disgraced. May peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon all of you.

142. Khomeini Message on Commission's Meeting

OW101008 Hong Kong AFP in English, 1007 GMT, 10 Mar. 80 OW.

[Text] Tehran, 10 March (AFP)—Iranian revolutionary guide Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini today dashed hopes that the United Nations international

investigating commission could see all the American Embassy hostages. A message published today said the commission could see only those hostages implicated "in the crimes of the Shah and the United States in Iran". Once the commission has given its opinion on the alleged crimes it will be allowed to see the other hostages held in the Embassy since 4 November, Ayatollah Khomeini said.

A spokesman for the students holding the estimated 50 hostages said they had accepted the Ayatollah's decision.

143. More on Khomeini Message

LD101200 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1036 GMT, 10 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] Following the joint session of the Revolution Council and the Council of Ministers, which took place this morning in the presence of Imam Khomeini at his temporary residence, the leader of the revolution addressed an important message to the Iranian nation.

In connection with the US hostages of the former US Embassy, the leader of the revolution addressed a message to the Iranian nation as follows:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate, Noble and struggling nation of Iran. Crimes committed by the Shah and America need no proof. The Shah and America made us dependent in all fields. Murder, vilification, imprisonment and exile were common practice for these criminals. We shall fight the US Government to the end of our lives. We shall not rest until we put America in its place, cut off its hands from the region, help all liberation fighters to defeat it and enable the Iranian people to take over their own destiny.

To us there is no difference between the aggressive East and the criminal West. We shall fight and, as justice shall prevail, we shall triumph. US domination entails calamity for all the oppressed nations. The aggression committed by the aggressive East has disgraced history.

Dear Iranian nation, beware, as we have long years of struggle ahead of us. To destroy you, the superpowers are engaged daily in plots. The devil's mischief harms the oppressed [previous sentence in Arabic]. The question raised nowadays is America and the American hostages and spies who are held by the Muslim and struggling students. In this connection I shall make a few points:

1. Copies of all documents related to the US Government and the traitorous Shah should be made available to the commission of inquiry into the crimes committed by the US Government and the Shah. As for the Muslim students, if they, too, have any evidence, then they should provide copies to the commission.

2. The meeting with the hostages involved in the dossier, on the crimes committed by the Shah and America, can take place for the purpose of their interrogation.

3. If the commission of inquiry announces its views in Tehran about the crimes committed by the ousted Shah and the interferences by the aggressive America, then a meeting with the hostages [as heard] can take place.

Once again I declare my support for the Revolution Council and His Excellency the President and call on everyone to help them and spare no efforts in supporting them. I want all strata to follow the praiseworthy Islamic ethics and safeguard fraternal rights.

My dear sisters and brothers, today is the day of unity and unanimity; today is the day when, if you fail in your unity, then you will be trapped either by the East or the West. Never adhere to a single idea; do whatever serves the interest of this land the Islamic nation. The movement of the noble nation of Iran continues to cut off the hands of the enemies. So long as America and other

superpowers continue with their oppression and crimes our nation too will continue its confrontation and struggle against them, while safeguarding its comprehensive independence with all its might.

It is up to the intellectuals to increase their efforts in exposing the superpowers and powers. I hope that Khomeini will never deviate from the straight path of Islam, which is fighting against the oppressive powers, and will never rest in realizing Islamic goals; as I hope our Muslims, especially the struggling Iranian nation, will endeavour toward achieving this Islamic goal and continue their struggle against the oppressors of the East and West.

I pray to God almighty for the victory of Islam and the Muslims. God bless you all.

[Signed] Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini, 10 March 1980.

144. Students' Appeal for Marches

LD102305 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 10 Mar. 80 LD.
[Text] Following the broadcasting of the message of Imam Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy issued an announcement tonight. The text of the announcement is as follows:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. "We will fight against the US Government to the end of our lives. We will not rest until we put America in its place, cut off its hands from the region, help all the liberation fighters to defeat it and enable the Iranian people to take over their own destiny", as Imam Khomeini has said.

The Imam's rousing call to the nation gives the loud and clear glad tidings of long years of struggle to the dear and valiant nation and causes the two superpowers of East and West—one of which has disgraced history through its aggression and the other has sucked the last drop of the blood of the oppressed people through murders, plunders and crimes—to tremble. All the misery of the oppressed nations and all our different forms of political, military, economic and cultural dependence were caused by the criminal Shah and are due to hegemonist America.

Be wakeful and vigilant so that you may neutralize the plots of the traitors and the superpowers, especially America. Don't stop struggling and fighting until final victory which is the victory of truth. Today is not a day when superpowers and the criminal America can withstand the tumultuous waves of the boundless ocean of human beings who have risen to regain their lost freedom and independence; because, according to the orders of the Imam, today is the day of blood and martyrdom and because until the banner of "There is no God but Allah" is unfurled in the world and the call of "God is great" resounds the struggle continues, and so long as the struggle continues we will be in it.

The straight path of Islam from which iniconoclast Khomeini said he hopes he will not deviate is struggle against the oppressive powers and the achievement of Islam's goals. With all our soul we will comply with the message of our Imam when he said:

1. Copies of all documents relating to the US Government and the traitorous Shah should be made available to the commission of inquiry into the crimes committed by the US Government and the Shah.

2. Meeting with the hostages involved in the Shah's and America's dossiers of crimes can take place for the purpose of their interrogation.

3. If the commission of inquiry announces its views in Tehran on the crimes committed by the ousted Shah and the interferences by aggressive America, then a meeting with the hostages may take place.

We will act decisively and expeditiously in accordance with these orders.

Wakeful and noble nation, your children, following the Imam of the nation, declare today as the day of union, accord and brotherhood. In these critical and historic moments, complying with our commitment and the heavy responsibility which has been placed upon our shoulders, with an added strength and resolve based on faith and by relying on and insisting on the great and life-giving principles of unity, accord, solidarity and harmony, we will so persist in our task until we have reinforced the divine covenant of brotherhood, equality and justice among ourselves and the oppressed nations so that, continuing our great battle against the oppressive and tyrannical world power, that arch-Satan, bloodthirsty America, we may successfully achieve victory. As a crystallization and manifestation of obedience to the message of the Imam when he says: "My dear sisters and brothers, today is the day of unity and concord", as thanksgiving for his recovery, and in order to preserve the strength of unity and cohesion of all the strata of the noble nation against bloodthirsty America, and in order to prepare the alert nation for united participation in the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly we declare—provided that this meets with the approval of the respected supervisor of the Ministry of Interior—Thursday a day of mass marches throughout the country.

We humbly request all the dear strata of the nation in all cities and villages to take part in these great marches which are the embodiment of obedience to the orders of the Imam concerning the maintenance of unity, accord and solidarity and continuous struggle against America. We should mention that the routes of the marches and their special programmes will be announced later.

[Signed] Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

145. Revolution Council on Hand Over

LD102144 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 2030 GMT, 10 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] Members of the Revolution Council and the Council of Ministers tonight held a joint session. During the session various issues were discussed and were subject to an exchange of views. According to a Pars News Agency correspondent, Ayatollah Mosavi-Ardabili, following tonight's session, said:

Foreign relations and harmonizing Iran's foreign policy with economic and non-economic issues were discussed during the session tonight, and it was decided to form a group to pursue the matter. Problems of ministries were also discussed during the session and it was decided that these issues be discussed with people in a round-table discussion.

The deputy education minister and another member of the Revolution Council, in an interview with the correspondent following the session, said, in reply to the correspondent's question on what had been decided on the fate of the hostages:

The Imam has specified the future with his statement, namely that the commission that has come may contact those individuals from among the hostages who can make a contribution to their work in preparing their dossier; in other words, those who have been identified as spies and whose interference in Iran's business has been established. The members of the commission may contact these individuals. Another issue is that the commission must also investigate America's interference in Iran and that if it should require any documents, these should be placed at their disposal, wherever this may be done. If there are any documents in the den of espionage indicating America's interference in Iran, these must also be placed at the disposal of the commission. After their investigation regarding the crimes of traitorous Mohammad Reza and America's interference in Iran, they should give their views on these matters here. If they announce their views they will be entitled to meet all the hostages.

He added: Regarding taking delivery of the hostages, most of the Revolution

Council members said: We do not want to take delivery; they should remain in the hands of the students. The Imam, too, did not have any particular views on this matter, either, and he said that what is important is that America's crimes must be pronounced here and that the fate of the hostages must be clarified by the Majles, and there is in no way any question of releasing the hostages. Thus, the Council will not take delivery of them, either, and there was no insistence on this matter from the start either; it was something that was proposed by the students themselves. The majority of the members of the Council are also opposed to taking delivery of the hostages.

He added: Another point that was raised in the presence of the Imam today concerned the question of the disabled and crippled, and he ordered that these people should be officially taken care of individually, including their families, as concerned housing, jobs and all other things. The same applies to the survivors of the martyrs. He said that these should not in any way be isolated from society; they must definitely be employed.

In answer to a question as to whether anything was said regarding the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy during the meeting today between the members of the Revolution Council and the Imam, the deputy education minister said: of course, there was nothing new and he insisted that the unity of the revolutionary ranks of the Muslims must be preserved; that there should be good relations and understanding between the Revolution Council, the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy and all the people, so that, with cohesion, solidarity and unity, they can fulfil their duty.

146. Students' Release of Documents

LD110518 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 0430 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] The public relations office of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy has announced that following Imam Khomeini's message yesterday, the students today put some documents concerning the intervention of the US Government at the disposal of the commission investigating the crimes of the Shah and the United States. These documents include:

1. One hundred and eighty-five documents belonging to the US State Department which show the American intervention in the internal affairs of Iran.

2. Two hundred and eighty-three espionage documents of the US espionage organization in Iran. These documents reveal the ways in which 103 American spies were active in Iran at the time of the deposed Shah.

147. Commission's Departure. Meeting with Students

NC110818 Paris AFP in English, 0813 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 11 March (AFP)—The five-man United Nations investigation commission left here today without seeing any of the American hostages, but they did see some of their jailers. Three of the militants, who have held the 50 Americans since 4 November went to the Hilton Hotel, where the investigators were staying, demanding to see the Algerian commission member Mohamad Bedjaoui to hand him a number of documents.

But Mr. Bedjaoui angrily refused to see them.

The militants then followed commission members to the airport where they spoke for several minutes with the investigators in the presence of Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh, in the airport VIP lounge. The meeting was behind closed doors, but it appeared the exchanges were heated.

The jurists then flew to New York to confer with United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on how to continue their assignment, which they said was "indivisible"—a clear reference to their mandate to inquire into the alleged crimes during the Shah's régime and to visit all the embassy hostages.

148. Gotbzadeh on Commission's Departure

NC110936 Paris AFP in English, 0929 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Tehran, 11 March (AFP)—An unnamed member of the ruling Revolutionary Council recently visited the United States Embassy and saw each of the 50 hostages individually. Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh said here today. The visit was "one more proof that the hostages are safe and in good health", he said at an improvised airport news conference after seeing off the United Nations commission investigating the alleged crimes of the ex-Shah.

149. INA on Commission's Departure

JN110824 Baghdad INA in Arabic, 0818 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 JN.

[Excerpt] Tehran, 11 March—The United Nations commission investigating the crimes of the deposed Shah left Tehran for New York this morning. The commission's spokesman made a short statement before departure, asserting that the committee is incapable of compiling the requested report in light of the current circumstances. He added that the commission has conveyed this information to the Iranian authorities.

The commission decided to leave after revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said they could see only those hostages implicated "in the crimes of the ex-Shah and the United States against Iran".

Mr. Gotbzadeh added that when the hostages were sick they had been transported to hospital, but he gave no details.

"With a little more patience it (the commission) could have accomplished the whole of its mandate without interruption", Mr. Gotbzadeh said. He added that the investigators had expressed the desire to return. "Don't say their mission has failed, it is simply suspended", he added.

150. Broadcasting Official on Departure

LD111112 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1030 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] The Imam's representative at the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a Pars interview today, gave his views on the performance of the commission investigating the crimes committed in Iran by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America.

On the unexpected return of the members of the commission he said: In my view the nature of the commission and its mission necessitated this action and therefore their return was not unexpected. They saw that they could not act according to the message of the Imam. They could not do anything else. He added: They did not come to condemn the crimes committed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America. Last night students took some files they had discovered to hand them over. The students even took these documents to the airport with them. But their efforts were fruitless. He said: One of the Iranian officials said that, since the occupation of the den of espionage is illegal, the commission cannot accept the documents.

The Imam's representative at the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran refused to give the name of this official. He said: Waldheim has been quoted as saying that the commission is not allowed to express its views in Iran.

151. Commission's Communiqué on Departure

LD111056 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1035 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 LD.
[Text] According to the Pars News Agency, the commission investigating the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America in Iran left Tehran for New York this morning. The commission released a communiqué before departure. The text [as heard] of the communiqué is as follows:

The investigative commission carried out its duty with regard to the investigation and examination of all Iran's complaints, and is ready to inspect and study any other documents that Iranian officials might want to submit in connection with the crimes of the Mohammad Reza régime and America. As for the commission's participation in finding a solution to the international crisis, the commission believes that, considering the latest developments on the continuation of the commission's work, the members of this commission will go back to New York and will have talks with Kurt Waldheim.

At the end of this communiqué it is mentioned that the commission is not able to submit the result of its inquiries and had communicated this to the Iranian Government.

The commission investigating the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and America in Iran arrived in Tehran on 16 February pursuant to an invitation extended by Iranian officials.

152. 11 March Developments concerning US Relations, Hostages

Bani-Sadr on Students, Commission

NC111501 Paris AFP in English, 1457 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 NC.

[Text] Paris, 11 March (AFP)—Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr today deplored the obstruction by the "Islamic students" of the United Nations inquiry into the ex-Shah's régime, telling the Paris daily *Le Monde* that "holding hostages is no way to fight imperialism".

Mr. Bani-Sadr also quashed any lingering hopes of an early release of the 50 hostages, held since November, saying they could not be released before "mid-May at the earliest" to give the planned Iranian Parliament time to "study the files".

Without questioning the good faith of the militants holding the hostages, the President told *Le Monde* that they were "influenced at times by pro-Soviet political circles, such as the Tudeh communist party, who have everything to gain from isolating Iran from the international community".

Mr. Bani-Sadr said he regretted the committee had been unable to complete its mission "as all its members were anti-imperialists and rebuffing them could cut us off from world opinion, especially from the Third World".

Saying the committee's report would have been of "capital importance" to Iran, he added that any condemnation of a superpower was in itself "a turning point in history", although "unfortunately the students did not realise this".

Mr. Bani-Sadr told *Le Monde* that in rejecting the committee, the "students" had unwittingly fulfilled the Shah's prophecy that the United Nations mission would fail.

Criticizing the Revolutionary Council's "weakness and indecision", the President explained the committee's mission as worked out between United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the Iranian Government, with "revolutionary guide" Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's approval.

"Once adopted by the United Nations Security Council, we would use the committee's report to force Panama to send us the Shah", Mr. Bani-Sadr said, adding that the report would give Iran the international backing to "put

pressure on the United States and force it to recognize its faults and give up opposing the Shah's extradition".

153. Students' Statement on Documents

LD111814 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 1630 GMT, 11 Mar. 80 LD.

[Text] The public relations office of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy, in connection with the delivery of documents and proof concerning the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the United States in Iran to the members of the international investigation commission and in connection with the manner in which the members of the commission refused to receive these documents, issued a statement and placed it at the disposal of the central news bureau of the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as follows:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Following Imam Khomeini's message, based on showing copies of the documents and proof to the commission investigating the crimes of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the United States, the students prepared some 438 [as heard] pages of documents and proof which were at the spy nest. The spokesman of the Revolution Council also received a letter pertaining to the step acquiring an official status. It was then that the documents and proof, together with the introductory note of the spokesman of the Revolution Council, were dispatched in order to be received by the commission at the Hilton Hotel, the headquarters of the commission members during their stay.

Despite all the prevarications and the lack of success displayed by the members of the commission in meeting the students and taking delivery of the documents from them—each member of the commission passed the buck to the next man and the next man refused to receive the documents—at long last the question of accepting the documents was not agreed to by the members of the investigation commission, who then refused to accept the documents in strong terms—so much so that the students placed the documents and proof in the car that was carrying the head of the commission and was moving off toward the airport.

In the meantime, all film cameramen and newsmen, too, took films of these scenes. Nevertheless, the cars carrying the members of the commission were accompanied to the airport by the students in order to make sure that the documents and proofs were with the members of the commission to the last moment and that they could take them with them.

Following the arrival of the commission members at the airport, the issue was discussed with Mr. Gotbzadeh, who had gone to the airport to see off the commission members. It was then said that one of the reasons for the commission members not receiving the documents and proofs was the fact that since they deemed the occupation of the US den of espionage as illegal, they therefore deemed the documents and proofs arising therefrom as worthless from the legal standpoint.

At long last, after time had elapsed and the commission members were on their way toward the airport runway in order to board the plane, one of the people accompanying the commission members handed over the documents and proofs—which had been placed by the students in the car carrying the head of the commission—to one of the Iranian employees of the airport and told him that after the flight of the members of the commission the documents and proofs would be taken delivery of [as heard].

Thereby, the members of the investigation commission refused to receive the documents placed at the commission's disposal—documents and proofs already at the disposal of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy who are occupying the den of espionage.

154. Gotbzadeh on Commission's Role

JN122025 Tehran International Service in Arabic, 2000 GMT, 12 Mar. 80 JN.

[Text] Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh made statements to journalists in which he talked about the results of the work of the international commission investigating the crimes of the deposed Shah and America. He said: The US Government must not imagine that the commission came to Iran to release the hostages, because the release of the hostages was not discussed with the investigation commission at all. Moreover, the statements issued made no mention at all of the idea that the release of the hostages will take place through the commission or that this subject is among its tasks.

The Foreign Minister said that the commission's task is to investigate the deposed Shah's crimes and the plundering he and his family perpetrated, as well as to meet with the hostages. Gotbzadeh affirmed that the commission has accomplished the first and second parts, but was unsuccessful in accomplishing the third.

The Iranian Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the international investigation commission will shortly visit Iran once again.

155. Bani-Sadr on Commission. Students

LD121251 Paris *Le Monde* in French, 12 Mar. 80, pp. 1, 10 LD.

[Eric Rouleau dispatch: "Failure of Commission of Inquiry in Iran."]

[Text] Tehran—The "Islamic students" are jubilant. In prompting the premature departure of the United Nations commission of inquiry they think they have thwarted the "plot" which was to lead to the normalization of relations between Iran and the United States. They are more determined than ever to hold the US diplomats until the Shah is extradited.

It was with anger mixed with sadness that President of the Republic Bani-Sadr told us late in the evening of Monday, 10 March: "Holding the hostages is no way of struggling against imperialism."

The head of State does not doubt the "students'" good faith: "They are motivated by a hatred of US policy which the United States itself engendered in our country", he said in their defence. However, he added: "Unfortunately they sometimes allow themselves to be influenced by some political groups favorable to the USSR, like the Tudeh Party, which stands to gain from isolating Iran on the international scene in order to prevent Afghanistan [apparent line drop]."

Bani-Sadr replied indirectly to the arguments put forward by the "students" in the past few days: "The United Nations commission of inquiry is completely honourable in our eyes since we approved its composition. All its members are anti-imperialists. Objecting to them is a way of cutting us off from world opinion, especially Third World opinion."

The nature of the report which the commission was to draw up at the end of its mission does not worry him. "We have provided the commission with hundreds of documents irrefutably demonstrating the guilt of the Shah and of the United States. Even though the files we have given it are incomplete—due to the destruction of evidence by US agents before the monarchy's fall—and even though the commission has not been given enough time, the report it was to write is vitally important for us. An indictment made against a superpower is in itself a turning point in mankind's history—the dawn of a new age for all the oppressed in the world. Unfortunately the Islamic students have failed to understand that."

The President of the Republic also thinks that the occupiers of the US Embassy are mistaken when they maintain that the process started by the international commission runs counter to their main objective—namely the

Shah's extradition. "The scenario drawn up jointly by United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the Iranian Government with Imam Khomeini's explicit approval is not in the least secret, as some people suggest. Once it has been adopted by the Security Council the commission's report will be used to demand that Panama hand over the Shah for trial. We will then enjoy the support of the international community. It will also put pressure on the United States to recognize their crimes and give up their opposition to the Shah's extradition."

After a moment's silence Bani-Sadr added: "By opposing the commission of inquiry the Islamic students have unintentionally proved the Shah correct since right from the start he predicted that the United Nations mission would fail." However, the President of the Republic above all attacked the "weakness" and "indecision" of the *Revolution Council* which he accuses of having largely contributed to the crisis.

"If the Council had shown more determination, if it did not change its mind every day at the instigation of particular pressure groups, we would not have come to this pass", he said, before adding: "During our meeting Sunday evening I told my colleagues that it was impossible to govern the country in this way, that we have to have the courage to take, and above all to implement, unpopular decisions. I said that the Iranian people are sick of measures which are never carried out. I then told them that I would not go with them Monday morning to ask Imam Khomeini to arbitrate in the conflict which had arisen between the *Revolution Council* and the Islamic students."

President Bani-Sadr did indeed stay away from the meetings and consultations which took place throughout Monday. He did not attend either the meeting with Imam Khomeini or the meetings held separately by the *Revolution Council* and the Government.

He merely agreed to receive the international commission and afterward to have a one-on-one meeting with one of its members, Mohamed Bedjaoui, Algerian ambassador to the United Nations, to whom he advocated the "proposals" put forward that morning by Imam Khomeini. According to Bani-Sadr these proposals were "in no way contrary" to the mandate given to the United Nations investigators. They would have been authorized to meet all the American hostages "after expressing their opinion on the former Shah's crimes and the US aggressors' interference", to cite Imam Khomeini.

Reasons for Refusal

The only concession which the commission was prepared to make—Bani-Sadr continued—would have been the following: "Before issuing a report in New York it would have announced its initial impressions in Tehran, thereby reassuring the Islamic students as to its real intentions." It is being pointed out here that two of the three measures advocated by Imam Khomeini in his "message to the Iranian nation" were not binding on the commission. The "revolution guide" stated that the documents found in the US Embassy should be "placed at the disposal" of the investigators. Therefore they had the opportunity to reject documents which some of them regard as "stolen".

The Imam also stated that the commission was "free to question ... some of the hostages implicated in the Shah's crimes". In other words, Mr. Waldheim's representatives were equally "free" to deem such interviews with men and women held in violation of international laws to be inappropriate. The only contentious point in Imam Khomeini's message therefore related to the appropriateness of a statement by the investigators before their return to New York on the Iranian Government's grievances against the Shah and the United States—an absolutely vital precondition for their visit to the American hostages.

The commission immediately stated that this distortion of the agreements was unacceptable. The pleas and exhortations of the chief of Iranian diplomacy

Gotbzadeh, who conferred at length with the United Nations representatives three times on Monday, were not enough to shake their determination to leave Iran before concluding their inquiry.

Their refusal was motivated by at least two reasons. If they had agreed to "announce their initial impressions" in Tehran they would in fact have given way to Imam Khomeini's "blackmail". And even if they had given way they would have run the risk of not being granted the other half of the bargain. Indeed, who could guarantee that the Islamic students were not going to find their condemnation of the Shah and the United States to be sufficient or adequate? The commission therefore left Tehran this Tuesday morning after issuing a polite but firm communiqué. It will "pursue its task" in New York but will not draw up a report on the conclusions of an inquiry which it regards as incomplete. Indeed, under the terms of its mandate it is not authorized to separate Iran's grievances from the US grievances over the hostages.

In good diplomatic fashion the United Nations investigators refrained from talking of rupture or failure. This is a wise decision since nobody has any alternative in the scenario laboriously dreamed up to satisfy both Iran and the United States. In any case President Bani-Sadr told us that the hostages could not be released until mid-May at the earliest since the future Iranian Parliament would not have the chance of examining the question before that date. Meanwhile it is the Iranian situation, rich in new developments, which will ultimately determine the fate of the hostages and the future of relations between Tehran and Washington.

156. Statement by Secretary-General of the United Nations on Inquiry Commission to Iran

SG/SM/2869
20 February 1980.

Following is the text of a statement made today by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim at the start of a press conference at United Nations Headquarters:

I wish to announce the establishment of a commission of inquiry to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States.

Iran desires to have the commission speak to each of the hostages.

The commission will be composed of: Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, Mohamed Bedjaoui of Algeria, Adyb Daoudy of the Syrian Arab Republic, H. W. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka and Louis-Edmond Pettiti of France. The members from Algeria and Venezuela will serve as its Co-Chairmen.

The commission, which will leave for Tehran over the week-end, will complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report to the Secretary-General.

157. White House Statement on Commission

Secretary-General Waldheim has announced the establishment of a commission of inquiry to go to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. He has stated that the commission will speak with each of our people.

Both the United States and Iran have concurred in the establishment of the commission as proposed by the Secretary-General in mutually acceptable official responses to him.

In concurring, the United States has taken note of the Secretary-General's

statement that the commission will undertake a fact-finding mission. It will not be a tribunal. The United States understands that the Commission will hear the grievances of both sides and will report to the Secretary-General. The American people are deeply aggrieved that Iran, after guaranteeing the protection of our people, has taken them hostage and held them in intolerable conditions for 108 days. The United States has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, but it does insist on the prompt return of the 53 Americans now illegally held in Tehran.

The United States has also made clear its position that the meeting of the commission with our people must be consistent with international law and that the hostages must under no circumstances be subjected to interrogation. It is vital, however, for the commission to determine that they are all present, and to assess their condition.

We hope that the commission will, as the Secretary-General has said, achieve an early resolution of the crisis between our two countries which requires the release of the hostages.

158. Department of State, Special Press Briefing, Saturday, 23 February 1980
(excerpts)

(On the record unless otherwise noted.)

Mr. Carter: Good afternoon.

We have had a preliminary look at what the Ayatollah is reported to have said. In response to it, I would like to make the following points for the Administration.

We have stated our position repeatedly. The Iranians are continuing to violate the basic principles of international law and human rights by holding hostages for ransom.

The purposes of the United Nations commission are two-fold: not only to hear Iran's grievances, but also to bring about an early end of the crisis.

That, of course, requires the release of all the hostages.

The United Nations commission of inquiry has arrived in Tehran today and will immediately devote itself to carrying out its two-fold mission. While that is underway, I am not going to have anything further for you on this.

[Question] Let's put it this way, is this the mandate of the commission? Does it have two sides, because the White House has said that one of the things that the commission will do would be to hear US grievances as well as Iranian grievances?

This has not come out very clearly. Is that part of an official mandate as given to them by the Secretary-General?

[Answer] The official mandate is as stated in the Secretary-General's own release on this subject, and I really don't want [words indistinct].

159. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Tuesday, 26 February 1980
(excerpts)

[Question] You say there are two objectives of the commission. And one is to bring about a speedy resolution of the crisis.

Is that the understanding of the Iranian authorities as to one of the objectives of the mission?

[Answer] The Secretary-General has outlined the objectives of the Commission that he put together and sent to Iran. He has projected what it is; we agree with that.

160. Press Conference Held by Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock, Deputy Prime Minister Brian Talboys, and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance at the Conclusion of the 29th ANZUS Council Meeting, Washington, DC,
27 February 1980

(excerpts)

[Question] Mr. Secretary, could I follow up your first question? Since the issuance of the Secretary-General's statement on the mandate for the commission, which you pointed out had a two-fold purpose, the Iranian authorities have publicly at least denied that it had more than the purpose of hearing their grievances. And, secondly, since then there have been statements by Iranian authorities, including the Ayatollah, suggesting that if the hostages are released—and it's just an "if"—it would not be any time before April, and now today it's suggested May."

The American people I think would like to know: Is this a misunderstanding by the United Nations and the United States of the role of the commission? Has there been any change in Iran? Or where do we stand on this?

[Secretary Vance] Let me say that the understanding of the United Nations and ourselves has been clearly set forth by the Secretary-General. He was asked what the mandate was after a question had been raised as to the nature of the mandate and he confirmed it was as he had originally stated it.

[Question] Mr. Vance, going back to Iran, you consulted very closely with Secretary-General Waldheim before those terms of reference were issued. Why, if the Iranians were in agreement that there was some linkage between the commission and the release of the hostages, was it not spelled out in those terms of reference? And if they weren't in agreement, why did you make the concession allowing the commission to be formed, when you had said previously you wouldn't do that unless there was some linkage to the release of the hostages?

[Secretary Vance] I think the terms of reference and the understanding with respect to those terms of reference was clear, remains clear, and I think they have been correctly reflected by what the Secretary-General has said.

161. Inquiry Commission Decides to Suspend Activities in Tehran to Confer with Secretary-General in New York

SG/SM/2880

IR/14

10 March 1980.

The following statement on behalf of Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim was made today by a United Nations spokesman:

The commission of inquiry, in the light of recent developments and after consulting with the Secretary-General and the Iranian authorities, has decided that it should suspend its activities in Tehran for several days. The commission will leave for New York tomorrow morning (11 March) to confer with the Secretary-General with a view to pursuing its tasks, which it regards as indivisible.

Under the circumstances, the commission is not now in a position to submit its report. It is, however, prepared to return to Tehran in accordance with its mandate and the instructions of the Secretary-General, when the situation requires.

The mandate of the commission is to hear Iran's grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. The Governments of Iran and the United States agreed to the establishment of the commission on that basis.

The Secretary-General will continue his efforts, as requested by the Security Council, to search for a peaceful solution of the crisis.

162. Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
Held at Headquarters on 11 March 1980

SG/SM/2881
11 March 1980.

[The Secretary-General] Ladies and Gentlemen, I thought it would be helpful if I came to this briefing to explain the situation which has arisen in connection with the presence of our commission in Tehran. As you know, I issued yesterday evening a statement that briefly explained the situation, but I thought it important to stress a few points personally.

One of those points is that the commission has not terminated its work; it has suspended its work and will resume its activities after consultations here in New York between the commission and me. The members of the commission will be here tomorrow, and we shall begin these consultations tomorrow afternoon. In the light of the briefing I shall get from the members of the commission, we shall then decide how to proceed further.

At any rate, we came to the conclusion during the telephone contacts I had in these past few days with the members of the commission that, in the given situation, it would be better for the commission to return to Headquarters in order to discuss the situation with me, and then to decide when the commission should return to Tehran.

A number of clarifications are of course necessary. I hope that these clarifications can be made in the next few days, and then we shall decide on the further procedure.

The second point is the question of the report. Obviously, for the time being, there will be no report, and I want to make that clear, since the commission was unable to fulfil all aspects of its mandate and was not able to see the hostages. It is clear that in these circumstances, a report cannot for the time being be made.

Finally, I wish to stress the point that whatever I did and whatever we did here in the United Nations was closely co-ordinated with the two sides. I say this because it is important for you to know that all the steps which I took when I decided to put this commission together and send it to Tehran were co-ordinated and discussed with the two Governments, and they fully supported them. Obviously, for any such undertaking it is essential to have the support of the parties in conflict.

Further, I wish to stress again that I shall continue my efforts. I do not consider these efforts concluded with the departure of the commission from Tehran. On the contrary, I think that we are now entering the second phase of the operation, which will begin tomorrow with consultations with the members of the commission, followed by further consultations with the two Governments—the Iranian Government and the United States Government—and we shall then decide on how to proceed further.

That is all I wished to say by way of introduction, and I shall of course be very glad to answer your questions.

[Zhigniew Boniecki] (President, United Nations Correspondents Association): Mr. Secretary-General, I want to welcome you on behalf of all of us and to thank you for coming to us again now at this very difficult stage of the whole operation.

After three months of very dedicated efforts to solve this problem, judging by your statement, you are still cautiously optimistic, if I may say so. Do you have any specific scenario in mind for a further stage of the United Nations involvement in this operation?

[The Secretary-General] I feel encouraged by the reactions on both sides. The Iranian authorities have made constructive statements stressing their readiness to continue these efforts and explaining the difficulties they were facing when the commission was in Tehran. You know that there is a rather complex power structure in the country. But the fact that the Government—the President himself, as well as the Foreign Minister—stressed repeatedly, in the first reactions to the departure of the commission, that they wanted to continue these efforts is encouraging.

It is also encouraging for me that I have always had most constructive co-operation from Washington. The Administration has fully supported my efforts. We have been in close contact during all these weeks, and the statements you heard yesterday evening and this morning make very clear that Washington is interested in continuing these efforts.

So I am quite confident that the time will come when we will solve the problem. It is just a question of time.

[Question] Sir, the hostages have been sitting there for over 100 days; their families are waiting anxiously. What encouragement can you give them, in terms of time, for a solution?

[The Secretary-General] I feel very much for the families of the hostages, and let me say that I am constantly thinking of the suffering of those people. I myself have a family and I know what it means for those families to know that their dear ones have been kept hostage for so many months. I shall certainly continue to make every effort and to do everything in my power to achieve the release of these hostages. I cannot give you a time-limit. I cannot tell you when it will happen, but I think the next few weeks will give us a clearer picture.

[Question] Under what general conditions, in advance of your consultations, do you think you could send the commission back to Tehran?

[The Secretary-General] As you know, I read out a statement when the commission went to Tehran in which I mentioned the mandate of the commission, which is two-fold: to hear the grievances of Iran, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to allow for a solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States, which means, in the first instance, the question of the hostages and their release. We have held to this mandate. I think that what has to be clarified is exactly when the Iranian Government will be in a position to implement the second part of the mandate of the commission.

[Question] Does that mean, then, that you would not send the commission back until you were convinced that the Iranian Government was in a position to implement the second part of the mandate?

[The Secretary-General] Obviously, I shall keep in contact with the Iranian authorities in this regard to try to find out how they see the situation and I shall make the decision in the light of the answer I get from the Iranian Government.

[Question] In an interview published today in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said: "Sometimes the militants allow themselves to be influenced by some political groups favourable to the USSR, such as the Tudeh Communist Party, whose interest is to isolate Iran on the international scene." That is a direct quote from President Bani-Sadr. My question to you, Sir, is: Is the Soviet Union meddling in your efforts to resolve this crisis.

[The Secretary-General] I can only tell you that there is a power struggle in Iran. It is clear that the views of the Government do not coincide with the views of the students in the compound. That was one of the reasons why finally the commission decided, after consulting with me, to return. I think there is also the other aspect, which is the attitude of Ayatollah Khomeini, who made a statement early yesterday in which he gave the impression of supporting the students. He put forward a number of conditions to the commission which had to be fulfilled before it could see the hostages. Those conditions had not been

foreseen in the arrangements and could not be fulfilled by the commission. Therefore, it was in the light of that fact that we decided it was better for the commission to return and consult with me, in order to give the Government in Iran time to clarify these matters. The commission could then perhaps return to Tehran when the situation becomes clear.

[Question] Do you expect any change in the composition of the commission? I have heard that one or two members have indicated they may want to be exempted from this job.

[The Secretary-General] That is not correct.

[Question] When you returned from Tehran the last time you indicated at a press conference here with us that somehow or other you did not feel that there was any government in power there, that it was difficult to know with whom to deal. Would you say that the present situation, as it has turned out, is similar to what the situation was when you were there, that there is no authority with whom to deal?

[The Secretary-General] Obviously we are dealing with the Government. That is the normal procedure. But the problem is that the Government apparently has not been able to reach agreement with those elements which oppose the arrangements, especially the students, who refused to allow the commission to visit the hostages.

[Question] At what point will you go public yourself with the written assurances, the promises that you have from the Iranian authorities?

[The Secretary-General] I do not think that this is really the question. The important thing is that we achieve the release of the hostages. And in the past I have repeatedly said please have patience; this is an honest effort. I have tried extremely hard to achieve a solution to this very delicate problem. We are facing tremendous difficulties. We cannot control the situation in Iran, obviously. And it is, I think, also clear to everybody that there is a power problem. That has come out very clearly in these last weeks. But let me also say that in the past we have been faced with situations of a kind in which it took nine months before the hostages or captives or whatever we call them were released. So let us be frank. This is not the first time that we have been faced with such a situation. But we should have patience, although I fully understand that, as was said a moment ago, it is a tragic experience for the families of the hostages. I am quite confident that the hostages will be released. But please have patience and permit me to keep certain things to myself, because I want to continue this process, and in such a situation it would not be helpful to say everything I know.

[Question] After the latest statement of the Ayatollah, do you still believe what he said earlier—that the Parliament will be the one to decide on the fate of the hostages? Will that still stand?

[The Secretary-General] Well, maybe; I cannot speak for the Ayatollah. But let us not forget that the elections are very near; they start on Friday. So, even if they take two weeks, that is not too far away, and since the Government and the President of Iran wish to solve the problem in a constructive way, I expect that the elections may be helpful in this effort.

[Question] Could I ask you about Khomeini? The Ayatollah is the only voice to which all listen there. You yourself have quoted him several times. Do you foresee that you will be able to be in communication with him, the one voice that has the authority, or will you go on with these other characters, who have no authority but must go to the Ayatollah in all cases?

[The Secretary-General] Obviously the Ayatollah is the spiritual leader of the country and has enormous influence. There is no doubt about that. But our interlocutor is the Government and the President of the country.

[Question] Do you consider it a possibility that this unique and complex situation may not be a job for the United Nations, that both the situation and the United Nations may be the worse off before it is over?

[The Secretary-General] We are always taking a risk in such situations. But has anybody who criticizes us—and I would not be surprised if there were criticism—offered a better alternative to what I have offered, with the commission? It is very clear that the work of the commission is logically linked with the release of the hostages and that the report cannot be presented before the second part of the mandate has been fulfilled. I am sorry that the actual situation means a further delay in the release of the hostages. But we have to accept it, and we have to continue with all our means to achieve our aims. But so far nobody has offered us a better alternative.

[Question] You mentioned the mandate under which you sent the commission to Tehran. You also mentioned that Ayatollah Khomeini has set some conditions that are unacceptable.

Do you believe that the fact that there were no clear, written terms of reference was the cause of the present complication? Even if that is not the case, were there any clear, written terms of reference for the commission's task, including what should be contained in its report and how it should go about its work?

[The Secretary-General] You do not know the background, and I certainly am not ready to elaborate. I told you that I want this matter to be settled, and settled in a satisfactory way. But I can tell you that the aspect you have referred to is certainly not the reason for the problems we are facing right now.

[Question] You said that there will be no report. Do you mean that the report will not be written, or that it will be written but not made public?

[The Secretary-General] There will be no report written or published before the mandate of the commission has been fulfilled.

163. Secretary of State Vance's Remarks to the Press after the Meeting at the United Nations, 12 March 1980, with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Commission relating to Iran, 8.15 p.m.

[Question] Mr. Secretary, will you tell us about your talks upstairs?

[Secretary Vance] Yes. I am most appreciative of having the opportunity to exchange views first with the Secretary-General on the visit of the commission to Tehran. Following that, I had an extensive exchange of views with the members of the commission on their visit to Tehran. It was useful to me to be able to exchange views and I think I have a clearer understanding of the situation as a result of that. I want to express my appreciation to the Secretary-General for his determination to continue to pursue this avenue. The door is still open and I will be keeping in touch with the Secretary-General. He and I have been continually in touch as the days have gone by and we will continue to do so in the future.

[Question] What next, Mr. Secretary?

[Secretary Vance] The Secretary-General will be continuing to discuss the matter with the commission which will be staying here and then after that we will be having further discussions.

[Question] Do you have any optimistic hopes for the hostages and their families? Can you give them anything new in terms of time?

[Secretary Vance] I can give them nothing new in terms of time. I hate to characterize things in terms of optimism or pessimism. As I said, I believe that the work of the commission has been useful.

[Question] Has there been any suggestion at all of a time frame?

[Secretary Vance] No, there has not. This will be something that the Secretary-General will be discussing with the commission.

[Question] Would you discuss, Mr. Secretary, the possibilities of the election that they might not be freed until after the elections ... Parliament meets next month?

[Secretary Vance] I don't want to go into the details of what we discussed. As I said, we had a broad exchange of views. I will leave it to the commission to decide what if anything they wish to say about the exchange of views we had.

[Question] You have full confidence in the commission and in the Secretary-General?

[Secretary Vance] I have full confidence in the Secretary-General and in the commission.

[Question] Are you counselling, Mr. Secretary, patience for the American people because the options that the United States now has—practical options—are few?

[Secretary Vance] I am counselling patience. I believe that this is the best course to follow. As I indicated, the door is not closed and I think we should continue to pursue this option.

[Question] What signal are you waiting for from Tehran, from President Bani-Sadr?

[Secretary Vance] I don't want to get into signals or anything like that.

[Question] Will you see the commission again?

[Secretary Vance] No, I do not anticipate seeing them again. But I will obviously be in touch with the Secretary-General who will be in touch with the commission.

[Question] (McHenry) Do you defend him totally, Mr. Secretary? You know they are after him.

[Secretary Vance] I defend him totally. He's a splendid man, an able man and I think the charges that have been made against him are baseless and despicable.

[Question] Do you have the backing of President Carter in this?

[Secretary Vance] Yes.

III

LETTER DATED 28 MARCH 1980 FROM THE DEPUTY AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REGISTRAR

Response to Questions Presented by the President of the Court on 20 March 1980¹ and by Judge Gros on 21 March 1980²

At and following the close of oral argument, the Court addressed to the United States two requests for additional information: a list of hostage names and functions and an account of the released hostages' testimonies on which the United States Agent drew in his March 19 presentation.

In response to the latter request, I am pleased to provide the Court with the enclosed declarations, which include every declaration provided to the Agent in response to an inquiry addressed to all released hostages. In the interest of privacy, the names and identifying data have been deleted from the enclosures.

In the interest of the well-being of the remaining hostages and the privacy of their families, the United States has not, to date, made available for public release a comprehensive list of those remaining hostages. Should the Court decide that it has a need for such a list which can be met without public release of the contents, I am authorized to provide it on that basis. In making this response the Government of the United States would respectfully call attention to the prior declarations which have been made to the Court by Under Secretary of State Newsom and by the Agent and which set forth the following facts: originally a total of 66 United States nationals were seized as hostages, two of whom were private citizens and 64 of whom were and are members of either the Diplomatic or the Administrative and Technical Staff of the United States Embassy; 13 of the 64 were released in late November 1979; and there remain in detention today two non-diplomatic United States nationals and 51 members of either the Diplomatic or the Administrative and Technical Staff of the United States Embassy, including the three persons held at the Iranian Foreign Ministry. It is respectfully submitted that, in so far as claims relating to the hostages are concerned, these facts by themselves provide a sufficient basis for the claims of the United States and that the names and functions of the individuals do not constitute an element which is essential to such claims. On the other hand, a list of such names and functions is available on the terms indicated above.

(Signed) Geri M. Joseph.

¹ See p. 323, *supra*.

² See p. 515, *infra*.

Appendix A

I, _____, certify and declare the following:

1. Before my departure from Iran on 20 November 1979, I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, where I served as Administrative Superintendent. I was taken hostage during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979, and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 20 November 1979.

2. I had arrived in Tehran on 30 October 1979 and throughout my detention on the Embassy compound, at no time was I physically mistreated or roughed up, nor were any physical threats or harm with or without weapons ever attempted.

3. On the other hand, for the first three to four days I was always blindfold and tied to either the arms or the backs of chairs I was seated in. As time progressed, say day five onwards, I was only bound by the hands and was blindfold whenever I went to the bathroom, thereupon, I was untied and unblindfold so as to take care of personal needs. At no time was I ever gagged or isolated from fellow hostages.

4. Throughout my hostage period I was never allowed to speak or gesture to my fellow members.

5. At no time was it mentioned that we would be able to write or make phone calls to our families in the USA. I did, however, see the American Red Cross representative as well as the Catholic Pope's representative. These visits were controlled, in that we were not allowed to speak to them unless they spoke to us.

6. The food preparation for the first couple of days was not the best. However it became palatable as time passed. The food was mainly American, however, we did have an Iranian type breakfast. The only current news accounts received were those provided by the students, and as such the media (newspaper, majority of the time) was folded so that one could not look at anything else printed thereon. There were no radios nor TVs for us to listen to.

7. The medical attention received was alright. I had developed a sore throat and a fever while there. A doctor gave me some pills and in a matter of three days the illness disappeared.

8. Sanitary conditions however were not that good. The latrine facilities were *always* in need of cleaning: the floors were always wet, dirty, and haphazardly cleaned (not thoroughly); bathing was not offered that regularly (twice a week) and when used, towels (drying) were limited, making it so that three or four individuals used the same towel to dry themselves. The use of these towels were for the Iranians as well as American! The restricted use of eating utensils (knives, forks, glasses, etc.) whenever a person was ill was never rigidly enforced; for example, a person with a sore throat would drink out of a glass, and as he finished with this glass, the student would pass this glass on to anyone that wanted a drink of liquid. This was the custom all the while I was there. For the first five or six days we were not issued soap, toothbrushes, combs, towels, or anything for personal use. Also, the entire time I was there, we never had a change of underclothes (we were given a change the night before I left) nor a change of outer clothes (shirts, pants, etc.). The only way they were cleaned (all clothing) was when you managed to do so at night so that they could be dried by morning.

9. You were able to do some exercising (sit-ups, push-ups, etc.), but only for two or three minutes.

10. We were *asked* to sign a statement agreeing that the Shah should be returned to Iran for trial. However, the "leader" stated to me that "only if I wanted to sign it, should I do so", I did not. That was the only statement they wanted me to sign. My only interrogation was the initial one received the first two

days of captivity. Questions asked were: How long I had been in Iran; my name; what type of job I performed. At no other time did I receive any interview.

11. There was evidence produced to us that the Iranians had "violated" a number of safes and had copied some letters and distributed to all us hostages for emphasizing why they (the Iranians) were correct in holding us as hostages. I was never threatened with trial nor with punishment or psychological duress.

Subscribed and sworn to before me and in my presence, this 3rd day of March, 1980, a notary public in and for the county of Harrison, State of Mississippi.

(Signed) Susie B. Washington.

Notary Public. My Commission Expires March 14, 1984.

Appendix B

1. I, _____, certify and declare the following:

2. Before my departure from Iran on 20 November 1979 I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, where I served as secretary.

I was taken hostage during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979 and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 20 November 1979.

3. On 4 November 1979, all of the Americans were blindfolded and our hands were tied as we were led from the Embassy Chancery to the Ambassador's Residence. Female hostages were segregated into the Study-Library of the Residence.

4. At about 6.30 p.m., on 4 November, I was led from the study of the Residence back to the Chancery by one of the student-militants. He brought me to the Chancery's second floor where he ordered me to open a safe in the Political Section. I told him that I did not work in that section, therefore, I could not open the safe. He took me to an office where we ate, drank coffee, and had a rational conversation re the Iranian situation. We were alone. After a few hours he got up, went over to the in-box of the desk where his jacket lay and retrieved a brown revolver from its folds. He pointed the revolver at me. I could see that all of the chambers were empty except for one bullet that was at the bottom of the circular chambers.

He said he did not believe that I did not know the combination to the safe; since my purse had been found there in the "spy centre" of the Embassy. I repeated that I worked down the hall in the Charge's office and that I could not open the safe; that someone at the last minute had thrown my purse behind this vault for safekeeping.

He clicked the gun and the bullet went up one notch.

He said I was a liar; that one of the Political Officers had told him that I worked in this particular office.

I said that I knew now that he was lying; that the Political Officer he mentioned knew I did not work there and that I would not know the combination to that safe.

He clicked the gun again; the bullet went up another notch.

He called me a liar again, and asked if I thought this was worth dying for.

I said: "Why didn't you do this to the Mexicans?"

He clicked the gun again and the bullet went up yet another notch.

I am not sure how many more times the gun clicked. When the bullet was in

the last chamber before it would have disappeared and presumably fired he said, "Do you think I will pull the trigger?"

I said: "I certainly hope not."

He repeated: "Do you think I will pull the trigger?"

I repeated: "I certainly hope not."

He continued to point the gun at me for about two more minutes. He then put the gun down, and said that he finally believed me, that I really did not work in that section.

He then wanted to know who did work in that section as secretary. I said: "Why, so you can kill her?" He said that he didn't kill women. I said he gave a good imitation of trying to a few minutes ago.

5. About midnight he brought me back to the Residence. As we passed through the Embassy I could see student-militants and religious mullahs wandering throughout the corridors and offices. They were ransacking desks and examining papers. Graffiti was all over the walls: "Down with Carter", "Down with Sadat", "Down with Begin", "Death to the Americans".

6. Once at the Residence, I was not allowed to rejoin the four female hostages in the study. I spent the night in the foyer of the Chancery just off the study. The next morning I was forced to sit in front of the window to the left of the door leading to the outside. The students, armed with guns, blindfolded me and tied my arms to the sides of a straight chair.

I could hear gunshots and the sound of a low flying helicopter outside. I heard the student-militants moving behind me so that I was positioned between them and the gunshots and helicopter. I could hear no less than six guns or rifles being cocked behind me. One of the girl students whispered, "Pasdaran" to another student. I thought that I would be caught in a crossfire between the students inside and the pasdaran/revolutionary guards outside.

I was kept in this state until the afternoon after which I could sense that the students were moving around and speaking Farsi in a more normal tone of voice.

7. When the sun went down on this day (Monday, 5 November) I was still blindfolded. One of the female students untied my hands from the sides of the chair and tied them in front of me. Then one of the male students came to me and said that it was "time to go".

I was led out through the back of the Residence by the male and female students, one on either side of me. I could feel when I was outside—it was cold, I could feel the pavement beneath my feet, then the grass, and then passing through bushes. As they were leading me in the dark the two students started a conversation in *English* directed at me:

The girl asked if I had ever thought about the thousands and thousands of Iranians who had been executed and tortured under the rule of the Shah.

The male student asked if I didn't think that someone should pay for all the murders and executions under the Shah.

The female student then said: "We think someone should be made to pay for all the executions and murders done under the Shah."

At this point I forcefully pulled my hands apart and freed them. I yanked off my blindfold and demanded to know what was going on. Then I realized, in freeing my hands, I had thrown both to the ground. They had startled looks on their faces. At this point, I knew that there was nowhere for me to run. I helped both of them up, apologized, and let them retie my hands and reblindfold me. I was led to the Embassy where I was interrogated again.

I do not believe the conversation the students had with me was random. I believe they wanted me to think that I was being led to my execution.

8. I was separated from the rest of the female hostages from the evening of 4 November (Sunday) until late afternoon of 7 November (Wednesday). I was always tied to a chair during the day and I was blindfolded about half the time.

My muscles became so sore that I resorted to isometric exercises to alleviate the stiffness.

9. The hands of the female hostages were tied to the sides of straight chairs 16 hours a day. We were made to face the wall all day, separated from each other by the girl students. The drapes were always drawn and the lights were on 24 hours a day. We never saw daylight. At night our hands were tied in front of us so we could not sleep on the rug. In addition, our feet were tied for four nights.

10. A "no-talk" rule was enforced from 5 November to 19 November when we were informed we were being released.

11. On 8 November (Thursday) as I was sitting tied up facing the wall, one of the girl students sat in my view carrying what looked like a croquet mallet. The mallet disappeared when we had our first "visitor", an Iranian Red Cross man. We were not allowed to see him alone. The student-militants and Iranian newspaper people were always present. The Red Cross man asked if we had been threatened with guns or physically abused. I wanted to tell him of my treatment, that I had been threatened with a gun, and that I had been subjected to what I thought was mental torture. I was afraid of reprisals so I said nothing.

12. Shortly after the Red Cross man left we were allowed to exercise 10 minutes a day inside. On that day (8 November) we were each given a toothbrush and allowed to take a shower—thanks to the Red Cross man. For the entire 17 days I was held hostage, I was allowed only three showers.

13. On 18 November (Sunday) I was brought back to the Chancery at night by car for interrogation. I was led blindfolded through the basement of the Chancery to the Political Section. There I could see that several safes were open. Some men were examining documents.

One of the "older" militants (clearly not a student) said that my life depended upon my co-operation. He said my life depended upon my answers; that I may never get out of there. He wanted to know who were the CIA agents in the Embassy. I told him I knew of none. He wanted to know who I *thought* were the spies. I said I knew of none and if there were any, they were unlikely to advertise. I could not say who I thought was a spy because if I were wrong I would be condemning someone. He mentioned some Embassy officials by name and I denied again that anyone was a spy.

14. During the entire 17 days we were not allowed to make phone calls, we were not allowed to write letters or receive mail, we heard no news from the outside. I first learned on 18 November in an interrogation that Bazargan and Yazdi were no longer Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 7th day of March, 1980,
at Washington, D.C.

(Signed) Irene INGALLS.

Notary Public. My Commission
Expires June 15, 1984.

Appendix C

I, _____, US Marine Corps, certify and declare the following:

1. Before my departure from Iran on 20 November 1979 I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, where I served as a Marine Security Guard. I was taken hostage while performing duty within the Chancery during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979 and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 20 November 1979.

2. Upon being taken hostage I was pushed and shoved by two members of the group that seized the Embassy. My hands were tied tightly behind my back and I was blindfolded. I was then taken to the residence of the Chargé d'Affaires. I was also threatened with a pair of brass knuckles at this time. The blindfold was removed after a few hours.

3. During the first week of captivity I spent over 12 hours a day tied to a chair. *During the first five or six nights I was forced to sleep with both my hands and feet tied. On the remaining nights I slept with my hands tied.* I was later blindfolded whenever I was moved from one location to another and occasionally as punishment for attempting to speak to other hostages or for disagreeing with the guards.

4. On the first day of captivity I was segregated from other Embassy personnel and held overnight by two armed guards in a room at the residence of the Chargé d'Affaires. I was subsequently moved to the Consular Office and another residence on the compound. I spent one other night isolated from other Embassy personnel. The other nights I was confined with one or more of the Embassy staff. During the day I was at times kept in isolation and at times held with others.

5. I was informed by the captors that I could not speak to the other hostages and they were not allowed to speak to me during the time I was held in captivity. I was constantly threatened that I would be blindfolded if I did speak to another hostage. I was, however, able to speak with other hostages on a number of occasions without the knowledge of the guards.

6. I only saw visitors from outside the Embassy on three occasions during this period. I was seen along with a number of other hostages by two men whom I later was told were Ambassadors from other countries. I was seen with a number of other hostages on two occasions by Iranian clergymen, one of whom I recognized as Sayyed Ahmad Khomeini, the son of the Ayatollah Khomeini. *Neither I nor any of the hostages in my presence were permitted to speak to any of these visitors.*

7. At no time during my captivity did I receive any mail. I did not attempt to send any mail inasmuch as I did not believe that it would be forwarded. Although I requested to telephone my family, I was not allowed to do so. I was not allowed to listen to any news broadcasts or to read any current news accounts.

8. I was provided an adequate amount of food during the period of captivity although the diet was not balanced.

9. I was seen each day by Iranian medical personnel who inquired of my medical condition. I do not know if any of these medical personnel were physicians. I was not allowed at any time to change clothing except for undergarments. I was only permitted to shower approximately every five days.

10. I was allowed to exercise on one occasion approximately one week after being taken hostage. I was taken outside where I did calisthenics for approximately one half-hour. I was blindfolded during this time.

11. I was questioned several times about the nature of my duties at the Embassy and about what I had seen while serving as a Marine Security Guard at the Embassy.

12. I was shown documents or copies of documents that appeared to be from the Embassy files. Some of the documents were marked as classified. I observed a large number of these documents in the possession of the individuals occupying the Embassy and *observed these documents being shown to other hostages.*

13. I was threatened by the captors with trial on charges of espionage and of working for the United States Central Intelligence Agency. I was also threatened with death should the United States take military action against Iran or if I attempted to escape. I was further threatened with death if the deposed Shah of Iran left the jurisdiction of the United States.

14. I was requested on a number of occasions to sign a petition requesting that the United States Government return the Shah of Iran so that the hostages would be freed.

15. I was constantly told by the captors that we were being held because the United States Government did not care about us. I was accused on a number of occasions of being a spy and a murderer.

16. My personal belongings were ransacked and taken by the captors along with my military gear. None of my personal belongings were returned to me.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1980 at Prince William County, State of Virginia, in my capacity as a Judge Advocate under authority granted me by Title 10, United States Code, Section 936.

(Signed) Eugene A. STEFFEN,
Major, US Marine Corps.

Appendix D

I, _____, certify and declare the following:

1. Before my departure from Iran on 20 November 1979, I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, where I was accredited as an Attaché. I was taken hostage during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979, and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 20 November 1979.

2. I was taken hostage at approximately 14.30 hours, the afternoon of 4 November 1979. I was physically knocked to the ground and a shotgun was aimed at my head. Upon standing I realized my right knee was injured and I was limping as a result of the altercation. Pistols, rifles, brass knuckles, sticks, chains and knives were several of the kinds of weapons I saw in the hands of my captors.

3. My hands were tied tightly behind me or, while I was sitting, at my sides to the legs of chairs during my first two (2) days in captivity. On at least three (3) separate occasions blood circulation to my hands was considerably reduced and they were noticeably swollen, I could not move my fingers and wrists and there was no feeling in them. I was blindfolded and gagged on at least six (6) separate occasions: on 5 November 1979 for approximately ten (10) straight hours. I was untied to eat and use the bathroom.

4. I was physically isolated as punishment for talking to other hostages once, for one (1) full day. Several other times I was threatened with an unspecified punishment when caught attempting to communicate with other hostages by whispering and gestures. I was not permitted to write any letters nor did I receive any mail. I was not permitted use of a telephone. I looked at television coverage of the Embassy seizure once for ten (10) minutes during my first day as a hostage. All other news was controlled and verbally passed or issued in the form of Student Statements. One type of verbal news, for example, was: "American fascists police killed eight (8) Iranian students in Los Angeles today. What do you think of that?"

5. I was once asked to sign a statement requesting return of the Shah to Iran. I was told several times there was evidence certain US Embassy officials were spies and interfering in the internal affairs of Iran. I was informed during my eleventh day as a hostage that I was cleared of any spy charges and was asked to tell what I knew about the activities of several US Embassy officials.

6. I was not permitted or given a change of clothing except for one shirt on my fifth day as a hostage and again on 19 November 1979, when I was also given my

first change of underwear. Some toilet articles were provided after the fifth day of captivity. Approximately 30 people shared six (6) towels for six (6) straight days, and 20 people shared six (6) towels during another five (5) day period. The towels were not washed or changed. Toilets, washbasins and bathtubs were cleaned when complaints were voiced.

7. Doctors were provided as needed, and some exercise, depending on which captors were present, was permitted.

8. Pistols, automatic rifles and shotguns were pointed at my face, head, chest and stomach in three (3) separate distinct instances when I was ordered to open my office safes and barlock files.

9. During anti-American demonstrations around the Embassy compound loudspeakers, to amplify crowd noise, were directed at myself and several other hostages at all hours of the day and evening causing tension and loss of sleep. Windows were boarded up and inside lights kept on 24 hours a day reducing periods of sleep. Indirect threats of physical harm were made against me when some of the hostage takers said repeatedly that someone had to pay for the deaths US weapons caused Iranian people. This heightened my feelings of stress and anxiety. Several discussions were held at all hours of the day and night between the hostage takers and myself on the alleged crimes the US Government had committed against Iran and the Palestinians. These discussions exhausted me and I thought death was inevitable.

10. Papal Envoy, Annibale Bugnini was the only visitor, identified by the hostage takers prior to his arrival, I was allowed to speak with briefly while I was held hostage. Twice, unidentified silent visitors saw me and seven (7) other hostages while we were being filmed and photographed. I remember being blindfolded four (4) separate times and warned to be silent when visitors, number unknown, who I could not see and who spoke in Farsi and Arabic, were present.

End of Declaration.

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 22nd day of February
1980, at Washington, D.C.

(Signed) Irene INGALLS.

Notary Public. My Commission
Expires June 15, 1984.

Appendix E

I, _____, US Marine Corps, certify and declare the following:

1. Before my departure from Iran on 19 November 1979 I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, where I served as a Marine Security Guard. I was taken hostage during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979 and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 19 November 1979.

2. Upon being taken hostage, I was taken to one of the residences on the Embassy compound where other hostages were also being held. My hands were tied to a chair and at times tied behind my back. My feet were also tied together at this time. I was blindfolded for a few hours with pieces of bed sheets and pieces of banners that the Iranian demonstrators were carrying. I was blindfolded at various times during the first two days of captivity.

3. I was later handcuffed rather than tied at various times during the day and I was handcuffed at night while sleeping. The handcuffs were removed three or four days prior to my release.

4. I was told by the captors that I would be killed if the United States attempted to rescue the hostages. I was also told that the hostages would be in danger if the Shah left the United States and did not return to Iran.

5. I was told by the captors that I could not speak to any of the other hostages and they were not permitted to speak to me during the time I was held in captivity. I was threatened with being tied up or moved to another location if I was caught speaking to another hostage. I was able to speak to other hostages a number of times without the knowledge of the guards.

6. At no time was I allowed to change clothes. I was able to take a shower every two or three days. I was provided a toothbrush after being held about a week.

7. I saw visitors to the Embassy on three occasions. About four or five days after being taken hostage, I was visited by a member of the Swedish Red Cross who asked about my physical condition. He said that he would return, but I did not see him again. I also spoke with a representative of the Pope during this period. I saw two members of the Red Cross just prior to my release. I never saw any physician or other medical personnel.

8. I did not receive any mail while being held hostage. We were told at first that we could neither write letters nor telephone our families. Later we were told that we could write letters, but that they would be read prior to being mailed. I did not write any letters during this time.

9. We were not permitted to read newspapers nor listen to any news broadcasts while being held hostage.

10. I saw various documents and copies of documents that appeared to be classified and from the Embassy files. These documents were often shown to me and the other hostages. I was told by the captors that they had documents proving that some of the hostages were spies.

11. I was requested on two occasions to sign a petition requesting the return of the Shah to Iran.

12. I was questioned by the captors about my duties and about any espionage activities I might have observed while in Iran.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1980, at Prince William County, Virginia, in my capacity as a Judge Advocate under authority granted me by Title 10, United States Code, Section 936.

(Signed) Eugene A. STEFFEN,
Major, US Marine Corps.

Appendix F

I, _____, certify and declare the following:

1. Before my departure from Iran on 20 November 1979 I was a member of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, where I served on temporary duty (TDY) as secretary. I was taken hostage during the seizure of the Embassy on 4 November 1979 and held hostage in the Embassy compound until my release on 20 November 1979.

2. I was captured by the militants at the Iran-American Society (IAS) at approximately 5.45 p.m. the afternoon of 5 November 1979. I was then taken by car to the Embassy compound and brought in through the front gate of the compound past the screaming mob. When the mob saw that I was seated in the back seat of the car, they started to rock the car in an attempt to turn the vehicle on its side. I was then literally pulled out of the back seat of the car and pushed through the gate into the compound. My purse was taken away from me and

there were hands grabbing at my arms from all directions (or so it seemed). I was then taken to one of the four yellow bungalows located on the compound and pushed through the front door.

3. I was "escorted" to one of the back bedrooms by three women militants. The door to the bedroom was closed and I was made to strip and then searched.

4. I subsequently spent ten days in solitary confinement in that room. The first two nights, I slept on the floor without a blanket, pillow or mattress. The window in the room did not close properly and the room was very cold. As a result, I developed a viral infection which took five weeks to finally clear up. I was subsequently given a mattress with a dirty sheet and a blanket.

5. On Tuesday, 6 November, sometime in the afternoon, four of the militants came into my room and closed the door. I was then seated in a chair, blindfolded and my hands tied behind my back. I sat like that for what seemed like an hour or so and I could hear them talking to each other and searching my purse. I knew it was my purse because it has a latch on one of the pockets that rattled because I didn't fasten it. The blindfold was finally taken off and they questioned me about some pills I had in my purse. The "pills" were Anacin and they wanted to know what the pills were for. I told the militants they were for a headache and I was forced to take one. They seemed satisfied when I didn't fall over dead immediately after taking the Anacin.

6. I was interrogated twice in my room. I was threatened with death a number of times during both interrogations. They may have been armed, but I didn't see any weapons. On the third or fourth day, one of the militants opened the door to my room, looked at me and pointed a G-3 at me. He said nothing. Shortly thereafter, he pointed the weapon in the other direction, turned around and closed the door behind him.

7. There were other hostages in the house with me as I saw them when I was first brought into the house. I could occasionally hear them talking to the militants but I was never able to speak to anyone. I did feel a bit reassured knowing there was someone else in the house besides myself and the militants. When I was able to sneak a look out of the window, I could see some of the militants (both male and female) walking around the compound carrying weapons.

8. I was subjected to a great deal of harassment by the women militants. They would talk very loudly when I was trying to sleep or in the middle of the night turn the light on and start talking again so that I was unable to sleep. There were always two or three women who slept in the same room with me at night.

9. While in the bungalow, I was very close to the front gate where the mobs were demonstrating from about 0800 to 0200 the next morning. The chanting only stopped during the call to prayer. It was getting to a point where I really couldn't stand the shouting anymore.

10. The Wednesday of the second week, the militants woke me up about 11.30 in the evening and informed me that I was being moved to another location. I was blindfolded and my hands tied behind my back and led out of the bungalow into a van where I sat for about five minutes. Someone else was also brought into the van and I discovered it was Kate Koob (the IAS Director who was taken hostage with me at IAS, but brought to the compound in a separate car). I could tell from the direction that the van was going that we were headed for the Ambassador's Residence. When we got there, I was led out of the van and into the Residence (through the kitchen). I was seated in a chair still tied and blindfolded for about 15-20 minutes. I was then told to stand up and was moved to another chair and made to sit down—still tied and blindfolded. About 15 minutes later, I was told to stand up and was then pushed down on to the floor—still tied and blindfolded. After a while, the blindfold was taken off and I was untied. I was then able to take my jacket off. As I looked around, I saw that the other women were all in the same room with me. My hands were then tied in

front of me and I was made to sleep that way (as was the case every night) on the floor with the light on and the women militants walking around and talking all night long with the bottom of their chadors skimming across my face as they walked by. As a result, it was virtually impossible to sleep. All our jewelry (watches, gold chains, etc.) were taken away from us.

11. Wake-up time was approximately 6.30-7.00 in the morning. They woke us up one at a time and escorted us to the toilet one at a time and waited inside with us until we were finished. After each one finished in the bathroom, we were taken back to the living room of the Residence (the room in which all the women were held) and tied into hard back chairs. Our hands were tied to the arms of the chair and we had to face the wall and were not allowed to look at each other or to speak to each other. The drapes were tightly drawn so as not to allow any daylight into the room and it was impossible to know what time of day it was. We had to sit that way until breakfast was served and we were untied to eat. After breakfast, we were tied back into the chair until lunchtime and after lunch, tied up again until dinner and then untied to eat and tied up again until bedtime at 10.00 p.m. If we asked for a glass of water with our meals, we had to drink it all at one time with our guards staring at us. We weren't able to sip the water. The glasses were never washed which made my viral infection worse. An Iranian doctor (one of the female militants) came twice to see me because I was quite sick at this point. I was given medicine that was written in English and Farsi, so I knew exactly what she was giving me to take. None of the medicine helped much, though.

12. Twice I was blindfolded and taken over to the Chancery for interrogation. Both times it was late at night, after 11.00. The first time I was taken to the RSO's office and interrogated for about three and a half hours. I was interrogated in the RSO secretary's office and the door to the RSO's office was closed but I could hear people in that room. They had gotten my safe open as the militant who was interrogating me had one of my files in his hand. That night, all the questions posed to me were written and I had to write my answers and sign my name after each one. They questioned me extensively about various people who worked in the Embassy concerning their personalities, families, political beliefs, etc. They became very annoyed when I told them I had no knowledge of the various families or political beliefs, etc., and it was obvious they didn't believe me. I saw no weapons that night, but if they managed to open my safe with the files in it, I am sure they opened the safe located right next to it which contained weapons. They were also very persistent in their questions about the Marines and their activities. They were also very persistent in their questions to me about the Administrative secretary.

13. With regard to visitors: the visitors at the beginning of the Embassy seizure (International Red Cross, four Ambassadors, Papal Nuncio, etc.) were only taken to the Ambassador's Residence. None ever came to any of the bungalows. If they did, I certainly never saw anyone. The militants came in a number of times wanting to take my picture. I would never look at them and they became very annoyed with me as they wanted the pictures to put in the local Iranian newspaper.

14. I also did not receive any mail. Upon returning to the States, I found out that two letters had been sent to me, but had never been delivered.

15. I had no change of clothing until about three days before we were released. All the women at the Residence were given a complete change of clothing. I also never had a shower the entire time I was held hostage.

16. I was not permitted to write letters, make telephone calls, read newspapers or listen to news accounts. When I asked the militants any questions re current events or about the other hostages, they would never answer me.

17. Our food was taken from the Embassy commissary. In the beginning, we were given too much starch and we all became constipated. After the first week

the starch was cut down—at least that is what they did in my bungalow. We never got any fruit, vegetables or milk.

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 4th day of March,
1980, at Washington, D.C.

(Signed) Irene INGALLS,
Notary Public. My Commission
Expires 15 June 1984.

IV

LETTER DATED 15 APRIL 1980 FROM THE DEPUTY AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REGISTRAR

Response to a Question Presented by the President of the Court on 10 April 1980¹

On behalf of the Government of the United States, I have the honour to refer to the Court's request of 10 April 1980 for additional information relating to the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*, and to attach the information which the Court has requested. My Government wishes also to make certain observations on recent developments relating to the case.

As stated in President Carter's announcement of 7 April 1980, the United States throughout this period has continued to make every effort to obtain the release of the America hostages. During the period immediately preceding the President's announcement, particular efforts were made to arrange the transfer of the hostages from the "students" controlling the Embassy to the direct custody of the Iranian authorities. As indicated by their own statements, the "students" were willing to turn the hostages over to the governmental authorities. The highest authority in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, to whom the matter had been referred by the Revolutionary Council, decided instead that the hostages should remain in the custody of the "students". These events emphasize anew the responsibility of the Government of Iran under international law for the continued illegal holding of the hostages.

In response to this situation, the President of the United States announced the steps described in his statement. These steps are, in the view of the United States, lawful and appropriate responses to Iran's flagrantly unlawful conduct, which remains in defiance not only of its treaty obligations, but of this Court's Order of 15 December 1979. The United States regards its measures as entirely compatible with paragraph 47 (B) of the Order of 15 December, with which, moreover, under established principles of law and the Court's jurisprudence, compliance is required only on a reciprocal basis.

Certain of the measures may appear to bear upon aspects of the relief requested by the United States in its final submissions to the Court. In paragraph (C) of its final submissions, the United States has asked that the Court adjudge and declare that the United States is entitled to the payment by Iran of financial reparations for the violations of Iran's obligations to the United States. The exact amount of reparations due would be determined by the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. The accounting or inventory of claims ordered by the President on 7 April will assist in determining the dimensions of the claims for damages put forward on behalf of the hostages and their families, as well as the amounts of the claims to be asserted against Iran by other United States nationals. These calculations may well be useful in further proceedings before the Court as to the amount of reparations owed by Iran, and they could also be of assistance in achieving a comprehensive settlement of outstanding claims against Iran by the United States and its nationals. The decision to take such an accounting or inventory is thus consistent with paragraph (C) of the United States submissions, which the United States maintains.

¹ See p. 516, *infra*.

The United States also respectfully requests the Court—in the words of the Court's Order of 24 December 1979—to take “account of the circumstances of this case” in considering paragraph (B) (I) of the final submissions of the United States. In view of the severance of diplomatic and consular relations with Iran, the United States trusts that the Court will treat this submission as a request for an order that the Government of Iran ensure the restoration of the premises of the United States Embassy, chancery, and consulates to the possession and exclusive control either of the United States or of a protecting power designated by the United States in accordance with Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

In all other respects, the text of paragraph (B) (I) remains applicable to current circumstances, and the United States wishes to maintain this paragraph, as well as all other clauses, of its final submissions.

(Signed) Geri M. JOSEPH.

Documents Enclosed

The following is the text of the *Announcement by President Carter on 8 April concerning Iran*. It has been circulated as a UN Security Council document:

Ever since Iranian terrorists imprisoned American Embassy personnel in Tehran in early November, these 50 men and women—their safety, their health and their future—have been our central concern. We have made every effort to obtain their release on honorable, peaceful and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians have refused to release them or even to improve the inhuman conditions under which the Americans are being held captive. The events of the last few days have revealed a new and significant dimension of this matter. The militants controlling the Embassy have stated they are willing to turn the hostages over to the Government of Iran, but the Government has refused to take custody of the American hostages. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the continued illegal and outrageous holding of the innocent hostages. The Iranian Government can no longer escape full responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the Embassy. It must be made clear that the failure to release the hostages will involve increasingly heavy costs to Iran and its interests. I have today ordered the following steps:

1. The United States of America is breaking diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran. The Secretary of State has informed the Government of Iran that its Embassy and consulates in the US are to be closed immediately. All Iranian diplomatic and consular personnel have been declared *persona non grata* and must leave this country by midnight tomorrow.

2. The Secretary of the Treasury will put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports from the US to Iran in accordance with the sanctions approved by ten members of the UN Security Council on 13 January in the resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Although shipment of food and medicine were not included in the UN Security Council vote, it is expected that exports of even these items to Iran will be minimal or non-existent.

3. The Secretary of the Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other US claimants. We are now preparing legislation which will be introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these claims.

4. The Secretary of State and Attorney General will invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the US, effective today. We will not reissue visas nor will we issue new visas except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires. This directive will be interpreted very strictly.

In order to minimize injury to the hostages, the US has acted at all times with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis. We have supported Secretary-General Waldheim's activities under the UN Security Council mandate to work for a peaceful solution. We will continue to consult with our Allies and other friendly governments on the steps we are now taking and on additional measures which may be required. I am committed to resolving this crisis. I am committed to the safe return of the American hostages and to the preservation of our national honor. The hostages and their families, indeed all of us in America, have lived with the reality and anguish of their captivity for five months. The steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other actions may become necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.

In connection with the President's announcement the following *two statements relating to the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran* were published:

A. State Department press release, 8 April 1980. Visa revocation for Iranian officials—effective immediately, all visas according diplomatic or official status to Iranians in the United States, other than those on UN business, are revoked.

The decision has been made pursuant to the authority conferred on the Secretary of State by section 221 (I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It applies to Iranian officials and employees, including those accredited to the United States, and their immediate families, attendants, and servants. It does not apply to Iranians accredited to or employed by the United Nations or other international organizations in the United States.

This action is taken in connection with the termination of relations between the United States and Iran. The termination of relations is necessary because of the continuing failure of the Government of Iran to put an end to the unlawful detention of US citizens in Tehran, Iran.

B. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury, 7 April 1982. In connection with my decision today to close Iranian diplomatic facilities in the United States, I am directing that the uniformed division of the Secret Service provide any assistance necessary to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General in order to make my decision effective, including control of movement of persons and property into and out of Iranian diplomatic facilities in the District of Columbia.

Jimmy CARTER.

Other aspects of the President's announcement have been the subject of appropriate messages, orders and regulations.

The following *Note was delivered to the Embassy of Iran on 7 April breaking-off relations:*

The Department of State hereby notifies the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the Government of the United States of America has decided to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Iran, effective immediately, and to require the immediate closure of the Iranian Embassy and consular posts in the United States.

Accordingly, the Embassy is directed to terminate its functions and those of

the Iranian consular posts in the United States, effective immediately. All persons who have been notified to the Department as being present in the United States as members of the staffs of the Embassy and consulates of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as indicated in the annexed list, must depart from the United States no later than midnight tomorrow. Members of the families of these persons (other than any who may be citizens or permanent residents of the United States) must also depart by that time. Thereafter, the United States will no longer regard these persons as being entitled to the privileges, immunities and protection which they now enjoy by virtue of their official status, and they will be subject to immediate expulsion.

Until their departure, these persons may continue to use regularly travelled routes for travel between their homes and offices, but otherwise must remain within a two-mile radius of their homes. Any failure to observe this restriction without the express approval of the Department will result in the immediate termination of official status and the immediate expulsion of the individual concerned. All departures are to be from Dulles International Airport unless the Department's consent to another port of embarkation is obtained. The Embassy is required to submit to the Department no later than noon tomorrow a complete list of the scheduled times and places of departure for all individuals who are hereby required to depart from the United States. All credentials issued to these individuals by the Department must be surrendered prior to their departure.

The Department is prepared to consider the appointment of a third State, acceptable to the United States, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran may entrust the custody of its diplomatic and consular property and the protection of its interests. If such an appointment is made before midnight tomorrow the Department would also be prepared to consider deferring until 15 April 1982 the required departure of one member of the Embassy staff, to be designated by the Department, in order to facilitate transitional arrangements.

The Embassy and consulates shall be closed immediately to any activity (other than internal administrative functions) by or on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After tomorrow the premises of the Embassy and consulates shall be closed and sealed, except to the extent that the Department may authorize any particular use of such premises by a protecting power.

The following are reports of statements relevant to the breaking-off of relations made by Iranian authorities or by those holding the hostages immediately preceding or following upon President Carter's announcement:

A. *Paris AFP in English 0957 GMT 5 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 7 Apr. 80, p. 16:*

[Excerpt] Islamic militants are ready to hand over the American Embassy hostages if President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr wishes, so as not to weaken his position, a spokesman for the militants told the newspaper *Keyhan* here today.

This was despite the fact that the students did not agree with the transfer, on the grounds that it was against the line taken by revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spokesman said.

B. *Tehran domestic service in Persian 1006 GMT 7 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 7 Apr. 80, p. 115:*

A statement issued by the Imam Khomeini's office in connection with the issue of hostages has just been released. The text of the statement is as follows: In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Noble nation of Iran: As we have previously said, the decisive stance on the hostages by his eminence Imam Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran, has not changed and the

hostages and the Embassy will remain as previously in the hands of the Muslim and struggling students until the formation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the decision on their fate by the esteemed representatives of the nation. We have repeatedly explained that the health of the hostages and the place where they are held is good in every way. In order to prove this, if there are people who want to be informed of their health and welfare, they may do so supervised by responsible officials.

[Signed] The Imam Khomeini's office, Qom. [Dated] 7 April 1980.

C. *Tehran domestic service in Persian 0935 GMT 8 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 8 Apr. 80, p. 1 2:*

The following message was released this morning by Imam Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding the break of relations between Iran and America: in the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Today, 8 April, the news of the break of relations between America and Iran was received by us. If Carter has done one thing in all his life in the interest of the oppressed, it is this break of relations between a country that has risen up and freed itself from the claws of international plunderers and a world-devouring plunderer. Such relations are always detrimental to the oppressed nation and in the interests of the plunderer. We take this break of relations as a good omen since this means that the Government of America has cut off its hopes from Iran. The fighting nation of Iran has every reason to celebrate this good news of the final victory which has forced a cruel superpower to break its relations and put an end to its plunderings.

D. *Hamburg DPA in German 0808 GMT 8 Apr. 80, as reported, in FBIS, daily report, 8 Apr. 80, p. 1 8.*

Tehran—the occupiers of the American Embassy in Tehran have reacted to the US sanctions with composure and even pleasure. In a short telephone conversation with DPA, a spokesman stated: "We are glad, because now things are finally clear and all the talking back and forth will stop."

He even expressed the hope that the US would exert still more pressure, "because then we can finally prove that we are offering resistance and can defend ourselves". He said he believes that nothing will change for the hostages, who have been held for 158 days, "because we are holding the hostages on the basis of the Koran". The spokesman said that the occupiers intend to publish a longer statement Tuesday evening or on Wednesday.

E. *Tehran domestic service in Persian 1645 GMT 8 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 9 Apr. 80, p. 1 1:*

Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the President of our country, and the members of the Revolution Council were received by the Imam, the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the Imam's temporary residence this evening. In a radio and television message tonight Dr. Bani-Sadr spoke to the nation about various problems discussed in their meeting with the Imam. We bring to your attention the President's message:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Dear nation of Iran, last night Mr. Carter, the US President, implemented the threats he has been talking about for some time, and he promised to employ a few more threats. Perhaps His Excellency was thinking that in our country we lack an essential unity and with these threats the situation will become more in line with American policy. But the implementation of these threats coincided with our decision in the Revolution Council that the problem of the country requires unity of heart, unity of people; and all of us must firmly and decisively wage our great struggle in the realms of the economy and culture, until we achieve complete indepen-

dence, and pull down the world system which the hegemonists have imposed upon us and other oppressed nations and countries.

Therefore, this is yet another one of these wonderful things in our modern history and in the history of the world whereby the enemy is constantly faced, at the moment of action, with an iron unity; and contrary to what he imagines he sees that his threats meet this steel wall and break apart.

The magnitude of the effect of US Government decisions is not great. When there is in existence a steadfast Muslim nation which can work, make efforts—even if others influence it, which is not so—then we should deem this as an excellent opportunity, since when a people know that they should stand on their own two feet then this is an excellent opportunity which should be grasped. *Therefore, we should not be disturbed by his threat. This threat will not have the least practical effect on our life except that with work, efforts and endeavours we will be able to grasp the opportunity for complete economic independence and to attain fresh victories.*

F. Tehran domestic service in Persian 0951 GMT 9 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 9 Apr. 80, p. 111:

Please pay attention to the statement just issued by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy: in the name of God, the avenger. We clearly warn the criminal Government of America that if that Government implements the slightest military intervention against Iran, we will destroy all the spy hostages (?on the spot); and we decisively warn the honourable nation of America that the American criminal ruling circles will be directly responsible.

[Signed] Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

G. Tehran international service in Arabic 0900 GMT 9 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 9 Apr. 80, p. 111:

The following statement was issued by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy:

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. "What shall we do about relations with America? Our relations with America are the relations of the oppressed with the oppressor, the relations of the plundered with the plunderer"—a quotation from Imam Khomeini prior to the occupation of the espionage den.

"Relations between a nation that has risen in order to rid itself of the claws of the international plunderers and a world-devouring plunderer are always detrimental to the oppressed nation and in the interests of the plunderer"—quotation from Imam Khomeini after the break of diplomatic relations between Iran and America.

Oh noble and struggling nation of Iran, O hero Muslim nation. The Imam's thundering voice and your continuous struggle under the leadership of the idol-smasher of the time, the great Khomeini, with the plunderer America and the courageous steadfastness against this foul world-devouring has dealt another great blow to the criminal ruling group of America.

This is the umpteenth time that vicious Carter and the criminal ruling group of America have fallen in fear in relation to the monolithic uprising of the Islamic nation and in a completely reactionary manner but announced the issue of breaking of relations, giving it the characteristics of initiative. The relations were ones of domination, hegemony and humiliation politically, culturally and militarily and inflicted the greatest of pain on our oppressed nation. The mature nation of Iran celebrates this event, for with the breaking of relations with America it marches ahead toward attaining genuine independence and guaranteed a realistic life. The pure blood of the martyrs of the revolution boils and daily brings consequences of greater effect to the martyr-cherishing nation of

Iran. The Iranian nation and all the meek people of the world are happy and celebrate this severance of relations, for they have attained the first result of revolution that is greater than their revolution—the severance of relations with America. This enhances the determination of this mature nation to proceed along the straight path of Islam, which is confrontation with the criminal America and has in store the defeat of the oppressors and brings with it the honour of Islam and the Muslims throughout the world. May this final victory that forced the savage superpower, America, to break off relations—that is, to put an end to plundering—be auspicious for all the meek of the world, especially the dear Iranian nation.

America, this criminal which has severed relations after losing hope and has become desperate over Iran, must know that it cannot inflict harm on the glorious Islamic revolution of Iran through its puppet government of the Traitor Saddam Husayn, who is himself on the brink of collapse. The martyr-cherishing Iranian nation not only will resist the American economic embargo but it will also courageously crush its military attack. And, with certainty, the Islamic nation will eliminate the rotten Iraqi-régime, which is the instrument of American conspiracies against the Iranian revolution, as well the traitor As-Sadat, who is peerless in his betrayal of Islam, together with his loyal friend, the runaway Mohammad Reza.

Today is the day of unity and solidarity for us all. Oh oppressed and valiant nations, oh brave and dear Iraqi nation, oh oppressed and plundered Egyptian nation, oh inhabitants of the enslaved land of Arabia, let us unite together and cut short the hand of the great criminal of the century from our heads and put the Islamic nation in the position of (regency) and (inheritance) of the earth.

The brave Iranian nation congratulates the Imam of the nation on the severance of relations with America, he who emphasized and insisted on it from the very onset. With the liberating voice of "God is great" the nation welcomes this measure and has complete faith and belief that the breaking of relations with the criminal America and the oppressors of the world is a necessary task in the move toward true life for the oppressed nations.

We are proud and honoured that the Imam of the nation, notwithstanding the empty American threats, entrusted the responsibility for taking care of the American spies and espionage den to his own sons until the convening of the Islamic (as heard) consultative assembly and in this way once again the trickery of the great satan came to no avail.

We ask the brave and struggling Iranian nation to maintain its consistent and decisive position and to take part in the grand general march on Friday, which is in support of the unity of our nation against the world-devouring America. The active participation of all the groups and strata of the struggling nation is indicative of their resistance and wisdom against all plots of the great satan.

[Signed] The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

1. *Tehran domestic service in Persian 0945 GMT 9 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 9 Apr. 80, p. 1 16.*

This morning, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, took part in a press conference for domestic and foreign reporters of radio, television and the press. In today's interview Gotbzadeh said: the severance of political relations with America is a sign of American hastiness and of having come to a deadlock. He also assured our people that the severance of political relations with America and the economic sanctions by that country will not bring any discomfort or difficulty to our compatriots. He added: Iran will do to any country that supports America what it did to America.

In today's interview Gotbzadeh also announced: Algeria has agreed to look after Iranian interests in America.

Referring to Iraq, our country's Foreign Minister said: we are determined to overthrow the Ba'tist régime of Iraq, headed by Saddam Husayn, who is an agent of America, and right now we are prepared for any confrontation against their acts of sabotage.

J. Tehran domestic service in Persian 2005 GMT 9 Apr. 80, as reported in FBIS, daily report, 10 Apr. 80, p. 111:

According to a report of the Central News Bureau, the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy issued their 109th statement in connection with severing relations between Iran and America. It is as follows: in the name of God, the crusher of oppressors. Valiant and fighting nation of Iran: your children in the den of espionage are still steadfast in their covenant. Now, once again, in your presence we draw the attention of the honourable American nation and we openly warn the criminal American Government that if the slightest military attack is carried out against Iranian soil, we will destroy the spy hostages together with the building in which they reside. Then we will hurry to take part in the face-to-face battle against the great satan along with the rest of our fighting brothers and sisters, and we are confident that victory will be ours.

[Signed] Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy.

V

RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES, 22 APRIL 1980¹, TO A QUESTION PRESENTED
BY JUDGE GROS ON 17 APRIL 1980²

The Press reports of the attack on the American Embassy of 14 February 1979 are essentially accurate with the following clarifications:

The armed attackers were identified initially only as guerrillas. So far as we know, the attackers did not declare an affiliation to the Fedayeen, although some of them probably belonged to that organization. Non-Fedayeen members also participated.

Our best information is that the attack began at about 10.45 a.m. Embassy officers then made an urgent appeal for assistance, and about 12 noon, Ibrahim Yazdi, who was then Deputy Prime Minister arrived at the compound accompanied by a member of the National Police, at least one clerical official, and a contingent of revolutionary guards from the headquarters of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This official contingent quelled the disturbance and returned control of the compound to American diplomatic officials.

We are aware that one attacker was killed during the assault, but we cannot verify that another attacker was killed. Two persons associated with the Embassy staff—an Iranian waiter and the son of another Iranian employee were killed.

The Marines returned the attacker's fire only with non-lethal buckshot and/or tear gas.

The Ayatollah Khomeini issued a statement condemning the use of violence in the attack on the Embassy.

Ambassador Sullivan has informed us that no knife was held to his neck when he was being escorted from the Chancery, although a photograph of the event was taken at such an angle that a bayonet, over two feet away from the Ambassador, in the hands of one of the rescuers, did appear to be at his neck.

¹ See p. 519, *infra*.

² See pp. 517-518, *infra*.

VI

RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES, 1 MAY 1980¹, TO A QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT ON 25 APRIL 1980²

1. The following is the text of a *White House Announcement* at 1.15 a.m. est., 25 April:

The President has ordered the cancellation of an operation in Iran which was underway to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The mission was terminated because of equipment failure. During the subsequent withdrawal of American personnel there was a collision between our aircraft on the ground at a remote desert location in Iran. There were no military hostilities, but the President deeply regrets that eight American crew members of the two aircraft were killed and others were injured in the accident. Americans involved in the operation have now been airlifted from Iran and those who were injured are being given medical treatment and are expected to recover.

This mission was not motivated by hostility toward Iran or the Iranian people and there were no Iranian casualties.

Preparations for this rescue mission were ordered for humanitarian reasons, to protect the national interests of this country, and to alleviate international tensions. The President accepts full responsibility for the decision to attempt the rescue.

The nation is deeply grateful to the brave men who were preparing to rescue the hostages.

The United States continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety of the American hostages.

The United States remains determined to obtain their safe release at the earliest possible date.

The President will address the nation this morning at 0700 est. Families of the hostages have been notified and Congressional leaders were also briefed. At this time, we have no evidence of any reprisals against the hostages.

2. The following is *Statement by the President of the United States* at 7.00 a.m. est., 25 April, in connection with the attempt to rescue the hostages:

The President: Late yesterday, I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive there since 4 November.

Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refuelling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities

¹ See pp. 519-520, *supra*.

² See p. 519, *infra*.

was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our Embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interest and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties, but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now. We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Thank you very much.

3. The following is a text of the *Report by the United States to the Security Council pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations*:

25 April 1980.

His Excellency, Mr. Porfirio Munoz Ledo,
President of the Security Council,
The United Nations.

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I am submitting for your information and that of the members of the Security Council the enclosed statement made early this morning by President Carter concerning the termination of a mission of 24 April 1980 aimed at the rescue of the American hostages unlawfully held by Iran since the forcible seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. That mission was carried out by the United States in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence with the aim of extricating American nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our Embassy.

Sincerely,

Donald F. McHENRY.

Attachment: Statement by President Carter.

4. The following is text of *Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on 25 April 1980*:

I have a short statement, which I will read and then General Jones and I will answer your questions.

As you know by now, we ordered last night the cancellation of an operation in Iran that was under way to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The President has already provided the general background. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are prepared to add some more detail.

Let me say at the outset that we can all be proud of the brave men who undertook this mission. They conducted themselves with skill and courage. And we're filled with sorrow for the eight men who gave their lives trying to rescue their fellow Americans.

Let me give you a brief summary of events before we take your questions:

On the late evening and early morning of 24 and 25 April Iran time, approximately 90 US military personnel, together with the air crews, embarked on an operation to prepare for rescue of the US citizens held hostage in Iran.

The eight helicopters and associated transport aircraft were en route to a remote landing site, 200 miles from Tehran, in the Iranian desert, that was to be used for refuelling—and on that map we've circled in black roughly the area to which I'm referring.

Depending upon the success of that and other steps, a later decision was to have been made as to whether to proceed with the actual rescue attempt.

Because we knew the long and arduous trip would tax the capacity of the helicopters, we added redundancy to assure that we could continue if some of them became unusable.

Two of the helicopters experienced problems en route. One landed in the desert and its crew was picked up by another helicopter, which then proceeded forward to the refuelling point. The second helicopter had difficulties, reversed course, and landed aboard the carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea.

Upon arrival at the desert landing site a third helicopter experienced a severe hydraulic malfunction which put it out of commission.

The operation plan provided for termination of the mission if there were less

than six helicopters operational at this point. Therefore, we decided to call off the remainder of the operation and to extract all of the personnel.

As the aircraft were preparing to depart—and this, of course, was in complete darkness—a helicopter and a C-130 aircraft collided. Both immediately caught fire. Eight of our men were killed; four others suffered burns.

To insure the safe evacuation of the rest of the party, the commander on the scene directed his men to leave the helicopters and depart on the remaining C-130's. This left behind the four functioning helicopters, the helicopter that had experienced the hydraulic malfunction and the burning wreckage of one helicopter and one C-130.

No Iranian military forces were encountered at any point during the mission. However, approximately 50 Iranian civilians, who were passing by in a bus at about the time the first C-130 landed, were detained at the site.

When the decision was made to terminate the rescue effort, all the civilians were allowed to depart unharmed.

As you can see from this description, the mission was complex and difficult. But it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself that it was operationally feasible. This judgment was reached after a thorough assessment, which included many practice exercises.

Our plan was carefully conceived and the training was exhaustive. The plan provided for the possibility of terminating the operation because of any difficulties, such as mechanical failure or detection by the Iranians of the mission.

The flight to the assembly point and the refuelling itself had been carried out with essential success but, to repeat, we concluded, based on established criteria thoroughly considered earlier, that the number of helicopter failures rendered the chance of subsequent success—reduced that chance to the point that dictated ending the mission.

I think you can understand why we felt that we had to try this difficult operation. In our opinion it represented the best course of action for getting our hostages out of Iran expeditiously. And it was also the course that raised the least risk of harming the Iranian people and the least risk of causing instability in this troubled region.

We're disappointed that the mission failed. We're saddened at the loss of our eight fellow Americans. But let no one doubt our resolve and let no one misunderstand the meaning of these events. We will not rest until we have secured the release of the hostages.

I'll take your questions.

5. Text of a Letter from the President of the United States to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate:

26 April 1980.

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Because of my desire that Congress be informed on this matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Public Law 93-148), I submit this report.

On 24 April 1980, elements of the United States Armed Forces under my direction commenced the positioning stage of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since 4 November 1979, in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for the reasons described below, all these elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities occurred.

The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the

rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was under my overall command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such approval was requested or given because, as described below, the mission was aborted.

Beginning approximately 10.30 a.m. est. on 24 April six US C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.

From approximately 2 to 4 p.m. est. the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refuelling operations and began to prepare for the subsequent phases. During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier *Nimitz*; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters in good operational condition able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refuelling and exit requirements of the operation. When the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States armed forces involved to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, which was preparing to take off, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the United States armed forces remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5.45 p.m. est. and departed from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8.00 p.m. est. on 24 April. No United States armed forces remain in Iran.

The remote desert area was selected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of United States armed forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the presence of United States armed forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission--the only phase that was executed.

At one point during the period in which United States armed forces elements were on the ground at the desert landing site a bus containing 44 Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United States armed forces until their departure, and then released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second vehicle also passed by while United States armed forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the second vehicle which then escaped across the desert. Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision to terminate the mission.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue phase of the operation had been commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They were

all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them. I share with the nation the highest respect and appreciation for the ability and bravery of all who participated in the mission.

To the families of those who died and who were injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused no Iranian casualties.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in section 8 (D) (1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

Sincerely,

Jimmy CARTER.
